Executive Summary Trump’s China missteps
The rise of China as a disruptor of the Trump’s confused approach toward post-Cold War US hegemony has been engaging with China has weakened US touted as a solution to President Donald leadership in East Asia and risks losing the Trump’s protectionist isolationism. Since confidence of long-time allies as well as Trump’s surprise election victory in motivating Beijing to act with fewer curbs November 2016, the coherence of on its conduct. Western-led economic, environment and security policies have been threatened by this isolationist shift. Fragmentation of the Since his election last November, the liberal world economies, with the US erratic front Trump has presented to particularly significant, would open up a China shows a distinct lack of a new and power vacuum in the East Asian region. coherent East Asian strategy to replace Simultaneously, China seeks to expand its Obama’s “Pivot to Asia”. This time last regional influence and pursue a greater year, the Commander-in-Chief remained role on the world stage. However, the an unlikely leadership contender who was experience of the Hamburg G20 Summit frequently satirized as “Big-Mouth Trump” shows that China is neither willing nor in the Chinese press. Since then, Chinese able to replace US hegemony in all areas, scepticism over Trump’s logic has not preferring to focus on economic issues. In abated. Both his unprecedented phone such a context, no obvious successor to call with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing- the US currently exists, pointing to a wen and vacillation over whether to period of uncertainty in which multilateral accept the traditionally ambiguous summitry gives way to the kind of bilateral American interpretation of the One-China deal-making beloved of both Trump and policy demonstrate a worrying lack of the Chinese leadership. familiarity with Chinese sensitivities and regional politics. With Xi’s unwillingness,
or even inability, to rein in North Korea, the US President is once again unhappy G20 Hamburg Summit, July 2017
with perceived Chinese intransigence demonstrates a clear strategy on Beijing’s despite a brief honeymoon period at Mar- part. It is unlikely that Xi would not have a-Lago. deduced that Trump’s policies are frequently based on ignorance and whim.
Thus, a putative Chinese challenge to US At the Hamburg Summit, Trump cut an pre-eminence in the economic and isolated figure among the G20 leaders, as environmental spheres has emerged, but the US reconsiders past commitments to in concert with other nations’ concerns allies in Europe and Asia. The speed and around these issues and without frequency with which the US President provoking any significant concern. seems willing to change his opinion of leaders, nations and issues creates many uncertainties, in particular around future Where the US has been unsteady on the US policy towards China. Arriving in economic front, China has been Poland before the G20 Summit, President remarkably consistent and vocal in its Trump castigated a recent (claimed and (albeit contested) endorsement of free subsequently disputed) 40 per cent trade. The 2016 G20 Hangzhou Summit increase in trade between Beijing and represented a watershed in China’s Pyongyang and tweeted his frustrations engagement with global summitry of this with characteristic braggadocio. Whether kind, but the extent to which its this represents renewed hostility to the leadership is willing to continue along Chinese leadership remains to be seen but these lines is questionable after the themes of China as an enemy date back to Hamburg Summit saw little progress on Trump’s 2016 manifesto. For a self-styled this front. dealmaker, a slow-burning and complex problem such as denuclearising the Korean peninsula poses particular However, one of the key achievements of challenges and frustrations. the Hangzhou Summit last year – the agreement between China and the US to
ratify the Paris Climate Accords – has The Limits of Hangzhou and Hamburg effectively been rendered moot by Trump’s decision to unilaterally withdraw The fact that China has taken some from the agreement. Unsurprisingly, G20 advantage of the space created by leaders were unable to persuade Trump Trump’s missteps to influence global to pay even diplomatic lip service to the politics in its national interest Accords, and the US position was G20 Hamburg Summit, July 2017
