WHICH PATH to PERSIA? Options for a New American Strategy Toward Iran
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BROOKINGS 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20036-2103 ANALYSIS PAPER www.brookings.edu Number 20, June 2009 WHICH PATH TO PERSIA? Options for a New American Strategy toward Iran Kenneth M. Pollack Daniel L. Byman Martin Indyk Suzanne Maloney Michael E. O’Hanlon Bruce Riedel ANALYSIS PAPER Number 20, June 2009 WHICH PATH TO PERSIA? Options for a New American Strategy toward Iran Kenneth M. Pollack Daniel L. Byman Martin Indyk Suzanne Maloney Michael E. O’Hanlon Bruce Riedel Disclaimer Which Path to Persia? Options for a New Ameri- tive opinions about them. The aim of this exercise can Strategy toward Iran is a product of the Sa- was to highlight the challenges of all the options ban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brook- and to allow readers to decide for themselves ings Institution. The essays were written by Saban which they believe to be best. Center scholars Daniel L. Byman, Martin Indyk, Suzanne Maloney, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Kenneth All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis ex- M. Pollack, and Bruce Riedel. Kenneth Pollack pressed are those of the authors and do not re- also served as the overall editor. flect the official positions or views of the CIA or any other U.S. Government Agency. Nothing in None of the ideas expressed in this volume the contents should be construed as asserting should be construed as representing the views or implying U.S. Government authentication of of any of the individual authors. The collection information or Agency endorsement of the au- is a collaborative effort, and the authors attempt- thors’ views. This material has been reviewed by ed to present each of the options as objectively as the CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified in- possible, without introducing their own subjec- formation. The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution i i i Acknowledgements The authors are deeply grateful for the financial assistance from the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Crown Family Foundation, and oth- ers in the drafting and publication of this study. The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution v The Authors Kenneth M. Pollack Martin Indyk Kenneth Pollack is Director of Research at the Sa- Martin Indyk is the Director of the Saban Center ban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. for Middle East Policy at Brookings. He served in He served as Director for Persian Gulf Affairs several senior positions in the U.S. government, and Near East and South Asian Affairs at the Na- most recently as Ambassador to Israel and before tional Security Council, Senior Research Profes- that as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East sor at National Defense University, and Persian Affairs and as Special Assistant to President Clin- Gulf military analyst at the CIA. His latest book ton and Senior Director for Near East and South is A Path out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for Asian Affairs in the National Security Council. America in the Middle East (Random House). He Before entering government service, he served for is also the author of The Persian Puzzle: The Con- eight years as founding Executive Director of the flict between Iran and America (Random House), Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq published widely on U.S. policy in the Middle East (Random House), and Arabs at War: Military Ef- and the Arab-Israeli peace process. His most re- fectiveness, 1948-1991 (University of Nebraska cent book, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of Press). American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East (Si- mon & Schuster), was published in January 2009. Daniel L. Byman Daniel Byman is a Senior Fellow at the Saban Cen- Suzanne Maloney ter at Brookings. He is Director of the Center for Suzanne Maloney is a Senior Fellow at the Sa- Peace and Security Studies and an Associate Pro- ban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. fessor in the School of Foreign Service at George- She has worked on the State Department’s Policy town University. He has held positions with the Planning Staff where she provided policy analy- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the sis and recommendations on Iran, Iraq, the Gulf United States (the “9/11 Commission”), the Joint States, and broader Middle East issues. Before 9/11 Inquiry and Senate Intelligence Committees, joining the government, she was the Middle East the RAND Corporation, and the U.S. govern- adviser at ExxonMobil Corporation and served as ment. He writes widely on issues related to U.S. project director of the Task Force on U.S.