BRIEFING PAPER Number 09052, 19 November 2020 The : A By Louisa Brooke-Holland

look ahead to the Government's review

Contents: 1. About the Integrated Review 2. The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) and SDSR 3. 2018 reviews 4. The Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office 5. Context for the 2020 Review

www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary 2 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

Contents

Summary 3 1. About the Integrated Review 5 1.1 What will the Integrated Review cover? 5 1.2 Timing 5 2. The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) and SDSR 8 2.1 The national security objectives 8 2.2 The national security context 8 2.3 The national security risk assessment 9 2.4 The armed forces 10 2.5 Reaction 10 3. 2018 reviews 11 3.1 The National Security Capability Review 11 3.2 The Modernising Defence Programme 12 4. The Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office 13 5. Context for the 2020 Review 15 5.1 Impact of the Covid-19 pandemic 15 5.2 The rules-based international order 16 5.3 Future relationships 17 5.4 Defence and the armed forces 21 5.5 The 0.7 per cent GNI aid commitment 24 5.6 Climate change 25 5.7 Security 27 5.8 Space 27 5.9 Will the review fulfil expectations? 28 5.10 Parliamentary scrutiny 28

Contributing Authors: Elena Ares, Patrick Butchard, John Curtis, Joanna Dawson, Anna Dickson, Stefano Fella, Claire Mills, Ben Smith

Cover page image copyright Union Jack by terimakasih0 / image cropped. Licensed under Pixabay License – no copyright required.

3 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

Summary

In early 2020 the Government formally began work on what it described would be the largest review of the UK’s foreign, defence, security and development policy since the end of the Cold War. Much has changed since the last major review of the UK’s national security and defence strategy in 2015. This paper sets out the context for the review and discusses when the review might be published. It looks back at the main conclusions of the 2015 review before examining a number of key developments since then which are expected to influence the outcome of the review. Links are provided to relevant House of Commons Library papers. When will the review be published? The timing of the publication of the review was thrown into doubt by the cancellation of the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR). From the outset, the Government indicated the integrated review would be published alongside a CSR, expected in autumn 2020. In late October the Chancellor announced plans to hold a one-year, rather than multi-year, Spending Review on 25 November. This led the Government to “consider the implications for the completion of the review”. On 19 November the Prime Minister gave a statement to the House announcing the review will conclude early next year (2021). What is the integrated review? In the 2019 Queen’s Speech the Government announced it will conduct an integrated security, defence and foreign policy review (hereafter the integrated review or review) that will cover “all aspects of international policy from defence to diplomacy and development.”1 Prime Minister has indicated it will be far broader than previous iterations. There has been at least one in every decade since the 1950s, albeit at irregular intervals. established the pattern of quinquennial reviews in 2010 to coincide with a five-year election cycle. The last major review was published as the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in 2015. What did the 2015 review say? The SDSR set out the Government’s analysis of the national security context, presented a national security risk assessment and set out the UK’s national security objectives: 1 Protect our people 2 Project our global influence 3 Promote our prosperity It identified the main challenges expected to drive the UK security priorities for the decade out to 2025. These included the increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability; the resurgence of state-based threats; the impact of technology and the erosion of the rules-based international order. It then laid out the policies the UK will pursue to achieve these broad objectives and the capabilities it will invest in. It also gave detailed plans for how the armed forces were to be structured and equipped for the next ten years.

1 Queen’s Speech, December 2019 4 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

Why does the integrated review matter? The Government laid out its ambitions for the review in the Queen’s Speech of December 2019: This will be the most radical reassessment of our place in the world since the end of the Cold War, covering all aspects of international policy from defence to diplomacy and development.2 The Government’s plans for defence will inevitably attract a lot of attention. This is not surprising, given that the integrated review has evolved from a long history of defence reviews which have made significant changes to the armed forces. One unknown had been the potential impact of the one-year Spending Review. Lord Robertson, who shepherded the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, fears policy decisions will not be underpinned by the required funding. The Defence secretary, , has previously discussed the hazards of an underfunded review: “no SDSR that I can remember, going back to the early ’90s, has been properly funded to back up the ambitions”.3 However, on 19 November the Prime Minister gave a statement to the House in which he announced a increase in defence spending of £24.1bn over the next four years.4 A different world? The context for this review is in some respects considerably different to 2015. The “special relationship” with the US has been challenged under President Trump. The UK has left the European Union and at the time of writing the future relationship has not been agreed. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on international relations and the UK’s finances is still to be fully understood. In other respects, many of the themes mentioned in the 2015 and 2010 SDSRs remain relevant. The Government’s call for evidence consultation document identifies key trends and drivers of change: • a shift in the international order, marked by intensifying great power competition and a shift in the world’s economic centre of gravity towards Asia • the increasingly tangible effects of climate change • an increasingly complex global economic context • increasing instability and challenges to global governance. Further reading from the House of Commons Library • A brief guide to previous British defence reviews • Integrated Review: a reading list • International affairs and defence: Parliamentary debates and statements in the 2019-21 session

2 Queen’s Speech December 2019, Prime Minister’s Office 3 HC Deb 3 February 2020 c11 4 PM statement to the House on the Integrated Review, Prime Minister’s office, 19 November 2020 5 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

1. About the Integrated Review

In the 2019 Queen’s Speech the Government announced it will conduct an integrated security, defence and foreign policy review (hereafter the integrated review or review) that will cover “all aspects of international policy from defence to diplomacy and development.”5

1.1 What will the Integrated Review cover? Five thematic The Prime Minister said the Integrated Review “will be the most radical workstreams: reassessment of our place in the world since the end of the Cold War, covering all aspects of international policy from defence to diplomacy 1. Resilience and development."6 2. Foreign Policy The call for evidence document, released in August 2020, gives perhaps 7 the most detailed outline yet of the thinking behind the review. Among 3. Defence the identified key trends and drivers of change are: the tangible effects of climate change and the deterioration in the national environment; 4. Science, the impact of technology which creates opportunity, potential risk and technology and increases the agency of non-state actors; and increasing instability and data challenges to global governance. 5. Strengthening The reference to the shift in the world’s economic centre of gravity governmental towards Asia and the need for a “secure, stable and prosperous Euro- systems Atlantic neighbourhood” indicates the likely geographic focus of the review. Government response There is also a clear emphasis on rapidly evolving areas such as science, to Defence Select technology, data, cyber and space. Committee report “In search of Strategy” The Government expanded on the process in its response to the 22 October 2020 Defence Committee’s first report on the integrated Review.

