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85The Madhyamaka Speaks to the West.Pdf Kent Academic Repository Full text document (pdf) Citation for published version McGuire, Robert (2015) The Madhyamaka Speaks to the West: A philosophical analysis of nyat as a universal truth. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University of Kent,. DOI Link to record in KAR https://kar.kent.ac.uk/54341/ Document Version UNSPECIFIED Copyright & reuse Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. Versions of research The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the published version of record. Enquiries For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: [email protected] If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html The Madhyamaka Speaks to the West A philosophical analysis of śūnyatā as a universal truth by Robert McGuire A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of a Doctor of Philosophy in Theology and Religious Studies Department of Religious Studies School of European Culture and Languages October 2015 (word count: 99,617) This work was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council under Grant number AH/K503046/1. Page | 1 Gratitude... to Gen Kelsang Tharchin. for the dharma. to Paul, Dave and all my sangha friends. for the debates and discussions. to that unforgettable group of people in Ayrshire. for listening patiently and loving unconditionally. to my parents and my brothers. for the support and the laughter. to my friends. for the escapism. to Lucy. for the kindness and the stoicism. to Richard. for taking me seriously. to Carol. for helping me stay awake. to the kind folks at the University of Kent. for looking after me. to the UK tax-payers and the AHRC. for supporting me and this project. --- I have been taught, and I have come to understand, that through the increase of wisdom and compassion in this world, all living beings may eventually become free from suffering and find lasting happiness and inner peace. Whatever merit this work may have is dedicated to that end. Page | 2 Abstract Through a philosophical analysis of realist interpretations of Madhyamaka Buddhism, I will argue that the Madhyamaka is not well represented when it is represented as nihilism, absolutism or as some non-metaphysical alternative. Indeed, I will argue that the Madhyamaka is misrepresented when it is represented as anything; its radical context-sensitivity entails that it cannot be autonomously volunteered. The Madhyamaka analysis disrupts the ontic and epistemic presuppositions that consider inherent existence and absolute truth to be possible and necessary, and so the ultimate truth, śūnyatā, is not an absolute truth or ultimate reality. However, I will argue that śūnyatā does qualify as a universal truth and should be understood as a context-insensitive, non-propositional truth in a non-dual dependent-relationship with the multitudinous context-sensitive, propositional truths. This analysis will prove helpful in an investigation of those tensions, discernible within Buddhist modernism and the discourse of scientific Buddhism, that arise when Buddhist apologists claim a timeless modernity and a non-hostility with respect to contemporary worldviews. I will argue that apologists can resolve these tensions and satisfy their intuitions of timelessness, but only if they are willing to foreground the crucial distinction between their Buddhist worldview (their context-sensitive propositional truths) and their Madhyamaka attitude towards that worldview (the context-insensitive truth of śūnyatā). I will go on to generalise this result, showing that this Madhyamaka analysis opens up the possibility for frictionless co-operation between any and all worldviews, and that we therefore have a philosophical basis for a workable and sensitive theory of worldview pluralism. I will find it necessary to defend this position by demonstrating that, despite its context-insensitivity, the ultimate truth’s non-dual relationship with conventional truth mitigates against moral and epistemic relativism. I will further substantiate my claim as to the universal truth of śūnyatā by showing that, in Karan Barad’s ‘agential realism’, we find a revealing example of śūnyatā being articulated from within a non-Buddhist context. Thus, I hope to demonstrate some of the good effects of the Madhyamaka message, and show that this message can only be communicated clearly when it is distinguished from the discourses of Buddhism. In this manner, not by giving it a voice but through finding its voiceless authority, I hope to enable the Madhyamaka speak to the West. Page | 3 Table of Contents Chapter 1 – Introduction 7 Methodology 9 Saying the unsayable: the Madhyamaka method 12 Structure of the thesis 14 Chapter 2 - Nāgārjuna as a Nihilist 17 Nāgārjunian disputations 19 Wood’s non-origination 22 Defending a non-nihilist interpretation 23 Non-affirming of entities 25 Nāgārjuna’s non-nihilism 28 Emptiness of emptiness 29 Śūnyatā = pratītya-samutpāda 34 The two truths 39 Conclusion 50 Chapter 3 – Madhyamaka Absolutism 58 Unacknowledged Absolutism 58 Raw svabhāvic impulse 60 Avoiding nihilism 62 Locating the True 68 Anti-realist realism. 