-Iran Re- national security, terrorism, and the Middle East. lations at the Council on Foreign Relations. His latest books are Deadly Connections: State Sponsorship of Terrorism (Cambridge University Press) and The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (Wiley). The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution v i i Michael E. O’Hanlon Bruce Riedel Michael O’Hanlon is a Senior Fellow in Foreign Bruce Riedel is Senior Fellow for Political Tran- Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. He is sitions in the Middle East and South Asia at the also Director of Research for the 21st Century De- Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. fense Initiative and Senior Author of the Brook- He served as Chairman of President Obama’s Stra- ings Iraq Index and holds the Sydney Stein Chair tegic Review of U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan at Brookings. A former defense budget analyst and Pakistan. In 2006, he retired after 30 years who advised Members of Congress on military service at the CIA including postings overseas spending, he specializes in Iraq, North Korea, Af- in the Middle East and Europe. He was a senior ghanistan, homeland security, Nuclear Strategy, adviser on the region to the last four presidents the use of military force, and other defense issues. of the United States as a staff member of the Na- He is the author of Budgeting for Hard Power tional Security Council at the White House. He (Brookings) and The Science of War (Princeton was also Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense University Press), both forthcoming this summer. for the Near East and South Asia at the Pentagon and a senior adviser at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels. Riedel was a member of President Clinton’s peace team at the Camp Da- vid, Wye River, and Shepherdstown summits. He is the author of The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Lead- ership, Ideology, and Future (Brookings). v i i i WH ic H PAT H T O P E R si A? O ptions for a New A merican Strategy toward Iran Table of Contents Introduction The Trouble with Tehran: U.S. Policy Options toward Iran . 1 Part I Dissuading Tehran: The Diplomatic Options . 21 Chapter 1: An Offer Iran Shouldn’t Refuse: Persuasion . 23 Chapter 2: Tempting Tehran: The Engagement Option . 42 Part II Disarming Tehran: The Military Options . 61 Chapter 3: Going All the Way: Invasion . 63 Chapter 4: The Osiraq Option: Airstrikes . 74 Chapter 5: Leave it to Bibi: Allowing or Encouraging an Israeli Military Strike . 89 Part III Toppling Tehran: Regime Change . 101 Chapter 6: The Velvet Revolution: Supporting a Popular Uprising . 103 Chapter 7: Inspiring an Insurgency: Supporting Iranian Minority And Opposition Groups . .113 Chapter 8: The Coup: Supporting a Military Move Against the Regime . 122 Part IV Deterring Tehran: Containment . 129 Chapter 9: Accepting the Unacceptable: Containment . 131 Conclusion Crafting an Integrated Iran Policy: Connecting the Options . 145 The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution x i Introduction THE TROublE WITH TEHRAN U.S. Policy Options toward Iran hat should the United States do about either. Iran is an important country in a critical WIran? The question is easily asked, but for part of the world. Although Tehran’s role in creat- nearly 30 years, Washington has had difficulty ing problems in the Middle East is often exagger- coming up with a good answer. The Islamic Re- ated, it has unquestionably taken advantage of the public presents a particularly confounding series growing instability there (itself partly a result of of challenges for the United States. Many Iranian American missteps) to make important gains, of- leaders regard the United States as their greatest ten at Washington’s expense. Meanwhile, the 2007 enemy for ideological, nationalistic, and/or secu- National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, properly rity reasons, while a great many average Iranians understood, warned that Tehran was likely to ac- evince the most pro-American feelings of any in quire the capability to manufacture nuclear weap- the Muslim world. Unlike other states that may ons at some point in the next decade.1 also fear or loathe the United States, Iran’s lead- ers have consistently acted on these beliefs, work- An Undistinguished Record ing assiduously to undermine American interests and influence throughout the Middle East, albeit Perhaps not surprisingly, the track record of U.S. with greater or lesser degrees of success at dif- policies toward Iran is not particularly impres- ferent times. Moreover, Iranian foreign policy sive. Since 1979 Washington has tried everything is frequently driven by internal political consid- from undeclared warfare to unilateral conces- erations that are both difficult to discern by the sions. These policies have done better at limiting outside world and even harder to influence. More Iranian mischief making than their critics will ad- than once, Iran has followed a course that to out- mit but have largely failed to convince Tehran to siders appeared self-defeating but galvanized the drop its support for terrorist groups, its pursuit of Iranian people to make far-reaching sacrifices in a nuclear weapons capability, or its wider efforts the name of seemingly quixotic goals.