T.C.W. Blanning. The French Wars, 1787-1802. New York and London: St. Martin's Press, 1996. xvii + 278 pp. $49.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-340-64533-8.

T.C.W. Blanning. The French Revolutionary Wars: 1787-1802. New York and London: Edward Arnold Publishers, 1996. xvii + 286 pp , , .

Reviewed by Ronald Schechter

Published on H-France (April, 1998)

The French Revolutionary Wars: 1787-1802, lutionary Wars are references to works in Ger‐ by T. C. W. Blanning, is a superb work of historiog‐ man, Italian, Spanish, and Russian, as well as raphy. Far more ambitious than its modest title French and English. Yet this book is more than a suggests, it is a history of the as tour de force of erudition. It is a richly textured, well as a military and diplomatic history of Eu‐ engaging narrative punctuated by cogent, often rope from 1787 to 1802. Blanning enriches our un‐ brilliant analysis. derstanding of the Revolution by placing it in its Blanning begins by arguing that French de‐ European context, by showing how it afected and feat in the Seven Years' War (1756-63) stimulated was afected by France's neighbors. He is especial‐ reforms in the army which are normally associat‐ ly well placed to take on this task. Not only has he ed with the Revolution: the breaking up of armies written extensively on the French Revolution; he into smaller, more fexible divisions; the use of has written a book on Mainz under the Old columns in addition to lines; an increasing re‐ Regime and the revolutionary republic, another liance on light troops; and the use of artillery. on the French occupation of the Rhineland, and More controversial, however, were the reforms two biographies of the Habsburg Emperor Joseph introduced in 1787 and 1788, which slashed the II.[1] He is one of the few historians who can number of ofcers in an army that was, in Blan‐ move comfortably from France to Germany to the ning's words, "absurdly over-ofcered" (p. 19). vast Habsburg empire stretching from Belgium to These reforms, coinciding with the revolt of the the Balkans, and he has flled in the remaining parlements, added fuel to the fre of the aristo‐ gaps with extraordinarily vast reading. Among cratic revolution by alienating many of its leaders, the thousand or so footnotes in The French Revo‐ who were not only parlementaires but army of‐ H-Net Reviews cers. They guaranteed that the army would not which according to Blanning killed some 400,000 serve the king when he needed it to suppress the people. insurrection in Paris in July 1789, and indeed The author goes on to describe the spectacu‐ pushed the ofcers to make common cause with lar series of revolutionary victories from August the Third Estate. Thus Blanning provocatively but 1793 to the spring of 1795, by which time France convincingly claims, "In part at least, the French had nearly reached its "natural frontiers" through Revolution was a military coup" (p. 28). In addi‐ the conquest of Belgium, the Dutch Republic, and tion to the hated military reforms, Blanning ar‐ most of the left bank of the Rhine. He explains gues that an unpopular alliance with Austria con‐ these victories largely in terms of French numeri‐ tributed to the discrediting of the and cal superiority, but also emphasizes the govern‐ that, more directly, the crown lost its legitimacy ment's power to requisition vast quantities of when it failed, ostensibly due to bankruptcy, to re‐ arms and to execute commanders judged insuf‐ spond to the Prussian invasion of the United Prov‐ ciently aggressive on the battlefeld. In addition to inces and the suppression of the pro-French indigenous factors, Blanning cites the allies' in‐ Dutch Patriots in 1787. fghting and lack of commitment to the war with The narrative continues with an account of France as crucial to French victory. Next Blanning the frst two years of the Revolution, when Russia, describes the war under the Directory govern‐ Prussia and Austria were preoccupied with ment, when the post-Terror regime made an of‐ Poland--which they would soon partition out of cial policy of "nourish[ing] war by war" and mak‐ existence--and therefore relatively uninterested ing the armies live of the land they invaded. This in developments in France, despite some occa‐ policy entailed the "pillaging of ", as the sional counter-revolutionary sabre- rattling. Yet French looted everything from grain and clothing this period of "deceptive isolation from the Euro‐ to gold, art treasures, and rare books and pean states-system" (p. 42) ended in the spring of manuscripts. It gave the lie to any liberationist 1792, when an unlikely coalition of Girondins and rhetoric and guaranteed repeated resistance and monarchists (including the king himself) pro‐ uprisings from Belgium to Calabria. Following a voked war against the equally unlikely coalition rich description of the naval confict between of Prussia and Austria, countries which had been Britain and France, Blanning ends the story of the at war for more than ffty years. Blanning tells the revolutionary wars with an account of the War of dreadful story of war and revolution from Sep‐ the Second Coalition (1799-1802), in which France tember 1792, when thousands of suspected faced a massive alliance that in the author's view traitors were butchered in Parisian prisons, to Au‐ was bound to fall apart under the weight of mis‐ gust 1793, when the revolutionary Convention de‐ trust and conficting interests. clared "total war" against external and internal Central to The French Revolutionary Wars is enemies alike. He describes the terrible process the notion of the primacy of foreign policy. Blan‐ by which the war escalated both beyond and ning sees foreign policy in general and war in par‐ within French borders: republican victories in the ticular as decisive both in causing the Revolution autumn of 1792 brought Britain and the Dutch Re‐ and determining its trajectory. He is careful to public into the war. To fght against this growing avoid reductionism, i.e. the dismissal of the com‐ coalition, the revolutionary government was plexity of causal factors in favor of a single pre‐ forced to adopt conscription, and conscription, ferred cause, and gives credit to a variety of fac‐ more than any other single issue, provoked and tors--from economics and social strains to revolu‐ fuelled the revolt of the Vendee and the civil war tionary political culture--but his main emphasis is

