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Navigating the New Oil Era Navigating the New Oil Era Diane Munro September 22, 2017 Navigating the New Oil Era Diane Munro Issue Paper #10 2017 The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW), launched in 2015, is an independent, nonprofit institution dedicated to increasing the understanding and appreciation of the social, economic, and political diversity of the Gulf Arab states. Through expert research, analysis, exchanges, and public discussion, the institute seeks to encourage thoughtful debate and inform decision makers shaping U.S. policy regarding this critical geostrategic region. © 2017 Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. All rights reserved. AGSIW does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSIW, its staff, or its Board of Directors. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from AGSIW. Please direct inquiries to: Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington 1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1060 Washington, DC 20036 This publication can be downloaded at no cost at www.agsiw.org. Cover Photo Credit: AP Photo/Matthew Browny Images About the Author Diane Munro is a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, where she specializes in international oil markets and geopolitical issues driving OPEC and Gulf Cooperation Council energy policies. She is also a vice president at Foreign Reports. Previously, she served with the Paris-based International Energy Agency, where her work centered on developing global oil market forecasts, policy analysis of IEA and OPEC member countries, and energy security strategies such as IEA simulations and war-gaming exercises among member countries in the event of major oil supply disruptions. Munro has written on energy issues for more than 30 years, with her work published by Bloomberg, Middle East Economic Survey, Reuters, Al-Hayat, Energy Compass, and Petroleum Intelligence Weekly. Previously, she was president and editor-in-chief of The Oil Daily Co, now known as Energy Intelligence Group. Navigating the New Oil Era | 1 Executive Summary The global energy industry is in the midst of writing a new chapter in its long-storied history as oil producing companies and countries reset their strategies and policies to meet the challenges of a technology-driven, lower oil price era.Industry expectations that prices would steadily strengthen by the end of 2017, as oil inventories contracted and production cuts took place with reduced capital investment curtailing supply, gave way to a soberer mindset. The prevailing industry narrative now sees $50-60/bbl as the new normal through the end of the decade, and possibly longer. Spearheaded by high-level diplomatic initiatives from Saudi Arabia and Russia, the OPEC and non-OPEC production cuts implemented on January 1 aimed at hastening a drawdown in high global stock levels initially triggered a sharp rise in oil prices on expectations of tighter markets. However, the unexpected, robust resurgence in U.S. shale (or tight oil) production has partially undermined OPEC’s strategy and led to a much slower than expected decline in inventories. The rapid rebound in shale took the group by surprise, prompting the producer alliance to undertake a review of its options to support stronger markets. Pressured by prices trading some 50-60 percent below peak levels posted three years ago, producers of relatively higher cost U.S. tight oil exceeded industry expectations yet again by developing even more innovative applications of technology to improve operational and cost efficiencies, increasing production to levels unimaginable just a year ago. The imperative to improve cost economics across the industry has also led international companies to re- engineer their operations by implementing more advanced technologies to develop new best business practices. Once again, the arsenal of more innovative and advanced technologies unleashed by the shale revolution continues to transform the global oil industry. Introduction The same small, independent U.S. drillers that pioneered the game-changing shale oil era are now driving a new industrywide focus on improved project economics to compete in a lower- for-longer oil price environment. Innovative development of more advanced technologies is enabling a significant improvement in cost efficiencies, productivity, and operational best practices. Projections circa 2014 that a price range of $60-90/bbl was needed to sustain U.S. shale (or tight oil) production have now been lowered to $30-65/bbl, with the average cost for the fast-cycle, flexible crude of $50/bbl effectively setting a lower marginal price for the industry. No longer unique to the shale oil patch, new technology-driven best business practices are enabling international oil companies to expand supplies of conventional oil, including traditionally more expensive deepwater projects, and nonconventional resources, by improving project economics and increasing recovery rates at much lower cost levels. National oil companies in the Gulf Cooperation Council