Coates Ulrichsen, K 2013 ’s Uprising: Regional Dimensions and stability International Consequences. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(1): 14, pp. 1-12, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.be

PRACTICE NOTE Bahrain’s Uprising: Regional Dimensions and International Consequences Dr Kristian Coates Ulrichsen*

The uprising in Bahrain that began on 14 February 2011 has been contained but not resolved. While the immediate period of danger to the position of the ruling Al-Khalifa family has passed, positions on all sides have hardened, and there is little prospect of a comprehensive or lasting political settlement to Bahrain’s deep-rooted social and economic inequalities. As the Bahraini government has failed to offer meaningful conces- sions to political reform, it has splintered and radicalised an opposition that is unsure of what to do next, but has also undermined its own constituency of support among the island’s Sunni communities. These trajectories have set in motion a radical reconfigur- ing of the island’s political landscape in ways that do not augur well for longer-term prospects for reconciliation and recovery.

Bahrain’s Uprising: Regional programmes. Bahrain’s unhappy experience Dimensions and International has implications for the ruling families of Consequences other (GCC) states, This practice note examines the regional as they also struggle to adapt to greater par- and international dimensions of Bahrain’s ticipatory pressures and societal demands for aborted revolution. It describes how the political freedoms. pro-democracy movement that erupted in The opening section describes the uprising early-2011 became entrapped in the cross- in Bahrain. It demonstrates how the current hairs of regional and international geopoli- unrest forms part of a cycle of recurrent peri- tics. This ensured that the burgeoning social ods of contestation and predates the ‘Arab movement in support of peaceful political Spring’ revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. reform was violently contained as Bahrain’s This leads into the second section, which international partners opted to look the examines how the range of governmental other way. Yet this came at a very high price and opposition responses have redrawn the economically and politically, and it shat- political landscape within the country. The tered social cohesion in a country polarised third section explores the regional and inter- as never before. Moreover, it shredded the national dimensions to the uprising and con- image of ‘Business-Friendly Bahrain’ that textualises it within an upsurge of sectarian had formed the cornerstone of the country’s rhetoric directed against Iran. This occurred economic diversification and development as GCC governments sought to externalise the roots of unrest and discredit oppositional elements within their own societies. It also highlights the very differing reactions from * Research Fellow, Department of Government, LSE, UK Bahrain’s external partners and from interna- [email protected] tional civil society organisations. Art. 14, page 2 of 12 Coates Ulrichsen: Bahrain’s Uprising

The Uprising A series of constitutional reforms were Bahrain has a long history of popular opposi- launched in November 2000 that promised tion to the Al-Khalifa dynasty rooted in poli- much but ultimately delivered little of sub- cies of unequal and selective development. stance. In 2001, the draconian 1974 State Periodic outbreaks of major social unrest Security Law that had provided cover for have alternated with periods of détente in the suppression of political opposition and cycles dating back to the 1920s. Sustained massive human rights violations (under the and organised campaigns for more rights charge of a British national until 1998) was occurred at regular intervals in 1921–23, scrapped. Constitutional changes were laid 1934–35, 1938, 1947–48, 1953–56, 1965, out in a National Action Charter that was and 1975, with the 1950s being notable overwhelmingly approved by 98 per cent of for the creation of a non-sectarian social Bahrainis in a referendum on 14 February movement that openly challenged the ruler, 2001. This paved the way for the return of an Sheikh Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, and his elected assembly in 2002, twenty-seven years longstanding British advisor, Sir Charles Bel- after the suspension of the previous short- grave (Peterson 2001: 587–88). Feelings of lived (two years) parliamentary experiment popular anger against British policy toward in 1975. Also as part of the reforms, Bahrain Egypt and the Suez Crisis in 1956, and, sub- became a constitutional monarchy, with the sequently, the appeal of Arab nationalism Emir taking the title of King (Ehteshami and and socialism, provided a platform around Wright 2007: 919). which