Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice Author(S): Thomas C

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Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice Author(S): Thomas C American Economic Association Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice Author(s): Thomas C. Schelling Reviewed work(s): Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety- Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1984), pp. 1-11 Published by: American Economic Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1816322 . Accessed: 15/12/2011 13:46 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Economic Review. http://www.jstor.org RICHARDT. ELYLECTURE Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice By THOMASC. SCHELLING* An increasingly familiar occurrence for conflict, if, say, the husband disagreeswith obstetriciansis being asked by patients to the physician in the delivery room about withhold anesthesia during delivery. The what his wife really wants. physicianoften proposes that a facemaskbe put beside the patient who may inhale ni- I. AnticipatorySelf-Command trous oxide as she needs it. But some de- terminedpatients ask that no such opportu- This obstetricalexample, though special in nity be provided:if gas is availablethey will certain respects, is not a bad paradigmfor use it, and they want not to be able to. the general anomaly of anticipatory self- The requestis interestingfor decision the- command. That is the phenomenon that I ory, and raises questions of ethics, policy, want to discuss-that a person in evident and physician responsibility, even if the possessionof her facultiesand knowingwhat woman is merely making a mistake-if she she is talking about will rationally seek to simply does not know how painfullabor will prevent,to compel, or to alter her own later be and how glad she will be, even in retro- behavior-to restricther own options in vio- spect, if the pain is relieved.But some wom- lation of what she knows will be her prefer- en who make this request have had earlier ence at the time the behavioris to take place. deliveriesduring which they demandedanes- It is not a phenomenonthat fits easily into a thesia and received it. They are acquainted discipline concerned with rational decision, with the pain. They anticipate asking for revealed preference, and optimization over relief. And they want it withheldwhen they time. do. They expect to regret afterwardsany Attempting to overrule one's own pref- recourseto anesthesia. erencesis certainlyexceptional, as consumer This particularinstance of attemptedself- behavior goes, but not so exceptional that denial has featuresthat are specialbut many anyone who reads this is unfamiliarwith it. that are common.The womanis, so far as we Let me remindyou of some of those behav- know, in good health physically and men- iors that sharewith obstetricalanesthesia the tally. She anticipatesa transientperiod when characteristicthat a person may requestnow her usual values and preferenceswill be sus- that a later requestbe denied. Please do not pended or inaccessible.She has reasons for give me a cigarette when I ask for it, or wanting to frustrateher own wishes at the dessert, or a second drink. Do not give me criticaltime. She needs cooperation.She may my car keys. Do not lend me money. Do not ratify her choice afterward by expressing lend me a gun. herself grateful that no anesthesia was Besides denial there are interventions.Do offered,even when requested.There are ethi- not let me go back to sleep. Interruptme if I cal dilemmasand legal issues, and there is get in an argument.Push me out of the plane when it's my turn to parachute.Don't let me *LuciusN. LittauerProfessor of PoliticalEconomy, go home drunk unless you can remove my HarvardUniversity, Cambridge, MA 02138. I am grate- childrento a safe place. Blow the fuse if you ful to the Russell Sage Foundationand the Alfred P. Sloan Foundationfor support and encouragementin catch me watching television. Make me get this work. up and do my back exercisesevery morning. I 2 A EA PA PERS A ND PROCEEDINGS MA Y 1984 Keep me moving if I am exhausted in the Professionaldiscussion of suicideindicates wilderness.Pump my stomach if you catch that anticipationof changing preferencesis me overdosedwith sleepingpills. common. There are two symmetricalcases Then there is restructuringof incentives, here. One is preventingsuicide when a per- often with somebody's help. Wagers serve son has asked for protectionagainst his own this purpose, and are often used by people determinationduring periods when he un- who share an interestin losing weight. Con- mistakablyprefers to be dead. The other is fessing somethingincriminating that can be the contrary,being begged to expeditesome- revealed in the event of a lapse, or just one's departurein