1.2 Timing There has been at least one defence review (see box 1) in every decade since the 1950s, albeit at irregular intervals. The current practice of undertaking a strategic defence and security review (SDSR) every five years dates back to 2010. The most recent SDSR was published a few months after the 2015 election. The 2019 Queen’s Speech confirmed the Government’s intention to hold a fresh review, which was formally launched in February 2020.8 In parallel with the Comprehensive Spending Review The Government said at the outset the review would run in parallel with the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) to ensure “departments are equipped with the resources they need to enact the review’s

5 Queen’s Speech, December 2019 6 Queen’s Speech December 2019: background briefing notes, Prime Minister’s Office, 19 December 2019 7 “Integrated Review: call for evidence”, Cabinet Office, 13 August 2020 8 “PM outlines new review to define Britain’s place in the world”, Prime Minister’s office, 26 February 2020 6 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

conclusions” and conclude in line with the review.9 The 2010 and 2015 SDSRs were both published within days of a spending review. Ministers and MPs have spoken of the importance of aligning the two. The Defence Secretary has repeatedly said previous defence reviews often failed because they were never in step with the spending plans of the Government, resulting in reviews that were over-ambitious and underfunded.10 Sir , when National Security Advisor, told MPs “the big decisions have to be accompanied by resource choices, and that needs a spending review”.11 The Defence Committee similarly heard from witnesses of the importance of aligning the integrated review with the CSR. The Committee urged the Government to consider a long-term multi-year financial settlement for defence, warning without one “ongoing issues with the affordability and availability of the UK’s defence capabilities will persist and our role in the world diminished”.12 However, on 21 October 2020 the Treasury announced it would hold a one-year, rather than comprehensive, Spending Review on 25 November.13 The Defence Secretary told MPs on 2 November 2020: The implications of that decision for the integrated review are currently being considered. The Government will provide an update to Parliament once this has been decided.14 To conclude in early 2021 On 19 November the Prime Minister gave a statement to the House on the integrated review. He said the review will conclude “early next year”. He also announced a multi-year spending settlement for defence, increasing defence spending by £24.1bn over the next four years.15 Library material • A brief guide to previous British defence reviews, House of Commons Library • Integrated Review of security, defence, development and foreign affairs: a reading list, House of Commons Library

9 “PM outlines new review to define Britain’s place in the world”, Prime Minister’s office, 26 February 2020 10 HC Deb 6 July 2020 c647; The MOD’s Permanent Secretary told MPs in late September he expected the integrated review would be announced alongside the Spending Review, likely towards the end of November. Public Accounts Committee, “Delivering carrier strike: oral evidence”, 28 September 2020, q6 11 “Revisiting the UK’s national security strategy: The National Security Capability Review and the Modernising Defence Programme”, 15 July 2019, HC 2072, 2017- 19, p31 12 Defence Committee, “In search of strategy – the 2020 integrated review”, 13 August 2020, para 91 13 “Boris Johnson’s 3-year UK spending master plan to be ditched”, Financial Times, 21 October 2020; “Spending review to conclude late November”, Treasury, 21 October 2020 14 HC Deb 2 November 2020 c5 15 PM statement to the House on the Integrated Review, Prime Minister’s office, 19 November 2020 7 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

Box 1: About defence reviews A defence review enables a Government to present a forward-looking assessment of Britain’s strategic interests and requisite military requirements. It examines the defence and security landscape, identifies current and emerging threats and then decides how best to organise and equip the armed forces.

There are restrictions, of course. Any new government inherits the defence policy, force numbers and force capabilities of its predecessor. Procurement of major pieces of equipment take years, sometimes decades, to come into service, meaning governments can be financially tied to expensive programmes not of their own making.

An oft-heard comment when discussing defence reviews is whether they are either Treasury- or strategy-led. That is, are they directed or influenced by the financial realities of the day or are they the outcome of a deeply thought out strategic assessment?

Another perennial issue is affordability and inadequate funding. The Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace, made this point when discussing past reviews in early 2020: “no SDSR that I can remember, going back to the early ’90s, has been properly funded to back up the ambitions.”16

Reviews can be quickly undone by subsequent events. The 1981 Nott Review’s recommendations to significantly reduce the fleet were largely reversed after the Falklands War.

Recent iterations of reviews have broadened beyond purely defence considerations.

Further reading: Commons Library paper A brief guide to previous British defence reviews

16 HC Deb 3 February 2020 c11 8 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

2. The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) and SDSR

The Government published the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (hereafter the SDSR) in November 2015.17 The most noticeable change from 2010 was combining the NSS and SDSR into one document. Doing so provided a clear connection between the overarching strategy and the specific policies and capabilities that flowed from it. The document set out the Government’s analysis of the national security context, presented a national security risk assessment and set out the UK’s national security objectives. It then laid out the policies the UK will pursue to achieve these broad objectives and the capabilities it will invest in. The Library published two papers examining the document. This section summarises these papers. • The 2015 UK National Security Strategy (CBP7431) • The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (CBP762) 2.1 The national security objectives The strategy was distilled into three national security objectives: 1 Protect our people 2 Project our global influence 3 Promote our prosperity 2.2 The national security context Three threats to the UK were highlighted: Russia, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and cyber-attacks. The document laid out four main challenges which it identified as being likely to drive the UK security priorities for the decade out to 2025: • The increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability The main emphasis in this section was on the emergence of ISIL, although the continuing threat of Northern Ireland-related terrorism also received a mention. It also noted some of the impacts of instability: humanitarian crises, mass migration and human trafficking, and exploitation of weak governments by terrorists and criminals. • The resurgence of state-based threats; and intensifying wider state competition Russia is mentioned first in the section discussing state-based threats, with the document observing “Russia has become more aggressive,

17 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 9161, 23 November 2015 9 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

authoritarian and nationalist”.18 The narrative also mentions intensifying state competition in the Middle East and North Africa and in South and Southeast Asia. North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is specifically cited as a major concern. • The impact of technology, especially cyber threats; and wider technological developments Here the emphasis is strongly on cyber with discussion on the range of cyber actors, although there is also brief reference to potential threats from advances in biotechnology, material science, big data and robotics. Growing congestion and inter-state competition in space is also touched upon. • The erosion of the rules-based international order, making it harder to build consensus and tackle global threats. Describing the UK as a champion of a rules-based order, the narrative paints a picture in which economic power is shifting to the south and east of the world and where the international order needs to adapt so that it reflects the contribution of growing powers. It also discusses the ways in which some state and non-state actors are ignoring international norms. Continuing risks This section sets out five other risks which remain important: civil emergencies, major natural disasters overseas, energy security, the global economy, climate change and resource scarcity.

