Extended Producer Responsibility: Examining Global Policy Options

A thesis submitted to the Division of Research and Advanced Studies of the University of Cincinnati Partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Community Planning

In the School of Planning of the College of Design, Architecture, Art, and Planning

2011

By Shannon Quinn Bachelor of Science, The Ohio State University, 2008

Committee Chair: Carla Chifos, Ph.D. Member: Margaret Kupferle, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

Humans have been producing since the beginning of our existence. Since that time we’ve needed to find ways to dispose of the waste that we produce. Our schemes have only increased in sophistication over the years and today we find ourselves posed for another step towards municipal solid waste management modernization. Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) has been presented as one of the potential policy strategies that would usher in this modernization. EPR policy currently exists in varying forms around the world. This thesis investigates EPR policies and programs as they exist or have existed in five countries: Brazil, , Germany, Japan, and South Africa. It delves into the key differences and similarities in these culturally and economically unique nations in order to produce the beginning of a typology that can be used to identify and define the different forms of EPR policy implementation that exist in our world today.

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ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There were many people integral to the completion of this thesis. I would like to especially thank Dr. Carla Chifos for her guidance and wisdom. I would also like to express my gratitude towards Dr. Margaret Kupferle for her willingness to cross academic boundaries and offer her knowledge throughout this process. It is also important that I thank P&G employees Annie Weisbrod, Forbes McDougall and Kai Menzler for introducing me to importance of solid waste management and the existence of Extended Producer Responsibility policy. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Marc Mills and Eric Kleiner at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for their constant willingness to point me in the right direction. Apart from my professional and academic mentors, I cannot forget to thank my wonderful family for supporting me through my academic career. Without their love, encouragement and honest opinions I would not be where I am today. My wonderful mother and father have been my stronghold and my biggest supporters throughout my entire education. Thank you Mom and Dad for always believing in me and teaching me that I can do anything I put my mind to. Finally, I extend a special “gracias” to Alfonso for his patience and unwavering support throughout the past two years as I worked towards the completion of this thesis. I am truly grateful to all of those who have helped me along the way. Thank you.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction, Problem Statement, Research Questions and Objectives…………. 1 Chapter 2: Literature Review…………………………………………………………………11 Chapter 3: Methodology……………………………………………………………………... 22 Chapter 4: Brazil……………………………………………………………………………... 32 Chapter 5: Canada……………………………………………………………………………. 43 Chapter 6: Germany………………………………………………………………………….. 53 Chapter 7: Japan……………………………………………………………………………… 64 Chapter 8: South Africa………………………………………………………………………. 73 Chapter 9: Case Study Conclusions and Key Points………………………….……………… 84 Chapter 10: Findings and Analysis…………………………………………………………… 89 Chapter 11: Conclusions and Future Research………………………………………………. 102 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………...... 111

iv LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 MSW management for England (2007/2008)……………………………………… 3 Figure 1.2 Generation of MSW in the EU in 1995 and 2007………………………………….. 6 Figure 1.3 Management of MSW in Germany……………………………………………….... 7 Figure 3.1 Thesis methodology diagram………………………………………………………. 22 Figure 5.1 Breakdown of the amount of waste diverted, incinerated, and landfilled …………. 45 Figure 6.1 German MSW composition………………………………………………………… 55 Figure 6.2 Management of MSW in Germany……………………………………………….... 56 Figure 6.3 Waste recovery improvements since 1990…………………………………………. 57 Figure 7.1 MSW generation and disposal methods in Japan (2005)…………………………... 66 Figure 8.1 South African ……………………………………………………... 76 Figure 8.2 Recovery rates over time for bags, cans, glass, and PET…………………… 82

v LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Table format outlining the findings for each country………………………………. 29 Table 4.1 Waste disposal method by percent in Brazil………………………………………... 34 Table 4.2 Targets defined for tire take-back program as defined by resolution in Brazil…………………………………………….... 38 Table 7.1 Additional waste-related legislation in Japan……………………………………….. 68 Table 10.1 Summary of key findings based on 13 identified variables………………………... 91 Table 11.1 Actors, incentives and constraints present in EPR policy implementation……….. 105 Table 11.2 EPR typology applied to Brazil, Canada, Germany, Japan and South Africa…….. 107

vi Chapter 1: Introduction, Problem Statement, Research Questions and Objectives

Introduction

Humans have been producing waste in one form or another since the dawn of our existence. In the beginning, the waste we created came in organic forms, whether it was the remnants of the food we ate or the excrement we left behind as we moved across the land hunting and gathering. Over time, the waste that we produced became increasingly incompatible with the systems of our natural surroundings and we were forced to find a systematic way to dispose of it.

Today, human societies (especially developed nations) produce waste composed of very different characteristics than those of our Homo sapien ancestors. Synthetic materials like , , textiles, metals and glass are now present in the municipal solid waste1 streams of countries around the world. The United States, for example, produces 250 million tonnes of solid waste each year and of this waste 31 percent is composed of paper and 33 percent is plastics, textiles, metals and glass (U.S. EPA 2009). Germany and France tell similar stories in their waste composition (although overall they produce much less waste than the U.S.) (OECD

2008). With the production of so much waste, humans are now forced to make conscious decisions about how to dispose of it.

1 Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) – Household (domestic) waste, commercial waste, and institutional waste (McDougall et al. 2002, 2).

1 Waste Disposal Techniques

Each country has its own way of managing the waste that it produces. Several common practices currently exist from which to create a solid waste management (SWM) system.

Commonly used techniques include (OECD 2008):

o Sanitary o Other – including open dumping • Incineration o With energy recovery o Without energy recovery • Recycle//Recovery • • Biogas Recovery

The waste management scheme of a country may rely heavily on one of these disposal methods (as Japan does on incineration) or it may choose to use multiple techniques in order to deal with the type and amount of waste produced (OECD 2008). England is a typical example of using multiple disposal techniques to manage the municipal solid waste (MSW) generated by its inhabitants (Figure 1.1).

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Figure 1.1 MSW management for England (2007/2008). Source: DEFRA 2010

Each country sets its own priorities and decides on a waste management scheme based on their needs, available technology and monetary capacity. With any combination of disposal, however, come difficulties as current systems are becoming overwhelmed by the amount of

MSW being put into the waste stream.

At Our Waste’s End

The issue of management has now become an issue that knows no jurisdictional boundaries. As the world moves deeper into globalization each country’s actions grow more connected to actions and outcomes in other countries. Solid waste is no exception to this rule and waste is being produced at an increasing rate in many countries around the globe (U.S. EPA

2009; OECD 2008). There is growing concern about landfill capacity and waste’s environmental impact. Governments and citizens alike are worried about where the excess waste will go once

3 the begin to overflow. They want to ensure that vast garbage dumps and solid waste processing centers do not consume their land. In fact, this growing concern prompted the

European Union (EU) to issue the Landfill Directive in 1999 marking a decisive shift from a waste management system reliant on landfilling towards a new waste management hierarchy2 prioritizing waste prevention, followed by re-use, and recovery, seeking to avoid landfilling wherever feasible (EEA 2009).

Alongside of the arguments of where the waste should go is the argument of who should be the one to pay for it. The majority of current systems put the responsibility of financing solid waste management (SWM) programs on states or . Providing collection services, waste transportation, street cleaning and recycling is an expensive service for a state, city or town to provide regularly to its inhabitants. In fact, in many countries, like Brazil, MSW management can use 5-15 percent of the ’s total budget (Bizzo 2005). This strain on local budgets is an incentive for municipalities to pressure their country’s governments to find another way to manage and fund MSW collection and disposal.

Due to the growing amount of waste production, the shrinking availability of land and the increasing financial pressures of SWM there is now increased awareness that traditional environmental policy and its focus on production processes may no longer bring about the changes needed to protect human health and the environment (OECD 2001). It has also been recognized that these same policies do not address the continued need for more new landfills and incinerators (OECD 2001). Additionally, the rising rate of MSW generation has created higher costs to the public and public entities creating the need to rethink management financing. With

2 Waste management hierarchy refers to the order of preference of waste management techniques. Some countries decide to focus on waste reduction before moving onto other methods such as reuse, recycling and final disposal (State of California 2011).

4 new restrictions on landfilling, dwindling land area for waste disposal, concern for human and environmental health and rising costs to citizens and governments, it seems to be time to look for another waste policy option.

Enter Extended Producer Responsibility

Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) has answered the cry of those who have demanded a new way to manage the problem of MSW. EPR is a policy option that has surfaced as an alternative to traditional environmental policy implementation. Extended Producer

Responsibility (EPR) is “an environmental policy approach in which a producer’s responsibility, physical and/or financial, for a product is extended to the post-consumer stage of a product’s life cycle” (OECD 2001, 18). Within EPR policy, there are two main features. The first is the shift in responsibility (physically and/or economically; fully or partially) upstream to the producer and away from municipalities and the second is to provide incentives to producers to incorporate environmental considerations in the design of their products.

In essence, EPR policy seeks to extend responsibility to producers and other entities in the upstream life of a product. It should be done in such a way that producers are given incentives and signals concerning the life cycle environmental impacts of their products. These incentives and signals are then picked up by the producers and subsequently give them motivation for making changes in the materials selection and design aspects of their products.

This policy option drives upstream change while also making those who create the products responsible for the downstream consequences of their designs and material selection.

Germany is seen as the golden example for EPR policy implementation. The German government first instituted EPR policy in the early 1990’s and since then have led the world by

5 example (OECD 2001). Positive results in waste reduction can already be seen over a 12-year span of EPR policy implementation in Germany (Figure 1.2) (FMENCNS 2010).

Figure 1.2 Generation of MSW in the EU in 1995 and 2007. Source: EEA 2009, 15

Not only has the overall amount of waste generated decreased, but the country has also decreased the amount of MSW landfilled to nearly zero percent (Figure 1.3) (EEA 2009).

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Figure 1.3 Management of MSW in Germany. Source: EEA 2009, 40

EPR policy implementation has yielded positive results in other countries as well by helping to divert MSW from landfill, decreasing MSW generation and redirecting waste management costs away from the public. Along with its successes, however, have also come failures. In some instances EPR policy implementation has been ineffective or has presented its implementers with unforeseen problems. For example, monopolies formed in Germany and an

EPR program involving the return of plastic bags never fully got off the ground in South Africa

(Spicer and Johnson 2004; McKerlie et al. 2006; Nahman 2010).

It is important to recognize both the successes and failures of implemented EPR policies.

Only by studying various implementation strategies can we hope to successfully reap the benefits that EPR has to offer countries in the future.

7 Problem Statement

In the early 1990’s Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) made its debut as a recognized policy option in Germany with the inception of The German Packaging Ordinance

(OECD 2001). It has since been implemented in many forms and throughout much of the world.

While EPR policies have been documented and analyzed, a diverse sampling of EPR policies in different contexts at the country level throughout the world has yet to be consolidated into a single source. Research documenting the global variation of EPR policy will allow governments, business leaders and policy makers to be more prepared as they attempt to embark on their own EPR journey or as they try to navigate those policies already in existence. My research accomplishes this consolidation by examining five countries currently implementing

EPR policies or programs and bringing together my findings into a single report.

After careful analysis of each country and the ways in which it has implemented EPR policies key conclusions were made as to the various components of the policy option. These components were combined and used to create the beginning of an EPR implementation typology. Overall, my research will uncover the key components of EPR policy in different cultural and political contexts in order to better understand how this policy method can be used successfully in different situations all over the world.

Research Questions

Different countries and cultures implement policy based on their individual needs and unique capabilities. The implementation of EPR policy is no different. My research has attempted to answer the following research questions:

8 • What is EPR and how has it been interpreted and implemented in five distinct countries around the world?

• What happens in different contexts with similar policy?

• In what context do we find the most successful EPR implementation?

• Are there key characteristics that help us predict success? Does a general typology emerge to describe the variations of EPR policy?

Objectives

Three main objectives were met through my research:

1.) After careful research and consideration of numerous sources, I documented a more

comprehensive definition of Extended Producer Responsibility policy. Currently, there

exists one broadly accepted definition offered by the OECD. While this definition

encompasses the overall function of EPR policy it does not specify as to how it is

implemented. It also does not take into account changes that have been made to the EPR

policy method over the past 10 years. Through my research I attempt to more accurately

define EPR policy by exposing the variations that exist today.

2.) Another objective of my research is to consolidate EPR policy information from five

countries into one document. I compare and contrast each country’s implementation

method(s) and highlight key aspects to its functionality by examining each country using

the same underlying variables (outlined below in the methodology section). In addition, I

explain notable successes and failures that each country has experienced and attempt to

identify the reasons for them.

9 3.) My final research objective is to identify the variations in existent EPR policy and expose

key components to the implementation of the policy option. Additionally, I outline the

beginning of a general typology of EPR based on the analysis of the five countries

examined in the case study.

10 Chapter 2: Literature Review

The topic that will be explored in this literature review is Extended Producer

Responsibility (EPR). A particular interest lies in seeking out the programs, policies and voluntary actions that exist throughout the world in terms of Extended Producer Responsibility related specifically to the waste generated by corporations in the form of their manufactured products and packaging. My examination of the literature will strive to answer the following questions: What is Extended Producer Responsibility? What programs exist that require/encourage Extended Producer Responsibility? What are their strengths, weaknesses, similarities and differences?

Before I can begin to answer these questions, however, I must investigate several underlying aspects of EPR. It will be necessary to examine aspects of existing Corporate Social

Responsibility (CSR) and EPR literature. The first body of literature to be examined will be literature written to discuss the general concept of CSR. By becoming fluent in the history and evolution of CSR, it will be possible to trace the origins of EPR, as EPR has been derived from

CSR. After understanding its origins, it will then be possible to delve into the recent history of

EPR. Understanding the history of the concept will allow for a better understanding of how it is expressed through policy and the ways in which it is presently being implemented.

The creation of this firm knowledge base of EPR will allow for better analysis of the issues, debates and problems that exist surrounding this topic. I will also be able to identify methodology and data used to study EPR policy and programs. Finally, after examining all relevant literature, my developed knowledge base will allow me to identify the holes that exist in

11 current EPR literature and will help me to establish my place in the ongoing Extended Producer

Responsibility conversation.

Background and Terminology

The term “Corporate Responsibility” has been in existence since before the dawning of the 21st century (Spitzeck 2009; Blowfield 2008). In 1973, one of the leading experts on

Corporate Responsibility, Neil Chamberlain, wrote a book about its limitations (Chamberlain

1973). At the time of Chamberlain’s book, the concept had not yet made the transition from discussed concept to widespread real world implementation. It took time and the exposure of several worldwide corporate scandals and incidents to begin a trend towards Corporate

Responsibility implementation (Idowu and Filho 2009; Spitzeck 2009). It was this new trend of occurrences that brought more attention to the idea that corporations should take responsibility for more than just their profits and daily activities. There was a “call for more stakeholder orientation” and new importance given to the subscription of corporations to the principle of

Corporate Responsibility (Spitzeck 2009).

Today, Corporate Responsibility is often referred to as Corporate Social Responsibility

(CSR) (Malin 2009). This is the idea that a private industry has societal responsibilities and must “behave well in all its dealings and put in place appropriate measures which would help to reduce the adverse impact of its actions on both the environment and its stakeholders” (Idowu and Filho 2009, 2). In more general terms, it is the “concept where companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with stakeholders” (Tudor et al. 2008, 765). The stakeholders, referred to in the above definitions,

“are any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the

12 organization’s objectives” (Spitzeck 2009, 496). These people or entities now have much more clout when it comes to demanding transparency and higher social standards of business practice.

Their demand for effective CSR has been heard by the corporations that serve them, and CSR is now at the forefront of what modern corporate entities want (Idowu and Filho 2009). “They aspire to implement CSR initiatives which portray them as being socially responsible in all the actions they take” (Idowu and Filho 2009, 2).