disparate groups could coalesce. How- However, the initial promise of a unicam- ever, after 1979, the Islamic Revolution in eral elected legislature was subsequently Iran, and alleged Iranian involvement in an diluted by the addition of an upper house attempted coup attempt in Bahrain in 1981, of royal appointees. Low confidence in the cast a shadow over such cross-sectarian sincerity of the political opening also led to mobilisation (Alhasan 2011: 603). Under a range of political societies boycotting the the Shah, the Iranian government had main- 2002 election. The significance of this move tained a longstanding territorial claim to should be appreciated in terms of the broad Bahrain, and while this was dropped follow- range of political societies involved, which ing a United Nations-sponsored fact-finding collectively spanned the ideological and mission in 1970, periodic statements by Ira- religious spectrum. Although most socie- nian officials reiterating that Bahrain was ties subsequently participated in the 2006 Iran’s ‘fourteenth province’ caused lingering and 2010 elections, the former were marred tensions in Manama. In the 1990s, the long- by allegations of systematic fraud and ger- est sustained period of pressure on the Bah- rymandering while the latter followed a raini government culminated in an uprising heavy-handed clampdown on opposition between 1994 and 1999. It pitted advocates members and human rights activists. During of political and economic reform against a the run-up to the 2010 election, accounts of ruling family determined to maintain the the arbitrary detention of opposition mem- status quo and avoid diluting or distributing bers and human rights activists, and allega- its power (Fakhro 1997: 167–68). tions of torture seemed to herald a return to The longstanding ruler of Bahrain, Sheikh the repressive measures in place during the Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifa died unexpectedly 1990s uprising. Meanwhile, socio-economic in March 1999, and was succeeded as Emir discontent was bubbling up, propelled by: by son, Hamad bin Isa. Similar to the case in high levels of unemployment; the inability neighbouring Qatar, the process of genera- of economic diversification to generate suf- tional change of leadership was followed by ficient jobs or economic opportunities for a programme of tentative political reform. Bahraini youth; and, popular anger at per- Coates Ulrichsen: Bahrain’s Uprising Art. 14, page 3 of 12 ceived corruption at the heart of the Govern- of overwhelmingly young Bahrainis were ment (Davidson and Coates Ulrichsen 2011). camped in Pearl Roundabout and shouting Feelings in Bahrain were running high ‘Down, down Khalifa!’ These chants were even before the revolutions in Tunisia and aimed at the Prime Minister of 41 years, Egypt rocked the Arab world. It was in this Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa, rather context of rising tension that Bahraini organ- than at the ruling family itself, but the dra- isers planned a day of protest on 14 Febru- matic cross-sectarian escalation directly ary 2011. The focus of the planned protest threatened the government’s grip on power aimed at securing greater political participa- and domestic legitimacy. It panicked the tion and accountability, rather than targeting regime into a violent response, as security the position of the King or the ruling fam- forces stormed the roundabout in the middle ily in Bahrain. The date was symbolic as it of the night and opened fire on demonstra- marked the tenth anniversary of the referen- tors (Coates Ulrichsen 2011a). dum that had approved the National Action As the protests moved into a new post- Charter in 2001. It also followed in the wake clampdown phase, the government reacted of the popular uprisings that swept away by sponsoring counter-demonstrations to try the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes in Tunisia to fracture the social movement confront- and Egypt. The inspirational sight of largely ing them. Thousands of pro-government non-violent demonstrations, defying politi- supporters gathered at the Al-Fateh Mosque cal suppression and refusing to submit to the in Juffair on 21 February (and again on 2 security regimes that had kept authoritarian March 2011) to declare their support for leaders in power for decades, was transform- the regime. They formed The Gathering of ative. Cafes in Manama that usually showed National Unity (TGONU), consisting of a loose Lebanese music videos were instead filled umbrella grouping of loyalist Sunni commu- with images from Tahrir Square in Cairo that nities spanning a spectrum of Salafist, Mus- transfixed their audiences; the same was lim Brotherhood, tribal, and urban commu- happening elsewhere throughout the region. nities, all loyal to the regime. In response, an Emboldened