Riskmetrics Technical Document
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund
Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Mullert Inherent tensions in the financial sector mean that episodes of extreme stress are inevitable, if unpredictable. This is true even when financial regulatory and supervisory regimes are effective in many respects. The government's capacity to intervene may determine whether distress is confined to the financial sector or breaks out into the real economy Although adequate resolution authority to address a failingfinancialfirm is a necessary objective of the current regulatory reforms, a firm-by-firm approach cannot address a major systemic failure. Major blows to the financial system, such as the financial crisis of 2007-2009, may require capital support of the financial sector to prevent severe economic harm. We therefore propose the creation of a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund ("SEIF" or "Fund"), initially set at $1 trillion, but periodically rescaled to the size of the U.S. economy. SEIF should be funded (andpartially pre-funded) by risk-adjusted assessments on all large financial firms -including hedge funds -that benefit from systemic stability. The Department of the Treasury ("Treasury") would administer the Fund, the use of which would be triggered by a "triple key" concurrence among the Treasury, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), and the Federal Reserve ("Fed"). Unlike taxpayer "bailouts," such a fund would mutualize systemic risk among financial firms through a facility overseen by regulators. Moreover, its funding mechanism would give financial firms a greaterincentive to warn regulatorsof growing systemic risk. And this standby emergency authority would avoid the need for high-stakes legislative action mid-crisis, which can be destabilizing even ifsuccessful and catastrophicif not. -
Estimation and Decomposition of Downside Risk for Portfolios with Non-Normal Returns
The Journal of Risk (79–103) Volume 11/Number 2, Winter 2008/09 Estimation and decomposition of downside risk for portfolios with non-normal returns Kris Boudt Faculty of Business and Economics, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and Lessius University College, 69 Naamsestraat, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium; email: [email protected] Brian Peterson Diamond Management & Technology Consultants, Chicago, IL; email: [email protected] Christophe Croux Faculty of Business and Economics, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and Lessius University College, 69 Naamsestraat, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium; email: [email protected] We propose a new estimator for expected shortfall that uses asymptotic expansions to account for the asymmetry and heavy tails in financial returns. We provide all the necessary formulas for decomposing estimators of value-at-risk and expected shortfall based on asymptotic expansions and show that this new methodology is very useful for analyzing and predicting the risk properties of portfolios of alternative investments. 1 INTRODUCTION Value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES) have emerged as industry standards for measuring downside risk. Despite the variety of complex estimation methods based on Monte Carlo simulation, extreme value theory and quantile regression proposed in the literature (see Kuester et al (2006) for a review), many practitioners either use the empirical or the Gaussian distribution function to predict portfolio downside risk. The potential advantage of using the empirical distribution function over the hypothetical Gaussian distribution function is that only the information in the return series is used to estimate downside risk, without any distributional assumptions. The disadvantage is that the resulting estimates of VaR and ES, called historical VaR and ES, typically have a larger variation from out-of-sample obser- vations than those based on a correctly specified parametric class of distribution functions. -
Chapter 5 Risk Adjusted Value
1 CHAPTER 5 RISK ADJUSTED VALUE Risk-averse investors will assign lower values to assets that have more risk associated with them than to otherwise similar assets that are less risky. The most common way of adjusting for risk to compute a value that is risk adjusted. In this chapter, we will consider four ways in which we this risk adjustment can be made. The first two approaches are based upon discounted cash flow valuation, where we value an asset by discounting the expected cash flows on it at a discount rate. The risk adjustment here can take the form of a higher discount rate or as a reduction in expected cash flows for risky assets, with the adjustment based upon some measure of asset risk. The third approach is to do a post-valuation adjustment to the value obtained for an asset, with no consideration given for risk, with the adjustment taking the form of a discount for potential downside risk or a premium for upside risk. In the final approach, we adjust for risk by observing how much the market discounts the value of assets of similar risk. While we will present these approaches as separate and potentially self-standing, we will also argue that analysts often employ combinations of approaches. For instance, it is not uncommon for an analyst to estimate value using a risk-adjusted discount rate and then attach an additional discount for liquidity to that value. In the process, they often double count or miscount risk. Discounted Cash Flow Approaches In discounted cash flow valuation, the value of any asset can be written as the present value of the expected cash flows on that asset. -
