EU Conditionality in Serbia

CEU eTD Collection

Impact of EU Enlargement EU of Domestic Policy Impact Serbian Patterns oft and Serbian Compliance In partial fulfillment of requirements the for the degree of EU

C ONDITIONALITY IN IN ONDITIONALITY S Nationalism Studies Program Central European University TUART TUART Budapest, Hungary Má Florian Bieber Florian M. Kovács M. ria Advisors 2011 J.

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CEU eTD Collection 5 Chapter 4 Chapter 3 Chapter 2 Chapter 1 Chapter Abbreviations ofList Tables Abstract iv Content

Conclusions Agenda Normative EU’s 5.4 The 5.3 The Kosovo Question ICTY5.2 Cooperation the with 5.1 A Gamut of Explanations EU Conditionality Critical in S Conclusions 4.3 2008- 4.2 2003- 4.1 2000- nt of the SerbianDevelopme Po Conclusions Accession of Model’ ‘Croatian 3.4 The and3.3 The Stabilization Association Process of theEU Evolution 3.2 EUConditionality Enlargementand Development Law Enlargement EU of Stages Six 3.1 The Policy Enlargement EU Transformation of Conclusions 2.3 The Role of Nationalism 2.2 EUand Conditionality Patterns of Compliance Governance2.1 External Policy and Enlargement the EU’s Basis Theoretical A 1.2 Thesis Structure Statement 1.1 Thesis Introduction and Unanswered Questions Conditionality EU of Milošević Present: Ensuring EU Accession Present: Ensuring EU 2008: PartySystem Stabilization of Legacy the and Reforms Democratic Early 2003:

erbian Issues: Missing Links Context the in Spectrum litical

72 58 51 43 40 50 18 91 85 80 73 70 63 48 20 17 15 6 3 1 1 viii vii vi 76 19 9 6

CEU eTD Collection Bibliography 8 Chapter 7 Chapter 6 Chapter

Conclusion Conclusions of Serbia’s7.2 Sustainment Environment Corrupt Political Orientation Accession EU the of 7.1 Dominance Serbia’s for Policy Enlargement EU’s the of Implications Conclusions 6.3 Manipulation of EU Conditionality by Serbian Political Elites 6.2 Marginalization of Serbia’s Pro 6.1 E of Impact The Democratic Transition Spectrum Incarceration of Serbian Politics Serbian of Incarceration

U Conditionality on the Serbian Political v

EU Political Parties

121 93 125 124 122 117 104 119 99 119 94 CEU eTD Collection whicheffectiveness undermineconditionality the of that aboutenlargement EUcontinuously rule tran failsbringing to policy sfer. Serbiadeterminingin underplaysEU’s impact thewhy of importance the such conditionality impacts domestic factors; however,the existing literatureEU on conditionality 2000accurately Miloševićin tospectrumt fallexten sinceof which theEU the portrays transformation an into enlargement policy politics has developed significantly since the inception of enlargement to its full law compliance of Serbia’s political elites with EU conditions. The EU’s influence in domestic spectrumhow political suchparticularly impactof and influencesthe patterns onthe Serbian Abstract the domestic impact of conditionality in This thesis examines the examines thesis This domestic impact of focusing conditionality Serbia, in

. The development of the Serbian political ofpolitical the development Serbian . The produces weak patterns a compliance acompliance patterns weak produces Serbia vi

as a means to promote EU rule transfer. rule EU promote to ameans as T argues his thesis argues

CEU eTD Collection Table 5.1 4. Table Table 3.4 Table 3.3 Table 3.2 Table 3.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.1 List of Tables 1

(Serbia) Model Compliance of Patterns Weak Current National Assembly Composition Chapters of the EU Selected Chronology of the and EU Phases AccessionProcess Law StagesEUDevelopment Enlargement of Corresponding to Freyburg‘Identity and Model’ Richter Weak the Rounds ofthe Enlargement Rounds Patterns of of Patterns Articles of the Treaty of Lisbon of Treaty the of Articles

Compliance Model Acquis Communautaire Acquis vii

91 67 42 40 29 20 16 12

CEU eTD Collection UNSC – UN Security Council UNSC Kosovo in –UNUNMIK Mission UN –United Nations Yugoslavia of Republic –Federal SRJ Act –Single EuropeanSEA SAP and –Stabilization Association Process –Stabiliza SAA –Organization for Europe Security in andOSCE Cooperation –NorthNATO AtlanticTreaty Organization – LGBT – IMF – ICTY – ICJ Euratom AtomicEnergy –The European Community Kosovo in Mission Law –EU of Rule EULEX –EuropeanEU Union Assembly Parliamentary –European EPA –EuropeanEP Partnership Community –EuropeanEEC Economic –European SteelCom ECES and Coal –EuropeanEC Communities –EuropeEA Agreement of –Council Europe CoE –CentralCEE and Europe( Eastern Partnership –Accession AP Agreement AA –Association a –For European Serbia ZES Party Radical SRS –Serbian SPS – Movement Renewal SPO –Serbian Serbia –New NS – LDP G17+ –G17 Plus Serbia of Party DSS –Democratic Party –Democratic DS of Serbia –Democratic Opposition DOS Serbia in Movement –Democratic DEPOS Serbian Political Parties Abbreviations International of Justice Court Socialist PartySerbia of International Fund Monetary Liberal Democratic Party Democratic Liberal International Criminal Tribunal forFormer the Yugoslavia Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and TransgenderLesbian,Bisexual, Gay, tion andtion Association Agreement

an)

munity

viii

CEU eTD Collection of (SNS Third, the late shift seems stable given the pa Additionally,Serbia’scountry’s prospects. further strengthens such EU the accession previously anti an Such developmentsensured have the (DS) Party Democratic pro Serbia’s elections, a resultthree ofpresidentialas events. the 2008Serbian and First, key parliamentary Serbian politics, by political seen as parties, and increased political elites) has dramatically Serbian accession Serbian and failurecontinuously EU rule ‘frozen’status promote transfer to by its however, demonstrated suit; EU ineptnature—as bid the sluggish, of Serbia’s amongremaining the countries of 1.1 Introduction C EU membe se in cooperation with EU accession con accession EU with cooperation in se increa HAPTER HAPTER ) a splinter of the EU—a splinterof the

In recent years, SerbianIn EUspecrecent political membership supportfor the in andCroatia,, Montenegro Macedonia,candidate andeach have achieved EU status StatementThesis as a rship as - 2008 emergence and popularity boom of and popularity boom 2008 emergence - EU, Milošević Who is to blame to forprogress? is lack this . Who of 1 - — EU forces swept theEU country. Pres

goal across the entire Serbian political spectrum. Nevertheless, Nevertheless, spectrum. political Serbian entire the across goal

won reelection won - skeptic Serbian Radical Party (SRS) Party Radical Serbian skeptic - the in rty’s continued participation led Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS Serbia of Party Socialist led Western Balkans Western the continued supportfor and EU have membership marked and aDS and 1

the repositioning Second, the ditions. - led coalitionformed government. a stable next likely next the is Serbia , the pro- ident Boris Tadićident Boris

EU ) current DS current suggests the—suggests universality as a of leading proponent Serbian Progressive Party Party Progressive Serbian threatens the success of of success the —threatens —leader - led government. trum (i.e.trum follow in follow in to of the of the ,

CEU eTD Collection rules Serbia. in conditionality andquestion, the government’s termed concept (a approach society and‘European’ Serbian normsin a- top identity, utilizing values, issue’ofas or ‘thered ‘the andthe Kosovo diffusion Kosovo(3) question’), to refer final (also status resolutionof emerging cooperationKosovo’s betweenandregional the links cooperation’ thewith conditionality and the Serbian political spectrum:(1) unrelenting EU for demands ‘full this thesis limits its analysis to only three critical issues on the Serbian spectrum. political this thesis also claims that such inefficacy is primarilyresult a of the imp quo phenomenon’ and coopera unmetdespite WhySerbian remain bolsteringfor spectrum. conditions political support do betweenraises link conditionality many concerning, questions and specifically,the EU the the not case. is assumption Such of accession conditions with compliance in increase parallel a expect would one spectrum, political Serbian the elites, theremains country’s blocked. EU bid despite this drastic boost in 2 EU Conditionality in in Serbia Conditionality EU Given the issue takingWhen of consideration high into this degree tion with the EU in Serbia? This thesis claims that the explanation for this ‘ unresolved nature of unresolvedthe Kosovo cooperationICTY, nature the the with insufficient as generally argued generally —as

continued suggest failure the EU’sagendatake to that of normative hold is rooted in the ineffective nature of EU conditionality in Serbia; thehowever, in ineffectiveconditionality rooted of nature in is EU International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia - the EU enlargement process. As seen the EU thequo,however, enlargement in status process. this specific natureconditionality Serbia’s in process, ofspecific EU accession

supportfor among EUparties political accession and Serbian by this thesis as ‘the EU’s normative byEU’s agenda’). as thesis ‘the this which trendsa construct perplexing phenomenon

—is largely ineffective in promotingEU of transfer the

regardingbetween link the EU supportfor EU down, hierarchical hierarchical down, act of conditionalityact accession with accession T he Se he (ICTY), (2) (2) (ICTY), inevitably rbian the the status status in in CEU eTD Collection accession process in the Western Balkans? How sinceaccessionWestern process Balkans? has the such the policydeveloped in 1.2 regardin post Serbia’s to political spectrum, and illuminates the overarching implications of the EU accession process onthequestions effectiveness EU of enlargementgoals critical three the of EU conditionalitySerbian by political elites. An analysis of this impact in the context of (2)politics, the ma political elites, this thesis identifies parties, of and Serbian of the rhetoric,andSerbian political behavior, tacts balance the —Serbianion opin on—regardless of public political elites. intervention, determine success the EU of rule transfer in Serbia; the ultimate decision rests Serbia. While in cannot,transfer the EU it plays shortof a role, a vital unilateral thesis focusesthesis onhow As accession. EU Serbia’s to obstacle chief the as spectrum political Serbian the establishing thus compliance placedis impact of on howEU the conditionality domestic i componentthe thesis’ andanalyticalanalysis. ofInstead, providesthis foundation emphasis o ineffectiveness the for

This thesis asks: What is is asks:What thesis ofthe EUThis natureconditionality extent the in current and Structure Thesis By focusing onthe influence The conclusions thesis of this counterproductive to the very very the to showshowissues EU conditionality Serbian counterproductive is previously stated, in order to explain thequophenomenon, status previously explain this stated, orderto in rginalization of Serbia’s the domestic impact ofconditionality the Serbia undermines in

f EU rule transfer in Serbia; conditionality is merely Serbia; in an indirect transfer rule EU f . In t . a broader context, - communist, democratictransition. of EU conditionality in Serbia and its impactandconditionality onthe Serbian its ofSerbiain EU athree of EU conditionality of EU do not focus donot as a onconditionalitye direct - pro f impact:old the (1) -

EU politicalEU parties he scope he

of this thesis on the nature of

nfluences Serbian patterns of of patterns Serbian nfluences

incarceration of Serbian Serbian of incarceration manipulation manipulation , andthe (3)

goes b goes Serbian politics, politics, Serbian eyond Introduction 3 xplanation xplanation EU rule rule EU

CEU eTD Collection and how does it influenceof it andc patterns how does Serbian Serbia What the domestic EUis impac conditions? degreeare they linkedwith areWhat elites sinceandconcern what theto theSerbia key fallin of ofissues Milošević? parties, political and politics, political has development the EU of influenced the Serbian EU thecurrent applicationenlargements illuminate and of conditionality policy enlargement EU current clarify of case the uses chapter previous enlargements;then, this Process Association Balkans Western the process currentthe most accession in EU understand how examining governance. Chapterthe framework fundamental conditionality 3provides of by EU concepts and to tieconclusions the of this thesis into the existing literatureon EU exter research. chap following seven of EU fromof enlargement the the policy(albeit candidate perspective country). The inner of analysis an not is democratic This and process ssion transition. acce EU Serbia’s of context the It ruleconditionality evaluateof thetransfer to the aims in promotion EU effectivenessof in impact of EU conditionality on the Serbian political spectrum and its implications for Serbia. communist, democratic transition? This thesis is conce And,transfer? what of are the implications EU accession process post onSerbia’s areWhat EU previous rounds? the EU goals of enlargement the 4 EU Conditionality in in Serbia Conditionality EU ’s to establisha to basisonwhich de to policy enlargement Chapter a theoretical 2builds basisonwhich introduce to the mainexplanatory

transformation of transformation EU the , why - EU impacts and implications; but, this thesis does thesis discuss this but, impacts andthe development implications; EU builds uponthe developed character—builds of ters seek to set the stage for and present the principle conclusionsand seekoffor presentmy set the to stage the principle ters , and in what in context and ,

enlargement law process and enlargement the order accession in to . Furthermore, this analysis of previous this both Furthermore, and such policy emerged policy such

ompliance and the success the and ompliance rned primarily the with domestic to to example an as bid EU Croatia’s termine the successfulness of EU EU of successfulness the termine EU conditionality EU —the Stabilization and The following over following . The ’s

enlargement the the of goals central the t oft conditionality policy from the the from of EU rule rule EU of view of

? How How ? - nal nal in in

CEU eTD Collection the previous discussions implications for Serbia’sdemocratic transition. Serbian politics, political parties the threeshowissues how deep Serbian critical a of EUimplications conditionality conditionality analysis This in theEU Serbia. role in of Chaptuniquenessadvanced thesis. of bythis the claims EU whichconclusionsorder conditionality similar in present Serbia in determine to normative agenda.chapter This issues of Serbia’s EU (1 bid: chapters Milošević democratic transition. n political spectrumSerbia byfocus 4 Chapter transfer. rule Finally, chapter 8 constructs the links betweenFinally, theclaims eachchapter links and 8constructs conclusions of the of The Chapter 5define . Chapter resear ch substance the which to EU the conditionality extent introduces permeates and provides remarks. closing s s evaluate and ) ICTYand (3)) the Kosovo,the cooperation,question (2) EU’s

and principle conclusionsand , and elites. Suchimpact political overarching has profound,

also provides a ing three key periods in the course of Serbia’s the in coursepost key onthree periods the degree of EU conditionality in the three the degree conditionality of critical in EU

critical assessment critical n impact has formed within the impact nature has formed of within ers 6 and 7 discuss theers impact 6and 7discuss presented in presented are of works the existing on the

remaining Introduction 5 the the and -

CEU eTD Collection 1 A Theoretical Basis C thriving academicfield with a firm theoretical basis. Easterncountriesand (CEE ofEurope Central 1989and in of the theintegrate subsequentcommunism Union’sto campaign initiation the of fall the after until emerge not did literature such of bulk The area. research new relatively U functioning 2.1 theory. governance external concept impact. This chapter providesa theoretical basis for this thesis’hypothesis domestic EU’s the and governance, external of modes varying leverage, of types different in particular, Oxford University Press, 2003). Kevin Featherstone Radaelli, Claudio M. and The eds., Politics of Europeanization Risse, and NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2003), 57- Impact of in Europe,” The Politics of Europeanization ed., KevinFeatherstone Radaelli ClaudioM. and (Oxford Oxford University Press, 2005), 45- York: New and (Oxford Christian The Lequesne Member and States of the Bulmer European Simon Union ed. ,

See, e.g., A. Tanja “Europeanization: Börzel, Union Interacts European the with How Member States,” its in nion’s HAPTER HAPTER Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change ‘Europeanization’ called (also EU the of influence external the of study The The of community transformation theeconomic EUregional from a External the EU’s GovernancePolicy Enlargement and s of of s Consequently, EU institutions and a into global parallelEU institutions superpower. transformation Consequently, constitutional, supra , constitutional, conditionality the EU subfield of the a represents 2

and domestic patterns of compliance patternsand of domestic

76; 76; A.Tanja and Börzel Thomas“ConceptualizingRisse, Domestic the - the the by characterized been has organization governmental

80; Maria80; Green Cowles, Ja ’s

). Since then, this subjectSince then,has this developed). a into 6 ; such literature details influence the external

The study of EU external governance The studyexternal of EU

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); 2001); Press, University Cornell (Ithaca: within the context of EU the context within

mesA. Caporaso, and Thomas

(Oxford and New York:

in by analyzing the the by analyzing to ato fully 1 ) is a is -

, CEU eTD Collection 5 4 3 2 f transfer: rule comprise governance.the dimensions effectiveness theEU nature external Two of of EU rules formal and policies beyond membership”. domestic issues effecti more be to rules such believe they because rules domestic existing policies via ‘competition’. Essentially, th on based is governance external EU of mode market bilateral produce to and Finally, interactions mutually dialogue solutions. accepted the emphasize which actors equal legally of relationship power ahorizontal create constellations rules enforceable (i.e. conditionality governance is governance: entails deliberate involvement. EU Withinthis context, there are three modes of external leverage active membership, EU of attraction the to merely refers leverage passive While enlargement policy neighbors.Therefore, t the in affairsEU of represents of the Union’sand the influence epitome international cloutstrengthenedand EU New States,” Member Journal of Routledge, 2010), 1- Lavenex Projecting Governance: EURules inMembership Beyond EUExternal Politics,” in European

Vachudová See, e.g.,Falkner Gerda “ThreeOliver Worlds of and Treib, EU The Compliance Four? or Ibid. Governance External Theorizing Borders: EU Beyond Rules “EU Schimmelfennig, Frank and Lavenex Sandra

modes of external governance, the EU aims to extend its “internal its extend to aims EU the governance, external of In such modes utilizing Two types leverage of and Frank Schimmelfennig, Journal of European Public Policy Series (London and New York: York: New and (London Series Policy Public European of Journal Schimmelfennig, Frank and , Europe Undivided. (1) hierarchical (1) essentially avertical essentially ormal ruleormal transfer . nt policy nt enlargeme the chiefEU’s —represents of the tool 22. ) . Th . .

concept of EU external governance conceptof EUbesthe illustratedbythe externalis EU’s is mode is

Common Market Studies , (2) network (2) , —

characterized by non by —characterized passive and active and rule diffusion - , top domestic forces decide to adopt EU rules favorforces in adopt decideto EU of domestic norms down , and (3) market , and (3) relationship of domination and of domination subordination relationship became politicized

4 This process This

46, no. 2(2008): 293- characterize EU external governance. external EU —characterize ; 5 (and (and effective and, order in constitute to e indirect EU transfernormsand of - negotiable, and legally binding,

governance measures —measures transfer rule —EU The enlargement of the the of enlargement . The 313; Frank Schimmelfennig Schimmelfennig Frank 313; . 3 Hi relations with its ve in resolving in ve A TheoreticalA erarchical erarchical . N - 15 Compared to , ed. Sandra ed. , etwork

Basis 7 Basis 2

CEU eTD Collection 7 6 Economy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005). and Ulrich The Sedelmeier,eds., Europeanization of Central andEastern Europe domestic compliance of patterns In conditionality of domestic politics. words, the other implementation achievingin manner onits EU depends ruleof appli transfer playa more active role mode of e the most governanceas regarded is hierarchical Generally, 3.2). chapter (see policy enlargement EU’s the characterize specifically to come has governance of mode hierarchical transfer. rule EU governa effectiveness. policy’s the measuring when enlargement takedimensions accountboth Union must into policy, the governance external of mode hierarchical the utilizing contradicting enlargement, EU of context the in especially risk, domestic processformal does rule of not transfer elitediffusion, ontheacceptance measures otherrules.and ofThe hand, EU the public Rule level. governmental the at solely albeit transfer, rule EU effectiveness the gauges transfer substantial) EU rule transfer, both dimensions must be sufficiently met. Formal EU rule 8 105- Schi Frank in EU ExternalPolitics,” Governance: Projecting EU and Rules Lavenex Beyond Membership Sandra ed. ,

EU Conditionality in in Serbia Conditionality EU See, e.g., Richard Youngs, “EURules Theorizing Beyond EUBorders: External in Governance European S and Lavenex 125.

passive (market mode) and active (hierarchical (hierarchical active and mode) (market —passive governance external of form Each - athree as —defined nce and network constellations modes) and nce network transferring EU rules EU transferring elite mmelfennig, Journal of European Public PolicySeries (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), chimmelfennig, “EU Rules Beyond EU Borders”. EU Beyond Rules “EU chimmelfennig, s ought take to i While EU external governance utilizes all three modes of rule transfer, the the transfer, rule of modes three all utilizes governance external EU While . 7 Nevertheless, the effectiveness of hierarchical external governance governance external hierarchical of effectiveness the Nevertheless,

pronged process of selecting, adopting,and of process applyingru selecting,pronged les nto account the demands of accountthento demands and typically characterizes cases which necessitate the EU to to EU the necessitate which cases characterizes typically and determine effective EU rule transfer. rule EU effective determine

ice versa) ruleguarantee diffusion (and vice

varyingly influences the influences —varyingly

as of the instrument chief the EU’s

cation and its impact and on its cation electorate, their actions often electorate, popular perceptions , Cornell Studies in Political Political in Studies Cornell ,

of EU rule transfer transfer rule EU of and its influence and its on

effectiveness of of effectiveness ; while . In In ffective 6 —

CEU eTD Collection 9 8 learning model. compli seek forconditionality patternsexplanation provide the to influenceonvarying of an compliance. pulledfrom the existingexternal governance, Two models, literatureonEU of socialization. aprocess by conceptualized norm ‘ interest Models Domestic of Compliance EU with Conditionality directl ability influenceeffectiveness of conditionality depends rule to of transfer uponthe EU ‘sticks’).giventhat domestic elitespatterns determine As such, of compliance,the e suchthreaten th calledprompts EUrewards withhold to (also and punishments even however,domestic government’s set EU compliancewith non- conditions; the ensure to ‘carrots’) or ‘rewards’ called (also incentives external offering It entails 2.2 York: Free Press, 1989): 160. Eastern Europe York: Schimmelfennig Palgrave Macmillan,2004); and Sedelmeie r, Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality Palgr Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (September 2007): 405- ImpactEurope: The EURegulatory of Diverse G

logic of consequentialismlogic of James G.March andOlsen, Johan P. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics See, e.g., Michael Christoph Bauer, W. Knill, and DianaPitschel,“Differential Europeanization in Eastern ave James Macmillan, and Gwendolyn 2006); Claire Hughes, Europeanization Sasse, Gordon, and - oriented onthe other ‘ action, hand, followsthe y indirectly or ance among domestic elites: (1) the external incentives model and (2) the social - A dual behavioral orientation characterizes political action of domestic elites nat inherent The andPatterns Compliance EU of Conditionality oriented .

and norm 423; Heather Grabbe, Grabbe, Heather423; —political action. ureconditionality of sculpts itas primarily a incentive

’ and utilizes acost utilizes and ’ - oriented

compliance.While interest - , Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics (New York: (NewYork: Politics Union in European Studies , Palgrave The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization Through

overnance Patterns,” 9 Suchactions determinepatterns of domestic - benefit analytical approach to compliance; compliance; to approach analytical benefit

logic of appropriateness logic of

The Europeanization of Central and European Integration

oriented followsthe action A TheoreticalA compliance compliance 29, no. 4 ’ largely largely ’ - based policy. based —

(New (New

Basis 9 Basis (New (New — 8

CEU eTD Collection Conditionality”. International Orga UniversityJeffrey Press,2004); Checkel,“Why T. Social Comply? Learning Identity and European Change,” Europe Undivided. Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca andLondon: Cornell University Press, 2005), 29- in He and Engert, Stefan Schimmelfennig, Frank 2003); The European Union Kubicek, and J. Democratization Paul 2004); Press, and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe 2004): 672. Candidate Countries ofand Eastern Central Journal Europe,” of European Public Policy exceed the domestic adoption costs.” exceed the domestic adoption incentives model claims that a “[…] state adopts EU rules if the benefitsEU of 12 11 10 EU ruleclashing ensurescompatibility norms. transferof policy,or the process of socialization eliminates or delegitimizes conflicting domesticrules, legitimizes the elites or to indirectly Conditionality strategically exerts normative pressure to either directly enhance ofdomestic internalization EU theirappropriateness. normsand, turn, perceived in intended pr to hingesaEU’s of process enlargementsocialization policy on action of domestic elitesmore than their desire for utility short, t legitimate. as policy transfer rule EU the and appropriate as them perceives it if rules costs to the domestic elites. incentives the when compliance guarantees only provideempowerment conditionality the incentives compliance. to for as means However, ofinstrument conditionality though direct As such,enlargement thepolicy EU’s strive for utility 10

Judith G. Kelley, Ethnic Kelley, G. Judith Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms andIncentives Hughes Cond by “Governance Sedelmeier, Ulrich and Schimmelfennig Frank The Europeanization of Central andEastern Europe EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU his model claims that internalized identities, values, and norms motivate political Inadopting the interest Conversely, the norm et. al. et.

Europeanization and RegionalizationJacoby, ; Wade -

nization maximization in order to promote their own power, interests, and order their in survival. own power, promote to maximization interests,

is guaranteed only after the the after only Compliance guaranteed encourage is socialization.

55, no. 3 (2001): 553 (2001): 3 no. 55, 11

oriented social learning model claims that a state adopts EU

- oriented approach to domestic compliance, the external external the compliance, domestic to approach oriented 10 — This model assumes that political elites strategically within the framewo - 588; Schimmelfennig588; and Sedelmeier,“Governance by intergovernmental bargaining and indirect and intergovernmental bargaining iko Knobel, “The Impact of EU Political Conditionality,” Conditionality,” Political ImpactofEU “The Knobel, iko , ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, Sedelmeier, Ulrich and Schimmelfennig Frank ed. ,

(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University University Cambridge York: New and (Cambridge

providedexpected bythe EU outweigh the - maximization. In this context, the The Enlargement of the European Union itionality: EU Rule Transfer to the to Transfer Rule EU itionality: rk model of this (London and New York:Routledge,

(Princeton: Princeton Princeton (Princeton: persuade domestic domestic persuade

11, no. 4 (August (August 4 no. 11, omote the —utilizes the rewards rewards 50; Vachudová elite 12

In In , CEU eTD Collection and Eastern Europe March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions Evidence,” The in European Union and Democratization, ed. Paul J. Kubicek (London: Routledge, 2003), 1- KubicekPaul J. models rely upon numerous factors relymodels the cost which influence uponnumerous ofand conditionality determinerole to effectivel in the Accordingly,factors predict orderto in of the quo. in status domesticcompliance patterns influence ofeffectiveness upon domestic elites, its depends action so political doing in 13 Onand theeffectively. other factors bargain primarily hand, domestic emphasize adoption credibility andUnion’s capacitymonitor threatspromisesanto of conditionality, dthe of the the EUexample, clarity demands, both demands legitimacy and EU of processes, of thesewithin twocamps, categories; factors concern, thereand for domestic EU are both ofthe normfactors socialization influence chiefly cost the measure Likewise, convergence’,socialization). rationalistfactors andprimarily norm serve to intrinsic represents while the andperspective constructivist gainspower lowadoptioncosts) and survival, dual orientation of compliance rationalist Determining the Effectiveness EU of Conditionality socialization processes domestic of elites.

See, al. e.g., Bauer et. While EU conditionality The rationalist perspective represents material represents perspective rationalist The Each (both pre such of factors these or aconstructivist or , “International Norms, the European Union, and Democratization: Tentative Theory and and Theory Tentative Democratization: and Union, European the Norms, “International , - .

benefit balance of interest of balance benefit incentives (e.g. the strongerwith EU, ‘cogni identification Ethnic Politics in Europe in Politics Ethnic Kelley, Europe”; in Eastern Europeanization “Differential , perspective and complimentarily and act perspective

—to determine political action of domestic elites. —as models portrayed bythese two ; Schimmelfennig and Schimmelfennig ;

- - existing and developing) classify either a either classify developing) and existing oriented political action, and constructivist action, political and constructivist oriented

- oriented political Additionally, action. incentives (e.g.rewards, EU political

y influencing such patterns, these these patterns, such y influencing

Sedelmeier, - benefit analysis and and analysis benefit effectively traversing the the traversing —effectively The Europeanization of Central —seeks deeply to A TheoreticalA tive 13

Basis 11 Basis 29; ;

CEU eTD Collection appropriateness of the condition (i.e.appropriateness formal of norule thewith rule condition diffusion) transfer thecomply higher costsof avoid orderto non- in inappropri rewards deemed is andcompliance.If has appropriate a lowadoptioncosts condition determining in patterns and of perceptions constructivist domestic tendencyrationalist of the perceptionsrationalist and tendoverlap. constructivist to demanded are However,models andexclusive thesethe action. political mutually twonot perspectiveconstructivist of the effectivenessconditionalityconversely, socialutilizes and, oflearning the model model relies on the rationalist cost- effectivenessconditionality influencing in of their political action. The external incentives governance, aim to explain the compliance patterns of domestic elites and determine the capacityidentity players, convergence/divergence, of veto resonance. and normative costs (e.g.compliance effects interests, power, the onpolitical and density survival), and 12 EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU This thesis’ developedpresentedt This above model (see frameworkThese of models EU of the external the factors, within twopresented , then political action will constitute full compliance ate but has low adoptioncostsand/orate high has but low rewards

Logic of Consequentialism

UNFAVORABLE FAVORABLE Table 2.1 Table Inconsistent Compliance

domestic elites to determine the appropriateness of EU Full Compliance CORRESPOND –

Weak Compliance of Model Patterns benefit analysis of domestic elites to determine the Logic Appropriateness of

com

pliance, accept also not will but Imposed Compliance

Fake Compliance Non CONTRADICT able the overlapping 2.1), depicts . , then domestic elites will If deemeda is condition - Compliance

and/or high

—such action -

the the CEU eTD Collection of EU conditionality more accurately defines the former usage ‘domestic of impact’. and parties, political politics and of alter influence veto players). The the behavior domestic effects the meaning domestic implementation and enforcementreforms), of but this thesis interprets this term as ‘domestic impact’ oftenrefers toability the conditionality of to influence the role full of the patterns the effectiveness ofaccount conditionality, complianceand into theytake of donot an Conditionality EU of Impact’ ‘Domestic the Conceptualizing conditionality promotingrule in transfer. EU fake,inconsistent, i conditionality produces failsgarnercompliance to compliance,it full weak of patterns conditionality has heavilywhen theto but, possibility influencecompliance; patterns of political action. and will thus result incompliance inconsistent the orientation appropriateadoption costs high has but guarantees of EUFinally, neitherrule transfer. dimension i strict implementation of conditionality in this instancecan coerce imposed compliance costs and/or low rewards, then political action will result in non- fake compliance demonstrates d domestic factors (both rationalist and constructivist) as direct rationalistand constructivist) influencesondomesticd domestic factors (both While the vast majorityWhile onEU onEU studies external governance existing of focus —interest As an instrume domestic impactEU of conditionality domestic mestic factors conditionality ondomestic of mposed, and non- - oriented or norm . If high deemedinappropriatea and is . condition has adoption nt to provideand to nt threaten incentives punishments, compliance) whicheffectiveness underminecompliance) the of and/or l - oriented

which alsoproducing risks contradictory which

w rewards ow —of the decision- . Within the. Within l (e.g. mold identity, transform , then political action depends, then on political f a condition is deemeda is condition f compliance

making domestic elites iterature, the term A TheoreticalA political action (e.g. ; however,; the

Basis 13 Basis (i.e. which

CEU eTD Collection Market Studies Complianc and “Corruption Subotić, Subotić, Western Balkans,” Journalof European PublicPolicy JournalBalkans,” of European Western in the PublicConditionality Policy and credibility 16 15 14 and transfer an for explanation how andexaminingfurther the domestic impact ofconditionality EU on political elite behavior as explains weak patterns compliance; of but, itdivergesfrom existing literaturegoing by state’smore overlying broadly, democratic onthetransition. target diffusion) rule and,rule ruleformal transferon the effectiveness transferandEU (both of analyzeconditionality not and also do the im however, provide studies, donot - existing in howbroadly such impactedexplain elites. Such factorsaction influence political of domestic Analyses of this negative domestic impact of EU conditionalityar EUwith demands. (seetable 2.1) compliance of patterns weak constructivist) which promote the other impact of hand, conditionality the (rationalist domestic also create canor factors but learningexternalgovernance model of EU byfurtheringof process socialization; the domestic impact can potentially form constructivist factors which, in turn, play into the social national identityidentity, and EU surfaced. instance,claim, changescompatibility for the perceived They thatconditionality of 14 Quarterly JelenaSubotić, is “Europe Statea of Mind: Europeanization Identity in and Balkans,” the JelenaSubotić,

Freyburg Richter, “National and Identity “Fake, Matters”; Compliance”; and Partial, Noutcheva, Imposed Gergana“Fake, and Partial, Noutcheva, ImposedLimits Compliance:the the of in Power EU’s Normative the Political ofEU Impact Limited the Matters: Identity “National Richter, Solveig and Freyburg Tina EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU ; Subotić, “Europe is “Europe JusticeHijacked Subotić, ; Studies which analyzeStudies dom the This thesis agrees that negative the domestic impact of EU conditionality sufficiently

. 1 (March 2011): 1 2011): (March 55, no 1 . jeopardize the democratic transition of the target state.

