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Operation Zarb-E-Azb, Idps, and the Life in Camps Sajad Rasool and Zahid Anwar∗

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Operation Zarb-E-Azb, Idps, and the Life in Camps Sajad Rasool and Zahid Anwar∗ REVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 2019, 33-54 DOI: 10.35994/rhr.v5i1.99 Operation Zarb-e-Azb, IDPs, and the Life in Camps Sajad Rasool and Zahid Anwar∗ https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5667-0041 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5596-5940 Abstract This article focuses on internal displacement of the tribal people from North Waziristan Agency in the wake of military operation called Zarb- e-Azb. It takes Abharam Maslow’s model of hierarchy of needs for analyzing the life of IDPs in camps. We argue that the institutions responsible for taking care of the camps tried their best to cope with the situation, nevertheless, keeping in view Maslow’s model of hierarchy of needs, the IDPs faced difficulties to overcome their biological and psychological trauma. Key words: Camp, IDPs, Terrorism, Zarb-e-Azb, North Waziristan. Background: The War on Terrorism and Military Operations in the Tribal Borderland Soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US and ISAF air forces began to bomb Afghanistan while, subsequently, also aiding the Northern Alliance to attack Taliban strong holds. Resultantly, Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters yielded on all fronts within weeks and began to flee. A large number of these fighters and their diehard followers managed to slip into the tribal areas of Pakistan after crossing the international border. Here, they kept hiding for several ∗Sajad Rasool is a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Peshawar. Corresponding email: [email protected]. Zahid Anwar is a professor of political science at the University of Peshawar. Email: [email protected]. Published Online: September 15, 2020. ISSN (Print): 2520-7024; ISSN (Online): 2520-7032. https://reviewhumanrights.com 34 S. RASOOL & Z. ANWAR years before they started reorganizing gradually. As their organization gained strength, they began to encroach upon the local administrative authority. They appealed to the people in the name of Islam and in that of creating an Islamic Shariah system. Partly due to their growing power and their Islamic appeal, the local tribal people responded positively to them. In 2002, the Pakistani Army started its military operation in South Waziristan Agency (SWA) against Nek Muhammad and his Ahmad Zai tribe for harboring foreign militants. Later in 2004, a peace deal was struck between the Pakistan Army and Nek Muhammad.1 The deal, however, came apart with the killing of Nek Muhammad in a US drone attack. He was succeeded by Baitullah Mehsood, a tribal Mehsood. He assumed the command of the newly emerging Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). So as to put an end to him and his movement, the Pakistani Army carried out a military operation against him and his tribe. Later on February 7, 2005, Sararogha Peace Agreement was posited in order to end the operation.2 Mehsood and his tribe pledged in this agreement that they will abstain from attacks on government installation and movement across the Pak-Afghan border. However, in 2007, the armed forces started operation Zalzala against the Mehsood tribe because they were believed to have violated the agreement. Similarly, operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem in Khyber agency and operation Sher Dil in Bajaur agency were conducted in June 2008 and in the month July of the same year respectively.3 In July 2007, operation Silence was conducted against the clerics and students of Lal Masjid Islamabad in response to their illegal activities and having challenged the writ of the government. This operation resulted in severe backlash.4 Protests and demonstrations began in various parts of Pakistan, especially along the tribal borderland. The Taliban manipulated the religiously charged situation and invited young students of madrassas to join their ranks. In what followed, the Taliban movement spread all over FATA, Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, and Southern Punjab.5 On the other hand, the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) reorganized in the Swat valley with an armed mission against the state. Under the leadership of Sufi Muhammad and Mullah Fazlullah, it organized large rallies and promised the imposition of Shariah. In a short period of time, the TNSM spread REVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 35 across the valley and started challenging the territorial authority of the government. For the sake of peace and security in the region, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP) government made a compromise with them and allowed them to implement Shariah in the valley. However, the TNSM soon breached the deal and expanded its control on district Bunir.6 Mullah Fazlullah frequently used an FM channel to propagate TNSM’s ideology and asked the local people for donations, later on becoming popular as Mullah Radio. Because of a