Introduction to Philosophy

Home , Apology (Plato), Crito, Euthyphro dilemma, Piety, Republic (Plato), Socratic dialogue

Ted L. Poston

January 28, 2018 Contents

1 The Euthyphro 2 1.1 Setting ...... 2 1.2 Socratic Definition ...... 2 1.3 Euthyphro’s Answer ...... 3 1.4 The Euthyphro Dilemma ...... 3 1.5 Alston ‘What Euthyphro should have said’ ...... 4 1.5.1 The first horn ...... 4 1.5.2 The solution to the first horn ...... 5 1.5.3 Second horn ...... 6 1.5.4 three objections ...... 6

2 The Apology 8 2.1 Setting ...... 8 2.2 What is Socrates up to? ...... 8 2.3 Memorable lines ...... 9 2.4 The Impiety of Socrates ...... 9

3 The Crito 10 3.1 Setting ...... 10 3.2 The arguments ...... 11 3.2.1 The argument from agreement ...... 11 3.2.2 The argument from universalization ...... 12 3.2.3 The parent - polis analogy ...... 12

i Part I

Five Dialogues

1 Chapter 1

The Euthyphro

1.1 Setting

Euthyphro is a professional, well-established priest. It’s clear that he is well-known and has influence. He meets Socrates near the king-archon’s court. Socrates has been indicted by Meletus on the crime of corrupting the youth. Meletus charges that Socrates is undermining the foundation of Athean political society. Socrates is questioning religion and morality. Euthyphro is brining his father up on the charge of murder. His father was in charge of a slave who had murdered someone. Euthyphro’s father then imprisoned the slave, and went off to see what ought to be done. In the meantime, the slave died. Euthyphro feels strongly that this is wrong and thus charges his father with murder. Socrates wonders how Euthyphro can be so confident that he is in the right. The conversation then develops into a regular Socratic dialogue.

1.2 Socratic Deﬁnition

Socrates wants to know what is the nature of piety. What is it that all and only pious acts have in common in virtue of which they are pious? We can list pious acts: alms- giving, forgiveness, prayer, self-improvement, etc. And impious acts: lying, cheating, stealing, murder, etc. But Socrates wants to know what is it that makes the acts described as ‘pious’ all form a class and the acts described as ‘impious’ all form a class. E.g, “Is not the pious the same and alike in every action, and the impious the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to be impious presents us with one form or appearance insofar as it is impious?” (5d) Or, at 6e “I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious acts but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious.” We can put the goal of Socratic deﬁnition this way. Analyze the concept (e.g., pious) in terms of necessary and suﬃcient conditions. So,

2 CHAPTER 1. THE EUTHYPHRO 3 x is pious if and only if x is . A necessary condition for Y is a condition that is required for Y. For example, you can’t graduate from college without passing a course. So, passing a course is a necessary condition for graduating. But you can surely pass a course without graduating. A sufficient condition for Y is a condition that guarantees that Y occurs. A sufficient condition for graduating for college is completing all your coursework, pay- ing your tuition, and being in good standing. If those conditions obtain then you graduate. Socrates wants to know what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for piety. Socratic definition gets at the form. Plato’s theory of the forms holds that individual acts participate in a form that explains why they have the property at issue. E.g., a just act is just because it participates in the form of justice.

1.3 Euthyphro’s Answer

Euthyphro gives the following account of piety.

x is pious if and only if x is valued by the gods.

Socrates dithers a bit around the fact that the gods disagree about what is valu- able, but then fixes on a key question. Do the gods value pious acts because they are pious, or are the acts pious because they are valued by the gods? “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” (10a) This question is getting at the explanatory direction. Does the piety of the acts explain why the gods value those acts, or does the fact that the gods value those acts explain the piety of the acts? It’s important to realize that the mere truth of a biconditional doesn’t tell us anything about the explanatory direction. Suppose Harrison has this property. All and only times at which he is hungry does he eat crawfish. So this is true. Harrison is hungry if and only if Harrison eats crawfish. Here, though, we can grasp which explains which. Does the fact that Harrison eats crawfish explain why he’s hungry, or does the fact that Harrison is hungry explain why he eats? Clearly, it’s the later. Harrison’s hunger causes him to eat. So, Socrates thinks that Euthyphro should come to see that it’s not the gods valuing the acts that make the acts pious but rather it’s the piety of the acts that explains why the gods value those acts.

1.4 The Euthyphro Dilemma

What is of interest in this dialogue is the puzzle Socrates presents concerning the relationship between moral obligation and God. Divine Command Theory states CHAPTER 1. THE EUTHYPHRO 4 that x is obligatory if and only if x is commanded by God. We then have the following dilemma.

