The SDP and Merger 1981–1987 Bill Rodgers traces the history of the SDP-Liberal relationship, from beginnings to alliance to merger.

In January  I wrote a letter to , as nent. We took for granted that a partnership of a kind would be essential. There was, how- much to clear my own mind as to convey a message. ever, no collective view of what form it should Hitherto I had been concerned only to find a way take, not because of disagreement within the of saving the Labour Party from itself. Now I was Gang of Four but because it was absent from our agenda. It follows that any idea that two hesitantly considering the possibility of helping to parties – one not yet launched – might even- launch what I called ‘a fourth party.’ I was not tually merge was very far away. It may have sanguine about the prospects but reflected on the crossed Roy Jenkins’ mind but it never crossed mine. scope for an understanding with the Liberals. For The first hint that there might be serious the moment I favoured a cautious and discreet differences of opinion in the Gang of Four approach to them. about relations with the Liberals came on the day of the launch on  March . The four As the Labour Party continued to slide to- of us sat together on the platform at the Con- wards disaster, I had given it a year, no more, naught Rooms, off Kingsway in central Lon- to come to its senses. Unlike Roy Jenkins, who don, each to make a short statement and to had set out his stall very clearly in his Dimbleby answer questions on an allocation previously lecture, I was locked into the party I had joined agreed between us. Apart from the largest con- over  years earlier, and as yet had no coher- ent view on realignment. I was ready to con- A new party is launched: the Connaught Rooms, cede the possibility of a new party but my en- 26 March 1981. ergies were still devoted to the rescue of an old one. was aware of this, but on sev- eral occasions tried to open a dialogue. We had worked together during the European refer- endum campaign of  and I had acted as a conduit between him and the Prime Minister, Jim Callaghan, in the early days of the Lib-Lab Pact. I was in no doubt that he was a man we could do business with. For the moment, how- ever, that was a bridge too far. The position of both and was similar: it was too soon to discuss what rela- tions we would have with the Liberal Party if it came to a break. What is strange, looking back, is that we had not discussed the matter much between ourselves even by the beginning of  when the Declaration and the formation of the Council for Social Democracy – which led two months later to the SDP – was immi-

8 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 tingent of UK press, radio and tel- evision I had ever seen, there were reporters from most of western Eu- rope, the United States, the Com- monwealth and the rest of the world. One of these was Bonnie Angelo, head of Time magazine’s London bureau and she asked how many Par- liamentary seats the SDP would fight. This fell to me to answer and I said without hesitation, ‘About half, at least three hundred.’ Had I been asked this question before the , I might have suggested about  seats, the figure I had in mind in my letter to Roy Jenkins a year earlier. But the immense enthusiasm we had ‘What do you mean, can’t we slow down a bit? We haven’t even started the motor aroused and the skeleton of a nation- yet!’ (2 February 1981) wide organisation for which there was already a blueprint, made me confident in my announcement. together of the two parties with ac- members of the Gang of Four. Al- David Steel might not like it, but if tivists setting the pace. But merger though close to Roy, my negotia- the Liberals and the SDP each was not then part of my vocabulary. tions with the Liberals in – fought half the seats it would be a It was the result of the  elec- over the allocation of Parliamentary measure of our equal partnership. tion that made it a serious subject seats – including my public row with My answer was given on the for discussion. The Alliance won David Steel – had won David spur of the moment, but it did not .% of the vote and was within Owen’s approval whilst Roy had occur to me that exception would .% of overtaking Labour. It was been unhappy. Shirley had seen be take to it within our own ranks. first or second in  seats and nearly David Owen to be the more accept- I was mistaken, and soon David eight million votes were divided al- able image for a new party and had Owen was arguing that I had made most equally between Liberal and nominated him against Roy for the a serious error in ‘giving away’ half Social Democrat candidates. The leadership. A small group of key peo- the seats to the Liberals. I should, I SDP had the highest proportion of ple who had kept in touch with Roy was told, have threatened to fight women candidates and an effective during his Brussels years, particularly all seats as a measure of the domi- national organisation. The result nev- after his Dimbleby lecture – David nance the SDP proposed to achieve. ertheless was a great disappointment Marquand, Clive Lindley, Matthew We might even choose to fight the after the byelection victories of Oakshott, Jim Daly – were some- erals or in saying they were perceived Crosby, Hillhead and Bermondsey; times more royalist than the king. by the public as representing failure. and after the time, in December But for the most part even those Thus the lines were drawn up which , when Gallup had recorded most active in committees preferred were to persist to the decisive merger % of the electorate prepared to to judge issues on their merits. They vote of . vote for the SDP or the Liberals and wanted a harmonious collective Relations with the Liberals re- an average of all polls had given the leadership. mained a constant theme in the two Alliance .