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The Development of Macroeconomics and the Revolution in Finance
1 The Development of Macroeconomics and the Revolution in Finance Perry Mehrling August 26, 2005 Every graduate student learns a story about where modern macroeconomics came from, if only as context for the reading list he is supposed to master as part of his PhD coursework. Usually the story is about disciplinary progress, the slow building of the modern edifice one paper at a time by dedicated scientists not much older than the student himself. It is a story about the internal development of the field, a story intended to help the student make sense of the current disciplinary landscape and to prepare him for a life of writing and receiving referee reports. Exemplary stories of this type include Blanchard (2000) and Woodford (1999). So, for example, a typical story of the development of macroeconomics revolves around a series of academic papers: in the 1960s Muth, Phelps, and Friedman planted the seed from which Robert Lucas and others developed new classical macroeconomics in the 1970s, from which Ed Prescott and others developed real business cycle theory in the 1980s, from which Michael Woodford and others in the 1990s produced the modern new neoclassical synthesis.1 As a pedagogical device, this kind of story has its use, but as history of ideas it leaves a lot to be desired. In fact, as I shall argue, neoKeynesian macroeconomics circa 1965 was destabilized not by the various internal theoretical problems that standard pedagogy emphasizes, but rather by fundamental changes in the institutional structure of the world 1 Muth (1961), Phelps (1968), Friedman (1968); Lucas (1975, 1976, 1977); Kydland and Prescott (1982), Long and Plosser (1983); Woodford (2003). -
Fundamentals of Money and Banking.Pptx
Fundamentals of Money and Banking Alfredo Schclarek Curutchet National University of Córdoba, Argentina National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET), Argentina www.cbaeconomia.com The 24th NSE International Development Forum INSE, PKU August 9, 2018 1 Plan for presentation 1. Motivation 2. Visions of money 3. Money view 1. Hierarchy of monetary system 2. Fluctuation of monetary system 3. Liquidity and (in)stability of monetary system 4. Credit, money and investment 2 Motivation Recent international financial crisis (2007/2009) shows: Understand financial and banking system for macroeconomic analysis Mainstream theories (Neoclassical and NewKeynesian) not useful for: understanding, predicting and giving policy advise Not sufficient to incorporate credit frictions and banking sector in standard DSGE models Main problem: underlying theory of money 3 Visions of money Metalist: Jevons, Menger, von Mises, Kiyotaki, Wright, neo- classical and neo-keynesian Cartalist: Knapp, Mireaux, Goodhart, and post-Keynesian Money view: Perry Mehrling (Columbia University and Institute for New Economic Thinking) 4 Metalist Origin: Private sector (minimize transactions costs involved in barter and advantageous characteristics of the precious metals as a medium of exchange e.g., durability, divisibility, portability, etc.) Value of money: backing (gold, metals) Loss in value: reduction of gold and metals, relative to quantity money Quantity of money: exogenous, given by availability of gold and dollars Role of banks: only intermediaries -
Care and Freedom
Care and freedom Author: S. Umi Devi Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/4083 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Berkeley, CA: Center for Working Families, University of California, Berkeley, 2000 Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States" (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/) Care and Freedom S. Uma Devi* October 2000 *S. Uma Devi is currently on sabbatical from her position as Chairperson of the Economics Department at the Univeristy of Kerala, India, where until recently she was also the Director of Women’s Studies. S. Uma Devi was a visiting scholar at the Center for Working Families during the Spring of 1999-2000. ÓCenter for Working Families, University of California, Berkeley Acknowledgments I am grateful to the Vanguard Foundation for generously funding my research on globalization, human development, and gender concerns. This paper, part of that ongoing project, would not have been possible but for Professor Arlie Hochschild’s keen interest and investment of time, energy, and care. She reversed the global chain of caregivers. I also thank Professors Arlie Hochschild and Barrie Thorne as co-directors of the Center for Working Families, for inviting me to affiliate with the center. Their team, consisting of Bonnie Kwan, Chi-Shan Lin, and Janet Oh, have gone out of their way to provide assistance with loving care. I will always cherish the cordial work atmosphere of the center. I also wish to thank Professors Hochschild and Thorne for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and Dr. -
Culture and Development Economics: Theory, Evidence, Implications