1. Either (i) an act is obligatory because God commands it or (ii) God commands an act because it is obligatory (required, the right thing to do). 2. If (i) then God’s commands are arbitrary and God’s goodness isn’t morally substantive. 3. If (ii) then there is a moral structure independent of God.

4. Either God’s commands are arbitrary or there is a moral structure independent of God.

(2) is problematic because it seems like God’s commands reﬂect certain basic facts about what ought to be done. But (3) is problematic because God is supreme. There is nothing outside of God to which God must measure up to. But if morality is independent of God then morality is the ultimate standard, not God.

1.5 Alston ‘What Euthyphro should have said’

Alston’s focus is on divine command ethics, i.e., “whether God commands us to love one another because that is right or whether that is right because God commands us to do it.”(Alston; 2002, 283) His goal is to determine what view of God and human morality a divine command theorist should adopt is she is to be in the best position to deal with this dilemma. Divine command theory states that divine commands are constitutive of moral obligation. “Ethical wrongness is identical with the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God.” DCT should be understood as a general view of moral obligation. The Euthyphro dilemma is supposed to be fatal for theism.

1.5.1 The first horn The first horn that says an act is obligatory because God commands it. Alston iden- tifies two difficulties. First, that (i) makes divine commands arbitrary. The problem is that this horn ‘blocks off any moral reason for them (the divine commands).”1 Second, we are left with no way to understand God’s goodness. If the standard of moral goodness is set by divine commands, then to say that God is morally good is just to say that he obeys his own commands. But this isn’t what theist means when they say that God is supremely good.

1(Alston; 2002, 285) CHAPTER 1. THE EUTHYPHRO 5

1.5.2 The solution to the ﬁrst horn A general solution to the ﬁrst horn is to make sense of the goodness of God that is independent from moral obligation. On this view, obligatory action is constituted by divine commands, but moral goodness is broader than obligation. Alston suggests that If God is essentially good then there will be nothing arbitrary about his commands.(Alston; 2002, 285) Divine goodness is not constituted by divine commands. Human goodness, by contrast, is constituted by divine commands. How to make sense of divine goodness that allows for the truth of DCT? The view: If it is impossible for God to have duties or obligations, if it cannot ever be true that God ought to do something or other, then divine commands can be constitutive of these sorts of moral facts, for human beings and perhaps other creatures, while leaving other sorts of facts that are constitutive of divine moral goodness to be otherwise constituted. (Alston; 2002, 286)

Reasons to think that obligation is different from goodness Kant Immanuel Kant (1724–1804): Famous for his resolution of empiricism and rationalism. The three critiques: Critique of pure reason, Critique of practical reason, the critique of the power of judgment “The fundamental idea of Kant’s ‘critical philosophy’ is human autonomy. He argues that the human understanding is the source of the general laws of nature that structure all our experience; and that human reason gives itself the moral law, which is our basis for belief in God, freedom, and immortality. Therefore, scientific knowledge, morality, and religious belief are mutually consistent and secure because they all rest on the same foundation of human autonomy, which is also the final end of nature according to the teleological worldview of reflecting judgment that Kant introduces to unify the theoretical and practical parts of his philosophical system.” (SEP)

Oughts have force only it’s possible to disobey. There’s an idea that an ought is applicable only if there is a possibility of regulating conduct. Alston’s football rule analogy (p. 288)

Stump’s objection “If God should break a promise then he would be doing something he ought not to do.” (p. 289). Reply: This is an impossible antecedent. Were God to break a promise then God would be the type of being that is under obligation. But as God is essentially good, he is not.

Upshot Divine commands are constitutive of facts of the form ‘S morally ought to do A’. These facts don’t apply to God. God is still good by virtue of his lovingness, justice, CHAPTER 1. THE EUTHYPHRO 6 and mercy. God’s commands are an expression of his perfect goodness.

1.5.3 Second horn Divine goodness is logically prior to divine commands. Second horn: if God com- manding us to love is obligatory because it is good. Problem: ‘it implies that there are realities other than himself that do not owe their being to his creative activity.” Analogy: if you drive too fast then you can get a ticket from the law. You, as a holder of a permit to drive, are subject to a law. God, as the supreme creator, is not under a law.

1st reply Evaluative principles are logical truths. They are necessary and so there’s little sense to God being under an externally imposed law.

2nd reply The problem with the second hard is that it assumes a Platonic conception of the objectivity of goodness. There is some general principle that explains for any person or act in virtue of which that act is good.

God himself is the standard of goodness. “Lovingness is good (a good-making feature, that on which goodness is supervenient) not because of the Platonic existence of a general principle or fact to the eﬀect that lovingness is good, but because God, the supreme standard of goodness, is loving.” (291–292)

Platonic predicates the criterion for the application of, e.g., ‘good’, involves a general essence or idea that can be speciﬁed in general terms.