The principle of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) laid the groundwork for the inception of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR). EPR is defined by the Organisation for

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as “an environmental policy approach in which a producer’s responsibility, physical and/or financial, for a product is extended to the post- consumer stage of a products life cycle” (McKerlie et al. 2006, 617). In other words, EPR says that the producer of a product is responsible for their product from birth until death (cradle-to- grave) and thus must dispose of it properly after a consumer has finished using it (post- consumer).

In reality, EPR is merely an extension of CSR. It “extends the traditional environmental responsibilities that producers and importers have previously been assigned [through CSR] (i.e. worker safety, prevention and treatment of environmental releases from production, financial and legal responsibility for the sound management of production ) to include the management of their products at the post-consumer stage” (OECD 2001, 9). EPR is also an extension of the

Polluter-Pays Principle (PPP) (another principle under the more general concept of CSR)3

3 The PPP ensures that polluters, rather than society, bear the expenses for the environmental impacts that they generate (OECD 2001). It was first adopted on a large-scale by the OECD member countries in 1972.

13 (OECD 2001). EPR extends PPP to incorporate others, such as manufacturers, in the product chain of products which create environmental impacts (OECD 2001).

By the late 1990s, there was growing recognition that traditional environmental policy focusing on production processes no longer brought about needed changes to protect human health and the environment (OECD 2001). It was identified that new policy options were needed to integrate the environmental characteristics of products and production processes throughout the product chain (OECD 2001). This need grew even greater as policymakers realized that even with the implementation of policies and programs to reduce pollution and waste generation, pressures on the environment continued to increase (OECD 2001). Many governments concluded that there was a need to apply new policy instruments to address this growing problem, including placing the responsibility for post-consumer waste of certain goods onto the producer. The result to their conclusions was the inception of EPR and its implementation into policy.

The Evolution of EPR as a Policy Tool

The original concept of EPR as a policy tool was the desire to create a policy strategy that would provide ongoing incentives for the incorporation of environmental concerns into the design of products (Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008). The idea was that “if producers were made responsible for the end-of-life of their products, they would find it in their own best interest to anticipate end-of-life costs and design products to minimize those costs” (Lifset and Lindhqvist

2008, 144). Creators of the concept hoped that the EPR policy schemes would be dynamic and producers would respond differently based on their unique circumstances (Lifset and Lindhqvist

2008). EPR advocates wanted to see producers mobilize themselves to find the most innovative

14 and cost-effective means of reaching EPR goals without needing detailed prescriptions by governments (Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008). Presently, the actual implementation of EPR has only partly met these expectations (Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008).

Instead of innovation and integration of EPR into business models, the typical industry response has been to form Producer Responsibility Organizations (PROs). PROs are “consortia that manage the collection and processing of the relevant products and packaging on behalf of member companies” (Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008, 144). They work to meet collection and recycling targets on behalf of groups of producers or entire industry sectors (Lifset and

Lindhqvist 2008). The formation of PROs does not conform to the original vision of EPR. As such, this vision has now been given a new, more specific name: Individual Producer

Responsibility (IPR) (Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008).

IPR strives to reconvene with the original principles of EPR. IPR identifies the importance of the involvement of producers on an “individual” basis. Bringing the concept back down to the individual level encourages innovation in product design and competition within the

EPR market (Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008). It has proven difficult, however, to provide the framework to encourage IPR rather than the formation of PROs (Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008).

That being said, the creation of EPR policy has been accompanied by marked success. They seem to have increased recycling and promote environmentally friendlier product designs

(Kautto 2006). EPR policy continues to address the limitations of traditional environmental policy. It also continues to make changes based on emerging consequences and successes that the policies have brought about. The concept of EPR (now more specifically known as IPR) is an increasingly present policy option that will not soon leave the world stage.

15 Key Issues, Ideas, Problems and Concerns

Several issues, ideas, problems and concerns were found in the current literature surrounding Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Extended Producer Responsibility

(EPR). One of the major ideas that presented itself in the literature was corporate transparency.

Recent corporate scandals, private industry mishaps with the environment, and a general mistrust of big corporations have prompted stakeholders to demand greater transparency in the daily proceedings of big businesses (Spitzeck 2009). Demand for transparency has prompted corporations to incorporate CSR into their business models (Spitzeck 2009). In fact, a recent study in the UK found that Corporate Social Responsibility is actually becoming “infused and embedded” in corporate governance (Spitzeck 2009, 495). This apparent “infusion” of CSR into corporate function bodes well for the potential widespread application of EPR policies and programs.

Although the concept of EPR is gaining momentum, it is occurring more frequently and progressing more rapidly in some countries than in others. For example, the discussion on EPR is most vocal in the European Union (EU). The EU has taken the lead in creating policies which serve to implement EPR practices (McKerlie et al. 2006; Spicer and Johnson 2004). Cradle-to- grave policies now exist in Germany, Denmark, and Holland, among others (Cramer 2005;

McKerlie et al. 2006; DEPA 2004). Other non-European countries, such as Canada, Japan and

Taiwan, have also worked to form their own EPR policies (McKerlie et al. 2006; Nahman 2010).

The implementation of the concept of EPR is done differently depending on the preference of the country/corporation where it is being implemented. EPR has been implemented as strictly voluntary to strictly mandatory. These differences in implementation styles can often cause difficulties, especially in the case of the EU.

16 As of late, difficulties have arisen in the implementation of EPR policies in the EU (Clift and France 2006). These difficulties present themselves as an established directive filters down to individual EU states from the larger body of the EU government. This situation is exemplified by the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive implemented in the

European Union (Clift and France 2006). The WEEE Directive sets boundaries for producer responsibilities in disposing of electrical and electronic equipment, but member states are free to implement them as they wish (Clift and France 2006). As the approaches diverge, problems arise in the differences between implementation.

Several problems can arise if EPR policy is left to diverge in unique forms without much government intervention. The first major problem is the establishment of Producer

Responsibility Organizations (PROs) (Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008). PROs can become monopolies and control the market unfairly (Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008). Another issue that arises is the occurrence of “free riders” (producers who don’t participate in the established system) (Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008). The final major difficulty that an EPR program or policy can experience is the risk that firms may go out of business, thus creating “orphan products”4

(Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008). When these problems arise, government intervention is called for and a new twist on EPR implementation may be in order.

While corporations are being called to act by their stakeholders, the governments whom usually form these EPR policies are in many cases motivated by the waning landfill space in their countries (McKerlie et al. 2006). This is one major reason EU countries have proven to be much more progressive in pushing for EPR policies. Many governments in the EU, and in other

4 Orphan products are products that outlast their manufacturer (such as a TV discarded 20 years after the date of sale (INFORM 2003).

17 countries, have decided to create policy that makes EPR a required course of action for corporations selling products within their borders. While programs like “Green Dot” have found success in creating a mandatory system of EPR, voluntary systems are also in existence and have found success as well, such as those present in South Africa (Nahman 2010). In fact, their voluntary EPR system for glass, cans, and PET bottles has proven to work better than the mandatory system that was implemented to recycle plastic bags (Nahman 2010). In this case, the key reason for the mandatory EPR policy’s failure was determined to be the inability of a market to receive the collected plastic bags to develop over time, even though it was mandated program

(Nahman 2010).

With the creation of new policies for waste production responsibility, companies have had to investigate options for complying with the new directives. Third-party demanufacturing of products (often taking the form of PROs), which have reached the end of their life, is one such option that has been introduced as a potential solution for compliance with the extended producer responsibility (Spicer and Johnson 2004). In fact, this process already takes place in Germany and problems have arisen since its implementation due to monopolization of the demanufacturing market (Spicer and Johnson 2004; McKerlie et al. 2006). It will be important to examine and monitor these third-party relationships as EPR programs become more commonplace.

One of the first major steps to the process of implementing an EPR program is actually engaging companies in taking responsibility for the waste that their product generates. Knowing what has worked and what hasn’t worked for other companies trying to incorporate CSR and

EPR can serve as a model for companies wanting to undertake the process themselves. Two of the major success indicators of implementing these concepts into business plans are the creation

18 of legislation mandating socially responsible behavior and the potential for cost savings (Tudor et al. 2008).

Another issue to be aware of is the goal of waste minimization with the implementation of EPR policies and its possible repercussions. The “Green Dot” program in Germany prompted many companies to decrease the amount of packaging their products contained in order to decrease overall costs (production and packaging taxes) (McKerlie et al. 2006). With the implementation of the “Green Dot” program, Germany saw a three percent decrease in annual packaging accumulation as well as a stimulus in new recycling technologies (McKerlie et al.

2006). These benefits should be documented and examined for potential reapplication in other countries. Along with this, any pitfalls in the system should be pointed out so that future programs do not fall into the same traps.

Finally, one major concern that has come up in both past and recent debates is the discussion around shared responsibility of final product disposal. This wasn’t something that was documented in the reviewed literature, but instead comes from a professional within a major corporation dealing first-hand with the monetary losses EPR policy could incur on their business.

This particular corporation is bringing up the idea that product waste disposal is a shared responsibility between the producer and the consumer. This debate could bring up the possibility of taxes (or more taxes) on product packaging for consumers, among other things. The concern companies have is that they will be the sole bearers of the responsibility, while consumers, the users of the products, will not be required to do anything. This concern has incited these new conversations about Corporate Social Responsibility and they are sure to continue as Extended

Producer Responsibility becomes more of the norm than the exception.

19 Methods for Studying EPR

Several methods have been employed to study EPR policies and to evaluate their effectiveness. The OECD carried out an extensive study on EPR in 2001 (OECD 2001). They conducted semi-structured interviews in OECD member countries in order to better understand the existent systems and how involved parties participated in those systems (OECD 2001).

Several case studies have been done at the industry level and at the county level. The OECD, for example, looked into the EPR practices of Dell, IBM, Nike and Xerox (OECD 2001). Case studies in Japan and Sweden have also taken place (Lifeset and Lindhqvist 2008). In addition, the OECD has compiled a matrix of successful EPR programs and their main features (OECD

2001). They also collected relevant documents from the internet (such as EPR program descriptions and policy explanations) to better understand the function of EPR. In general, interviews, case studies, matrices and internet searches have all been completed in the past to better understand EPR programs and policies.

Conclusion

At this point, the conversation surrounding EPR policy and programs is well established and continues to grow in intensity. Scholars, experts, and governments alike are documenting what works and what doesn’t work under specific circumstances. They have identified the programs that currently exist throughout the world and are working to document the details of their functionality. The literature has also made suggestions as to the direction of future EPR programs and policies. The evaluation of such programs and policies is still lacking, however, and this is one area that the conversation needs to move into so that future policymakers can learn from the successes and failures of past attempts.

20 The literature has also identified the need for the identification of when and where design for the environment (DfE)5 occurs (Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008). Also, the delineation of how

PROs and IPR are flexible and adapt to changing products and technologies over time is still needed in order to better understand current systems (Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008). Overall, the

EPR conversation still lacks program and policy comparisons. The comparisons of existent programs (large, small, voluntary or mandatory) will add a great deal of understanding to the concept and aid future EPR policymakers in the creation of new and effective EPR policies.

Therefore, by answering the questions, “What programs exist that require/encourage Extended

Producer Responsibility?” and “What are their strengths, weaknesses, similarities and differences?” my work will contribute to the ongoing EPR conversation in a constructive and informative way.

5 DfE are labels given to products that meet stringent criteria for human and environmental health (USEPA 2010).

21 Chapter 3: Methodology

Figure 3.1 Thesis methodology diagram.

Phase I i. Background

A review of relevant literature was conducted to identify the origins of Extended

Producer Responsibility as well as to investigate its prevalence throughout history and today. In addition, several definitions were examined within the literature and one was chosen to consistently define EPR policy throughout the research and writing process. Peer-reviewed journal articles and books helped to make clear the historical context of the policy option and gave me a solid foundation from which to grow my understanding of the subject. Special attention was given to present-day occurrences of EPR policy implementation as well as to its current importance and influence in the world. Key issues and debates were identified and holes in the existing literature were noted. In the end, I was able to distinguish several countries currently using EPR as a policy option and moved forward with determining the criteria used to select the countries to be researched.

22 Phase II i. Criteria for the Selection of Countries

Individual countries and their implementation of EPR policy were the units of analysis for this multiple-case study research project (Yin 2009). Examination of EPR at the country level proves to be the most enlightening perspective on implementation. In most cases, it is currently the role of the federal government to engage in EPR policy formation, creation and implementation. Lower levels of government do not yet have a large role to play in EPR. We are therefore able to gain the most insight into EPR as a MSW policy option at the country level.

Countries were chosen based on the amount of information regarding EPR policies available in English at the country level in peer-reviewed journal articles, books, government reports, official presentations, articles and official websites. It was also ensured that the five countries chosen represented a diverse array of EPR policy and program types as well as varying cultural contexts. ii. Selection of Cases

The following countries were identified as the cases to be studied based on the criteria outlined in section i of Phase II:

Brazil, Canada, Germany, Japan and South Africa

Each has at least two peer-reviewed journal articles covering aspects of EPR at the country level.

In addition, the five cases chosen represent a diverse selection of programs and cultures. Many of these countries are also notably different in their cultural organization and EPR implementation strategies making them easily contrastable (Yin 2009).

23 Phase III i. Case Study

During this phase the investigation and research of the identified country cases was carried out. Academic journal articles, books, government reports, official presentations, newspaper articles and official websites were used in order to examine each case in terms of 13 identified variables. These 13 variables were used in the research of each country case in order to ensure proper replication for each case (Yin 2009). These variables included:

• General Context • Cultural Context • Government Organization • Economy • Current Municipal Solid Waste Management Hierarchy • MSW Management Responsibility • Approach to EPR policy • Voluntary or Mandatory? • Physical Responsibility • Financial Responsibility • Reporting Responsibility • Enforcement • Unique Characteristics

Variables for Analysis

Each variable contributed to the final analysis of the case study in its own way. Each of the 13 variables has unique importance to the eventual analysis of the data and each must be considered during the Case Study phase.

24 General Context

The general context variable was selected in order to gain a better understanding of the overall circumstances in which we find the examined country today. It is essential to understand the unique situation each country finds itself in. By gaining a better understanding of this we are then able to set the stage for the proper analysis of more specific happenings within the country

(i.e. Extended Producer Responsibility policy). General context includes characteristics of the country such as the level of technological sophistication, geography, historical events, major environmental concerns or successes, social characteristics (e.g. poverty) and experience with

EPR policy and programs.

Cultural Context

Alongside the general context variable we find cultural context. It is important to include general cultural characteristics in analyzing EPR implementation in individual countries. This importance comes from the undeniable influence that culture has on all aspects of interaction within a country. Unique cultural characteristics were identified for each country. Religious affiliation, ethnicity, outside influences, major cultural events and unique mentalities and circumstances were all examined in order to better understand the landscape in which EPR was being implemented.

Government Organization

Extended Producer Responsibility policies are often handled by the federal government.

A greater knowledge as to the structure of the national government in each country proves to be a key element in identifying the type of EPR system that will arise in specific government types.

A Federal Republic, for example, could create an EPR policy very different or much easier than

25 one created by a Monarchy. Additionally, this variable investigates the level of sophistication each country’s government maintains in order to understand how this may influence the implementation of EPR.

Economy

This variable focuses on understanding the general economic situation in each country.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is examined and recorded in order to gain a better handle on the level of poverty and economic success or failure the country is experiencing. This variable also looks at the major sectors present in the economy and identifies the sector employing the greatest number of inhabitants. By looking more broadly at the economic situation of the individual countries we may gain greater insight into the unique EPR implementation styles of each country.

Current MSW Management Hierarchy

Before being able to truly understand the motivations for EPR policy implementation it is imperative to understand the current state of the solid waste management in each country.

Countries all over the world manage their MSW in varying ways depending on their unique needs, technological abilities, population, waste composition and geographic circumstances. The level of solid waste management sophistication may give us clues as to how successful the integration of EPR policy will be in each situation. One way to measure this sophistication is by looking at the percent of the population that receives MSW collection services from the managing entity. This data has been collected and recorded for each country.

