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Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal 50 ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JOURNAL 50 2 The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the contributors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society. First published in the UK in 2011 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society All ri hts reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical includin photocopyin , recordin or by any information stora e and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writin . ISSN 1361 4231 Printed by ,indrush -roup ,indrush House Avenue Two Station .ane ,itney O021 40, 3 ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY President 2arshal of the Royal Air Force Sir 2ichael 3eetham -C3 C3E DFC AFC 7ice8President Air 2arshal Sir Frederick Sowrey KC3 C3E AFC Committee Chairman Air 7ice82arshal N 3 3aldwin C3 C3E 7ice8Chairman -roup Captain 9 D Heron O3E Secretary -roup Captain K 9 Dearman FRAeS 2embership Secretary Dr 9ack Dunham PhD CPsychol A2RAeS Treasurer 9 3oyes TD CA 2embers Air Commodore - R Pitchfork 23E 3A FRAes ,in Commander C Cummin s :9 S Cox Esq 3A 2A :A72 P Dye O3E 3Sc(En ) CEn AC-I 2RAeS :-roup Captain 2 I Hart 2A 2A 2Phil RAF :,in Commander C Hunter 22DS RAF Editor & Publications ,in Commander C - 9efford 23E 3A 2ana er :Ex Officio 4 CONTENTS THE 3ATT.E OF 3RITAIN ? 70 AEARS ON by Dr 2ichael 6 Fopp SU22ARA OF THE 2INUTES OF THE T,ENTA8THIRD 31 ANNUA. -ENERA. 2EETIN- HE.D IN THE ROAA. AIR FORCE C.U3 ON 16 9UNE 2010 BE0ECUTI7E FU..ERCD ? THE ROAA. AIR FORCE AND 34 THE CHANNE. DASH by -p Capt Alistair 3yford THE RIGHT OF THE LINE by 9OHN TERRAINE ? A RE8 62 ASSESS2ENT 2E AEARS ON by Dr 9ohn Peaty ARTHUR TEDDER ? AIR PO,ER 2AESTRO by -p Capt 74 Andrew Thomas THE ,IRE.ESS OPERATOR IN ,, II by , Cdr 9eff 17 9efford THE BHAND AND THUNDER3O.TD 3AD-E by , Cdr 9eff 112 9efford ERRATA 117 UPDATE ON FORTHCO2IN- RAF 2USEU2 E0HI3ITS 111 3OOK RE7IE,S 119 E SELECTED ABBREVIATIONS ACRC Air Crew Reception Centre AI Airborne Interception equipment (ie rader) A2O Air 2inistry Order A2,O Air 2inistry ,eekly Order 3C2H 3ritish Commission for 2ilitary History CDS Chief of the Defence Staff DERA Defence Evaluation and Research A ency D/F Direction Findin FEAF Far East Air Force -APAN -uild of Air Pilots and Navi ators HF Hi h Frequency (radio) IFF Identification Friend or Foe IT, Initial Trainin ,in 2AP 2inistry of Aircraft Production Nav(3) Navi ator additionally qualified as an air bomber Nav(,) Navi ator additionally qualified as a wireless operator Nav(Radio) Navi ator additionally qualified as an AI operator OTU Operational Trainin Unit PRO Public Record Office RC Recruit Centre RDF Radio Direction Findin (later Radar) RUSI Royal United Services Institute SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force T- Trade -roup T.S Time .iterary Supplement TNA The National Archives ,E2 ,ireless and Electrical 2echanic ,O2 ,ireless Operator 2echanic 6 Our Guest Spe ker t the RAF Club, following the Society,s AG- on .6 June 00.0, w s the recently retired Director Gener l of the Roy l Air Force -useum nd current 2resident of GA2AN Dr -ich el Fopp whose topic w s THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN 3 70 YEARS ON Dr Fopp’s presentation was built around audio tapes and video clips which, by their very nature, do not lend themselves to reproduction in print. What follows, therefore, reflects the content of what was delivered on that occasion but extensively revised, and selectively amplified, to adapt it for publication. Ed For the last seventy years ChurchillDs words predictin BOur Finest HourD have run ever true, both for their historical accuracy and for their eloquence. They conveyed a messa e of defiance and resolution and were a powerful indicator to all who were listenin , at home and abroad, ally, enemy and potential ally or enemy. They have also served as the inspiration for decades of embellishment, analysis, review, revision, hero worship, character assassination and rainforests of paper and books about a relatively short period of 3ritish history. That period is officially 10 9uly to 31 October 1940, the dates promul ated, after the war, to determine who would be entitled to adorn their 193984E Star with the 3attle of 3ritain clasp. To qualify, aircrew were required to have flown one operational sortie with a desi nated unit within Fi hter Command between those dates. Thus they were then cate orised as participants in the 3attle of 3ritain. These are dates with very little supportin evidence to Hustify their existence. Prior to 10 9uly other encounters with the Luftwaffe had been Hust as ferocious as they were to become after that date. On 4 9uly, for example, 9u 17s confirmed their deadly accuracy with E00k bombs on a coastal convoy, and free8ran in 3f 109s flew around Sussex in search of Hurricanes and Spitfires. After 31 October there were also many hard fou ht aerial en a ements ri ht up to December. Few of us appreciate havin our cherished illusions distorted by reality. 