Particularistic predicates the criterion for the application of, e.g., ‘dog’, involves essential reference to one or more individuals. There is no general deﬁnition of ‘dog’; rather there is a family resemblance between various exemplars.

‘Good’ is a particularistic predicate.

1.5.4 three objections 1st objection It is arbitrary to take God’s lovingkindness as good apart from a general principle that states that lovingkindness is good. A variation: what is the explanation for why God’s features are good. Explanations have to end somewhere. CHAPTER 1. THE EUTHYPHRO 7

2nd objection Knowledge of good would require knowledge of God, but we can know what is good without knowing God. We can know that this is water without knowing the compo- sition of water.

3rd objection If God is good independently of conformity to divine commands, and the divine commands reﬂect God’s goodness then conformity to divine commands is good because it reﬂects the nature of God. Hence no need to talk about the activity of divine commands.

Diﬀerence between an act being good and an act being obligatory. Obligation is a matter of being subject to law. Chapter 2

The Apology

2.1 Setting

The Apology is Plato’s account of the trial of Socrates. Socrates stands accused of crimes against the state (or, polis). He is accused of undermining the foundation of the state by corrupting the young and not believing in the gods (impiety). Socrates defends himself against several sets of charges. Recall the dates for Socrates was 469-399 BC. Socrates most famous student was Plato (428-348 BC), and Plato’s most famous student was Aristotle (384-322 BC). Aristotle himself taught Alexander the Great.

2.2 What is Socrates up to?

The Apology gives us an account of Socrates’s activity. Most importantly, is his account of why he has a reputation in Athens. Socrates relates the story from the Delphic oracle who said that Socrates was the wisest person. (21a) Socrates was puzzled by this because he knows that he isn’t wise (21b). So he went about meet- ing with reputed wise people, the politicians, poets, and the craftsman, to find out whether they were really wise. He discovers that the reputed knowledge workers–the politicians and the poets–lack wisdom. The craftsmen have knowledge but it is lim- ited to their craft. This knowledge, though, leads them to be over-confident in the ‘most important matters’. What kind of wisdom is Socrates after? This comes out in his response to Meletus’s accusations (see 24d ff). It is the wisdom that will make a person good. Notice the analogy with horse breeders (25b). Also, notice the assumption: there is a wisdom that makes a person good. See 29e: care for the best possible state of your soul.

8 CHAPTER 2. THE APOLOGY 9 2.3 Memorable lines

• “To fear death is no other than to think oneself wise when one is not” (29b)

• “It is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows when one does not know.” (29b)

• “Neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm me in any way; he could not harm me, for I do not think it is permitted that a better man be harmed by a worse.” (30d)

• “the unexamined life is not worth living.” (38a)

2.4 The Impiety of Socrates

Burnyeat argues that we should read the Apology in the place of a juror. We must be concerned with the polis and the justice of the charge against Socrates that he is impious and he has corrupted the youth. Burnyeat argues that Socrates is guilty of impiety and corrupting the youth. In the defense that Socrates gives he refers to the God, but he doesn’t endorse the gods of Athens. Moreover, Socrates puts forward that people ought to concern themselves chieﬂy with human wisdom, the wisdom of how to live. This wisdom can be found on the basis of reason and dialogue. Burnyeat points out that this is a threat to the polis with its foundations of civic agreement laying in the stories of Greek mythology and religious observation. So Burnyeat presses the point that Socrates is indeed guilty of impiety and corrupting the young. Thus, the 280 Athenian jurors that convict Socrates do so rightly. Socrates is doing those activities that Meletus and others have accused him of. It’s a separate issue of whether Socrates is guilty of death; he’s not. Burnyeat also argues that Plato’s aim in the Apology is an indictment against Athenian politics and a setting of the stage for Plato’s own political philosophy in the Republic. Chapter 3

The Crito

3.1 Setting

The Crito is an account of the conversation of Socrates and his dear friend Crito, days before Socrates death sentence is carried out. Crito comes to Socrates to encourage him to secretly leave Athens to go to a nearby polis, eg., Thessaly, where he can live out his days with this friends and family. Socrates provides reasons why it would be unjust for him to abscond from Athens when the polis has reached a verdict. Socrates gives several arguments that we will examine that to the eﬀect that it is wrong to disobey an order of the state. A puzzle with the Crito is how Socrates’s arguments that it is wrong to disobey the state ﬁgure in with Socrates’s statement in the Apology that if the polis ordered him to stop philosophizing he wouldn’t obey. See 29d-e Socrates says

Men of Athens, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to any one of you who I happen to meet: ‘Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation, and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth or the best possible state of your soul?’