47 (2009): 43- Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans , 15 and how domesticand elites interpret respond EU to demands. such weak patterns weak compliance of such promote ineffective e in the EU’s Post EU’s the in e 62.

- 22. 14

the way political parties and elites viewEU legitimacy -

esticconditionality impactrecently of have EU only Communist MembersCommunist and Candidates,” Journal of Common a State of Mind”. depth analysesimpact ofdepth of EU the domestic plications

22,

no . 1

( 2009 ): of such weak patterns of compliance compliance of patterns weak such of

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); 2009); Press, University Cornell (Ithaca: 1065

17, no. 2 (March 2010): 263- - 1084; e rare; but, nevertheless, nevertheless, but, rare; e

Milada Vachudová International Studies EU rule rule EU 16 Such , 282; , on CEU eTD Collection (Cambridge:Cambridge Universit Verso, 1991); Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in Europe 20 19 18 17 demands. 2.2)Freyburg works“identityreproduced asfor andsee an Richter EU test” below, table of filter EU process the conditionality. in ‘identity depicted developed This (as model’ by measuresappropr the problemssubjective and perceptionpotential(re of the for filter a “[…] as acts which factor aconstructivist as identity national present elites and determining the effectiveness of conditionality in influencing political action. emphasize nationalism as a key factor in explainingcompliance the patterns of domestic ofsensitive questions statehood and national identity.” conditionalityaccession processesparticular ofstates, oftenupon“[…] EU these touches and domesticthus politics in their alsoEspecially in respective the EUin membership bids. ofthe nationhood—national heavy politicization identityplays extremely an influential role Balkans Western the of andmakes exploitation. continually subject them, therefore,contestation to of discursiveinterpretationconstructions processes resultingfrom actors; bypolitical this are scholars, camp(as nationalsocial identities of opposed the nationalism to primordialist) nationalism of in political action influence the of domestic elites. According to the modernist 2.3

Ibid. 266. Matters,” Identity “National Richter, and Freyburg Ulrich Sedelmeier,“Europeanization and Candidate New in Member States,” 31. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections onthe Origin and Spread of Nationalism

In terms of EU external EU of In terms onpatternsDiscussions necessitateof ofan compliance assessment EU with demands The Role Nationalism of 20

iateness of political action and, ultimately, determinesthe effectiveness characterized by recent histories of turbulent ethnic violence and and violence ethnic turbulent of histories recent by —characterized y Press, 1996).

governance Freyburg theory, andRichter Tina Solveig

- )actions”. 18 Therefore, itis important to 19

In identity short,national

A TheoreticalA 17

Incountries the

(New York:

Basis 15 Basis

CEU eTD Collection (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2008): 10. 22 21 national identi redefinitions which promote their utility the fluidity and reinterpretability of national identity, domestic elites canconstruct government, of t revolt) or popular political survival (by means of electoral punishment, disintegration of a coalition of nationalnotion identity(norm contradictory political action. orientation of the decis with national identity; asinterpret ‘identity such conditions elites when results ultimately result compliance in weakcase, compliance. In latter the ambivalentlycontradict identity for provide national domesticmaneuver elites to room and whichresults fromconditions interpretedas conditions contradictorynationalto identity; but, slightly), then dependsappropri action political uponthe logicof rationalist cost- 16 Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Eur in Eastern Transformation Democratic and Conditionality, Political Organizations, Politics and Societies and Politics

Freyburg and Richter, “National Identity Matters,” 268 Matters,” Identity “National Richter, and Freyburg Encounters ional Internat and Norms Contested ofPolitics: Constitution Invisible The AntjeWiener, 267; Ibid, EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU If EU conditions correspond to national to identity,If to action EUcorrespond political conditions adheres then action which contradicts the electorate’s electorate’s From the a rationalist perspective, contradicts which political action ty benefit contradictconditions analyses; (however ifnational EU but, identity —especially in regard to multiple national identities (i.e. national identity

21,no.(2007): 1 133- 21 - ion Table 2.2Table –Freyburg ‘IdentityRichter Model’ and however, this process hinges on the rationalist or constructivist onthe however,rationalistor constructivist hinges process this makingelites and,and inconsistent risks therefore,even domestic

- violation) incurs domestic political costs and threatens the - he decision - 134. friendly’ and successfullyas correspondingand friendly’ frame them -

maximization. However, interpretationsmaximization. different of

making domestic elites.

- 269; Frank Schimmelfennig, “European Regional Regional “European Schimmelfennig, Frank 269; ateness. Non ateness.

22 ope,” ope,” Nevertheless, given East European - compliance compliance CEU eTD Collection University Press, 1993), 6- China’s in Quest for NationalIdentity,” Identity International Relations theoretical justification. promote compliance, weakhypothesis of the patterns of central this action,political and conditionality domestic impactfactors (4)which of creates EU the compliance patterns of domestic elites and the effectivenessconditionality of in influencing 23 compliance, influenceand ofpatterns conditionalityits of ondomestic implementation depends onthe prima the constitutes governance hierarchical (1) that . Given overlying transition democratic the ineffectiveness and,subsequently,rule transfer jeopardize the EUstate’s target of by producingpolicypolitics weakpromote compliancewhich of impacts domesticpatterns hierarchical Conclusions potentially effectivenessof EU conditionality. undermining the and EU identity)

Barnett, “Culture, Strategy, and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” European Oslo,” Journal to Road of Israel’s Change: Policy Foreign and Strategy, “Culture, Barnett, ryenlargement modetransferthepolicy,(2) ofEU’s for EU rule effective rule transfer In of theory, terms t (3) numerous factors numerous (3) as the chief the of EU’s mode governanceinstrument external enlargement the of as

run the risk of clashing (moments of “identity riskof and clashing—run thus (moments the conflict”)

5, no. 1 (1999): 10; Lowell Dittmerand Samuel Kim,“In Sear 7; Freyburg and Richter, “National Identity Matters,” 267. Matters,” Identity “National Richter, and 7; Freyburg he primary hypothesis of this thesisstates that utilization of the

both rationalist and constructivist rationalist —both , ed. Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim (Ithaca: Cornell Cornell (Ithaca: Kim Samuel and Dittmer Lowell ed. ,

thesis enjoysfirm, a —determin

ch ofch aTheory of National A TheoreticalA e the e the

Basis 17 Basis

CEU eTD Collection “Governance by Conditionality,” 669 Conditionality,” by “Governance Schimmelfennig Enlargement Policy 24 (SAP) - state a‘member such into Balkans clearlydevelopmentfull enlargement) (seventh of theEU portray enlargement law enlargements 2004,and the 2007.Current in Western EU 1986,1995, in enlargement efforts graduallytheenlargement) span of 1981and subsequent evolved in the fo over ur transformationThis thenew with accession began of Greece ‘European’(second states. alignment. significantly from a procedure doctrine conception, enlargement Since law its (seechapter EU has 2.1). transformed of conditionali internala principle its andboth external policies. As previously mentioned, the EU utilizes and ofanddictate adopted compilation to laws, normswhich principles, come a have vast since its original formation as a 6 the Europeanregion. 27- The governance. external mechanism oftransformationanda foreign mere from procedureflexible policy legal a to Enlargement EU of Transformation Policy C

Grabbe, Grabbe, HAPTER HAPTER the official EU policy for the Western Balkans Western the for policy EU official —the A full understanding of the EU’s enlargement policy necessitates a deep look into its its A understandingainto full EU’s deep ofenlargement the policynecessitates look The European Unionplaysextremely an influential role in promoting democracy in The EU’s Transformative Power 24

In the EUstatescreating ‘European’to went existing from other uniting words, et.al. ty to govern enlargementorderty in its promote to the process spreadof this

(Stockholm: Swedish Institutefor European Policy Studies, November 2010); , “The Impact of EU Political Conditionality,” 29 Conditionality,” Political ofEU Impact “The ,

creation’ policy. Hence, thecreation’ Stabil policy.Hence, member union has undergonemember has union several

of inclusion and collaboration to a ofand to policy inclusion structured collaboration - 687. - member or member

; Christophe Hillion, The Creeping Hillion, NationalisationChristophe of the EU ganization. Duringganization. this 18

represents a structured framework framework astructured —represents - 50; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeie ization and Association Processization rounds time, the time, EU developed

of enlargement enlargement of of legal

r, r, CEU eTD Collection Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality Concubinage?,” Fields of Democracy andthe Rule of Law 27 26 25 Southeastern Europe Treaty Treaty EU recent most the of changes the consideration into takes which developmentenlargement lawfive of EUinto stages: transformationdevelopment. this the Dimitry categorizes of Kochenov’s explanation as serve also and law enlargement regulate Treaties the predecessors; the Treaties emergedissues within and the developedin form of of the provisions EU and its andsetting administering process accession. accession conditions, the of 3.1 conditionality an and overview alsoandSAP. provides assessment critical of the the in contexthe history enlargement of EU for of the former EUsuccessor states accession chapter of This the Yugoslavia. outlines

While Iceland also and Turkey current are EUcandidate countries, they not are states participant of SAP. the Dimit EU Enlargement and the Failure Kochenov, of Conditionality:Dimitry Pre and the employmen the —and ry Kochenov, “EU Enlargement Law: History and Recent Developments: Treaty Treaty Developments: Recent and History Law: Enlargement “EU Kochenov, ry (6) the with additionstage updatesexplanation thesis This of this a sixth of development (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) applican potential defining issues: three regulates law enlargement EU general, In The Six EU Stages of Development Enlargement Law

TreatyLisbon of (2007) EU. 6(1) Article to areference with renumbered) (O –Articl EU e 49 (1997) Amsterdam of Treaty abrogated); Euratom and 237EEC, 98ECSC, –Article 205 (Arts. O EU (1992) Maastricht of Treaty the and SEA Article 98ECSC; Single European 205Euratom Act–Articles as (1986) and 237EEC amendedby Treaties(1957) of Rome – (1951) Paris of Treaty European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 27 ):

26 t of the SAP (thestage oft the sixth applies SAP to countries mainly of

(Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2008), 21. 2008), International, Law Kluwer Rijn: den aan (Alphen Article 98 ECSC alone; ECSC 98 Article – Article 49 EU. Articles 98 ECSC, 237E – Articles 98ECSC, , 16 , -

21. t oft theand of origin EU development

9, no. 6 (April 14, 2005), 4-

Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 19

EC andEC 205Euratom; - accession Conditionality in the clear markers of its its of markers clear — 25 EU EU Kochenov, 7; Each of these these of Each - the Lisbon

Custom Custom

ts, ts,

CEU eTD Collection 29 28 Paris of Treaty Stage One 3.2 of EU conditionality Serbia. in concerningdiscussion foraccount thesis’ central the this setsthe framework the EU’sdevelopment enlargement policy.Suchan as of an conditionality of instrument the devoted Western Balkans.attentionis the Additionally, to origin particular and ongoinand roundsround ofthe currentaddresses enlargement previous seventh the six It above. described development law enlargement EU of stages six the of lines the along widening the of Treaties’ g enlargement,hand,EU Treaties, the reflect enlargement rounds of lawthe the in onthe other stages synchronized.not simultaneously, these they the aresix While outline development of the (see rounds ofal enlargement table 3.1); 20 or Treaty of Paris). Expired 23 July 2002. Enlargement Rounds Development Law Enlargement EU of Stages

Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 18April 1951, 261 Kochenov, EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU Theof SteelCommunity the foundingEuropean documentand Coal (ECSC) EUEU of Evolution Conditionality Enlargement andthe the transformation EU structuredaccount of followingaccession is ofprocess the The Kochenov development notes that these stages do : Conception : EU Enlargement andthe Failure of Conditionality was signed on 18 April 1951 and entered July on18April 1951and —was force 1953. into on23 signed Table Table

Corresponding to theEnlargement to Roundsof Corresponding

3.1 eographic scope. eographic

–

Stages Stage

of EUof Enlargement Law Stage 1, 2,3 28 though thesethough develop twoprocesses often

Stage , 16. -

not 3 numerically correspond with numericallywith correspond

Development Stage

U.N.T.S. Stage

5, 6 domestic impact 140 (ECSC140 Treaty 5

the —the Stage 6 29 g in g in

7 In In

CEU eTD Collection dépositaire dutraité 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. (EEC Treaty or TreatyRome); of Treaty Establishing European the Atomic March Community, 25 Energy EU Enlargement and theKochenov, Failure 521; of Conditionality 2010), Press, University and Southeast E co les l'unanimité, à également fixe, et à l'unanimité statue Autorité, Haute la de l'avis pris avoir après lequel, ‘ as follows: 47 1982), Affairs, Institutional institutional matters of the Community from 1950to 1982 34 33 32 31 30 and237 EEC 205Euratom sole member stateseach of of these three Communities. As with Article 98 ECSC, Articles and Atomic Energy continued exist, (Euratom).Theto Community the EU ECSC January the European 1958,established the(EEC) CommunityEuropean and Economic Democracy of ion : Institutionalizat Stage Two Treaties. succeeding all in enlargements of conduct the influenced it alone, role the in process. Cou the to exclusively enlargement application be to considered. Article 98 ECSC, by established as criteria, Membership ECSC. thewas, concept therefore, the in of inherent East Europe thatwouldensureandorganization West peaceboth byuniting Foreign a was Robertbuild pan Minister Schumanto on9May- 1950, French common by market declared as among member its ECSC, states. the of Theon visi EU (the Germany West and Netherlands, ofWar, the unitedBelgium,the Cold midst France,Italy, the ECSC Luxembourg, the

Treaty Estab Kochenov, Ulrich Sedelmeier,“The EUand DemocratizationCentral in in and Southeastern Central since Europe 1989,” ECSCThe was reads Treaty ECSC in only drafted FrenchECSC).98 Article (Article origina 100 The of l text Schuman,Robert in “The SchumanDeclaration Selection May 9 1950),” (Paris, of texts concerning nditions de l'adhésion. Celle The Treaties of Rome, of Treaties The Tout État européen peut demander à adhérer au présent traité. Il adresse sa demande au Conseil, EU Enlargement andthe Failure of Conditionality lishing the European EconomicCommunity, 25March 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. uropean Politics Since 1989 ed., Sabrina Ramet (Cambridge andCambridge New York: 259, 5 Eur. Y.B. 454 (Euratom Treaty). ’. 31

33 only specified that a state had to be for only “European” hadits specifiedthata to order in state Despite the fact that Article 98 ECSC was never applied in practice practice in applied never was ECSC 98 Article that fact the Despite - - 48, ci prend effet du jour où l'instrument d'adhésion est reçu par le gouvernement proclaimed enlargement as a central aspect of their organizations’ organizations’ their of aspect acentral as enlargement proclaimed 32 http://www.ena.lu/schuman_declaration_paris_1950-

34 Article 98 ECSC allocated Article of 98ECSC authority onallstages both signed1957 and both force entered into on1 on25March ncil effectively depriving the member states of any direct direct any of states member the depriving effectively ncil - 6) into an economicat creatinga an aimed6) union into

(Luxembourg: European Parliamen European (Luxembourg:

, 17. Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 21

European supranational 2 -

3, 4 Eur.Y.B.3, 4 412 613 . 30 , 17. t Enlargement Enlargement .

Committee on on Committee - were the the 6 were

CEU eTD Collection 1967 enlargement principles enlargement other of two.The the officially three two unification combined Communities the also without accedingbecameCommunities accede to the three to impossible one to of (EC), it create the andconsolidated EEC, the Euratom European the Communities ECSC, to 38 37 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6453889.stm 36 35 membership negotiations and 1970.Thebegan accession officially first Accession June in subsequent enlargement law. one into 1969. in office left Gaulle de horse” influence. U.S. for UnitedIreland, Kingdomand thehi citing Norway, Gaulle forby 1963whenvetoed in first membership hetheapplications very Denmark, between relations to subject became membership of Accession conditions theof state; ratification thus, everymember Treaties required states. member the to process enlargement the 205 Euratom and, Council; ECSC ontheauthority other and hand,237EEC the Articles to supranational of all principles.of devolved an OnArticle set one entirely hand, 98ECSC different c and lawmandates; Euratomjure were however,enlargement EEC de 22

Kochenov, Kochenov, Treaty Establishing a SingleCouncil and a Single Commission of the European Communities, 8April 1965, NEWS BBC Rivalry,” ofFraternal Years “Fifty Horsley, William Kochenov, EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU JO

In May 1967, Denmark, Ireland,In 1967,Denmark, Norway, a May Treaty Merger the After intergovernmentalThis Charles byFrench exercised de approachsoon President was 152/1 (Merger152/1 TreatyFrench). in enlargement law. This dual approach of the EC to enlargement characterizes all all characterizes enlargement to EC the of approach dual This law. enlargement

EU Enlargement andthe Failure of Conditionality EU Enlargement andthe Failure of Conditionality promoted the principle of intergovernmental — supranational (ECSC) and intergovernmental (EEC and Euratom) intergovernmentalsupranational and (ECSC) (EEC 36 Progress of the first Progressenlargement of the after budge round not did until

37 (signedApril 1965 on8

The Treaties of Rome declared that all all that declared Rome of Treaties The

member states and candidate countries. candidate and states member nd the United for Kingdom EC reapplied nd the s fear that the UK was merely a “Trojan “Trojan a merely was UK the that fear s , 19. , 18

(London, March 19, 2007), -

19. ism by allocating the lead role in and effective on effective and

onstructed onthe basis onstructed 29 July 1967) 29July differing differing

— CEU eTD Collection Democratic Identity,” Journal of European Public Policy Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 22January 1972, OJ the EC. the JanuaryIreland,and the 1973,Denmark, constituted UK the first successful enlargement of leading OnSeptember membership1 application. its 1972 referendum withdraw Norway to vote via referendum. Norwegian against membership people EC the The in 25 voted Ratification procedure Denmark,Ire of 42 41 40 39 a [as] order, political free a of sense the in state, of form democratic a of existence guaranteed “the for acall as union’ closer ‘ever an of a vision and ‘liberty’ to references Treaties’ the presentedReport23 JanuaryBirke was subsequently the on1962. to EPA association process and adhesion Birkelbach Germanmembercommissioned on the “ Willi produce a EPA to report of democratic norms. constitutionalization and human rights challenge underFranco Francisco that Spain’sfascist Generalwould dictatorship the feared (EPA) Assembly Parliamentary European the of members Communities, the of states signing Despite Rome. of of supportfr theproclamations Treaties of implementation. for werehumanestablished membership rights, facto asvia de conditions such values resp or democracy to reference no make Rome of Treaties the and Paris of Treaty the and While membershipobstacles Spanish ambitions. fact early in whichGreek ledserious to and allhaveof histories this Spain dictatorships, andis recent it , Portugal, Greece process. creation’ onthe the originand discussion open EU of accession process conditionality the in Treaty

Daniel C. Thomas, “Constitutionalization through Enlargement: The Contested Origins of the EU’s the EU’s of Origins Contested The Enlargement: through “Constitutionalization Thomas, C. Daniel Sedelmeier, “The EU and D Kochenov, Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of 39 The second and third enlargement rounds mark the beginningThe theand ‘memberstate second enlargementthe third of rounds mark 40 was signed on 22 January was Norway. byeach signed ratified applicant on221972and except

EU Enlargement andthe Failure of Conditionality 41 Spain began vying for membership in 1958, less than a year 1958,lessthan in a began Spain for vying after membership the emocratization,” 521.

” under the Treaties of Rome; the completed Birkelbach Birkelbach completed the Rome; of Treaties the ” under land, and required Norwaythe (buta not UK) land, majority

(L 73).

13, no. 8(December 2006): 1195-

, 5. Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 23

In l In ate 1961, the EPA 1961, ate om all theom all member lbach interpreted interpreted lbach 1197.

the the ect for for ect Treaty Treaty -

CEU eTD Collection NATO andthe European Union Final, communist Europe Conditionality 48 47 46 45 44 43 a to policy frompromotion. begun a of procedure of inclusion norm transformation its essential elements of membership”. are state member each in rights human and democracy representative of maintenance statement theEuropean first explicit for of thethat“respect marked EC and Council enlargement on1January completed was 1981. Treaty Accession the signed return a to membership application. establishment of a right and signed an A 1959 the EU’spolicy. June in current enlargement Greeceappliedmembership originally for prospects. principles that the Communities p year submitting its membership application in February 1962; however, its rejection later that forcondition (emphasis membership” added). 24 1197- Documents Séance de 1961 de l’adhésion ou de l'association àla Communauté Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne

Sedelmeier, “The EU and William Democratization,”OpeningWallace, 521; the Door: The Enlargement of Accessi Opinion on Greek Application Commission, for MembershipEuropean (of 29January 1976) Sedelmeier, “The EUand Kochenov, Democratization,” EU 521; Enlargement and the Failure of 1200 Enlargement,” through “Constitutionalization Thomas, Willi —citing the “non EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU 1199. E.C. Bull. E.C. Birkelbach, Similarly,Greek the membership bid also reflects the emergenceconditionality of in 1978 Copenhagen Summit ofThe 1978Copenhagenthe onDemocracy’ ‘Declaration produced at the Summit on to the European Communities of the Hellenic Republic, 28May 1979, OJ

44 democratic form of government,”form democratic

, 5; Geoffrey Pridham, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post , supp. 2/1976, (February 1976).

ssociation Agreement (AA) in 1961, but after Agreement but (AA) coup’ ssociation 1961, the and in ‘Colonels’ the (New Palgrave York: 31 Macmillan, 2005): e la commission politique sur les aspects politiques et institutionnels institutionnels et politiques Rapport aspects les sur fait politique aunom commission la de - democratic” nature of the Spanish dictatorshipdemocratic” as Spanish “contrary of nature the the to - - 1962, January 15, 1962, in Thomas,“Constitutionalization t wing military dictatorship in 1967,the froze in EPA wing Greece’s dictatorship military 45 Thegiven Greece’s military 1974and in juntacollapsed “[…] (London: Centre for European Reform, 1996): 16.

on 28 May 1979. Greece acceded to the EC and the second on28May theand 1979.Greece accededto EC ursue” 48 By this time, the EU’s effectively put an end to Spain’s membership end—effectively Spain’s to an put

46 43 the Communities resumed its application and

This development This deter not did from Spain - - 1205. 32.

accession process had officially officially had process accession

(L 291). hrough Enlargement,” Enlargement,” hrough , Document 122, , COM (76) 30

- CEU eTD Collection Treaties. forthree Communities prepared theirmerger retained inthis EP The 1967. name throughout the successiveEU June 1985, OJ 53 52 51 50 49 Union. thesphere Soviet of influence neared ande th foreign drastic as Soviet the the in Gorbachev EU shift policyunder administration ofWar, theEastern1990s, the 1989revolutionsin Cold end the Europe imminent provoking the early1987 stock market until an which collapse into economic sent Europe depression states. candidate by requiring its consent, in addition to member state ratifications, to the accession of Euratom The amended lawnt development. A enlargeme EU of stage third the force :Foundation The Three Stage of Conditionality ality.pressuresEU condition of followingresultsuch fromaspirations. developments Conversely,the the enlargements in Portugal, were prompted membership and democracy, not byEC althoughresultingin Spain, emerged yet not had affairs domestic thehad EC for set conditions While membership, a policy 1January round 1985andwas completed the enlargement signed third on12June 1986. Portugal (re1975, both Spain and

Ibid, 6. Kochenov, The Single EuropeanAct, 17February 1986, 1987 OJ 12 Republic, Portuguese the and Spain of Kingdom the of Communities Economic European the to Accession 1 July 1987) on1July European Parliamentary Assembly (EPA) was renamed the European Parliament (EP) in 1962 as the the as 1962 in (EP) Parliament European the renamed was (EPA) Assembly Parliamentary European

After the Carnation Revolution ofandFranco Portugal 1974in the deathAfter of Revolution General in the Carnation Single European Act (SEA) Act European Single The

—plus EU Enlargement andthe Failure Conditionality of (L 302). Article ECSC 98 52 Thi

, markedfirst the amendment to s period was characterized by the destabilizing factors of the October October the of factors destabilizing the by characterized was period s

revised the role played by the European Parliament (EP) Parliament European the by played role the —revised - )applied for)applied mem . The collapse of authoritarian regimes in Greece, Greece, in regimes authoritarian of collapse The . , 50 was signed on17

(L 169); 25 I.L.M. 506. 53

bership an 1977; in AccessionTreaty the 1957Treaties , 19. Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 25

of conditionality used influence to of conditionality - 28 February(entered into 1986

rticles 237 EEC and 237EEC 205 rticles of Rome , and drove 49

CEU eTD Collection (20 December 1989). 57 56 55 54 for membership. nalityconditio policy 1993,laidthe in foundationThe for adopted ‘Copenhagen the criteria,’ bytheEU’s Council law development, this period demonstrates a significant legitimization of EU conditionality. time. Finland,accession processthis of andendured the the obstacles Sweden during indefinitely to their EUOnlyAustria,1994 led bids. Norwayand suspend Switzerland referendum onEU membe the 2003 thesuccessfully considerationuntil application Maltese pushed of back its between debates domestic fiery In Malta, conflicts. internal applicationby was deferred the Commi Cyprus with and and regionalpolitical economicGreece. conflict situation regarding1989 by DecemberconcernspostponedTurkey’s in over the Commission poor awas ‘European’ consideredbe not to st enlargementround. Morocco’s (1992)Finland, Norway, and Switzerland and AustriaMorocco Malta(1987), (1989),andTurkey (1990),rus (1991), Cyp and Sweden 26 (June 1993).

Copenhagen European Council (21 Council European Copenhagen Sedelmeier, “The EU and Democratization,” 522. , SEC (89) 2290 Final Community the to Accession for Request Turkey’s on Opinion Commission, European Ibid, 28- EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU Between July 1987 and November 1993, nine countries appliedBetweenNovember— countries for 1987and membership July EC 1993,nine (3) (2) (1) norounds of e While 29.

Union”. the within forces market and pressure competitive with cope to capacity the as well as economy market afunctioning of existence the rightsrespect forprotection and of and minori stability“[…] guaranteeing institutions of thelaw, rule democracy, human of

Such conditions include: Suchconditions 57 and marked the first official EU declaration of the political conditions conditions markedEU declaration andof the firstpolitical official

rship. Finally, the Swiss and Norwegian referendums in 1992and in and Norwegian referendums rship. Finally, the Swiss

nlargement occurred during this third stage third occurrednlargement enlargement duringof this EU

- application was swiftly rejected by Council the given that it 2 E.U. Bull. E.U. Presidency, the of 2 June 1993), Conclusions ssion in Juneengagedserious in 1993as wasssion Cyprus ate. but only—but the fourth were three included in

Deliberationwas on the Turkish bid

ties the two political leading parities

55 , supp. 6/1993 The Cypriot

CEU eTD Collection Treaty). ed. Christophe Hillion (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 3. 62 61 60 59 58 influence trivially only changes these therefore, weight; their retained approaches intergovernmental the Union”. establishing a single article in o 205 Euratom abrogated) officially OEuropean EU established(Articles the Union.Article Stage Four Decemberin 1991,at new Throughout at reforming proposals struck aimed thedow numerous 1980s, thewere EC Balkans, conditionalityextensive. the most is EU enlargementenlargements. Western regarding currentround Today, the seventh in the such, the brunt of this process was primarilyfeltby the states the of fifth andsixth fourth As enlargementconditionality the experienced only beginningof intensification. EU Thecodified previous states emerged of enlargements.from the the principles the three that merely criteria Copenhagen the Democracy, on Birkelbach Declaration 1978 Report and the 1998), 52, in Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Kochenov, Failure in 52, of Conditionality1998), From Maastricht to Amsterdam

Kochenov, Kochenov, G.KapteynPaul J. VerLoren Pieter and van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European Communi Treaty on European Union, 7February 1992, OJ Sedelmei EU in Enlargement: A Legal Progeny,” Approach Their , and Criteria Copenhagen “The Hillion, Christophe

This declarationmeansThis innovative; byno is the Treaty of Maastricht of Treaty On 1November 1993the As with international order, the EC wasals d exi er, “Theer, EUand Democratization,” 522. EU Enlargement andthe Failure of Conditionality : Accession as a Structured Process Structured a as Accession : 61 Despitesignificantcosmetic this and change, prior dual supranational the enlargement practice. sting enlargement introduced numerous changes to enlargement law aimedintroduced at law numerous enlargement changes to , ed. Laurence Gormley, 3rd ed. (London and Boston: KluwerLaw International, reaty was finally settled upon. settled finally was reaty

rder to “[…] bridge the gaps bridgerder the elements “[…] between to the of various 62

(C 191), 31 I.L.M. 253 (the Union Treaty or the Maastricht Maastricht the or Treaty Union (the 253 I.L.M. 31 191), (C

59 o in ao in during period ofstage. flux this

58 in actuality, in asbythe 1962 seen , 20. Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 27 60 (signedFebruary on71992)

, 20. , 98 ECSC, 237 EEC, and 237EEC, 98ECSC,

n, but n, but ties: ties:

CEU eTD Collection founded, Protocols No 2and 3, 29August 1994, is Union European the which on Treaties the to adjustments the and Sweden of Kingdom the and Finland of Sweden, 24June 1994, OJ 66 65 64 63 consummation. It accession:( phases bethree can dividedinto of today stands it as process accession EU the of structure the represents below supranationalThe expanded) table and (and reproduced intergovernmental approaches. Maastrichtroughchronologyaccession process constructeda of the development. law enlargement EU of stage based process accession process a dynamic as rather but fact, criteria. ascompliance not a simple the presented with Copenhagen This compliance“[…] conditionality to directlyimpact the candidate reformin process ensure to countries planned; nevertheless, the significance of this actis that the EU was capable of utilizing Finland and Sweden. Swedish the 1994, established Sweden. Afterthe signingAccessionTreaty of the initial application of the Copenhagen criteria inaccessio the the was difference notable most The enlargements. three previous the as same the essentially 28 Kingdom Commentary onthe Treaty and the Acts Concerning the Accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002), 101; Jean Enlargement: A Commentary on the Enlargement Process no. 1(1995), 104; Frank Hoffmeister, “Changing Requirementsfor Mem CEE Conditionality

Common Market Law Market Review Common Issues,” Procedural and Legal “Enlargement: Forman, John and Booß Dierk Kochenov, Act of concerning conditions accession the of the Norway,Republic the of Austria, Kingdom of Republic the Accession European the to UnionAustria, of Republicofthe the RepublicFinland the of and Kingdom of - EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU

Essai d'interprétation juridique regulated by Article O EU O Article by The 1January fourth enlargement on 1995—regulated By the consolidating enlargementof provisions the EC, amended Treatyof

(Leyden:A.W. Sijthoff, 1975); PanayotisSoldatos and Georges Vandersanden, EU Enlargement andthe Failure of Conditionality , 60 - speaking population of the Åland I of the Ålandspeaking population - 61. ‘

protection of thecultures,people traditions, Sami and of languages protection the 64

(C 241). Such conditions were quickly met and the accession proceededaccession wereas Suchconditions metand the quickly on thefourth a principle nodoubt, legacyof is, of the conditionality

- Pierre Puissochet,Pierre TheEnlargement of the European Communities.

