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Federal Register/Vol. 72, No. 141/Tuesday, July 24

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Federal Register/Vol. 72, No. 141/Tuesday, July 24 40216 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 141 / Tuesday, July 24, 2007 / Rules and Regulations Because of rapid improvements in conditions apply to future versions of Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 12, airplane technology, the applicable the 787, including possible freighter 2007. airworthiness regulations do not contain configurations. Stephen P. Boyd, adequate or appropriate safety standards FAA Response: These special Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. for these design features. These special conditions apply to airplanes that conditions for the 787 contain the incorporate a reinforced bulkhead. They [FR Doc. E7–14333 Filed 7–23–07; 8:45 am] additional safety standards that the are not limited to any particular type of BILLING CODE 4910–13–P Administrator considers necessary to operation, nor do they impose establish a level of safety equivalent to operational requirements. Thus, if a that established by the existing DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION future freighter version did incorporate airworthiness standards. On January 15, 2002, the FAA issued a reinforced bulkhead, these special Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR 25.795(a) (Amendment 25–106), conditions would apply. These special which specifies that the flightdeck door conditions are adopted as proposed. 14 CFR Part 39 of a transport airplane be designed to Applicability [Docket No. FAA–2007–28749; Directorate resist forcible intrusion by unauthorized Identifier 2007–NM–079–AD; Amendment persons and penetration by small arms As discussed above, these special 39–15134; AD 2007–15–05] conditions are applicable to the 787. fire and fragmentation devices. At the RIN 2120–AA64 time it was written, the regulation was Should Boeing apply at a later date for limited to the flightdeck door to a change to the type certificate to Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell expedite a rapid retrofit of the existing include another model on the same type Douglas Model DC–10–10 and DC–10– airplanes required by operating rules to certificate incorporating the same novel 10F Airplanes, Model DC–10–15 have a flightdeck door. or unusual design features, these special Airplanes, Model DC–10–30 and DC– In addition to a reinforced flightdeck conditions would apply to that model as 10–30F (KC–10A and KDC–10) door, the 787 will have a flightdeck well. Airplanes, Model DC–10–40 and DC– bulkhead which is reinforced to resist 10–40F Airplanes, Model MD–10–10F Conclusion intrusion and ballistic penetration. The and MD–10–30F Airplanes, and Model regulations do not adequately address This action affects only certain novel MD–11 and MD–11F Airplanes the certification requirements for such a or unusual design features of the 787. It bulkhead, and appropriate certification AGENCY: Federal Aviation standards are necessary. These special is not a rule of general applicability. Administration (FAA), Department of conditions require that the reinforced List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 Transportation (DOT). flightdeck bulkhead meet the same ACTION: Final rule; request for standards as those specified in Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting comments. § 25.795(a) for flightdeck doors. These and recordkeeping requirements. special conditions contain the minimum SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new I standards that the Administrator The authority citation for these airworthiness directive (AD) for all considers necessary to ensure that safety special conditions is as follows: transport category airplanes identified standards are maintained after the Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, above. This AD requires an inspection aircraft enters into service. 44702, 44704. to determine if a certain fuel pump On December 21, 2006, the FAA housing electrical connector is installed. issued a notice of proposed rulemaking The Special Conditions This AD also requires a revision to the FAA-approved airplane flight manual that proposes amending § 25.795(a) to I Accordingly, pursuant to the authority (AFM) to advise the flightcrew of the require that a flightdeck bulkhead—and delegated to me by the Administrator, any other accessible barrier separating appropriate procedures for disabling the following special conditions are certain fuel pump electrical circuits the flightcrew compartment from issued as part of the type certification occupied areas—also be designed to following failure of a fuel pump housing basis for the Boeing Model 787–8 electrical connector if applicable. This resist intrusion or penetration. The airplane. methods of compliance described in the AD also requires the deactivation of preamble of that notice and associated In addition to the requirements of 14 certain fuel tanks or fuel pumps and the draft advisory material could be used to CFR 25.795(a) governing protection of installation of placards if applicable. show compliance with these special the flightdeck door, the following This AD allows the optional conditions. For the 787, the reinforced special conditions