Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Anatoly V. Torkunov, eds.. White Spots--Black Spots: Difficult Matters in Polish-Russian Relations, 1918-2008.. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015. 682 pp. $65.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8229-4440-9.

Reviewed by Patryk Babiracki

Published on H-Diplo (May, 2016)

Commissioned by Seth Ofenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

Much of the carnage and contestation in the these issues did not exist as a subject of conversa‐ twentieth century involved Russia/the USSR and tion or debate. "Black spots" are the dark histori‐ , states and societies that have inherited cal events which have been, and in some cases mutual animosity and distrust from earlier cen‐ are, spoiling Polish-Russian relations. The book's turies of great-power rivalry and imperial strife. title is brilliant: it captures the contradictory rela‐ It may not be surprising that publicists, politi‐ tionship between national cultures and histori‐ cians, and historians from the two countries ographies, but it expresses it in the language of rarely see the past eye-to-eye. Remarkably, a metaphors that and Russians very much group of eminent Russian and Polish historians share. and members of the tellingly named Polish-Rus‐ Yet divisions between Poles and Russians also sian Group for Difcult Matters embarked on a shaped the very process that led to the publica‐ common project that aims to examine the sorest tion of this book. The twists and turns of politics spots in Polish-Russian relations in the twentieth in each country impeded the work of the Polish- century. The result of that efort is a pioneering Russian Group for Difcult Matters: the group volume of collected essays edited by two scholars was established in 2002, dissolved shortly there‐ and former diplomats, Adam Rotfeld and Anatoly after, reactivated in 2008 only to face new chal‐ Torkunov, titled White Spots--Black Spots. Diffi‐ lenges caused by the Russian aggression on cult Matters in Polish-Russian Relations, in 2014-215, a crisis that resulted in the 1918-2008 (it was published simultaneously in resignation of Adam Rotfeld, the group's co-chair Polish and in Russian in 2010). "White spots" refer on the Polish side in December 2015. Another hur‐ to those moments in the Russian-Polish past that dle was the conficting sensibilities among histori‐ were taboo under communism; much like a terra ans. Within the group of Russian and Polish schol‐ incognita marked as a white blotch on a map, ars who embarked on the project, "there were not H-Net Reviews so many contradictions or major diferences over archival access in Poland and Russia today. The facts. There was more emotion, which stemmed volume also includes two appendices, one featur‐ from a lack of desire or willingness to listen to or ing "Reports on Sessions of the Group on Difcult to hear what the other party had to say" (p. 4). The Matters," and the other, "The Letter of the Co- group's chief goal was to "support state institu‐ Chairs of the Group on Difcult Matters to the For‐ tions," largely by drawing "recommendations," in eign ministers of Poland and Russia." addressing problems that prevent a development The book breaks new ground in departing of Polish-Russian "partnerlike relations based on from the forms of scholarly collaboration that truth and mutual respect" (p. 5). References to characterized much of the twentieth century. Be‐ "truth" and "the truth" come up often in the book-- tween the two world wars, scientifc contacts especially the latter may surprise some readers, among humanists and social scientists from the or even make them smile. It might be worth not‐ two countries were sparse, refecting tensions be‐ ing, therefore, that unlike in the West, where post- tween the newly independent Poland and the World War II philosophy and historiography ac‐ nascent Soviet Union. And after World War II, tively sought to challenge all epistemological cer‐ scholars who chose to work on Soviet-Polish rela‐ titudes by emphasizing the "constructedness" of tions had to publish vapid accounts and sterile social realities and by relentlessly "deconstruct‐ document collections that supported the state- ing" narratives and myths, the term retained its sanctioned narrative about "brotherly Soviet as‐ lease on life in countries where totalitarian gov‐ sistance" to Poland and "friendship and coopera‐ ernments distorted and denied history to its peo‐ tion" between the two states and peoples. Histori‐ ples. ans in both countries who wanted to be truthful The volume is organized in ffteen parts, and to their craft often worked on more remote peri‐ each part features two chapter-length contribu‐ ods of the past or on histories of distant locations; tions, one from a Polish and one from a Russian working on the nature of monarchy in medieval author. The parts proceed largely chronologically Poland, religious dissent in early modern Europe, and cover Poland's relations with revolutionary or the economy of Southeast Asia also enabled Russia in 1917-21 (part 1), "The Interwar Period" them to speak to present-day concerns through (part 2), "The Causes of World War II" (part 3), analogies, and thus avoid direct confict with the "Poland between the Soviet Union and Germany, censors. Anyone wishing to engage in genuine ex‐ 1939-1941" (part 4), "The " (part 5), ploration of contemporary history had to publish "World War II, 1941-45" (part 6), "The Postwar abroad or underground. Decade, 1945-1955" (part 7), "The Thaw," that is, Against that historiographic backdrop, the the changes in Polish-Soviet relations that fol‐ frst thing that stands out in White Spots--Black lowed the death of Joseph Stalin (part 8), "The Dis‐ Spots is the openly voiced Polish and Russian dif‐ sident Movement" (part 9), and "The Soviets and ferences of perspective on particular issues. Many the Polish Crisis," that is, the Solidarity movement historians in both countries have ostensibly been that led to the imposition of martial law in De‐ invested in the pursuit of long-obscured factual cember, 1981 (part 10). Parts 11, 13, and 14 exam‐ information (as opposed to Western-style narra‐ ine the way that postcommunist transformations tive history); it is interesting to see, therefore, that shaped Polish-Russian relations in the economy, in juxtaposing the Russian and Polish accounts politics ,and culture. Part 12, "Assistance or Ex‐ the volume brings out the contrasting narratives. ploitation?" is a thematic section devoted to Pol‐ Polish authors tend to focus on Poland's struggle ish-Soviet economic relations. Part 15 ("Heritage to maintain independence or autonomy, some‐ in Archives") examines problems related to