% of the vote. Roy This was not the way David years that led to the  general Jenkins’ position as leader of the SDP Owen saw it. He preferred to label election. For the most part, Roy, had become untenable with David them and balance their numbers on Shirley and I saw no point in re- Owen making clear that he would committees and working groups. straining a closer partnership, but challenge Roy if he failed to give The Jenkinsites were pro-Liberal and David Owen was constantly on the way. Thus at the moment that therefore pro-merger. His own alert to anything that might com- merger became a credible option to troops were anti-Liberal and not pre- promise the SDP’s identity either by discuss, the SDP’s new leader ruled pared to see merger discussed. open decision or by stealth. I re- it out. Merger by stealth was what he mained more cautious than Roy, and From the earliest days of the SDP most feared when it came to another occasionally found myself sharing David Owen had seen it – at least agreement with the Liberals about some of David Owen’s reservations. in its central core – as divided into Parliamentary seats. The Liberal My essential theme was of ‘natural Jenkinsites and Owenites. This was Party did not want the prolonged convergence’, a bottom-up growing nonsense in the case of the other two and damaging round of previous journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 9 Liberals in a byelection (and, it was negotiations. Nor did most Social and that the remaining seats should implied, trounce them). But within Democrats. Under pressure from simply choose the candidate they a few days, my approach to the di- David Owen, I agreed to take charge preferred. vision of seats was agreed by the of the negotiations once again but, David Owen’s attitude to merger Steering Committee of the SDP, al- apart from agreed exchanges, hoped insofar as it had previously seemed though not without some argu- to leave the  arrangements inchoate was firmly articulated in his ment, and we turned to how ne- largely in place. But the question first few months as leader. Roy gotiations should be conducted. I arose of who should choose the can- Jenkins was not in favour of merger said in a paper: ‘Relations with the didates, individual Liberals and in- but of keeping the door open to it. Liberals are bound to follow an ir- dividual Social Democrats (each in I certainly rejected an instant merger regular pattern. In some areas, there their own seats) or Liberals and So- but in an article for the Political Quar- will be hard bargaining with little cial Democrats voting together for terly, said this was ‘quite different from genuine spirit of cooperation; in whoever they thought to be the best a deliberate attempt to frustrate the others, the Liberals and Social man or woman? organic growth of the Alliance.’ ‘If’, Democrats will get on happily to- Most of us would have left this I continued, ‘members of both par- gether.’ And so it proved. to local decision with no more than ties wish to turn a loose Alliance into Nine days after the launch of the guidance from the centre, but in the a close day-to-day relationship .... it would be foolish to resist such pres- sure on the grounds that premature What slowly emerged was a clearer view merger might result.’ But this was unacceptable to David Owen, and he of David Owen’s strategy. Put simply, it contrived to ensure a motion for was to keep the Alliance together only debate at the SDP’s Salford Confer- ence in September  that effec- long enough to win proportional tively ruled out merger until the end representation for Westminster; and then of the Parliament. The Party, always deferential to its leader, agreed and for the SDP and the Liberals to go their this became a point of reference in separate ways. the years ahead. What slowly emerged was a clearer view of David Owen’s strat- SDP, Shirley Williams and I de- end we devised a system of joint egy. Put simply, it was to keep the parted for the  Anglo-German closed and joint open selection. Alliance together only long enough Königswinter Conference on the Under the first, members of both to win proportional representation Rhine. In the margins of it we had parties would vote together but for Westminster; and then for the serious discussions with David Steel only for a shortlist made up entirely SDP and the Liberals to go their and Richard Holme, in which we of Liberals or entirely of Social separate ways. This was flawed in were joined by David Marquand. Democrats; under the second, open, two crucial respects. Whatever re- The outcome was the so-called system members of both parties straints he placed on coming closer ‘Königswinter Compact’, an agree- voting together would choose from together, there was very little in ment between the two parties writ- a mixed list of Liberals and Social terms of ideas or policies that sepa- ten out by Richard Holme on a Democrats. These arrangements rated the two parties. The Alliance lined sheet of greenish paper that were monitored by the National itself was a measure of this. For the looked as if it had been torn from Committee of the SDP which SDP to turn on its previous allies an office ledger. It committed us to would approve or disapprove local at some future date and fight the fighting the next general election proposals with David Owen taking Liberals was quite unrealistic. Even in alliance, ‘as distinct parties but of- a close interest in every seat. It was the Salford delegates would have fering the nation a government of a laborious process. The objective found that unacceptable had it been partnership.’ seemed reasonable enough – to en- spelt out to them. Shirley Williams and I returned to sure a fair share of seats for both The second objection was even London well pleased, believing that parties, especially good seats – but more profound. David Owen had our agreement was totally consistent for David Owen it was meant to abandoned the ‘win-a-majority, with previous understandings. But place a barrier wherever possible form-a-government’ message of again there was trouble, principally against members of two parties be- both the SDP and the Liberals prior from David Owen who said we had ginning to think and work as one. to the  election. He now set his no mandate for our Königswinter He only abandoned the attempt in sights much lower, making activities. He was not alone in dislik- the autumn of  when I told holding-the-balance in a hung par- ing a closer relationship with the Lib- him I would no longer oversee it liament the aim. This was an unsat-