protestors voiced their demands estimated 200,000 Bahraini citizens (one in ahead of the 14 February day of protest for three of all Bahraini citizens) participated in greater political freedom and equality for all a pro-democracy march to the Pearl Rounda- Bahrainis(Lynch 2012: 109–10). bout on 25 February, as two massive columns Although initially small in scale and pre- of protestors converged on the roundabout dominantly confined to Shiite villages out- to demand the resignation of the Prime Min- side Manama, the demonstrations gathered ister, Khalifa bin Salman. This represented a momentum after Bahraini police killed two level of societal mobilisation unprecedented protestors on 14 and 15 February. They also in any of the movements in 2011 migrated to the heart of the capital’s Pearl (Lynch 2012: 110). Roundabout, close to the flagship Bah- With the position of the ruling family rain Financial Harbour. Ominously for the clearly in jeopardy, negotiations between regime, the demonstrations quickly assumed the regime’s leading modernising figure, the popular overtones as Sunnis and Shiites alike Crown Prince, Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, gathered in unprecedented numbers and and the largest opposition political society, chanted slogans such as ‘No Shiites, no Sun- Al-Wefaq, commenced in March. Despite nis, only Bahrainis.’ The rapid mobilisation coming close to an agreement based around highlighted how quickly the lack of trust felt a set of agreed political reforms (the ‘seven by many activists toward the government principles’), the talks broke down when Al- could assume a more radical stance. By the Wefaq refused to enter a formal dialogue evening of 16 February, tens of thousands unless the government agreed to a new Art. 14, page 4 of 12 Coates Ulrichsen: Bahrain’s Uprising constitutional arrangement. Accordingly, Pearl Roundabout, with its iconic monument the offer of talks was withdrawn, and on 14 to Gulf unity, on 18 March represented a March the GCC sent in its Peninsula Shield crude attempt to destroy the symbolic heart Force to help restore stability in Bahrain. In of the protest movement. With this act, the reality, this consisted of 1000 men of the authorities hoped to prevent it from becom- Saudi Arabian and a contin- ing an anti-regime equivalent of Cairo’s Tah- gent of 500 military police from the United rir Square. However, it highlighted the darkly Arab Emirates. They provided the essential ironic nature of the emerging counter-rev- backbone while the olution, as the Pearl Monument had been pursued and arrested several thousand peo- erected in 1982 to mark the creation of the ple across the country in a prolonged cam- GCC. Its six pillars represented each of the paign of political repression and retribution GCC members, yet it was destroyed just days (GSN 2011a). after the entry of those same Gulf forces into A state of national emergency was declared the kingdom (Farmer 2011). the following day, 15 March, that lasted until Martial law was lifted on 1 June 2011, 1 June 2011. There followed a crackdown as and shortly thereafter, the King convened a the Bahraini government pursued all forms National Dialogue and created an ostensibly of dissent, detaining doctors and lawyers for independent investigation into the spring- treating or representing detainees, suspend- time unrest. Through these initiatives, the ing opposition political societies and arrest- government hoped to begin a process of ing their leaders, and detaining a founder reconciliation with the opposition. How- of Bahrain’s major independent newspaper ever, their flawed implementation widened Al-Wasat, who subsequently died in cus- the chasm between the Al-Khalifa and their tody (BBC 2012). Up to 2000 mostly Shiite opponents by casting serious doubt on the public-sector and 2400 private-sector work- credibility of the commitment to reform. ers were dismissed from their positions for They also revealed deepening divisions “absenteeism” during the demonstrations. within the ruling family as a hard-line fac- Widespread tactics of intimidation also tion emerged around the increasingly power- included the destruction of Shiite shrines ful bin Ahmed brothers – Khalid bin Ahmed and the display by protesters of pictures of Al-Khalifa, the head of the Royal Court, and prominent Shiite leaders with nooses around Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, the chief of their necks. Meanwhile, a relentless propa- the Bahrain Defence Force (Cockburn 2011). ganda campaign was unleashed on Bahrain TV and through the state media, portraying Reconfiguring the Political dissidents as ‘traitors’ and inciting violence Landscape against them (D’Almeida 2011). The National Dialogue convened on 2 July Simultaneously, the Bahrain National and ran until 30 July 2011. It began under