39-62b.qxd 22.10.2002 13:12 Page 39 POLSCI PAPERS CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: THEORY, EVIDENCE, IMPLICATIONS Michael Woolcock * Vijayendra Rao ** Sabina Alkire *** 1 The only way to offer universality for one's scientific judgement is to use other disciplines that can contribute to that judgement - or, at least, this seems to be the latest consensus among scholars. Economics is a complex domain which cannot function well without the help of other sciences. Cultural variables are relevant for the economic studies because various forms of cultural behaviour have to be tested by economists for the success of developing and implementing economic strategies. Although economics has the arrogance to consider itself self sufficient, quantitative data must be sustained for accuracy by qualitative interpretations supplied by sociology or anthropology. One can, after using cultural data, find new research questions and raise more accurate theories. This article argues that multidisciplinary studies are the best cure for superficial and unfounded conclusions Key words: economy, culture, multidisciplinarity, development, social capital, epistemology * Michael Woolcock is social scientist with the Development Research Group at the World Bank and an adjunct lecturer in Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University ** Vijayendra Rao is senior economist with the Development Research Group at the World Bank *** Sabina Alkire is research writer for the Commission on Human Security and Senior Research Associate with the Von Hugel Institute, University of Cambridge 1 Our thanks to Anthony Bebbington, Lynn Bennett, Michael Cernea, Paul Clements, Shelton Davis, Kreszentia Duer, Katrinka Ebbe, David Ellerman, Scott Guggenheim, Robert Klitgaard, Alexandre Marc, Stephen Marglin, Deepa Narayan, Ron Parker, Frank Penna, Nicholas Sambanis, Amartya Sen, Marco Verweij, Michael Walton, and Anna Wetterberg for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. -
November 19, 2008 Letter
November 19, 2008 The Honorable Henry Reid The Honorable Nancy Pelosi Senate Majority Leader Speaker of the House Washington, DC 20510 Washington, DC 20515 The Honorable Mitch McConnell The Honorable John Boehner Senate Minority Leader House Minority Leader Washington, DC 20510 Washington, DC 20515 Dear Sen. Reid, Sen. McConnell, Speaker Pelosi, and Rep. Boehner: We, the undersigned economists, urge Congress to pass a new stimulus package as quickly as possible. The need to deal with financial turmoil has directed attention away from the "real" economy. But the latest data clearly show that the economy is entering a serious recession, initiated by the collapse of homebuilding and intensified by the paralysis of credit markets. Without a fast an effective response by government, the economy could continue to spiral downward, leading to a large increase in unemployment and a sharp decline in GDP. The potential severity of the downturn suggests that a boost to demand on the order of 2.0-3.0 percent of GDP ($300-$400 billion) would be appropriate, with the goal being to get this money spent quickly. The list of targets includes: a) aid to state and local governments that are being forced to make emergency cutbacks as revenues fall; b) extending unemployment insurance and increasing other benefits targeted toward low and moderate income households who are likely to spend quickly; c) moving forward infrastructure projects that have already been planned and scheduled; and d) providing tax credits and other support for "green" projects that can be done quickly, such as retrofitting homes and businesses for increased energy efficiency. -
Mit and Money
Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion UMR CNRS 7321 MIT AND MONEY Documents de travail GREDEG GREDEG Working Papers Series Perry Mehrling GREDEG WP No. 2013-44 http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers.html Les opinions exprimées dans la série des Documents de travail GREDEG sont celles des auteurs et ne reflèlent pas nécessairement celles de l’institution. Les documents n’ont pas été soumis à un rapport formel et sont donc inclus dans cette série pour obtenir des commentaires et encourager la discussion. Les droits sur les documents appartiennent aux auteurs. The views expressed in the GREDEG Working Paper Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the institution. The Working Papers have not undergone formal review and approval. Such papers are included in this series to elicit feedback and to encourage debate. Copyright belongs to the author(s). MIT and Money Perry Mehrling October 22, 2013 I would like to thank all the participants in the HOPE conference for helpful suggestions and stimulating discussion, and in addition Bob Solow, Roger Backhouse, Goncalo Fonseca, Duncan Foley and Roy Weintraub for thoughtful and searching comment on early drafts. 1 Abstract: The Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951 and the subsequent rebuilding of private capital markets, first domestically and then globally, provided the shifting institutional background against which thinking about money and monetary policy evolved within the MIT economics department. Throughout that evolution, a constant, and a constraint, was the conception of monetary economics that Paul Samuelson had himself developed as early as 1937, a conception that informed the decision to bring in Modigliani in 1962, as well as Foley and Sidrauski in 1965. -
