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The Integrated Review: a by Louisa Brooke-Holland BRIEFING PAPER Number 09052, 19 November 2020 The Integrated Review: A By Louisa Brooke-Holland look ahead to the Government's review Contents: 1. About the Integrated Review 2. The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) and SDSR 3. 2018 reviews 4. The Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office 5. Context for the 2020 Review www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary 2 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review Contents Summary 3 1. About the Integrated Review 5 1.1 What will the Integrated Review cover? 5 1.2 Timing 5 2. The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) and SDSR 8 2.1 The national security objectives 8 2.2 The national security context 8 2.3 The national security risk assessment 9 2.4 The armed forces 10 2.5 Reaction 10 3. 2018 reviews 11 3.1 The National Security Capability Review 11 3.2 The Modernising Defence Programme 12 4. The Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office 13 5. Context for the 2020 Review 15 5.1 Impact of the Covid-19 pandemic 15 5.2 The rules-based international order 16 5.3 Future relationships 17 5.4 Defence and the armed forces 21 5.5 The 0.7 per cent GNI aid commitment 24 5.6 Climate change 25 5.7 Security 27 5.8 Space 27 5.9 Will the review fulfil expectations? 28 5.10 Parliamentary scrutiny 28 Contributing Authors: Elena Ares, Patrick Butchard, John Curtis, Joanna Dawson, Anna Dickson, Stefano Fella, Claire Mills, Ben Smith Cover page image copyright Union Jack by terimakasih0 / image cropped. Licensed under Pixabay License – no copyright required. 3 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020 Summary In early 2020 the Government formally began work on what it described would be the largest review of the UK’s foreign, defence, security and development policy since the end of the Cold War. Much has changed since the last major review of the UK’s national security and defence strategy in 2015. This paper sets out the context for the review and discusses when the review might be published. It looks back at the main conclusions of the 2015 review before examining a number of key developments since then which are expected to influence the outcome of the review. Links are provided to relevant House of Commons Library papers. When will the review be published? The timing of the publication of the review was thrown into doubt by the cancellation of the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR). From the outset, the Government indicated the integrated review would be published alongside a CSR, expected in autumn 2020. In late October the Chancellor announced plans to hold a one-year, rather than multi-year, Spending Review on 25 November. This led the Government to “consider the implications for the completion of the review”. On 19 November the Prime Minister gave a statement to the House announcing the review will conclude early next year (2021). What is the integrated review? In the 2019 Queen’s Speech the Government announced it will conduct an integrated security, defence and foreign policy review (hereafter the integrated review or review) that will cover “all aspects of international policy from defence to diplomacy and development.”1 Prime Minister Boris Johnson has indicated it will be far broader than previous iterations. There has been at least one defence review in every decade since the 1950s, albeit at irregular intervals. David Cameron established the pattern of quinquennial reviews in 2010 to coincide with a five-year election cycle. The last major review was published as the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in 2015. What did the 2015 review say? The SDSR set out the Government’s analysis of the national security context, presented a national security risk assessment and set out the UK’s national security objectives: 1 Protect our people 2 Project our global influence 3 Promote our prosperity It identified the main challenges expected to drive the UK security priorities for the decade out to 2025. These included the increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability; the resurgence of state-based threats; the impact of technology and the erosion of the rules-based international order. It then laid out the policies the UK will pursue to achieve these broad objectives and the capabilities it will invest in. It also gave detailed plans for how the armed forces were to be structured and equipped for the next ten years. 1 Queen’s Speech, December 2019 4 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review Why does the integrated review matter? The Government laid out its ambitions for the review in the Queen’s Speech of December 2019: This will be the most radical reassessment of our place in the world since the end of the Cold War, covering all aspects of international policy from defence to diplomacy and development.2 The Government’s plans for defence will inevitably attract a lot of attention. This is not surprising, given that the integrated review has evolved from a long history of defence reviews which have made significant changes to the armed forces. One unknown had been the potential impact of the one-year Spending Review. Lord Robertson, who shepherded the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, fears policy decisions will not be underpinned by the required funding. The Defence secretary, Ben Wallace, has previously discussed the hazards of an underfunded review: “no SDSR that I can remember, going back to the early ’90s, has been properly funded to back up the ambitions”.3 However, on 19 November the Prime Minister gave a statement to the House in which he announced a increase in defence spending of £24.1bn over the next four years.4 A different world? The context for this review is in some respects considerably different to 2015. The “special relationship” with the US has been challenged under President Trump. The UK has left the European Union and at the time of writing the future relationship has not been agreed. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on international relations and the UK’s finances is still to be fully understood. In other respects, many of the themes mentioned in the 2015 and 2010 SDSRs remain relevant. The Government’s call for evidence consultation document identifies key trends and drivers of change: • a shift in the international order, marked by intensifying great power competition and a shift in the world’s economic centre of gravity towards Asia • the increasingly tangible effects of climate change • an increasingly complex global economic context • increasing instability and challenges to global governance. Further reading from the House of Commons Library • A brief guide to previous British defence reviews • Integrated Review: a reading list • International affairs and defence: Parliamentary debates and statements in the 2019-21 session 2 Queen’s Speech December 2019, Prime Minister’s Office 3 HC Deb 3 February 2020 c11 4 PM statement to the House on the Integrated Review, Prime Minister’s office, 19 November 2020 5 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020 1. About the Integrated Review In the 2019 Queen’s Speech the Government announced it will conduct an integrated security, defence and foreign policy review (hereafter the integrated review or review) that will cover “all aspects of international policy from defence to diplomacy and development.”5 1.1 What will the Integrated Review cover? Five thematic The Prime Minister said the Integrated Review “will be the most radical workstreams: reassessment of our place in the world since the end of the Cold War, covering all aspects of international policy from defence to diplomacy 1. Resilience and development."6 2. Foreign Policy The call for evidence document, released in August 2020, gives perhaps 7 the most detailed outline yet of the thinking behind the review. Among 3. Defence the identified key trends and drivers of change are: the tangible effects of climate change and the deterioration in the national environment; 4. Science, the impact of technology which creates opportunity, potential risk and technology and increases the agency of non-state actors; and increasing instability and data challenges to global governance. 5. Strengthening The reference to the shift in the world’s economic centre of gravity governmental towards Asia and the need for a “secure, stable and prosperous Euro- systems Atlantic neighbourhood” indicates the likely geographic focus of the review. Government response There is also a clear emphasis on rapidly evolving areas such as science, to Defence Select technology, data, cyber and space. Committee report “In search of Strategy” The Government expanded on the process in its response to the 22 October 2020 Defence Committee’s first report on the integrated Review. 1.2 Timing There has been at least one defence review (see box 1) in every decade since the 1950s, albeit at irregular intervals. The current practice of undertaking a strategic defence and security review (SDSR) every five years dates back to 2010. The most recent SDSR was published a few months after the 2015 election. The 2019 Queen’s Speech confirmed the Government’s intention to hold a fresh review, which was formally launched in February 2020.8 In parallel with the Comprehensive Spending Review The Government said at the outset the review would run in parallel with the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) to ensure “departments are equipped with the resources they need to enact the review’s 5 Queen’s Speech, December 2019 6 Queen’s Speech December 2019: background briefing notes, Prime Minister’s Office, 19 December 2019 7 “Integrated Review: call for evidence”, Cabinet Office, 13 August 2020 8 “PM outlines new review to define Britain’s place in the world”, Prime Minister’s office, 26 February 2020 6 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review conclusions” and conclude in line with the review.9 The 2010 and 2015 SDSRs were both published within days of a spending review.
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