Guard embarked on a hasty recruitment a cloud following the 22 June decision of drive in Pakistan to augment its limited man- the National Safety Court to sentence 13 power with non-Bahraini personnel with prominent opposition figures to varying less direct connections to the civilian pro- terms of imprisonment. The majority were testors that they were charged with control- committed to non-violent protest and many ling. Although Bahraini Shiites were already had participated in the aforementioned barred from holding senior level positions in political liberalisation process that had been the Bahrain Defence Force and the police, launched by the King after the end of the this reinforced the sense of exclusivity and previous bout of internal unrest in 1999. partiality in the security services (Gengler In addition to amounting to ‘a who’s who 2012a). Meanwhile, the bulldozing of the of the predominantly Shiite opposition,’ Coates Ulrichsen: Bahrain’s Uprising Art. 14, page 5 of 12 they included the head of the secular-left- sor Cherif Bassiouni, who led the UN Security ist Wa’ad political society, . Council commission that investigated war Their imprisonment illustrated the gloved- crimes in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. fist nature of the regime’s approach, jailing The BICI report was published on 23 Novem- some of its opponents while simultaneously ber. In a televised speech in front of the reaching out to others. From the start, the King, Bassiouni stated that the authorities National Dialogue suffered from a credibility had used torture and excessive force during gap. Despite winning up to 45 per cent of its crackdown on protestors. He pinpointed the vote in the October 2010 parliamentary a culture of non-accountability among the election, Al-Wefaq was only granted five out security services operating during the state of 300 delegates. This was consistent with of emergency, and accused unnamed officials the overall composition of the dialogue, in of disobeying laws designed to safeguard which delegates representing all Bahraini human rights. Furthermore, he argued that opposition societies only constituted 11.67 many of the protests did not fall outside the per cent of total participants. The remain- rights of citizens to participate in, and that ing dialogue members overwhelmingly he had not found evidence of any link to Ira- favoured keeping the regime in its current nian involvement, contradicting regime nar- shape. Moreover, core opposition demands, ratives that ascribed them to external inter- for redrawing electoral boundaries, greater vention rather than domestic grievances. The proportional representation, and creating an 513-page report painted a detailed picture elected government were not on the agenda. of abuses of power by the Bahraini security Neither was any discussion permitted of the forces and elements of the regime, most nature or extent of the ruling family’s power damagingly in its finding of ‘systematic prac- (GSN 2011b). tice of physical and psychological mistreat- Al-Wefaq withdrew from the National Dia- ment, which in many cases amounted to tor- logue halfway through, its own judgement ture’ (BICI 2011: 298). to participate being called into question by In response to the BICI report, the King its critics. The dialogue continued, and con- pledged to initiate reforms, and established a cluded with a series of recommendations, national commission to oversee their imple- including one that the Prime Minister (rather mentation. Yet the measures that were taken than the King) would appoint the govern- largely failed to address the roots of Bah- ment. As the long-serving Prime Minister (in rain’s political and economic inequalities. In office since 1971) represented one of the key addition, they took place against a backdrop obstacles to reform, this hardly constituted of continuing clashes and daily low-level a political concession. Nor did the dialogue violence between protesters and security come to an agreement over the electoral forces. Specific reforms included: the revoca- boundaries, another major opposition griev- tion of arrest powers from the National Secu- ance. Far from drawing a line under the rity Apparatus; legislative amendments that unrest, the flawed process reinforced exist- expanded the definition of torture and lifted ing divisions and signalled that critical issues time-limits for the prosecution of cases; of political contention were simply not open pledges to rebuild Shiite houses of worship to debate (Coates Ulrichsen 2011b). destroyed by the regime during the crack- The National Dialogue partially overlapped down; and, the reinstatement of workers with the Bahrain Independent Commission dismissed on grounds of political expression of Inquiry (BICI). This was established by (Coates Ulrichsen and Fakhro 2012). King Hamad on 29 June to ‘enquire into the However, a report published in November incidents’ in February and March and their 2012 by the Project on Middle East Democ- consequences. Its chair was Egyptian Profes- racy (POMED), entitled ‘One Year Later: Art. 14, page 6 of 12 Coates Ulrichsen: Bahrain’s Uprising