26 MSW Management Responsibility

Understanding who is responsible for the management of MSW can give us clues as to how EPR will be managed and how the policy may be able to remove the burden from current

MSW management entities. If a government is burdened with the costs and infrastructure needs of disposing of MSW it may lead to greater motivation for shifting waste disposal responsibility to producers.

Approach to EPR Policy

Although there is a single accepted definition for Extended Producer Responsibility this does not guarantee that each country will subscribe to it. Identifying each country’s interpretation of EPR allows us to gain a better understanding of their implementation systems.

We are also able to distinguish the differences between each system and uncover their unique characteristics.

Voluntary or Mandatory?

Three overarching implementation methods have been identified since the research completed in the literature review. An EPR policy can be considered voluntary, mandatory or have aspects of both voluntary and mandatory. Knowing which method is used for implementation is essential in order to begin investigating the functioning of an EPR program or policy.

Physical Responsibility

Using this variable of analysis we will discover who is actually responsibility for the collection and disposal of produced waste. While the name “Extended Producer Responsibility”

27 lends itself to assuming that producers of the waste are solely responsible, we will see that this is not always the case. Some programs have found ways to include government entities (local, state or federal) or have found ways to contract out the physical responsibility to other companies (i.e. PROS). By understanding where the true physical responsibility of and disposal falls, we are able to better understand the overall EPR program.

Financial Responsibility

It is essential to ask the question, “Who is financially responsible for the operations of

EPR policy?” Each country will have its own schema as to how the stipulations for implementation of EPR are met. Gaining knowledge about who is supplying the money to meet these stipulations is a major step towards understanding how current systems function and how they could be improved or applied in other countries.

Reporting Responsibility

A key aspect of any typical EPR program is the collection and reporting of data. These data could be reported as yearly quotas or previously determined targets. The role of reporting is especially important to a mandatory EPR policy. Identifying who is responsible for collecting and reporting on these numbers helps to give us a greater understanding of how the system works. We can compare how each country handles reporting responsibilities and determine where it is best utilized and who is experiencing the most success with their current system.

Enforcement Responsibility

Most mandatory EPR policies need to have some form of enforcement in place in order for producers to abide by the stipulations set forth in the document. This responsibility usually

28 falls on different levels of government. Enforcement responsibility is an important variable to consider while analyzing the EPR programs and policies of each country. Understanding whom, if anyone, is in charge of enforcing the policy helps to uncover potential reasons for success or failure of a program.

Unique Characteristics

This variable points out any characteristics that I deem as important to the analysis and have not already been included within the other 12 variables. These unique characteristics will add even more context to the final understanding of how EPR is currently being implemented within each of the five country cases.

Variable Summary Table

I have gathered the information needed to respond to each of these questions for each country and highlighted my findings in a well-organized table (Table 3.1 below).

Table 3.1 Table format outlining the findings for each country.

29 This table will help the reader and myself easily compare and contrast the countries studied. It will also assist me in extracting the information I need in order to distinguish the key actors, incentives and constraints of EPR as well as to create a general typology to explain the different variations in the components involved in EPR implementation.

Data Constraints

It is important to recognize the constraints that have influenced the amount of research available for analysis. Firstly, I was unable to find or read all of the information that exists for

EPR policy and programs in each of the countries studied. This constraint was only emphasized by my inability to include relevant sources available in languages other than English. I performed all of my literature searches using English keywords and phrasing. Secondly, there was a major time and financial constraint on the amount of research I was able to complete. Less than six months were allotted to complete the case study and no funding was available for travel to any of the five countries selected for study.

Phase IV i. Extract information

After thoroughly studying all of the cases, I extracted the information needed to address each of the 13 identified variables. Both quantitative and qualitative data were used to fill in the variable summary table and complete the final analysis. The completed table was then used to determine trends and patterns between each of the five countries studied. Analysis was based solely on the data collected during the study period and did not include any countries outside of the scope of the case study.

30 ii. Conclusions and recommendations further research

After having compiled my findings and analyzing the data I was able to identify more significant conclusions surrounding EPR implementation. The first larger conclusion comes in the form of an explanation as to the components involved in EPR policy. Key actors, incentives for implementation and constraints were identified and discussed. Additionally, a typology was developed to explain the main features found in each of the five countries studied. This typology is meant to serve as the beginning of a general typology for EPR policy implementation and strives to portray the variations that currently exist at the global level. The information used to create the typology was extracted from the analysis and portrays the five aspects of EPR policy implementation that I found most enlightening and important to reaching a better understanding of the current state of EPR in our global world today.

In order to conclude my thesis I discuss the future research that my work may help to inspire. These suggestions for future study come from questions that arose during the case study and analysis phases, questions that were not answered by the end of the case study and ideas for valuable research avenues that have been created as a result of my thesis.

31 Chapter 4: Brazil

The nation of Brazil covers over eight million square kilometers of land on the South

American continent making it the fifth largest country on the planet (CIA 2011). This expansive land mass is covered by rolling lowlands in the north, and plains, hills and mountains in the south. Brazil is blessed with vast natural resources including petroleum, hydropower and timber.

This abundance of natural resources does not come without its issues, however, as the country is now facing environmental problems involving their forests, air, water and land. Deforestation is an increasingly serious environmental problem in the Amazon Basin, while land degradation and water pollution is occurring due to mining practices in many areas of the country. Within the cities, air and water pollution are both major concerns, and wetland degradation from continued development has many worried about the future of Brazil’s natural landscape.

Over 201 million people inhabit this large country and this number only continues to increase each year. Currently, about 86 percent of the total population lives in urbanized areas

(CIA 2011). Each year more and more Brazilians flock to the cities in search of work and other opportunities. The population of the cities are expected to increase by almost two percent every year (CIA 2011). Several ethnic groups make up the population as it currently exists in Brazil’s cities and countryside. The majority of inhabitants are white followed by mulatto and black

(CIA 2011). About 74 percent of these inhabitants are Roman Catholic followed by Protestant,

Spiritualist and Voodoo and they can expect to live to just over 72 years of age (CIA 2011).

Brazil’s inhabitants find work where they can, but the majority find their place within the

Brazilian service sector. Brazil’s economic sector relies heavily on services (68 percent) (CIA

2011). About 26 percent of their economy is industry and only about six percent can be claimed

32 as agricultural (CIA 2011). Overall, the GDP per capita is relatively low at only $10,900 in 2010

(CIA 2011). Poverty among Brazilians is prevalent, but the country continues to develop its economy and looks towards a better fortune in the future.

Brazil was originally colonized by the Portuguese, but won their independence in 1822.

The Brazilian government now considers itself a Federal Republic and governs over 26 states and one federal district. There is a president, who serves as both the chief of state and the head of government. There is also a cabinet, which is appointed by the president. Their legislative system boasts a bicameral National Congress and the legal system is based on Roman codes.

Brazil is party to several international agreements involving waste and the environment.

These agreements include: the Kyoto Protocol, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes,

Marine Dumping and Ozone Layer Protection (CIA 2011). With the help of these agreements, and other initiatives, the country is working to change their environmental impact on the world.

One way in which they are trying to accomplish this is by making improvements to their existing municipal solid waste management system.

Current Municipal Solid Waste Management

Composition

As of the year 2007, 52 million tonnes of municipal solid waste (MSW) was produced and collected in Brazil (UNSD 2011). The typical waste composition of a Brazilian city is dominated by organic material (46 percent) (Bizzo 2005). Paper and paperboard follows behind organic material and composes 20 percent of the MSW stream (Bizzo 2005). Plastics (15 percent), textiles and others (13 percent), metal (4 percent) and glass (2 percent) make up the rest

(Bizzo 2005).

33 Disposal

Overall, approximately 83 percent of Brazilians are served by MSW collection services

(UNSD 2011). This percentage can vary depending on whether an urban area or rural area is being considered as cities typically receive larger coverage than rural areas. The general breakdown of disposal methods is summarized below in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Waste disposal method by percent in Brazil.

Source: Bizzo 2005, 7

In addition to the percentages listed above, four percent of MSW is composted and one percent is recycled (UNSD 2011). The recorded percentage for recycling, however, is likely significantly underestimated. A very highly developed culture of waste pickers exists in Brazil alluding to the fact that much more MSW is recycled than has been officially documented

(Borzino 2006).

34 MSW Practices – Management

Municipal solid waste collection and disposal service are overseen by the National

Government, but are managed directly by each municipality. Waste management services and urban cleaning costs use 5-15 percent of the total municipal budget (Bizzo 2005).

Management Advances & Legislation

Brazil has begun to recognize the need for change in their MSW management system.

They see now that it is unsustainable for municipalities to continue spending large parts of their budgets on waste collection as the amount of waste to be processed continues to increase. They have also recognized that the rate at which their population and waste production are increasing is impossible to sustain without major environmental and social equity problems. In an effort to confront this issue, a new policy for national solid waste management has recently been proposed (National Solid Waste Policy Proposal). The proposal’s basic concepts include: no generation, reduce-reuse-recycle, Integrated Solid Waste Management, formal inclusion of garbage picker organizations, post-consumption and logistics reversal, cleaner production and the institution of Extended Producer Responsibility policies (Borzino 2006). The government, at both the national and local levels, seems to be working to ensure that new steps are taken to create an integrated system of solid waste management in Brazil.

Extended Producer Responsibility in Brazil

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de

Janerio (1992) was a milestone in Brazilian environmental policy (Milanez and Bührs 2009).

The conference inspired the Brazilian National Council of the Environment (CONAMA) to create a more integrated solid waste policy. The council began to incorporate the principles of

35 EPR policy in the creation of their new solid waste policy. They decided to use the well- established European EPR policy as a model for Brazil’s own EPR policy implementation. In theory, this emulation seemed a novel idea, but due to many factors, including only partial implementation of the model and the limited institutional capacity of the federal environmental agency, their implementation of EPR policy was unsuccessful in achieving set goals.

National Council of the Environment (CONAMA)

The National Council of the Environment (CONAMA) was created as part of the Brazilian

Ministry of the Environment in 1981 and fulfills the following roles (Milanez and Bührs 2009):

• Recommend policy priorities to the Federal Government and promulgate environmental norms • Designed to be participatory and serve as a forum for stakeholders to negotiate environmental policies, standards and criteria • Power to enact packaging regulations with the force of law without any new legislation (World Bank 2005)

EPR Becoming a Resolution

The Brazilian constitution states that only responsibilities and obligations created by acts of the Congress can be legally enforced. Therefore, from the beginning there was no consensus that a resolution approved by CONAMA would legally force producers to take-back the waste created by their products after consumption. Knowing this, CONAMA drafted a Solid Waste

Bill to be sent to Congress in an effort to take control of overseeing solid waste management responsibility, but pushback from industry immediately presented itself. Industry, such as tire manufacturers, immediately voiced their opposition to the EPR principle. Industry caused direct damage to the official acceptance of EPR policy by blocking resolutions dealing with packaging

36 and lamps, but Congress was able to approve resolutions for battery waste and tire waste in 1999

(Milanez and Bührs 2009).

While these resolutions were passed by the Congress, the Solid Waste Bill was never enacted as law and companies continue to question the legal validity of the resolutions and the

Solid Waste Bill as they never made it out of the President’s office (Milanez and Bührs 2009).

After much arguing and verbal exchanges between CONAMA and industry representatives an agreement was reached wherein CONAMA would practice lenient control and the industries would no longer contest the resolution judicially. This “agreement” between the two major stakeholders has made the resolution ambivalent. CONAMA designed the resolutions as mandatory regulations that have now turned into merely “agreements” lacking sufficient legal support to be fully enforced. This is a consequence of EPR policy being implemented as agreements rather than enforceable legislation.

EPR Policy for Tire Waste

CONAMA first set up a working group to discuss a resolution for tire waste beginning in

1998 (Milanez and Bührs 2009). New tire manufacturers and re-molding companies argued back and forth about the allowance of importing tire waste and its negative effects on the environment.

New tire manufacturers argued that with the continued importation of tire waste there was a greater chance of improper tire disposal thus leading to environmental degradation. Even while they argued this, however, they would not agree to be liable for the end-of-life of their own used tires.

In attendance at these meetings were the tire manufacturers (both sides), federal government environmental agencies, and some support from the International Trade Office.

37 There was little to no involvement of state environmental agencies and non-governmental environmental organizations. Meetings were held for six months and during this time there was little to no consensus as to the stipulations of an EPR policy. Re-molders agreed to take responsibility for the old tire waste in return for free imports of tire waste. New tire makers were against both of these proposals, and the government and environmental agencies supported EPR and end-of-life responsibility, but rejected waste imports. Although it seemed impossible, an agreement was finally reached and an EPR resolution was created.

The final version of the EPR resolution on tire waste did not allow imports of tire waste and defined tire producers and importers as the ones responsible for the collection and appropriate final disposal of tire waste. It allowed for a delayed start and progressive targets based on total tire production and imports so that industry had time to create the infrastructure needed to comply with the resolution (Table 4.2) (Milanez and Bührs 2009). This resolution did not stop re-molders from importing tire waste, however, as they obtained a writ of mandamus obliging customs to allow tire waste to enter the country.

Table 4.2 Targets defined for tire take-back program as defined by resolution.

Source: Milanez and Bührs 2009, 611 The Federal Environmental Protection Agency (IBAMA) created a new monitoring system with the help of the International Trade Office. They created an ex ante system for

38 controlling tire imports and shipment was only allowed only if companies could prove beforehand that they had treated an equivalent number of used tires. An ex post system was created for controlling tire producers and companies were required to inform IBAMA of the number of collected tires at the end of every year. A partnership was developed between tire importers and local governments called the “Paraná Driving Clean” (Milanez and Bührs 2009).

In this program waste scavengers collected tire waste and sold it to the tire remolding companies.

The program proved sufficient and the importers claimed that they had destroyed enough tires to fulfill their obligations for 10 years (Milanez and Bührs 2009).

Tire producers (of new tires) had more difficulty fulfilling their quotas. They created drop-off centers and built shredders, but the number they made was not enough to fulfill their quotas. Drop-off centers were usually created in partnership with local governments, even though they carried the responsibility for the collection system. Under this scheme the mayors’ offices financed the infrastructure while tire producers collected, transported and treated the material. These partnerships significantly reduced the companies’ investment requirements. In fact, most of the collection infrastructure is financed by local governments or has already been built.

Difficulties in Successful Implementation of EPR

Brazil has had difficulty in the successful implementation of EPR policy (especially for tire waste as exhibited here). Observations and research suggests that Brazilian policymakers had an incomplete understanding of the EPR concept and also indicates that limited institutional capacity has constrained the outcomes of the policy (Milanez and Bührs 2009). Unfortunately,

39 the changes in policy strategies have been unable to overcome the institutional and political obstacles to the development of an appropriate environmental policy.

When the Brazilians first started to look at EPR policy as an option to creating a more integrative MSW management scheme, they highlighted two main elements: the transfer of responsibility from municipalities to industries and a focus on innovation and product redesign

(Milanez and Bührs 2009). It seems that policymakers limited their discussions to the transfer of responsibility and did not include the second element.

Complementary policies for promoting technological innovation and preventative solutions were not considered and tire producers and importers confined their choices for complying with the quotas to the less technology-intensive alternatives. Other alternatives were not presented to them and they chose the “easiest” method of disposal next to landfill (Milanez and Bührs 2009). There was no investment made in improving the life or design of tires was implemented. Additionally, there were no incentives created by government or organizations.

The lack of addressing this second goal points to failure of the EPR policy implementation, as

EPR policy’s main goal is to affect change in the designing and production of products. In the end, “EPR policies must be implemented together with innovation-driven initiatives to be truly effective” (Milanez and Bührs 2009, 613).