Gauging Systemic Risks from Hard-To-Value Assets in Euro Area Banks’ Balance Sheets
Box 7 Gauging systemic risks from hard-to-value assets in euro area banks’ balance sheets Prepared by Michał Adam and Katri Mikkonen Uncertainty associated with hard-to-value securities on bank balance sheets can affect market perceptions of banks, especially during periods of stress. Fair value assets on bank balance sheets are classified into three categories: (i) those which are easy to value and based on quoted market prices (level 1 (L1) assets); (ii) those that are harder to value and only partially derive from quoted market prices (level 2 (L2) assets); and (iii) those that are particularly complex and the valuation of which is based on models instead of observed prices (level 3 (L3) assets). While the accounting standards provide the principles for the allocation of assets to the L2/L3 categories, they also leave some room for interpretation, which can result in different choices across banks. Valuation uncertainties can be problematic in times of stress should they lead investors to mistrust the value of banks’ assets, and in turn trigger liquidity or deleveraging pressures – not least if valuations behave in a correlated manner across banks or are concentrated in systemic banks. Worsening market liquidity conditions that would possibly also lead to reclassifications of assets into the L3 category could further amplify the effect. Against this background, this box first looks at the magnitude and distribution of L2/L3 assets in euro area banks’ balance sheets, and second at their impact on market perceptions of banks through the lens of price-to-book (P/B) ratios during normal and stressed times. -
Risk Management (Online Only)
Risk management Risk management (Online Only) 18 Swiss Re | Financial Report 2020 Risk management Swiss Re | Financial Report 2020 19 Risk management Internal control system and risk model regulatory requirements which Swiss Re is subject to, including compliance, legal and tax risks Internal control system • Effectiveness and efficiency of The internal control system is overseen by operations − addressing basic business the Board of Directors of Swiss Re Ltd and objectives, including performance and the Group Executive Committee. It aims to profitability goals, and the safeguarding provide reasonable oversight and assurance of assets covering significant market, in achieving three objectives: credit, liquidity, insurance, technology • Reliability of reporting − addressing the and other risks preparation of reliable reporting arrangements as well as related data Operationally, the internal control system is covering significant financial, economic, based on Swiss Re’s three lines of control regulatory and other reporting risks and comprises five components: • Compliance with applicable laws and regulations − addressing legal and RISK ASSESSMENT CONTROL INFORMATION & MONITORING ACTIVITIES ACTIVITIES COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES Processes to identify Risk mitigation activities Capturing and sharing Ongoing evaluation of control and assess risks established in policies and information for risk control effectiveness procedures and management decisions • Performed by risk takers • Performed by risk takers (1st • Performed by all lines of • Risk -
Capturing Downside Risk in Financial Markets: the Case of the Asian Crisis
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Research Papers in Economics Journal of International Money and Finance 18 (1999) 853–870 www.elsevier.nl/locate/econbase Capturing downside risk in financial markets: the case of the Asian Crisis Rachel A.J. Pownall *, Kees G. Koedijk Faculty of Business Administration, Financial Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands and CEPR Abstract Using data on Asian equity markets, we observe that during periods of financial turmoil, deviations from the mean-variance framework become more severe, resulting in periods with additional downside risk to investors. Current risk management techniques failing to take this additional downside risk into account will underestimate the true Value-at-Risk with greater severity during periods of financial turnoil. We provide a conditional approach to the Value- at-Risk methodology, known as conditional VaR-x, which to capture the time variation of non-normalities allows for additional tail fatness in the distribution of expected returns. These conditional VaR-x estimates are then compared to those based on the RiskMetrics method- ology from J.P. Morgan, where we find that the model provides improved forecasts of the Value-at-Risk. We are therefore able to show that our conditional VaR-x estimates are better able to capture the nature of downside risk, particularly crucial in times of financial crises. 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Financial regulation; Value-at-risk; Riskmetrics; Extreme value theory 1. Introduction A number of Asian economies have recently been characterized by highly volatile financial markets, which when coupled with high returns, should have been seen as an attractive avenue down which one could diversify portfolios. -