2 H-Net Reviews times against the odds, and often against the Rus‐ Bolshevik declarations of support for Polish au‐ sian/Soviet eforts to dominate Poland. Several tonomy as mere lip service, belied by the Bolshe‐ Russian accounts stress the strategic signifcance viks' exclusive cooperation with the Polish radical of Poland to Russian/Soviet national interests and Left, Matveyev has no doubts that the Bolsheviks Poland's relatively privileged position within the were serious. He cites vague proclamations of the historical Russian empire and the Soviet sphere of Bolsheviks and the Petrograd division of the So‐ infuence, as well as the inability of Polish politi‐ cial Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland cal elites to respond to the admittedly complex in‐ and Lithuania (a radical leftist party closely tied ternational circumstances and especially to the to the Bolsheviks) as "indirect" proof that the Bol‐ constructive initiatives from the Bolshevik/Soviet sheviks did not regard the Kingdom of Poland as leaders. an integral part of the new Russia (p. 37). The opening part, titled "The Beginnings: Pol‐ The facts presented and the narratives them‐ ish-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921," illustrates the selves, for the most part, complement each other contrasting choices of framing. The Polish au‐ well. What sets them apart is the authors' rela‐ thors, Daria and Tomasz Nałęcz (both historians tionship to the historical actors: the historians' and leftist politicians), depict a precarious rebirth diferent levels of trust in Piłsudski's or the Bol‐ of an independent Poland amidst the turmoil of sheviks' good intentions, and the scholars' willing‐ World War I, the Russian revolutions, and the ness to explain, at greater or lesser length, what Russian civil war. They argue that despite some each of these players had to contend with to appearances, notably statements of the Bolshe‐ achieve their goals. viks, independent Poland had no substantial sup‐ Part 2, titled "The Interwar Period: Poland port among any signifcant Russian political and the Soviet Union in the Late 1920s and early grouping. That forced Józef Piłsudski, Poland's 1930s," involves even more divergent evaluations chief of state, to carry out a pre-emptive strike of this tense period in Polish-Soviet relations. The against Bolshevik Russia, which led to the Polish- essay by Wojciech Materski ('s Institute Bolshevik war of 1919-20 and to Poland's acquisi‐ for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sci‐ tion of new territories to the east--lands that had ences) shows Polish diplomats bending over back‐ once belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Common‐ wards to avoid direct confrontation with either of wealth, and that would now form a bufer zone the two neighboring states--the increasingly mili‐ against communist Russia. tant Nazi Germany and the interchangeably de‐ Compare this to the account of these events ceitful, divisive, and unresponsive USSR. In his es‐ by Gennady F. Matveyev, a senior historian at the say, Aleksandr V. Revyakin (Moscow State Insti‐ Moscow State University. Unlike the Nałęcz duo, tute for International Relations, or MGIMO) does he spends considerable time discussing the dilem‐ the opposite, showing the obstructionist Polish mas of the imperial Russian government concern‐ leaders as ultimately responsible for the failure to ing the "Polish question." On the one hand, the work out a long-lasting modus operandi. Russian elites understood that nothing short of One of the most contentious issues in Soviet- granting the Poles full independence would satis‐ Polish relations is the history of World War II, and fy the Poles; on the other hand, they feared pro‐ as many as four sections of the book are devoted voking Germany into war and also setting a prece‐ to the subject. In part 6, "World War II, 1941-1945: dent for other nationalities within the empire, Politics and Its Consequences," the distance be‐ which would then lead to the break-up of the im‐ tween the Polish and the Russian scholars' under‐ perial state. Whereas the Polish historians see the standing of the war is the greatest. In his contri‐