(CDE, 1968); Kochenov, EU Enlarge ” (emphasis added). ” (emphasis

(C 241/352).

slands , ed. Andrea Ott and Kirstyn Inglis (The Hague: Hague: (The Inglis Kirstyn and Ott Andrea ed. , 1) initiation, (2)1) and negotiations, initiation, (3) 63 on 24 June 1994,t on24June , 34. ’

as conditions for the accession asforof conditions the 65

The emergence of a structured EU EU astructured of emergence The n processes of Finlandn processes and of Handbook on European Handbook in on bership,” ment andthe Failure of that factored in both both in thatfactored he EU he L’admission danla (see table 3.2). table (see , in August, in was —was

32, 66

CEU eTD Collection third enlargementthird prevent to the of rounds return authoritarianregimes Greece, Portugal, in democratization one promote methodto enlargementPreviously,utilized the EU procedure. only Consummation Negotiations Initiation 13. 12. 11. 10. 9. 8. 7. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. 20. 19. 18. 17. 16. 15. 14.

The fifth and sixth enlargements represent a drastic deviation from earlier earlier from deviation adrastic represent enlargements sixth and fifth The

Negotiations conclude only after every chapter is closed is chapter every after only conclude Negotiations ii. i. acquis the of chapters (unanimously)common negotiationbeall 35 to takenfor the positions bythe EU proposes and adopts theNegotiations commence;theCouncil Commission for theof Adoption the Acquis Programme The and candidate Plan country creates upan draws Action aNational candidate draftedThe AccessionPartnerships regularly Council bythe Commission; issues forreports, futureand strategyclarifications onconditions progress papers, yearly assessment andThe requests reactsthe to Commission’s Council progress i. phasenegotiations thends beginningof the recomme then report’) (‘screening and an issues onthea Opinion application summary report The Commission the completedThe questionnaire candidate country the to Commission submits in an complete requests process,As part the ofcandidat the the Commission ‘screening’ request issueanto onthe Opinion membership Commission The accepts Council (unanimously) and or rejectstherequests application the Copenhagen the satisfying at aimed of membership of applicationreforms and the to Council Submission initiation establishes additional criteria criteria CopenhagenThe rules Council onenlargementthe to andor points and declaration such recognizes EU The declareCountries aspirations EUby Agreement membership an Association signing Accession completes after all all after completes Accession force into enters Treaty Accession i. states member the and country candidate by the ratified is Treaty Accession country candidate the with Treaty Accession the sign states member The The passesAct Council a Unanimous a issues final Opinion The Commission its declares Parliament European The

makes ita member state Copenhagen setor by conditions member criteria or states the Council met prior the to beginning phase of the negotiations The Closure (provisionally)state chapters requires the of approval of every member canThe also(‘opening set certainconditions be Commission to benchmarks’) entitling itto interim privileges During the process, candidate country this Table Table negotiations phase negotiations be a can satisfy suspendedto country if ceases the Union membership. This mechanism was used initially in the was second—Union membership. mechanism used This and initially in countries are expected to alter their reforms accordingly reforms their alter to expected are countries 3.2 - depth questionnaire ondomestic conditions depth questionnaire –

Chronology andPhases theChronology of EU Process Accession

transitional periods end

based of the AccessionPartnerships onthe priorities

(speak vote) not but criteria and the conditions set by conditions criteriaand the Council

consent

launches assistance programs assistance launches Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 29

acquires ‘Acceding State’ status status State’ ‘Acceding acquires

until

its official accession

e countrye to

CEU eTD Collection Sweden in regard in to principlesSweden ofminority protection. thiswas universal time by as its final demonstrated in presence phase the of Finland of accessions the and democracyhuman rights. and promote encourage post transformations of bloc. the former communist conditionality. These weredemocratic developedchiefly mechanisms regulate the to and programs assistance encompasses democratization promote to EU by the utilized means apost represents 71 70 69 68 67 regimesmanycommunist liberalized. and Between 1990, the EUand concludedtrade 1988 beganthe 1989revolutions. immediatelyafter Union wouldensureof CEE. the successfultransition conditionality in the EU’s enlargment policy frameworkaccession process. of of the As previouslymentioned, the instrument the as control andor to progress as cooperationaid initiatives, programs well within respect,conditionality, this in regulate to phase. mechanism necessary Theits ofconditions proceeding for EU uses the to negotiations —en EU enlargement law evolution bloc. communist former the of reformation economic and democratic successful the guaranteeing mechanisms order in were adopted quellmounting to membership fearsCEE ofby premature emergingEU above accession outlined process contemporary (se and while Spain simultaneouslythe longevity ensuring norms. of democratic 30

Whilemechanism designedwith as a deal to former the communistthe bloc, of emergence conditionality at Kochenov, Ibid; Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power Kochenov, Sedelmeier, “The EUand Democratization,” 520. EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU 70

EU relations with Central andEUgradually relationsEastern Central with stabili Europe process accession EU structured The EU Enlargement Conditionality andthe of Failure EU Enlargement andthe Failure of Conditionality - communist economic transitions and conditionality was used to boost conditionality economic boost to and was transitions used communist - accession tactic but still applies in the cases second and third of The CEE.

tails the efforts of candidatecountries fulfill to the set 69 The latter two mechanisms characterize the the characterize mechanisms two latter The , 7. Association Agreements, visa liberalization, trade

—a unique developm

emerged ofas how anthe answerthe to question 68

Assist , 51. , 50 71

ance programs were designed to to designed were programs ance In these cases, the accession process process accession the cases, In these -

51.

e Such table 3.2). ent of the of fourth stage zed in the in latezed as 1980s 67 This This CEU eTD Collection in EU programs and agencies. and programs EU in inclusion and Partnerships, Accession Agreements, Reports, and Its Whitemany Papers. accession instruments include assistance Europe the programs, the specific reforms by required via the CommissionStrategy/Composite EU Opinions, Regular Papers, ItCouncil Decemberset in 1994. framework thefor each country’s candidate accession process by out bonds of cooperation. for Kosovo. Additionally, EU the has signed AAswith many other countriesworldwide intending to forge an fifth signingAAs anecessarystep in of became process; EAs EUaccession the were by signed all the states of the the enlargement, fourth the After regions. surrounding its with relationship Union’s the bettering at aimed ex eventually was PHARE countries, its on titular being based The EU ‘pre which process. formalized and candidateEU the countries’ initiated accession ambitions PHARE reforms quicklyfocusedallresources but accession fund only - to ing various technical assistance projects. This mechanism initially promotedgeneral economic grants numerousrevolutions, the EUwhich aid established programs fund allocateddirect to 78 77 76 75 74 73 72 created. was labor) and capital, services, ofandcooperation goods, was economic area trade movement enhanced,a (free free and proces astructured as accession tool. an accession financing wasinto exclusive 1997,PHARE program’ in reformed line; budget symbolic the to breakdown measures contributed historicdi of states CEE andcooperation Union.These most the with Soviet primarily agreements conditionality by attaching five conditions five attaching by conditionality (SAP) Process agreements,Union EUCustoms agreements. and In (CU) years, recent Association Stabilization the and agreements Agreements genericAAs, included Free Trade (FTAs), EuropeanArea Economic (EEA) severalto with types signed agreements of non EUby the partysystem,free and elections, fair market and a economy regulate participation in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and adopted participation requires the signingStabilizationAssociation of andAgreement a (SAA).AAs also with the Union. the with

Grabbe, Grabbe, The EU ‘pre The addition of EA suspensio AgreementsEurope of atype ‘Association are Agreement’(AA) CEE to unique Grabbe, Despite Economy’. the of Reconstruction the for Assistance Hungary and ‘Poland for acronym an is PHARE Grabbe, 74 d sixth enlargements and SAAs have been ratified and/or signed sixth SAAshave enlargementsd and ratified been by and/or Balkan every Western stateexcept The EU’s tieCEE with was solid 73 The EU’s Transformative Power The EU’s Transformative Power The EU’s Transformative Power aid program, for example, started example, 1989and aidin program,by a‘democracy for separate 1992had —a program devis - - accession strategy’ for the fifth and sixth enlargements was launched at the Essen European European Essen the at launched was enlargements sixth and fifth the for strategy’ accession

accession strategy’ accession

n clauses in May 1992, although never employed, further strengthened EU EU strengthened further employed, never although 1992, May in n clauses ed specially for the seventh enlargement round in the Western Balkans Western the in round enlargement seventh the for specially ed

s in which legislation and policies were harmonized, political political and policies were harmonized, which in s legislation 77 constructed, for the first time, EU time, —constructed, —adopted the first 1994 for in — , 9. , 7 , 8. maintenance of the rule of law, human rights protection, a multi a protection, rights human law, of rule the of maintenance - 8. 78

ified by signing of Agreements the Europe

- member states. Before the adoption of EAs, such to the framewor —to tended to other countries ofCEE. Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 31 —a foreig vides. n policy instrument of the EU the EU of instrument n policy k of cooperation and association

related ventures. The The ventures. related 72 a broad term which term—a broad refers After 1989 the

75 (EAs) (EAs) lining lining — was was 76

CEU eTD Collection Central Eastern and Europe,” 1997). 83 82 81 80 79 strategy; interpretedcornerstoneOpinions Copenhagena the the EU criteria as pre of process; conditionality the in accession of application active first (1) importantly, most developmentconditionality reasons: three of for they EUthe marked the Malta, remainingproceed plus to negot five states, with a result of the theEuropean did 1999Helsinki 1998parliamentaryCouncil elections, Minister Vladimír Me economy theLithuaniagrounds, in caseeconomic but Slovakia of on Luxembourg European Council recommendations thewith Commission’s behind. T leaving thus the states fiveCEE other followedLuxembourg throughHungary, The European Council 1997 and Poland, Slovenia. commenceCyprus, negotiations ommendedrec the Republic,Estonia, only Czech that with the applicants hadmet fully the set economic criteria; nevertheless, the Commission theto EU pre membership applicationssubmitted 1996. between 1994and June March Romania, Slovakia,and Slovenia)Agreements and signed1990s Europe during the mid Republic,Latvia,Czech Estonia,Hungary,enlargementsLithuania, Poland, (Bulgaria, 32 8, (1997).

Ibid; Tim Haughton, Haughton, Tim Ibid; Ibid. Helsinki European Council (10- Luxembourg European Council (12- European Commission,Agenda 2000: for a Stronger and Wider Union, COM (1997) 2000 Final (17 June EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU

Excluding Cyprus the of remaining and the fif Malta, ten states The 1997 Commission Opinions andThe conclusions are Council 1997Commission the significant for In July

83 exclusion wasgovernment based—exclusion ofunder onthe the unwillingness Slovak Prime and, the (3)Copenhagen while all membership, criteriafor areconditions the EU - accession strategy as well as the Copenhagen criteria and stated that none of of none that stated and criteria Copenhagen the as well as strategy accession 1997, the Commission issuedOpinions 1997,the Commission “When Does“When the Conditionality EUMake aDifference? Accession the and in Process č iar to accept to the criteria. Copenhagen iar Onlyafter Me Political Studies Review Studies Political

11 December 1999), Conclusions of the Presidency, Bull. E.U.

13 December 1997), Conclusions of the Presidency, 80 justified the exclusion of Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, of Bulgaria, the justified exclusion and Romania,

5 (2007): 240-

79 on the adherence of applicant states states applicant of adherence the on 242. iations. which had a favorably assessed assessed afavorably had —which

(2) secondly, the th and sixth and sixth th č - E.U. Bull. E.U. accession accession iar’s removal, as as removal, iar’s , no. 12 (1999). , no. 12, at 81 allow he he

CEU eTD Collection Accession 240 Process,” Communities Certain Acts,Related and OJ 1997, October 2 86 85 84 instituted practices into EU enlargement law. established. been already Copenhagen therefore, EU criteriaenlargement extend what and, not law did had beyond ‘respect of the minorities,’ EU for evaded the codif andfull protection freedoms, thelaw’ rule and of asfor conditions membership. ‘the principlesinstituted ofrights liberty,forfundamental humanand respect democracy, 1 Ma 1997 and Amsterdamas effective (signedof of on1October Treaty the in renumbered)amendment the of to the 1997 binding conditions 2004, EUfurtherCopenhagen enlargement law the criteria positioned asl outright, Stage Five continu a and law enlargement Theaccession following wouldbe of characterizedby of furtherEU development phases the the the with remainderswith firstFebruary half March1998and were in opened 2000. in onlyapplynot to at but any setact conditions, to andonthem accession negotiations. Council established compliance with its political component

Kochenov, Kochenov, TreatyAmsterdamAmending of TreatyEuropean the Establishing Union, Treaties on the the European Kochenov, Among and s the fifth the states of During period thein fifth leading enlargement the the upto completionof round : Emergence of an EU Conditionality EU an Policyof : Emergence EU Enlargem EU Enlargement andthe Failure of Conditionality of accession of - 242. ent andthe Failure of Conditionality 84 These validatedand developments the the abilitywillingness EU of

In the only Treaty previously Amsterdam incorporated short, of

ed intensification of conditionality. by referencing Article 6(1) EU in Article 49 EU (O (O EU 49 Article in EU 6(1) Article by referencing ixth enlargement rounds,ixth accession negotiations presented —presented reference Such Maastricht. of Treaty

(C 340); 37 I.L.M. 56 (Treaty of Amsterdam). , 33. , 55 Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 33 -

56; Haughton, “Conditionality and th and “Conditionality Haughton, 56;

s as a prerequisite for ass a opening prerequisite 85 point By also including not

in the in accession process. ication of the ication y 1999) egally egally — e

CEU eTD Collection Ashgate, 2009), 159. Communities and CertainRelated Acts, 26February 2001, 89 88 87 domestic policy involvement in significantly andinfluence promoted a boosted degree EU high ondomestic politics o negotiations rendering certainasthus issues bysetting conditions them unnegotiable, (3) effectiv given thecountries(1) key externalas driver establisheddomestic reform thatthey the EU of not therefore however,tha instrument, is this the ‘National of Adoption Programsthe Acquis for via timeframes and priorities set and goals, development general from away and requirements specific detailed APs intended, As enlargement. enlargement seventhsixth and importance has retained rounds its the in subsequent would quicklyof wasreforms. This theeffectively fifth a and andpromotecrucial aspect Partner Accession adopted EU the gaps, these alleviate at the Bulgaria, front ofand the while Slovakiapulledupthe pack rear. Romania, To Thestaggered Republic, Czech Hungary, democratization. of and thewere spectrum Poland states. member new twelve of addition enlargementdesignedUnion for and the the thefifth prepare and to negotiations sixth were Treaties two these Together, process. accession the on impact had nonoteworthy and solve the to of shortcomings the Suchchanges Treatyofwereand Amsterdam. minor 1February the requirements of as enlargementfulfill to law, 2003),was regard in effective 34

Grabbe, Grabbe, The Balkans: Bitzenis, Aristidis TreatyAmending NiceTreaty of on European the Union, Treaties the Establishing European the EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU By 2000,thejuggling early EU accession was negotiations The purpose of the ely superseding and undercuttingand ely superseding(2)the external actors, scope other limited of The EU’s Transformative Power legally binding.

subsequent TreatyNice subsequent of

Foreign Direct Investment and EU Accession 89

Despite this limitation, APs greatly impacted EU candidate t it lacked a legal base in the Treaty of Maastricht and was was and Maastricht of Treaty the in base alegal lacked it t - making, and (4) extended to issues beyond issues of to the jurisdiction andextended (4)making, , 15. 88

EU conditions, reallocated aidaccession to EU reallocated conditions, OJ ’ (NPAA). overriding The weakness of

(C 80) (Treaty(C 80) of Nice). 87 ships (APs) as an instrument that as an (APs)instrument ships (signed on26Februaryand (signed 2001 with twelve states which (Farnham and Burlington: Burlington: and (Farnham

f direct f direct CEU eTD Collection Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, 16April 2003, OJ RepublicLatvia, ofRepublic of the Lithuania, Republicof the Hungary,Republic theMalta, the of Republicof limits of its conditionalitypolicygreat to avail. enlargements, theconditionality. fifth and Throughout sixth conti the EU 94 93 92 91 90 communityagreedIne unanimouslycollaborativ eyes action. policy of the uponEU general instability;established and peace the European international thus, settlements, fearedhumanitarianfuture collapse thatsuch instabilitydisasters,risked potentialof the actors external and late Western ethnic 1990s, Balkans broke violence (again)the out in steep(e.g.In economicand flows, a massrefugee troubles, demolished infrastructure). the defineddecadefootprint ofregional the previousremained clearlyasbynumerous crises seen howev the decadeer, find itselfonthe to pathstability of to and turmoil European integration; In thesuccessor Westerna Balkans ofemerged thefrom 2000, former Yugoslavia. states round. recent, and most Union on1Januarymarkingcompletion of enlargement the 2007 sixth, the European Council, 2004. Bulga on1May enlargementsuccessfully therefore,which fifth concluded left ofround out the the Decemberthe other at European ten 2002Copenhagen Council; applicants pushed back Balkanalongside complete to were after the unable their two negotiations states negotiatingof were Bulgaria The candidate and countries. accessions Romania inevitably acquis the (2002).

Accession to the European Union of the R the of Union European the to Accession Brussels European Council (16- (12 Council European Copenhagen Accession European the to Republic, Union of CzechRepublic the of Estonia,Republ the Ibid, 14-

On 16April 2003,an AccessionTreaty During this period, the EU’s voracious enlargement momentum also included momentum enlargement During voracious the the EU’s period, this 15, 22 - . 90 The depended influenceAPs andof weight principle of onthe EU’s ria and Romaniaatria laterupnegotiations the 2004Brussels December wrapped 23, 35 - 93 signed an AccessionTreaty25April 2005, on 37.

17 December 2004), Conclusions of the Presidency, 16238/1/04 REV (2004).

- 13 December 2002), Conclusions of the Presidency, Bull. E.U. epublic of Bulgaria and Romania, 21 June 2005, OJ 2005, June 21 Romania, and Bulgaria of epublic 91

was ten signed with of the twelve Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 35

(L 236). 94 and the accededto

nued the push to 92 ic of Cyprus, the they were, were, they

(L 157). , no. 12 12 no. , - makers, makers,

CEU eTD Collection dual agenda: (1) regional cooperation and stability and (2) EU accession. As andual agenda: and EU cooperationaccession. (2) regional (1) EU and stability of Amsterdamcriteria.As by stipulated and SA name, the Copenhagen its the framework enlargement region the EU’s into enterprising enlarg the profound of EU’srole the this and, leadventure in likewise, the encouraged inclusion fact the Europeanthis into of justified secure the Western integration Balkans full Union; the importantly, Most implementation. of purpose the the overarching StabilityPact was to financial institutions managed a joint assistance strategy;and the OSCE oversaw the Pact’s UNHCR handled the refugee crisis; NATO monitored regional security; international the and were humanpromotion Democratization rightsorganizations. taske each to major of thesesuch specific out a broad responsibilities divvied mandate, (EBRD).with the EuropeanBankfor andStabilityPact, Development Reconstruction The IMF,InvestmentDevelopmentBank, the theEuropean (OECD), the World forCommissioner Refugeesfor Economic the Organization (UNHCR), Cooperation and HighUN, of the the theCouncil Europe United OSCE, NATO, Nations (CoE), countries Europe of Southeastern other and state numerous the Stability Pactwas championed by EU, the itwas a multilateral undertakingall of the promotingfor democracy, ‘peace, humanandAlthough respectrights, prosperity’. economic prevention Easternconflict the strategyas Stability Europe fora South Pact aimed at action influence. and promote to EU resulted strengthen to from ambition and a coordinate unitedinternational comprehensive regionalBalkans. 2000directly Thein stability the turning in Western and prosperity point this situation necessitated a policyrevamp given failure the existing of strategies to promote 36 EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU To facilitate the accession of the Western Balkans, the EU constructed a unique a unique constructed EU the Balkans, Western the of accession the facilitate To July in At the Sarajevo 1999,the EU,the German under presidency, Summit launched the Stabilization and Association—the Stabilization Process

ement drive. ement

s and organizations including andthes organizations —modeled onthe Treaty d to the CoE; the the CoE; d to Bank and (EIB), P endorsedP a CEU eTD Collection (2000). 98 97 96 95 countries,accession”. future allthe way their to constitute framework the“[…] overall for the Balkan European courseof the Western policyensure would Agenda’ Thethe success. andalsoSAP declared ‘Thessaloniki its that theof with addition “elementsSAP enlargement strengthen process” fromorderto in the the added). Association Agreements,particular cooperation in ” (emphasis onregional in 1993,andCouncil the progressJune implementing in and made the Stabilization TreatyUnion, respectfor onthe Europeanthe criteria at defined the Europe Copenhagen the basisof of the provision that the[enlargement] hinged region’s“[…] accession on commitmen Western Balkans, ofand pervious reiterated declarations the European Council’s the EU formally as endorsed the theEUSummit, it official policyfor declared the SAP, eregion th and political into economic of Europe”. mainstream the fullest as “[…] integrationpossible SAP primary countries objective of of the the of the committed itself to the ‘potential’ accession ofWestern the Balkansand reiterated the the wouldbe “[…] SAP ce Lisbon Thedeclarations European of March2000 EU support. confirmedthatthe Council enlargements.coursefifth and of sixth the from the late 1990s and seemingly the limitless efficacy conditio of borrowed the SAP initiative, the‘Regional EU’s fromApproach’ of preceding the strategies (2000).

Declaration of the EU European Commission, FinalDeclaration of the Zagreb Summit (24 November 2000), Bull. E.U. Santa Feira Mariada European Council (19 Lisbon European Council (23-

At the 2003EU of stream endless an with along reception optimistic grand a received SAP The t. Furthermore, in the ‘Declaration of the Zagreb Summit,’ the EU Furthermore,theproclaimedt. Zagreb the theof in ‘Declaration Summit,’ - Western Balkan Thessaloniki Summit (21 June 2003), 10229/03 (Presse 163). - Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki, theBalkans in EU “enriched” the Western Summit nterpiece of [EU] policyBalkans”. [EU] nterpiece of thein 24 March 2000), Conclusions of the Presidency, Bull. E.U.

- 20 June 2000), Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U.

98 de facto as de movethe This solidified SAP Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 37 96 Finally,at the 2000Zagreb nality used the in as 95 The EU further further EU The , no. 3(2000).

Bull. , no. 11 11 no. , 97

, no. 6 ,

an an

CEU eTD Collection 100 99 December. subsequentlyevery 13Novemberand EUstate member on 2009 Lisbon.gruelingratification Aftera the process, Treatyof draft‘Reform agreedDecemberfinal was Treaty’and had asigned 2007in on 13 been upon amend the Romania reforms. of vast institutional the conceptionadoption and B anyenlargement ongoingfurther campaign the the in Western in progress unreformed a SuchdominatingUnion into state of flux. essentially ruled preoccupation out effectively implementation. smotheringanythepropelled text’s This hopes of the rejectedresult of ofconstitut ratification the their proposed 2005referendums, the Rome; 2004 in year norms. democratic codifying further while efficiency and transparency improve of thewhich a development European would European constitution commissioned Council large upcoming inf overwhelmingreform framework the Union’scope need constitutional to the with to order in :Stage The Six Limits Conditionality of development. stage sixth enlargement the of beginnings access the of and EU marked law 38

Laeken European Council ( Council European Laeken

Treaty establishingConstitution a for Europe (29 October 2004), 16December 2004, OJ - EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU process, a constitution was finally uponanda 29October later agreed constitution signed on process, long Constitution debatesyears revivedConstitution two later were round 2004,EUAfter in politics enlargement characterizedbyan the fifth when the German EU—when Presidency theanother German draft launchedanto initiative Treatyto Treaty of Maastricht. Within six 2007,the framework months, June Within in Treatyof of Maastricht. the

100 however,a quicklythe initiative Netherlands, as France and collapsed. the lux of new member states. Anticipating this frenzy, the 2001 Laeken of new Anticipating memberlux frenzy, states. the this 2001 14- 15 December 2001), Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 300/1/01 (2001).

after the accession of Bulgaria the and accession of —after

was finally approved finally Lisbon was entered into forceentered into ion procession alkans until after

(C 310). 99 After a two After ion andion on1

by by

CEU eTD Collection European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), 2008): 36, 104 103 http://www.eipa.eu/files/repository/eipascope/20080509184645_SCOPE2008- 102 101 law enlargement decisions. enlargement for consent state member requires which a process significantly‘nationalize’ provision potential to the accession bydeveloping into the has also it however, transparency; encourages and law enlargement of legitimacy the boosts provision By national parliament, widening officially accession to debates this involve membership. member sta development. law enlargement andLisbonlaw marks of the theTreaty of stricter EU conditionality. conditi Such codificationLuxembourg its enhancesand theclout 1997 conclusions) European the Council criteria;Democracy;the1962 Birkelbach1978Declaration the 1993Copenhagen on Report; adherence ofaccession represe conditions the Council the to accession. approving prematurely of mistake the repeat never will enlargement hasround, been it bythatthe Union acknowledgedtimes officials numerous EU conditionality states. ensureAs a to readiness of les candidate the by laidout Articlewell in as adherence 49EU conditions to (seetable the 3.3). Council as by“values” specifically of conditions EU membership referencing defines the promotion

Piedrafita, Piedrafita, Hillion, Piedr Sonia Hillion, These two additions were included as responses to calls for the tightening ofThese callsEU for were twoadditions included the astightening to responses Treaties,LisbonIn lawcomparison oftheTreatymore enlargement the with previous of EU representInadditions actuality, nomajor thesechangethe in practice EU of wasEnlargementrole the alsoenhance modified to of and the procedure EP The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy tes by requiring that they now also be informed fortes byrequiringalso beof Union applications thatthey now The Treaty of Lisbon, afita, afita, 103 As with previous changes, this addition merely previous As with changes, existing addition practice. this legalized and the Lisbon , and a continuationof the Treatyis simple the of process codifying The Treaty of Lisbon: New Signals for Future Enlargements? EIPAScope, (Maastricht:

36.

distinctive characteristic of the stage sixth EU of onality is embodied theis in modified enlargement onality

Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 39 , 8. , 8. nts nonew (i.e.nts development the

104 1 102 son from the sixth the sixth fromson -

6_SoniaPiedrafita.pdf Furthermore, while Furthermore, .

101

CEU eTD Collection Report 105 process. accession region. can transition Onlyafter this such states be prosperous economies” ensure to maintain stable theopen, sustain democratic to institutions, and rule prevails, of law standards, to and practice European on based means, “[…] the with Balkans Western the 3.3 law. enlargement portrayal of this trendit is essentiallyas nextprogres the existing practices withoutlimiting future development.In this respect, SAPis an the accurate 40 Article 49 EU 49 Article Article

European Commission, The Commission, European EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU , COM (2002) 163 Final (2 April 2002): 6. As officially defined by the EU, the primaryaim of the SAPis to supply states the of andAssociation ProcessThe Stabilization 2 EU

taken account. into ofconditions eligibility be shall Council agreed uponbythe European requirements. constitutional respective their with accordance agreement shall be submitted for ratification byall th This State. applicant the and States Member the between agreement founded,entails,besuch shall anUnion is admission the subject which of and of theconditions admission theto Treaties onwhich adjustments the majority members.which actabsolute component The shall of its byan and afterthe Commission receiving European assent Parliament, of the the application which the to Council, act shall after consulting unanimously State address shall applicant its application.notified of The this be shall Union. Theand national European Parliaments Parliament is committed to promoting themapply may to become a member the of and 2 Article in to referred values the respects which State Any European and men prevail. men and tolerance,discrimination, justice, solidarityequality between women and a in theStates societycommon to Member non- pluralism, which in are including belonging theof rights values persons minorities. to These democracy,ruleand human of equality,respectrights, thelawfor human thedignity,The values founded freedom, Union is of on respect for

Table 3.3 Table 105

in order to achieve the successful democratic transition of the the of transition democratic successful the achieve to order in Stabilization and Association Process for South East Europe, First Annual Annual First Europe, East South for Process Association and Stabilization

–

Selected Articles from the Treaty of Lisbon of Treaty the from Articles Selected

gin the negotiations phase of phase thegin EU the negotiations sive step in the development ofsive the stepEU in development e contracting States in in States e contracting

The The CEU eTD Collection New York: Routledge, 2003), 182. European Union,” in International in Intervention Union,” in theEuropean Balkans since 1995, ed. SianiPeter Incentives? 108 107 106 Balkans the with EU Trade regional also boost orderto growth. in economic liberalization Balkan exports. percentEU free marketWestern permittedand accessroughly 80 dutythe quota to EU forof a is keyliberalization European of the trade SAP. component Council, demonstrates onevery of the first initiatives of the SAP. As stated byMarchLisbon the 2000 regional policy. represent and theconditions are SAAs characterizedby types of numerous In of principles whichbound. list to thealso signatory contain are an sum, extensive states making itthe most important instrument of the SAP. SAA the agreement, bilateral aformal, As country. respective each towards policy enlargement EU’s the constitute mechanisms thethe outline formal and SAAs benchmarks which necessary acquis communautaireThe procedure (seetable content, structure, 3.4). and negotiation thebegins with chapters harmonization adoptingEU rules promote the of to process the contractual link fourenlargement form Western instruments theBalkans. foundation of the thepolicyin EU’s preferences, trade (2) (SAAs), stabilization and EU integration

David Phinnemore and Peter Siani Peter and Phinnemore David Lisbon European Council (23- The Stabilization Elbasani, Arolda and Association Process in the Balkans: Overloaded Agenda and Weak As previously explained, the SAP wasAs previouslythe designedexplained, SAP promote to a dual agenda The establishment of autonomous tradeThe the with Western establishmentof preferences Balkans autonomous the to EuropeSimilar Agreementsenlargements are SAAs the CEE, of in the previous —both its negotiation and implementation , Working Paper, E Paper, Working , s to the EU accession process. After an SAA is signed, the candidatecountry accessionAfter an process.signed, the theSAAis to EU s

108 This instrument aimed at increasing the level of imports from the Western UI Working Papers (Florence: European University Institute, 2008): 10 2008): Institute, University European (Florence: Papers Working UI 24 March 2000), Conclusions of the Presidency, Bull. E.U.