The Root of Failure

Brazil lacked the institutional capacity to successfully carryout this policy. COMANA, is an isolated federal agency and there was little involvement and support from state agencies and

NGOs. There were also several other challenges related to the interaction between the various stakeholders involved that presented themselves from the beginning of the discussions. The

40 diversity of the firms, the artificial competitive advantages, unrealistic targets and monitoring failures all contributed to the difficulties and failures in the EPR policy process. Unfortunately, great diversity is not conducive to reaching an agreement. The Brazilian case involved tire producers, re-molders, tire importers and car importers and the historical rivalry between tire producers and tire re-molders spelled disaster from the very beginning. This rivalry is so intense that two separate collection systems were created and competed with one another thus reducing the scale and increasing costs. They were absolutely unwilling to work together due to past misgivings.

Monitoring also caused a major problem as the resolution lacked precision in the quantitative information for defining collection targets. IBAMA had limited monitoring capacity and due to this there are no consolidated official data of the total amounts of tires collected since the implementation of the EPR policy. The data collectors made large assumptions and used disputable units. There is long standing competition between IBAMA and state environmental agencies in Brazil. CONAMA failed to involve state governments in the debate and thus the state governments did not feel responsible for taking part in the monitoring. IBAMA did not have enough staff to visit all sites and the firms became the only source of information via paperwork.

Brazilian policymakers did not fully understand the EPR concept. They were able to transfer the responsibility for waste management to producers, but did not encourage life-cycle assessment, the redesign of products or the adoption of preventative measures (Milanez and

Bührs 2009, 613). In addition, they underestimated the complexity of EPR-based policies. They modeled their EPR policy after policies implemented by highly developed, organized and complex European governments. These governments have a tradition of policy cooperation,

41 robust monitoring systems, and easy access to technological innovation. Brazil lacks these major characteristics enjoyed by the European countries they used as a model. They exhibit both weak political and technical capacity. Their mistakes show other countries in similar situations that simply applying a foreign policy principle without tailoring it to one’s unique circumstances is a naïve and often unsuccessful strategy (Milanez and Bührs 2009).

42 Chapter 5: Canada

The country of Canada stretches along the entire northern border of the United States of

America taking up nearly 10 million square kilometers (CIA 2011). This vast expanse of land is mostly covered with rolling plains, but there is mountainous terrain to the west and lowlands in the southeast. Canada’s large vast landscape lends itself to creating a country rich in natural resources. Petroleum, coal, natural gas, timber and hydropower are five of the most prominent natural resources found in Canada (CIA 2011).

There are 10 and three territories that make up the jurisdictional boundaries of the country. About 80 percent of the 33 million inhabitants living in these jurisdictions live in urban areas (CIA 2011). Canadians enjoy a relatively high life expectancy of 81 years and are one of the richer nations of the world boasting $39,600 GDP/capita (CIA 2011). People work mostly in the service sector followed by industry and agriculture (CIA 2011). A parliamentary democracy, federation and constitutional monarchy are the three forms of government that mesh together to govern the people of Canada. An elected Prime Minister governs the inhabitants and uses Canada’s constitution as a guide. The young constitution is made up of written and unwritten acts, customs, judicial decisions and traditions. Their legal system is based on French law, although they still hold ties with Great Britain. Apart from the government and the legal system is religion. The majority of religious Canadians are Roman Catholic followed by

Protestant, Christian and Muslim, respectively (CIA 2011).

Canada, like many countries around the world, is currently engaged in several battles against contamination and destruction of their environment. Air pollution and the resulting acid rain caused by automobile exhaust and contamination from many of the country’s economic

43 activities (mining, agriculture, industry, forestry) is one of the fiercest battles at hand. Canadians are also well aware of the growing issues the world faces in terms of solid waste management and have tried to engage in new ideas for changing their current MSW management scheme.

Current Municipal Solid Waste Management

Composition

In 2006, Canadians disposed of upwards of 34 million tonnes of waste (Statistics Canada

2010). The majority of Canada’s waste stream is composed of paper and paperboard (47 percent) (OECD 2008). Organic material trails behind composing 24 percent, followed by metals (13 percent), textiles/other (eight percent), glass (six percent) and plastics (three percent)

(OECD 2008). These percentages are compiled and measured by large collection and disposal points throughout Canada. About 99 percent of the country’s population is reached by collection services (Statistics Canada 2010).

Disposal

Of the waste that is collected, the majority of it is currently transported to landfill (Figure

5.1). In fact, at least 36 percent of generated waste is disposed of in a sanitary landfill (Statistics

Canada 2010). Incineration is incorporated into management plans occasionally, but less than five percent of the total disposed waste is actually incinerated (Statistics Canada 2005). Over the past 20 years recycling has become an accepted practice of waste management programs throughout Canada. With this acceptance and push towards waste diversion from landfills, over

25 percent of all of their MSW was recycled in 2008 (Statistics Canada 2010). Composting is considered a form of and composting facilities are located across the country. About six percent of the total MSW collected is composted (Statistics Canada 2010).

44 In many regions, a resident’s organic waste is collected separately from their MSW and taken to a central location to be composted (Statistics Canada 2005).

Figure 5.1 Breakdown of the amount of waste diverted, incinerated, and landfilled (Canada circled). Source: David 2007

MSW Practices - Management

The responsibility for MSW management is shared between the federal, provincial/territorial and municipal governments (Environment Canada 2010). Municipalities are responsible for the collection, diversion and disposal of MSW from residential sources

(David 2007). The provincial government is responsible for the movements of wastes within their jurisdiction, licensing of generators, carriers and treatment facilities and enforcing extended producer responsibility. The federal government is responsible for agreeing to and complying with international agreements, creating new national legislation, regulating the movement of , recyclable material and non-hazardous waste. These three levels of

45 government work together to develop national initiatives, promote technical expertise, gather statistics, perform analyses, support innovation and build capacity.

Management Advances & Legislation

Over the course of the last decade, new concern for the environment and rising MSW management costs have prompted the creation of new legislation as well as government and industry waste minimization programs. Municipalities are able to enact by-laws covering many facets of waste storage, collection and disposal. A few examples of these regulatory measures include: landfill bans, bag limits, user-pay programs6 and tipping fees (Statistics Canada 2010).

Education has become another way of trying to reduce waste generation and the public has put forth an effort to reduce and re-use in their daily lives.

Individual provinces generally devise management strategies, goals and overall plans related to MSW management. There have been instances of provinces partnering with an industry to support programs relating to waste management in order to help them achieve specific objectives. There are packaging stewardship initiatives, for example, in ,

Ontario and , which are jointly funded and/or administered by provincial governments and private industry (Statistics Canada 2010). These new initiatives towards incorporating

Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) policy come as part of Canada’s general need to consider alternative MSW management options to those relied on in the past.

5 Require residents to pay for waste collection based on the volume or weight of materials they disposed (Statistics Canada 2011).

46 Extended Producer Responsibility in Canada

Canada has one of the longest histories of implementing variations of EPR policies and programs. They have spent almost twenty years trying out voluntary programs, creating Product

Stewardship initiatives and looking for ways to incorporate mandatory EPR policies into the current the framework. They have seen success and failure with their use of voluntary and

Product Stewardship programs. Policymakers are now working towards incorporating recommendations into future initiatives and are focused on finding ways to implement a stricter

EPR policy approach in creating producer responsibility programs, legislation and initiatives.

Early EPR Policy – Voluntary

Canada began considering EPR policy options as early as April of 1990 (McKerlie et al.

2006). It was at this time that the Canadian Council for Ministers of the Environment (CCME) introduced the National Packaging Protocol (NaPP). The NaPP was a voluntary agreement with industry created by a multi-stakeholder advisory group. Specific targets were developed, but each was able to develop its own plan for implementation. Over the years of its implementation, the targets were reached to the credit of reduction in transport packaging rather than post-consumer product packaging, as was intended.

Motivating Mandatory EPR Policy Creation

In September of 2004, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD) helped to motivate the creation of more thorough EPR programs and policies through recommendations made in the “Environmental Performance Review of Canada” (OECD 2011).

The report recommended that Canada improve its environmental management by implementing

“polluter pays” and “user pays” principles (OECD 2011). Canada heeded these

47 recommendations and now implements both EPR and programs to manage products at end-of-life.

Canadian EPR Policy: Relying on Product Stewardship Policy

Canada has historically focused more on Product Stewardship policy than pure Extended

Producer Responsibility policy. The term EPR is often confused with Product Stewardship.

Stewardship policy or initiatives serve as a form of EPR, but do not subscribe to the key goals associated with the formal definition of EPR. Product Stewardship, on the other hand, allocates responsibility to each of the stakeholders involved in the lifecycle of a product (consumer, provincial government, municipal government and industry).

Product Stewardship programs utilize public funds and tax-based funding to realize its goals (Environment Canada 2011). “This approach (excluding the case of ’s

‘full product stewardship’ legislation) suggests that all parties with a role in designing, producing, selling or using a product are responsible for minimizing the environmental impacts of the product over its life” (McKerlie et al. 2006, 620). This strategy includes consumers, industry and governments in the responsibility for the environmental impacts of waste being produced. It does not, as does strict EPR policy, assign responsibility for waste disposal and reduction to industry solely. There are no goals set for product redesign or pollution prevention.

In addition, it does not clearly define producer responsibility and implies shared responsibility for municipalities in the costs and handling of waste.

Downfalls of Product Stewardship as a Producer Responsibility Policy in Canada

Most stewardship programs in Canada have too much of an end-of-life focus. The shared responsibility model, which product stewardship relies on, does not deliver full market signals of

48 a clear feedback loop to the producers in regards to the true costs of managing their products throughout the entire life cycle (McKerlie et al. 2006).

Canada has chosen to use shared product stewardship as their approach to implementing

“producer responsibility” policy. It has proven ineffective in the reduction of waste volumes and has failed to stimulate significant design changes. Major change needs to occur with jurisdictional responsibilities. Currently, local governments are responsible for waste management, and provinces and territories are the ones who create and enforce EPR legislation.

Federal mandate has yet to occur so EPR legislation varies widely among provinces. No coordination or cooperation between different political entities. “Unless producers must internalize full costs of their products throughout its entire life cycle, they are unlikely to re-think business-as-usual or come up with innovative product service systems” (McKerlie et al. 2006,

624).

Lessons Learned from Canada

Experts in the field of EPR have been able to come up with a set of clear recommendations for Canada to consider if it hopes to create a more successful set of EPR policies in the future. They are suggestions that should also be considered by countries considering their own EPR policy implementation. Most of the recommendations discussed here come from McKerlie et al. 2006.

Giving Responsibility Where Responsibility is Due

Producers must be given full responsibility for products throughout their entire life cycle including: costs for operation of the Packaging Recovery Organization (PRO), collection, recycling, disposal and consumer education (McKerlie et al. 2006). Once rules are established

49 industry should have opportunity to create EPR system that works to their advantage.

Additionally, cooperation and coordination is needed between different levels of government.

Legislation

In order for EPR to be truly effective, holistic and meaningful legislation must be created.

The goals surrounding sustainable product design, reduced use and enhanced recycling must be clearly defined as the purpose of the piece of legislation. Overall, legislation must also stimulate pollution prevention as well as phase out hazardous material use in products. Finally, it is essential for goals to be set in an effort to continually improve legislation over time thus improving the design of EPR programs.

Voluntary Programs Riddled with Problems

Voluntary EPR schemes are riddled with problems, such as free riders7. For EPR to work properly a level playing field must be set up for all producers and each one must play by same rules.

The Importance of Metrics and Technology

Metrics are essential for guiding the evolution of the material’s policy. Data must be obtained to ascertain the effectiveness of EPR programs. Technology should be used in order to assist in the goals of EPR policies. As an example of this, Radio-frequency Identification (RFI) tags may enable low cost, effective ways of identifying products by brand.

7 Industries that do not participate in the voluntary or mandatory EPR program or policy.

50 Accessibility and Consumer Involvement

The siting of take-back and collection facilities should be easily accessible to consumers. It is also important to create deposit refund systems and eco-fees that can be used to create incentives which affect consumer behavior.

Avoiding Monopolies

It is important to avoid the creation of monopolies through the formation of an EPR policy or program. In order to achieve this, a minimum number of Packaging Recovery

Organizations (PROs) established.

Canada’s Need for Flexibility

The varying landscapes and vast expanses of land enjoyed by Canada make it essential for EPR policies and programs to be flexible and unique to each area (CCME 2009). Localities may vary greatly as to their market capacity and infrastructure. Large stretches of land may stand between one small city and the next in the northern territories. The distance between each city creates a long and expensive product line. The addition of EPR policy may increase the price of products sent to these areas increasing an already high expense of living. In addition to taking into account varying landscapes and circumstances, each jurisdiction within Canada has its own set of regulations and established practices to be considered. Tailoring EPR initiatives to the special needs and circumstances of individual jurisdictions within Canada will be essential for the policy option’s widespread success. The Canadian government is well aware of these needs and is working diligently to set forth standards of practice and flexible guidelines.

51 Future of EPR in Canada

Strides are being taken to move Canada towards greater producer responsibility, including transforming Product Stewardship initiatives into full EPR programs (Environment

Canada 2011). The Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment is focused on realizing this goal. They have created an Extended Producer Responsibility Task Group to provide guidance on the development and implementation of EPR programs (Environment Canada 2011).

This task group created a countrywide plan in October of 2009 entitled, “Canada-wide Action

Plan for Extended Producer Responsibility” to help realize their mission (Environment Canada

2010). Overall the group aims to (CCME 2011, 1):

• Identify opportunities to harmonize, make consistent where appropriate, expand, and

improve EPR programs;

• Develop general guidance on EPR issues;

• Identify and explore opportunities to forge strategies for new EPR initiatives; and

• Facilitate EPR communications and information exchange among jurisdictions.

52 Chapter 6: Germany

The country of Germany occupies 357,022 square kilometers of land in central Europe

(CIA 2011). The landscape is mostly lowlands in the north, uplands in the center and mountainous in the south. The climate is temperate, cool and cloudy with wet winters and summers. Several abundant natural resources can be found in Germany including: coal, natural gas, construction materials and timber (CIA 2011). Air pollution, water pollution and hazardous waste disposal are all current environmental issues. Germany is party to several international agreements to address these and other environmental issues including: Air Pollution, Kyoto

Protocol, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Marine Dumping, and Ozone Layer

Protection.

Germany’s population stands at over 82 million inhabitants and is declining (CIA 2011).

Over 91 percent of the German population is composed of Germans (as defined ethnically) (CIA

2011). Religious affiliation is split evening between Protestant and Roman Catholic. Of the total population, 74 percent live in an urban setting (CIA 2011). Germans enjoy a life expectancy of just under 80 years (CIA 2011). They are governed by a Federal Republic comprised of 16 distinct states. The president is the Chief of State while the Head of

Government is the Chancellor. Their legal system is a civil law system with indigenous concepts. Legislative acts are reviewed in the Federal Constitutional Court. A bicameral legislature exists for the creation of policy and laws.

Germany has the fifth largest economy in the world and boasts a GDP per capita of

$35,900 (CIA 2011). They are among the world’s largest and most technologically advanced producers of iron, , coal, cement, chemicals, machinery, vehicles, machine tools, electronics,

53 food and beverages, shipbuilding and textiles. The majority of their robust economy is made up of services (71 percent) followed by 28 percent industrial and only one percent agriculture (CIA

2010). Germany’s strong economic and technical background has given it advantages in modernizing and diversifying its waste management techniques. It is considered one of the most advanced countries in the world in terms of municipal solid waste management.

Current Municipal Solid Waste Management

Germany generates over 46 million tonnes of municipal solid waste (MSW) each year

(UNSD 2011). They boast a sophisticated system of solid waste management supported by advanced technology and innovative policy. Their strategy focuses on separate collection and recycling of secondary raw materials (paper and biowaste), pre-treatment of mixed household waste in mechanical-biological treatment plants and dedicated incineration with energy recovery of mixed household waste (EEA 2009).