2.3 The national security risk assessment The National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) places the domestic and overseas risks faced by the UK into three tiers “according to judgement of both likelihood and impact”. Tier one includes terrorist attacks on UK residents and nationals; international military conflict; cyber-attacks; a major human health crisis; major natural hazards; and major instability overseas creating threats to the UK. David Blagden, a lecturer in strategy at Exeter University, explains the purpose of the NSRA “is to identify and prioritise UK security risks for the coming five-yearly cycle based on their likelihood and impact”. 19 Reflecting on the Government’s response to the covid-19 pandemic, Blagden observes identifying a risk “does not necessarily result in greater preparedness unless strategic attention and resources are subsequently allocated”.20

18 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 9161, 23 November 2015, para 3.19 19 D Blagden, The Flawed Promise of National Security Risk Assessment: Nine Lessons from the British Approach. Intelligence and National Security, 33(5), 716-736 20 Defence Committee, The Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review, written evidence ISD0036, 10 April 2020 10 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

2.4 The armed forces The SDSR outlined plans for Joint Force 2025. This will provide, if required, an expeditionary force of 50,000 personnel based on a Land Division, Maritime Task Group and Expeditionary Air Group. The armed forces’ role in projecting soft power was interwoven throughout the document, with defence engagement becoming a funded, core MOD task for the first time. After a period of redundancies following the 2010 SDSR, the Government pledged not to reduce the Army below 82,000 and to provide a small increase for the Royal Navy and RAF. Unlike its predecessor, this SDSR focused on what the armed forces would gain rather than what would be cut. £12bn was added to the equipment budget over the next ten years. Supporting exports was also made a core MOD task.

2.5 Reaction Initial reaction to the 2015 UK strategy document focused on the specific policies and capabilities that flowed from the overarching strategy. The overall reaction was broadly positive and the increased spending on defence equipment welcomed. Since 2017, however, the National Audit Office has described the defence equipment budget as “not affordable” and dependent on unrealistic savings goals.21 The Government has acknowledged the deficiencies of the last two SDSRs. In May 2020, Sir Stephen Lovegrove, the MOD’s Permanent Secretary, told the Public Accounts Committee: My view is that it is arguable that the SDSRs in 2010 and 2015 were both deficient in different ways. I think 2010 balanced the budget effectively, but without regard for the integrated nature of the force and the capabilities that were most needed to fulfil the policy ambitions. What happened was that in effect they balanced the budget simply by cancelling uncommitted expenditure, without significant regard to strategic coherence. In 2015 there was an attempt to rectify some of that dynamic, but that was at the expense, as it were, of over-ordering, which was enabled by over-aspirational and unsubstantiated efficiency targets.22

21 See National Audit Office reports on the Defence Equipment Plan 2017, 2018 and 2019 available from www.nao.org.uk. 22 Public Accounts Committee, Oral evidence: Defence Capabilities and The Equipment Plan 2019-2029, HC 247 2019-2021, 28 May 2020 11 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

3. 2018 reviews

The 2017 election prompted some debate as to whether a fresh review was needed – not least to consider the result of the 2016 EU referendum and continued concerns about Russia’s aggressive behaviour.23 Instead, Prime Minister opted to review the UK’s national security capabilities.

3.1 The National Security Capability Review In March 2018, the Government published the National Security 24 “The challenges Capability Review (NSCR). have become more This review updated the 2015 SDSR’s assessment of the challenges likely complex, to drive UK security priorities, although it did not revise any of the intertwined and SDSR’s principle commitments. dangerous as the world has become The 2015 SDSR identified four challenges that are likely to drive UK more uncertain and security priorities for the coming decade. The NSCR added two volatile”. additional challenges: National Security • The ongoing growth in serious and organised crime and its impact Capability Review Here the NSCR describes how organised crime groups have a daily, corrosive impact on our public services, infrastructure and reputation. It makes clear that, as serious and organised crime is inherently transnational, many of the threats the UK faces emanate from overseas. • Diseases and natural hazards affecting the UK The NCSR identifies pandemic influenza, national blackout and severe flooding as the most serious of the risks that could materialise in the UK in the next five years. It points to the September 2017 edition of the National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies. The Fusion doctrine The NSCR outlined a new national security doctrine known as the Fusion Doctrine. This creates, the document states, a more accountable system to support collective Cabinet decision-making. Senior officials are made senior responsible owners to deliver each of the National Security Council’s priorities. These priorities include topics such as Global Britain, cyber, national resilience, ports and borders, and national security communications. Relations with the EU The NSCR said the UK wants a partnership with the EU: As we leave the EU, we want a partnership that offers both the EU and the UK the means to combine efforts to the greatest effect, both operationally, and in developing capabilities

23 See for example Professor Malcolm Chalmers, “Would a new SDSR be needed after a Brexit vote?”, RUSI briefing papers, 3 June 2016 24 National Security Capability Review, Cabinet Office, 28 March 2018 12 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

3.2 The Modernising Defence Programme Defence was separated from the NSCR into the Modernising Defence “Persistent, Programme (MDP), published on 18 December 2018. aggressive state This relatively short document identified three broad areas defence competition now would prioritise: characterises the international • We will mobilise, making more of what we already have to security context”. ensure our Armed Forces are best placed to protect our security , • We will modernise, embracing new technologies and Secretary of State for assuring our competitive edge over our adversaries Defence, 18 December 2018 • We will transform, radically changing the way we do business and staying ahead of emerging threats25 The only significant financial announcements were a new Defence Transformation Fund and an increase in the Defence Innovation Fund. Reaction to the MPD was muted. The Shadow Defence Secretary said it was “underwhelming” and failed to address the MOD’s budgetary issues, while the SNP Defence Spokesman described the conclusions as “extremely thin.”26 The Joint Committee on National Security Strategy was similarly downbeat, suggesting the MDP “raised more questions than it answered.”27 Further reading: Commons Library paper The Modernising Defence Programme

25 “Modernising Defence Programme update”, Ministry of Defence, 18 December 2018 26 HC Deb 18 December 2018 c660 - 662 27 “Revisiting the UK’s national security strategy: The National Security Capability Review and the Modernising Defence Programme”, 15 July 2019, HC 2072, 2017- 19, para 36 13 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

4. The Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office

On 16 June 2020 the Prime Minister announced to Parliament that the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) would merge. The new department, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), was launched on 2 September 2020. The new Department is headed by Dominic Raab, now Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs. Its ministers and senior civil servants are drawn from DFID and the FCO, although the majority, certainly in the initial six-month period, are formerly from the FCO.28 The decision was widely criticised, including by three former Prime Ministers.29 David Cameron said more could be done to coordinate aid and foreign policy, including through the National Security Council, but that closing DFID would mean “less expertise, less voice for development at the top table and ultimately less respect for the UK overseas.”30 The Prime Minister said the distinctions between diplomacy and development objectives were artificial and outdated and that the FCDO will allow development decisions to be better aligned with foreign policy objectives. He said the “long overdue reform” would ensure “maximum value” for taxpayers.31 This view was reiterated in response to a report by the International Development Committee.32 In terms of timing, the International Development Committee said the announcement of the merger in June, and before the end of the consultation period on the integrated review, risked prejudging the outcomes of that review.33 The Government says the decision will help it respond to Covid-19, prepare for its leadership of the G7 and the hosting of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) in 2021.34 Moreover, the Integrated Review could be used to shape the objectives of the new department. In its response to the Foreign Affairs Committee report on the merger, the Government indicated that the review would ensure domestic and international policy worked in the national interest and that the merger