3 H-Net Reviews bution to that section Wojciech Materski tells a terests of Poland" (p. 297). Key in that afair was, story of Soviet exploitation of Polish weaknesses of course, the discovery of the Katyn murder in through deception and force to expand territory April 1943. Acting insulted, Stalin broke of diplo‐ and gain infuence over the country--starting with matic relations with the Polish government after the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of August, the latter requested the International Red Cross to 199 and Soviet invasion of Poland in September, investigate that Soviet crime; however, 1939, to the Soviet use of its strategic advantages Parsadanova suggests that "both parties" were re‐ vis-a-vis the Allies to impose a puppet government sponsible for the break, because both "escalated" in Poland after the war. the situation (p. 295). The resulting statement fails A very diferent story emerges from the essay to spell out the fact that the the Soviets were con‐ by Valentina Parsadanova, a veteran scholar of strained by the very crime they committed. In this Soviet-Polish relations based at the Institute for account, Stalin then kindly accedes to the requests Slavic Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. of the Polish communist emigrés to the USSR, Parsadanova puts forth a number of other theses who, boosted by recent Red Army victories "start‐ that question that account (and much Western ed their activities in 1943 by establishing a patri‐ historiography). As is well known, shortly after otic nongovernmental organization, the Union of Adolf Hitler's attack on the USSR in June, 1941, Polish Patriots (Związek Patriotów Polskich, or Stalin allowed the formation of a Polish army in ZPP)" (p. 297). Characteristically, Materski down‐ the USSR, which was subordinate to the anti-Sovi‐ plays the signifcance of ZPP's founding date by et Polish Government-in-Exile and headed by Gen. noting that it "merely marked the crowning of a Władysław Anders. While Materski emphasizes process initiated in 1942. It was then that the con‐ that General Anders withdrew the Polish army viction had started growing in the Soviet Union from the USSR via Iran due to the harsh condi‐ that the Red Army was likely to enter Central Eu‐ tions in which it was forced to form (heavily un‐ rope frst and be able to dictate its future" (p. 277). derequipped, and lacking leadership, since most Perhaps the subject of the Warsaw Uprising of of the Polish ofcer corps had been murdered by August, 1944 brings out the starkest contrasts be‐ the Soviets in Katyn), Parsadanova mentions no tween the two accounts. Here, too, despite difer‐ such problems and instead, characterizes General ent emphasis, the two authors would agree on Anders's withdrawal from the USSR as "the largest several key facts. The crux of the diference, how‐ mistake the Polish government made during the ever, is moral responsibility for the 200,000 dead. war" (p. 234). Stalin's formation of Soviet-spon‐ Stalin should not be held responsible for the hu‐ sored military units in the USSR are presented not man losses of the Warsaw Uprising: "Was it he as part of his consistent efort to gain control over who had planned and organized the uprising?" this strategically important country, an uncontro‐ Parsadanova asks. Her response: the responsibili‐ versial explanation both in Polish and in Western ty for the "deaths of two hundred thousand peo‐ historiography, but rather as a logical outcome of ple in Warsaw rests on those Polish politicians that Polish mistake. Parsadanova's piece includes who masterminded the uprising and urged Poles statements and equivocations that echo the Soviet to fght without coordination with the Soviet com‐ era. Consider the thesis that "the break in rela‐ mand" (p. 304). The Warsaw Uprising has been a tions between the Soviet Union and the Polish major black spot in Soviet-Polish relations from government [in-exile] severely limited the Soviet the outset. It has also been a near-sacred event in Union's ability to support the ‘underground state’ Polish culture; most Poles would not doubt Stalin's with diplomatic instruments, while maintaining complicity in the afair; historians or public fg‐ its own interpretation of the national and state in‐ ures who dared to question the decision to stage