states are also aggressively restructuring their operations, which is made more challenging by the need to reduce bloated bureaucracies and at the same time create new skilled jobs for their exploding populations. Moreover, some state oil companies have been behind the curve in the application of even the most standard Diane Munro | 2 technologies long used by the international industry, and severe budget constraints in the wake of lower prices will limit their ability to take advantage of the new advancements. A prolonged lower oil price scenario of between $50 and $60/bbl will also have far-reaching implications for the political agendas and economic fortunes of the Gulf states and oil producing countries around the world. Chronic civil unrest in OPEC members Libya, Nigeria, and Venezuela continues to inject a high level of uncertainty in global supply forecasts. U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s vow to withdraw from the controversial Iran nuclear agreement is undermining Tehran’s efforts to attract foreign investment to its oil sector, which effectively will constrain its future supply New leaders are assuming control and rewriting the growth. playbook for the region in a way that could have significant implications for energy geopolitics. At the same time, a new generation of leaders in the Gulf is upending political agendas and government policies that have long guided relationships among the GCC states, regionally, and internationally.1 From an unprecedented economic embargo on Qatar by some fellow GCC states to the Riyadh-led diplomatic overtures to Iraq, new leaders are assuming control and rewriting the playbook for the region in a way that could have significant implications for energy geopolitics. Meanwhile, oil markets are casting a critical eye on the new Saudi-Russian oil axis, given its pivotal role in achieving and sustaining the unprecedented OPEC and non-OPEC cooperation agreement on production policy. Success of the accord is critical for GCC states as they struggle with economic imperatives and political agendas competing for limited oil revenue. The OPEC and non-OPEC agreement is providing a welcome boost to government coffers with relatively stronger oil prices increasing revenue by an estimated 10 percent from January to June 2017 over the last six month of 2016.2 OPEC’s new market management strategy is not only strengthening oil prices for the industry but the Saudi- and Russian-led production pact is helping government officials better navigate geopolitical strategies and economic reform plans. OPEC and Oil Market Dynamics Despite some unforeseen setbacks, OPEC’s unprecedented agreement with non-OPEC partners has been a success: It averted a price collapse and is on track to deliver a revenue increase of around 20 percent to member countries in 2017. The creation of this powerful alliance signaled a major shift by OPEC toward a more dynamic market management policy aimed at navigating this new era of technology-driven lower prices.3 The historic agreement inked on December 10, 2016 committed the OPEC and non-OPEC producers to reduce supplies by just over 1.7 million barrels per day (mb/d), effective January 1, 2017, for six months, which 1 Kristin Smith Diwan, “New Generation Royals and Succession Dynamics in the Gulf States,” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, March 21, 2017. 2 Alex Lawler, “Despite Weak Oil Prices, OPEC Still Pockets More Dollars,” Reuters, June 28, 2017. 3 “OPEC Press Release,” OPEC Secretariat, December 10, 2016. Navigating the New Oil Era | 3 was later extended to March 2018. OPEC members agreed to reduce production by almost 1.2 mb/d while non-OPEC oil producing countries committed to cutting supplies by 560,000 barrels per day (kb/d). The 22-member alliance accounts for just over 50 percent of global oil supplies. The agreement initially propelled oil prices 20 percent higher but by March a more bearish outlook emerged, reflecting market frustration that the anticipated rebalancing of oversupplied markets had yet to materialize. The weaker market sentiment was also fueled by growing concerns a surge in drilling rig activity in shale oil fields would soon lead to a strong rebound in U.S. production. Prices have ebbed and flowed with shifting market sentiment in a relatively wide $12/bbl range since the new production accord took effect. Futures prices have edged lower from the loftier levels posted in the first three months immediately following the announcement of the agreement but nonetheless were significantly stronger from January to mid-September above the 2016 levels. International Brent has averaged $8.50/bbl higher this year while U.S. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) has gained a smaller $6/ bbl. The relatively weaker increase for WTI in large part reflects a combination of increased shale production for domestic markets and the lifting of exports constraints, which has made prices more competitive while Brent has benefited from tighter markets in Europe and Asia due to the cutback in OPEC supplies.
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