28 Devex, FCDO Interim leadership team appointed, August 2020 29 “Leadership of merged DFID evidence of ‘hostile takeover’ by FCO, say critics”, The Guardian, 25 August 2020 30 “UK will lose respect overseas”, The Independent, 16 June 2020 31 HC Deb 16 June 2020, c666 32 International Development Committee, Effectiveness of UK aid: Government response, HC 820 2019-2021, 2 October 2020 33 International Development Committee, Effectiveness of UK aid: potential impact of FCO/DFID merger, HC 596 2019-2021, 14 July 2020 34 International Development Committee, Effectiveness of UK aid: Government response, HC 820 2019-2021, 2 October 2020 14 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

would enable the Foreign Secretary to determine which countries receive UK aid: the Integrated Review will set out the ways in which ODA spending by other Departments will support the delivery of the UK’s international objectives. The Review will cover all aspects of international policy, including international development, and we will continue to look at how the aid budget can be spent most effectively in our national interest and as part of a single UK strategy for each country. 35 The merger was thus brought forward as a way to realign UK aid towards UK interests (commercial and security). It is still unclear what this actually means for the existing beneficiaries of UK aid. Further reading: • The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office: How are departments reorganised?, House of Commons Library, 17 June 2020 • DFID and FCO merger: Implications for International Development, House of Commons Library, 18 June 2020

35 Foreign Affairs Committee, Merging success: bringing together the FCO and DFID: Government response, HC 809 2019-21, 24 September 2020

15 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

5. Context for the 2020 Review

This section looks at some of the themes and concerns that have emerged or intensified since the 2015 SDSR. It is not intended to be read as a comprehensive overview of all the issues that are likely to be addressed. Links to relevant Library briefing papers are provided for further reading.

5.1 Impact of the Covid-19 pandemic The pandemic directly affected the progress of the review: it was paused between April and June. The deputy national security advisor told the Defence Committee in July that the Government had conducted “new horizon scanning and fresh analysis” in light of Covid- 19 and focused on “intensified geopolitical competition” following the pandemic.36 Both the 2010 and 2015 SDSR’s placed an influenza pandemic in tier one of the national security risk assessment. The Government warned in 2010 that “the risk of human pandemic disease remains one of the highest we face”.37 The 2015 SDSR stated “We have detailed, robust and comprehensive plans in place and the necessary capacity to deal with infectious diseases, including pandemic influenza and respiratory diseases”.38 Jonathan Marcus, the BBC defence correspondent, suggests the pandemic will alter how we assess national security: National security capability will be judged by stockpiled medical equipment and preparedness for the next pandemic or environmental catastrophe, not just on how many tank brigades can be deployed.39 Discussing how the pandemic reveals “our strengths and weaknesses” with the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Clara Swinson, Director-General, Global Health, Department of Health and Social Care identified a lack of manufacturing capacity for diagnostics, PPE or domestic ventilators. The Committee is currently examining how biosecurity is addressed in national security planning and resilience implementation.40 The Prime Minister told the UN General Assembly that the UK intends to use its G7 Presidency in 2021 to create a “new global approach to

36 Correspondence from the Deputy National Security Advisor to the Chair of the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy and Chairs of the Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees, 8th July 2020 37 “A strong Britain in an age of uncertainty: the national security strategy”, Cm 7953, 18 October 2010, para 3.38 38 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 9161, 23 November 2015, para 3.19 39 “How will coronavirus change the way we live?”, BBC News, 30 April 2020 40 Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy “Oral evidence: Biosecurity and national security”, 19 October 2020, q57 16 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

health security based on a 5-point plan to protect humanity against another pandemic”.41 Further reading: Covid-19 areas of research interest, POST, 6 October 2020

5.2 The rules-based international order The ‘rules-based international order’ featured prominently in the 2015 SDSR, which described a system which is ‘founded on relationships between states and through international institutions, with shared rules and agreements on behaviour.’42 The SDSR committed to the strengthening of the rules-based international order and the relevant international institutions, such as the United Nations Security Council, in anticipation of the changing global economy and associated international relations.43 Both the 2015 SDSR and the 2018 National Security Capability Review identified “the erosion of the rules-based international order” as a threat, arguing that it would make it “harder to build consensus and tackle global threats.”44 The NSCR pointed to Russia’s “pattern of aggression”, North Korea’s “flagrant violations of international law”, Iran’s “destabilising activity in the Middle East” and competition and tensions between other States, including in the South China Sea, which “brings risks of miscalculation and conflict”. The rules-based international order has also faced challenges in recent years following decisions by the United States to withdraw from, or actively undermine, a number of institutions that the UK supports as part of the rules-based international order.45 The Foreign Affairs Committee has begun an inquiry into the UK’s role in strengthening multilateral organisations. Some, such as Malcolm Chalmers, RUSI’s deputy director-general, have questioned whether the UK is misguided in cleaving so closely to the premise of a rules-based international order. He argues "there is no single rules-based international system (RBIS), but rather a series of systems that exist alongside, and often in tension with, one another". He then suggests that, given the more nationalistic tendencies of key international players, "any UK attempt to sustain or develop

41 Prime Minister's speech to United Nations General Assembly: 26 September 2020 42 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 9161, 23 November 2015, para 3.32. 43 Since the Review, there have been no developments on the reform or expansion of the membership of the UN Security Council. 44 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 9161, 23 November 2015, para 3.3; and National Security Capability Review, Cabinet Office, 28 March 2018, paras 2 and 6. 45 For example, the US has blocked the appointment of judges to the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation, meaning that the appeals process for dispute settlement at the WTO has ceased to function, with members forced to agree new procedures between themselves. The UK has expressed concern over this situation at the WTO. “US blocks WTO judge reappointment as dispute settlement crisis looms”, Reuters, 27 August 2018; UK statement to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body on Appellate Body Appointments, 29 September 2020. 17 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

international rules-based systems needs to cope with the realities of a world that is moving in the opposition direction".46 Recent UK Actions and the Rules-Based International Order Recently, a number of developments by the Government have been criticised as having the potential to undermine this rules-based international order. Recent debates relating to the UK Internal Market Bill are primarily focused on whether the Bill, and the powers contained therein, may breach the UK’s international obligations.47 Similarly, measures in the Overseas Operations Bill to create a presumption against the prosecution of UK armed forces personnel after 5 years have also been argued to be inconsistent with the UK’s international obligations.