4 H-Net Reviews the uprising in August 1944 have been few ble yet deep commitment to Marxist ideology, and (among them was the notoriously outspoken for‐ identifcation of security with territory as a sine mer minister of foreign afairs Radosław Sikorski, qua non of international confict. Most historians who in 2011 criticized the leaders of the Home in the West would also be less likely to take Stal‐ Army for lack of "political imagination and irre‐ in's word as a reliable barometer of his thinking. sponsibility"[1]). Parsadanova's criticism it is not Yet, despite such interpretive chasms, the vol‐ without merit, for it is certainly debatable ume ofers surprises to those who expect only a whether the uprising, undertaken, as Materski re‐ Polish-Russian blame game and a war of words. minds us, suddenly "and based on assumptions Natalia S. Lebedeva (Institute of History, Russian that had not been fully verifed" (p. 282), was Academy of Sciences) discusses the Katyn murder worth the sacrifce of so many people, particular‐ without mincing words. She carefully examines ly the civilians. But Parsadanova's point feels the decisions that led to the crime, showing also clumsy, too, in its efort to exculpate Stalin alto‐ "how the Soviet leaders (for a half of century) gether, as though responsibility for the bloodbath tried to deny their responsibility for Katyn's exe‐ could not be--and was not--shared. Certainly, too, cution and instead incriminate Nazi Germany" (p. her argument does little to convey the agonizing 246). She also highlights the importance of the dilemma of the Polish leaders whose choice was Polish communist state in suppressing the memo‐ either to wait to be liberated by the Soviets, an op‐ ry of Katyn, and the key role of various Soviet and tion tantamount to political and military neutral‐ Russian citizens in the process of revealing the ization, or to risk being decimated by the Ger‐ truth--thus reminding us that the division into ve‐ mans. racity and falsehood did not always overlap neat‐ Finally, Parsadanova quickly dismisses Stal‐ ly with the Curzon line. Aleksandr V. Revyakin, al‐ in's unresponsiveness to the Allies' ofers to sup‐ though emphatically critical of interwar Polish port the rebels with air drops, on the grounds that diplomats, also fnds that "the perception of the proposal was pure propaganda. But although Poland was infuenced by some stable phobias of the Russian scholar describes Stalin at one point Soviet diplomacy in the 1920s and 1930s" (p. 81). understatedly as "a controversial and notorious One would wish that Polish historians recognized person" (p. 303), she also appears to trust and more often another important nuance of Soviet- somehow understand him the most: Stalin, she Polish relationship. It is up to the Russian histori‐ writes, "who changed his opinion about the air‐ an to bring it into the discussion, though: quoting drops, believed that the best and most efective the Hungarian writer Sándor Márai, Noskova re‐ way to help the anti-Nazi Poles would be to crush minds us that the Red Army soldiers could not the Germans at Warsaw and liberate it for the bring freedom to Eastern Europe, because they Poles" (p. 304). That uncritical approach to Stalin themselves did not have any. is a serious faw of Parsadanova's essay. Similar My favorite part of the book is part 9 because beneft of the doubt is also detectable in the con‐ it reminds us that sectors of Polish and Soviet so‐ tributions by Mikhail M. Narinsky (MGIMO) and cieties shared commitment to certain universal Albina F. Noskova (Russian Academy of Sciences), values such as beauty and freedom--and that they which portray the Soviet leader as a well-wishing pursued them together. Polish writer Jerzy Pomi‐ rational statesman largely responsive to Polish anowski and Russian diplomat Andrei V. Voroby‐ and Western actions. It is worth noting that this ov together with historian and leftist political ac‐ view contrasts with orthodox and postrevisionist tivist Aleksandr V. Shubin (one of the younger Western historiography of the Cold War, which contributors to the volume, born in 1965) trace sees Stalin, with his suspicious personality, fexi‐