71 Prajñā and soteriology 74 A contemporary parallel 78 Conclusion 81 Chapter 4: Non-absolute Middle Way 84 The process of determination 84 Consequences of the collapse - a colourful analogy 86 The nature of the illusion and the truth of convention 89 A dynamic basis 93 Neither realism nor anti-realism 95 Page | 4 Traces of ontic realism 96 Soteriological concerns 98 Answering intuitions 103 Grounding reality and truth 103 The possibility of Prajñā 104 Conclusion 107 Chapter 5 – The Encounters Between Buddhism and Science. 110 Three modes of encounter 111 Abrasive propositions 113 Problems with compatibility 115 Timelessness and Skilful means 117 Domestication of the dharma 120 Problems with complementarity 121 Shared metaphysical basis 122 Wallace’s metaphysical agnosticism 123 Unbiased science 125 Unbiased Buddhism 126 Unequivocal ‘truth’ 130 Dividing reality 132 Conclusion 133 Chapter 6 – A Madhyamaka Response: Frictionless Co-operation 135 Insubstantial security 135 A Madhyamaka mode of engagement 140 Transportability of śūnyatā 141 Applicability to all worldviews 142 Frictionless co-operation 144 Soteriological risk assessment 149 The Madhyamaka response to Madhyamaka Buddhism. 151 An all-new timeless truth 151 The Madhyamaka analysis and Madhyamaka Buddhism 155 Conclusion 160 Page | 5 Chapter 7: Addressing Concerns 162 Suzuki’s Zen 163 Binary thinking 166 The insensitivity of emptiness 168 A non-dual relationship 170 The importance of compassion: avoiding moral relativism 170 Morality grounded in reality 171 How our nature effects our morality 173 Living rightly and the impulse to painlessness 177 The importance of spiritual practice 181 Equally empty but not equally inherently existent 182 Conclusion 186 Chapter 8: Madhyamaka Physics 188 Bohr’s philosophy-physics 189 Bohr’s śūnyatā 189 Bohr’s pratītya-samutpāda 192 Bohr’s two truths 193 Leaving the laboratory 198 Barad’s agential realism 199 Non-abrasive truth 202 The soteriological dimension 203 From understanding to realisation 204 Accidental enlightenment 206 Conclusion 209 Chapter 9 – Conclusions and Opportunities 210 Timelessness and frictionlessness 212 Pluralistic opportunities 213 Conclusion 216 Bibliography 218 Page | 6 Chapter 1 – Introduction In this thesis I will be attempting to help the Madhyamaka speak to the West. From this, two things are clear: firstly, that I think the Madhyamaka has something important to communicate; secondly, that I believe the Madhyamaka is not yet speaking clearly in this contemporary context.1 The Madhyamaka has a deeply important message regarding the ultimate nature of reality; the ultimate truth of śūnyatā (emptiness). It will be part of my project to argue for and defend the universal truth of śūnyatā and to motivate this realisation through indicating the personal and interpersonal benefits of such a realisation. From the point of view of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the realisation of śūnyatā is typically understood as constitutive of enlightenment, and thus is the ultimate meaning and purpose of life. With due caution as to the possibility of devotional hyperbole, I wish to agree with this sentiment while making sense of these claims within a more contemporary, secular, axiology.2 In presenting the importance of śūnyatā I will principally be talking in terms of the elimination of existential suffering through the resolution of tension and conflict in personal, interpersonal and social spheres. Furthermore, I hope to emphasise that the recharacterisation of ontic and epistemic concerns that are enacted through a realisation of śūnyatā provide new opportunities to resolve entrenched oppositions and conflicts in Anglo-American philosophical discourses. I feel that, where the Madhyamaka is given a contemporary voice, the message is typically not spoken clearly. The tendency towards miscommunication is discernible both in hermeneutical attempts to locate and
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