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Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: Some Philosophical Problems

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Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: Some Philosophical Problems Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka: Some philosophical problems Jan Westerhof Department of Philosophy University of Durham www.janwesterhof.net [email protected] 1 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide Nāgārjuna’s historical background • 2nd to 3rd century AD • lived mainly in Southern India • six extant philosophical treatises, plenty of later commentarial works Jan October 2007 Westerhof 2 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide The theory of emptiness . everything is empty of svabhāva . epistemological and ontological notion of svabhāva: • essence: what an object cannot lose while remaining that very object • substance: something which does not depend for its existence on anything else . Only substance-svabhāva is the Mādhyamika’s object of refutation. Jan October 2007 Westerhof 3 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide Two general problems . Madhyamaka arguments present both general and specific arguments for the thesis of universal emptiness. Reflective problems for the thesis of universal emptiness: • the emptiness of emptiness • the emptiness of the theory of emptiness (the antirealist’s dilemma) Jan October 2007 Westerhof 4 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide The emptiness of emptiness . Is emptiness itself empty? `Ultimate reality for the Buddhas is svabhāva itself. That, moreover, because it is nondeceptive is the truth of ultimate reality. It must be known by each one for himself.’ . Svabhāva and emptiness are characterized as changeless, not originated, and not dependent on anything else. Emptiness appears to be a contradictory concept. Candrakirti’s Madhyamakāvatārabhāsya 108: 16-19. 5 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide Priest’s response . The contradictory notion of emptiness shows that reality itself is contradictory. `Reality has no nature. Ultimately, it is not any way at all. On the other side of the street emptiness [the lack of an ultimate nature] is an ultimate characteristic of things. The paradox is grounded in the contradictory nature of reality itself.’ Graham Priest: `Nāgārjuna and the limits of thought’, in: Beyond the Limits of Thought, OUP 2002, 267. 6 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide An alternative response . `being changeless, not originated and independent’ means something diferent when applied to svabhāva and to emptiness • emptiness is independent because its existence does not depend on some specific object • emptiness is changeless and not originated because it is the property of every object and not produced together with the empty object Jan October 2007 Westerhof 7 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide Emptiness does not exist by substance- svabhāva . emptiness is not a property phenomena have independently of anything else . example of vitreous floaters . emptiness is dependent since its purpose is to dispel an erroneous conception of objects Jan October 2007 Westerhof 8 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide Emptiness is the essence-svabhāva of all objects . as heat is the essence of fire emptiness is the essence of all things . the notion of emptiness is not contradictory because emptiness does not constitute an underlying substance . emptiness is no noumenal reality but simply a property objects could not lose without ceasing to be those very objects Jan October 2007 Westerhof 9 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide The emptiness of the theory of emptiness Antirealist’s dilemma: . For the global anti-realist, what is the status of the theory of global anti-realism itself? • it is an absolute truth: inconsistency • it is relative: no impact Emptiness of the theory of emptiness: . If everything is empty, what is the status of the claim asserting universal emptiness? • it is not empty: inconsistency • it is empty: impotence Jan October 2007 Westerhof 10 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide Thomas Nagel The claim `everything is subjective’ must be nonsense, for it would itself have to be either subjective or objective. But it can’t be objective, since in that case it would be false if true. And it can’t be subjective, because then it would not rule out any objective claim, including the claim that it is objectively false. […] It is a report of what the subjectivist finds agreeable to say. If he also invites us to join him, we need not ofer any reason for declining since he has ofered us not reason to accept. The Last Word, OUP 1997, page 15. 11 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide Nāgārjuna’s opponent If there is no substance of things, your statement [that everything is empty] must be devoid of substance too. Therefore it cannot deny the substance of things. […] A non-existent fire cannot burn, a non-existent knife cannot cut […]. But if your statement has a substance your original position is destroyed. There is a contradiction and you have to give the special reason why your statement is not to be counted amongst all things. Vigrahavyāvartanī 1-2. 12 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide Considering possible replies . embracing the first horn is not attractive . finding a reply to the `no impact/ impotence’ charge • alternative interpretation of the second horn • understanding the force of Nāgārjuna’s opponent’s argument Jan October 2007 Westerhof 13 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide The `no thesis’ reply ‘If I had a thesis the difculty you mention would apply to me. However, I do not hold any thesis. Therefore there is no defect in my position.’ . Nāgārjuna denies that he asserts any thesis which is to be interpreted according to the opponent’s semantics: • referring to a `ready-made world’ • relying on an objective reference relation Vigrahavyāvartanī 29. 14 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide A question of semantics . In order to reply to the second horn of the dilemma it is necessary to develop a theory of meaning and truth which dispenses with the notion of a non-linguistic world. treat language not as a means of representation but as a set of conventions for coordination between agents Jan October 2007 Westerhof 15.
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