Composition

The majority of German MSW is composed of organic waste (30 percent) (FMENCNS

2010). Paper waste makes up 24 percent of the MSW stream, while packaging (including plastics) make up 13 percent of the total stream (FMENCNS 2010). The rest of the MSW stream is made up of glass (10 percent), others (8.6 percent), bulky waste (7 percent), textiles (4 percent), diapers (2.1 percent) and metals (1.4 percent) (FMENCNS 2010). Figure 6.1 visually summarizes the composition of the MSW stream in Germany.

54

Figure 6.1 German MSW composition. Source: FMENCNS 2010, 23

Disposal

All German residents are served by MSW collection services (UNSD 2011). Avoidance, recovery, disposal is the principle of the waste hierarchy for waste management in Germany.

Germany was among the first European countries to introduce policies to limit landfilling. As such they have an incredibly sophisticated waste management scheme. The German waste hierarchy follows the EU hierarchy with prevention as the first priority, followed by material recovery and energy recovery (depending on which is better for the environment) (EEA 2009).

The two main biodegradable MSW fractions (paper and biowaste) are collected separately so as

55 to reduce the amount of going to landfills. Paper waste is recovered and biowaste is composted or treated via anaerobic biological treatment.

Recycling is the most common method of treatment for MSW in Germany (Figure 6.2).

Thirty-five percent of all disposed MSW is recycled (OECD 2007). The second most utilized treatment option is incineration. About 34 percent of waste is incinerated, 26 percent of it being incinerated with energy capture (Eurostat 2009). Eighteen percent of MSW is composted while only one percent is disposed of in landfill (OECD 2007). Finally, about eight percent of MSW is treated via other methods, which includes mechanical biological treatment (MBT) (OECD

2007).

Figure 6.2 Management of MSW in Germany (estimated recovery includes MBT). Source: FMENCNS 2010

The amount of MSW recovered has increased dramatically since 1990 (see Figure 6.3)

(FMENCNS 2010). Advances in sorting technology will make it possible to reclaim additional recoverables from MSW in the future. Germany’s overarching objective for waste management

56 is to advance waste treatment technologies so that all waste generated by human settlements in

Germany can be fully recovered in an environmentally safe way.

Figure 6.3 Waste recovery improvements since 1990. Source: FMENCNS 2010, 25

MSW Practices – Management

The responsibility for waste management is shared between the national government, federal states and local authorities (EEA 2009). The national Ministry of Environment sets priorities, participates in the enactment of laws and oversees planning, information and public relations, and defines requirements for waste facilities. There is no national waste management planning in Germany. Instead, each German federal state is able to select their strategy for MSW pre-treatment. Some have focused on reducing the organic content of waste (mechanical-

57 biological treatment), while others have focused on waste incineration. Each state also adopts its own waste management act, which contains supplementary regulation to the national law.

Management Advances & Legislation

Within the Federal Environment Ministry (BMU), the “directorate” deals with waste policy (FMENCNS1 2010). It elaborates legal regulations, ordinances and administrative provisions dealing with the environmentally sound disposal of wastes. In 1996, the BMU established the Act for Promoting Closed Substance Cycle Waste Management and Ensuring

Environmentally Compatible Waste Disposal (FMENCNS1 2010). This act set the groundwork for further ordinances and guidelines, all of which subscribe to the Act’s main initiative; that the owners or generators of waste are responsible for waste avoidance, recovery and disposal

(FMENCNS1 2010). In general, legal regulations now exist for packaging, end-of-life-vehicles, biodegradable wastes, sewage sludge, and hazardous wastes. Voluntary agreements exist for construction and demolition waste and special paper.

The Waste Landfilling Ordinance was implemented in 2001 re-establishing a 2005 deadline for implementing the landfill ban (EEA 2009). Special limit values for the organic content of waste that has undergone mechanical biological treatment (MBT) were also introduced. Due to this legislation the amount of MSW landfilled has fallen to one percent.

Germany is committed to recovering all MSW completely by 2020 so that landfilling of MSW and waste treatment residues will no longer be necessary.

One of the core tenets of German waste legislation is the producer responsibility principle. In 1991, the Packaging Ordinance became a prototype for legislation designed to close substance cycles. It requires manufacturers and distributers to take back packaging and to re-use

58 or recycle it. Producers and distributers have since come together to set up a “Dual Disposal

System”. This system operates alongside of public waste disposal arrangements and organizes the curbside collection of packaging waste directly from private households, sorting the waste and recycling it. The levying of charges is determined by the license label, the “Green Dot”, introduced in 1993 (FMENCNS1 2010). More recently, federal recycling targets for packaging waste were set by the 2004 Packaging Directive.

Extended Producer Responsibility in Germany

Germany is often used as a model for implementing EPR policy and programs. EPR policy has existed in Germany since the early 1990s. Currently, EPR initiatives exist in varying forms throughout Germany. Some are legislated (mandatory), while others are organized by manufacturers (voluntarily) and still others are governed by a combination of the two (Nakajima and Vanderburg 2006). The German Packaging Ordinance was the first large-scale EPR initiative. Other programs now exist focusing on end-of-life vehicles and waste electrical and electronic equipment.

The German Packaging Ordinance

The German Packaging Ordinance was put into effect on June 12, 1991 under the

German Waste Act (Nakajima and Vanderburg 2006). With the implementation of this ordinance, Germany became the first country to set requirements for recovery and recycling of sales packaging. The ordinance continues to require retailers and producers to take back a certain percentage of packaging materials and recycle them.

59 A clear path can be followed to the uncover the inception and eventual creation of the

German Packaging Ordinance. Many forces came together to make the development of this ordinance. These forces include the following (Nakajima and Vanderburg 2006, 511):

• In 1986, the Waste Avoidance, Recycling and Disposal Act was passed, setting up the hierarchy of avoidance, then reuse, then recycling. • People were generally aware of and accepting of the polluter pays principle. • Citizens were used to separating wastes for recycling and composting. • Systems for recycling glass and paper and for composting were well established. • Municipal waste and how to reduce waste going to landfills were important public issues. • Public opposition to incineration had increased, making the previous issues even more critical. • Packaging represented 50% of the volume of municipal waste and was a public target for something to try to avoid and reduce.

Becoming Mandatory

As can be deduced from this description, many events and conditions came about over time to encourage the successful adoption of this ordinance. It was not always mandatory, however. For their first try the German government attempted to encourage voluntary measures to reduce packaging (Nakajima and Vanderburg 2006). This was not successful, however, and when no real results were evident, the ordinance was passed by the government so that industry had no choice but to comply with the statutes.

60 During the drafting of the ordinance, both industry and the public participated. The ordinance was implemented in three stages (Nakajima and Vanderburg 2006):

1. Transport packaging

2. Excess (secondary) packaging8

3. Sales packaging9

The ordinance implements mandatory controls with time-based quotas for material re-use and recycling, and by requiring mandatory return to retailers of packaging waste. Packaging waste is not a joint responsibility between municipalities, producers and distributors. Total responsibility lies on the producer and the distributor. The ordinance also allows for producer responsibility organizations (PROs). This is also sometimes referred to as an “industry exemption scheme” because it exempts the company from directly managing its waste (Nakajima and Vanderburg 2006).

German states are in charge of implementing the national ordinance. The ordinance requires that the collected packaging material be recycled “insofar as this is technically possible and economically reasonable” (FMENCNS 2004, 18). It also specifies mandatory quotas for recycling glass, paper/paperboard/carton, tin plate, aluminum, plastic and composites. The quota reflects the percentage (on a waste basis) of the packaging material in circulation. Quotas set according to hierarchy of avoidance/reduction at source, reuse, recycling and energy recovery.

8 Secondary packaging is defined as “packaging that is used as packaging additional to sales packaging and is not necessary for transfer to the final consumer for reasons of hygiene, durability or the protection of goods from damage or contamination” (FMENCNS 200, 4; Nakajima and Vanderburg 2006, 511).

9 Sales packaging is defined as packaging that is made available as a sales unit and arises at the final consumer. Sales packaging within the meaning of the Ordinance shall also include such packaging provided by retailers, restaurants and other service providers as facilitates or supports the transfer of goods to the final consumer (service packaging) and disposable dishes and disposable cutlery (FMENCNS 2004, 4; Nakajima and Vanderburg 2006, 511).

61 The quotas were raised after the first few years of implementation in order to allow industries to ease into the new requirements.

The Importance of PROs

After a short time of the German Packaging Ordinance’s implementation, it was obvious that tracing packaging back to the specific manufacturer or distributor was difficult. This was one of the reasons that Producer Responsibility Organizations (PROs) were allowed into the process as third party contributors. Under a PRO, packaging producers claim collective responsibility for the collection and recycling of packaging waste.

The PRO in Germany is called, “Duales System Deutschland” (DSD) (Nakajima and

Vanderburg 2006, 512). Manufacturers, via the DSD, pay for the recycling required by the EPR regulations. They pay a licensing fee in accordance to the amount and type of waste packaging the company’s packaging represents out of the total in a year. Manufacturers place a green dot on the packaging in order to indicate that that package should be collected and recycled by DSD.

Fees paid to PRO not for covering cost of recycling because anticipated that recycling would pay for itself.

In the beginning, license fees were based on the volume of packaging and not the type of packaging. This changed however, after it became clear that this fee structure did not create any incentives for manufacturers to choose materials that were easier to recycle. The new fee structure is now based on the material used. The policy has proven successful in achieving the goals of EPR. Manufacturers were motivated to change the type of material they used and designs. The results of the packaging ordinance have been successful at meeting its goals of shifting the materials used in packaging from those that are less environmentally acceptable to those that are more so and also to reduce packaging waste.

62 Keys to success

There are many key reasons why the German’s have succeeded in implementing successful EPR policy. The first is that they did not give into lobbyists to lower quotas during the policy’s inception. In addition, retailers play a major role. This is important because they have a large influence over packaging and have a strong incentive (cost to them) to demand minimal packaging from producers.

63 Chapter 7: Japan

Japan is an island chain nation covering a total of 377,915 square kilometers of land in the Pacific Ocean (CIA 2011). The terrain is mostly rugged and mountainous and the accompanying climate varies from tropical in the south to a cool and temperate in the north.

Japan and its land cover were not blessed with an abundance of natural resources, with the exception of fish. This lack of resources forces the country to import most of its energy needs.

In addition to their limited natural resources, the country is also under constant threat of volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis and typhoons.

The major environmental issues that plague Japan deal with both the water that surrounds them and the air that hangs above them. Air pollution from power plant emissions results in acid rain and this acid rain acidifies the water sources threatening both water quality and aquatic life.

In an effort to resolves some of their environmental issues, Japan has become party to several international agreements pertaining to waste, including: Kyoto Protocol, Environmental

Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection

Almost 127 million people inhabit the land area of Japan, but the growth of the population is declining (CIA 2011). Of these 127 million people about 66 percent inhabit the urbanized areas of Japan (CIA 2011). The Japanese enjoy life expectancy of just over 82 years and the most practiced religion is Shintoism (84 percent), followed by Buddhism and

Christianity (CIA 2011).

Until the mid-1800s Japan was isolated from the outside world (CIA 2011). Upon finally opening their ports external influence sparked rapid industrialization. Since the country’s industrialization, its GDP per capita has risen to $34,200 (CIA 2011). Services make up the

64 majority of their economy (76 percent) followed by industry (23 percent) and agriculture (2 percent) (CIA 2011). Japan is among the world’s largest and technologically advanced producers of motor vehicles, electronic equipment, machine tools, steel and nonferrous metals, ships, chemicals, textiles and processed food.

The Japanese government is a parliamentary government with a constitutional monarchy.

Within this government there are 47 administrative divisions (prefectures). Their legal system is modeled after European civil law systems with English-American influence. Legislative acts are reviewed in the Supreme Court. The Chief of State is the Emperor and the Head of the

Government is the Prime Minister. The cabinet is appointed by the prime minister and a bicameral Diet (or Kokkai) is used to create a democratic process.

Current Municipal Solid Waste Management

Limited landfill space and a tradition of energy conservation pushed Japan into environmental leadership and subsequently they have become leaders of waste management

(World Bank 2005). Protecting the global environment has become a number one issue among the general public in Japan and their system of waste management exemplifies the emphasis of the importance they put on this issue.

Composition

Japan generates almost 55 million tonnes of municipal solid waste (MSW) every year

(OECD 2005; UNSD 2011). Organic material makes up the largest percentage of the MSW stream in Japan (34 percent) (OECD 2005). Paper and paperboard follow closely behind composing 33 percent of the total waste stream (OECD 2005). Plastics make up 13 percent,

65 textiles and others compost 12 percent, glass five percent, and metals three percent (OECD

2005).

Disposal

All residents of Japan are served by MSW collection services (UNSD 2011).

Incineration is the major treatment technique for MSW and has been for the last century (Tanaka

2005). About 73 percent of MSW is incinerated and the majority of the incinerated material goes to facilities with the capability for energy capture (OECD 2005).

Recycling is also another major tool used by the Japanese in MSW management (Figure

7.1). About 35 percent of waste is recycled when including privately recycled materials (Okuda and Thomson 2007). Recycling has been vigorously pursued in the public and private sectors.

Japan leads the world in the recycling of packaging (glass, paper, steel and aluminum), despite the fact that it has no established quotas for recycling. They are also leading the world in sustainable landfill strategies, which promote stabilization and after-use of the land.

Figure 7.1 MSW generation and disposal methods in Japan (2005). Source: Okuda and Thomson 2007

66 Only three percent of collected MSW is disposed of in sanitary landfills (OECD 2005).

Other techniques are also used on occasion. Biological treatment, for example, is one method that may be used to dispose of up to six percent of the total disposed waste in Japan (OECD

2005).

MSW Practices – Management

In Japan, all levels of government are integrally involved in MSW management. The proximity principle – disposing of waste close to its origin – has been a central value in MSW management in Japan for the last 30 years and continues to be the national social norm in MSW management (Okuda and Thomson 2007). Recently, however, despite fierce dedication to this principle, MSW management policy has shifted towards regionalization due to the rising cost of

MSW management and the closure of smaller incinerators. MSW is strongly controlled at all levels, with the central government providing funds and policy direction and prefectures and municipalities being the primary implementing authorities.

Management Advances & Legislation

Japan has a long history of waste management legislation (Table 7.1). In fact, the first was enacted in 1900 (Tanaka 2005). Under the Japan recycling law

(Containers and Packaging Recycling Law of 1997), food and other industries are obligated to promote the use of recycled resources and to encourage consumers to recycle their product packaging (Tanaka 2005; World Bank 2005). The Law for Promotion of Utilization of Recycled

Materials was promoted in 1991 and five related laws and acts were established in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Those laws and acts include: the Containers and Packaging Law, the Electric

67 and Household Appliances Recycling Law, the Food Recycling Law, the Automobile Recycling

Act, and the Construction Material Recycling Act.

Table 7.1 Additional waste-related legislation in Japan.

Source: Tanaka 1999

Over a decade and a half ago, Japanese society was forced to confront numerous environmental constraints on waste management. Landfill sites were becoming scarce, concerns mounted as to the disposal of toxic wastes, hazardous emissions from waste-management facilities became problematic and there was growing concern over the high dependence Japan had on imports of raw materials (Ogushi and Kandlikar 2007). Due to these issues, and many high-profile controversies, the issue of waste disposal became increasingly visible on the

Japanese political agenda in the 1990s. This newfound prominence culminated in the adoption of new laws and initiatives aimed at creating safer and more effective waste management. EPR policy emerged as the central strategy to Japan’s new approach towards MSW management.

68 Extended Producer Responsibility in Japan

Japan’s existence as an island nation creates unique challenges for the management of their MSW. The inherit lack of landfill space and densely populated urban areas has driven the nation to look at alternative ways of waste disposal. Since the late 1990s the Japanese government has supported the development of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) policy by enacting EPR requirements for waste packaging, end-of-life vehicles, electric appliances and personal computers (INFORM 2003).