Assessing Bahrain’s Implementation of the ginalised. In this environment of mutual BICI Report,’ concluded that ‘the Govern- mistrust, the convening of a new National ment of Bahrain has fully implemented three Consensus Dialogue in February 2013 and of the BICI Report’s 26 recommendations. the naming of the Crown Prince as first Two other recommendations were impos- deputy prime minister in March did little sible for us to properly evaluate due to a to raise hopes that a political breakthrough lack of available information, and 15 recom- might be imminent. The Crown Prince was mendations have only been partially imple- just one of five deputy prime ministers all mented. Finally, the government has made subordinate to the continuing power of no meaningful progress toward six of the the Prime Minister, and he did not join recommendations, which are precisely the the national dialogue, as members of the most important steps that need to be taken opposition had wished. Moreover, the dia- – accountability for officials responsible for logue was restricted to discussions over the torture and severe human rights violations, agenda itself, rather than actual negotiation the release of political prisoners, prevention over issues of substance relating to changes of sectarian incitement, and the relaxation of in the structure or balance of power within censorship and controls on free expression’ Bahrain (GSN 2013). (POMED 2012: 1). The emergence of radical splinter groups Tensions in Bahrain have continued to means it is no longer possible to speak of a escalate in the absence of meaningful or ‘regime-opposition’ dichotomy in any case. credible reform initiatives either from the Elements of the opposition are growing more government or the opposition. Continuous violent with an increase in bomb attacks car- announcements of impending reforms have ried out by members of the ‘February 14’ failed to translate into significant action to youth movement, while extreme loyalist redress the abuses of power and responsi- groups calling on the regime to crush the bility identified in the BICI report. Crown opposition once and for all have also inten- Prince Salman – previously the spearhead of sified. Together, these trends are redrawing Bahrain’s reforming elite – remains sidelined the political landscape of Bahrain by weaken- by internal struggles for influence within ing the moderate wings of the government the ruling family. A flight to the extremes and the opposition whose leadership is vital has occurred among both loyalist and oppo- to building support for political reform and sition groups as advocates of compromise reconciliation. Of particular interest is the and consensus become outflanked by radi- splintering of the Sunni community that cal elements and advocates of violence over hitherto provided the backbone of support engagement. Another BICI anniversary for the Al-Khalifa regime. This has frag- report, published by Amnesty International in mented as the initial Gathering of National November 2012, concluded that ‘The legacy Unity has largely broken up, though in truth of the BICI Report is fading fast, increasingly it always identified itself as a ‘soft opposition’ overshadowed by ongoing impunity for tor- with reform demands of its own. In its place, ture, the jailing of activists, and the ban on rival factions and individual groups have all protests. In the face of what increasingly become increasingly vocal critics of govern- appears to be a defunct reform process, those ment policy and have started to make politi- who have championed Bahrain’s record on cal demands of their own. Partially borne reform must be increasingly forced to chal- out of frustration at the government’s seem- lenge the charade’ (Amnesty 2012: 36). ing inability to resolve the issue, groups of Across the political spectrum, radical vigilante squads have started to take local voices have been empowered while Bah- enforcement of law and order into their own rain’s political middle ground has been mar- hands (Gengler 2012b). Coates Ulrichsen: Bahrain’s Uprising Art. 14, page 7 of 12