2 H-Net Reviews on foreign afairs. He observes that the monar‐ and domestic policy, one in which real threats chy's failure to respond to the Prussian invasion from abroad have an impact on domestic politics, of the Dutch Republic in 1787 was crucial to its de- and in which imaginary foreign threats and con‐ legitimation and downfall and that "virtually all ficts are fabricated for use by domestic politi‐ of the great journees--10 August 1792, the Septem‐ cians, with real international consequences. In ber Massacres [1792], 31 May and 2 June 1793 and this scenario foreign policy is certainly important, 18-19 Brumaire [Year VIII]-- were essentially re‐ indeed crucial to an understanding of the whole sponses to failure in war" (p. 269). Yet though picture--and for this reason Blanning's study is in‐ Blanning cites Francois Furet's claim that "the valuable--but whether it has "primacy" is ques‐ war conducted the Revolution far more than the tionable. Revolution conducted the war" (p. 267), he gives Blanning's claims about the primacy of for‐ ample evidence of the Revolution conducting the eign policy, moreover, are at least potentially at war as well. Indeed, he suggests that the war was odds with his revisionist sympathies. Blanning largely provoked by domestic politics. He notes cites Francois Furet and Simon Schama approv‐ that after the Champs de Mars massacre in July ingly, and his verdict on the Revolution is corre‐ 1792 the "lid" had been "cram[med] ... back on the spondingly harsh. The government of the Terror popular cauldron", but only "[f]or the time being." was "a regime that can only be described as crimi‐ He continues: nal" (p. 137). Even in the summer of 1793, before To create a brew so explosive that no amount Terror had become "the order of the day", the rev‐ of legislative weight could contain its pressure, an olutionaries had committed unspeakable atroci‐ issue even more combustible than the royal fight ties in the "pacifcation" of the Vendee, and in Au‐ was needed. The aftermath of [the king's abortive gust, in the midst of "wild excitement" and "ni‐ fight to] Varennes [in June 1791] made it clear hilism" the National Convention issued a declara‐ that it could not be domestic in origin. If the at‐ tion of "total war" reminiscent, in the author's tempted fight of the king could not fnally delegit‐ mind, of a similar declaration by the Nazi propa‐ imate the monarchy, then only the gravest charge ganda minister Joseph Goebbels in the winter of that can be made against a sovereign would suf‐ 1943 (p. 101). Yet by emphasizing the extent to fce--high treason. For that, war was needed (pp. which foreign afairs in general and war in partic‐ 55-6). ular determined the course of events in France, Moreover, Blanning gives evidence of the rev‐ Blanning inadvertently suggests mitigating cir‐ olution conducting the war during the Directory. cumstances for the revolutionary crimes. This He notes that after the coup d'etat of 30 Prairial paradox is most dramatically illustrated his ac‐ (18 June 1799) the neo-Jacobin Directory was un‐ count of the September prison massacres of 1792. der pressure to show its zeal against France's ene‐ Here Blanning describes the fear which gripped mies and consequently ordered a premature mili‐ Parisians at the news of the fall of Verdun and the tary ofensive, led by General Barthelemy-Cather‐ allied invasion of France. He notes that this fear ine Joubert, in northern Italy. He explains the hu‐ was compounded by the Brunswick manifesto of miliating French loss at the battle of Novi (15 Au‐ 25 July, which had threatened collective punish‐ gust 1799) in terms of "Joubert's ill-timed initia‐ ment of Paris should the Tuileries palace be at‐ tive, determined more by domestic politics than tacked or the king or royal family harmed (the Tu‐ military considerations..." (pp. 251-2). ileries were attacked on 10 August and the king subsequently imprisoned with his family). To be Indeed, the evidence Blanning presents sug‐ sure, Blanning's goal could not be further from gests a dialectical relationship between foreign excusing the heinous acts which took place over