5.3 Future relationships G7 Presidency The UK will hold the Presidency of the G7 in 2021 for the first time since 2013. In early October the Government said it was developing an “ambitious agenda” for its presidency, focusing on “strengthening international cooperation on key health, economic and climate challenges”.48 The 2020 head of state and government summit in the US was postponed because of covid-19.49 The European Union Following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on 31 January 2020. the UK has been in a transition period in which EU law and decisions largely continue to apply. The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has continued to apply to the UK but it is able to abstain from certain actions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).50 The UK and EU began formal negotiations on their future relationship in March, with a view to agreement on a treaty (or set of treaties) covering trade, security (police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters) and other areas of co-operation. However, while the EU has proposed a security partnership that also covers defence and foreign policy co- operation, including a Protocol on participation in EU-led military operations, the UK Government has indicated that it does not want a

46 “Taking control: rediscovering the centrality of national interest in UK foreign and security policy”, RUSI Whitehall report 1-20, February 2020. 47 See further, House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper No 9003, The Internal Market Bill, 14 September 2020, pp 16–19; and House of Lords Library, United Kingdom Internal Market Bill: Briefing for Lords Stages, 9 October 2020, pp 45-52. 48 PQ94545, 6 October 2020 49 The summit was scheduled for June but postponed because of covid-19. Material on the G7 is available on the ‘G7 information centre’ hosted by Trinity College at the University of Toronto. 50 Defence and foreign policy cooperation during the transition period is examined in Brexit next steps: defence and foreign policy coordination, House of Commons Library, March 2020 18 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

formal agreement in this area. Instead it favours an informal, ad-hoc approach. The Prime Minister’s written statement on UK-EU relations on 3 February 2020, stated that cooperation on foreign affairs and related issues “is of course likely to be substantial, but does not in itself require a joint institutional framework”.51 The Government’s command paper setting out its approach to negotiations, published later in February stated that it did not agree that every area of future co-operation with the EU needed to be covered by a negotiated Treaty or similar arrangement. It gave the example of foreign policy and immigration, which it said were for the UK Government to determine, within a framework of broader friendly dialogue and cooperation between the UK and the EU: they do not require an institutionalised relationship.52 Diplomatic representation in Europe Following the end of the post-Brexit transition the UK will also likely be focusing more on its bilateral relationships with EU Member States. In 2018, the Government said it had created 50 new diplomatic positions in Europe. These included posts in non-EU states, and to the then UK Permanent Representation to the EU in Brussels, now the UK’s Mission to the EU. The funding came from cost savings across the diplomatic service but also through “internal reprioritisation” i.e. removing posts from missions in Asia, Africa and the Americas. FCDO has also stated it has “created approximately 550 EU Exit roles in the UK and overseas”. It is not clear if the 50 positions mentioned above are a subset of the 550 roles. Following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, what was formerly the UK Representation to the EU (UKREP) has now become the UK Mission to the EU (UKMis Brussels). The former UK Permanent Representative to the EU, Sir Tim Barrow, is now UK Ambassador to the EU. UKMis has been staffed from across Government departments as well as through direct and local appointments.53 The EU Commission office in London has now become an EU embassy, hosting the EU’s delegation to the UK and headed by the EU ambassador to the UK. Focus of future relationships in Europe The FCDO’s expansion of its diplomatic corps in Europe is an acknowledgment that bilateral relations between the UK and other European countries will be an increasingly important focus post-Brexit. The UK’s relationship with Ireland will remain as one of the UK’s diplomatic priorities. Tensions between the two countries have risen

51 Prime Minister’s Written Statement, UK/EU relations, HCWS86, 3 February 2020 52 HM Government, The Future Relationship with the EU The UK’s Approach to Negotiations, CP211, February 2020, p4. 53 For proposals and discussion of how UKMis and the UK Government more widely should seek to engage with the EU post-Brexit see Institute for Government, Influencing the EU after Brexit, 15 January 2020. 19 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

over the future of the Northern Ireland/Ireland border post-Brexit, but both sides have continued to cooperate in areas of strategic interest, for example on talks to re-establish the Northern Ireland Executive in January 2020. When they were both members of the EU, British and Irish interests were closely aligned, and Ireland could, if relations were to be repaired and improved, be an advocate for keeping relations between the EU and UK close. Despite often being at odds on the future of the European Union, France and the UK have maintained relatively close alignment on foreign policy matters, and have enhanced defence cooperation. France and the UK are Europe’s only nuclear weapons states and partly due to their imperial legacies, both countries have maintained defence capabilities and an appetite for limited unilateral operations abroad. Such ties will mean continuing cooperating in defence and foreign policy matters, whatever the outcome of negotiations on the UK/EU future relationship. Germany has participated alongside the UK in multilateral peace initiatives such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Defence cooperation has not been as deep as between the UK and France, but with defence spending increasing in Germany and the UK continuing to look to partner with countries on major weapons programmes, some commentators see potential for deeper defence ties. As well as its relationship with ‘core Europe’ the UK will likely pay more attention to its relationships with countries such as Ukraine and Turkey that are on the ‘edges’ of Europe. Some of this work is already happening, the UK signed a defence cooperation agreement with Ukraine in 2016 and then in October 2020 a much more comprehensive Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement. Alongside this Partnership Agreement, the UK and Ukraine signed agreements focused on naval cooperation in August 2020 and October 2020.. The UK has maintained closer relations with President Erdoğan’s administration than other European countries. Relations between the UK and Turkey, however, are being strained by Turkey’s increasingly interventionist foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. The UK was a strong proponent for EU membership for the Western Balkans, and for greater links with the countries in the region, it hosted a Western Balkans Summit in London in July 2018. Both Russia and China are showing increasing interest in the region. It’s not clear at present how the UK will engage with the Western Balkans post-Brexit and to what extent it will be a continuing area of interest. The United States of America The Trump presidency highlighted the strategic dilemma facing the UK post-Brexit. As the US and Europe pulled in different directions, which of its allies would the UK stay closer to? The election of Joe Biden could make this question slightly less thorny. For example, the forthcoming Biden Administration has pledged to take 20 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

the US back into the Paris Climate Agreement, bringing the US into line with UK and EU strategy. On other foreign policy issues, however, it may not be so simple. Biden has pledged to re-join the Iran nuclear deal if Iran fulfils its commitments. The outgoing Administration may try to make that impossible, however, by increasing sanctions on Iran, further straining the relationship and making it difficult for Iran to make the necessary concessions. There is also the question of Brexit and the Irish border. Biden has said that sacrificing peace in Ireland for the sake of Brexit is unacceptable; this could lead to a head-on clash if UK actions are perceived across the Atlantic to be endangering peace. Brexit may anyway have convinced Democrats that France and Germany are more valuable and influential European partners. Russia UK relations with Russia have been particularly rocky in recent years. As an EU member state, the UK used to advocate a strong EU line against Russia for its perceived transgressions, such as the annexation of Crimea. That involved imposing EU sanctions on Russian individuals and trade, often based on significant UK-supplied intelligence. Russia poses the same big strategic question for the UK in a different way. The UK now has a legal basis for autonomous sanctions, including the new “Magnitsky sanctions” regime. One question is whether UK sanctions against Russia will continue to align in practice with the EU after 31 December 2020. NATO Successive governments have described the North Atlantic Alliance as the “cornerstone of our national security”.54 London hosted the NATO Leaders meeting in December 2019, an event that marked 70 years since the Alliance was founded. In recent years NATO has worked on improving the readiness and mobility of its collective forces and made moves to achieve fairer burden-sharing among allies. The Secretary General will provide a longer-term look-ahead at the 2021 summit under the banner NATO 2030.55 Further reading: NATO: 70th anniversary, House of Lords Library paper China The Asia-Pacific region has grown in strategic importance in the UK’s foreign policy over the last decade, and this trend looks likely to continue. An increased focus on the UK’s relationship with Asia in the review is, therefore, to be expected.