While the government can no longer rally stream opposition. Having witnessed the the ‘Sunni street’ behind it, the same can be previous cycle of revolt (1994–99) and politi- said of the predominantly-Shiite opposition. cal opening (2001–10) end with the crush- Al-Wefaq and the established political socie- ing repression in 2011, ties have been damaged by their failure to activists will be loath to give the government show substantive results from their decision the benefit of the doubt in future reform to engage the regime. They have been out- initiatives. Nor is it clear that there exists a flanked by the shadowy ‘February 14’, which powerful advocate of reform within the rul- emerged at the time of the Pearl uprising in ing family or the government, as evidenced 2011. Little is known about ‘February 14’: one in the continuing inability to reconvene a article described them as ‘a confederation of new national dialogue organised around loosely organised networks…faceless, secre- commonly-agreed issues. tive, and anonymous,’ consisting of ‘thou- sands of supporters [who] have abandoned Regional and International the failed leadership of the country’s better Implications established, but listless, political opposition’ Developments in Bahrain have a significance (Jones and Shehabi 2012). It is likely that it is that far transcends the islands’ shoreline. Its ‘February 14’ which constitutes the vanguard dwindling oil reserves mean that Bahrain of the protestors who confront security ser- functions as a bellwether for charting the vices daily. However, it is unclear whether speed of the winds of change in the Gulf, those who subscribe to its ideology neces- as well as the challenges of transitioning sarily organise themselves through coordi- to a post-oil future. The country is caught nated networks. Instead, their effectiveness between powerful geopolitical cross-cur- comes from the sporadic, uncoordinated, rents that give domestic developments a and unpredictable nature of their tactics, regional and international dimension. Both and their capacity to mobilise and coordinate the Saudi incursion into Bahrain in 2011, and large demonstrations at short notice. Their Riyadh’s thwarted attempt to create a Gulf decentralised nature makes it more difficult Union in 2012, stem from acknowledgement for the government to reach out to them, or that it has the most to lose from prolonged to prevent individual acts of violence, which or major instability in its eastern neigh- have included a bombing in the village of bour. This is particularly the case when seen Al-Eker on 9 April 2012 that injured seven through the regional prism of the hegemonic policemen and a car bombing ahead of the competition for power and influence in the April 2013 Formula One Bahrain Grand Prix Gulf between Saudi Arabia and Iran. From an (Toumi 2012, Reuters 2013). ideological perspective, the ruling Al-Saud Bahrain’s shifting political landscape holds family has twice demonstrated– in the 1990s significant lessons for both the domestic uprising and again in 2011 – that it is pre- legitimacy of the ruling family and for its pared to use force if necessary to support a regional and international partners. The fellow ruling dynasty in the Gulf. In addition speed with which the initial demonstrations to exercising political and security influence for political reform escalated into calls for over Bahrain, Saudi Arabia wields economic regime change among a significant segment leverage through the sharing of the Abu of the demonstrators testifies to the low Safah oilfield, which generates the majority threshold of confidence in the regime’s abil- of Bahrain’s fast-depleting oil reserves and ity to reform itself. Calls for regime change revenues (Mills 2012). were once the preserve of extremists such as This influence notwithstanding, the col- the splinter , yet they have lateral damage to ruling families through- migrated dangerously close to the main- out the Gulf, were one of their number to Art. 14, page 8 of 12 Coates Ulrichsen: Bahrain’s Uprising be forced into making major concessions Clinton went on to state that ‘Our choices to popular opinion, still less ousted from also reflect other interests in the region with power, is magnified still further in Saudi Ara- a real impact on Americans’ lives – including bia’s case. This arises from the fact that Bah- our fight against al-Qaeda; defense of our rain lies off the coast of its oil-rich Eastern allies; and a secure supply of energy…There Province with its large Shiite minority. Like will be times when not all of our interests their Bahraini counterparts, Shiites in Saudi align…That is our challenge in a country like Arabia have long complained of systematic Bahrain’ (deYoung 2011). discrimination and marginalisation at the At a time of rising international tension hands of state authorities (Jones 2006: 213). with Iran over its disputed nuclear pro- Worryingly for Saudi officials, the Eastern gramme, the is hardly going Province has been at the epicentre of ‘the to abandon a key regional ally and the host largest and longest protest movement in of its Fifth Fleet. Gerges has noted how the Saudi Arabia’s modern history’, replete with Obama administration ‘has consistently declarations of support