apply. replacement of the fuel pump housing bulkhead may be comprised of The reinforced bulkhead, including electrical connectors with new, components such as the walls of components that comprise the bulkhead, improved parts, which would terminate adjacent lavatories, galleys, or crew rest separating the flightcrew compartment from the AFM revisions, deactivation of areas. Those components are covered by occupied areas must be designed to meet the certain fuel tanks and fuel pumps, and these special conditions. following standards: placard installation. This AD results It must resist forcible intrusion by from a report of two failures of the fuel Discussion of Comments unauthorized persons and be capable of pump housing electrical connector. We Notice of Proposed Special withstanding impacts of 300 Joules (221.3 are issuing this AD to prevent continued Conditions No. 25–07–08–SC for the foot-pounds) at critical locations on the arcing following a short circuit of the 787 was published in the Federal bulkhead as well as a 1113 Newton (250 fuel pump housing electrical connector, Register on April 12, 2007 (72 FR pound) constant tensile load on accessible which could damage the conduit that 18412). One comment was received, handholds. protects the power lead inside the fuel from Air Line Pilots Association, It must resist penetration by small arms fire tank; this condition could create an International (ALPA). and fragmentation devices to a level ignition source inside the fuel tank, ALPA Comment: ALPA recommended equivalent to level IIIa of the National which, in combination with flammable that the requirements of these special Institute of Justice Standard (NIJ) 0101.04. fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank VerDate Aug<31>2005 17:17 Jul 23, 2007 Jkt 211001 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\24JYR1.SGM 24JYR1 pwalker on PROD1PC71 with RULES Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 141 / Tuesday, July 24, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 40217 explosion and consequent loss of the Subsequent x-ray inspections of the electrical continuity and resistance and airplane. electrical connectors revealed soldering repetitive inspections to detect DATES: This AD becomes effective problems with the connector contacts. discrepancies of the fuel boost/transfer August 8, 2007. Continued arcing following a short pump connectors; and corrective The Director of the Federal Register circuit of the fuel pump housing actions, if necessary. Accomplishing the approved the incorporation by reference electrical connector could damage the optional replacement of all electrical of certain publications listed in the AD conduit that protects the power lead connectors in accordance with as of August 8, 2007. inside the fuel tank. This condition, if paragraph (k) or (l) of this AD, as On December 5, 2000 (65 FR 69658, not corrected, could create an ignition applicable, terminates the requirements November 20, 2000), the Director of the source inside the fuel tank, which, in of AD 2002–13–10. Federal Register approved the combination with flammable fuel On April 4, 2003, we issued AD 2003– incorporation by reference of a certain vapors, could result in a fuel tank 07–14, amendment 39–13110 (68 FR other publication listed in the AD. explosion and consequent loss of the 17544, April 10, 2003), for a certain We must receive comments on this airplane. McDonnell Douglas Model DC–10–30 AD by September 24, 2007. Fuel pump housing electrical airplane. That AD requires repetitive connector, P/N 60–84355, has also been tests for electrical continuity and ADDRESSES: Use one of the following installed on McDonnell Douglas Model resistance and repetitive inspections to addresses to submit comments on this DC–10–10 and DC–10–10F airplanes, detect discrepancies of the fuel boost/ AD. • Model DC–10–15 airplanes, Model DC– transfer pump connectors; and DOT Docket Web site: Go to 10–30 and DC–10–30F (KC–10A and corrective actions, if necessary. http://dms.dot.gov and follow the KDC–10) airplanes, Model DC–10–40 Accomplishing the optional instructions for sending your comments and DC–10–40F airplanes, and Model replacement of all electrical connectors electronically. MD–10–10F and MD–10–30F airplanes, in accordance with paragraph (k) of this • Government-wide rulemaking Web in accordance with Boeing Alert Service AD terminates the requirements of AD site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov Bulletin DC10–28A229. Therefore, all of 2003–07–14. and follow the instructions for sending these models may be subject to the same your comments electronically. Relevant Service Information • unsafe condition. Mail: U.S. Department of We have reviewed the following Transportation, Docket Operations, M– Other Relevant Rulemaking service bulletins: 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room On November 1, 2000, we issued AD • Boeing Alert Service Bulletin W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 2000–22–21, amendment 39–11969 (65 DC10–28A259, dated March 20, 2007, Washington, DC 20590. FR 69658, November 20, 2000), for all for Model DC–10–10 and DC–10–10F • Fax: (202) 493–2251. • McDonnell Douglas DC–10, MD–10, and airplanes, Model DC–10–15 airplanes, Hand Delivery: Room W12–140 on MD–11 series airplanes.
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