The Vision of Hyman P. Minsky
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Vol. 39 (1999) 129–158 The vision of Hyman P. Minsky Perry Mehrling ∗ Barnard College, 3009 Broadway, New York NY 10027, USA Received 3 March 1998; received in revised form 20 July 1998; accepted 22 July 1998 Abstract ©1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: B3; E5 Keywords: Financial fragility; Financial instability; Speculation; Lender of last resort; Refinance On the mezzanine of Littauer, Schumpeter instructed about the primacy of vision: in particular that we — the young who engaged him in conversation — should develop our vision, we should have a view that in a sense is prescientific of what the game is about, about the way the beast functions, about the way the various parts of economics and social science are related and, yes, about our own maps of Utopia. Once we have a vision, then our control of theory, our command of institutional detail, and our knowledge of history are to be marshaled to support the vision...Schumpeter’s methodology of vision and theory, with theory a servant of vision, may seem cynical, but, in truth, it is honest. It is a way of systematizing thought so that dialogue could take place. The division between vision and technique leads to a recognition that we are marshaling evidence when we do theory, when we analyze data, and when we read history. Schumpeter’s methodology undercuts much of the pretentious nonsense about economics as a science and elevates the importance of discourse, of dialogue, and of just plain good talk for a serious study of society. -
Report September 2000 10/6/03 11:31 AM
Report September 2000 10/6/03 11:31 AM Report September 2000 Volume 10, Number 3 Conference on Saving, Intergenerational transfers, and the distribution of wealth As part of its research program into the causes of and solutions to income inequality, the Levy Institute held a conference from June 7 to 9 on the distribution of wealth. The conference was organized by Senior Scholar Edward N. Wolff. Brief notes on the participants' remarks are given here. CONTENTS Conference Saving, Intergenerational Transfers, and the Distribution of Wealth Workshop on Earnings Inequality Editorial Monetarism is Finally Dead, RIP New Working Papers Trends in Direct Measures of Job Skill Requirements Kaleckian Models of Growth in a Stock-Flow Monetary Framework: A Neo- Kaldorian Model "It" Happened, But Not Again: A Minskian Analysis of Japan's Lost Decade Family Structure, Race, and Wealth Ownership: A Longitudinal Exploration of Wealth Accumulation Processes Can European Banks Survive a Unified Currency in a Nationally Segmented Capital Market? Household Savings in Germany An Examination of the Changes in the Distribution of Wealth from 1989 to 1998: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances Discontinuities in the Distribution of Great Wealth: Sectoral Forces Old and New file://localhost/Volumes/wwwroot/docs/report/rptsep00.html Page 1 of 25 Report September 2000 10/6/03 11:31 AM Profits: The Views of Jerome Levy and Michal Kalecki New Policy Notes Welfare College Students: Measuring the Impact of Welfare Reform Health Care Finance in Need of Rethinking Can the Expansion Be Sustained? A Minskian View Drowning in Debt Levy Institute News Lecture Steve Keen: Toward a General Model of Debt Deflation New Staff Event Publications and Presentations Publications and Presentations by Levy Institute Scholars The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, independently funded research organization devoted to public service. -
February 11, 2016 Curriculum Vitae Stephen A. Marglin EDUCATION
February 11, 2016 Curriculum Vitae Stephen A. Marglin EDUCATION Ph.D., Harvard University, 1965 Cambridge University, 1959-1960 A.B., Harvard University, 1959 PRINCIPAL ACADEMIC POSITIONS Walter S. Barker Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1984– Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1969–1984 Associate Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1968–69 Assistant Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1965–68 Assistant Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964–65 Research Associate (India Project), Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New Delhi, India, 1963–65 Junior Fellow of the Society of Fellows, Harvard University, 1960–63 Henry Fellow, Pembroke College, Cambridge University, 1959–60 OTHER ACADEMIC POSITIONS Research Adviser, World Institute for Development Economics Research (United Nations University), Helsinki, 1985-1993 Directeur d'Études Adjoint, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1982 Visiting Scholar, Concordia University, Montreal, 1978-1984; Visiting Professor, 1974–78 Visiting Professor, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1974 Visiting Professor, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, 1967–68 ASSOCIATIONS Econometric Society (Fellow) World Economic Association (Founding Member) World Future Council (2006–2009) BOOKS Dismal Science: How Thinking Like An Economist Undermines Community, Harvard University Press, 2008 Perdiendo el Contacto, Cochabamba and Lima: Cai Pacha and PRATEC, 2000 Growth, Distribution, and Prices, -
Chapter 5 the Golden Age of Capitalism