by Shiite demonstra- measured every Arab uprising by whether it tors for their Bahraini brethren across the plays into Iran’s hands’ (Gerges 2012: 110). water (Matthiesen 2012: 629). Gulf rulers know which buttons to push These regional and international dimen- in Washington to get the administration’s sions to Bahrain’s uprising influenced a very support, and head off potential criticism of different response to popular calls for change heavy-handed actions. This provides succour than in other Arab Spring settings. Just five to hard-liners within the regime who oppose days before Qatar and the UAE rallied support far-reaching reforms, even if some of them, for UN Resolution 1973 authorising the crea- most notably the Minister of Defence, have tion of a No-Fly Zone to protect Libyans dem- suggested (bizarrely) that the uprising was onstrating in Benghazi against the Gaddafi ‘by all means a conspiracy involving Iran with dictatorship, these same states formed part the support of the United States.’ Indeed, of the GCC intervention designed to put an Khalifa bin Ahmed (mentioned earlier in his end to protests in Bahrain. Moreover, the guise as head of the Bahrain Defence Force) international community, led by the United went on to add, in his interview to Egypt’s States and the United Kingdom, effectively Al-Ahram newspaper on 6 July 2011, that turned a blind eye to the repressive measures ‘More important than talking about the dif- that followed. Indeed, mounting criticism of ferences between the U.S. and Iran’ are ‘their the Al-Khalifa regime from international civil shared interests in various matters that take society and foreign journalists contrasted aim at the Arab welfare.’ His sentiments sharply with muted statements from Bah- were repeated by other Bahraini officials and rain’s external partners. Aside from tooth- media outlets, which appeared to genuinely less statements urging all parties to commit believe that US policy was aimed at under- to a generic reform process, there was lit- mining the Sunni rulers of the Gulf based on tle follow-up from foreign governments to an apparent ideological affinity toward Shi- ensure implementation and/or monitoring ism (Gengler 2011). of declaratory commitments to reform. This However odd these feelings may seem, in became clear in a speech made by Secretary light of the longstanding US security strat- Clinton to the National Democratic Institute egy in the Gulf, they tapped into a deeper in Washington, DC, on 8 November 2011, streak of rising sectarian rhetoric, as ruling which highlighted the multiple dimensions elites across the GCC struggled to respond shaping US policy towards the upheaval in to the new regional zeitgeist. Immediately the Arab world. Arguing that ‘it would be after the Bahraini uprising in February- foolish to take a one-size-fits-all approach,’ March 2011, a plethora of participatory Coates Ulrichsen: Bahrain’s Uprising Art. 14, page 9 of 12 pressures and demands for reform hit the wave of popular rejection of authoritarian Gulf rulers at their most vulnerable point. misrule that swept four Arab leaders from These included: petitions in the UAE and power may have ebbed, but the impact of Saudi Arabia, signed by prominent intellec- the Arab Spring is ongoing and transforma- tuals and activists; weekly demonstrations tive. The powerful reaffirmation of support and episodes of violence in Saudi Arabia’s for universal values, such as human and restive Eastern Province; deadly clashes political rights and social and economic between protestors and demonstrators in justice, has demolished any perception of a normally-placid Oman; and, escalating ‘regional exceptionalism’ in the Middle East. public protests in Kuwait directed against This challenges the cosy inter-relationship the unpopular Prime Minister there (Coates that for decades existed between regional Ulrichsen 2011c). strongmen and their political and security Yet, in response to these pressures, and partners in the West. It requires that officials despite the grassroots calls for change focus- both in Western and in regional capitals for- ing, not on regime change, but on a more mulate a new approach that better balances equitable distribution of political power, geopolitical and commercial interests with officials in the GCC turned to an old tactic greater concern for human rights and politi- of blaming Iran for meddling in their inter- cal reform. However, the radicalisation of the nal affairs. This externalised the roots of dis- initial protests additionally carries a caution- sent and deflected them from any possible ary lesson for regimes as Bahrain’s experi- domestic grievances, trapping them into a ence demonstrates how rapidly positions wider struggle for regional power and influ- can polarise and inflict immense damage on ence