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Security Implications of the Virtualized Datacenter

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Security Implications of the Virtualized Datacenter F5 WHITE PAPER - BY ALAN MURPHY - F5 TECHNICAL MARKETING MANAGER, SECURITY SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE VIRTUALIZED DATACENTER Introduction The concepts behind application and operation system virtualization are not new concepts, they have been around long before server appliances and desktop PCs were readily available in our daily vocabulary. The recent rate of virtualization adoption however, especially that of software operating system virtualization, has grown exponentially in the past few years. “Data does not leak According to Joe Tucci, the CEO at EMC®, most VMware® customers are planning on across virtual machines virtualizing 50% of their IT infrastructure within the next three years2. Virtual machines and applications can have fi nally come into their own, and are quickly moving into the enterprise data center and only communicate becoming a universal tool for all people and groups within IT departments everywhere. over confi gured So what exactly is a virtual machine? VMware defi nes a virtualization as “an abstraction network connections.” layer that decouples the physical hardware from the operating system...”3 Today, we 1 commonly think of virtual machines within the scope of one hardware platform running - vmware.com multiple software operating systems. Most often this concept is implemented in the form of one operating system on one hardware box (the host platform) running multiple independent operating systems on virtual hardware platforms in tandem (the guests). Platform virtualization usually relies on full hardware segmentation: allowing individual guest platforms to use specifi c portions of the physical host hardware without confl icting or impacting the host platform. For example, even though guest operating systems require the same CPU and RAM access that the host system requires, the guests use different hardware locations and addresses than the host. This allows the host and guest(s) to run in tandem without stepping on top of each other. There are two primary types of platform virtualization: transparent and host-aware (often referred to as paravirtualization). Transparent virtualization is implemented so that the guest is not aware that it’s running in a virtualized state. The guest consumes resources as if it were natively running on the hardware platform, oblivious to the fact that it’s being managed by an additional component, called the VMM (Virtual Machine Monitor), or hypervisor. The more standard forms of virtualization today, such as those by VMware, implement transparent hypervisor systems. These systems can be thought of as proxies: the hypervisor will transparently proxy all communication between the guest and the host hardware, hiding its existence from the guest so the guest believes it’s the only system running on that hardware. Host-aware implementations differ in that the guest has some form of virtualized knowledge built into the kernel; these can be considered “virtual self-aware” environments. There is some portion of the guest operating system kernel that knows about the existence of the hypervisor and communicates with it directly. Rather than transparent proxying of all communication, the guest OS will call the hypervisor directly, which will in turn manage the communication to the hardware. Xen (pronounced ‘zen’), a popular virtualization implementation for Linux, uses a host- aware architecture, requiring special hypervisor command code actively running in both the host and all running virtualized guests. Each form of virtualization comes with pros and cons, but both work equally as well. Transparent systems are the most portable for the guest, but sacrifi ce speed and are typically designed around much heavier hypervisors; host-aware systems are faster and more lightweight, but require guest modifi cations and can introduce security issues that transparent systems may not suffer from. One of the driving factors in virtualization adoption is the open nature of hardware support for VMMs: Hardware platforms, which run and manage the primary host operating system, and the VMM are not specialized devices or appliances. Virtual host platforms can be any type of hardware that used today: single CPU desktop machines; laptops; x86 servers; SPARC servers; rack mounted appliances; etc. A normal user running Microsoft® Windows® XP Professional on their laptop can run multiple virtual instances of other operating systems—such as Linux, BSD, or Windows Vista— using any number of freely available VMM software implementations. This fl exibility, the move of virtualization software to everyday hardware, has allowed everyone direct and inexpensive access to run virtualized environments. While at fi rst this access was relegated to technology professionals, such as Unix users who were required to run Windows as their base OS, it has quickly become the topic of IT managers. Platform virtualization provides an inexpensive mechanism to substantially expand server farms and data centers. Virtualization allows a company to purchase one high- end hardware device to run 20 virtual operating systems instead of purchasing 20 commoditized lower-end devices, one for each single operating platform. Virtualized Threat Vectors The benefi ts of virtualization are obvious: more bang for your buck. But everything has a pro/con list, and virtualization is no exception. The pro column is a large one, allowing progress and fl exibility for multiple projects and environments. But the con list isn’t so obvious. What could be bad about running 20 servers for the price of one? Although by no means considered to be a large threat today, security of virtual machines and environments is typically not considered, not because the security of these implementations is a technological mystery, but because it is generally an unknown vector by the groups that are implementing wide-spread virtualization. In other words, virtualization is usually implemented with no specifi c regard to the new security risks it brings. On the surface, a virtualized BSD guest carries with it the same security threats and issues that a real, single-device copy has, and this is mostly correct. However the glaring difference is that extra management layer: the hypervisor. The 1 F5 WHITE PAPER SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE VIRTUALIZED DATACENTER hypervisor, is in effect, another operating system that manages the communication between the host OS and the guest OS. Rather than worrying about a single BSD implementation on a single device, administrators now have to worry about the security of three operating environments. For example, if you harden the virtual BSD guest installation, but leave the host and VMM unaddressed, then you are ignoring critical components. If the host is compromised, then security on the guest devices is irrelevant. While the hypervisor is the “Master Controller Program” of virtualization, it isn’t the only virtualized abstraction layer that carries with it implied security risks. Another critical piece to any virtualization system is the networking layer. Different virtualization software platforms have different methods for building and handling networking between the guest and the host, ranging from the more basic, generic network emulation of Qemu4 through VMware’s extremely sophisticated, and proprietary, software switching platform. Often accepted as “just working,” virtualized networking should be considered one of the most critical areas of security research for virtual machines and environments. Unlike hardware network devices, a software-based network brings with it security issues that typically are not seen in hardware. For example, until recently VMware’s guest networking subsystem functioned in “hub only” mode, meaning multiple guest instances on the same physical host within the same software network domain had open and free access to all network data shared within that domain. It was a standard hub implemented via software. If two guests were both a member of the same host-only network and shared the same virtual interface, both machines could see all traffi c between the host and guest. This is still true today for VMware’s bridge mode confi guration, where all guests map to the same physical network devices. And although there are barriers for more robust confi gurations, such as using multiple VMware software networking devices (known as vmnet0, vmnet1, vmnet2, etc.), their entire network management subsystem still exists in software. Using multiple virtual network interfaces to segment traffi c equates to plugging two machines into the same switch, each with unique subnets yet neither segmented by VLANs. VMware is also a great example of where software network security development is rapidly moving ahead. Having created a very robust software switching network in more recent enterprise releases, VWware is moving towards full software-only segmentation of virtual switching from layer 2 VLANs through layer 4 routing. Figure 1 shows a VMware ESX Virtual Switch (vSwitch0) with multiple virtual VLAN segments. As the diagram shows, ‘vm_oracle’ and ‘vm_sharepoint’ are on separate VLANs, but both networks are part of the same virtual switch and traffi c fl ows through the same physical network card. But even with these security-minded advances, software switching still carries a greater risk than hardware. Unlike a real networked environment where proximity is usually a substantial barrier to attack, all guests on one host share the same software stack across all other guests and the hosts. Network stack sharing is a key issue
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