Government Involvement in Creation and Implementation

The Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

(METI) were the main departments within the Japanese government that took steps to enact EPR legislation. The “Basic Law for Establishing and Recycling-based Society” created in 2000 serves as the framework guiding both recycling and producer responsibility efforts (INFORM

2003). Japan invokes the shared-responsibility principle in their EPR policy implementation.

By using the ideas of the share-responsibility principle, citizens, businesses, municipalities and the national government each have clearly defined responsibilities (Ogushi and Kandlikar 2007).

The Home Appliances Recycling Law exhibits a poignant example of this principle.

EPR Applied to Electric Appliance Waste

By the late 1990s the Japanese began to notice an increasing quantity of electric appliances in their MSW stream (INFORM 2003). They also observed that there was inadequate processing capacity for these waste products. The government’s immediate response to these observations was to create and enact the Recycling Law in 1998. In order to give time for manufacturers, importers, and retailers to prepare themselves to comply with all of

69 the requirements of the law didn’t go into effect until April 2001 (INFORM 2003). The law shifted the responsibility of collecting and recycling appliances (i.e. air conditioners, , televisions, washing machines) from the government and citizens to the manufacturers, retailers, and importers of the appliances. The law obligates manufacturers to finance the recycling of their products and makes a trade group, the Association for Electric

Home Appliances (AEHA), responsible for any orphan products10 that may present themselves.

This law also sets out that for every product sold by a manufacturer, the retailer must take back a similar used product from the consumer.

Under the language of the Home Appliance and Recycling Law retailers, citizens, and manufacturers have been assigned specific responsibilities in order to successfully implement the

EPR legislation. Retailers hold primary responsibility for providing collection services. They serve as the collectors of end-of-life products and ensure that they are taken to the appropriate collection center. Citizens, the consumers, pay a portion of the cost for the product’s transportation and recycling. Each product type has a mandated transportation and recycling fee that the consumer must pay at the time of purchase (computers/automobiles), during regular inspection (automobiles sold before the law), or at time of disposal (home appliances). Finally, manufacturers are required to see that their products are recycled properly.

As specified by the Home Law, manufacturers assume responsibility for the proper recycling of their products. To conform to these regulations manufacturers have created two consortia. Each group has established regional consolidation centers to ensure complete transport and collection of their products from these centers to

10 Orphan Products – those products that outlast their manufacturer (INFORM 2003, 1).

70 recycling facilities. Companies that sell only a small number of products in Japan take advantage of the consortia to designate other organizations to fulfill their collection and recycling responsibilities on their behalf.

Financing EPR

In order to finance the collection, transport and recycling stipulated in the Home

Appliances Recycling Law, end-of-life fees are paid by consumers (not typical of most EPR programs). Instead of using front-end financing requirements, such as those common in Europe, which encourage costs to be included in the price of the product so it is invisible to the consumer, Japan directly assesses the fee to the consumer. In the case of new computers and automobiles the fee is assessed at the product’s purchase. This fee structure is designed to stave off illegal dumping. These fees alone do not cover all the costs of recycling and manufacturers are responsible for the remaining costs.

Monitoring EPR

Japanese government has implemented a robust monitoring system to abate illegal dumping brought on initially by the end-of-life fees (INFORM 2003). Individual companies are required to track the weight of their products collected and recycled within each product category. The Association for Electric Home Appliances (AEHA) is responsible for aggregating the data and it later voluntarily reports on the implementation of the law. There is no specified public reporting schedule, but companies, the government and AEHA distribute the data collected on recycling rates to the public.

71 Successes & Shortfalls

The recycling of collected goods has performed well over the life of the legislation.

Industrial investment in both research and development towards the establishment of infrastructure dedicated to improving the recovery process is one major reason for this documented success.

The processes for the collection of manufactured goods have not been entirely successful.

The law fails to specify material restrictions or other requirements that could promote design for environment practices by appliance manufacturers. Japan’s EPR policy for electronics relies on recycling goals rather than collection targets as in Europe. This creates manufacturers who are only motivated to engage in increased design for disassembly, reuse, and recycling if it will help them to meet specified recovery targets. There are no concrete incentives to encourage new, more environmentally compatible designs.

72 Chapter 8: South Africa

South Africa covers over one million square kilometers at the southern-most tip of the

African continent (CIA 2011). The country is made up of a vast interior plateau rimmed by rugged hills and a narrow coastal plain. It is blessed with various naturally occurring elements and natural resources. Coal and natural gas are two of the major resources found naturally there.

The climate in South Africa varies from semiarid to subtropical along the east coast and often suffers from prolonged droughts.

Frequent droughts have brought to light a serious problem with their ability to provide sufficient water to its inhabitants. Conservation of water is now one of the primary issues in the country and many are pushing to introduce control measures on the use of rivers and lakes. In addition to water quantity problems South Africa is also battling water quality issues. Rivers are being polluted by agricultural runoff and urban discharge. In addition to water issues, air pollution, soil erosion and desertification are also major environmental problems plaguing the country. Proper disposal of municipal solid waste is also an issue although it is not yet considered a priority. South Africa is party to several international agreements pertaining to waste including: Kyoto Protocol, Hazardous Wastes, Marine Dumping and Ozone Layer

Protection (CIA 2011).

There are over 49.1 million people living in South Africa as of 2010 (CIA 2011).

Unfortunately, however, the country is seeing negative population growth. The HIV/AIDS epidemic has put a great strain on the population with over 18 percent of adults living with

HIV/AIDS in 2007 (CIA 2011). The average life expectancy is only 49 years (CIA 2011). In

2000 it was estimated that 50 percent of the total population is below the poverty line (CIA

73 2011). Seventy-nine percent of the population is black Africans followed by 9.6 percent white and 8.9 percent colored (CIA 2011). Religious influence is relatively evenly distributed among several different dominations, but Christian is the major practiced religion (CIA 2011). An interesting facet to the population of South Africa is that the country has 11 official languages (as of 2001) creating a very diverse nation (CIA 2011). In terms of the entire population, 61 percent now live in urban areas (CIA 2011). This number is increasing by each year and is sure to add additional strain onto the current infrastructure of the cities.

As previously mentioned, half of the total population of South Africa is below the poverty line. This fact influences the low GDP per capita of $10,700 (2010) that the country now claims (CIA 2011). In 2010, it was recorded that their economy is supported mainly by the service sector (66 percent) followed by industry (31 percent) and agriculture (3 percent) (CIA

2011).

South Africa as it exists today is a product of colonization by the Dutch and the British.

After overcoming colonization and an apartheid, the country can now proudly declare itself to be a Republic. Although it is important to remember that majority rule was instituted in 1994 and does not yet have a long history to rely on (CIA 2011). As part of the Republic there is one president elected by the National Assembly every five years and a bicameral parliament exists to create legislation for the nine provinces in South Africa. The legal system is based on Roman-

Dutch law and English common law.

Current Municipal Solid Waste Management

Over 42 million cubic meters of municipal solid waste (MSW) is generated each year in

South Africa (SAWiC 2006). The average amount generated per person per day is 0.7 kg

74 (SAWiC 2006). South Africa still lacks an efficient and properly regulated system of solid waste management, but integrated waste management is emerging and may prove a promising solution to the challenges currently facing MSW management (All Business 2010).

Composition

Currently, there is no data available as to the composition of the MSW stream in South

Africa. This may be for various reasons, but it has yet to be compiled and shared publicly.

Disposal

There are still many inhabitants in South Africa who do not receive MSW collection services (DEA 2010). However, the Department of Environmental Affairs is trying to address this issue by initiating a project in order to offer residents free basic refuse removal. Disposal of

MSW in landfills and open dumps still remains the primary treatment type used to manage waste in South Africa. More source separation is gradually being seen, but the recycling rates are still very low (All Business 2010). A new waste hierarchy (Figure 8.1) has been adopted by the government and is being used as the foundation for the creation of their new National Waste

Strategy.

75

Figure 8.1 South African waste hierarchy. Source: SAWiC 2006

MSW Practices – Management

Recently, the government has transferred the permitting of waste disposal sites from the

Ministry responsible for water resources to the Ministry responsible for the environment. Each provincial environmental department is responsible for monitoring and enforcing pollution and waste management issues within their province (SAWiC 2006). Municipalities are responsible for providing waste management services and for managing waste disposal facilities.

Management Advances & Legislation

There are several policies and pieces of legislation that dictate the way in which waste is managed in South Africa. Apart from set policies, the South African government is encouraging

Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR). Voluntary agreements have already been signed with the glass and tire industries and others are being encouraged. In addition to EPR policies, a

National Recycling Forum has been established by the government in order to coordinate

76 recycling activities in the country at the national level (DEAT 2006). The government is also seeking to address the reduction of waste generation at the source as well as encourage the efficient use of resources and the use of cleaner technologies. The government has adopted a

“cradle-to-grave” approach of waste management and are pushing policies, management techniques, and legislation that help to realize this vision of waste management (DEAT 2006).

The National Waste Management Strategy presents a long-term plan (up to the year

2010) for addressing key issues, needs, and problems experienced with waste management.

Government has put this strategy into action by creating the Draft White Paper on Integrated

Pollution and Waste Management for South Africa (1998) (World Bank 2005). The government is aiming to move away from fragmented and uncoordinated waste management to integrated waste management where the focus is on waste prevention and waste minimization.

Extended Producer Responsibility in South Africa

Developing countries have been far slower than developed countries in implementing

EPR. Some of the difficulties associated with implementing EPR in developing countries are as follows (Widmer et al. 2005; Nnorom and Osibanjo 2008):

• consumers tend to re-use or dump products rather than recycle • recycling is undertaken largely by the informal sector, making organized collection difficult to implement and posing risks to the environment and human health • consumers are unwilling to return goods for recycling or pay for disposal of their waste • lack of awareness among consumers and collectors of the environmental and health impacts associated with inappropriate waste handling and disposal, and of the benefits of recycling, including potential financial rewards • lack of funding to finance recycling or even adequate waste management • lack of safe and efficient infrastructure for recycling or appropriate waste management

77 • absence of waste management and recycling legislation/regulations and/or enforcement • lack of adequate capacity, skills and technology • lack of reliable data for designing efficient waste management/recycling strategies and for making rational investment decisions

The Overseers of EPR Implementation in South Africa

Despite many of problems typical of developing nations being present in South Africa, national legislation has steadily given government enough power to implement EPR. The

National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 states that “responsibility for the environmental health and safety consequences of a policy, program, project, product, process, service or activity exists throughout its lifecycle” (Republic of South Africa 1998, 12). In addition, the National Waste Management Strategy mentions EPR and product take-back legislation as major focus areas for continued investigation with the hopes of implementing programs in the near future (DEAT 1999).

The National Integrated Waste Management Bill also uses EPR as one of its major principles for implementation. The more recent National Waste Management Bill (2007) and the

Waste Act (2008) explicitly allow for the environmental minister to establish national standards for EPR and to provide for implementation of nationwide EPR policies. It also allows provincial authorities to implement EPR at the provincial level.

Mandatory Programs

Plastic Bags

Plastic bag litter became a mounting problem in South Africa by the year 2000 and a very small amount of it was being recycled. The government responded to the problem by imposing

78 legislation in May 2003. The new legislation imposed a minimum thickness (to be obtained within five years of the law’s implementation) and a limit to the amount of printing allowed on the surface of the bags. In addition, a mandatory fee of 3c per bag (now 4c) was imposed on plastic bag manufacturers and importers11 (Nahman 2010). Intentions of legislation included the following three major goals (Nahman 2010):

1. Regulations on bag thickness and printing increase range of potential end uses of recycled plastic bags and lower collection and processing costs thus increasing the viability and cost-effectiveness of plastic bag recycling. 2. The tax on plastic bags manufactured or imported increases cost of manufacturing or importing plastic bags and this cost is passed on to the consumers who must pay for the bags in retail centers. This tax, visible to the consumer, aims to decrease demand for plastic bags and encourages re-use among consumers, reducing material use and the generation of plastic bag waste. 3. Stimulate a plastic bag recycling industry by promoting the return and collection of used plastic bags and to create employment.

Legislation has been effective in reducing plastic bag production and waste, but much less effective in creating a viable plastic bag recycling industry and employment. The money does not go directly to the established company and instead they must go through a process to request the money after turning in a business plan. It has been noted that most of the money collected via the instituted tax end up in government hands (Gosling 2006; Packaging Council of

South Africa 2006; Nahman 2010). Even though this system is widely accepted as sound fiscal management, this process results in insufficient funds for recycling and job creation. Another reason it has not been effective is because the tax on the bags has decreased demand for plastic

11 100c = 1 South African Rand (R); $1 = R7.92 (Nahman 2010)

79 bags (they are being replaced with reusable bags) so now there may not be enough plastic bags in circulation to ensure a viable recycling industry.

Voluntary Programs

Collect-a-Can

Collect-a-Can is a Producer Responsibility Organization (PRO) that “supports the collection of metal cans, the separation of tin from steel, and the sale of recuperated materials”

(Córdoba 2011, 1). The EPR program was established to take advantage of industry-based intervention to encourage recycling. It is a joint venture established in 1993 by a steel and tinplate company and a major producer of beverage cans and other packaging (Brink 2007;

Collect-a-Can 2011). Collect-a-Can buys used cans and pays collectors and consumers above market prices. By doing this they can now effectively subsidize the price paid for used cans, which thereby increases the price thus increases the quantity of used cans that can be supplied.

Collect-a-Can’s “main objective is to ensure Extended Producer Responsibility on behalf of the industry through recovery and recycling of used cans” (Nahman 2010, 158). They have recently adopted a secondary objective: help to avoid harmful legislation like that imposed on the plastic bag industry (Kock 2011). In addition to promoting and facilitating recycling, Collect-a-

Can is directly involved in the physical recycling process itself. Collect-a-Can has experienced success in raising the rate of steel beverage can recycling from 18 percent to 67.5 percent

(Córdoba 2011). The program has endured for so long for two main reasons: (1) funding for the program is exclusively given by the companies involved and (2) cost structures are managed at optimum levels (Collect-a-Can 2011; Córdoba 2011). Collect-a-Can is often cited as being an

80 excellent example of how industry can develop a sustainable effort to meet its responsibilities to the environment.

Glass Recycling Company

The South African government’s focus on the packaging industry and its strict legislation on plastic bags motivated the glass industry to coordinate efforts and embrace the concept of

EPR. This coordinated effort resulted in the formation of the Company (GRC) in 2006 (Nahman 2010). The GRC is a non-profit joint industry initiative established through a nationwide partnership between government, glass manufacturers, fillers and recyclers. The

GRC is a PRO responsible for facilitating the recovery of waste glass for recycling on behalf of the glass industry. They do not partake in the physical recycling process, like the PRO established as part of the Collect-a-Can program, and recycling is instead carried out on site by major glass producers.

The GRC focuses on facilitating glass recovery by promoting glass recycling, raising awareness about its importance, and building capacity (Brink 2007). They follow a model which uses a combined advance recycling fee/incentive system to encourage recycling of glass.

Member companies pay a tax at the point of purchase per ton of glass bottles purchased from glass manufacturers (The Glass Recycling Company 2011). This tax is used to cover costs and raise funds for the provision of information (i.e. marketing, education programs, awareness campaigns), basic collection infrastructure, and financial incentives. They also work to increase supply by placing glass banks at strategic locations around the country.

81 PETCO

The PET industry was motivated to institute its own EPR program by their hopes to avoid government legislation like that imposed on the plastic bag industry (PETCO 2006). Its functioning and creation occurred much like that of Collect-a-Can and the Glass Recycling

Company described above. PETCO was officially formed among PET manufacturers in 2004 and acts as a PRO for all of the PET industry in South Africa (Nahman 2010).

Success of Voluntary Programs in South Africa

In the case of South Africa, voluntary EPR programs and policies have been more successful in achieving the goals of EPR than mandatory programs (Figure 8.2). This should not imply, however, that voluntary initiatives are always and everywhere more effective than mandatory regulations. It is likely that differing results for plastic bags, when compared with other packaging waste streams in South Africa, can be explained by examining the unique characteristics of plastic bags that make it more difficult to recycle.