the event of some ghastly making a ceremonialdisplay of determina- condition, even if the condition is accompa- tion to exerciseor to stay off cigarettes,can nied by such horrorof dying that he will beg threatenoneself with shame. us to perpetuatethat horror in violation of Most of the tacticsused to commandone's our earlierpromise. There is also the person own future performanceprobably do not who elects death but cannot face the finality depend on someone else's participation.I of bringingit about, and, like the parachutist mentionedsome that do, partly for compari- who asks to be shoved out if he grips the son with the obstetricalexample, partly be- door jam, implores our help in getting him cause our experiencewith purely individual over the brink. efforts is usually restrictedto our own and Legal issues arise in some attempts to we are unawareof the effortsof othersunless abdicate rights that are deemed to be a need for cooperationmakes them visible. inalienable.I cannot get a court injunction Further,the legal, ethical, and policy issues against my own smoking. I cannot contract arise mainlywhen a second party is enlisted. with a skydivingpilot to push me out of the And these are the cases that appear to call airplane.I cannot authorizemy psychiatrist for a judgmentabout the ambivalentperson's in advance to have me hospitalizedagainst true interest-which set of preferencesde- my wishes in circumstancesthat we have servesour loyalty or sympathy. agreedon. I cannot contractwith a fat farm The obstetrical case is rich in its ethics to hold me against my will until I have lost and legalities. To which patient is a physi- some numberof pounds; they have to let me cian obligated?The one askingfor anesthesia out when I ask. (If we are clever we can or the one who asked that it be withheld? arrangeit; I go to a remote fat farm that Can the physicianenter a contract that will requiresa 24-hour notice to order a car, a both protect againstmalpractice and compel notice that I can rescind during a moment's compliancewith the woman'searlier prefer- resurgentresolve to lose weight.I have heard ences? Do we like policies that make such that what keeps cruise ships from offering contracts possible; do we like policies that this kind of service is the inability to keep make such contractsvoid? the crew from smuggling extra calories on Physicians,of course,are bound by a pro- board for the black market.) fessionalcode as well as theirpersonal ethics, An interestingissue is the ethics of pro- and are subject to criminal and civil com- hibition-against, say, the display and sale plaints. In the same way, our personalethics of rich dessertsin the facultydining room, or are challengedwhen the drinkingguest who against cigarette smoking in the work- entrusted us with his car keys wants them place-not to keep othersfrom overeatingor back, or snatchesthem and heads for his car. smoking,as is usually the motivationbehind Ourethics are even challengedwhen he didn't prohibitions,but to keep ourselvesfrom suc- ask but we know he intended not to drive cumbing and to reduce the pain of tempta- himself home, he has a momentaryalcoholic tion. There is a legal test in Massachusetts confidencein his drivingability, he will cer- now of whethernicotine addictionis a pro- tainly thank us tomorrowif we disable his tected species of handicapand a person has car, but he demands now that we let him a right to relief through smoking in the alone. workplace. VOL. 74 NO. 2 RICHARD T. ELYLECTURE 3 The most serious cases are those that in- an ostensiblyvoluntary enforceable commit- volve, one way or another, actively or pas- ment. The polygraphis a current example. sively, taking your own life-one of your Sterilizationis another. selves takingthe life that you share.The law Many heroin addicts are alcoholics.Meth- takes sides with the self that will not die. adone is legally available for some heroin Someonewho lives in perpetualterror of his addicts; it replaces the need for heroin. own suicidal tendencies can welcome the Antabuse is legally availablefor alcoholics; law's sanctions against people whom he it interactswith alcohol to produce extreme might, during a passing depression,beg to nausea, and precludesdrinking. Methadone help with suicide. People for whom life has is attractive-at least in the absence of become unbearablebut who cannot summon heroin-but antabuse is unattractivewhen the resolve to end it have the law against alcohol is available.Some therapistsprovide them in their efforts to recruit accomplices. the methadone only after the patient has In Decembera Californiajudge ruledagainst taken the antabuse in the presence of the a quadriplegicwoman who wished to die and therapist.' asked the hospital's help in starvingherself to death.
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