The position Socrates stakes out the Crito, though, can seem very authoritarian. Socrates in 51a-c asks

Do you think you have this right to retaliation against your country and its laws? . . . Is your wisdom such as not to realize that your country is to be honored more than your mother, your father, and all you ancestors, that it is more to be revered and more sacred, and that it counts for more

10 CHAPTER 3. THE CRITO 11

among the gods and sensible men, that you must worship it, yield to it, and placate its anger more than your father’s? You must either persuade it or obey its orders, and endure in silence whatever it instructs you to endure, whether blows or bonds, and if leads you into war to be wounded or killed, you must obey. To do so is right, and one must not give way to retreat or leave one’s post, but both in war and in courts and everywhere else, one must obey the the commands of one city and country, or persuade it as to the nature of justice. It is in impious to bring violence to bear against your mother or father; it is much more so to use it against your country.

3.2 The arguments

3.2.1 The argument from agreement The argument from argument comes from 52c and following.

1. Socrates agreed to be a citizen of Athens. 2. A citizen agrees to obey the laws of a polis. 3. It is wrong to break agreements.

4. It is wrong to break the laws of Athens

The problem with this argument is that (3) is false. In general, it’s wrong to break agreements but there are special circumstances that warrant breaking an agreement. I agree to meet a friend at a local pub. On the way to the pub I witness an accident. I now must help the victims of the accident. It is better to help the victims than to ignore them and continue to the pub. Crito, in fact, presses this kind of reasoning against Socrates. Crito in 45d says I think you’re betraying your sons by going away and leaving them, when you could bring them up and educate them. You thus show no concern for what their fate may be. They will probably have the usual fate of orphans. It’s surprising that Socrates doesn’t address these concerns explicitly other to say that if we have family duties then we have even greater duties to the polis. There is another aspect of the argument from agreement worth pointing out. Socrates mentions that he had the opportunity to ask for a diﬀerent sentence during the sentencing hearing. Socrates had asked for the life of an Olympiad, free food and lodging. Instead they gave him death. If Socrates was attempting to run away from a death sentence he could have asked for a lighter sentence. But he did not. So Socrates reasons that his public course of action compels him to continue on that. It’d be wrong to be one way in public and another way in private. CHAPTER 3. THE CRITO 12

3.2.2 The argument from universalization In 50a and following Socrates imagines the laws and the polis as people. The Laws and the Polis ask:

Tell me, Socrates, what are you intending to do? Do you not by this action you are attempting intend to destroy us, the laws, and indeed the whole city, as far as you are concerned? Or do you think it possible for a city not to be destroyed if the verdicts of its courts have no force but are nulliﬁed and set at naught by private individuals?”

The reasoning here is that if Socrates runs away from the verdict of the polis then his action as the consequence that if many other people acted similarly it would undermine the laws and the polis.

1. Socrates reason for running away tacitly undermines the polis. 2. It is wrong to undermine the polis.

3. It is wrong to act the reason Socrates has for running away.

The argument here raises the issue of a conﬂict between personal interest and group interest. It may be in the interest of a single individual to act in a way contrary to what is of interest to a group of people. Suppose we want to build a new library for our community. We all recognize that it would be better for us if our community had a library. And so we all recognize that we should raise the money for a library. However, each individual recognizes that it would be better for him or her not to contribute to the library and enjoy the beneﬁts. Another example: it’d be better for everyone if we had speed limits that were obeyed. But if everyone is obeying the speed limit, one person who speeds isn’t a problem. Socrates appears to think that it is wrong to fail to apply the conclusion of group reasoning to oneself. In Socrates’s case it’d be better for his family and friends if he went away to Thessaly. But he thinks that reason supports that it’d be better for the polis if laws are obeyed.

3.2.3 The parent - polis analogy See 50d and following. The last several pages of the Crito seem to be filled with the idea that we owe much to our parents for raising us, teaching us, giving us livelihoods, etc. The polis does all this as well and to a much greater extent. Therefore we owe much more to the polis. Two points to keep in mind about this. First, the human good, human excellence, what the telos of human life is provides a complete vision of life that is worked out in the polis. The structure and activity of the polis are all organized around the human CHAPTER 3. THE CRITO 13 good. Thus, to live apart from the polis or to abandon the principles of the polis is to cut oneself off from the human good. Second, the Greek polis of Socrates’s time was a small city. It did not have the feel of a modern democracy in which those who make decisions for the law are removed from most people. Our experience as 21st century people is much different from how Socrates would think of civic life. Bibliography

Alston, W. (2002). What euthyphro should have said, in W. L. Craig (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, Edinburgh University Press, pp. 283–298.