(3) financial assistance,financial (3)These andEuropean Partnerships. (4) - by means of (1) Stabilization and Association Stabilization Agreements—by of (1) means Davies, “Beyond Intervention? “Beyond Davies,

—is subject to strict condi thus tions 106 Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 41

In dual its to addition agenda, SAAs

the Stability Pact and the and Pact Stability the Balkans, The 107

Inlate 2000,the

- a strict EU Davies (London and and (London Davies , no. 3(2000). — regional - 11.

s of of s

CEU eTD Collection Decisions 97/256/EC and 1999/311/EC, 7December 2000, Regulation (EC) No 1628/96 and amending Regulations (EEC) No 3906/89 and (EEC) No 1360/90 and C 163 Final (4 April 2002): 6. Report [SEC(2002) 339] [SEC(2002) 340] [SEC(2002) 341] [SEC(2002) 342] [SEC(2002) 343] 111 110 109 requirements of democratic, economic, and institutional reforms essentially creating one of condi was assistance CARDS Stabilization (CARDS) as the official EU framework to regulate SAPfinancial assistance. and Community adoptedReconstructionthe Council for Development the Assistance acquis EU the conflict reconciliation, with reconstruction and capacity institutional harmonization building, the countries of the S free of anetwork of development the to acatalyst as serves “[…] 42 17. Economic and monetary policy 16. Taxation 15. Energy 14. Transport policy 13. Fisheries 12. Food safety,and veterinary 11. Agriculture developmentrural and Information10. and media society services Financial 9. policy 8. Competition Intellectual7. law property 6. Company law procurement5. Public capital of movement Free 4. and3. Rightfreedom to of establishment 2. Freedomfor of workers movement 1. roatia, theroatia, Federal Republicof YugoslaviaYugoslav andRepublic Former the repealing of Macedonia,

Council Regulation 2666/2000 of 5December 2000on assistancefor Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Ibid, 7. The StabilisationAssociation Commission, and European Process for South East Europe -

Freegoods movement of provide services EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU phytosanitary policy

As the third instrument of the SAP, EUAs of the instrument financial third the SAP, post seeks assistance promote to

ment of democracy and the rulement ofand of, anddemocracy law. entrench

Table 3.4 Table

tabilization and Association Process and beyond”. tabilization

–

tioned not onlytioned not Council criteria, also Copenhagento the to but

Chapters of the of Chapters EU A

21. Trans 20. Enterprise policy and industrial 19. Socialpolicyemployment and 18. Statistics 35. Other issues Institutions34. 33. Financialand provisions budgetary 32. Financialcontrol 31. Foreign, security relations30. External union 29. Customs protection28. Consumer and health 27. Environment 26. Education and culture research and Science 25. security 24. Justice, freedom and rights23. Judiciary and fundamental 22. Regionalcoordination of policy and OJ

cquis (L306/1). structural instruments - C European networks ommunautaire

trade agreements between between agreements trade

110 and defense and policy

109 In 2000, December

First Annual Annual First

, COM (2002)

- 111

CEU eTD Collection Institute for International Relations, March 2005). March Relations, International for Institute (Presse 166). European Foreign ofConditionality,” Affairs Principles the Review and Balkans Western 114 113 112 dynamics for and preparedcountry life, political to the successfully fordifferent aroused laidthe Croatia’s foundation EU dramatically bid, Undoubtedly,by and SAAnegotiations. the Croatiaopened the SAP EU officially 3.4 weaknesses undermine threatenpower to the transformative potential its Croatia’s exposes shortcomings thehow experience with SAP such and shows foundationalSAP’s alsosuch concepts form criticism.The the basisof analysis following keydifferences its areembedded in Moreover, the instruments. within weaknesses inherent achievedCentral and transition ofEurope,” Eastern bythemajor countries successful impacts on its participating states. While the SAPwas engineered to“[…] replicate the on the process. reformagendaprogress the accession within to Policy (CDSP) issues. countries the with EU acquis of pr SAP ‘enriched’ newly bill several the EU’s comprehensive ‘most conditionality clauses’.

Višnja Samardžija, Conclusions of the General Affairs and External and Relations Affairs Council (Luxembourg, General the of 16June 2003), 10369/03 Conclusions the for Processs Association and Stabilisation EU The Europe: to Road Rocky “The Pippan, Christian evious enlargements, EPs identifynecessary EPs alignment of for SAP evious the enlargements, conditions the Finally, the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit Finally, 2003Thessaloniki the At the EU Summit in Zagreb in At the EU on24November 20 Summit Model’The ‘Croatian Accession of 2000,much in criticismhas emerged SAP regardingSince its the adoptionof the

ion Euros worth of assistance (grants and loans) to SAP participant of assistanceloans) Euros SAP ion states. worth to and (grants Challenges of Croatia andEU Integration: is the fast track approach possible? — 113 European Partnerships (EPs). Similar to the to AccessionPartnerships Similar European (EPs). Partnerships Byestablishing priorities anddetailed plans, EPs focus all efforts , demarches, declarations, and Common Foreign and, demarches, Common and Security declarations,

introducedpart the fourthof as the instrument

Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 43 full European full integration; 112 00, the SAP was00, the formally SAP endorsed Since 2000,the EU has provided of EU conditionality. of

9, no. 2(2004): 232. 114

but, as but, (Zagreb: of of

CEU eTD Collection Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), July 2007), 98. 2007), July (EUISS), Studies Security for Institute 115 thatCroatia reiterated previousBay)borders condition and its Piran in concurrentlyItaly,over a initiated and between maritime borderdispute Croatia, Slovenia unilateralAdriatic FishingaZone’ declarationprotected‘Ecological and (which the of in onCroatia’sOpinion a promoted) multiple layers of EU conditionality committed to effectively complying This conditions. created anwith additionalset of (and became Balkans Western the of states the accession, and association EU of process bilateral and association components By issues. stabilization attaching stabilization the onto regional conditionality its weight and double by enabling EU the to directly influence both process. accession EU of Croatia’s belowexemplified the by in context ofanalysis the SAP the anweakness three of ofcontr onlycomponents not run the clashing, risk but within the common regional framework, is an essentially bilateralexercise,” while integration,the requirescontext, stabilization factregional of aeven that“[…] more i state participant each of integration the and awhole as Balkans Western previous enlargements. the key difference vague also representaccessionand its process, Suchweaknesses membership (3) incentives. the to EU conditionality,include context (1)(2)of overloaded introduction a its regionalist weaknesses the dualaround revolveagenda threaten,challenged,to and the continuetransformative in region. power the EU’s These developed three the courseof over accession, Croatia’suniquethe weaknesses SAP EU 44

Milica Delevi EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU First, these two parallel agendas of the SAP enhance the applicability of EU EU of applicability the enhance SAP the of agendas parallel two these First, a two- Inherently, constitutes the SAP ć, ć, Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans s between the current EU accession process and the similar processes of of processes similar the and process accession EU current the between s

pplication for m EU pplication

, theembership EU sharply criticized Croatia’ —stabilization andassociation

pronged agenda: the general stabilization of the the generalpronged stabilization agenda:

. For the in April 2004Commission example, , Chaillot Paper (Paris: European Union Union European (Paris: Paper Chaillot , adicting each other. Such risks are are risks Such other. each adicting “[…]pursue a nto the EU. Given nto of the SAP, and—of the SAP, 115 these two two these s

CEU eTD Collection European Parliament on the Stabilisation and Ass and Stabilisation the on Parliament European (2004) 257 Final 119 118 117 116 EU its coulddevelopments’ negativ orely influence thetense in region neighborly relations In regard,countries Croatian this regional to concerns that ‘unfortunate issues. subordinatesEU individual and accessionthe and process EU accession association of ofinstrument the conditionality multi further contributes to the detriment of a truly regional strategy”. orde a ‘regionalcooperation’ instituted Thecomponent SAP illuminates another weakness in the EU’s currentenlargement policy conditionality are undermined. returns noimmediate economic with political or reforms domestic to load extra an “[…] adds merely process and fulfillment the of stabilization conditions shows howdual theagenda SAP’s determinacy EU of enlargement policy. this SAP additional layerconditionality which of not did Croatia’s and makeparticipant thus accession SAP negotiations) states subject an to process jeopardizingdisputes) blockage pose (i.e. the riskof theSlovenia’s association of conditions 2008.Suchstabilization accession in negotiations involved”. neighborsconstructive its meetall the the parties concerns dialogue meant of with to (COM(1999) 235

European Parliament Resolution on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the the and the Council to Commission from the Communication the on Resolution Parliament European Ibid, 14. Elbasani, Opinion on Croatia’sApplication Commission, for European Membership of the European Union r to “[…] avoid the of risks concentratingr “[…] to bilateralism to ona solely policyof selective ” (emphasis added). ” (emphasis This divi This -

constructed “jungleconditionality” impacts ofthe clarity negatively and 116 The Stabilization and Association Process in the Balkans This regional dispute escalated to the extent where Slovenia blocked Croatia’s Croatia’s blocked Slovenia where extent the to escalated dispute regional This

(20 April 2004): 32- -

C5 sive relationship between the two foundational components of the SAP siveSAP relationship components between offoundational the the two - 0124/1999 118 -

Consequently,effectiveness of the EU legitimacy and

1999/2126(COS)), 7February 2001, OJ 37.

117 ociation Process for Countries of South- The link between Croatia’s EU association association EU Croatia’s between link The 119 Accordingly, regional cooperation as Accordingly,an cooperation regional

exist in previous in EU enlargements. As such, exist Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 45 —staying true to its dual agenda , 13. , - layered, natureus of ambiguo the (i.e. resolution of regional

(C 40). —its regionalist context.

Eastern Europe , COM COM , in —in

CEU eTD Collection 163 Final (4 April 2002): 11. Report [SEC(2002) 339] [SEC(2002) 340] [SEC(2002) 341] [SEC(2002) 342] [SEC(2002) 343] in turn, furtherin challenges broadly interpret 123 122 121 120 ‘ of development the (e.g. Croatia m clear of the SAP. from theBalkans,of originala 1999framework EU excluded firmmembership promise was concern enlargement fifthconditionality. and rounds, preoccupation sixth Duethe with EU to EU of effectiveness the for implications detrimental inherent characterizes also agenda application of conditiona processbetweencurrentprevious accession and enlargements. thatof the additional process a within contextually r do”. states demonstrate that they willing are and able to interact with their neighbors EU as member EU bluntly stated that “integration with the EU regionalnormalize and promote relations cooperation. and pressures”Croatia and historical “overcomefrictions” subdue “nationalist regional to EU continued demand to adequatelyreforms Serb of process minority, implementedease thereturn its to refugee the justified. completely are accession 46

Elbasani, Elbasani, Ibid. Stabilisation The Commission, European Delević, EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU

embership prospects; instead, the EU extended a number of loose commitments to to instead, the prospects; EU extended aembership loose commitments number of Similar s of enlargement fatigue, and skepticism towards the readiness of the Western Western the of readiness the towards skepticism and fatigue, enlargement of s layer of conditionality; this development represents yet represents layerconditionality;another of development key this difference Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans 122 The 123 This instance This successfully showshow theaccession SAP orients the EU

AsSAA such, Croatia’s Stabilization and Association Process in the Balkans to the agenda to weaknesses of the stabilization the of association the SAP, ing its mandate nation- with EU and accession linking

—given tense Croatian- the unyieldingly lity such in non the

egionalist f lidity and transformative powerlidity and conditionality. transformative of EU close political relations 120

For example, even For Croatiaand though adopted example, and Associationand Process for South East Europe - with the EU also lacked lacked also EU the October —signed 2001with in - affairs stretches the stretches affairs EU ramework and subjects its signatory states to an

is only is if future possible can members , 103.

121

’, and supportfor ‘economic , 14 In report,April 2002SAP the the - 15. limits of such policy by

—that relationship Serbian sensitive issues; this, Furthermore, t Furthermore,

First Annual Annual First , COM (2002)

he he

CEU eTD Collection the and the Part, One Republic of Croatia, of the January Part, Other 28 OJ 2005, 126 125 124 decrease percent 10 (a positive as membership EU viewed respondents Croatian of percent processaccording continues 25 bestands, a only to Asto draggedit out. 2010survey, effectiveness. EU membership for Support i conditionality and ultimately undermined its legitimacy and continue to jeopardize its vagueaccessionand its process, membership (3) incentives (1) overloadedconditionality, its (2) introduc its Iceland)accession of further and credibility. undermining its arbitrarily limiting signatory the ofons SAP opti the (comparedexample, for with, states the process existing sought an accession the thus create SAP internal to within framework accession. to other,merely more a forma stone stepping to first the as SAAs 2003which confirmedEU respond June to Agendain byendorsing the the Thessaloniki Croatia of case The prevail. continued to of theSAP contributed EUvague theintentions, of to clarification the incentives Thessaloniki EU and Summit grant theto Croatia EU’s candidateto 2004 status in decision Inapply the EUeffect, discredited SAP. membership. for this These Croatia, incentives on21Februarysuch vague and process led directly bypass 2003,to ‘political andmainstream economic of Europe’ international cooperation’,candidate’, theoft and status ‘potential into ‘integration’

Ibid. Elbasani, of States Member their and Communities the European Between Agreement Association and Stabilization

As outlined by the ‘Croatian Model’ byAs outlined the ‘Croatian The Stabilization and Association Process in the Balkans 126 Nevertheless, it is clear from Croatia’s divergence from SAP structures that that structures SAP from divergence Croatia’s from clear is it Nevertheless, and last contractual agreements contractual t functions andt of the insufficien theprompted exposed SAP, the

of accession of n Croatia continues to decline as its accession accession its as decline to continues Croatia n l condition

124 tion of a regionalist context of the ato EU regionalist tion —rejecting the belief an that SAA was ) as inducements) for the SAP. undertaking Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 47 - heavy Association Agreements Association heavy , inherent the weaknessesSAP , of , 15 —created multiple layers of

- 16. 125

While the 2003 While

(L 26/3).

he he —up —

CEU eTD Collection Southeast European Integration Perspectives (Baden Domestic Reforms andEuropean Integration, ed. Goran Svilanović,Christophe Solioz, and Wolfgang 129 128 monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor 127 beginningjust appear. to litt are rounds enlargement member and individual seventhgoals states. The Unionor fifth, even sixth, of the accessionand process, inconsistently order the in strategic applyingstandards promote to meansinstitutionalized of broadly inte it appears in the an Treaty’stext. In represents this respect,conditionality EU essentially than flexible and complex more exceedingly is law enlargement EU that reality the reinforces mentioned not ,in are but Articleprocedures, utilized, and principles 49 this EU; fact Conclusions condit with the possibility of added momentum after stronger links areestablished between EU suggest continue downwardto Existing likelyeven thatthis is analyses situation trend of the access EU of assessments Serbian . Serbia in wellEU as accession a publicsupportfor in consistent decline have perceptiona marked been considerablemembership drop theofas by in positive EU well. development rootedof nodoubt, the is, in weaknesses SAP. from 2006) 48 (Brussels: Gallup and the European Fund for the Balkans, 2010), 2010), Balkans, the for Fund European the and Gallup (Brussels:

Florian Bieber Florian Ibid. 2010Summary of Findings, Monitor, Survey,Balkan Insights andPerception: Voices of the Balkans EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU

Ingrip- the strong of pro of spite ions andions Serb nationhood.

Similarly, this lack support of in Croatia is likelyto become the trend in S many instruments, instruments, many Croatia, of case the and enlargements EU previous from seen As the lowest EU support —the lowest

, “Territory, Identity and the Challenge of Serbia’s EU Integration,” in Serbia Matters: in Integration,” EU Serbia’s of Challenge the and Identity “Territory, ,

- ered with examples of such practices and the impacts of which are are which of impacts the and practices such of examples with ered 2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf

129 ion dropped from 61 percent in 2006 to 44 percent. 61percent droppedion 2006to in from

r ating, by far, in the in region. ating, byfar, rpr EU eting enlargement law, exploiting politica - Baden: N Baden:

l elite omos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009), 65- http://www.balkan .

s recent years onSerbianrecent politics, 127 The source of this - In 2010,positive loopholes in the in loopholes erbia as as erbia 71. 128 Petritsch, Petritsch,

CEU eTD Collection accession process transformation. process accession stage keychallenge EU of the the’s sixth of EU marks bid Serbia Nevertheless, identity. and asthreatSerbia, anattitude towardswas the the imposition to Serb prevailing the EU integration, onthe legitimacy andbut, otheras international an hand, state); independent in presentedas congruent beneficiala and source (i.e. differs the CroatiatowardsEUIn the was in perspective from the ofEU. attitudes Croatia, note to thatthe important developmentItis spectrum. ofpolitical thecase Serbian Serbia of influenced the the EU the degreeconditionalityThe influenced chapter following outlines which to

of economic prosperity, EU structural of economic prosperity, Transformation of EU Enlargement Policy 49

CEU eTD Collection electionstheby led theZoranand DOS, DS’s later Đinđić, wonparliamentary the 2000 December elections. presidentialMiloševićcandidate, Vojislav the defeated Koštunica, president DSS’s in 2000 September the DOS The hispresidency. of survival the ensure to constitution the alter to attempts Milošević’s and the (DSS) Party Democratic Serbia of Perspectives (Baden Integration European Southeast Petritsch, Integration Wolfgang , ed. Goran and Svilanović, Christophe Solioz, th during politics able to formgovernment a bycoaxing thesupport ofminority a party dissolvedwere and elections again held weakWithoutwas 1993. onwas December SRS,SPS the and only partner, thewith SRS, percent. A 22.6 parliamentary with elections concluded percent of SPSsecuring the the 28.8 followed voteby itsgovernment electionsvictorious with 46.1 percent of thevote thus securing 194seats in Parliament. The December 1992 unitedwithcreatethe to SPS Miloševićemergedpresident.SPS parliamentaryThe as from 1990 December the 132 131 130 political parties (including the opposition parties) a objectiveof into commonpolitical EU of membership allleading developed Serbian the democratic transition of Serbia froman illiberal state to a viable EU candidate. T Srbije Cрбије/ Демократска of SerbiaOpposition (DOS: oпозиција replaced EU formed, bya newly Србије/ партија of Serbia (SPS: Социјалистичка thirtee states onthe pathEU to accession. After aten after Serbia, allowed and Context Spectrumof the Conditionality in EU Development of the Serbian Political C a government (again) with the increasingly popular SRS. The Kosovo War (1998 War Kosovo The SRS. popular increasingly the with (again) government a the December 1997parliamentary elections, the onlyway for the dwindling SPS to remain in powerwas to form

Tim Judah, “Serbia: Is the Good News Old News?,” in Serbia Matters: News?,” News Old the Domestic Is Good “Serbia: Tim Judah, Reforms andEuropean 18 was an DOS The In July 1990, the League ofCommunists of Serbia (SKS: Savez Komunista Srbije HAPTER HAPTER ) . T 131 Slobodan Milošević Slobodan of fall he Over the following decade, such reformist and pro Over following- such the reformist decade, e following years and Milošević’s popularity plummeted taking the SPS down with him. with down SPS the taking plummeted popularity Milošević’s and years following e - Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009), 25 - - party 4

— the the of two including

- year fellow its Central join and to European Eastern delay, fterfallinga outthe Milošević between and Šešelj, government was - the Democratic coalition—theDemocratic opposition financed, unified opposition coalition. It emerged coalition. —opposition in 2000 as a unified response to effectively ended effectively on 5October 2000 three largestthree opposition parties, the Party Democratic (DS) 50

n years power n in

and quickly dominated domestic politics and quickly domestic dominated Soc ijalistička Partija Srbije 31. —

Nova Demokra Nova Demokratska opozicija Demokratska opozicija EU political parties engineered , Milošević’s Socialist Party - 1999) dominated Serbian ) and the Socialist Alliance Alliance Socialist the and ) tija (ND). As a result of As result a (ND). tija Serbia ) 130 - sponsored was was n isolation n isolation he goal goal he

ial ial

. 132

CEU eTD Collection Burlington:Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010): 61. 292- 2003 inies Serbia, Part Political The of Case of Trajectories Yugoslavia Political Clothing: (Fall Dove’s in 2003): “Hawk 73; Bochsler, Daniel International Journal of Politics, Culture, andSociety 134 133 resentment Serbia in theandinternal and U.S. towards the constructeda divisions profound acrosseventually, and bombings continuedthecut all 1999NATO sanctions effectively Milošević’s constantwith firm1990s, resistance; EU pressure were andds met deman and, contributed thenation’s to deepeningofself the Serb clear is Serbia And, it onlyfervor thatEuropean Serbinvolvementin nationalism. of rise successfully power,his to infused Milošević t delay Југославија/ Milošević’s ruleia the in Federal (SRJ: Yugoslav Republic of 4.1 Serbia’s political development. following the influence account examines of EUduring these leverage th 2003, 2007,and 2008) characterizeEU Three recent2000, in periodselections four (derived distinct fromparliamentary most the —drastically of the the development since Serbian impacted spectrum 2000. political active the foundationwhich to builds onwhich EU show the to leverage extent influenced ‘passive’and byboth ‘active’ leverage Characterized bya wasdegree Serbia’s high EUdemocratic involvement, transition of

Florian Bieber, “The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Tra ofthe Delayed Roots Society: Civil and Opposition Serbian “The Bieber, Florian See Vachudová 295; Compliance Christopher of Politics the and Justice Criminal K. Lamont, International ed By o By Characterized by Characterized 2000- the of the country’s beginningof post utlining the role of the EU in the democratic transition oftransition Serbia,chapter EU the this in democratic ofutlining the role a fragmented political and opposition Jugoslavija) produced afragmented Savezna Republika 2003: Early Democratic Reforms andthe2003: Legacy Early Democratic Milošević of , Europe Undivided, Development of the Serbian Political Spectrum in the Context of EU Conditionality 51

a high - 2008,”

degree of nationalistic elements and authoritarian tendencies, tendencies, authoritarian and elements nationalistic of degree

63. Central European Political Studies Review

- Serbian relations since The the relations fall ofSerbian Milošević.

- communist democratic

17, no. 1, Studies in the Social History of Destruction: Destruction: of History Social in Studies the no. 1, 17,

he Serbian political spectrum with the 133 of the EU. - portrayed victimhood. Throughoutportrayed the victimhood. Са

везна Република Република везна transformation

10, no. 4(Autumn 2008): — ree periods of nsition in Serbia,” in Serbia,” nsition both passiveboth and

(Farnham and and (Farnham . 134 With With

CEU eTD Collection 2008): 88. Process in Serbia?, UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 18 (Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madr Meeting 140 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/028a0057.htm 139 138 137 136 http://w 135 perceptions of the an notion victimhood, anti of Serb Approach and successor,and the laidthe 1999Stability its foundat Pact) (particularlyhowever,EU the involvementin SRJ any concerning the prevented Regional ofthe and political conditions the economic Regional Approach. with compliance for incentives as relations contractual and assistance, financial preferences, first time, a coherent strategyconditionality of towards which the SRJ established trade con abitter of inevitable clashandits Milošević’s the with authoritarianism, fact emerged onthe thatit eve relations. oncriintegration but or Unionmembership, on Regional not focused, as opposed EUthe states, to CEE Approach policytoward quickly freezing an to be abrupt to and ‘immature’ proved EU led of Involvement EU Early Serbia’sclash Europe. with stark only tight framework thus conducted nationalist affairs this addedand within their to political EU. 52 “identity divergence”. “identity Report N°99 (Belgrade/Washington/Brussels,August 17, 2000): 20,

See Subotić, “Europe is a State of Mind,” 1 Summary of the 2003rd Union, General Affairs European the andExternal of RelationsCouncil Council Ibid, 88 - Ibid. Olivera The Djordjevic, Limits of Europeanization “from Without”: Is there anEU Serbia: Group, The Crisis MilosevicInternational Regime onthe Eve of the September Elections 135 EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU

ww.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Serbia%209.ashx Milošević’s collapse in 2000, the mounting opposition parties Even on the brink of2000, the mounting Milošević’s collapse opposition in , No. 7738/97 (Press 129) (Luxembourg,April 29, 1997), in theinvolvement in regionInitialapproaches—the 1996‘Regional EU Approach’ to

137 89. This strategy proved initially ineffective due to its lack of significant incentives,

flict with the EU Kosovo. in the flict with 140

In this respect,In legacy this byprevailing marked Milošević’s is

- 22.

138 sis resolution, securityand regional resolution, sis issues, Then, April 1997,the in for EU adopted, the

- Serb of EU, the the underdevelopment .

139 Milošević - SRJ relations.SRJ - ion for Serbian for ion Driven Democratization .

- led isolation, led isolation, , Balkans Balkans , 136 id España, España, id The The - EU EU — CEU eTD Collection 51; Subotić, Balkans the in Conflict 146 145 144 leader?_s=PM:WORLD http://articles.cnn.com/2000 143 142 141 lose their identity if theyforget those c us]; Serbs will cannotWe wrong, forgetor [against whothe bombedcrimes us. the damage regime: whous “There did represented continuity are degreethose the with previous this of the public and the political elites. ofduring the EUtraversed Serbia a in perception negative which the promoted 1990s both ofrelations Milošević’sthea sufferedlegacy.Theregion result EU’s as involvementin relations soured. soon and wasnumerous tremendousby matched remunerations,not this EU enthusiasm the SRJ, member and Association Process gainingtheof status thus ‘potentialStabilization candidate’ EU for was included as a stateon 24November, participant of the newly launched the SRJ participating state formally government.endorsed new the receivedBiarritz andwhere to Summit an attendedOctober EUUnion invitation the 15the reconstruction aid. in pledged billions of EU rewards.mass influx The long Unionlifted its the Serbinto national identity. ‘EuropeanICTY, toward attitudes and of the the the embedment Kosovo myth negative idea’,

Subotić, “Europe is Clark, Djordjevic, Robin“Kostunica Oakley, Brings Welcome for Relief , EULeaders,” October CNN 14, 2000, Subotić, Subotić, “Europe is a State Mind,” of 13 Immediately after the overthrow of Milošević in October 2000, the SRJ experiencedImmediatelyOctoberafter a the overthrowof 2000,the Miloševićin SRJ Over the course of the first period of Serbia’s democratic trans democratic Serbia’s of period first the of course the Over ship asship detailed 2000Feira bytheEuropean June Council. Serbia in the Shadow of Milošević Hijacked JusticeHijacked , 41; Subotić, “Europe is a State Mind,” of 15. Hijacked JusticeHijacked , The Limits of Europeanization “from Without” of the Stability Pact; and, accordingly, at the EU the at accordingly, and, Pact; Stability the of a State Mind,” of 13. (London and New York: TaurisAcademic Studies and Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 44- Development of the Serbian Political Spectrum in the Context of EU Conditionality 53 .

- 10-

67- 14/worl 69.

141

145 d/summit.oakley_1_eu blic address as President as address public first Koštunica’s - , 44

15; Janine Clark, Serbia in Clark, Janine 15; 142 rimes.” - 143 Newly 51; On 16 October, the SRJ was accepted as a as accepted was SRJ the October, 16 On Subotić, “Europe is a State of Mind,” 13. 146

elected President, Vojislav Koštunica, elected President, Vojislav , 88 - leaders - lasting, economic sanctions and sanctions economic lasting, - 89.

- vojislav the Shadow of Milošević

- 144 kostunica - Balkans Zagreb Summit However, despite these these despite However, ition, EU ition, - new - - Serbian Serbian : the Legacy of of Legacy the : - elect elect

CEU eTD Collection parliamentary elections, as of the part DEPOS, seatswon DSS 18 the in Assembly; DS however, National coalitions with the DS with the coalitions Vojislav Koštunica, and DS leadership. Throughout the 1990s, the DSS entered in and out of opposition served as the president of the DOS coalition in 2000. led Đinđić Serbia. in party opposition leading ZoranDS’s leadershipThe new Đinđić. successfully turnedthe the party aroundDS asand established the performance givenMićunović inpoor its polls. Inthe was January 1994, by his vicereplaced evident president was state weakened DS’s the elections, parliamentary 1993 and At1992 the parties. opposition own their parliamentary elections. Differenceswithin grewmany DS the and leadership keyleftfigures party the form to elected president and thewas secure to DSable in seven seats the Ass National Vojislav Koštunica, andZoran Đinđić. At the party’sfounding assembly on 3 February 1990 Mićunovićwas dissidents on 11DecemberAmong 1989. these intellectuals were DragoljubMićunović,Kosta Čavoški, N°126 (Brussels, March 7, 2002): 7, viewed as a Western imposition aimedviewed at deconstructing imposition as Serb a identity. Western and rejected popularly was ICTY the elites, political by encouraged As relations. Serbian 151 150 149 148 147 Србије/ Đinđić andDemocratic Koštunica’s (DSS: of Serbia Party / странка Party (DS: Демократска Assembly. Withinthis umbrella coalition, the front two - coalitionDOS opposition the emergedin National winning 176of victorious, the 250seats Internal Rifts and DOS Collapse applied. Serbia which to award international every ICTY cooperation but marginalize thealmost Tribunal, linkedwith the with quicklybecame government’s suchcircum to response conditionalityattempts early included for TheICTY condition EU cooperation asEUSRJ firmlyestablished theaid. central democratization, state structuralICTY cooperation reforms,and 54

The DSS was DSSThe after formed it July1992 in split from because the of serious DS rifts its between leader, DS The Subotić, Subotić, “Europe is a State Mind,” of 15. Belgrade’s Group, Crisis LaggingInternational Reform: Cause for International Concern Balkan, Report EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU Additionally, the steep conditions attachedaccoladesAdditionally, EU to conditions the steep As a result of the parliamentary elections held on 23 DecemberAse 18 aheld 2000,th on result elections of the parliamentary Demokratska strankaSrbije —generally as regarded first the opposition party Serbiafrom in —emerged signed an by act 13 Hijacked JusticeHijacked , 44. — Serbian Democratic Moveme

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nt (DEPOS) and the Zajedno the and (DEPOS) nt

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Democratic were therunner parties Democratic 150 Демократска странка странка Демократска led by Pri by led 147 embly as a result of the 1990 —further EU undermined —intensified coalition. In the 1992 me Minister Zoran 148 Nevertheless, the the Nevertheless, vent and - party party .