54 “UK to host NATO 70th anniversary meeting”, Prime Minister’s Office, 6 February 2019 55 For more on this, see NATO 2030 on NATO’s website. 21 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

The UK’s relationship with China has rapidly deteriorated over the last few years.56 This is in sharp contrast to the high-point of UK-China relations over the last two decades during the 2015-17 Conservative Government, when there was talk on both sides of a “golden era”. Growing controversy in the UK over the involvement of the Chinese multinational company Huawei in the UK’s 5G mobile phone network, along with mounting concern about the erosion of the “one country, two systems” status quo in Hong Kong, have contributed to the dramatically changed atmosphere between the two countries. Other important factors have been UK concern about Chinese secrecy over the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic and China’s human rights clamp-down against the Muslim Uighur population in the Western province of Xinjiang. The UK is not alone in having serious concerns over these issues, the United States under President Trump have pushed hard for the UK and other allies to block Chinese investment in their infrastructure, and many European countries have also moved towards a less accommodative approach towards China. A prospective Biden administration is not likely to significantly soften the US’s stance on China’s investment policies and human rights record. However, the UK’s growing trade and investment relationship with China, may lead to a cautious approach to its relations with the country. Further reading: The UK-China relationship, House of Commons Library, September 2020 Sub-Saharan Africa The army ended its four-year contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan at the beginning of 2020. At the end of 2020 it will begin a new, three-year contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali. In 2018 the Government signalled the shift in focus to the Sahel when it laid out new strategic approach for Sub-Saharan Africa. The Government says by working to stabilise states and tackle the root causes of conflict it is helping to prevent conflict spilling over to neighbouring states. 57 In 2019 the UK and the African Union signed a Joint Communiqué on the AU/UK partnership. Further reading: UK deployment and recent political challenges in Mali, House of Commons Library, September 2020

5.4 Defence and the armed forces Although this review promises to encompass far more areas than previous purely defence-focused reviews, it is the decisions on the

56 For further details see Library CBP ‘The UK-China relationship’, September 2020 57 “Beyond aid: the UK’s strategic engagement in Africa” written evidence UKA0012, Foreign Affairs Committee, 22 October 2019. More detail is available on Gov.uk: UK’s partnerships for Africa 22 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

structure, equipment and funding of the armed forces that is likely to attract the most immediate attention. The review is likely to flesh out the new Integrated Operating Concept outlined by the Chief of the Defence Staff in late September 2020.58 Discussing the future of warfare, General Sir Nick Carter reflected on the need to compete below the threshold of war in order to deter war. Carter gave few details of what this means in practice, but there were clear indications of a more forward presence overseas, greater use of training and exercising overseas, improving interoperability with allies, further integration across the military, and embracing information- centric technologies: We must chart a direction of travel from an industrial age of platforms to an information age of systems.59 Carter indicated this means some platforms may be retired early: Some industrial age capabilities will increasingly have to meet their sunset to create the space for capabilities needed for sunrise.60 This is not entirely unexpected, given that the National Audit Office has described the defence equipment plan (2019 to 2029) as unaffordable, and that the MOD itself estimates the costs of the plan could be between £3bn to 13bn more than the allocated budget.61 The memory of the swath of cuts in the 2010 SDSR still looms large and media reports have highlighted concerns about tank upgrades and F-35 Lightning aircraft numbers. Sunrise capabilities, on the other hand, are likely to feature some form of artificial intelligence and autonomy. The 2018 Modernising Defence Programme identified artificial intelligence and autonomous systems as a significant way in which the character of warfare is changing. The MDP talked about aggressively exploiting opportunities for modernisation and to “accept higher risk in pursuing novel ideas, driving operational advantage and overall affordability”.62 The MOD published a Science and Technology strategy on 19 October 2020. Prime Minister’s statement to the House on 19 November The Prime Minister informed the House of the “first outcome” of the review, which he said would conclude early in 2021. This first outcome focused on defence. The Prime Minister announced an increase in

58 The Minister for Defence Procurement, Jeremy Quin, said in evidence to the Defence Committee the detail of the concept will be given in the review, Oral evidence: Progress in delivering the 's armoured vehicle capability, 20 October 2020, HC 659 2019-21, q74. In its response to the committee’s integrated review report, the MOD said the concept is being used to inform Defence’s contribution to the review. Defence Committee, “In search of strategy – the 2020 integrated review: government response”, HC 910 2019-21, 22 October 2020 59 “Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter launches the Integrated Operating Concept”, Ministry of Defence, 30 September 2020 60 “Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter launches the Integrated Operating Concept”, Ministry of Defence, 30 September 2020 61 “Ministry of Defence Equipment Plan deemed “unaffordable” by NAO”, Commons Library Insight, 28 February 2020 62 Mobilising, Modernising and Transforming Defence, December 2018, p.22 23 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

defence spending by £24.1bn over the next four years. This will raise “The international defence spending as a share of GDP to at least 2.2 per cent. The situation is now Conservative election manifesto had committed to exceed the NATO perilous and target of 2 per cent and also committed to increasing the defence intensely budget by at least 0.5 per cent above inflation every year of the new competitive than at Parliament.63 any time since the Cold War” The Prime Minister outlined plans to “upgrade our capabilities across Prime Minister Boris the board” with reference to artificial intelligence, direct energy Johnson weapons and autonomous vehicles. The Royal Navy received the most 19 November 2020 attention, with plans for a new Type 32 frigate, more forward deployment of naval assets and confirmation the first deployment of the HMS Queen Elizabeth carrier group will be to East Asia, via the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The Prime Minister also announced a new RAF Space Command, a new centre dedicated to artificial intelligence and the existence of a national cyber force.64 The Ministry of Defence said new technologies will include swarm drones and cutting-edge battlefield awareness systems.65 What of the structure of the armed forces? The 2015 SDSR’s pledge for the army to provide a warfighting division of three brigades as part of Joint Force 2025 might now not happen until the 2030s because of delays to the delivery of new armoured vehicles.66 The Defence Committee has been examining the Army’s ability to deploy an armoured division in the 2019-21 session. Lastly, will the review discuss service personnel numbers? Amid media reports of plans to cut the army, the Defence Secretary said in July “I can confirm that there is no plan to slash the size of the armed forces”.67 When asked about personnel numbers following his statement on the review on 19 November, the Prime Minister said there are “no redundancies” planned in this package. The Government explicitly pledged in the 2015 SDSR to not reduce the Army below 82,000 and set personnel targets for all three services, to be achieved by 2020. All three services are below their targets. The Army has the largest deficit, numbering just over 73,000 compared to the target of 82,000.68 The following table reflects the full-time trained/trade trained strength of the services. Library briefing paper UK