5 H-Net Reviews the mutual cultural infuences between the two one's "other" with an open mind than about countries in the postwar era. They show just how combing through factual data in the expectation aware sections of elites in both countries were of that one kind of indubitable truth might eventual‐ each other, how they felt inspired by each others' ly emerge. cultures and histories, particularly in the strug‐ This wonderful book is a must for scholars gles to challenge the status quo. Pomianowski re‐ and graduate students of Russian and East Euro‐ calls how, "at a time when Soviet advisors--the pean history, who will, no doubt, also consult the likes of Dmitry Wozniesienski and Antoni Skul‐ fully annotated Polish or Russian version. Those baszewski--reigned supreme in the Polish secret in the English-speaking world outside the feld service, Russian literary classics saved Poles from will appreciate this book as a research resource sinking into russophobia" (p. 410). Vorobyov and and an extended introduction to the intertwined Shubin tell a story of how Polish opposition move‐ histories of the two states and societies, and a re‐ ments provided models for Soviet dissidents. lationship of key importance to modern European These gestures of empathy and common explo‐ past. Anyone interested in methodology of history rations of a shared but little-known past are sig‐ will appreciate the book's polyphonic cadences, nifcant because they show that underneath the which provoke questions about the links between white spots and the black spots in Russian-Polish past and present, writing and truth, as well as his‐ relations lay complicated narratives that ft un‐ tory and politics. That such a collaborative book easily into a misleadingly natural antinomy be‐ appeared with the support of Polish and Russian tween the hokey communist narratives about governments is certainly a great achievement. friendship of the peoples, and those that center on Alas, it is a pity that state patronage for similar eternal struggle and irreconcilable diferences be‐ projects is unlikely to be found in Jarosław tween Poles and Russians. Kaczyński's Poland or in Vladimir Putin's Russia. But a question remains: what about those That is because in both countries the ruling elites tenacious diferences? The question must not be ever more frequently derive strength from the dismissed, because it cuts to the raison d'etre of new divisions they create, and not from the dia‐ this book and many others that have been (and logue they open up; because they use history to will be) written about complicated issues in inter‐ political ends and not as an instrument of recon‐ national relations. Though they refer without dis‐ ciliation; and because they claim monopoly on comfort to "the truth" in the context of state-soci‐ historical truth while stigmatizing alternative ety relations in communist Eastern Europe, the points of view. editors of White Spots--Black Spots are hardly Note naive: they also know that in the context of Pol‐ [1]. Newseek Polska, July 31, 2011, http://pols‐ ish-Russian relations no such thing as "the truth" ka.newsweek.pl/sikorski-zhanbil-pamiec-powsta‐ really exists. How can it? Scholars who write his‐ nia--radni-pis-przed-1-sierpnia,80291,1,1.html. tory of the subject often do not share "national memories" or "mentalities and cultures," and are heirs to "diferent schools of methodology in his‐ torical research;" moreover, they sometimes be‐ long to diferent generations, and have diferent levels of access to archival documents (p. ix). By giving the authors "full freedom to present their points of view" (p. ix), Rotfeld and Torkunov rec‐ ognized that truth here is more about confronting

6 H-Net Reviews

If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-diplo

Citation: Patryk Babiracki. Review of Rotfeld, Adam Daniel; Torkunov, Anatoly V., eds. White Spots--Black Spots: Difficult Matters in Polish-Russian Relations, 1918-2008.. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. May, 2016.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=44893

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

7