- DSS DSS - CEU eTD Collection September 21, 2001): 3, morecalculated the regime. orderly, and of legal, dismantling to order deep rifts emerged within its ranks. its Whi deep rifts emerged within 156 155 154 153 152 o successfully which coalition elections in protest of Milošević’s regime.Despite their differences, the DSSjoinedthe to form DS the DOS parliamentary 1997 the boycotted the DSS DS, with the As seats. win only seven to elections parliamentary mid in the coalition DSSleft the and resurfaced rifts quickly Force’ Task representatives2001 andSRJ a 2002,EU andseries held of meetings measures numerous “[…] the was DS government discredit chief effortsto doubled andhis his Koštunica rival. April Miloševi democratic reluctance oversteppedKoštunica’s arrested Đinđić and world”, for to Milošević’s Milošević.Believing extradition be“entrance the Serbia’sto ticket ICTYgovernmental over was duringhowrespond the first crisis to exposed to rift demands hightoo pay” to European integration. for ICTYaccepted of condition thecooperation EU’s and famously that“no proclaimed price is nationalistic, EU (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007). Press, Washington of University (Seattle:

Ibid, Group, Crisis International Ibid, 45 - Subotić, Ramet SabrinaP. andPavlaković, Vjeran ; he was later was he 2001;

10. After power, took Milošević the DOS Soon after the Milošević extradition crisis, on17 afterSoon extradition theAugust the left Milošević 2001,the DSS left as the dominant player forward Đinđić left continued asthepress with in DOSand to the dominant completely redistribute power favorof in completely redistribute ”

47. Hijacked JusticeHijacked , 72. 156 —

conditioned by throughout otherand Hence, external various actors. the EU aimed at enhancing progress i progress enhancing at aimed - skept economically unpopular, necessary but difficult, Development of the Serbian Political Spectrum in the Context of EU Conditionality 55 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Serbia%2018.ashx - theasstance, DS apro reformist, ic Đinđić positioned

secretly Hague The transferred to on28June. verthrew Milošević in 2000. in Milošević verthrew Serbia’s Transition: Reforms Under Siege

Serbia since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milošević and After

le theadvocated DS the riding revolutionary 153 n the implementation of Thethe DS DOSfragility severity and of - era political fragmentation resurfaced soon era political and

the new government,the the DSS - 1993. The DSS ran independently in thein 1993 independently ran DSS The 1993. , Balkan Report N°117 (Brussels, (Brussels, N°117 Report Balkan , 152 As opposed to Koštunica’s to As opposed reforms in line with EU reform and transition reform the ‘Consultative ‘Consultative —the 154

155 Meanwhile, the the Meanwhile, . EU party which

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CEU eTD Collection of Political Science Political of N°129 (Brussels, May 7, 2002): 8- April 4, 2002), Republic of Yugoslavia 2002 Stabilization and Association Report Briefing (Brussels, June 20, 2003): 3, conditionality’ 164 163 162 161 uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/71025.pdfhttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 160 159 158 http://www.crisisgr 157 makingofthus the StateUnionan undoubted thedissolution certainty. future Montenegrin both serious to - impediments many of its SRJ Duedysfunctional thecountry to EU’s problems.desire overwhelming the keep to together, TheMontenegro’sUnion, however,was new littered SAAnegotiations. State with endenacted ofon 4February 2002and 2003. with t Solana, from pressure and engagement heavy 15 the at approval EU gained reintegration structural SRJ on Agreement’ ‘Belgrade March the between lagging Serbia the orderconclusive in and negotiations Montenegro 14 broker to Serbia. and the in SRJ regard to its three entities of composition byhowever,wasSAA Feasibilitythe structural defunct undermined Report, stan 56 100/1/02 REV 1, March 15, 2002,

Djordjevic, Djordjevic, JovanAccession“EU Teokarević, the and Serbian Thessaloniki Group, Crisis andAfterInternational Djordjevic, European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona European Council, 15- B Still Group, Crisis International The Limits Djordjevic, Ibid; of Europeanization “from Without” Thessaloniki Group, Crisis andAfterInternational (III) The EU, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, Europe dards the StateUnionof Serbia and— Montenegro EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU Late in January 2002, EU HighLate Javier JanuaryEU in intervened Representative Solana personally 2002, in to ensure successful SAAnegotiations. ensuresuccessful to 158 The Limits of Europeanization “from Without” The Limits of Europeanization “from Without” http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/serbia_and_montenegro/com02_343_en.pdf

163 - oup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Serbia%20Thess%2029.ashx

3, no.2 (2003):3, 45- inherited defects were concealed or ignored and such problems soon became became soon problems such and ignored or concealed were defects inherited ) removed a serious obstacle on the path to launching Serbia and pathlaunching) to a removed serious obstacle Serbia onthe

10, -

16 March Barcelona European16 MarchBarcelona meeting. Council uying Time: Montenegro, Serbia, and the European Union Balkan, Report http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Montenegro%209.ashx 46.

Kosovo (under UN controltenegro, Mon since—Kosovo (underUN 1999), Serbian relations and relations Serbian , 1 - Montenegrin Constitutional Charter, Constitutional Montenegrin 162 - he Constitutional Charter Constitutional he

3. Suchdevelopment as ‘beyond (described

157 dubbed ‘Solania’ , 91 , 91. The of receiving likelihood a positive - , SEC (2002) 242, COM(

92. , 90

- 92; . 159 European Commission, Federal the country’s EU the country’s accession Thepromptly agreement .

161 .

was drafted by the the by drafted —was replacing the SRJ SRJ the replacing 16 March 2002 SN , ” 2002 163(Brussels, Romanian Journal 164 160

Under .

CEU eTD Collection and but 1997) not did suffer greatly as as the SPS after thefall of Milošević. NRS leader, Tomislav as Nikolić, his deputy. SRS The into entered a ruling coalition National Radical Party (NRS)to form theLeader SRS. of the SČP the EU Consultati Thessaloniki confirmed Europeanperspective states;and, theJuly, EUthein Council SAP of Constitutional Charter; but, the real turning point camefew a mon 169 168 167 166 165 power.in run Furthermore, collapseDOS umbrella the inevitable ofcoalitionon18November, the the in Party (SRS: Srpska Radikalna Stranka) Radical vacuum and instantlySerbian whichthe DSS nationalist was filled byKoštunica’s ICTYof jeopardizing cooperation thus Hague”). The “Stop called assassinated by members of the notorious paramilitary unit theBerets Red (the mission was democratic transition remained capricious Assassination of PrimeMinister to conflictresolution from . cooperation andintegration clear the marked rewards two These

Subotić, Subotić, In Chetnik February Serbian 1991, the Subotić, Ibid. Ibid, 89. - up to theobliterated2003 parliamentaryup to Decemberofelections, remaining any hopes DS

Nevertheless, EU Nevertheless, Despite successful DOS successful Despite

Hijacked JusticeHijacked , 76. JusticeHijacked , 75. ve Task Force was upgraded to Development of the Serbian Political Spectrum in the Context of EU Conditionality 57 - Serbian relations recovered after the successful enactment of the the of enactment successful the after recovered relations Serbian 167

His murder His halted democratic reforms,hampered proponents

- led reforms and an improved EU relationship, Serbia’sled reformsand EU anrelationship, improved Đinđić Movement (SČP) broke away from the SPO and merged with the the with merged and SPO the from away broke (SČP) Movement focal shift of EU co EU 168

. On . ledand Šešelj byNikolić. Tomislav Vojislav - Serbian relations, and created an enormous relations, power andan created Serbian 12 March 2003, Prime Minister Đinđić Marchwas Minister 12 2003,Prime

‘Established Permanent Dialogue’. Permanent ‘Established 166 , V nditionality policy toward Serbia policy toward nditionality

ojislav Šešelj, wasojislav Šešelj, with president elected

ths later. The June 2003 The later. June ths with the SPS twice ( twice the SPS with 165

169 1992

CEU eTD Collection 171 170 партија/ - Liberal (LDP:Либерално of theDemocratic Party emergence the (2) elections parliamentary Emerging PoliticalParty Politics of theandwon DS the later J popularity DSS undermined efforts.a EU res integration As ultimately ofZoran ledthe the to death Union’s starĐinđić which player effectively the (asCharter), country’stransition the in caseof democratic the Constitutional and conditionality encouraged political rifts (as seen byextraditionthe crisis), slowed Milošević activeofdesire theand, prompted DOScoalition; EU the breakup membership for EU spectrum from the very start. Disagreements among political partiesconcerning Serbia’s 4.2 a political free dispersion of political parties and the strengtheningelites of which initiated the beginning of 58

Bochsler, “Political Trajectories of Political Parties in Serbia,” 3 in Serbia,” Parties ofPolitical Trajectories “Political Bochsler, Pavlaković, and Ramet - EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU led governing coalition (with Koštunica as Prime Minister) (withand Koštunicaled a marked i governing as boost Prime coalition t concluded with thewith developmen spectrum’s The political concluded firstt periodSerbian of the from the 2003 to the 2008 The—from secondtransition ofpolitical the 2003to 2008 Serbia’s period Serbia’s characterized leverage EU active and passive Both 2003- - Liberalno . 170 2008: Party System Stabilization 2008: Party System The DS was weak; in February 2004, Boris asweak;replaced Thepresident Tadić was February2004, DS Đinđić in - for - all in Serbia. demokratska), and repositioning partija (3) SPS. the of the Serbia since 1989, 117. consisted of (1) DSS dominance and challenges to EUchallenges to integration,—consisted of and (1)dominance DSS

une Serbian presidential elect presidential Serbian une

ult, the 2003 parliamentary elections secured 2003parliamentarya elections the ult,

01. ions

. 171

post демократска демократска - Milošević political

n SRS CEU eTD Collection (Belgrade/Brussels, November 8, 2006):1- reconciliation (Lamont 2010, 71- ICTY evading while simultaneous illegitimacy perceived viewthe Tribunal’s of popular surrenderswere‘patriotic’ deemed as with actsno refere their to nce actual crimes. This strategy encouraged the them faceto while on theircharges bail in Hague).The Serbia instead of In media, the such voluntary retur in Hague The new, cooperation. nationalistic He ICTY encouraged to war approach indictees crime voluntarily to surrender to come pow to rights, aparliamentguaranteedfor dictator ostensibly restrictopening to the door allthe - sub governmentfirmly control, more while turning under prosecutor’sthan little a office into the constitution violence ordert in elementsKosovar aimed Kosovo’s atand preventing independence Albanian provoking which was riddledand nationalistic with antithe newconstitution 2006Serbian 176 s.ashx http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/b44_serbias_new_constitution___democracy_going_backward 175 174 173 172 candidates leading other The parties. political Serbia’s K the on rhetoric radical strategy ICTYKoštunica’s manipulative ‘voluntary surrender’ strongtheChurch,sway, with Serbian ties supported the approved of Orthodox DS state he was able inf substantially to government. integration the orderEU werewith nationalistic, in softened ensurecompromises to cooperation- Hard Koštunica. with

Ibid, 13. Serbia’s Group, Crisis NewConstitution:International Democracy Going Backwards ofPo Trajectories “Political Bochsler, After parliamentaryvictory the DSS the in 2003 Koštunica, elections, asbegan Prime Minister, employing a Ibid, 302. branch of the executive.” the of branch .

The DS, left out of the governing coalition, adopted a pragmatic approach to to governingThe a leftapproach ofcoalition,adopted pragmatic DS, out the Still, theremained DS credible theStill, most proponent

—adopted effect in on8Novemberand still today 2006 172 er via parliament; the itplaces the courts Despite popularity, Tadić’s Koštunica leaderreal Serbia in was given that the n for state support (i.e. financial assistance for their families and governmental support for for support governmental and families their for financial assistance (i.e. support state for n o strengthen Serbia’s position at theo strengthenbargaining position Serbia’s table. Development of the Serbian Political Spectrum in the Context of EU Conditionality 59 osovo issue. osovo 72, 83; Subotić 2009, 48- 176

luence Tadić’s positions onkey Koštunica’s positions luence Tadić’s Under issues.

litical Parties in Serbia,” 302. in Serbia,” Parties litical line D 4, 4, 174 Most importantly, Koštunica secured DS backing DS importantly,for Most Koštunica secured S positions on ICTY on cooperation and positions EU S

49).

including the Constitutional Court —including the Constitutional —G17 of a pro of

Г17 Плус (G17+: Plus Г17 173 , and adopted the DSS’s , andthe DSS’s adopted - EU reform agenda among among agenda reform EU “[…] permits—“[…] the 175 - , Europe Briefing N°44 The new new The prompted - minority - skeptic skeptic / G17 —

CEU eTD Collection part of a coalition with NS) joined with the DSS to successfully form a government of minority parties. of government form a successfully to with DSS the with joined NS) coalition ofa part Milošević. overthrow to efforts the DOS or coalition umbrella DOS the joining (without Drašković as Deputy Prime Minister. In 1999,the SPOpulled out of the governmentcontributed and to (Belgrade/Brussels, July 22, 2004): 14, DSS the joined SPO, with the together and, seats 9 won NS with the SPO, in coalition a elections, parliamentary into the DOS in 2000and won 8National Assemblyseats the in 2000parliamentary elections. In the 2003 SPS Milošević’s into evenentered and seats) 45 (winning elections parliamentary subsequent 1993parliamentary elections. Unlike the DS the and DSS, the SPO did not boycott the 1997 SPO with the coalition the DEPOS formed Drašković 1992, In Assembly. National inthe seats 19 winning well, did SPO the elections, parliamentary party’s fromgovernment departure the citing 2006 October in failure DSS arrest to RatkoMlad Mlađan Dinkić May2006, Labus replaced his(due to resignation) president, as G17+ and Dinkić the lead two December 2002 by the DS 181 //www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/040722_serbia_changing_political_landscape.ashxhttp: 180 179 178 177 andcontinued attemptedLiberal attack form to to a Tadić sh Februaryassembly, party 2004DS Deputy Čedomir Minister Prime Serbian theregarding DS with DSS within party’s cooperation the significantmove developments. marked step forwardthe 2003Thessaloniki the next since Union established Serbia a with European Partnership an non- encourageby effort to reforms,asDSS threatened EU mounting In progress whichto attempts DS thethwartedthe with DSS ruling the EU. coalition towards obnove Plus 60 but hebut from was3Decemberexpelled the eventuallyparty 2004.Jovanovi on negotiationslaunched. were finally Additionally, Feasibility October2005, the in and EU issuedaSAA positive Report

arply criticized Tadić’s cooperation with Koštunica. Inarply criticized cooperation Tadić’s follow, Jovanović to the Koštunica. months with Djordjevic, Djordjevic, Serbia’s Group, Crisis Changing International Political Landscape wasNS formed bynumberof SPOdissidents, a led by VelimirIlić, Unlike in NS entered 1997. SPO, the SPO,likeThe thewas DS,founded with in 1990 Vuk Drašković as party president. Initially, in the 1990 G17+ was established asNGO an in 1997andwas eventually converted into a political party on 16 - National in seats the 31 won coalition, party - ) led g led EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU 177 ) Nevertheless, such progress was perceived as too little, too slow, and slow, too tensionlittle, Nevertheless, surfaced such was progress as perceivedtoo the Serbian Renewal Movement ( Movement Renewal Serbian , the 178 overnment. , and Serbia New The Limits of Europeanization “from Without”

- dissident Labus. Miroljub parliamentary At 2003 the as leader G17+, elections, of a As parliamentary aresult of 2003 the elections (winning SPO the seats 13 as (

: Нова: Србија/

as the leading party. DEPOS did well in both the 1992and the Assembly and joinedwith the DSS to form a government. In SPO -

: Српски покрет обнове/ покрет Српски : led government after the 2000 parliamentary elections) elections) parliamentary the 2000 after government led ) Nova Srbija , 89. andJune in 2004. Montenegro

- , Europe Briefing N°32 Democratic faction within the DS; 179 - led government. Attheled government. —comprised, among others, - led gover led compliance, the the compliance, Srpski pokret Jovanović Jovanović nment with with nment ć capitalized on ić.

180

This This 181

CEU eTD Collection formergeneral police Đorđević. Vlastimir (Belgrade/Brussels, May 31, 2007): 1, theSerbia be to legal the to successor former State Union. Union June. 3 Then, onJune, on 5 Assembly Serbian the National officiallyRepublicnew the declared of 186 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/b46_serbias_new_government__turning_from_europe 185 184 183 http://www.ldp.rs/o_nama/istorijat.13.html 182 finally delink to itself from significant runevent- during the coope negotiations 2007aftera to from clear on13June government commitment the new and Mladić,Despite thecontinued EUarrest SAA Serbia’sKaradžić failureresumed to wit band to by togethergovernments thewaspopular DS pressured party.Western Afterwards, resulted tremendous in e constitution.In its campa of the StateUnionof Serbiadissolution and Montenegro the after elections first the were they because significant particularly were elections negotiations onthe (on eve 3May 2006) o most change. of agent rejecting anyform of cooperation withLDP the in 5 November 2005. on Party Democratic Liberal the established and shift rightist DS’s the by created vacuum the

The SerbianThe in government the cooperated arrest of Bosniangeneral Serb Zdravko and Tolimir Serbian Serbia’s Group, Crisis NewInternational Government: Turning from Europe Following asuccessfulMontenegro Mayindependence referendum on declared 21 2006, from Stat the 305. in Serbia,” Parties ofPolitical Trajectories “Political Bochsler, See “Osnivanje LDP,” Liberalno Demokratska Partija, accessed onApril 30, 2011, h the DSS in order in preventh thegovernmentof DSS form elections. to a andround another to - wanted indictees wanted fully withICTY. the fully rate Tadićreaffirming reacted the and DS’spro reestablishing - by The death of Milošević on 11 March 2006 at The Hague marked yetTheHague 11March death ofmarked another Miloševićon 2006at The 183 182 Unfortunately, Serbia and Montenegro’s failure to arrest the ICTY’sthefailure Unfortunately, andtwo arrest Montenegro’sto Serbia Development of the Serbian Political Spectrum in the Context of EU Conditionality 61

— lectoral success lectoral Radovan and Karadžić Mladić Ratko ign, the DS intensifiedproveign,DS effortsto pro- its the the Miloševićauthoritarian, nat

186 up to the 2007 parliamentary elections. This allowed the SPS allowed This the elections. SPS theup to 2007parliamentary

; but, nevertheless, the SRS remained nevertheless, but, the; SRS the single most f the These January 2007parliamentaryelections.

order to discredit the party as a viable a viable as party the discredit to order 184

ionalist past and move forward past and in ionalist and the adoption of the and new the adoptionof 2006 led the EU to suspend to SAA —led the EU , Europe Briefi EU agenda and by and agenda EU EU credentials which which credentials EU ng N°46 ng N°46 185 .ashx e

CEU eTD Collection the facto U.S., and EUalso Russia. de The role in the subsequentAugust 2007 negotiations as part of the ‘Troika’ advocate EU integration and aleft and integration EU advocate assembly party 2006 shiftedSPS its partyDecember the at platform —announced electoral cripplingthus popular party nationalist SPS problem, support.To overcome the this 190 189 188 187 April, lessthan before twoweeks an theSAAand EU anelections, signed the parliamentary political turmoil and advocated both Serbia’s territorial inte involvement Koštunica EU attempted membership link the to given with recognition of Kosovo the EU’s to months the over executed” “perfectly was DSS the with break DS’s The andannounced forgovernment electionsfall 11May. of were on8March the scheduled the clashesindependence the DS within causing serious after,on 20January February,February. Shortly and on17 Kosovo unilaterally 3 dec presidential electionswhich in A Turning Point swing party. campaigned on nationalist issues; such shift would eventually establish asSPS a the critical Serbian politics. 62 Milošević

The EU took part in the February 2006Vienna talks ontheissue of Kosovo’sstatus and assumed a leading Ibid, 306. Ibid, 312 - Clark, 307; in Serbia,” Parties ofPolitical Trajectories “Political Bochsler, EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU 2008 wa , 72.

313.

190

in the in newthefrom supervised DS distanced the state’s Tadić independence, s an incredibly turbulent year for Serbian politics. Ityear ans for politics. incredibly2008 Serbian started turbulent the with 187

In the post

after two rounds of voting after two Nikolić incumbent Tadić defeated - 2000 political scene, the SRS replaced as scene,the2000 political the SRS most the SPS - wing economic program.wingeconomic supports the controversial Ahtisaari Plan. Ahtisaari the controversial supports

- DSS rulingDSS coalition.Koštunica soon —a team of ambassadors from the grity integration. andOn 29 EU 188 The party nolonger Serbia in the Shadow of

follow. to —to 189 While lared lared

EU, EU, CEU eTD Collection Southeast European Integration Perspectives (Baden Domestic Reforms Petritsch, andEuropean Wolfgang Integrationand Solioz, , ed.Christophe Goran Svilanović, 192 191 and otherroped and President Under Tadić minority Prime theon7July. in SPS parties Natio Government New the Forming EU influencedeteriorating of nature passive by characterized was spectrum political the Serbperiodian theof in evolution In(albeit earlier) of tepidSerbian influence the to the orientation politics. second short, Partnership and theFeasibility EU October 2005positive attempts also represent Report electorate. Serbian the among popularity the April 2008reflect SAAin concerns the regarding EU’sof the threat increasingSRS elections. The pr parliamentaryelections andthe victory the of DS ledthe to formation ofintervention the Serbian DS in politics Serbian non- EU 4.3 coalition forInterim the necessarythe Agreement DS onTradeSerbia with boost which provided

Lamont, Lamont, in It?,” Finish to Is Who but Business, Unfinished Integration: EU “Serbia’s Delević, Milica - punish punish to wasboth employedSerbian tenuous. The SAAas relationship a Union tool the nal Assembly;DS however, a With onlyWith coalition lacked‘Fora 102seats, European a the theSerbia’ in majority yearsSAA, the andDuring thean signing fiveassassination of between Đinđić’s the 2008- —‘Fora European Serbia’ International Criminal Justice andthe Politics of Compliance compliance and Present: Ensuring EU Accession Present: Ensuring emature resumption of SAA negotiations in in 2007and theemature signing resumptionofJune SAAnegotiations of Development of the Serbian Political Spectrum in the Context of EU Conditionality 63 t boost the credentialso boost of pro -

—to - led government wasgovernment formedTadić soon led successfully after the polls the sweep 192 Furthermore, 2004European the June - — Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009), 43. a strengthening of active EU leverage. leverage. EU active of a strengthening

- led the coalitionin 2008parliamentary . 191

EU parties. Direct EU EU Direct parties. EU - , 84 DSS government after government DSS the 2007 - 85.

—upon the Serbia Matters:

- led led

CEU eTD Collection 195 194 193 adaptedEU Kosovo with theirproclaimwouldonly agendas to political the thatSerbia join parties reentered Serbian and Serbian force politics with great seriously pro Serbia’s - undermined Kosovo PolicySerbia’s Initial - trade the issuein eyesdemonstrated of this of the priority Union. factanKosovo and question Serbia offered SAAto the thatthe EU subsequently the of potential destabilizing the by overshadowed became crimes war of issue The relations. EU altered dramatically year that earlier independence of declaration Kosovo’s throughbegan for and conditions satisfying parliament, EU visa liberalization. indictees remaining locate to employedorchestrated the Karadžić efforts the arrest2008, of on21July serious leverage. EU active and passive both to attributed directly are was a These not DSS member.government changes of which the had beenDSS Furthermore,an complete. marked equally as significantthis junction, the first SPS’s post MirkoCvetković,Minister Serbia- first hadentirely its pro 64

Ibid. Subotić, Delević,“Serbia’s I EU EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU off

Kosovo’s independence transformed the Serbian political spectrumKosovo’s a independence in Serbian way political transformedwhich the Thegovernment’s successfully newconfirmed after it credibility was quickly Europe for Hague—Europe The Hijacked JusticeHijacked , 81. - Milosevic repositioning as a pro- Mladić, pushed Hadžić—Goran many and EU Mladić, Ratko ntegration,” 45. ntegration,”

— EU forces. S forces. EU

Europe for Kosovo.” —Europe one anew by replaced now was EU party and the break between theand DS the party break between andEU the

erb nationalism and populist rhetoric and nationalism populist erb EU government.EU At the this point,

including the—including DS 194 , as previously explained, explained, , as previously

In “ sum, - required laws [t]he earlier earlier [t]he 193 - Se However, —swiftly rbian 195

CEU eTD Collection in the Post Central European University Press, 2011), 95 2011), Press, University European Central independence law of was international breach in of issueanonwhether to International opinion (ICJ) e declaration th of Court Justice forfiled athe15 August, with UN request Foreign Vuk Minister Jeremić Serbian the key givenSerbia’spoweras role bargaining the EU’s position thewith EUhand, Serbia’s and Tadić furthered ordert EU in bid cooperated Kosovo, andindependence;ontheefforts other employed and, Kosovo’s legal reverse to statehood, refused Kosovarand cooperation with those who with recognize authorities of Kosovo’s hand, Serbiaandrecognition domestically internationallyrejected promoted the 196 facilitation cooperation’ ofand on ‘dialogue progress ‘make between ‘promote the to parties’ EU The September position. Serbnegotiations,ia common agreedand 2010joint upona the EU one a developed and Assembly General UN the before case Serbia’s take to decided government 2008. December in (EULEX) Kosovo (UMIK) accepted international the transfer Kosovo authorityfrom in of the UN of asSerbia’s Meanwhile, intense a E result position. Jeremić launched whichextremelycampaign lobbiedfor supportof an international proactive . particularly strenuous situation part. integral an as

Stefano Bianchini,“The EUin the and of Expectations Values Serbia,”in Civic andUncivic Values: Serbia - - Serbian UN Resolution stipulated that Belgrade stipulated the Resolution in bilateralSerbian and cooperate UN Priština sided resolution. The EUunilateral condemnedSerbia’s sided resolution.The after approach, and intense The Serbian government adoptedThegovernment a Serbian two- After the ICJ delivered an delivered ICJ the After - Miloševićera to the EU Kosovoguise underLawin the theEU—to theofMission Rule of 196 Development of the Serbian Political Spectrum in the Context of EU Conditionality 65 , ed. , ed. Ola Listhaug, Sabrina Ramet, P. and Dragana Dulić This put the put EU This

unfavorable advisory opinion on22July unfavorable advisory opinion 2010,the - integration effortsof the DS ruling 96.

pronged approach to the Kosovo issue: onone approachpronged the to Kosovo issue: . During two- . the U government pressure, the Serbian - years deliberation, ICJ of player in the in region.player On

(Budapest and New York: the UN Mission in in UN Mission —the - led coalitionled in a o improve the the

CEU eTD Collection (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, September 2010): 1- article.php?mm=2&dd=10&yyyy=2010 199 198 197 The странка/ напредна Српска (SNS: Party Progressive Serbian the colleagu SRS abruptlyNikolić to more ashis liberal vice on6September. resign appealed president He to leadership ant an advocated during strong because elections, overtones, nationalist it the despite 2008parliamentary its Conversely, t and concurrentlySerb to nationalism. appealing Party Progressive Serbian the of Rise approaches. EU with compliance and mandatedindependence thatfurther permanent, accession progress is Serbian EU in EU’. the paththe to 66 support closely followed bysupport closely 29.9percent.followed with the SNS popularmost parties Serbia in include Feb in published farpoll Accordingofruary a surpassing theresults 2010, the SRS. to two theKosovo as Unionwith into an integ pol

B92, “Poll: DS, SNS Share Top Spot” (Belgrade, February10, 2010), Ibi Jovan Teokarević, which stated which agenda itical SNSheld its EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU d.

T new new he Šešelj and—Šešelj Nikolić they they and es i government able was founding 2008anda Nikolićadopted center on21October congress - EU political platform. Mounting betweenEU tension dual the political party’s Is the EU Capable of Making Serbs and Albanians Finally Reconcile? 197 This compromise This thatKosovo’s reflected realization Tadić’s eventually broke away from the SRS to form the SRS eventually aawayfrom broke new political party

that EU accession is essential but that Serbia would only essential thatSerbia but enter thatEU accession is

concerning the SRS’s position onEU integration position —concerning led the SRS’s 198 .

the ruling DS with 30.6percent with DS rulingregistered voters’ theof to gain popular support byadvancing gain to popular support a pro ral part. Since then, SNS then, Since part. ral

199 By theand DS September 2010, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics 2. he SRS dropped popularityhe in SRS

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B92, “SAA Ratific “SAA B92, DS the of formation the Since B92, “SNS, DS Most Popular September Parties” (Belgrade, 15, 2010), 202 - led coalition fr coalition led Tadić’s current current Tadić’s On the other hand, the main opposition party the mainopposition On the other hand, wayachieving to EU membership ation Positive Stimulus” (Belgrade, 2011), actured (albeit the breakawayPartyactured party, ofSerbia (PUPS), Pensioners United of Development of the Serbian Political Spectrum in the Context of EU Conditionality 67 strategy towards Kosovo emphasizes collaboration towards thestrategy with EU, Kosovo emphasizes as - Serbian UN Resolution. The presentSerbian UN Resolution. ruling coalition Table 4.1 Table - broke with the the with governmentled parliamentary 2008 the after broke elections, G17+

( Coalition but, the but, mainissue the use is among of of concern scholars 24 seats ( Coalition G17+ DS 78 seats - ( NS (Koštunica apart coalition to broke decided run DSS the Coalition - 12 seats SPO SPO

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) Current Current ) Composition ) 14 seats Others in January in SAA Serbia’s of ratification recent

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Today, support for the SNS among Today, for the the SNS support 20 seats the ‘United Regions of Serbia’ coalition Serbia’ of Regions ‘United —the successful visa visa taking successful consideration into 56 seats DSS

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Dulić, B92, “SNS to s Dulić Dragana - Miloševićera EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU Nikolić’s SNS The SAP clearl SAP The

“Serbiaafter 37. Milošević,”

, “SerbiaMilošević:after , Rebirth of in Nation,” The a upport ‘state upport , ed. Ola, ed. Listhaug, Sabrina Ramet, P. Dragana and Dulić (BudapestNew and Central York: uccessfully resulted in a sudden massive increase in SNS popularity increasea SNS sudden in resulteduccessfully massive in recognized this fact and has and fact this recognized uses yregional cooperation a defines - building decisions’” (Belgrade, October 19, 2008), Kosovo to its advantage. strongly its Kosovo to SNS The prioritizes is “ver is

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y consciously designed” and attempts “[…] to reach reach to “[…] attempts and designed” yconsciously - neck race for electoral support with the ruling race electoralneck the DS supportwith for

In the EU successdepends Serbia’s bid short, of 204

begu Nikolić’s 203 The widespread appeal of the SNS SNS the of appeal widespread The n complying with the EU ordercomplying in the with to n s a condition for EU accession; and, for condition as EU a s accession; populist discoursepopulist and rhetoric Civic andUncivic Values: Serbia in the de evident that .