63 “Get Brexit done. Unleash Britain’s potential”, Conservative Party, p53 64 PM statement to the House on the Integrated Review, Prime Minister’s office, 19 November 2020 65 “Defence secures largest investment since the Cold War”, Ministry of Defence, 19 November 2020 66 “Army's 'warfighting' division will be delayed by at least five years, the MoD admits”, Daily Telegraph, 9 October 2020 67 HC Deb 6 July 2020 c647 68 Quarterly service personnel statistics 1 July 2020, Ministry of Defence, 24 September 2020. This table shows the full-timed trained strength (RN/RM and RAF) and full- timed trade trained strength (army) which is counted against the workforce requirement. The workforce requirement is the number of Service personnel needed, based on the Defence Planning Round, set for each of the three Services. The 2020 targets were set out in the SDSR 2015 Defence Key Facts booklet for each of the Services. 24 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

defence personnel statistics explains the different methods of measuring personnel statistics.

Strength of the full-time trained UK Armed Forces S trength of the full-time trained UK Armed Forcesa against workforce requirement and S DS R target for 2020; at 1 July

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Targetb

Army Strength 79,389 77,936 76,877 74,437 73,780 Requirement 82,638 82,645 82,485 82,022 82,047 82,000 Surplus/Deficit -3,249 -4,709 -5,608 -7,585 -8,267 -8,220 Surplus/Deficit (%) -3.9% -5.7% -6.8% -9.2% -10.1% -10.0%

Royal Navy / Marines Strength 29,650 29,465 29,154 29,090 28,862 Requirement 30,125 30,300 30,480 30,600 30,675 30,450 Surplus/Deficit -475 -835 -1,326 -1,510 -1,813 -1,588 Surplus/Deficit (%) -1.6% -2.8% -4.4% -4.9% -5.9% -5.2%

Royal Air Force Strength 30,873 30,647 30,276 29,929 29,610 Requirement 33,188 32,427 32,296 31,838 31,887 31,750 Surplus/Deficit -2,315 -1,780 -2,020 -1,909 -2,277 -2,140 Surplus/Deficit (%) -7.0% -5.5% -6.3% -6.0% -7.1% -6.7%

Total: Army, RN/RM and RAF Strength 139,912 138,048 136,307 133,456 132,252 Requirement 145,951 145,372 145,261 144,460 144,609 144,200 Surplus/Deficit -6,039 -7,324 -8,954 -11,004 -12,357 -11,948 Surplus/Deficit (%) -4.1% -5.0% -6.2% -7.6% -8.5% -8.3%

Notes: a Full-time trained strength for Royal Navy / Marines and ; Full-time trade- trained strength for the Army b Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 target for 2020 Source: Ministry of Defence, Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics, table 3a

5.5 The 0.7 per cent GNI aid commitment In 2013, the Coalition Government enshrined in law the commitment to provide 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) as Official Development Assistance (ODA). The UK has met this target each year since then. Following the merger of DFID with the FCO, there were fears that the aid budget would be cut.69 However, the Government has said its “manifesto made clear that we would proudly maintain our commitment to spending 0.7 percent of our national income on

69 “Alarm bells ring over aid spending”, The Guardian, 3 July 2020 25 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

development—a commitment enshrined in law and one to which the new Department will honour its responsibilities.” This will be done by transferring responsibilities under the International Development Act from DFID to the FCDO. Restrictions on economic activity during the Covid-19 pandemic have reduced GNI. This means that meeting the target to provide 0.7 per cent of GNI as Official Development Assistance will require less funding. In July 2020 the Foreign Secretary confirmed that the UK development assistance budget will be cut by US$3.6 billion (£2.9 billion) in 2020. He maintained that spending on ODA would remain at 0.7 per cent of GNI.70 The Government said it would ensure a continued focus on poverty reduction: the money we will still spend in 2020 remains prioritised on poverty reduction for the ‘bottom billion’, as well as tackling climate change and reversing biodiversity loss, championing girls education, UK leadership in the global response to COVID-19, and campaigning on issues such as media freedom and freedom of religious belief, thereby ensuring that the UK is a global force for good. We have also sought to protect the UK’s science and research and development base.71

5.6 Climate change The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted during the 1992 Earth Summit and came into force in 1994. The objective of the Treaty, is to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The treaty, aiming to address the causes and impacts of climate change, has been ratified by 196 States (including both the EU and the UK) which constitute the “Parties” to the Convention. The US withdrew from the Convention under Donal Trump’s presidency, but Joe Biden has committed to re-joining the Convention on the first day of his term, calling climate change “an existential threat to humanity”.72 A Conference of the Parties (known as COPs) takes place every year. COP21, held in Paris resulted in the Paris Agreement which set an ambitious goal to keep the global average temperature increase “well below 2 °C” and “pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C”. Since then a number of countries, including the UK, have set a Net Zero emissions target for 2050, as has the EU. For further background on UK and international aspects of climate change, together climate change explainers are available on the Commons Library website.

70 Coronavirus: UK foreign aid spending cut by £2.9bn amid economic downturn, BBC News, 23 July 2020 71 Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending for 2020: First Secretary of State's letter, FCDO, 22 July 2020 72 Financial Times, Biden shift on climate change welcomed by world leaders, 8 November 2020, 08 November 2020 26 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

UK to host COP 26 in Glasgow COP26, hosted by the UK and Italian Governments in Glasgow and Milan, was to be held in November 2020, five years after the Paris Agreement was reached and the Agreement comes into effect. Countries agreed to put forward their second, enhanced Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) by 2020; NDCs set out each country’s efforts to reduce national emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. Having previously been part of a joint EU-NDC, the Government had confirmed that the UK will be bringing forward its own NDC, which will now be published after the Committee on Climate Change publishes its advice to the Government in December on achieving the UK’s 2050 Net Zero target. To date only Suriname and Norway have submitted their second NDC; 186 countries have submitted their first one. COP26 (now postponed until November 2021 in Glasgow) will be the largest summit the UK has ever hosted, with over 30,000 delegates, including world leaders, experts, campaigners and government officials. The UK will host the COP event; and Italy will host pre-COP events. Alok Sharma, the UK Business Secretary has been confirmed as COP26 President. As the Grantham Institute explains the conference hosts can have a significant impact on the effectiveness of COP climate conferences: Over the year preceding the conference, lead negotiators for the host must encourage others to pledge emissions cuts below what is required to limit global warming to as close as possible to 1.5°C. The host provides a vision, shapes discussions, and develops momentum in the build-up to the summit at the end of the year. They build alliances with other countries to achieve this, for example, by providing technological and financial support to developing countries, identifying solutions, and working towards a common goal across governments, businesses and civil society.73 Further reading: COP26: the international climate change conference, Glasgow, UK, House of Commons Library, April 2020. Climate change and security The armed forces have long been conscious of the potential security implications of climate change. The MOD’s Future Operating Environment 2035 discusses how the secondary effects of climate change - migration, social unrest, instability and conflict – may affect the UK’s interests. The effects of climate change may also create greater demand on the armed forces to provide humanitarian assistance.74