failing judicial, administrative system, the people hoped that Shariah’s implementation might improve their condition. Thus, the Swat valley fell to TNSM who successfully installed their own justice system, administration, and policing based on their understanding.7 They targeted and killed or chased away many government officials, tribal leaders, and political figures. Those who stood up against them were either tortured or killed. They shutdown shops selling music and films on CDs and DVDs. Cable network was cut off and banned. Media persons also faced victimization. Several journalists were attacked and were forced to project a soft image of the TNSM. Moreover, girls’ schools were targeted everywhere in the valley. A campaign was launched in 2009 against girls’ schools on account of which more than 400 schools were destroyed.8 The worst of their actions was that they commanded every family to provide one of their male members for the movement and a girl to marry one of their fighters otherwise the family could be given severe punishment.9 The TNSM put together an armed wing and carried out several training camps. They attacked several police stations and killed more than 100 policemen. Their control in the area reached its peak when they publicly beheaded several government officials.10 As a result, people began to flee in thousands; around 300,000 people are reported to have left the area. On February 16, 2009, the government agreed on the Nizam-e-Adal (Justice System) in Malakand Division and Kohistan District of Hazara hoping that TNSM stalwarts would surrender arms and refrain from resorting to violence. However, the agreement was soon breached as they slipped into the districts of Bunir and Dir.11 The government called on all parties and religious groups to meet in Islamabad wherein they unanimously endorsed a military action against the TNSM. Thus, the operation Rah-e-Rast (The Right Way) was launched on May 1, 2009. After the successful completion of the operation, the IDPs were allowed to return home 36 S. RASOOL & Z. ANWAR from July 13, 2009. The return was successfully completed in ten weeks.12 In 2008, an operation called Sirate-Mustaqeem (Righteous Path) was launched by the Pakistani Army against the sectarian conflict persisting between two armed groups namely Lashkar-e-Islam and its rival Ansarul Islam in the Khyber tribal agency.13 The Lashkar-e- Islam was foreign financed and involved in killings and kidnappings of many local innocent people.14 By the end of 2008, the Pakistani Army successfully quelled the conflict and established its control.15 A military operation in Bajaur started followed suit in August 2008. The Human Right Commission of Pakistan reported that around 700,000 people were displaced due to the operation and the resulting conflict, which was the largest displacement ever in Kahr, Mamund and Nawagai.16 Soon after the successful completion of operation Rah-e-Raast, another military operation Rah-e-Nijat (the Path to Salvation) was launched by the Pakistani Army against the Al-Qaeda, the TTP and their allies in South Waziristan Agency on June 19, 2009.17 This operation proved to be the most difficult one for the army. They targeted the TTP leader Baitullah Mehsood on three different occasions in 2004, 2005, and 2008, but he managed to escape. Later, he was killed in a US drone attack.18 By December 12, 2009, the Pakistani Army announced successful completion of the operation and restored the writ of the government in whole of the South Waziristan.19 Later in 2011, operation Koh-e-Sufaid (the White Mountain) was initiated in central and lower Kurram Agency with the objective to secure the Thall Parachinar road and to end the sectarian clashes between Sunni and Shia sectarian groups. Although these various military operations weakened the TTP and other such problematic groups, they were not completely defeated. In 2009, Sri Lankan cricket team was attacked by the militants followed by an attack on the Pakistan Military General Head Quarters (GHQ) Rawalpindi.20 Later in May 2011, the TTP attacked Mehran Naval Air Station, Karachi, Pakistan Navy’s headquarter and Navy’s Naval Air Arm installations.21 After these attacks on the GHQ and the Pakistan Navy headquarters, the government once again decided to fight against the TTP and all other militant groups. Thus, the operation Zarb-e- REVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 37 Azab was initiated in the North Waziristan Agency (NWA). On June 15 2014, this operation was launched22 with three objectives: evacuation of the local population from the NWA; elimination of terrorism; and restoration of government’s writ. The operation resulted in displacement of a big number of local tribal people. The neighbouring district Bannu received around 800 thousand Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). This displacement not only severely affected the IDPs but the host population of Bannu and local government offices as well. After their arrival in Bannu, many problems surfaced including the increase in prices of food, house rent, transport fares, utilities as well as crime incidents.
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