3 H-Net Reviews those fve infamous days in September. Yet when diers" French troops were equipped with a patri‐ he writes, "Never has there been a revolution so otic spirit or elan and a special sense of mission paranoid," and then lists the reasons why it had which enabled them to fght more courageously cause to be fearful (p. 72), he simultaneously de‐ and more successfully than their counterparts in nounces the and ofers an oppor‐ the allied forces. He notes that the myth of elan tunity for their defenders. corresponds to revolutionary rhetoric and should Moreover, Blanning's emphasis on the trea‐ not be taken at face value. He points out that the sonous fight of General Charles-Francois du revolutionary soldiers sometimes lost, and that to Perier Dumouriez to the Austrians in April 1793 suggest that they lost because they had less elan as an explanation of the proscription of the on some days than others would be begging the Girondins and the "lurch by the Revolution to the question. In explaining French victories, then, left" (p. 99), suggests that the events of the war other more mundane factors, such as the number were decisive in the drift toward the Terror. Para‐ of soldiers in the feld and the size, number and doxically, then, the logic of the "primacy of for‐ quality of their weapons, must take precedence eign policy" theory puts Blanning uncomfortably over abstract assumptions about elan (pp. 119-21). close to the long list of apologists for the Terror Yet elsewhere Blanning resorts to the very princi‐ from Albert Mathiez to Albert Soboul. Of course, ple he has called into question. When explaining tout comprendre n'est pas tout pardonner, and Napoleon's victory at Lodi (May 1796) he writes, besides, history is more than simply assigning "It was now that the special vigour and elan of the blame and conferring praise retrospectively. But revolutionary ofcers noted earlier came into Blanning's convictions about the "criminal" na‐ play" (pp. 145-46). He cites the Prussian General ture of the Terror lead to an understandable de‐ and famous military strategist, Carl von Clause‐ sire to discount any potentially exculpating fac‐ witz, who emphasized Napoleon's "enthusiasm", tors such as the war. In other words, as a revision‐ defned as "an elevation of spirit and feeling ist Blanning is not surprisingly unwilling to adopt above calculation", and claimed that the victory at the position that the Terror was "an aberration, Lodi "inspired tremendous enthusiasm in all the an emergency response to the threat of foreign in‐ friends of France and its general" (p. 147). Clause‐ vasion and counter-revolution" (pp. 137-38). Yet witz appears frequently throughout the book in his convictions about the primacy of foreign poli‐ support of Blanning's claims about the social and cy prevent him from endorsing Simon Schama's psychological elements of war which other strate‐ claim that the Terror was "merely 1789 with a gists have reduced to rational calculation. Yet higher body count" (p. 138). Blanning concludes: Clausewitz, for all his insight, was a product of his "However faccid it may sound, the most satisfac‐ age, and Blanning might have historicized his as‐ tory conclusion seems to be that the Terror was sumptions about enthusiasm, spirit, and feeling-- latent in revolutionary ideology but needed the all rough equivalents of elan--by connecting them strains of war to be activated" (p. 139). This posi‐ to contemporary currents in romanticism. In the tion is hazardously close to being tautological. It process he might have strengthened his claims may be correct, but its veracity cannot be demon‐ about the importance of numbers of troops, the strated empirically. size and quality of the weaponry, and the state ap‐ paratus that stood behind the war efort. A similar tension is evident in Blanning's dis‐ cussion of the importance of the alleged elan of Paradoxically, quandaries such as those dis‐ the French revolutionary soldiers. In some places cussed above result from one of the great virtues Blanning criticizes the notion that as "citizen-sol‐ of Blanning's book: namely, its aversion to reduc‐ tionism. Blanning includes an impressive quantity

4 H-Net Reviews of possible causes for the events and phenomena he endeavors to explain. He is careful to establish a hierarchy of causes, and occasionally resorts to the distinction, famously posited by the seven‐ teenth and eighteenth-century German philoso‐ pher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, between neces‐ sary and sufcient causes. Yet the sheer number of causes gives the impression that the events and phenomena in question are overdetermined. Of course, this is not Blanning's problem alone. His‐ torians primarily concerned with causation are inevitably forced to steer between the Scylla of re‐ ductionism and the Charybdis of overdetermina‐ tion. In The French Revolutionary Wars Blanning steers skillfully. More important, this book re‐ minds historians that the French Revolution was not merely about France, but about Europe, and ofers the type of pan-European treatment of the Revolution that academic specialization along na‐ tional lines has made into a scarce commodity. [1]. T. C. W. Blanning. Joseph II and Enlight‐ ened Despotism (London, 1970); Reform and Revo‐ lution in Mainz, 1743-1803 (London, 1974); The French Revolution in Germany: Occupation and Resistance in the Rhineland, 1792-1802 (Oxford, 1983); The French Revolution: Aristocrats versus Bourgeois? (Houndmills, 1987); Joseph II (Lon‐ don:, 1994); and ed., The Rise and Fall of the French Revolution (Chicago, 1996). Copyright (c) 1998 by H-Net, all rights re‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ tact [email protected].

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Citation: Ronald Schechter. Review of Blanning, T.C.W. The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802. ; T.C.W. Blanning. The French Revolutionary Wars: 1787-1802. H-France, H-Net Reviews. April, 1998.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=1877

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