- led led 205

CEU eTD Collection from the Right No72.pdf 208 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/sr_rapport_2009_en.pdf 207 206 government of thewere 100persons injured force of upholding theonduty members police the As aanti participantsBelgrade result of of the the mass, 2010Pride parade. support andcommendable protection— degree of discrimination law. and judiciary level of supportand commitment gay, The for EU and continues call an transgender to population. bisexual, increased (LGBT) strong groupskey remains minority (e.g.however,et hate discrimination speech, popular intolerance, violence, independentcreated ofequality. an Still, thecommissioner for position of the protection lawadopted;governmental establishedrights this widespread protection and for human of DiscriminationcandidateFirst, Prohibition March in Law wa on status. 2009,the Implementing EU Reforms conditionality is the normalization of the brittle Serbian EU of test ultimate the Serbia, of case In the policy. enlargement EU and bid EU Serbia’s - possibility non of Serbian state is Kosovo as an independent opened. are status

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, The Pride Serbia, in Parade: Rights Human for “Violence Committee Helsinki Culture” the Offensive nd a Serbia 2009 Progress Report Commission, European 65 Integration,” EU ofSerbia's the Challenge and Identity “Territory, Bieber, Over the last two years,OverSerbia hasachieving made the towards two last progress EU outstanding .

- , Helsinki Bulletin, no. 72(Belgrade, November 2010), declared security. declared for such victims of discriminationvictims new and anti enforcement—for such of the 206 207 Development of the Serbian Political Spectrum in the Context of EU Conditionality 69 Nevertheless, it is becoming Nevertheless, is it thatSerbia’s of understood recognition

In andgovernment the a police Octoberprovided 2010,the compliance,for respect, disastrousconsequences risks this both in

208 The popular reaction to t The to popular reaction —mainly the governme from acon the Roma, persons with disabilities, and the disabilities, lesbian, with —the persons Roma, dit ion for Serbia’s Furthermore, forion EU accession. the

, SEC (2009) 1339 (Brussels, October 14, 2009), as opposed to - relationship. Kosovar http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/HB he a 2010pridesuggests parade nt, police,service,nt, prosecution the previous year previous - 71. .

c.) against three three against c.) - LGBT 80 riots, for the the —for - s -

CEU eTD Collection SNS. In si SNS. lieuof Serbia’s increasingly threatened popularityof bythe EU mounting blockedgovernmentfurther of and Serbia’s is the Ratification progress. SAAremains of theKosovo issue,andEU diffusion critical steps forwardSerbia’s in EU bid, butmost the vital issues 2000. The Miloševićin spectrum fully,fall sinceof thepro Conclusions such The to move extradited further Hague,but EU necessitates Serbia’s bid in progress Belgrade.streets been 31Maynot quickly of2010,Mladić ontheAshad of out broke strong welcomed but the development, UN Securitythis Council cooperationICTY. the with partially April 2008)openingHowever, the thus remains ratification Serbia’s only process. SAA forand by EU end candidacy unfroze SAA(signed of status Serbia’s 2009,the in the bySerbiaconditionality. appliedterized On intense22,2009, December charac was and step citizens (excluding residents of Kosovo) as ofDecember. 19 Visa liberalization was a critical paththe to EU.its On 30November, visa abolish requirements for decidedto theSerbian EU bid. of governmentalcommitment to non governmentlevel ofbetweenand the disconnect the such electorate, displays regardless, but, 70 EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU Clearly, conditionalityhas EU development influenced the of the Serbian political On 26May MladićEU 2011,Ratko forces. wasand The arrestedpolice bySerbian the months last of 2009,thre Within

ratified due to the reluctance of certain EU member states which cite Serbia’s lack of of lack Serbia’s cite which states member EU certain of reluctance the to due ratified

Serbia’s pro gnificantreturns, of EU Serbia’s lack but progress

- discrimination significant are progress ’s normative agenda’s normative e launched significant events forward Serbia on

- represent serious obstacles to to obstacles serious —represent skeptic parties such as Nikolić’s such skeptic parties - EU government is making is government EU anti —ICTYcooperation, the - government protests government in Serbia’s EU EU Serbia’s in - EU political . CEU eTD Collection Perspectives (Baden Integration European Southeast Petritsch, Wolfgang and Solioz, Christophe Svilanović, Goran Integration ed. , 209 absentgovernmental despite clear supportfor EU Serbia’s accession. Serbia’s the stage EU and for bid sets this and efficacy EU conditionality. of predicament eff at riskof is country’sagainst turning them—which population elite are of for need EU desperate recognition theirefforts in positive satisfy the orderto in

Hannes Swoboda, “SerbiaHannes European Integration,” Swoboda, and Serbia in orts. 209 The following chapter addresses the three key obstacles to continued progress in The in chapter following addresses continued the keyto three progress obstacles Serbia’s membership for the On EU, the otherSerbia’s hand, —howreward to Serbian‘partial’ compliance while maintaining the legitimacy - Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009), 37. Development of the Serbian Political Spectrum in the Context of EU Conditionality 71

thesis’ explanation for whyremains thesis’ explanation progress

Matters: Domestic Reforms andEuropean

—and encourage to further bid represents a problematic aproblematic represents bid

CEU eTD Collection set the foundation for determining the uniqueness of this thesis’set claims. theof foundation this for determining the uniqueness pre analysis assesses this strong and EU with presents conditionality. links Additionally, the political action of domestic elites. conditionality the fac influence depends domestic on of EU of effectiveness the 4), chapter (see Serbia of case the by demonstrated as likewise, 2); andchapter patterns the relationshipand of between conditionalitydomestic compliance(see theory cangovernance explanations beframework based formulated external of onthe EU Numerous3.4). phenomenon Why, occurexplicitly then,such so did Serbia? in (see outstandingly neighboringthat, in EU chapter conditionality proved cases, successful the eveng in Serbian is spectrum. political conundrum more This perplexing the with EU remain conditions unmetdespite supportforcooperation the high and of degree thesis’ framework. asks a phenomenon The key regarding introductory question why such cooperation, andquestion, the EU’sagenda the Kosovo normative about regard Serbiancritical compliance full issues in the EUto three with demands Links Questions Missing Unanswered and EU Conditionality in Critical Serbian Issues: C valent conclusions from the existing literatureonEU the existing conditionality from Serbia in orderto valent in conclusions HAPTER HAPTER in issues critical three these examines chapter This conditionalityAs discussions, drawn thebringing previous in from continues fail to 5

tors - depth order in identifytheir to regarding regarding which make—which upthi on issue specific each iven the fact fact the iven —

ICTY ICTY s CEU eTD Collection 669 “Fake, and Partial, Imposed Compliance”;and Sedelmeier Schimmelfennig Central andEastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality Assessment The in European Union and Democracy Promotion: Inducements,” A Critical European GlobalBalkans: Transf Integration Perspectives (Baden European Integration 156- Ulrich Sedelmeier,Corn TheEuropeanization in Hungary,” of Central and and Eastern Poland to Europe (Baden Perspectivesration Integ European Southeast Solioz, Christophe and Svilanović, Goran Petritsch, Wolfgang Christophe Solioz,Matters,” “Why in Serbia Serbia Matters: Domestic Reforms andEuropean Integration , ed. explain the inability of conditionality to ensure Serbian progress: divisions within the EU, within the inability divisions explain progress: conditionality ensureSerbian to of present explanation ofmember this states. Proponents seek numerous factors which to structur EU internal as governance external 213 212 211 210 EU conditionality promote to nationalexploit agendas, processgeneral or its incompatibility with Serbia, lack ofclarity, EU legitimac power generalbe grouped three cat into phenomenon ofthe literatureSerbia. this can within but a Explanations to degree, large vary ofspite the strongSerbian spectrum political supportin agendathepromoting ineffectivenessconditionality the EU’sof demonstrate normative intensifying and status, between the EUand staggeredin links conditions progress Kosovo’s despi Mladić The to Kosovo question Hague,the continued of nature unresolved the 5.1

Hillion, Hillion, See, e.g., Biserko, Sonja “Serbia’s EuropeanCrumbles,” Potential Serbia in Matters: Domestic Reforms and See, al. e.g., Baueret. See, e.g., Noutcheva, andPartial, “Fake, - 687; 177; Swoboda, “Serbia and European Integration,” 33- ormative Power - - Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009), 11- based explanation, and (3) the domestic politics explanation. and explanation, (3)based the domestic politics The EU The failure governmenttransfer the Serbian arrest and to of A Gamut Explanations of Vachudová , e The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy d. Richard Youngs (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 16- - institutionalist explanation defines the determinant of the effectiveness of EU , , ed. Goran, ed. Svilanović, Christophe Solioz, Europe Undivided. ; Hughes al. et. ell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 2005), Press, University Cornell London: and (Ithaca Economy Political in Studies ell , “Differential Europeanization in Eastern Europe,” 405 Europe,” in Eastern Europeanization “Differential , - Baden: Nomos 77 Verlagsgesellschaft,Baden: 2009), y, or credibility,

, Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to egories: (1) the EU the (1) egories:

ImposedCompliance”; Wolfgang Petritsch, Svilanović, and Goran es, trends, law, and/ores, policy trends, implementation, 211 21; Beate21; Sissenich, “Theof Transfer EUSocial Policy

the flawed structure of the EU enlargement enlargement EU the of structure flawed the

(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Noutcheva, Noutcheva, 2004); Macmillan, Palgrave York: (New 40. 212 -

EU Conditionality in Critical Serb Critical in Conditionality EU the fact that individualmember states institutionalist explanation, (2) the and Wolfgang Petritsch, Southeast European European Southeast Petritsch, Wolfgang and 213 in promotingrule—in transfer EU in the degree of strictness or or strictness of degree the .

, , byConditionality “Governance - 84; Sofia84; Sebastian,“The , ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and and Schimmelfennig Frank ed. , - Goran

423; Grabbe, The EU’s Hadži 37.

ć and and ć ian Issues 73 Issues ian te the the te Ratko Ratko in —in 210 ”

CEU eTD Collection Union and NATO Economy Economy Central andEastern Europe in TheEuropeanization Europe,” Eastern and of Central of the Europeanization Conceptualizing “Introduction: 215 214 effects are and of ondomestic EUinstitutions politics broadly conditionality oftenexplained, studies’ utilization of domest determine to ic factorsplayerscosts) the vetoand (e.g. domestic 2.2). chapter (see compliance of patterns in differentiation the explain factors factorsdetermine effectivenessof EU which conditionality domestic the which or the which approach adopts this typicallyfocuses Literature governance. external EU of impact and effectiveness the determine to criteria as incomplete. the (despite Serbian spectrum political such power explanation this hesitation, does account not the in towering for for support/desire accession rel this context, it is commonly argued thatglobal the economic crisis or Serbia’s tertiary determined by the ties between exist that the EU andSerbia within international order.In the wider political sphe of state the on dependent is governance external EU of theoutcome that claims explanation government. bysuch remain conditions unfulfilled the Serbian It of whythe EUincomplete. an perspective, is doesanswerquestion provide it for not the onlyfatigue. explanation However, this inefficacy because onconditionality focuses from flexibility co of 74 2010), 148- Press, Institution Brookings D.C.: Assessing (Washington, Europe’s Bindi Role in the Federiga World ed. , Western Balkans Western Balkans’ Accession Roads,”

See, e.g., Hughes al. et. See, e.g., Luca“The Balkans in and Gori, European the Union,” The Foreign Policy of the European Union: ations with Russia explicate the lack of Serbian progress. While such claims warrant EU EU warrant claims such While progress. Serbian of lack the explicate Russia with ations EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU Similarly, the second explanation is also inherently is Similarly,explanation The insufficient. power the second Thirdly, the domestic politics explanation draws explanation Thirdly, ondomestic factors countries the domestic politics of third ( Ithaca andIthaca London 154; Judah, “Serbia: Is the Good News OldNews?,” 25 -

2, no. 1(April 2010): 79- Ethnic Politics in Euro in Politics Ethnic ; Kelley, nditions and/or conditionality and/or implementation, nditions , Europeanization andRegionalization; Jacoby, The Enlargement of the European re; so, instead so, of beingconditionality internal to affairs,is re; subject tical tical Poli in Studies Cornell Sedelmeier, Ulrich and , Frank Schimmelfennig ed. : Cornell University Press University Cornell

Europea Perspectivesn 98.

pe ; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, on identifying and analyzing domestic and onidentifying the ,

2005) - fore, again, it is again, is it fore, there factors); based -

; Journal on European Perspectives of the Vachudová 31; Liu Zuokui, “EU’s Conditinality and the the and Conditinality “EU’s Zuokui, Liu 31; 214

, Europe Undivided . and EU enlargement 215 However, these these However,

- based based

CEU eTD Collection Subotić, Subotić, Candidate States,” 30 European Politicsand Societies East Europe,” Central in East Competition Political Domestic and EU The Expectations: “Great es, Inn Eastern Governance Europe,” 218 217 216 unanswered. thesis Thethis analysis following of addresses prevalent the arguments Therefore,bid. existingprogress key of question Serbia’ssuchconclusions in leavethe EU significanceits for the in explanation weakcompliance why and how se theyand ofdownplaya suchthus developed assessment domestic fullyimpact provide donot how the domesticexplain of impactcompliance, of conditionality but produces weakpatterns EU conditions compliancewith of andSerbian patterns conditionality relevant literature insufficiently develops thebetween link the domestic impact of the phenomenonimpact explains of conditionalitythe Serbian quo. status domestic the that argue accounts these Essentially, below. addressed and presented are app 2.2). chapter (see transfer rule EU and conditionality of efficacy the influence negatively that compliance) of patterns weak (i.e. factors domestic produce states) a cred lack which states the domestic politics explanation argueimpact that the domestic states where EU the explicitly rules out membership). membership prospects non- (i.e. insufficiently addressing those countries the undifferentiated, adhoc to and subject

See, e.g., Freyburg “National Richter, and 263 Identity Matters,” Sedelmeier, “Europeanization in CandidateStates,” New Member and 31. and Central in Change Institutional and Organizations International Essay: “Review Scherpereel, A. John ir analysis to states which possess a ‘credible EU membership perspective’ thus thus perspective’ membership EU a‘credible possess which states to analysis ir roach, argumentation, and conclusions run parallel to the findings presented in this thesis thesis thethis to findingsin androach,argumentation, conclusions runpresented parallel Hijacked JusticeHijacked ; Subotić, “Europe is a S Alternatively, number a of limited accounts This chapter reinforces the uniqueness of this thesis’ conclusions byclaiming chapterThis uniqueness thesis’ of thatthe this the reinforces - 31.

ible EU membership perspective (e.g. non

19, no. 1 (January 2006):

17, no. 1(2003): 64-

candidate applicant states, potential applicant states, and applications. —which enjoy donot definite Serbia as —such tate of Mind,” 1 tate of Mind,” 73; Noutcheva,73; “Fake, and Partial, ImposedCompliance”;

136; Sedelmeier, “Europeanization in New Member and

including this thesis this —including 216 EU Conditionality in Critical Serb Critical in Conditionality EU 217 Furthermore, these accounts limit - 22.

- 282; Anna Grzymała Anna 282;

of EU conditionality ofsuch in EU

- candidate Western Balkan Balkan Western candidate 218 . Similar studi Those authors whose rves as a hindrance to to ahindrance as rves which also adopt —which - Busse and Abby Abby and Busse ian Issues 75 Issues ian es es

CEU eTD Collection Hadzic” (New York, May 19, 2011), Prosecutor SubmitsProsecutor May (Belgrade, Report” Negative 2011), 19, Yugoslavia 199 since Yugoslavia former in the law humanitarian international national (ifnecessary) processes deemedandas establishes theICTY the ultimate on violations authority of theto competence the of ICTY authority all must defer courts) national (i.e. institutions state that certain requires and jurisdiction the Tribunal’s lawional and all thusrequires in states respect internat to proceedings its and verdicts.Articles andaddress 8 9 legitimacy ICTY’s the establishes 1 Article ‘full cooperation’. of this definition to contribute which also articles article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=19&nav_id=74420 221 220 219 The to criminals war of —transfer measurementcooperation of forcondition Serbian accession. a as EU by the adopted clearly been also has demand such Likewise, suspects. remaining both extradite to stands,Serbianas onsatisfying it cooperation full the dependent demand is byICTY, only the current of status Ser the deemed Brammertz Serge Prosecutor Chief ICTY report, recent most his in challenges; Serbian the years, and respecting and proceedings, collaboratingdetaining,and the with subsequent extraditingcriminals, war allsuspected Article in As outlined ICTY, 29of theof Statute the YugoslaviaTribunal marksFormer for the principa the 5.2 thequophenomenon. status how theyexplain inadequately explanationdomestic politics regarding thr each of the 76

Submitted to the UN Security Council on 17May and scheduled for debate on 6June; B92, “Chief Hague Statute Yugoslavia, of theFormer International the for Tribunal International Tribunal for the Former While Articledefines 29 compliance appropriate the of of former theother states are Yugoslavia, there EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU Over the course of ICTY of course the Over InternationalGovernmental the with proceedings the cooperation of Criminal the ICTY with Cooperation (The Hague, May 25, 1993), 1993), 25, May Hague, (The - ICTY relationship has been characterized by occasional setbacks and and setbacks by occasional characterized been has relationship ICTY remain Hadžić bian cooperation as ‘inadequate’.

upon request. And, article 10 overrides the international legitimacy of similar similar of legitimacy the international overrides 10 article And, request. upon

http://www.tanjug.rs/vest.as

- enforcing the verdicts delivered by the court. the by delivered verdicts the enforcing related conditionality EU implementation, a single s http://www.icls.de/dokumente/icty_statut.pdf at large

and Mladić’s extradition remains uncertain; remains extradition and Mladić’s

; Tanjug, “Insufficient Effort to Locate Mladic and and Mladic Locate to Effort “Insufficient ; Tanjug,

219 221 ee critical Serbian issues and shows shows and issues Serbian critical ee http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics p?id=13739 l targetl conditionality of Serbia. in EU ‘full cooperation’ entails locating, ‘full cooperation’ entails 1. Of demanded the Serbian fugitives

Hague .

—developed. .

220

In recent In recent - and, CEU eTD Collection (The Hague, February 26, 2007), Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) article.php?yyyy=2007&mm=05&dd=03&nav_category=90&nav_id=41026 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics 223 cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf?PHPSESSID=c6e0d3b942981b10a5dbe958886baa31 222 of EUlegitimization membership as a however, keyweak compliance continues incentive; to Tribunal portray of Serbia’s the breakdown previo of Karadžićyetextradition the with Julycontinued, in 2008,and‘partial’, cooperation and failedcooperation. suchfull breaches UNSerbia’s coerce to legal Nevertheless, of thenon- potentially disastrousramifications hard the UN,a the andparty contracting as of of amember as Agreement, Dayton the of state asignatory as duties its violated had Serbia ruling the in case of Bosnia ICTY Forclashes of the cooperation. exa with EU terms in process, Throughout beenconditions. courseaccession have there Serbia’s various the of bring to Serbia3.4), remains conditionality unable towards blocked accession progress. indictees. Consequently,Serbia’s continuously capture failureto suchits fugitivesjustifies rep and statements EU official ICTY forIn cooperation.compliance conditions as case of portrayed its Serbia, by with the then ratify Serbia’s SAA). As such, the EU utilizes this criterion as a mechanism to measure reluctanceSAA; negotiations of onthe certain part on Serbia’s EU states member to sign and of Marchsuspension in thethe 2005; 2006 postponementaccession of negotiations Croatia’s Numerous and and reiterate discernable EUpolicies institute documents criterion this (e.g.

B92, “Serbia, EU Talks at Standstill” (Belgrade/Brusse Standstill” at Talks EU “Serbia, B92, Case Concerning Justice, of Court theInternational Application of the Convention on the Prevention and - line stance on Serbian non- onSerbian line stance Today, current pro- the the strategyWhile conditionality proved of strict Croati successfulin -

http://www.icj Herzegovina v. Serbia andMontenegroHerzegovinav. Serbia

orts, compliancehingestwo remaining transfer of the onthe EU government’s positive view of the ICTY,view government’sofarrest and the EU the positive - compliance and continued to block to SAAnegotiations.compliance and continued - UN Genocide Convention) the EU reiterated Convention)the its EU UN Genocide

ls, May 3, 2007), us aversionsus compliance full to and the EU Conditionality in Critical Serb Critical in Conditionality EU ing mple, after the February 2007 ICJ FebruaryICJ mple, after the 2007 compliance with EU demands compliancewith about full compliance with EU .

222

(which concluded (which that .

, General List No. 91 91 List No. General , a (see chapter chapter a (see ian Issues 77 Issues ian 223

CEU eTD Collection Policy Center, January 2009), Serbia, No. 18 (Belgrade: CenterBelgrade for Security July Policy, Balkans Western the in Policies Governance by Conditionality, Trauner, NetworkFlorian Governance or Both? 305- Humanity’s Worst Criminalsand the Culture of Impunity Report N°145 (Belgrade/Brussels, July 17, 2003): 14- 226 225 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics 224 identity(seean national perceptions role important chapter determining 2.3), in playselite of dilute material incentives for compliance”. non and compliance rationalize “[…] states ICTYfull compliance not solely is a matter of material incentives; instead,the way in which f EUwith conditions. turn, resultweak in suchEU factorsof conditionalitywhich, compliance patterns in produces However, these what shortcom explains Serbia’sof coordination pro - amongst of reforms,lack sluggishchallenges,threatened adoption parliament’s including bynumerous Even pro though- the strongly ofenvironment.Serbia’s political the country’s compliancefalls full lack onthe nature of ful to failure pro continueEU impede will to progress accession. Serbia’s in Until the government complies of wi Hadžić demandsthe andth extradition Mladić for characterizeaction ofgovernmentEU theconditions. Serbianregard the in such political to 78 (Belgrade, 2006), Human Security Serbia, in anUnfinished in Rights State: Human Serbia 2005 or the lack of progress in Serbia’s EU bid. Christopher Lamontor Serbia’s claims in thatguaranteeing the progress lack EU Christopher bid. of

Lamont, Lamont, Delević,“Serbia’s IntEU B92, “EU WantsConcre - 332; Srdjan Cvijić, Cvijić, Srdjan 332; EU developments within the Serbian within spectrum,EU political Serbia’s developments what explains continued EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU It is commonly argued among proponents of the domestic politics explanationdomestic politics It that of arguedthe among commonly proponents is The rationalist,cost International Criminal Justice andthe Politics of Compliance ly comply with EU conditions? complywith ly .org.rs/doc/Report2005.pdfhttp://www.helsinki The New Serbia: Fast Forward towards the EU? Policy , te Hague Results” Marchte Hague(Belgrade, 2011), 29, egration,” 45; Carla Del Ponte, Madame Prosecutor: Ponte, Del Carla 45; Confrontationsegration,” with www.epc.eu , Western, Balkans SecurityObserver: Years of Ten Security Sector Reform in - benefit

EU, DS EU,

- article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=03&dd=29&nav_id=73489 - ; International Crisis Group, Serbian Group, ReformCrisis Stalls ; International Again Balkans , balanced nature of conditionality alone does not accountbalancedalone nature conditionality does not of - EU political parties, political corruption. andEU widespread led government government led ings? Thisings? thesis claims that the domestic impact of 226 -

compliance acts can either ser either can acts compliance 16, Similarly, as depictedFreyburg by

, English language ed. (New York: Other Press, 2009): 2009): Press, Other York: (New ed. language , English http://www.crisisgroup.org ; is in power, in is continues be progress to

- September 2010). 224 Nevertheless, given the recent, recent, given the Nevertheless, , 86. , Helsinki Bulletin, no. 58 58 no. Bulletin, Helsinki ,

Studying EU Internal Security Brief (Brussels: European ; Helsinki Committee for for Committee ; Helsinki

ve to amplify or .

and Richter Richter and 225 , the

CEU eTD Collection 229 228 227 of EU rules, avertedre but regional more of a liability to receiving material rewards. EU of thatwere suspectedsimultaneouslya disposedcriminals asset war political and less of cooperation. policyment’sgovern this upheld As such, the nationalist credibilityand EU forgarnered theof Serbia’s collective and Serb masspublicsupport victimhood, perception chapterglorifiedsurrenders’ ‘Voluntary wa successfully 4.2). Serbian (see compliance fake this demonstrates strategy surrender’ ‘voluntary the of employment in strategy of fake compliance. Such strategyentails formal rule transfer, but or inexistent gainingaimed atEU both rewardsbenefitselectoral and (e.g.support) domestic However, given therefore, of conditionality the domestic impact frames complianceas inappropriate. Serb national of identityEU complying conditions; concurrentlythe such costs with boosts nationalism and its claims to v cooperation further revitalize serve[Serb] national identity Serb “[…] contradict and to thus cooperation fake represents compliance ICTY on conditions rbia’s EU to response Se compliance. of patterns weak Serbia’s explains determinants patterns effective of domestic complianceand conditionality Serbia.in ofconditions ICTY cooperation. nation such of case the in especially action, political of appropriateness the adequate diffusion. rule

Lamont, Lamont, Subotić, “Europe is a State Mind,” of 18. 263 Matters,” Identity “National Richter, and Freyburg - skeptic forces while concurrently (and legally) complying with EU conditions for ICTY for concurrentlyskeptic(and forcesconditions complying while legally) EU with Domestic politics explanations claim that the domestic impact of EU conditionality From 2000- International Criminal Justice andthe Politics of Compliance thematerial high incentives provided byconditionality, domestic elites 2008 (under the reign of Koštunica), the Serbian government’s government’s Serbian reign of the 2008 (underthe Koštunica),

ictimhood and historical injustice”. 227 Clearly, domestic co domestic Clearly, conciliation and demands past deal for and to its with Serbia conciliation

. Jelena Subotić explains how EU demandsICTY explains for Subotić . Jelena

- 282. EU Conditionality in Critical Serb Critical in Conditionality EU 229

This strategy secured formal transfer transfer formal secured strategy This factors serve as key key as nstructivist serve factors , 83.

228 This increased threat to to threat increased This r ‘heroes’, reinforced reinforced r ‘heroes’, - sensitive EU employ a —employ ian Issues 79 Issues ian

—

CEU eTD Collection 5.3 EU for rewards. aspirations the in continuedcurrent resulting fake Serbian government given strong the complianceof its cooperation complianceICTY of thus EUfor inappropriateness persist conditions with theassessment thehow of actualdegree shows impactEU of conditionality domestic of 231 230 political action of the current decision how the domestic theyexplain not thus, quo; status impact of do conditionality influencesthe the to ICTY extend not of cooperation do Serbian EUcompliance with patternsconditions of pro of compliance weak persistently skeptic domestic elites; but for what the remains however,an underdeveloped, is explanation ICTYimpact of regarding EU of conditionality cooperationE oncompliancepatterns current, pro pr Serbia’s prone argumentthe compliance. weakpatterns to this explains of While complianceof equally significancewith costs,suchbecomepolitical conditions adoption more but high the more of an impact th norm[s] […] while at the same time rejecting or ignoring their substance”. self domestic elites interpretand utilize international norms tovalidate “[…] their preexisting effectivelythus rule diffusion. undermining 80

Ibid, 29. Subotić, - intereste EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU The KosovoQuestion This thesis extends this domestic politics line of argumentation to As seen by these arguments, theAs seenmoreICTYarguments, emphasis bythesethe EU on places cooperation,

Hijacked JusticeHijacked , 49 evious, EU - EU government. In the domestic literature thegovernment. existing words, EU discusses other d claims and to frame their preferences and actions as consistent with the the with consistent as actions and preferences their frame to and claims d - skeptic government, it does not address not government, does the the compliancepatterns skeptic it of e issue has on domestic factors. Ine issuehas on domestic factors. a turn, with degree high of - 52.

- EU domestic elites. Therefore,existingEU domestic on accounts - making domestic elites in Serbia. 230

In light,argues Subotić thatSerbia’s this

a deeper claim deeper a that 231

U - CEU eTD Collection Central European UniversityPress, 2011), 355. the Post 232 EUand participation the in 2011 independence, agreement of Kosovo from exclusion the November 2009visa liberalization of bilateralnormalization which relations Kosovo’s those countries recognize with ‘ actually establishingan ‘ explicit surrounding reliesquestion conditions thepromotewithout issueto a onindirect solution the to Kosovonegotiate question. a favorable solution theaccomplished which EU in byasto themeans this only cooperation with presenting of Serbia’sposition EUpriority. accession as thenational top Kosovo augmented—given nature destructive its importance of the Serbian government employs now a strategy aimed at diverting domesticattention away from stabi primacyICTY over cooperation and the intensified EU its commitment to preserving regional took issue Kosovo The changed. dramatically process accession EU Serbia’s of dynamic the Kosovo issueis occuruntil not accessionresolved. will demonstrates the SAP thatSerbian of for thecondition Kosovo question, the resolution Nevertheless, while EU conditionality surrounds a componentconditions. 3.4) of that resolutionof characterizes these borderdisputes chapter see Croatia, of case the in (especially policy enlargement EU previous from clear also and 3.3); chapter (see ofprocess neighborlyconditions therelations’ EU accession are clear ‘goodItis that‘regionalover theand SAP Kosovo’s from cooperation’ status. surrounding conditions surrounding

Hilde Katrine Haug, “Kosovo in Serbian Politics since Milošević,” in in Milošević,” since Politics inSerbian “Kosovo Haug, Katrine Hilde lity relations. As a pressure onSerbiathe response, bydoubling current normalize to - Miloševićera The second critical issue characterizing the debate on Serbia’s EU bid is the dilemma dilemma the is bid EU Serbia’s on debate the characterizing issue critical second The rent strategy, the tact of EU theKosovo tactconditionality strategy, of regard in the rent to cur EU’s the for As After Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, the declaration of on17February2008, independence Kosovo’s unilateral , ed , . Ola Listhaug, Ramet, Sabrina P. and Dragana Dulićand (Budapest New York: ’ include: consentdeployment December forEULEX the 2008, ofin

- resolution condition Suchindirect’ foraccession. Serbian - Belgrade led

Priština technical talks. These efforts have have efforts These talks. technical Priština but does officially—but not include EU Conditionality in Critical Serb Critical in Conditionality EU

Civic andUncivic Values: Serbia in 232 Tadić successfully successfully Tadić in order to pr to order —in ian Issues 81 Issues ian —a eserve the the eserve itis ,

CEU eTD Collection 234 article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=03&dd=02&nav_id=65538 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/comments.php?nav_id=53811 233 and action political determining (seeKosovo elite perceptions chapter 2.3). Clearly, runs of parallel nationalandexplanation a identity FreyburgRichter’s filter with as for theintegration within both EU and Serbia also in itself.” determinant EU ofSerbia’s the “[…] political context towards that affects attitudes the Similarly,Delević, headIntegration Kosovo as ofEUa MilicaOffice, Serbia’s describes andthe effectivenessconditionalitythe ofEU success Serbia’s bid. EU’s policy of the promotegovernment thegridlock talks? diplomatic onstatus continue to and be Kosovo’s thattheto Unionconsiders independence “irreversible” then why If depends Kosovoanswer issue, a onresolving criticalaccession the question: EU Serbia’s they but for lack factorsthis of donot an success, focuses explanation as onSerbian domestic coerce KosovoRel question. even Serbia resolving,the or addressing, into resolutioncondition failconditionality conditions to andexplicit lacks why surrounding an cooperation issue efficacy promoting in - Serbian likely is nosolution future.condition, emerge the to in immediate progressregional promoting in however, cooperation; the in absen Clearly,governmenta onthe EUstronghold Serbian and hasmakingconsiderable is the progressoverlyingand ending resolvingin in theimpassetalks. onstatus borderdispute the any of Kosovarlegitimization make to onthe statehood; but, other hand, theyfailed have thesuccessfully the breakdown authorityand of contributed Serbian to Kosovo in 82 FM” (Priština, March2010), 2,

Delević,“Serbia’s Integration,”EU 45. B92, “Kosovo’s Independence Irreversible”, September 28, 2008, EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU The explanation domestic politics for issueargues this thatdomes Ties betweenthe conditionalityEU’sKosovoa issueare of andquestion EU the not — given EU membership asgiven EUthepriorityof top membership it has been—it has quite successful); instead, but, itis a matter of why EU http://www.b92.net/eng/ne

Kosovar cooperation (considering cooperation Kosovar

. ws/politics

; B92, “Independence; B92, ‘irreversible’,French says both the government andgovernment the public the both 234 -

In terms of theory, this statement as opposed to the ICTY the to —as opposed

ce of a resolution cea resolution of

233 tic factors determine determine factors tic evant literature literature evant —does the CEU eTD Collection 238 237 236 235 of surroundingKosovo’s declarationsubsequent of andimposition independence the EU al governance) external international‘othering’ byclaiming as encounters EU (such relationship thatreciprocal community” tional identity na and the state’s concerning relationship to the debates widerand change can trigger and[…] rapid domestic international politics changes in wide fervor nationalism of in Serbian politics. presents Serbian and both integrity to territorial t SerbiaKosovo issue The afterwhich Kosovo’s threats the declaration of independence. the compl imposed resolvingand the dispute factors created by the domestic impact of EU conditionality dictate both its effectiveness in rep reactions. Serbian favorable Noutcheva,onlyensuresas indicated imposed that compliance by Gergana b compliance; nomaterial forresolution condition eliteswith link Kosovo’sbenefits Serbian status, EU thewith absenceexplicit therefore, costs.Nevertheless, an has adoption of high demands theidentity Kosovo issueheavily theSerb and, resolutionof contradicts national characterizes political action of domestic elites; in this context, any condition EU which possesses for importance an degree high extremely Serb and, of national identity, likewise,

Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics, 28. Politics, of Constitution Invisible The Wiener, 9 Change,” Policy Foreign and Strategy, “Culture, Barnett, See, e.g., Haug,“Kosovo in Politics”; Serbian 25 Judah, “Serbia: Is theNews News?,” Good Old Noutcheva, “Fake, Imposed and Partial, Compliance,” 1079 resents this form of this weakcompliance. resents The most prominent explanation revolves around the resurgence of nationalism within within The prominent explanation resurgence most around revolves nationalism the of In commonly regard,is alsothesis advocated it this arguedby —and 237 ut, theorut, mutually the the nature EU), opposing(Kosovo exclusive outcomes (e.g. post so sparkso reactionsover similar contested norms. - Cold War nationalism revivals). War nationalism Antjeuponthis Wiener builds Cold 235

As such, Serbian compliance with surroundingcompliance with Asconditions such, Serbian 236

According to Michael Barnett, “[…] ofmoments Barnett, Michael According“[…] to

ianceofgovernment. the Serbian

he Serb identity successfully reignited the the reignited successfully identity Serb he - EU Conditionality in Critical Serb Critical in Conditionality EU 10. - 1081.