The Golden Age of Capitalism Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira Chapter of the book being written, Rentiers’ Capitalism. March 2020. In the nineteenth century Western Europe and the United States experienced a remarkable economic and cultural progress but was tarnished by the domestic exploitation of the workers and by the reduction of the peoples of Asia and Africa to the condition of colonies. This was also a period of peace among the major potencies under the leadership of Britain, which had begun with its victory over the France of Napoleon. A period that end tragically with the irrational 1914-18 First World War, whose main cause was the resentment of Germany and Italy. The internal division of these two countries retarded their industrial revolution and lost the opportunity of building a colonial empire as The UK and France had been able to build. This war divided and fragilized Europe, opener room for the socialist 1917 Russian Revolution. and marked the transition of the dominant country from The UK to the United States. The post- war 1920s were euphoric years in the US, but, not surprisingly, ended up with the 1929 crash of the New York Stock Exchange and the 1930s’ Great Depression. Followed a huge fall in GDP, mass unemployment, the discredit of the gold standard and of economic liberalism. The time was, now, for fascism in Italy and Germany, for Stalinism in the Soviet Union, which falsified the Democratic Revolution of the turn of the twentieth century, but was also the time for the New Deal in the United States, which showed that capitalism could be made democratic despite the power of capital and or organization – that a compromise was possible between capitalists, technobureaucrats and the workers. -
Market Liquidity and Hence Ultimately on Dealer of Last Liquidity by Quoting Two-Way Markets, but Resort
Three Principles for Market-Based Credit Regulation By PERRY MEHRLING* * Mehrling: Barnard College, Columbia University, 3009 Broadway, New York NY 10027 (e-mail: [email protected]). I. Back to Basics Thanks to Aaron Brown, Tom Michl, Daniel Neilson, and Zoltan Pozsar for helpful comments. The Bagehot Rule for handling financial Over the last three decades, a new market- crisis—“lend freely but at a high rate”—was based credit system has grown up to become Bagehot’s attempt to distill the principles of larger than the traditional bank-based credit central bank practice as that practice had system, only to mark that achievement in 2007 developed organically over the previous fifty with a financial crisis of its very own. Some years (Bagehot 1873). Today the Bagehot say the crisis was a “Minsky moment” when Rule is where everyone starts when thinking the inherent instability of credit—market- about the role of the central bank, even if most based credit as well as bank-based credit— subsequent discussion is about how to avoid was revealed for all to see. While not crisis in the first place. necessarily disagreeing with that formulation, My concern about this near-universal I prefer to emphasize that it was a “Bagehot framing of the problem is that the world moment” when the Fed was forced to put Bagehot was thinking about is, in crucial aside its inflation fine-tuning and go back to respects, not the world we are dealing with basics. In retrospect, it was the actions of the today. Bagehot was all about the 19th century Fed, more than anything else, that put a floor bill market; our new market-based credit on the crisis. -
The Monetary and Fiscal Nexus of Neo-Chartalism: a Friendly Critique
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES Vol. XLVII No. 1 March 2013 DOI 10.2753/JEI0021-3624470101 The Monetary and Fiscal Nexus of Neo-Chartalism: A Friendly Critique Marc Lavoie Abstract: A number of post-Keynesian authors, called the neo-chartalists, have argued that the government does not face a budget constraint similar to that of households and that government with sovereign currencies run no risk of default, even with high debt-to-GDP ratio. This stands in contrast to countries in the eurozone, where the central bank does not normally purchase sovereign debt. While these claims now seem to be accepted by some economists, neo-chartalists have also made a number of controversial claims, including that the government spends simply by crediting a private-sector-bank account at the central bank; that the government does need to borrow to deficit-spend; and that taxes do not finance government expenditures. This paper shows that these surprising statements do have some logic, once one assumes the consolidation of the government sector and the central bank into a unique entity, the state. The paper further argues, however, that these paradoxical claims end up being counter-productive since consolidation is counter-factual. Keywords: central bank, clearing and settlement system, eurozone, neo-chartalism JEL Classification Codes: B5, E5, E63 The global financial crisis has exposed the weaknesses of mainstream economics and it has given a boost to heterodox theories, in particular, Keynesian theories. The mainstream view about the irrelevance of fiscal activism has been strongly criticized by the active use of fiscal policy in the midst of the global financial crisis.