Inclusive Autonomy a Theory of Freedom for Everyone by Frédéric Côté-Boudreau a Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Program In
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Inclusive Autonomy A Theory of Freedom for Everyone By Frédéric Côté-Boudreau A thesis submitted to the Graduate Program in Philosophy in conformity with the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada May, 2019 Copyright © Frédéric Côté-Boudreau, 2019 Abstract Persons with cognitive disabilities and nonhuman animals are denied the right to make personal choices because it is claimed that they are not autonomous, for autonomy requires the capacity to revise one’s preferences and to have second-order desires. In this thesis, I argue first that this account of autonomy (that I call ‘rational autonomy’) does not provide a satisfying foundation to the right to make personal choices and to the interest in liberty, even for the paradigmatic cases of humans deemed rational agents; second, I propose and develop a new conception, named ‘inclusive autonomy’, that is intended to do justice to rational agents, persons with cognitive abilities, and nonhuman animals. This enquiry involves multiple steps. First, I criticize the way rational autonomy intends to support a right to make personal choices, by arguing it is empirically inaccurate, that it could be perfectionist or elitist if it is deemed as a requirement rather than a value to promote, and that it generally fails to explain why choices that have not been rationally revised cannot be protected by the right in question. Second, I argue that persons with cognitive disabilities and nonhuman animals also possess an interest in liberty, and especially an objective interest in non-domination, and for the same reasons as rational agents. Third, after assessing a few notable alternatives to rational autonomy, I identify four desiderata for a satisfying conception: the balance between the right to take risks and paternalism, the antidomination requirement, the anti-ableist requirement, and the social support requirement. Inclusive autonomy, defined as the ability to form subjectively defined goods, is equipped to address these desiderata if it is further supplied by an account of preference formation and a theory of paternalism. For these reasons, I explain how the structuring of opportunities and the interest in non-domination can help individuals to develop authentic preferences, even when they are unable to revise their desires; and I discuss three provisos—the competence threshold, the social support principle, and the limited intervention requirement—that impose conditions for paternalistic interventions while enabling agents to enjoy autonomy to the greatest extent possible. Key words: autonomy; liberty; rights; interests; animals; cognitive disability; domination; paternalism; adaptive preferences; relational autonomy; ableism; speciesism. ii Acknowledgments This thesis would not have been possible without the significant social support of so many people who invested time, energy, resources, ideas, discussions, trust, patience, encouragement, and friendship in me and in this particular project. I wish to dedicate the fruits of these efforts to all of you individually, and to all of those who I hope can benefit from the following arguments. To Will Kymlicka, who has been an extraordinary supervisor throughout the project. I learned tremendously (in knowledge and skills) in each of our interactions and was deeply motivated and inspired by your own exemplary work on related topics. Thank you for believing in my research and for all of your comments and suggestions that brought my ideas to new levels. To Sue Donaldson, who has been in some way an unofficial supervisor, giving me advice and encouragement on many levels throughout the journey, always sharing with me with illuminating ideas and insights; and for being an outstanding model in balancing academic research and political activism, which I find very inspiring. À mes parents, Guylaine Boudreau et René Côté, pour toutes les façons dont vous m’avez supporté non seulement au cours des périples de ma thèse, mais surtout depuis les tout débuts. Grâce à vous, je réussis à faire ce que j’aime et ce en quoi je crois. À Valéry Giroux, pour avoir été une mentore exceptionnelle dans mon développement intellectuel en faveur de l’antispécisme et pour m’avoir inspiré confiance en ces idées, mais aussi et surtout, pour toute ton inestimable amitié sans laquelle je ne serais pas où je suis. À Christiane Bailey, pour ton enthousiasme toujours contagieux envers la justice et la compassion, pour ton amour des animaux et de la philosophie, et pour ton amitié, ta présence et nos discussions si enrichissantes. iii À Geneviève Côté, pour m’inspirer à chaque jour à la non-violence, pour m’encourager à constamment devenir une meilleure version de moi-même tout en m’accueillant tel que je suis. Merci pour tout cet