Figure 8.2 Recovery rates over time for plastic bags, cans, glass, and PET. Source: Nahman 2010, 161

82

“Voluntary” EPR Policies Truly Voluntary?

It is important to point out that “voluntary” initiatives in South Africa were arguably not always fully voluntary (Nahman 2010). The voluntary agreements created by the industries were signed by the government in both voluntary cases presented in this chapter. It could also be argued that while legislation was not directly effective, it was very effective in motivating a variety of industries to get on board with EPR and institute EPR programs and policies.

83 Chapter 9: Case Study Conclusions and Key Points

Brazil

Brazil’s attempt at EPR policy implementation failed to reach the expectations of its implementers and has yet to achieve the success enjoyed by the European countries that it is modeled after. In trying to recreate these European policies, however, they failed to realize that their country and the countries of Europe exist under very different circumstances. Germany, for example, is small compared to the land mass enjoyed by Brazil. The Brazilian government and economy are also very different from most European countries. In addition, the culture and pre- existing rivalries are unique to Brazil. Brazil did not recognize these major differences before implementing EPR policy in their country.

Brazil’s experience with EPR reinforces the idea that there is no single model that will be successful in every country. Each country has its own unique circumstances and should tailor their policies and programs to conform to their existing and historical context. Brazil’s implementation of EPR can also teach other similar countries about the things that they should be aware of when considering EPR implementation.

One of the most important facets that the EPR program implemented for tire waste lacked was a thorough monitoring system (Milanez and Bührs 2009). Official data, including how much is consumed and how much is collected, needs to be existent and available in order to determine targets and quotas as well as to ensure transparency between all parties involved. This data will be even more reputable if it is collected and posted by a nonbiased third party entity.

Additionally, involving experts in the trade would be ideal. This third party data would help to cut down on disagreements between industries. A system such as this would have helped Brazil

84 tremendously in addressing the historical rivalry that exists among stakeholders in the tire industry.

Considering this tremendous rivalry brings us to the next lesson that Brazil can teach us.

It is crucial to investigate and be aware of any historical rivalries or misgivings among stakeholders before embarking on EPR policy implementation. Brazil’s unawareness as to the extent of bad blood between the tire importers and tire manufacturers led to the industry’s unwillingness to cooperate as a single entity and inevitably led to the minimal success of the policy. The unwillingness of these two stakeholders to work together also contributed to the inability to create a mandatory policy. Instead, EPR became merely an agreement between the stakeholders.

This “agreement” between the two major stakeholders made the resolutions and requirements of the EPR policy ambivalent. They were designed as mandatory regulations, but lack sufficient legal support to be fully enforced. This is a consequence of EPR policy being implemented as agreements rather than enforceable legislation. If a policy is created using mandatory regulations it will function with the most success under mandatory EPR. Regulations created to be mandatory are not ideal to be implemented in a voluntary structure.

Canada

Even though Canada is still working towards the development of true Extended Producer

Responsibility programs and policies, they still have wisdom to offer us. Canada operates their current version of EPR using the ideals of Stewardship policy or initiatives. Product

Stewardship serves as a form of EPR, but it does not subscribe to the key goals associated with

85 the definition of EPR. In addition, it does not set out mandatory regulations nor does it require the producer to assume sole responsibility for the disposal of their products.

Product Stewardship could serve as a good way to ease producers and consumers into the world of true EPR. Canada has used this method as a way to do just that. They started with products that received strong public support (such as toxics) and included incentives for consumer participation to maximize recovery rates, (e.g. deposit refund systems, and return-to- retail options) (McKerlie et al. 2006). They also continue to involve local governments and municipalities in the siting and zoning of collection depots in communities. By getting the public involved in the process of proper waste disposal Canada is gaining allies, which can be called upon later when they eventually transfer financial and physical responsibility to the producers.

Germany

Germany is considered to be the poster child for Extended Producer Responsibility. They serve as an excellent example of how a mandatory EPR initiative can work efficiently and successfully. Through the implementation of their mandatory program, they have also done the outside world a favor by identifying potential pitfalls. One of the major challenges that presented itself to Germany was the formation of monopolies via a single product responsibility organization (PRO). It is important to be aware of this potential issue and to take steps in order to avoid the formation of a monopoly.

In addition to being cautious when dealing with PROS, it is also important to be careful of putting quotas too high as this may facilitate exportation of waste (as is suspected to have occurred in Germany). An action plan must be determined as to what to do if quotas are

86 exceeded. The question, “How do you plan for managing much more waste than originally counted on?” must be asked.

Germany’s success in the mandatory model did not come without hard work, difficult choices and extreme advances in technology. Extensive infrastructure is needed in order to successfully imitate the German model of EPR policy. It is also essential that those involved in the policy’s creation are willing to stand strong against the bargaining power of producers.

Japan

Japan gives us an excellent example of how geographical circumstances (i.e. it is an island nation) can greatly influence and motivate the use of alternative policy techniques. The land restraints and highly populated areas create a great need for managing waste in an efficient way. This is evident in their current municipal solid waste (MSW) management hierarchy and their implementation of strict EPR policy.

South Africa

South Africa has experience with both mandatory and voluntary EPR programs. Oddly enough, it was the voluntary programs initiated by industry that proved to be the most effective at achieving the goals of EPR.

South Africa showed us that shareholder commitment is crucial to the success of the voluntary model. “Such commitment is more likely to be secured through a voluntary industry initiative than through government-imposed regulations, highlighting one of the benefits of voluntary industry initiatives” (Nahman 2010, 159). It is important to realize, however, that the voluntary EPR initiatives were originally motivated by the mandatory legislation affected on the plastic bag industry. This points to the fact that mandatory legislation has the potential to, and in

87 this case did, motivate voluntary EPR action in the form of policies and programs created by industry to avoid mandatory programs implemented on their business.

88 Chapter 10: Findings & Analysis

The case study was analyzed based on 13 variables that will best enlighten us as to how

EPR policies and programs differ and relate between the five countries studied here. The identified variables include:

• General Context • Cultural Context • Government Organization • Economy • Current MSW Management Hierarchy • MSW Management Responsibility • Approach to EPR Policy • Voluntary or Mandatory? • Physical Responsibility • Financial Responsibility • Reporting Responsibility • Enforcement Responsibility • Unique Characteristics

Now that all of the data is available, remembering that language, time and funding were three major constraints to the data collection process, we are ready to explore what each of the 13 variables has to teach us about EPR policy implementation in the five countries studied. Table

10.1 gives an overview of the final analysis of each country based on the 13 determined variables. It is important to point out that the descriptions in each cell of the table assign value based solely on the comparison between the five countries involved in the case study. It is also worthwhile to note that for our purposes the term “success” means that the EPR program or policy has increased recycling, decreased MSW and/or motivated upstream design changes

89 (design for the environment12). In order to specify the level of success based on these three indicators different color stars have been placed beside the country name in the table to indicate which characteristics of success the country exhibits.

Following the table a more detailed comparison will be made across each of the five countries examined. Key trends and patterns will be explored and concrete lessons extracted from the available data.

12 Design for the Environment (DfE) – This is an idea that affects the upstream design of products. It means that producers have made an effort to carefully select materials and ingredients to create designs that line up with improving the health and environmental impact that the product (and its packaging) has once it is distributed to consumers (U.S. EPA 2010).

90 Table 10.1 Summary of key findings based on 13 identified variables. Brazil * Canada * Germany *** Japan ** South Africa * Small, densely populated island Large landmass, European country, Developing country, Large landmass, high nation, high life moderate life highly technological, high rate of poverty, General life expectancy, long expectancy, expectancy, serious high life expectancy, little technological history of EPR technologically Context environmental long history of strict innovation, very low implementation advanced, long concerns EPR implementation life expectancy history of EPR implementation Christian (several Roman Catholic, Roman Catholic, Protestant and Shintoism, isolated sects), recent colonized by close ties to the Cultural Roman Catholic, for decades, apartheid, 11 official Europeans before United Kingdom, primarily German in primarily Japanese in languages, colonized Context independence, heavy French ethnicity (91.5%) ethnicity (98.5%) by Europeans before diverse population influence independence Parliamentary Parliamentary Democracy, Government Government with a Federal Republic Federation and Federal Republic Republic Constitutional Organization Constitutional Monarchy Monarchy High GDP, 5th Low GDP, relies on High GDP, relies on largest economy in High GDP, relies on Low GDP, relies on Economy service sector service sector the world, relies on service sector service sector service sector Recycling and Covered ditch, Primarily sanitary Incineration with Landfills and open Current MSW incineration with sanitary landfill, landfill, recycling, energy capture, dumps, many still do Management energy capture,100% 83% receive 99% receive 100% receive not receive receive collection Heirarchy collection services collection services collection services collection services services Shared between Provincial Shared between MSW federal, Central government, environmental National government national government, Management provincial/territorial prefectures and department and and municipalities federal states and and municipal municipalities individual Responsibility local authorities governments municipalities Responsibility on Responsibility on Approach to Responsibility on Shared-responsibility producer Product Stewardship producer producer Principle EPR Policy (theoretically) (theoretically) Voluntary Both are present, agreements Voluntary or although mandatory (although initial goal Voluntary Mandatory Both are present is more visible and Mandatory? was to create a notably successful mandatory program) Citizens, businesses, municipalities, and Producers, but in Physical Producers/not clearly Producers, but often the national Producers some instances defined contract to PROs government (each Responsibility contract to PROs have clearly defined responsibilities) Shared by consumers Financial Producers (and local Public funds/tax Producers and Producers (fees), producers and governments) based funding government Responsibility government Not clearly stated, Association for assume local Government (states Electric Home Reporting Federal government governments as they No specific entity report to higher Appliances (AEHA) (theoretically) are responsible for identified Responsibility entities) (in the case of collection and ) management Federal government Enforcement Provinces and Prefectures and (no real power or Individual states Government/no one territories municipalities Responsibility incentive to enforce) Vast landscape and Intense, longstanding many cultural Advanced (world Island nation, Unique rivalries among variations among renowned) waste constant threat of HIV/AIDS epidemic stakeholders in some territories and Characteristics heirarchy system natural disaster industries provinces (i.e. ) * Increases Recycling * Decreases MSW * Motivates upstream design changes 91 Analysis Based on Variables Applied to Each Investigated Country

The following analysis focuses on patterns, trends and general observations made via the study of Brazil, Canada, Germany, Japan and South Africa confined within the parameters of the

13 variables outlined in Table 10.1. The main points extracted here are not meant to be used as an undisputable set of trends and patterns found in global EPR implementation, but instead are meant to lead us to the beginning of a broader typology for existent EPR implementation methods. This typology will be explored in more depth within the next chapter.

General Context

As explained in the methodology section of this thesis, it is imperative to gain a general understanding of the context in which EPR is being implemented. The general context of each country was examined carefully and several interesting trends and patterns were found between each one. The first was that life expectancy was found to have no obvious bearing on the success of EPR programming. South Africa has the lowest life expectancy (50 years) and still exhibits some indicators of success via its voluntary EPR programming and policies (CIA 2011).

Relating to the impact of life expectancy, it was observed that the level of poverty does not necessarily spell disaster for a country looking to implement EPR. South Africa and Brazil have the highest incidences of poverty yet are able to implement and see some success (although limited) in their voluntary programs.

It was found that, overall, a country with a longer history of EPR implementation will enjoy higher success and a greater diversity of programs (inclusion of different products and the mixing of mandatory with voluntary policies). Japan and Germany have the longest history of implementation and are seen to experience notable success in all of their programs. Along with

92 experience, it was also found that the more sophisticated a country’s technological portfolio the more likely mandatory EPR policies are to succeed. High levels of technological sophistication are found in both Germany and Japan and have undoubtedly aided in their successful implementation of mandatory policies.

Geography was also noted as having an impact on EPR. Smaller landmasses, such as

Japan, were found to be more motivated to engage in EPR, while countries covering large landmasses, such as Brazil and Canada, may be at a disadvantage in that their ability to effectively implement mandatory EPR becomes difficult to manage over vast expanses of land.

After reaching a better understanding of the trends occurring within the general context of each country, we can now bring our focus onto the cultural context each country has to share with us.

Cultural Context

Understanding the underlying cultural context of a country is essential if one hopes to gain a better understanding of the potential for different policy implementation types. One of the most crucial aspects of culture is religion. While it is recognized that religion can greatly affect the motivation for policy implementation, it was found that among these five countries studied religion does not have any obvious influence on EPR. It must be said, however, that four out of the five countries studied identify most closely with the principles of Christianity, which may explain why there was little to be gained from trying to understand how religion influences EPR implementation.

It was found that the diversity of a country may play a role in predicting the success of

EPR in a country. The case study revealed to us that the less diverse (or more “ethnically pure”)

93 countries, like Germany and Japan, display greater success in implementing consistent EPR policies. Countries like South Africa who have 11 official languages and markedly more inclusion of race and ethnicities does not seem to fair as well in EPR implementation (CIA

2011). In addition to the impact of diversity, it was found that previously colonized countries have more difficulty creating consistent and functioning EPR policies and programs. Brazil and

South Africa stand as our examples to support this finding. The connection between colonization and difficulty in creating consistently functional EPR policies and programs may also be a result of the political and social instability that the colonizers have left as a legacy in the countries they previously ruled. In order to better understand the role that political inefficiency can have on EPR we must next delve into the variable of government organization.

Government Organization

Before delving into the findings within the Government Organization variable, it will be beneficial for the reader to understand the different government types that are present among the five countries (CIA 2011). They are as follows:

Constitutional Monarchy – a system in which a monarch is guided by a constitution whereby his or her rights, duties and responsibilities are defined in written law or by custom.

Federal Republic – a state in which the powers of the central government are restricted and which the states, colonies or provinces, retain a degree of self-government; ultimate power rests with the voters.

Federation – a form of government in which sovereign power is formally divided between a central authority and a number of constituent regions so that each region retains some management of its internal affairs; the central government exerts influence directly upon both individuals and regional units.

94 Parliamentary Democracy – a system in which a legislature (parliament) selects the government according to party strength as expressed in elections.

Parliamentary Government – a government in which the members of an executive branch are nominated to their positions by a legislature or parliament and are directly responsible to it.

Republic – a representative democracy in with the people’s elected representatives and not the people themselves vote on legislation.

Now that we have a better understanding as to the types of governments present in the case study we can now proceed with the analysis.

Political sophistication has an obvious role in whether or not an EPR program, (especially mandatory), will be successful in a given country. The more politically stable and sophisticated a country’s government the more successful they will be at implementing impactful EPR policy.

Germany and Japan’s EPR programs have reaped the benefit of their political sophistication and

Canada’s sophistication is beginning to show signs of creating more impactful EPR policies.

Brazil and South Africa have not shown this same promise as their governments are still young and struggle organizationally.

While political cohesion was seen to be an extremely important indicator for EPR success, there was no direct correlation between government type and EPR implementation.

Although three out of five of the countries are Federal Republics or Republics I was not able to conclude that Federal Republics had more instances of success because Japan, the second most successful of all five countries, does not use a Federal Republic government type. Therefore, it was not possible to correlate EPR program success to government type.

95 Economy

One very consistent trend that emerged was that all countries rely primarily on the service sector for employing their inhabitants. This is a trend we will be seeing more and more as the world economy modernizes and invests more of itself in services rather than industry and agriculture. Another interesting finding was that GDP does not seem to determine the existence of EPR. EPR existed at some level in each country studied even though some GDPs were significantly lower than others (South Africa vs. Germany). It cannot go without saying, however, that higher GDPs correlate with more successful programs, with the exception of

Canada.