10 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 isfactory formula for campaigning jected its unanimous report which tuous impatience with much of the and it crucially depended on a stale- I, together with other Social Demo- Liberal Party which he thought of mate between Labour and the Con- crats, had signed in the spring of as jejune and ungovernable. There servatives which only the voters , was evidence that he pre- was no song in his heart about the could decide. There had been three ferred to keep his distance from the prospects for the next parliament. occasions since the war – ,  Liberals rather than reach any In the early hours of Friday  and  – when a strong and con- agreement that involved compro- June  any hope of a hung Par- fident third party might have been mise. Defence was, he believed, one liament fell apart as Mrs Thatcher able to negotiate a deal, but this gave area where SDP policy should be again headed for a three-figure ma- no more than a one-in-four chance distinct. It helped to mark an iden- jority. At .am Alan Watson, a of a next time. tity he hoped the SDP would re- former Liberal President and one of David Owen was not alone in grasp- tain. David Steel’s close advisors, and I ing at the idea: it seemed our best The report of the Commission were interviewed together on televi- hope. But to predicate the future of on Defence and Disarmament sion by Robin Day. Our message was the SDP on such an outcome was caused much bitterness in the SDP. the same: merger was now a serious fragile. David Owen always demanded great option that our two parties should We are now, in , also wiser personal loyalty and he also equated address without delay. Six difficult about the process by which propor- losing with humiliation. The belief months later, against David Owen’s tional representation might have that John Roper and I had been dis- wishes and after much political been secured. An agreement with loyally responsible for him ‘losing’ in blood-letting, it was achieved. Had either Labour or the Conservatives the Commission made us the object David Owen been prepared to ac- would have been extracted under of his anger. My personal relation- knowledge that merger was the logic duress and the new government ship with him was never to be the of two consecutive electoral defeats would have looked for an early op- same again. for the Alliance – or been willing to portunity to hold a further election During  and  we had accept the ‘Yes’ verdict of the SDP’s and win a clear majority. The need been quite close. I admired his domi- membership in a one-member, one- to decide on the form of PR, the nating parliamentary performance vote ballot – the Social and Liberal possibility of a referendum and the and his relentless determination to Democrats could have been difficult of legislation keep the SDP in the political game. launched with hope and excitement. through parliament (there would By any standards, it was an achieve- As it was, the climb back to cred- have been backbench revolts) would ment of a high order. Over lunch, ibility was to be hard. have provided the necessary breath- he would relax for a moment and ing space. A hung parliament would confess how tired he was and how William (Lord) Rodgers was Secretary not have delivered what David uncertain about the future. I would of State for Transport –, one of Owen wanted from it. The whole then try to persuade him not to rule the SDP’s ‘Gang of Four’ founders in experiment would have ended in out eventual merger and leading the , and SDP Vice President until tears. merged party thereafter. He never . In  he was elected to succeed Throughout the  Parlia- dismissed this out of hand but a ma- Lord Jenkins as leader of the Liberal ment, the two leaders, David Owen jor obstacle was plainly his contemp- Democrat peers. and David Steel, preferred to make decisions together rather than find themselves bound by any joint committee of the two parties. David Owen in particular feared that some Membership Services Social Democrats, myself and The following listings are available to History Group members: Shirley Williams included, might make common cause with Liberals Mediawatch: a bibliography of major articles on the Liberal Democrats in an unacceptable majority. But appearing in the broadsheet papers, major magazines and academic from  the Alliance Strategy journals from 1988; plus articles of historical interest appearing in the Committee, chaired jointly by the major Liberal Democrat journals from 1995. leaders, met regularly to discuss and sometimes resolve problems be- Thesiswatch: all higher degree theses listed in the Bulletin of the Institute tween the parties. In early meetings of Historical Research under the titles ‘Liberal Party’ or ‘liberalism’ (none yet there was a desultory attempt to under SDP or Liberal Democrats). raise merger until it was seen to be fruitless. And the row over the Joint Any member is entitled to receive a copy of either listing free; send an A4 Commission on Defence and Dis- SSAE to the address on page 2. Up to date versions can also be found on armament when David Owen re- our web site (http://www.users.dircon.co.uk/~dbrack/index.html). journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 11