An Analysis and Description of Pricing and Information Sources in the Securitized and Structured Finance Markets
An Analysis and Description of Pricing and Information Sources in the Securitized and Structured Finance Markets The Bond Market Association and The American Securitization Forum October 2006 ANALYsis AND DESCRipTION OF PRiCING AND INFORmaTION SOURCES IN THE SECURITIZED AND STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1 I. Introduction and Methodology ............................................................................. 9 Study Objective ............................................................................................................................. 9 What Does the Study Cover ....................................................................................................... 9 The Pricing and Information Sources Covered in this Report .............................................10 II. Broad Observations and Conclusions ................................................................10 Each product sector is unique, though some general conclusions may be drawn ..........10 Structured Finance Products Trade in Dealer Markets .................................................10 Types of Pricing ..........................................................................................................................11 Primary Market vs. Secondary Pricing ....................................................................................11 Pricing Information Contexts and Applications ................................................................. -
Preventing the Next Financial Crisis Lessons for a New Framework of Financial Market Stabilization
The Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. Center for Leadership and Ethics Preventing the Next Financial Crisis Lessons for a New Framework of Financial Market Stabilization A research symposium December 10–11, 2008 The Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. Center for Leadership and Ethics 1 Symposium Participants (In order of symposium agenda) Bruce Kogut Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. Professor of Leadership and Ethics; Director, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. Center for Leadership and Ethics Columbia Business School John Coffee Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law Columbia Law School Glenn Hubbard Dean; Russell L. Carson Professor of Finance and Economics Columbia Business School Wei Jiang Sidney Taurel Associate Professor of Business Patrick Bolton Columbia Business School Barbara and David Zalaznick Professor of Business Columbia Business School David Skeel S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law Markus Brunnermeier University of Pennsylvania Law School Edwards S. Sanford Professor of Economics Princeton University Stephan Meier Assistant Professor of Management Columbia Business School Michelle White Professor of Economics Charles Calomiris University of California, San Diego Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions Columbia Business School Chris Mayer Senior Vice Dean; Paul Milstein Professor of Real Estate Katharina Pistor Columbia Business School Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law Columbia Law School Pierre Collin-Dufresne Carson Family Professor of Business Jean-Charles Rochet Columbia Business School Professor of Mathematics and Economics Toulouse -
Securitisation of Intellectual Property Assets in the US M…
Securitisation of intellectual property assets in the US market William J. Kramer and Chirag B. Patel Marshall, Gerstein & Borun, Chicago, IL Corporations that have little or no tangible assets are able to obtain significant funding without selling a significant portion of the ownership of the corporation. How? One way is to offer security interests in intangible assets such as intellectual property in the form of patents, trademarks and copyrights. While intellectual property is not a tangible asset in a traditional sense, it is an asset and there are ways to obtain funding by collateralising intellectual property. Asset securitisation, the practice of converting an asset or a stream of cash flows into marketable securities, is well known in the finance industry but is relatively new to the world of intellectual property. Asset securitisation started in early 1980s by securitisation of auto-loan receivables and credit card receivables and has grown to cover a very wide range of assets, from auto loans to pub revenues. Moving into the future, securing funding using intellectual property will be even more important as the focus of corporations continues to move toward developing intellectual property. There are many reasons to use intellectual property as collateral with three primary reasons being: 1. intellectual property is an untapped source of collateral; 2. intellectual property securitisation offers a quick return on research and development; and 3. intellectual property securitisation captures additional value. An untapped source of collateral A number of studies have shown that intellectual property plays an increasingly important part in the US and world economy. For example, value of intangible assets as a percentage of the market capitalisation of US companies increased from 20% in 1978 to 73% in 1998, demonstrating that the ratio of value of intangible assets to the value of tangible assets of US companies has steadily increased over this period (Intangibles Management, Measurement and Reporting, Baruch Lev, Brookings Institute, 2001). -