Current MSW Management Hierarchy

Understanding the waste management hierarchy (see page 4 for definition) of each country is important to better understanding EPR in each country. My research uncovered that the more sophisticated and integrated the waste management hierarchy the more profound the existence of EPR. This observation is supported by countries like Germany and Japan who are known for defining strict and diverse hierarchies that include modern waste reduction, reuse, recycling and disposal techniques, and have also found ways to incorporate successful EPR policies.

Another interesting finding came with the investigation into the amount of inhabitants receiving some form of MSW collection service13. The higher the percentage of collection coverage correlates with more focus on EPR policy as an addition to the country’s waste

13 Collection coverage refers to the percentage of people who receive some form of waste removal service. This includes: House retrieval, public waste bins, dumpsters or any other service that the government provides itself or through a contractor.

96 management scheme. Germany and Japan both reported that 100 percent of its inhabitants receive MSW collection services (Eurostat 2009; OECD 2005). Besides the MSW hierarchy of a country, investigation into the entities responsible for carrying it out can bring us closer to understanding EPR implementation.

MSW Management Responsibility

Within this variable I was looking to discover the “who” of MSW management in each country. An obvious trend presented itself in that no single entity is responsible for MSW management in any of the countries. Each management system exhibits shared, decentralized responsibility. This means that the responsibility of MSW management is distributed among various levels of government. In this shared responsibility system, it was found that municipalities take the brunt of the financial burden. This often large financial burden on the local governments may give countries with this setup increased motivation to implement EPR in an effort to remove this burden from smallest level of government.

Approach to EPR Policy

After examining each country individually, we can now bring them together to discover that Extended Producer Responsibility is not defined universally among the five countries examined here. This misalignment among the countries and the inability to create a model of

EPR policy that will function successfully across boundaries and cultures are undoubtedly connected. Three main approaches were identified and defined among the five countries. They include:

97 1. Responsibility on Producer – This implementation technique is considered to be the “traditional” EPR implementation method. Its goal is to put both the financial and physical responsibility of waste management onto producers. It has also been observed, however, that while total producer responsibility may be the policy’s aim, the responsibility will often shared by both the producer and the government.

2. Product Stewardship – This method of EPR implementation takes the form of a voluntary program or policy. It spreads the responsibility out among the producers, consumers and the government. Each entity involved is made to feel connected to the policy and chooses to be involved in the program(s).

3. Shared-responsibility Principle – This implementation type takes the form of a mandatory policy or program. The responsibility of waste management is strictly assigned to producers, consumers, retailers and the government. There is evident enforcement, consumer fees and reporting requirements that are stipulated in EPR policy.

Among these three methods there was no single method of implementation identified to guarantee success. Upon the examination of these three methods across more countries, however, it may become clear that one method has greater potential for consistent success than the others.

Voluntary or Mandatory?

Whether a policy is implemented as a mandatory program or a voluntary program has strong implications as to the function and organization of EPR. Mandatory policies vary distinctly from policies implemented on a voluntary basis. Mandatory programs with the technological and financial means to implement them correctly find more success than voluntary programs. Both Germany and Japan exhibit the truth behind this observation. In addition, mandatory policies find greater success in manipulating upstream product designs (design for the environment), as Germany shows us. Voluntary programs can prove successful, but are most

98 often present in poorer countries (with the exception of Canada). Countries with lower GDPs and higher incidences of poverty, such as Brazil and South Africa, followed the norms of this finding.

Physical Responsibility

Determining which entity takes the actual physical responsibility for handling and disposing of waste is an important step in better understanding EPR implementation. It was found that the majority of the five case countries place responsibility on producers for physically disposing of their waste. Japan came through as the exception to this rule due to the shared- responsibility principle they follow in the implementation of their EPR programs. It was also found that Producer Responsibility Organizations (PROs) are a common alternative to producers directly dealing with their waste. By becoming part of a PRO producers are able to comply with their disposal responsibility without getting their hands dirty. While most EPR programs examined put full disposal responsibility on the producers, we will find that the financial responsibility tells a different story.

Financial Responsibility

After closely examining the financial organization of EPR programs in each of the five countries it could be seen that many of the countries claim to be implementing Extended

Producer Responsibility, but most still use public funding for programs. Germany was the only one that implemented policy that stayed true to the accepted definition of EPR and put total financial responsibility onto the producers.

99 Reporting Responsibility

A key contributor to a successful EPR program was found in data reporting. Clearly identified reporting entities are essential for consistent and effective EPR implementation. Japan boasts a very defined system of reporting and as such is able to carry out a more successful EPR program. The tracking of data goes hand in hand with being able to report this data to higher entities for consolidation and analysis. Data collection is important if a program wants to be able to track its progress and adapt to imperfections or successes accordingly.

Enforcement Responsibility

The enforcement of the stipulations included in EPR policy is also essential to a well functioning system of EPR. The most successful examples of EPR have given enforcement responsibilities to state and local entities (e.g. Germany and Japan). Less successful forms of

EPR have enforcement located further away from level of municipalities, have not clearly defined who is responsible for enforcement or do not have incentives in place to encourage compliance.

Unique Characteristics

Throughout the study several unique features arose that were determined to be important to achieving better understanding of EPR implementation. The first came to light in the study of

Brazil’s EPR policy surrounding tire waste where it was determined that internal rivalries among stakeholders can negatively impact EPR implementation. This observation points to the great importance of understanding the historical and current interactions between all stakeholders that will be involved in the implementation of the EPR policy.

100 Alongside of the importance of understanding stakeholder interactions, it was also observed that countries with previously advanced and integrated solid waste management

(SWM) schemes find greater success in implementing effective EPR policies. Finally, the last key unique characteristic to be pointed out was found in the geography of the countries studied.

It seems that countries confined to themselves (island nations) have more motivation for instituting EPR policies and programs as part of their MSW management plan. The lack of space is the key factor in this observation and Japan served as the best example of this among the five countries studied.

101 Chapter 11: Conclusions & Future Research

Within the early stages of analysis it became evident that the direct comparisons between countries would not be the most beneficial information produced by this thesis research. Instead, the case study enabled identification of the components of the EPR policy option existent in the world today. It is now possible to begin to distinguish the key actors, incentives and constraints of EPR. The study also allows for the beginning of an EPR policy typology to take shape. We can now pull out the possible variations of EPR policy from these five countries studied and begin to make general conclusions about EPR in general. More research is inevitably needed to increase the scope of this initial typology, but the research completed here helps policy makers, governments and businesses understand the variation of EPR policy implementation in the world today.

Actors Involved in EPR Process

There are several actors involved in the formation and implementation of EPR policy. It was found through these five cases that there is never just one entity responsible for carrying out

EPR. It takes the culmination of hard work and careful interaction between multiple stakeholders before a country can hope to attain the benefits of a successful EPR policy.

Some of the key actors identified within the case study include each level of government

(federal, state, local). Each level was found to be involved in EPR implementation in varying degrees, but it was evident that their involvement centered on enforcement and data reporting.

Producers (manufacturers, industries, companies, business leaders) were also identified as key actors in the process. They are identified as key stakeholders in EPR policy as they are the ones

102 who will have to make major changes to their budgets and possibly to their product designs when the policy option is enacted.

Along with the producers of products it has been identified that the retailers who sell the products also have a role to play in EPR implementation. Japan, for example, utilized the retailers as collection points and enforcement for carrying out their mandatory policy. In addition to government entities, producers and retailers, waste management companies are also actors in the EPR process as they may have to make changes in their organization and collection methods if EPR is to achieve ultimate success. Finally, Producer Responsibility Organizations

(PROs) fill a key role in EPR implementation. They often serve as the entity that handles the waste and allows industries to meet the targets for recycling as stipulated by the policy.

All of these actors are key to the implementation of EPR policy. Each entity fulfills an important role which cannot be filled by others. Before involving these many actors, it is important that a country understands the good that can come from implementing EPR policy.

There are numerous incentives for enacting EPR that can be used to convince stakeholders that their cooperation will aid in the achievement of something beneficial to their country, their world and themselves.

Incentives for EPR

Several incentives for implementing EPR policies and programs were discovered during the analysis phase of this thesis. The first major incentive for implementation is the transfer of financial responsibility of MSW management from municipalities to producers. This transfer allows for the burden of financing MSW collection and disposal to be lifted off of local governments and their already strained local budgets. Along with removing the burden from

103 local governments and public funds, EPR also has the potential to decrease the amount of MSW being generated and disposed of in landfills. Recycling can also be increased and new markets may open up for the reusable materials diverted from landfill.

A final incentive for EPR policy enactment comes in the form of making changes to products by motivating industry to improve their product designs. These new design changes may take the form of Design for the Environment (DfE), creating products whose materials are improved in order to become more compatible with human health and the environment. This incentive can even be advantageous to companies who would be able to use their new product redesigns as a marketing and public relationships opportunity.

Constraints to EPR Implementation

While there are many reasons to implement EPR, there also exist several constraints that countries must be aware of as they consider their own policies and programs. The first major constraint is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country. In this case the GDP is an indication of the sophistication of the country’s economy and the general well being of its inhabitants. The lower the GDP the lower the chance of EPR policy achieving the goals it sets forth. Infrastructure can pose as another problem. It takes sophisticated infrastructure to begin the large-scale recycling and proper disposal that EPR requires. If a country does not already have this infrastructure in place it could cause problems with the physical implementation of the program.

Another constraint presents itself in the sophistication, or lack of sophistication, found in the various levels of government. Governments that have a long history of cooperation and organization will fair better in the implementation of EPR compared to a country whose

104 government is new or fragmented. Finally, stakeholder cooperation poses as a potential constraint to EPR implementation. All stakeholders, or actors, must be involved and willing to cooperate (or at the very least compromise) or little success will be seen with the implementation of the EPR program or policy.

The major actors, incentives and constraints of EPR are summarized in Table 11.1. It should be noted again that these components are drawn solely from the analysis of the five countries investigated during the case study. More research is still needed to broaden and carefully define a final list of actors, incentives and constraints present in global EPR implementation.

Table 11.1 Actors, incentives and constraints present in EPR policy implementation. Actors Incentives Constraints

• Federal Government • Less strain on • GDP • State Governments municipal budgets • Infrastructure • Local Governments • Generation of less capabilities • Producers MSW • Sophistication of • Business Leaders • Increased recycling government • Retailers • Potential for new • Stakeholder • Waste Management product designs (DfE) cooperation Companies • PROs

EPR Implementation Typology

One thing that is explicitly clear after investigation and analysis is that EPR exists in varying forms around the world. There are a range of policy options that are all contained within the broader EPR policy option. These variations led to the formation of the beginning of an EPR

105 policy typology. There were five main components that were found to be important and connected to EPR implementation in each of the five countries studied. These identified components are:

• Ethnic Diversity • Gross Domestic Product (GDP) • Current Waste Hierarchy Priority • Voluntary or Mandatory • Implementation Method

By examining these five components and how they present themselves among the five countries studied we can begin to see the variation that exists. Table 11.2 gives a visual depiction of the variation in EPR implementation conditions/types and should also exhibit how this type of typology helps to categorize this evident variation in order to make EPR easier for businesses and governments to navigate. More research is needed in order to identify more defined patterns and trends among the five components and EPR implementation, but this typology is a good model to expand on in the future.

106

Table 11.2 EPR typology applied to Brazil, Canada, Germany, Japan and South Africa. BRAZIL

Ethnic Diversity Diverse Less Diverse Moderately Diverse

GDP High Low Moderate Current Waste Incineration Recycling Landfill Hierarchy Priority

Voluntary or Voluntary Mandatory Both Mandatory?

Implementation Responsibility on Shared-responsibility Product Stewardship Method Producer Principle CANADA

Ethnic Diversity Diverse Less Diverse Moderately Diverse

GDP High Low Moderate

Current Waste Incineration Recycling Landfill Hierarchy Priority Voluntary or Voluntary Mandatory Both Mandatory?

Implementation Responsibility on Shared-responsibility Product Stewardship Method Producer Principle GERMANY

Ethnic Diversity Diverse Less Diverse Moderately Diverse

GDP High Low Moderate

Current Waste Incineration Recycling Landfill Hierarchy Priority Voluntary or Voluntary Mandatory Both Mandatory?

Implementation Responsibility on Shared-responsibility Product Stewardship Method Producer Principle

107 JAPAN

Ethnic Diversity Diverse Less Diverse Moderately Diverse

GDP High Low Moderate

Current Waste Incineration Recycling Landfill Hierarchy Priority Voluntary or Voluntary Mandatory Both Mandatory? Implementation Responsibility on Shared-responsibility Product Stewardship Method Producer Principle SOUTH AFRICA

Ethnic Diversity Diverse Less Diverse Moderately Diverse

GDP High Low Moderate

Current Waste Incineration Recycling Landfill Hierarchy Priority Voluntary or Voluntary Mandatory Both Mandatory?

Implementation Responsibility on Shared-responsibility Product Stewardship Method Producer Principle

Future Research

This thesis is meant to be part of a larger conversation about Extended Producer

Responsibility and its variability around the world. The final conclusions are meant to be expanded upon by further research and analysis. One of the most obvious avenues for future research is the completion of a much broader case study. The case study which was undertaken in this thesis focused on only five countries. While cultural and economic diversity were captured in the case study, a case study including a broader range of countries currently implementing EPR policies and programs would add to the viability and benefit of the typology.

108 In addition to broadening the case study of countries implementing EPR, it would also be beneficial to exam each EPR program and policy within individual countries in order to better understand the scope and variability of policy and program types. As part of this investigation into the individual programs it would also be beneficial to look into how countries measure the success of their EPR programs. Currently, it seems that their measures of success do not align with the accepted definition of EPR. Understanding how countries determine their success in this policy option would inevitably bring us to a better understanding of its implementation on a global level. In conjunction with further investigation into country level programs research is needed in order to determine how EPR has evolved in countries around the world.

While much has been observed regarding the government’s role in EPR policy implementation, the point of view of the producer is absent from this thesis’ research, analysis and conclusions. This missing piece to the EPR puzzle is essential to find and examine before a more complete typology and list of constraints and incentives can be assembled. Research as to the impacts that the variability in EPR policies has on manufacturers will be an important avenue to explore in the near future. We need to determine if this diversity of policies and programs is good for producers or, more likely, does it make it more difficult for them. In addition, we need to know the impacts that the different EPR program types have on corporate decision-making.

Policies like EPR now exist in a globalized economy and have the potential to greatly affect the operations of industry. Understanding the range of effects EPR will have has the potential to make it a more robust and effective policy option.

One of the effects that EPR policy implementation strives to accomplish is to influence corporate decision-making by motivating upstream design changes. Unfortunately, this goal was not achieved in most of the countries studied. In fact, only Germany exhibited signs that their

109 EPR policies were affecting design changes before production. This leaves another avenue for future research wide open as we must gain a better understanding as to what it is that drives producers to make changes in upstream design. What does Germany’s EPR policy include that has resulted in industry’s motivation to change their designs? How can EPR policy achieving upstream design changes?

There is a wide array of future research paths that can be taken in order to better understand EPR policy and program implementation. Further study into this subject will be essential if policy makers hope to reap all of the benefits that EPR has to offer. Continued investigation into this subject will also help industries navigate through the variability found in

EPR policy implementation around the world. Extended Producer Responsibility has the potential to truly affect positive change on a global level, but it cannot attain its highest level of influence without being fully understood.

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Chapter 9 McKerlie, Kate, Nancy Knight and Beverley Thorpe. “Advancing Extended Producer Responsibility in Canada.” Journal of Cleaner Production 14 (2006) 616-628. Milanez, Bruno and Ton Bührs. “Extended Producer Responsibility in Brazil: The Case of Tyre Waste.” Journal of Cleaner Production 17 (2009): 608-615. Nahman, Anton. “Extended Producer Responsibility for Packaging Waste in South Africa: Current Approaches and Lessons Learned.” Resources, Conservation and Recycling 54 (2010): 155-162.

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117 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Environmental Data: Compendium 2006-2008, Waste. 2005.

Chapter 11 No citations.

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