amour et cette aventure. À Vincent Duhamel, pour nos échanges toujours passionnants et critiques sur tellement de sujets et pour ton précieux support. À Pierre-André Gagnon, pour avoir lu plusieurs parties de ma thèse, pour avoir discuté longuement avec moi de ces idées et de la forme, pour toutes ces heures passées à travailler dans des cafés (même si je n’en bois pas), et bien sûr pour tout le reste aussi. To Dinesh Wadiwel, for hosting me for three months at the University of Sydney where I strengthened key aspects of my research, for opening my eyes to issues I was overlooking, and for our inspirational discussions and all your kindness. To the members of my dissertation committee, Christine Sypnowich and Andrew Lister, for your encouragement in submitting a better thesis and for challenging what deserved to be challenged in order to do so. To Susanne Cliff-Jüngling, for your constant help with the technicalities in submitting the thesis, and generally for your support over the years at the department. To my friends and peers who have helped me in various ways, including Myriam Landry, Noémie Albert, Marie-Noël Gingras-Perron, Lora Zepam, Sophie Lecompte, Martin Gibert, Élise Desaulniers, Renan Larue, Caroline Desrochers, Charlotte Blattner, Omar Bachour, Kyle Johannsen, Zipporah Weisberg, Katherine Wayne, Nga-Yin Tam, Jamie Shaw, Andrew Butler, Syl Kocięda, Laura Davy, Angie Pepper, Jean-Jacques Kona-Boun, Axelle Playoust- Braure, Yves Bonnardel, Marion Demers, Aurélie Girard, Guillaume Thibault, and Jean- Christophe Pagé, François Hudon, among many others. Merci également à Maxime Labelle, Lise Lacroix, Geneviève Laurent, Christian Nadeau, pour vos conseils, votre présence et votre soutien à différents moments de mon parcours. iv This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) in the form of a Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship and a Michael Smith Foreign Study Supplement. Some ideas of Chapter 2 have been rehearsed in the second chapter of my M.A. thesis (Côté- Boudreau 2013, 35-62) and during a talk entitled “Animals and the Problem of Rational Autonomy” given on March 27, 2015, at Queen’s University. Some ideas of the section 3.3.2 have been rehearsed in my M.A. Thesis (Côté-Boudreau 2013, 55-61). Sections 4.1 to 4.3 and section 4.5 were first rehearsed in my M.A. Thesis (Côté-Boudreau 2013, 63-84). Some of the key ideas of the chapter have been presented at conferences, such as “Enabling Autonomy for Animals and People with Cognitive Disabilities”, given at Queen’s University on November 13, 2015 and University of Alberta on June 23, 2016. The basic ideas of Chapter 5 have been rehearsed at my talk “Preference Formation: A Non- Rationalistic and Non-Individualistic Approach” given on September 20, 2016, at the University of Sydney, as well as on June 4, 2018, at the Canadian Philosophical Association 2018 Conference. I want to thank Dinesh Wadiwel and Laura Davy for their comments and discussions and the Canada Graduate Scholarships’ Michael Smith Foreign Study Supplement for the opportunity of pursuing my research on this topic. I also thank Kristin Voigt for organizing the panel on animals and autonomy at the CPA in 2018. Finally, I would like to acknowledge that Queen’s University sits on the traditional territory of the Haudenosaunee and the Anishinaabe. v Table of Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgments iii List of Tables ix List of Abbreviations and Symbols x Chapter 1: Introduction 1 1.1. The Privilege of Autonomy 1 1.2. Of Animals and Cognitive Disability 4 1.3. From Negative to Positive Rights 7 1.4. Key Conceptual Clarifications 12 1.5. Structure of the Project 19 PART 1: THE CASE FOR NON-RATIONAL AGENTS’ AUTONOMY 24 Chapter 2: Rational Autonomy and Personal Choices 25 2.1. Rational Autonomy: Definitions and Functions 26 2.2. Empirical Inaccuracy 32 2.3. Antiperfectionism and Personal Choices 37 2.3.1. Procedural Perfectionism (or Procedural Fetishism) 43 2.3.2. Substantive Perfectionism (or the Elitism of Rationality) 46 2.4. Perfectionism and Personal Choices 51 2.5. Reply to the Objection of Autonomy as a Capacity and as an Implicit Process 55 2.6. Concluding Remarks 63 Chapter 3: The Interest in Liberty 66 3.1. Rational Autonomy and the Interest in Liberty 69 3.2. Liberty of What? 75 3.2.1. The Relationship and the Distinctions between Liberty and Autonomy 76 3.2.2. Extending the Three Conceptions of Liberty 79 3.3. An Objective Interest in Liberty 88 3.3.1. Value Theories 89 vi 3.3.2. Value Theories on Liberty 94 3.3.3. Objective Interests and Antiperfectionism 103 3.4. Recapitulation and Replies 107 3.5. Shifting the Burden of Proof: Two Arguments 112 3.5.1. An Instrumental but Non-specific Interest in Liberty 113 3.5.2. The Empirical Argument of Unequal Status 116 3.6. Conclusion 121 PART 2: DESIGNING AN INCLUSIVE AUTONOMY 123 Chapter 4: Towards an Alternative Account 124 4.1. Regan’s Preference Autonomy 126 4.2.