238 - scale domestic domestic scale

will characterize characterize will Likewise, Likewise, —that the ian Issues 83 Issues ian - 31.

CEU eTD Collection 2009), 55- Solution” (Belgrade, May 20, 2011), Wolfgang Southeast Petritsch, European Integration Perspectives (Baden Serbia Matters: D http://www.tanjug.rs/vest.asp?id=13835 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=18&n http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics 242 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics 241 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics 240 239 does political compliance. the EUhigh with reformsandof Why full reap rewards then, would attempt to r accession, EU Serbia’s for necessary the to Kosovo permanentquestionKosovo’s independencea resolution is and is that 4.3). chapter (see the government blatantly justifies its non decision the of the currentexamination government’s Kosovo- aclose Also, action. political and politics Serbian permeate factors domestic such slogan campaign presidential accession their further and credentials entailto using anationalist means Kosovo as which in simultaneously to secure their proemphasizing the Serbia’s - strategy the of importance required of Kosovo. This Serbupon the uphold abilityelitesnational to identity of domestic in political action by and Serbia’s pro nationalism within Serbian politics. concerningconditions Kosovo issuehave of Serb the undoubtedlycaused the intensification 84 Neighborly Relations R Relations Neighborly “Tadic: Pra “Tadic: Fresh Kosovo Partition Statements” (Belgrade, May 18, 2011),

B92, “Partition of Kosovo Only Solution, Minister Says” (Priština, May 15, 2011), B92, “President Boycotts Regional Summit ov B92, “Tadić: Serbia wants both Kosovo and EU” (B in Better?,” Done Be Things Can Serbia: and Balkans, Western the Union, European “The Vlahutin, Romana EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU This revivalrepresents anThis additionalobstacle of the SerbEU for nationalism merely 63. cticable and Acceptable Solution Should Be Found for Kosovo Issue” (Belgrade, May 20, 2011),

- making elites never contradicts this firm stance of Serb national identity.In fact, omestic Reforms andEuropean Integration Goran, ed. Svilanović,Christophe Solioz, and - EU forces. Political power, now and depend Political survivalSerbia in interests, EU forces. 241 einterpret such EU conditions as ‘identity einterpret such EU conditions equirement ofAccession” EU (Priština, May 21, 2011), Howev

er,given growing the perceptions within Serbian politics that —

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/in_focus.php?id=91&start=15 - - - - “bothKosovo” the EU and article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=21&nav_id=74463 article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=15&nav_id=74342 article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=24&nav_id=74505 article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=10&nav_id=46814 .

242 av_id=74401 - d agendas. focuse itwould seem logical that the pro - er Kosovo” (Belgrade, May 24, 2011), compliance with such EU conditions on this basis compliance onthis conditions such with EU elgrade, January 10, 2008),

; B92, “Northern Kosovo Inevitable Topic, Key to rel ated actions showshowated the behavior actions of http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics 239 Tadić’s victorious 2008 240 - friendly’ in order to proceed orderto in friendly’ - portrays the extent to which to —portrays the extent Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,Baden: Nomos - EU domesticEU elites ; Tanjug, Tanjug, ; ; B92, “Dačić in . .

; B92, “Good EU forces forces EU - CEU eTD Collection neighborly(2)relations andanti policy umbrella under integra broader of ‘European terms alsothe other, falls (e.g., addres of normsbypromotion ‘European’ thesis of conditionality, specifically,this means more presents a issue third however, thesis, obstacles EUkeyard Serbia’s accession; this to reg in domestic to issues’ 5.4 imposed compliancecurrent Serbian government. the of its(in boosting inappropriateness) to the Kosovoissue addition the continued causing thus the compliancerelated benefits sustain of which conditions to factors costsandlow high with by produces EUexplanation theconditionality domestic arguing impact of that weakEU concerning conditions Kosovo question. surrounding compliancewith the underdevelopsgovernment’sand of conditionalitythe betweencontinued the link impact accounts impac downplay the domestic despite their overwhelmingUnion membership.claims thatsuch thesis forThis desire pro current whySerbia’s explain domestic patterns of regard compliancein the to Kos studies res pro Serbia’s of action ult in imposed (or imposed in non- ult ses two particular norms: (1)norms: non- ses twoparticular —as portrayedabove Typically,ICTY are question cooperation andas ‘the the Kosovo addressed only two The EU’s Normative Agenda In the following chapter, this Relevant literature does not providenot Relevant anforexisting trend. literatureexplanation this While does the EU’s normative agenda. This concept is defined here as the the as here defined is concept This agenda. normative EU’s —the - EU, decision- EU, ) compliance? ) show the extent to which to has EU—show theimpacted conditionality extent - - discrimination and minority course, and discrimination Of protection. t EU elitesEU continue to refusecome to to the negotiating table making elites in regard in issuecontinue to making elites the to Kosovo thesis continues advocatethesis to the domestic politics t oft conditionality complianceand onpatterns thus of

ICTY -

related regional reconciliation andreconciliation related regionalgood EU Conditionality in Critical Serb Critical in Conditionality EU ovo question, theysufficientlyovo question, not do ian Issues 85 Issues ian tion’, tion’, his his

CEU eTD Collection online Papers (EIoP) Thomas“WhenRisse, Hits Europe Home:and Domestic Europeanization Change,” European Integration 2010): 787 - Transfer of European Norms Time across and Journal Space,” of Common Market Studies 2010), 1- Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment Europeanization,” 246 245 244 243 (andinconsistent possiblycontradictory) action follows their particular interest- as hascondition and/orthen appropriate hightheir it but lowrewards, adoptioncosts political compliancedemonstrates inconsistent a of pattern decision Serbia’s of action political Such agenda. normative responding ofconditionalitySerbian the EU’s regarding government the issues to begun comm agenda This revolves acquis promoteminorities. directeffortsto its around EU history,open of recent discussions non- en EU the whichbrought were newAs such, it previous with conditions in present enlargements. not (seethe EU‘Western’ accession enlargement chapter process beyond 3.2). Europe promotethus EU rule transfer (seechapter 2.2). to andencourage‘European’ orderto socialization normsin identity,the of process values, EU’s the spread to ICTY conditionalityto —aims question cooperation or the Kosovo on SuchEU and political conditions. agenda economic normative from conditions ‘democracy promotion’ ‘Europeanization’, 86

See, e.g., Richard Youngs, “Introduction: Idealism at Bay,” in The European Bay,” at Union Idealism and “Introduction: Democracy Youngs, Richard e.g., See, The See Grabbe, TheSee, e.g., Grabbe, EU’s Transformative Power D Matters: Europe “How Lehmkuhl, Dirk and Knill Christoph e.g., See, EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU unautaire The emergen The Only recently Only 15; Youngs, “E Youngs, 15; 810. largement process now calls for democratic stability, good now process largement calls stability, for neighborly relations, democratic

European Integration online Papers (EIoP) and other related (albeit excluded from relatedthe and(albeit acquis other excluded EU’s Transformative Power Transformative EU’s

4, no. 15(2000): 1 - 243 U Rules Beyond EU Borders,” 105- ce of the EU’s normative agenda is clearly ofnormativethece in transformation the EU’s agendaseen is with the electoral victory of Serbia’s pro Serbia’s of victory electoral the —with ‘EU 246 - ); but, this particular concept is used particulardifferentiating is for this ); but, the sake concept of ization’,

20. , ed. Richard Youngs (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, Press, University Hopkins Johns The (Baltimore: Youngs Richard ed. , 244

the ‘EU’s transformative power’, transformative ‘EU’s the ba discrimination, and respect for and protection and ofand respect fordiscrimination, . sed or norm or sed

action ; Trine Flockhart, “Europeanization Flockhart,; Trine EU or

. Both ofnormative issues the EU’s agenda.

. When domestic elites deem a certain EU EU acertain deem elites domestic When . 125.

3, no. 7(1999): 1- - based orientation thus resultingbased thus orientation in

- making elites, however, ifferent Mechanisms of - has the the —has forces 2008 in EU conditions. ) accession 19; 19; A.Tanja and Börzel 245 as well as EU EU as well as

48, no. 4 (September —as opposed - ization? The The ization? CEU eTD Collection (2004) 257 Final (20 April 2004): 32- 163 Final (4 April Report [SEC(2002) 339] [SEC(2002) 340] [SEC(2002) 341] [SEC(2002) 342] [SEC(2002) 343] http://serbianna.com/news/archives/6453 249 248 247 respect concerning conditions discriminatory repealment‘legal provisions’in to of ‘all the laws a haveto deadlockcitizenship EU has led The suchnegotiations. set in bilateral of the Statethe dissolution and Unionof Montenegro. Serbia added). (emphasis wewell, thesystem in desire everyone to sharethevalues in Europeanof prove that[…] to the to internationalsending but and message citizens, our to compatriots a only not publicas ofdemands regional Tadić for act relations. describes his the normalization afar initiated Serbia and Croatia replacedJosipović MesićCroatia as2010,the in twopresidents President of Stjepan of non by others and compliance by marked are instances vary condition a of degree; compliancelarge However, some Serbian this to with patterns subdue relationscooperation. ‘nationalistpressures’ regional normalize and to promote neighbors frictions’ its Union calls and regional forand ‘overcome to and Serbia historical pressurescase vague Serbiaaof definition this the sufficient provide in concept. of The s canand thatthey able demonstrate are willing inter to future the EUonly report, that“integrationis members if possible stated with the EU bluntly compliance.InApril 2002SAP inconsistent the Serbia’s of area first the mark cooperation which to conditionalitythe agenda. extent normative EU promote to employedits is bythe portray response inconsistent - this ofdecision Serbia’s tates do” tates

Serbianna,“Tadić, Josipović: Reconciliation Continues”, November 7, 2010, Opinion on Croatia’sApplication Commission, for European Membership of the European Union The StabilisationAssociation Commission, and European process for South East Europe - EU conditions aimed at breaking down historical divides andEU aimed encouraging conditions at downregional breaking historical divides (emphasis

2002). 249 added) On the other hand, relations with M On therelations other with hand,

. 247

What exactlyVarious What entail? condition EU this does 37. - reachingreconciliation campaign to comply with EU

EU Conditionality in Critical Serb Critical in Conditionality EU act with their neighbors mem EU as - m compliance. For example, after example, For compliance. aking elites while identifyingalso ontenegro soured have since only Fiery debates over clashing clashing over debates Fiery ions as “[…] asions “[…]

First Annual Annual First , COM (2002) ian Issues 87 Issues ian , COM COM , 248

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CEU eTD Collection Jahangir: Mission to theRepublic of Serbia, A/HRC/13/40/Add.3, (28 December 2009): 11. from the Right 2007): 7- Eastern Enlargement:than Better Is 2 (European 1? Promised the Autonomy Diversity Papers and 253 No72.pdf 252 251 250 hassuch fullyfor with government not EUtoday, demands non- complied the Serbian this law as discriminatoryandcalled for its reform and proper implementation. report,Rights Council beliefon freedom the UN rapporteurreligion or criticized special of registration of ‘ advances Communities concerningon Churchesmany and Religious arbitrarythe practices endorsespromote and discrimination policiesminority which Law The enacted vulnerability. and his/her express f to preventshowSerbia thatthere be which to anyoffree awould isn’t problem citizen single emphasized, “WeSerbian are and Čiplić Svetozar of Minister Minority Human Rights here to As EU. the to message a clear sending at aimed s wa move Such parade. Pride Belgrade Serbian government endorse fully to gender, Furthermore,pressure law EUled this factors. heavy the andenforce to other ont 2009 which banned discrimination government theansharp Serbian adopted anti EU criticism, accede” to willing states other and countries candidate the EU toeffectively “[…] alter the situation in the field of the minorityin protection as aof tool enlargement Balkans, conditionality the utilized in Western has successfully been enlargements fifth,can and andfourth, sixth theseventh beongoing from seen the the failurecompliance solution. resulted produce a in to has non- between continued redress but, and and accessMontenegro citizenship’ Serbia; to 88

United NationsAssembly, GeneralofReport the Special Rappo The Pride Serbia, in Parade: Rights Human for “Violence Committee Helsinki Cul EU the of Preparation the during Protection Minority to Approach Commission’s Kochenov, Dimitry Serbia 2009 Progress Commission, Report, SEC (2009)European 1339 EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU Second, when it comes to concernsSecond, when comesminorityand it non- to protection of 8, 8, .

www.eurac.edu/edap , Helsinki Bulletin, no. 72(Belgrade, November 2010), non- traditional’ religious communities.In reedom”. .

252 Conversely,concurrentlygovernment however, the as opposed to the year theto —as opposed before he grounds of race, orientation, religion, sexual

251 rteur on Freedom ofAsma Belief, Religion or (see chapter 3.2). For example, after after example, For 3.2). chapter (see

http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/HB a UN December Human 2009 - 250 discrimination law in March

(14 October 2009): 22, 51. the October 2010 —the ture” andthe Offensive discrimination, as discrimination,

253 As of of As -

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’s ’s - CEU eTD Collection Matters,” 267. Notwithstandingn, Helsinki, no. Bulleti 58(Belgrade, February 2010), 257 256 255 No58.pdf 254 Furthermore, an- in Serbian government thatcompetingof identity inherently thrive. suggests definitions more myths.” contested national Serbian work not elites did ondelwhy“[…] divergence’ employmentcoupledconditionality the the with Union’s for with EUaccounts of ‘identity Serbian of degree alarge that claims She compliance. inconsistent such for the EU Similarly, presents Subotić each with Europeanization consideredconflict or are incompatible.” other be to in often and identity Serb debates, the in that fact the from arises Serbia for challenge Serbianon publicperceptions society; within existing the weak of compliance.Within patterns literature on this topic, emphasis is placed complianceofgovernment? inconsistent the Serbian the of conditionality open.explains EU remain promoting ruleTherefore, in what transfer conditionality success varied with the portray f knowbut theyare inevitable”. acces Rights in Serbia, while Serbian political elites finally have EU “[…] acknowledged that anddiscrimination minority protection. As statedby the Helsinki Committee forHuman

Barnett, “Culture, Strategy, and Foreign Policy Change,” 10; Freyburg and Richter, “National Identity Identity “National Richter, and Freyburg 10; Change,” Policy Foreign and Strategy, “Culture, Barnett, Subotić, “Europe is a State Mind,” of 18. 71. Integration,” EU ofSerbia’s the Challenge and Identity “Territory, Bieber, Resolution Serbia, in on Rights Srebrenica: Human for Committee DebateHelsinki Opened, sion preconditions some moral gestures, [they are] still not ready not preconditionsgestures,sion somestill moral gestures,suchare] make to [they The focusesfactorsa explanation domestic political ondomestic (directlyThesethe EUsuchvis push recentto norms indirectly) of attempts or .

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254 256

- However, the inconsistency of political action of the However, of action political the inconsistency incompatibility of Serb n

inking requirements of Europeanization from inking requirements of Europeanization as Florian Bieber Florian as act that questions concerning the effectiveness effectiveness the concerning questions that act

EU Conditionality in Critical Serb Critical in Conditionality EU

http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/HB ational identity asational an identity explanation notes, “The particular particular “The notes,

s the spur for thesuchs spur ian Issues 89 Issues ian 257 - à

- 255 - vis vis

CEU eTD Collection (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2011), 51- and Uncivic Values: Serbia in the Post 262 http://www.tanjug.rs/vest.asp?id=13548 261 260 259 258 agenda. normative EU’s the of s condition insufficient for explanation thecompliance inconsistent ofelites concerning Serbia’s existing literature’s assessment of the domestic impact ofconditionality EU provides an ofmoments non- thein provided outweigh examples)to costsof therefore, compliance; the lowdomestic government believes bet gap this of presence The as 57.4percent). of‘hostile’to number who Croatia (from think respondents of Serbian47.2 Gallupto survey data, clash also Croatia with cooperate and reconcile hinge not did conditions or popular onpublicopinion efforts norms.Furthermore, to 4.3) and widespread bycontinued and intolerance parade Pride response in riots the to government’s the 2010Belgrade supportfor and actionopinion political of Serbia’s- decision serious argument,alsogap fallspublic This shortgiven between Serbian however, the costs. as nationaltion conditions conduciveidentity avoid orderto domestic adop in to complianceinconsistent by explained (re is the successful civic opinions that Serbia separatedEurope, is exceptionally from does liein the not explanation different fact,EU in neighbors.Serbian is, its to public opinion similar 90

Balkan Monitor, 2010Summary of Findings Monitor, Balkan Wide is People LGBT again “Discrimination Tanjug, Matters Identity “National Richter, and Freyburg Ibid, 73. Contex in European a Civic Values “Serbian Simkus, Albert and Ringdal, Kristen Listhaug, Ola EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU Explanations that rely Freyburg on and Richter’s ‘identity model’ claim that

[…].” co mpliance non from stem other, 259 the appropriateness of establish of appropriateness the 262

betweena the 2006and in 10.2percent was 2010,there increase ween thatthe andsuggests publicopinion action political

- Miloševićera .

,” 267. , ed. Ola, ed. Listhaug, Ramet, Sabrina P. and Dragana Dulić

- with publicnational perceptions.According with spread” (Belgrade, May (Belgrade, spread” 2011), 17, making bythepublic elites. As violent, seen

, - 261 identity ing as Serb(as ‘European’ identity seen governmental compliance governmental such with EU - - nation- )interpretation of related factors. In the related factors. short, 75. 258

Therefore, “to the degree degree the “to Therefore, (see chapter chapter (see Civic Civic in t,” sensitive 260

CEU eTD Collection of EU conditionali and attempt to fill these analytical gaps; they present the argument thatdomestic the impact Fortunately,why factors shortcomings exist. a number select these such of expose studies ‘adoption providing costs’the or of question without delving detailed fully definitions into oversimplifies domestic factors by using undifferentiated terms such as ‘veto players’ and rationalist or constructivist) ultimately determine such political action. chapter, this (whethertransfer and,(see domestic factors as 5.1below); in explained table ineffectiveness EU proruleSerbian rootin ofmoting represent issues conditionality’s the Conclusions Serbian government.compliance the of current perception EU of rewards producesthe EU willingness of undermine conditionality which factors This thesis adopts the domestic politics approach adopts the thesis domesticThis politics and impact arguesthe domestic that The of bulk literatureapproach, the existing adopts this which however, Serbia’s weak patterns compliance of with EU conditions regarding three the critical

Logic of Consequentialism Table 5.1 Table ty target costsand produces high constructs country onthe adoption

UNFAVORABLE FAVORABLE Inconsistent Compliance (THE EU’S NORMATIVE AGENDA) (THE EU’S NORMATIVE — – of Serbia’sof compl elites to Full Compliance

Weak Compliance of Model (Serbia) Patterns CORRESPOND Serb Serb on emphasis an (with Logic of

Appropriate

EU Conditionality in Critical Serb Critical in Conditionality EU y explaining the thus inconsistent National Identity) National Imposed Compliance Fake Compliance Non (ICTY COOPERATION) (ICTY (THE KOSOVO ISSUE) KOSOVO (THE ness CONTRADICT - Compliance

—

vis

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vis a low vis alow ian Issues 91 Issues ian

CEU eTD Collection conditionality and the lack of progress in Serbia’s EU bid. ofconditionality progress and Serbia’s in the lack domestic politics explanation with its political elites (specifically in regard to the three critical Serbian issues)su to chapter above anfor quophenomenon. andstatus explanation provides the The Serbian following government the current Serbian conditionality argumentat of line ofidentifies downplaying impact the degreethus full effects. its This thesiscompletes this foundationexplanations, for they suchare incomplete. national identity as‘filter’ a for the actions of vetoplayers. While these accounts set a firm 92 EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU As seen fromconclusions the of this chapter, existing literatures insufficiently analyzes in Serbia and extending the analysis to include to extendingthe Serbiacompliance patterns in the and analysis of of the impact of EU conditionality on Serbianpolitical theconditionalityand politics, impact ofparties, EU ion by providing a deeper analysis of the domestic impact ofproviding of EU the domestic impact analysis a by ion deeper

. In. answers presented thesis this so, doing the questions missing link between the domestic impact of

pply the

CEU eTD Collection ependent on two factors: EUanddependent conditions SerbEU nationalism. conditionality ontwofactors: essentially and political elites. The incarceration Serbian politics of spectrum political Serbian the of categories specific three the on thein following chapter. impact, ofhowever,promoting this analyzed EU The rule are resultingimplications transfer. of the thepolicyspectrum ineffective EU’sexpose order in enlargement nature in to conditionality chapter this impactthe of lack EU Therefore, identifies Serbia’s bid. the of in progress theEU source conditionality EUas compliance with patternsconditions and for Serbian of can this explained, be by accomplished betweenon the link focusing the Serbian for quo(seechapter status explanation presented1). the As phenomenon bythe answer left open literatureprovide by existing the an questions and (seechapter the 5), of development EU conditionalityspectrum ofpolitical the the in (seechapt Serbian ever the of state current the define 2), chapter (see governance external EU of theory political the reinforce mind, chapter in this this seeks onEUthe conditionality discussions to Serbia. in With the in previous thesis chapters naturehave the incomplete presented represent of been bythis Serbian Political Spectrum on The Impact oftheConditionality EU C HAPTER HAPTER The three The The various unexplained —in respect to the three critical Serbian - transforming EU accession process (see chapter 3), determine the influence influence the determine 3), chapter (see process accession EU transforming - fold dom 6

estic impact of EU conditionality is revealed by focusing attention phenomena, missing links, and unanswered questions that andphenomena, unanswered questions missing links, 93

issues political —on the Serbian makes political action solely —politics, political parties, domestic impact of er 4), er 4), CEU eTD Collection EU involvement EU of in critical degree domestic deep inevitably an such Serbia, of case the in seen As politics. domestic of intricacies the from process accession EU the separate 6.1 ineffective, also counterproductive but three onthis analysisexpands O transition. strengthento overlyingand Serbia’s democratic EU’sfurther advance influence the itswhich has seeks benefited it key pinpoint assessment to faults order instead, in this Serbia, weaknesses, Serbia’s to environment. and political corrupt contributes political elites conditionality inherent concurrently, credibility of pro the the influencepolitics, EU of parties Serbia’s of proconditionality subsequently encouragesmarginalization - the this environment,survival. EUof actiondeterminantWithin political and of the political Serbian within nationalism defining thus politics national ‘Serb interests’ the as top priority in tackling nation process.satisfying progressing the framework and within accession Also, conditions of the placin and reforms EU of content actual the from away focus political - antransformed into exclusively politics condition Serbian 94 EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU . Byconditions establishing Conditionality is inherently tied to certain issues; this fact makes itimpossible to Incarcera does de thesis not This nly arecan following after problems solved. Hence, identified they the be given that it provides givenit such for opportunities internal elites, exposes EU that - tion of Serbian Politics sensitive issues, EU conditionality prompted EU issues, the conditionality resurgence of Serbsensitive ly allows forthe of EU accession the manipulation by ly Serbia’s process

- skeptic/anti- - mean conditionality the of importance or EU the magnitude to fold impact and shows how conditionality is not onlynot how conditionalityfold impact and is shows - EU parties has been challenged. Furthermore, Furthermore, challenged. been has parties EU and nationalism as the defining characteristics of Serbian Serbian of characteristics defining the as nationalism and in promotingrule in transfer EUSerbia. in EU parties has drastically strengthened while, while, strengthened drastically has parties EU

oriented arena effectively shifting shifting effectively arena oriented g onsimply emphasis EU political CEU eTD Collection ions Nat United SecurityCouncil, Resolution 1329 (2000) Prosecutor 263 that fact the status candidate EU approaches Serbia as numbers; of game a become merely reconciliation” fact process Serbia’s to contribution challenges the of Tribunal’s “[…] national by a single, specificcriterion ICTYSerbian As previously‘full explained, politics. cooperation’ be to has measured come from goals theconditioned overlyingand social non- of both - aninto exclusivelycondition show howexamples the EU’s employmentof transformed conditionality Serbian has politics the also Serbia’srepresents it process EU undoubtedlyprogresses ruleintegration, of transfer EU the While bid. dominated EU bySerbian havecountry’s membership politics been the Since the SPSj Serbia’ led DS byTadić’s During thepolitics. parliamentary victoriouscoalition—‘Foraelections, European the 2008 Politics Condition Serbian EU an as political action in Serbia. - condition of EU (1) conditionality t Serbia: in In politics. respect,theoccurred twokey very this result ofas nature Serbian a developments issues EU— coupled membership theprioritizes with fact—influencedgovernment that the

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia, Former the for Tribunal Criminal International country’s most significant challenge to its overall democratic transition. Numerous EU conditions for ICTY cooperation most clearly demonstrate this development in in ICTYdemonstratecooperation development EU for conditions this clearly most member EU of prospect The , Press, Release, CC/PIO/027 oriented arena and (2) the reinstatement of Serb nationalism as a vital aspect of of aspect vital a as nationalism Serb of reinstatement the (2) and arena oriented

263 oined the DS oined the and detractsfrom norms.Cooperation the spreadofw EU

won the most votes—won in the most 6ofelectoral allbut Serbia’s 29 districts. - the transfer of suspected war criminals to The to —the Hague. transfer ofcriminals war suspected This led form coalitionto the 7July current government 2008, on oriented undermines arena a which EU rule diffusion

The Impact of EU Conditionality onthe Serbian Political Spectrum - E (The Hague, November 24, 1995), he transformation of Serbian politics into an of Serbianinto exclusivelyhe politics transformation ship has firmly taken hold ofhold hasallaspectsship firmlytaken of Serbian - Oriented A Oriented

, November 30, 2000. rena Joint Statement by the President andthe

conditioned reforms. http://www.icty.org/sid/7220

ith the ICTY the ith has nd detracts ; 95

CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics 267 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics 266 http://xs4.b92.net/eng/news/politics 265 264 fulfill the keyment is acceptanceand priorityofSerbia. the both EU Similarly, Serbia’s of Such preoccupation the with technicalities of conditionality the that condition reinforces fact instead but them. onthesubstantive contentconditions, merefulfilling of EU of process Hadžić and Mladić continued block to Serbia’sfailure EU citingcountry’s bid capture to the of Karadžićextradition cooperation, full sufficiently demonstrates the Netherlands its While ‘fullconstitutes cooperation’Serbia dominated argued Serbianthatthe politics. the aftermath ofdisput Karadžić’s2008,Serbia’s arrest in In orconditionality reforms. contentfocus of also takes awayfromthe conditions the very recentrej and popular past, Serbia’s to necessarily regionalguarantee unwillingness animosities, confront a to solution its undoubtedly, will, conditions EU does membership,closer not it but bring Serbia to actual arrest and his extradition. than life alternative and identity fake of aFurthermore, Karadžić’sconstruction the more public seemed successful in interested significance instead but meaning onits for for reconciliation, EU Serbia’s bid. arres Karadžić’s of coverage media Serbian example, that popular attentionnolonger strugglefocuses reconciliation. for onSerbia’s Consequently, havecaughtrhetoric and become Serbian suchdemands upin EU politics so arrest to failure continued its in process accession Serbia’ remain Hadžić 96 Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009), 137- - (Baden Perspectives Integration European Southeast Petritsch, Wolfgang and Solioz, Christophe Svilanović, in Serbia Matters: Opportunities,” and Obstacles Domestic Reforms andEuropean Integr

B92, “Holland Steadfast in SAA R SAA in Steadfast “Holland B92, “Karadžić B92, ‘Practiced Alternative “EU: B92, Arrest Karadžić Step” Important (Belgrade/Br See, e.g., Clark, EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU In addition to overshadowingIn to goals ofaddition the EU social the accession broad process, s s become large at Serbia in the Shadow of Milošević . 267 This example portrays example on the This Serbianfocus politics not how ection of the ‘truth’.

article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=52102 - - efusal” (Belgrade, October 27, 2008), article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=10&dd=27&nav_id=54530&version=print article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=52109 increasingly pressing. Likewise, obstacle pressing.foremost increasingly in the Medicine’” (Belgrade, July 22, 2008), Medicine’” July 2008), (Belgrade, 22, 141; Subotić, ; Eric D. Gordy, “Confronting the Past in Serbia: in Serbia: Past the “Confronting Gordy, D. ; Eric

ussels/The Hague, July 22, 2008), Hijacked JusticeHijacked . t on 21 July 2008 focused not on its onits focused not on21Julyt 2008 these final two fugitives. e the with Netherlands over what

266 Satisfying ICTY

and extradite and ation 265 . 264 , ed., Goran

For For

CEU eTD Collection Invisible Constitution of Politics of Constitution Invisible 1 Identity,” ofNational Theory 30, 2009, 269 268 EU the Innegative reaction EU. as perceptionbythe ofrepresented effect, massive, to the violent skeptic/anti- Serb national identity.becomewith directly linked changed.bid process of conditionality accession to The caused the implementation EU st member nation Serbia’s involvedin prioritytop 5.3). states Previously,had been (seechapteronly EU member revival of Serb nationalism of Restoration the frameworkthewithin EU accession process. of freel are goals social and norms European where extent the to politics Serbian incarcerated effectively has conditionality how show instances contradicts relations.regional ofprotection,These European standards equality, minority and onthe grounds ofof residence movement. Suchdiscrimination and territory sovereign Serbia’s of a part as Serbian government In ofover conditions norms.agree signingalso represents the the prioritization the excludedfrom EU’s the thatKosovo bevisa condition “[…]

See, e.g., Barnett, “Culture, Strategy, ForeignChange,” and 5 Policy Council Regulation Union, (EC)No 1244/2009 European the of Council - Kosovo’s 2008brought unilateralof independence a declaration it swift with in supported 2010 Belgrade government’ssupported- 2010Pride Parade, the pro http://eur ates recognized Kosovo’s independence from Serbia, the dynamic of Serbia’s Kosovo’s from independence Serbia, EU ates the dynamic recognized EU forces present the EU as a threat to Serb national values and promote a promote and values national Serb to a threat as EU the present forces EU - SerbNationalism sensitive issues indirectly (i.e. conditioning ICTY after but, indirectlyissues cooperation); conditioning 22 sensitive (i.e. - lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriS — given that Serbia and five EUcontinue membergiven viewfive thatSerbiato Kosovo states and - 31; Freyburg and Richter, “National Identity Matters,” 263 Matters,” Identity “National Richter, and Freyburg 31; . just as EU just membership had government’s officially becomethe

The Impact of EU Conditionality onthe Serbian Political Spectrum within Serbian within Politics deprived select Serbian citizens from their freedom freedom their from citizens Serbian select —deprived erv.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:336:0001:0003:EN:PDF

y sacrificed progressing for of the sake 269 Consequently, Serbia’s EU Consequently, Serbia’s

- 36; Dittmer36; and Kim, “In Search a of , Official Journal L 336/1, November - free regime for Serbia” for regime free ethnicity clearly clearly ethnicity EU orientation suffeEU orientation - 282; Wiener, The ment, the - .