between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Thus, social cohesion. in addition to the Bahraini foreign minis- Domestically within Western states, pres- ter’s claim that ‘We have never seen such a sures from parliamentary and advocacy sustained campaign from Iran on Bahrain groups to make a principled defence of uni- and the Gulf as we’ve seen in the past two versal values frequently clash with commer- months,’ the foreign minister of the UAE cial and strategic interests arising from the bluntly warned Iran ‘to respect the unity benefits accruing from regional and inter- and sovereignty of Gulf countries’ (Anon. national partnerships and alliances. This is 2011). This tactic served two purposes: first, particularly so in the case of the hydrocar- it enabled the (Sunni) regimes to de-legiti- bons-rich Gulf States, which are sources of mise any (Shiite-led) opposition activity or much-needed foreign investment (and con- demand for reform by conflating the issues comitant job creation) at a time of economic of Shiite loyalties and Iranian manipula- weakness and austerity in Europe and North tion into one amorphous threat. Second, by America. However, the rise of ‘citizen jour- portraying demonstrators as disloyal and/ nalism’ and public empowerment across the or potential extremists, the regimes played Middle East and North Africa has changed a classic divide-and-rule card by hindering the parameters of policy-making. Together, the emergence of a unifying cross-sectarian they constitute powerful new methods of opposition. Both tactics were heavily used holding governments and officials publicly in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Gulf in to account for their actions. This is as true 2011 (Coates Ulrichsen 2011c). just as much for Western partners as it is for local regimes. Moreover, the instantaneous Conclusion: A Delicate Balance spread of information and sharing of uncen- The Arab Spring presents a myriad of chal- sored, raw footage magnifies manifold the lenges to foreign policy-making at a number impact and reach of individual events and of interconnected levels. The contagious the reactions to them. The fact that there is Art. 14, page 10 of 12 Coates Ulrichsen: Bahrain’s Uprising no hiding place in today’s interconnected cember. Available at http://www.bbc. world means that all governments are more co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20874049 vulnerable to public and political opinion [Accessed 11 May 2013]. than ever before. BICI 2011 Report of the Bahrain Independ- Set against this are the structural ties that ent Commission of Inquiry. Available at bind together countries in the inter-state http://www.bici.org.bh/ [Accessed 23 system of alliances and partnerships. The November 2011]. strength of these connections and the sen- Coates Ulrichsen, K 2011a. Bahrain: evolu- sitivity of countries to perceived external tion or revolution? Open Democracy. 1 interference in domestic affairs have proved March. Available at http://www.opende- an awkward balancing act in the Arab Spring. mocracy.net/kristian-coates-ulrichsen/ Moreover, the conflation of the mobilisation bahrain-evolution-or-revolution [Accessed of Shiite communities with Iranian med- 1 April 2013]. dling demonstrates also how internal fault- Coates Ulrichsen, K 2011b Dark clouds lines in the Gulf States intersect with exter- over Bahrain. Foreign Policy, 6 Septem- nal fissures within the region. This merging ber. Available at http://mideast.for- of domestic and international pressure is eignpolicy.com/posts/2011/09/06/ already – at the time of writing in spring dark_clouds_over_bahrain [Accessed 14 2013 – being replicated in the deteriorat- February 2013]. ing relationship between individual Gulf Coates Ulrichsen, K 2011c Gulf States: stu- States and the . And dious silence falls on the Arab Spring. while Bahrain has proven to be the sharpest Open Democracy, 25 April. Available at clash between ‘interests’ and ‘values’ in the http://www.opendemocracy.net/kris- Arab Spring thus far, similar tensions may tian-coates-ulrichsen/gulf-states-studi- be expected to come to the fore should pro- ous-silence-falls-on-arab-spring [Accessed tests threaten other Gulf monarchies in the 28 March 2012]. future, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Coates Ulrichsen, K and Fakhro, E 2012 Post-BICI Bahrain: between re- References form and stagnation. Open Democracy, Alhasan H T 2011 The role of Iran in the 19 January. 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How to cite this article: Coates Ulrichsen, K 2013 Bahrain’s Uprising: Regional Dimensions and International Consequences. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(1): 14, pp. 1-12, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.be

Published: 29 May 2013

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