2y eneration, which was born soon after the end of the Second ,orld ,ar, was reared on classic films such as The 7 Among the participants in the Battle whose recorded voices featured in Dr Fopp’s presentation were (left to right, with contemporary ranks): his father, Sgt Desmond Fopp of No 17 Sqn; OC 257 Sqn, Sqn Ldr Robert Stanford Tuck and Major Adolf Galland, -eschwaderkommodore 9-26. Dambusters, Reach For The Sky, Carve Her Name With Pride and The Battle Of Britain. In some measure, at least, these epics were BfactionD. Such films are often denounced today, because all of their errors were on the side of enerosity, to emphasise heroism and enlar e achievement. Few people find this practice offensive. BFactionD, especially about the war, chiefly incurs the wrath of the public when it diminishes le ends, rather than enhancin them. Unlike so many historical periods or events, the passin of time has dealt kindly with the 3attle of 3ritain ? because the basic story is true. ,hile the eloquence and rhetoric of Churchill (and others) served to steel the resolve of the 3ritish people, his words were impressively accurate and perceptive. It is interestin to observe that, apart from bein the first decisive aerial battle in history, the 3attle of 3ritain is also probably unique in bein the first battle that was iven a name before it be an and had victory acclaimed before it was over. So what can I do to retell such a well8known story after so many yearsI ,hat can I do, as someone who was not even born at that time, althou h I would claim to have more that a passin interestI First, I am the son of a 3attle of 3ritain veteran. He was an Australian and, as such, one of the BFew of the FewD. 2y father never talked of his 1 experiences, either of the battle itself or of his lon career in war and peace as a Royal Air Force pilot. Secondly, I have, for more than thirty years, made my livin as an aviation historian, lecturin on the subHect and workin at the Royal Air Force 2useum ? for twenty8two of those years as its Director -eneral. I am, therefore, privile ed not only to have known many of the participants in the battle, but also to have had access to the archives and collections of the 2useum that has the most comprehensive array of material relatin to the period. This Society has already iven the subHect careful consideration durin its The Battle Re8T oug t symposium in 1990 and in Dr Alfred PriceDs post8A-2 address in 2002 when he analysed and described the events of 3attle of 3ritain Day itself in some detail. I am not, therefore oin to deal in any reat detail with the facts of the battle, since these are already well documented. I hope instead, to provide an insi ht into some of its aspects that may have been distorted or obscured by the plethora of material which has been published over the past 70 years. How The Story 5 s Told At The Time There was no 248hour Brollin newsD covera e on T7 in 1940, of course, and news bulletins on the radio were strictly censored. 3eyond that, the story of the battle was told in films and newsreels made for propa anda purposes, not least to impress the United States. These films were essentially documentaries, featurin real people, rather than actors, and, despite the underlyin intent and the constraints imposed by security considerations, they do provide us with an impressively accurate impression of the period. I decline to participate in any revisionist debate, because the 3attle of 3ritain story is, essentially, true. There can be no disputin the fact that it was an extraordinary feat of arms ? a Bfinest hourD. Throu hout the summer and autumn of 1940, Fi hter Command translated into reality the rhetoric of ChurchillJs defiance of Nazism. It was, however, a campai n characterised by paradoxes and ironies. For example, the mere fact that the 3ritish were even continuin the war was at odds with lo ic. A overnment of coldly rational men in .ondon in 9une 1940 would surely have made peace with 3erlin. After the fall of France, 3ritain had no realistic prospect of defeatin Hitler alone, even if the war lasted for ever. The ulf between the real and potential 9 resources of the two adversaries was simply too reat.
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