268 97 rs rs

CEU eTD Collection Poll from the Right the EU’s policy of constant conditioning clearly explains Serbia’sthe lack EU’s conditioning of policyof clearlyEU constant explains rule transfer In controversies,andpolitics. traditional Serbdeeply values sum more permeate to Serbian (3) revivedthus issues, be permitsnationalist nationalism widely and Serbia, in broadcasted benefits from extensivemedia coverage their of trail, (2) lets elite (e.gcoverage. allows popular turn, (1) in nationalists This, ICTYdealing thewith are becomeincredibly publicand a degree awarded high of media values. anwith Furthermore, EU Serb war‘heroes’, invalidate Serbian territorial integrity, and nationhood create 274 273 272 271 No72.pdf 270 in the Serbian political spectrum (excludingLDP) is not the the result of mutual agreement, Kosovo). in universal This Serbs boycott and to acceptance steadfast elections of nat onKosovo’s and status acts relatedcontinuallycallingposition (e.g. nationalist onKosovar integration process. order interest, survival values, and promote continue to theirand to the political EU theEU now frameworkin situate whotheinto nationalism must country’sbid of Serb EU reforms fulfillmentcondition and . cost nation Serbia’s and decreasing the to contributes greatly and fromattacks. numerous popular 98

See, e.g., Freyburg “National Richter, and Identity Matters”. “Territory,See, e.g., Bieber, IdentityChallenge the and of Serbia’s EUIntegration,” 65 2010Summary of Findings Monitor, Balkan European Integration Office, The Pride Serbia, in Parade: Rights Human for “Violence Committee Helsinki Culture” andthe Offensive (Belgrade: Government of Serbia, June 2010), of EU integration EU Conditionality in Serbia Conditionality EU Clearly, formedconditionality between has a link strong,negative EU membership .

, Helsinki Bulletin, no. 72(Belgrade, November 2010), the perception of the accession process as a vehicle of the EU to persecute persecute to EU the of a vehicle as process accession the of perception the - 274 sensitive issues. debateover the This adoption clashingand identities , however, This balancing the This in government’s can act beunwavering seen European Orientation of Serbian Citizens Trends: ResultsPublic of Opinion

270 convolutes - 273 deemed importance Associating As such, it presents a serious challenge to Serbia’s pro Serbia’s to challenge aserious presents it such, As .

support for popular EU accession. support //www.seio.gov.rs http: the actual benefits Serbia would obtainfrom thebenefitswould actual Serbia

EU conditions with EU conditions

due to its heavy conditioning heavy—due its to http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/HB . Šešelj) to acquire political chal .

- len provoked threats Serb to provoked issues co ge traditional Serb ge traditional 272 - 71. ncerning Serb Serb ncerning

ionalism —issues - 271 , -

CEU eTD Collection 368. Vachudová SystemsAfter and Before Accession,” Journal of European Public Policy 276 275 EU This DSS. (and, and to theNS), andSNS SPS someanti extent, EU Maximization of EU political parties. EU of influence the maximized support; party(both EU takingalternate an path becamealmost impossible. Today,every leading Serbian political pro Serbia’s and increased Milošević and Serbia’smembership theAs the strengthening prospects. EU’s of EU leverage 6.2 consequential domestic factors in Serbia’s political parties and political elites. the EU’s implementation of conditionality issue. on this anbut outcomeandone ofconsequencespolitical lackingthewere divert fear to leeway if of Politics

See See, e.g., Grzymała

e 14, no. 4(2008): 387- These twopopularly developments accepted wi When mentioningWhen EU partiesThe has, transformed too, of balance political of the fall Serbian since Serbia’s of Marginalization Pro- . g 276 . , “Corruption, Compliance”. and , Milada Vachudová “Center, however,conditionalitygovernmental has ultimately supportand undermined 275 - -

skeptic category only recently emerged after the 2008 presidential andskeptic category recently emerged only after the 2008presidential skeptic and pro- and skeptic - Busse and Busse

- skeptic/anti 405; - EU orientation the solidified, chances of

Innes,“Great 64 Expectations,” Milada Vachudová -

ske - EU) EUfor Serbia’s accession supports and popular vies skeptic and anti skeptic The Impact of EU Conditionality onthe Serbian Political Spectrum ptic political parties, this thesis is referring to, primarily, the - Party Party Europe,” Central East in Outcomes Political and Parties Right - EU Influence

EU Politica set the stage for the following discussion on discussion stage following for—set the the , “Tempered b “Tempered ,

- EU forcesmarginalizing pro thus Serbia’s - EU

l Parties - EU parties include the SRS and the the and SRS the include parties EU thin Serbianthin politics - 73; Haug, “Kosovo inSerbian Politics,” 329- y the EU? y the

15, no. 6 (September 2008): 861-

Political Parties and Party Party and Parties Political reversing or process this as a result of of aresult —as

99 879;

CEU eTD Collection 278 277 pace, desired the below significantly membershipgood as a thing), Serbian S public(1) supports influence EU of such First is the De Dačić Ivica leader (SPS government the in spot apowerful itself guaranteed and elections) parliamentary supportSPS and the fact that the will SPS likelyenjoy a similar position after the 2012 significant swing party in Serbia (the curre successfullygovernment. repositioned SPS itselfas Similarly, the the most established coalition of EU a which in elections and suggest) numerousthe in upcomingparliamentary polls 2012 in Serbia and represents largest the threat togovernment the (as municipalelection results years has become,arguably, the SNS three popular theparty creation, most political after its Serbia within anmass popular extremelyposition and following influential bid EU —support for andSerbia’s issues nationalist position components were ever conflict, to political take the precarious latter priority.This would if these Russia),but with Kosovo, Serband population, external kin relations two as opposed the to anti spectr support the most Kosovo lost favored Conversely, and partiescriticizedemphasized membership. EU accession which EU el parliamentary Serbia in 100 Conditionality EU

European Integration Office, 2010Summary of Findings Monitor, Balkan um was immediatelycapitalized on and filled by the SNSand the These SPS. parties The opportunities presented by EU conditionality serve mainly to maximize The presentedthe opportunities by conditionality maximize to servemainly EU - skeptic parties skeptic ections when it became clear that the majority of the Serbian electorate electorate Serbian the of majority the that clear became it when ections - - skeptic politicalskeptic parties in Serbia. Given that the majority of the EU parties EU puty Prime Minister andthe MinisterInternal of Affairs). European Orientation of Serbian Citizens Trends

erbia’s EU accession (albeit not necessarily viewing EU EU viewing necessarily not (albeit accession EU erbia’s . This apparent. This center 277

mainly the SNS and and NS —mainly SNS perhapsDSS the the (2) feels that the country’s current pace of accession is is accession of pace current country’s the that feels (2) uphold both EU membership and nationalist issues (e.g. issues EU both membership—uphold and nationalist 278 andconsidersand (3) conditionalitythe government’s .

nt government wasgovernment formed after only acquiringnt

- right void in the Serbian political political the in Serbian void right —has won EU .

- n politics. Nearlyn politics. skeptic parties a parties skeptic —could form a

— CEU eTD Collection tions. elec early for calls and parliament of dissolution the demands relentlessly rallies clearly discredit is to This the government. numerous SNS in seen baseconditionality use theirto as and theof argumentation ineffectiveness a tailored parties developedopposition order pro in their- programs this political tap to into article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=04&nav_id=74153 282 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics 281 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics 280 279 en ‘dead EU of thattime, conditionality such continueUntil allowwill to for an overrepresentation condition. emerge soon will givenresolution ofexplicit the as Kosovo question an thatthe com parties these however, DS the attack and support public garner to leverage EU credentials. governmentdiscreditand the more pro radically - - trade employed particular, in question, as a tool political is standing unfavorable to contributing of andthe government. perceptions reject the and EU ICTY the as threats to the Serbidentity thus boosting its nationalist European/anti inabilityguarantee progress credibilit Serbian bolsters the to accession of the progressgovernment’s Koštunica’sboth EU and Serbia. in criticism the anti con meet to failure

B92, “NoB92, Justice at Hague, say Radicals” 2011), May (Belgrade, 4, B92, “"Government Barely Has Majority, No Authority” (Belgrade, May 13, 2011), B92, “Opposition SNS PartyLeader Starts Hunger Strike” (Belgrade, April 16, 2011), Ibid. - EU parties have also benefitedEU parties the failureofpromote also to EU have from conditionality off for Serbian recognition of Kosovo’s for recognition independence off Serbian the largest and most recentmost held which on16April 2011—in was Nikolić and—the of largest which

As seen, Serbia’s EU Serbia’s seen, As d’ politicald’ parties in Serbia’s political spectrum.

- EU stance onSerbia’s stance future. EU ditions as the primary Serbia’sditions of for reasons progress, lack e to power, they will ultimately prevent Serbia’s EU accession - skeptic/anti-

- - article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=13&nav_id=74321 article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=04&dd=16&nav_id=73833 The Impact of EU Conditionality onthe Serbian Political Spectrum EU political parties utilize both passive and active 281 Furthermore, continues sharply to the SRS

EU parties and boost their nationalist partiesnationalist and their boost by presenting EU accession as a as accession EU —by presenting - led governing coalition. In governingcoalition. led the end,

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics to simultaneously—to further y unique pro DSS’s - of the - sponsored mass 282 The Kosovo 279 280 . .

EU EU support

Likewise, means means - skeptic skeptic 101 -

CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics 283 Kos recognize adhering other EU to demands, EU In soon. ‘good‘regional mayand relations’ much, too cooperation’ neighborly be condition fulfillment produce EUexample, For callsconsequences. for counterproductive Suchardent,misrepresentationSerbian demands spectrum. political for thehasty EU in support of the EU, pro- Infuturethe EU’s reforms.strictconditionality short, challenges the credibili for their boost credibility, satisfy orderto their in electorate, encourage progress and the po its reward — reluctance EU’s by the underminesthis the influence pro truly - of the componentnationalist Essentially, of their dual agenda takes EU priorityover membership. EU majority the portrays inaccurately of thepull dual pro- elections. Serbian Nikolić’s call electorate fo early r supports coalition leads the DS conducted poll publicopinion Marchthata in parties. SNS A2011shows recent Serbian EU progress, of Minimization Pro EU, - of Serbia in 102 Conditionality EU

B92, “New Poll Gives Opposition Parties Lead” (Belgrade, April 6, 2011), Additionally, theof ineffectiveness also EUcontributes this conditionality to Inadopting- pro sitive efforts. Serbia’s pro Serbia’s efforts. sitive ovo’s independence; yet, provedresult, this ovo’s as counterproductive independence; a as their - support awayfrom pro- support popular taken successfully have parties skeptic EU/Serb nationalist agenda;however, nationalist popularity ofEU/Serb these the parties mass - led coalition 41.7 percent to 24.3 percent and that 66.4 percent coalition41.7percent 24.3percentand the led that66.4 of to parties,government. andEU the EU political programs and harshcriticisms of the government’s lack citing the absencecompliance full of with EU conditions EU, and GovernmentInfluence

- article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=04&dd=06&nav_id=73645 - oriented states of the Western Balkans were quick to to quick were Balkans Western the of states oriented - orientation ofgiven thatthe the Serbian public orientation - EU forces are in desperate need of EU recognition recognition EU of need desperate in are forces EU EU forceswhose beingcountered is EU progress

283

This clearly demonstrates the the demonstrates clearly This tyand popular .

to —to EU EU - NS NS CEU eTD Collection Petritsch, Southeast Integration European Perspectives (Baden Matters: Domestic Reforms European and Integrat andmarginalized, discredited, underrepresented. Serbia; in consequently,government forces, proand Serbia’s - the of- reforms scale their orSuchnon citing lack scope. cooperation,LDPcriticizes the govern the openly partydissident governingIncredibility,and dearth of popularity,opportunity. the of support base; continues hence,rule Tadić to any out DS yet day,represents LDPnormative threa another agenda. Tothe this ICTY the EU’s thewidespread Kosovoand question, regarding cooperation, hesitation much more process radical approach Serbia’saccession which to denounced EU the filled the void at the far yearwho,LDP lessthan achapterLDP founded later, The the (see emergence of 4.2). the over levelculminated thedivisions the party’s of ofin expulsion Jovanović EU compliance of EU of EUparties rules.effectiveness underminesandof EU conditionality the thetransfer of the marginalization of pro and non- conditionality, internal divisions implementation and of (3) nature EUthe ineffectivecounterproductive conditions, of and EU quo which only thecurrent stabilitygovernment. of jeopardizes the produc anti reinforces and progress EU impedes 284 bilateral relations with Serbia dramatically worsened.

SeeIrena Ristić, Place: “StuckHard Rocka a Serbia’sbetween and IntegrationEU in Process,” - skeptic/anti- tivity of EU conditionality upholds and even contributes to the pessimism of contributestheeven thestatus to pessimism conditionalitytivity and of upholds EU These examples illuminate the reality tha Besides (1) the maximized influence of EU EU parties while concurrently undermining the clout of the EU,undermining proclout of while- concurrently parties the EU - left of the Serbian political spectrum; likewipartyse,adopted the a - EU political parties in Serbia. In internalSerbia. D EU parties 2004, political December in

The Impact of EU Conditionality onthe Serbian Political Spectrum - government criticism.Again,government the counter consensus within consensus ion , ed. Goran Svilanović, ChristopheSolioz, and Wolfgang

t EU conditionality maximizes the influence ment and oftentimes rejectsproposed EU - skeptic/anti - Baden:Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009), 53. consensus pro among Serbia’s - 284 - Suchadded friction in the region LDP coalition in order in LDP deprive to coalition the Serbia’s pro Serbia’s - EU parties,(2) strict the EU politicalEU partiesare

t toDS’s the electoral - EU ranks also add to Serbia - EU EU

S EU EU 103

CEU eTD Collection n of the particular decision particular the of importantly, and,dependsn most the ondomestic orientatio factors promotingin successconditionality EU rule of transfer fornevertheless,ofexplanations literature; the the Serbian lack existing within progress the processes, spurious conditions, com and typify most implementation inconsistent the conditionality Vague effectiveness which its determine (seechapters 2.2and 5.1). Political Elite Behavior: Exploitation of Vulnerabilities Weaknesses and bid. progressdomestic impactand ofSerbia’s in conditionalitythe lack EU of following analysis supplies the missing link of domestic the politics explanation between the The impactedof domesticcompliance patternsconditions. behavior EU with determines EUturn,exposing this thein accession vulnerabilities process; and the weaknesses of elites. ConditionalitySerbia’s has alteredway thein which Serbia’s political elites behave by spectrum,haspolitical too, action had it, of aimpact onthe and profound behavior political political elites; and, as EU conditionality impacted the formeraspects two of the Serbian previously(seechapterquestions outlined 5). quo phenomenon. prior These developments merely answering critical for set the stage the yetby has it accession but Serbian process, anfor the status EU explanation provide the to transformed been have parties political Serbian of balance the and politics Serbian of nature 6.3 Serbia in 104 Conditionality EU Stu Politics and political pa Serbia theHitherto, in thehasconditionality domestic impactshown how of EU EU of byElites Conditionality SerbianManipulation Political dies often cite EU clarity, legitimacy, andcredibility as thecritical three aspects of

rties are inhe are rties rently driven by the ambitions andby actionsrentlyambitions of driven the

as previously explained previously —as

—ultimately mon mon

- CEU eTD Collection “Serbia and European Integration,”33 Matters,” 11 elites, but not ontheir not elites, particular but orienta commonapproach analyzethis impact of of conditionality to domestic the action onpolitical number of studies focus influence onhow suchpolitics, factors domestic polity, and policy.Only a limited Instead,degree of domesticthey elites. such impact shortcomings the which behavior to 286 285 elites that either (1) Serbia’s current statecompliance of is satisfactory or (2) compliance is hampers a signal rolealsoenforcer, send mediatorbut the convoluted EU’s as and ofand the—support theSerbian Spain position government. only not These disputes recognize Kosovo’sfive from independence Serbia, internal 22EUKosovo alsothis EUmember question characterizes divide.While states Serbia in reforms EU with forward Italy and Austria conditionality many of source Fibid. the Union. within divisions howat action th subsequentlypolitical and domesticcompliance. patterns determines of following onconditionality’s domestic analysis impactelite focuses onpolitical behavior and Inchapter behaviorthe domestic impact the onelite end,remains 2.2). The underdeveloped. making elites involved. Market Studies Administrativeercise Reform and Romania,” in Journal Ex of Common Twinning The Change: Domestic 2003), 303- Politics of Europeanization, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Radaelli ClaudioM. University Oxford (Oxford: Press,

See, e.g., Noutcheva, andPartial, “Fake, Imposed Compliance,” 1065 Heather “Europeanization Grabbe, goes and Power East: Uncertainty EUAccession the in Pr rst, q rst, Implementation Serbia internal in ofpolicy exposes theconditionality EU’s of 327; Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, “Europeanization, Conditionality, and and Conditionality, “Europeanization, Phinnemore, David and Dimitris Papadimitriou 327; - 21; Sissenich, “The Transfer of EU Social Policy to Poland and Hungary,”- 156 uestions regarding uestions

42, no. 3 (2004): 619- chiefly, the Netherlands the —chiefly, dispute which actively lobby actively —which —typically characteristic ofdomestic the politics approach s 285 among member EU states. P These EU These 286 Two particularhave disputes dominate to Serbia’s come EU

ICTY cooperation 639; Pridham, Designing Democracy - The Impact of EU Conditionality onthe Serbian Political Spectrum 40. Second, the dispute among states over. Second, the dispute the EU member

- focused explanations, however,assessfocusedexplanations, the donot tion (whether interest (whether tion

clash sharply with those with —clash sharply fororder EU and leniency flexibility push to in

in Cyprus, Greece,—Cyprus, Slovakia, Romania, represent the the represent process accession Serbia’s roponent - - et. al. et. Petritsch 1084; oriented ororiented norm . s

of unyieldingly of strict member states member —move beyond 177; Swoboda, - , “Why, Serbia oriented; see ocess,” in The such as as —such s to Serbian to s

105

CEU eTD Collection DSS) and the boost was DS’s SAArefrozen. credibility.The quickly par despite a lack of progress, theEU signed anwith SAA Serbia inApril 2008 on the eve of the 2008 negotiationswere a brief after reopened display commitment fromthe of government. Furthermore, Serbian Koštunica’s continued non- EU less Serbia’s to Report) assassinati 287 unfreezing of spite the in continued process non- compliance.FreezingICTY non- for SAAnegotiations yetEU resumed.Serbianconditionalityfull bid has Consequently,EU produce to extradition and arrest conditionality. non- only (asnot example conditions claimedreinforces chapter see 6.1). early, This the that fact ‘full convoluting constitutes cooperation’ vary the EU within thus third of the EU member states ratifiedagreement. the Clearly, perceptions of what a months, open six lack theprocess SAAratification of and progress, despite within Serbia’s years 2010,the CommissionLessJune September decided two 2008. on14 than to later, in veto Netherlands’ the of aresult as frozen remained signed) (albeit SAA Serbia’s however, ICTY full to commitment and cooperation even Mladić Hadžić though Julyin member as 2008, manya EUstatesthis viewed demonstration of Serbia’ Theweaknesses to accession over Hague ofprocess.Karadžić handed the EU Serbia When cooperation’ the with ICTY implementation of conditionality in Serbia elitethe behavior. impact of inconsistent onSerbian EU conditionality The political and credibility EU of conditionality. In t evennot necessary.short, Serbia in 106 Conditionality EU

Other instances of this pattern are littered throughout Serbia’s recent history. For example, after Đinđić’s Đinđić’s after example, For history. recent Serbia’s throughout littered are pattern this of instances Other liamentary elections to simultaneously undermine support ofthe EU support undermine simultaneously to elections liamentary consensus exists within theconsensus EU, demonstrates but exists EU the inconsistency of These two in two These on, the EU extended rewards (the 2004European Partnership and the 2005positive Feasibility 287 asureable progress (i.e. the the (i.e. progress asureable me of lack a despite instance, this in seen As ternal divisions EU also serve as prime examples with which to illustrate of Hadžić - compliance, EUfroze the Serbia oriented encourage to government in attempt an progress; continued after but, encourages the country’s political elites to exploit the exposed the exposed —encouragescountry’s exploit elites to political the

he absenceerodes of consensus an internal and Mladić

a result of the internalresult divideover—a‘full Serbia’s ), previously strict conditions eased and strictconditions Serbia’s ), previously

cooperation sendsSerbian theto message ’s SAA in May 2006. Ayear later, in June 2007, cooperation and subsequently

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Kochenov, “EU’s Numerous Contradictory Approaches”, 8- , 18December Union 2000, OJ European the of Rights Charter of Fundamental Council Directive 2000/43/EC y onnon Previous EU enlargement rounds suggest that within the roundsUnion’s suggestconditionalityPrevious EU enlargement thatwithin Apart from internal clashes on the rationalist level, contradicting EU normative - discrimination standards

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on Srebrenica: Resoluti Serbia, in Debate Rights Human for Opened, Committee Helsinki Ibid. European Parliament Resolution of 15January 2009on Srebrenica, 14February 2010, OJ European Parliament Resolution of 7July 2005on Srebrenica, 6July 2006, OJ Council Decision No. 2008/213/EC t Concerning Case Justice, of Court International ng Serbia with European Partnership

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Council JointAction 2008/124/CFSP In regard to the EU’s surrounding conditions concerning the Kosovo question, the In concerningregard theconditions to EU’sKosovo question, surrounding the The second tact of Serbian political elites conditionality to relies on deceiving the public in order to advance certain reforms or advancejustify certain reforms —relies theorderto ondeceiving publicin (see chapters 2.2and 5.3). (seechapters UNSC consent and e —UNSC sue, Serb national identity clearlydeems all political action as inappropriate

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Implications of the EU’s Enlargement Policy for Serbia’s Democratic Transition 121 - EU SerbianEU political parties n of minorities, and regional cooperation and good neighborly andn ofcooperation and minorities, regional —also undercut democracyThe the stability Serbia. 2009visa of in ccession process onfulfilling process ccession and conditions

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CEU eTD Collection 306 ineffectiveness slowing achievinggoals in thus EU Moreover, Serbia’s bid. the such cooperation, andquestion, the EU’sagenda) the Kosovo normative ensure to instrument compliance (seeother theas employment of Europeanchapter the conditionality structures chief 3.2), democratic of post transformation Conclusions norms, and ultimately unde Such concealment contradicting bolsters publicdeception,nationalism, Serb and standards andconditions processesSerbia.Serbia’s in hides EUthe only actual bid of corruption level compliance EU with conditions. increasingly corrupt political environment lies with the domestic elites’ weak patterns of the conditionality,increased. domestic impact offrom the AsEU seensourceof Serbia’s has only not since camegovernment the beenbut new power), to corruption sustained (especially process accession EU its in progress Serbia’s despite that shows This percent). 3.8 10.2to wasgovernment corrupt not decreasethent in perception thatthe(from perce governmental (from while, concurrently, corruption 81.2percent) 71.4to there a 6.4 was 2010,there2006 to a widely 9.8percentrampant waspopular increase view the in corruption either orSerbia;corruption in ‘veryand, asa50.2percent problem either ‘serious’ serious’ believed results polls, of publicopinion Serbia in 122 Conditionality EU

Balkan Monitor, 2010Summary of Findings Monitor, Balkan While the nature policyWhile and ofenlargement stimulate to scope theintends EU’s the EU fulfill Justifications nevertheless, by elites weak compliance, that of erns patt

‘increased’ or ‘increased a lot’ over the last three years. Furthermore, from from Furthermore, years. three last the over a lot’ ‘increased or ‘increased’ rmines Serbia’s democratic transition.

306

in the context of the the thr —in context in 2010,88.2percent in of the Serbian publicviewed - communist states and fuel their integration into the EU into and states and communist fuel their integration .

ee critical Serbian issues (ICTY (ICTY issues Serbian critical ee

— guarantees the EU’s EU’s the guarantees CEU eTD Collection policy has proved to be detrimental to Serbia’s overlying democratic transition. domestic enlargement impact of EU’s conditionality the that in Serbia fact illuminat the es Implications of the EU’s Enlargement Policy for Serbia’s Democratic Transition 123

CEU eTD Collection overlying democratic transition. compliance thatundermine of rns patte weak produces which away in spectrum political Serbia’s impacts clearly 7). In Serbia’s impact undermines post turn, such 6). chapter (see elites political (3) of EUSerbian promoting conditionality manipulation by Serbia by(1) incarcerating Serbian politics, (2) marginalizing pro 5) chapter bring the EU’s enlargementfails to policycontinuously on EU conditionality Serbiadetermining in the underplays importance such impact in why of gEU domestic factors conditionality impacts literatureexistin (seechapter 4); however, the accuratelywhich to spectrum political fallthe extent sinceofportrays 2000 Miloševićin the transforma politics has developed significantly since the inception of enlargement to its full law compliance of Serbia’s political elites with EU conditions. The EU’s influence in domestic spectrumhow political suchparticularly impactof and influencesthe patterns onthe Serbian Conclusion C

HAPTER HAPTER Utilization of conditionality as the chief instrument of the EU’s enlargement policy domestic impact offocusing conditionality the Serbia, in examined has thesis This After in . After tion into an into enlargement policy tion - analysis,depth thesis this concludes 8

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CEU eTD Collection Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. “Conceptualizing the Domestic ImpactIn the “Conceptualizing Domestic ofBörzel, Risse. Europe.” and Tanja Thomas A., MemberInteractsBörzel, its How “Europeanization: the Tanja European Union with A. Booß, Die Bochsler, Daniel. “Hawk in Dove’s Clothing: Political Trajectories of Political Parties in Bitzenis, Aristidis. TheBalkans: Foreign Direct Investme In DomesticBiserko, European Serbia Matters: Crumbles.” “Serbia’s Sonja. Potential and Civil TransitionSociety: in of the———. “The Delayed Roots Opposition Serbian InIdentitySerbia’sIntegration.”———. “Territory, and ofEU the Challenge Serbia ———. “Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering:Kosovo myth The from Bieber, GettingLess Serbia is “A in Florian.Integration Troubeling EU Popular Decline: Bianchini,EU“The theIn in Values Stefano. andof Serbia.” Expectations and Knill, Diana Christoph “DiffereBauer, Pitschel. W., Michael Barnett,ForeignIsrael’sPolicy Michael.Oslo.” Strategy,Road to and Change: “Culture, Anderson, Benedict. Bibliography Radaelli, 57 Radaelli, Featherston by Kevin edited , Europeanization of The Politics Lequesne 45- Christian, In States.” Review Law Market 2008): 292- Serbia, 2003- Burlington: Ashgate, 2009. Baden: Verlagsgesellschaft, Nomos 2009. and77- Wolfgang Petritsch, Refo Thethe SocialHistory CaseDestruction: 2003):(Fall 73- of Yugoslavia of Culture, Politics, of andSociety Journal International Serbia.” Baden Perspectives. and Solioz, WolfgangChristophe Petritsch,65- Matters: DomesticandEuropean Integr Reforms anniversary600th present.” History the to Rethinking less January 22,2009. Press, 2011. and Dragana Dulić, 77 Values: European Integration29,no.4(September405- 2007): Patterns.” Governance Regulatory EU Diverse of Impact The Europe: Eastern Relations European International Journal of Nationalism rk, and John Forman.LegalIssues.”andand John “Enlargement: rk, Procedural Common - , edited by Goran Svilanović, Christophe Solioz, , editedSolioz, Christophe Svilanović, byrms andEuropean Integration Goran popular Serbia in the Serbia in Post The Member States of the of EuropeanStates Union , edited byThe Member Bulmerand Simon 319. - - . New York: Verso, 1991. 80. Oxford and80. Oxford University New Oxford 2003. York: Press, in Central European Political Studies European Political Review2008.” Central Imagined Communities: ReflectionsImagined andSpread onthe Origin of - serbia/ - http://fbieber.wordpress.com/2009/01/22/eu 32, no. 1(1995). 32, - Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Nomos Baden: 2009. . -

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