Valuation Risk Revalued∗
Valuation Risk Revalued∗ Oliver de Groot Alexander W. Richter Nathaniel A. Throckmorton First Draft: July 20, 2018 This Draft: September 8, 2021 ABSTRACT This paper shows the success of valuation risk—time-preference shocks in Epstein-Zin utility—in resolving asset pricing puzzles rests sensitively on the way it is introduced. The specification used in the literature is at odds with several desirable properties of recursive pref- erences because the weights in the time-aggregator do not sum to one. When we revise the specification in a simple asset pricing model the puzzles resurface. However, when estimating a sequence of increasingly rich models, we find valuation risk under the revised specification consistently improves the ability of the models to match asset price and cash-flow dynamics. Keywords: Recursive Utility; Asset Pricing; Equity Premium Puzzle; Risk-Free Rate Puzzle JEL Classifications: C15; D81; G12 ∗de Groot, University of Liverpool Management School & CEPR, Chatham Street, Liverpool, L69 7ZH, UK ([email protected]); Richter, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2200 N. Pearl Street, Dallas, TX 75201 ([email protected]); Throckmorton, Department of Economics, William & Mary, P.O. Box 8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187 ([email protected]). We thank Victor Xi Luo for sharing the code to “Valuation Risk and Asset Pricing” and Winston Dou for discussing our paper at the 2019 NBER EFSF meeting. We also thank Martin An- dreasen, Jaroslav Borovicka, Alex Chudik, Marc Giannoni, Ken Judd, Dana Kiku, Evan Koenig, Alex Kostakis, Holger Kraft, Wolfgang Lemke, Hanno Lustig, Walter Pohl, Karl Schmedders, Todd Walker, and Ole Wilms for comments that improved the paper. -
Applied Quantitative Finance
Applied Quantitative Finance Wolfgang H¨ardle Torsten Kleinow Gerhard Stahl In cooperation with G¨okhanAydınlı, Oliver Jim Blaskowitz, Song Xi Chen, Matthias Fengler, J¨urgenFranke, Christoph Frisch, Helmut Herwartz, Harriet Holzberger, Steffi H¨ose, Stefan Huschens, Kim Huynh, Stefan R. Jaschke, Yuze Jiang Pierre Kervella, R¨udigerKiesel, Germar Kn¨ochlein, Sven Knoth, Jens L¨ussem,Danilo Mercurio, Marlene M¨uller,J¨ornRank, Peter Schmidt, Rainer Schulz, J¨urgenSchumacher, Thomas Siegl, Robert Wania, Axel Werwatz, Jun Zheng June 20, 2002 Contents Preface xv Contributors xix Frequently Used Notation xxi I Value at Risk 1 1 Approximating Value at Risk in Conditional Gaussian Models 3 Stefan R. Jaschke and Yuze Jiang 1.1 Introduction . 3 1.1.1 The Practical Need . 3 1.1.2 Statistical Modeling for VaR . 4 1.1.3 VaR Approximations . 6 1.1.4 Pros and Cons of Delta-Gamma Approximations . 7 1.2 General Properties of Delta-Gamma-Normal Models . 8 1.3 Cornish-Fisher Approximations . 12 1.3.1 Derivation . 12 1.3.2 Properties . 15 1.4 Fourier Inversion . 16 iv Contents 1.4.1 Error Analysis . 16 1.4.2 Tail Behavior . 20 1.4.3 Inversion of the cdf minus the Gaussian Approximation 21 1.5 Variance Reduction Techniques in Monte-Carlo Simulation . 24 1.5.1 Monte-Carlo Sampling Method . 24 1.5.2 Partial Monte-Carlo with Importance Sampling . 28 1.5.3 XploRe Examples . 30 2 Applications of Copulas for the Calculation of Value-at-Risk 35 J¨ornRank and Thomas Siegl 2.1 Copulas . 36 2.1.1 Definition . -
Return to Riskmetrics: the Evolution of a Standard
Return to RiskMetrics: The Evolution of a Standard Jorge Mina and Jerry Yi Xiao Introduction by Christopher C. Finger RiskMetrics www.riskmetrics.com 44 Wall St. New York, NY 10005 Return to RiskMetrics: The Evolution of a Standard, April 2001. Copyright © 2001 RiskMetrics Group, Inc. All rights reserved. Certain risk measurement technology of RiskMetrics Group, Inc. is patent pending. RiskMetrics, RiskManager, CreditMetrics, CreditManager, LongRun, CorporateMetrics, and DataMetrics, among others, are trademarks or service marks owned by or licensed to RiskMetrics Group, Inc. in the United States and other countries. RiskMetrics Group, Inc. disclaims any and all warranties as to any results to be obtained from any use of the content or methodology provided by RiskMetrics Group, Inc. or any representation or warranty that such content or methodology are in any way guidance for any investor or investors in general to determine the suitability or desirability of the investment in a particular security, or securities in general. RiskMetrics Group, Inc. does not guarantee the sequence, timeliness, accuracy, completeness, or continued availability of such content or methodology. Such content and methodology are based on historical observations and should not be relied upon to predict future market movements. The information contained in this document is believed to be reliable, but RiskMetrics Group does not guarantee its completeness or accuracy. Opinions and estimates constitute our judgment and are subject to change without notice. Foreword This document is an update and restatement of the mathematical models in the 1996 RiskMetrics Technical Document, now known as RiskMetrics Classic. RiskMetrics Classic was the fourth edition, with the original document having been published in 1994.