acknowledged in the final Leaders’ means that it remains an imperfect and Declaration. In isolation, such a uneasy partner for the EU, and Germany development would be of little practical in particular. Regardless of her desire to concern to the Chinese administration. It present Germany as a liberal world leader, neither affects its token displays of and Hamburg as a free city tolerant of environmental responsibility nor reflects democratic dissent, Merkel failed to negatively on its prestige. Trump’s prioritize issues of human rights above the behaviour leaves China with ample Hamburg Summit’s more immediate aims, opportunities to exploit declining US soft not least of which involved shoring up power and present itself as the flagging support for free trade. At the responsible guarantor of free trade and same time, the German public’s focus on the environment. the illiberal leaders of Russia, Turkey and the US shifted the spotlight away from
China, making inaction on human rights The China Syndrome easier for the Chancellor. China’s recent abrogation of the Sino-British Joint China’s positioning as a champion of Declaration, irredentist designs on Taiwan global trade merits greater scrutiny. Xi’s and the militarisation of the South China past statements, on trade in particular, Sea also call into question the country’s fail to mask the protectionism and willingness to respect international hostility to the free flow of capital that has agreements. Good faith is indispensable characterized China’s development when seeking to achieve the G20’s model. At Merkel’s closing press objectives, and China cannot credibly lead conference and other events around the if it fails to respect this principle. G20 media centre, such as Japanese press briefings, German journalists mentioned China in conjunction with steel dumping. The Hangzhou Summit also demonstrated This issue had been raised in Hangzhou, China’s selective engagement with the but no substantive progress was made in G20 on the economic front. Hamburg’s Hamburg other than a vague commitment Leaders’ Declaration diplomatically to discuss it in August. mentioned “expanding on [Hangzhou’s] results”, but the stated Chinese summit priority of decreasing trade deficits and Although human rights concerns should surpluses to balance global trade was not not characterize every interaction with ultimately included. The People’s Daily China, its parlous record in this area opened its G20 coverage on the day G20 Hamburg Summit, July 2017
before the Hamburg Summit began with a window dressing concealing a trade policy call for the consensus reached at the that flouts WTO rules in the way that Hangzhou Summit to continue shaping the making America great again would. economic direction of global financial policy. The relative success of a home summit, albeit one without Trump, Gallic hyperbole aside, the shifting motivated the Chinese delegation to play coalitions that formed around particular it safe and direct its focus towards interests at the Hamburg Summit point to redoubling efforts to sell the One Belt, shared or contested global leadership. One Road (OBOR) initiative and the Asian Korean denuclearisation was primarily Infrastructure Investment Bank. tackled by a US-Korea-Japan trilateral meeting, for example, and achieving a
consensus on global warming mitigation Interconnected but Divided proved a bridge too far. This suggests that diminishing US prominence will lead to While the global economy continues to groups of influential nations and their develop along ever more interconnected supporters moving to assume joint lines, the political will to defend free trade leadership on specific issues. China has and globalisation exists in some nations, shown a willingness to sign up for joint but not among all significant players. efforts in areas where its preferred outcome can be achieved through cooperation. However, even OBOR has At his press conference on the last day of provoked controversy for the preferential the Hamburg Summit, French President treatment given to the (usually small) Emmanuel Macron commented that the countries that echo Beijing’s line. Once world has never been so divided. Divisions again, China will only be motivated to of this sort necessitate coalitions in cooperate when it is in its national unlikely places. China has benefited interest to do so. hugely from its position within a globalised, interconnected world economy, and has in the past been willing Summary to amend aspects of its economic policy for material or strategic gain, such as on Ultimately, China remains ill-suited to condition of World Trade Organisation taking on the kind of hegemonic role the (WTO) admission. After all, Xi’s US has comprehensively occupied in world endorsement of globalisation is not mere affairs since the end of the Cold War, in G20 Hamburg Summit, July 2017
which a single country’s stance on an G20’s future, lacks the weight or will issue determines its general success or necessary to lead unambiguously. failure. It remains to be seen whether US George Ashley is a third-year BA Chinese abdication of responsibility will be enough Studies at the University of Sheffield. to sink the already divided G20. What is clear at this stage is that China, while having a strong position moving into the