73 Grantham Institute, Why should the UK host the COP26 climate summit in 2020?, 3 June 2020 74 The UK armed forces have long experience in providing such support. The Royal Navy’s standing Atlantic Patrol Tasking North centres on providing humanitarian and disaster relief during the main hurricane season. RFA Angus is in the Caribbean for the 2020 hurricane season (April to November). 27 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

5.7 Security Internal security cooperation between the UK and the EU will change at the end of the transition period.75 The scope of any future security partnership will be subject to the outcome of the negotiations, but it is clear that it will not be on the same scale as current cooperation arrangements. In particular, at an operational level it is unlikely that the UK will retain direct access to important law enforcement databases which currently provide intelligence on persons, objects and vehicles of interest. The UK’s strategic influence in this area is also likely to be diminished at an EU level. Nonetheless, intelligence sharing and cooperation will continue at an intergovernmental and bilateral level, with the EU Member States and beyond. The Government has emphasised the importance of the Five Eyes network76, France, Germany and Japan as security allies.77 Ken McCallum, the Director General of MI5, gave a speech in October 2020 in which he outlined the current threat landscape and main priorities for security.78 He noted that in addition to the longstanding threats from Northern Ireland-related and Islamist terrorism, the threat from right wing terrorism was increasing. Alongside counterterrorism, he explained that hostile state activity was a focus for MI5, including espionage, and threats to people, the economy, academic research, infrastructure and democratic processes. He noted the Government’s intention to introduce legislation aimed at countering hostile activity.79

5.8 Space That the UK is reliant on access to space was acknowledged in the 2015 SDSR. The review may flesh out some of the developments already underway, including plans to publish a UK space strategy, form a national space council and set up a space command.80 On 19 November the Prime Minister confirmed plans for a new RAF Space Command that will launch British satellites and its first rocket in 2022.81 One result of the UK leaving the EU is the UK will no longer participate in EU space programmes such as Galileo. The Government had proposed the development of a sovereign UK navigation system, but in September 2020 it said was looking at a “wider range of options”.82

75 For further information see CBP8923 The UK-EU Future Relationship: the March 2020 draft treaty and negotiations update, 27 May 2020 76 An intelligence cooperation network comprising the UK, USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia 77 HCWS568, 11 November 2020 78 Ken McCullum speech, 14 October 2020, mi5.gov.uk 79 The National Security and Investment Bill was introduced on 12 November 2020. An Espionage Bill and Telecommunications Security Bill are also anticipated. 80 Queen’s Speech December 2019; Conservative election manifesto 2019 81 PM statement to the House on the Integrated Review, Prime Minister’s office, 19 November 2020 82 “Government to explore new ways of delivering ‘sat nav’ for the UK”, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 24 September 2020; “Ministers ‘seek alternatives’ for UK sat-nav”, BBC News, 24 September 2020 28 The Integrated Review: A look ahead to the Government's review

The FCDO is driving efforts to broker an international consensus on responsible behaviour in space via a UN General Assembly resolution.83 Further reading: Key EU space programmes, POSTbrief, June 2020

5.9 Will the review fulfil expectations? In 2019 the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy called on the Government to go back to first principles of a national security strategy: the Government should begin an honest conversation at the national level about the extent of its ambition for the UK as a significant global player, the risks it is willing to take in relation to national security, and the resources it is willing to commit to these ends.84 There are concerns the review will be undermined by the cancellation of the Comprehensive Spending Review. Tobias Ellwood, the chair of the Defence Committee, who previously described the review as the “the most critical since World War II”85, has since suggested a one-year funding settlement will make the review “next to meaningless”.86 Others have similarly voiced concern about the potential impact a one- year financial settlement could have for defence. John Healey, the shadow defence secretary, suggested the Chancellor has “cut the ground” from under the Defence Secretary and the armed forces.87 He has called for a fully funded review to ensure the “government not only delivers on its promises but matches its commitments with resources”.88 Lord Stirrup, a former Chief of the Defence Staff, said a one-year financial settlement risks “crippling” pending defence capital investment programmes.89

5.10 Parliamentary scrutiny Since 2015 several committees have reported on aspects of the NSS/SDSR. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) scrutinises the structures for Government decision-making on national security, particularly the role of the National Security Council and the National Security Adviser. It has reported on the National Security Capability Review and the Modernising Defence Programme and is currently holding inquiries into biosecurity and the work of the National Security Advisor.

83 “UK push for landmark UN resolution to agree responsible behaviour in space”, FCDO and MOD, 26 August 2020 84 “Revisiting the UK’s national security strategy: The National Security Capability Review and the Modernising Defence Programme”, 15 July 2019, HC 2072, 2017- 19, p54 85 “Tobias Ellwood MP: the UK must prepare for a dangerous decade and seek a more influential role”, The House, 27 January 2020 86 HC Deb 2 November 2020 c7 87 HC Deb 2 November 2020 c6 88 “Britain cannot afford a defence review that repeats the mistakes of the past”, Politics Home, 19 September 2020 89 HL Deb 3 November 2020 c621 29 Commons Library Briefing, 19 November 2020

The Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and International Trade select committees have all published reports on subjects that are likely to be discussed in the review. In addition, the Defence and Foreign Affairs committees have also undertaken inquiries on the subject of the Integrated Review. On 13 August 2020, the Defence Committee published its first report on the review, entitled In Search of Strategy - The 2020 Integrated Review. This focused on the process and the Committee concluded: Given that systemic challenges have not been resolved in the previous thirteen reviews of defence procurement, we doubt that the Integrated Review will come up with even a short-term fix. We believe that the Review ought to address the strategic issues that should underpin the UK’s approach to defence procurement, in order to provide a sound basis to address these challenges in the future.90 The Committee has focused phase 2 of its inquiry on threats, capabilities and concepts. The Committee had not published their report at the time of writing. The Foreign Affairs Committee published its report, a brave new Britain? The future of the UK’s international policy, on 22 October 2020. Further reading: • Integrated Review of security, defence, development and foreign affairs: a reading list, House of Commons Library • International affairs and defence: Parliamentary debates and statements in the 2019-21 session, House of Commons Library • Research for Parliament: Preparing for a changing world, POSTbrief, 28 August 2019

90 “In Search of Strategy — The 2020 Integrated Review”, Defence Committee, HC 165 2019-21, 13 August 2020

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