Modernity, State-Led Islamisation and the Non-Muslim Response: a Case Study of Christians in Peninsular Malaysia

MODERNITY, STATE-LED ISLAMISATION AND THE NON-MUSLIM RESPONSE: A CASE STUDY OF CHRISTIANS IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA

CHONG EU CHOONG

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 2010 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Firstly, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors, Professor Francis Loh Kok Wah and Associate Professor Latif Kamaluddin, for their guidance and support in the production of this thesis. Secondly, I would like to thank the countless individuals whom I meet during my research work in the field and who graciously agreed to be interviewed without which this thesis would not have materialised. Thirdly, my gratitude to my in-laws and my youngest sister, Eu Pui, for without their financial support this thesis would not have seen the light of day. Finally, I want to thank my wife, Mei Lin, for her support and encouragement in the completion of this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgement ii

Table of Contents iii

List of Tables ix

Abstrak x

Abstract xii

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION: SECULARISATION, POLITICS 1 AND RELIGION 1.1 Religion, Ethnicity and Politics in Contemporary Malaysian Society 3

1.2 Research Question and Methodology 7

1.3 Literature Review 9

1.3.1 Modernization, Secularization and the Death of Religion 10

1.3.1(a) Social differentiation 12

1.3.1(b) Privatisation 14

1.3.1(c) Rationalisation 15

1.3.2 Shattering the Orthodox Consensus 16

1.3.2(a) Rational choice theory 17

1.3.2(b) Strictness theory 18

1.3.2(c) Subcultural identity theory of religious strength 21

1.3.2(d) Religion in a postmodern world 22

1.3.2(e) Glifford Geertz and Karen Armstrong on the 24 persistence of religion in the modern world

1.3.2(f) Casanova’s post-secularization thesis 26

1.4 A Critique of the Current State of Knowledge 28

1.5 Religion and the Public Sphere in Post-colonial Societies 30

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1.5.1 Theoretical Insights from Southeast Asian Studies 32

1.5.2 Religion and the Public Sphere in Southeast Asia 35

1.5.2(a) A brief history of the relationship between Islam and 36 Christianity in Southeast Asia

1.5.2(b) The case of Singapore 40

1.6 Coda: Modernity, Religion, and the Public Sphere 46

CHAPTER 2 - MODERNITY, RELIGION AND THE STATE 48

2.1 Modernity, Religion and the Makings of a Plural Society in British 49 Malaya

2.1.1 Islam and the British Colonial State 50

2.1.2 The Makings of a Plural Society and the Emergence of a non- 53 Islamic Religious Sphere

2.2 Malaya on the Eve of Independence, 1946-1957: The emergence of 55 ethnic politics

2.2.1 The Birth of the Alliance Party 59

2.3 Independence and the Crystallization of Ethnic Politics, 1957 – 1969 61

2.4 State led-modernization, Ethnicity and the Challenge of Islamic 64 Revivalism, 1969-1980

2.4.1 Dakwah Movements as the Carriers of Islamic Revivalism in 66 the Country

2.4.2 The Ethnic Dimension of Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia 70

2.4.3 Malay Politics and the Politicisation of Islam 71

2.5 State-led Islamisation Program during the Mahathir-Badawi 75 Administrations between 1981 and 2009

2.6 Conclusion 82

CHAPTER 3 - The STATE, ISLAMISATION AND SOCIETY 85

3.1 Surveillance and Discipline among the Muslim Community 86

3.1.1 Surveillance and Discipline in the Public and Private Lives of 86 Muslims

3.1.2 Surveillance and Discipline against “deviationist” Islamic Sects 91

3.1.3 Disciplining Apostasy: Muslim who wants out of Islam 96

3.2 The spill over to Non-Muslim Social and Religious Spheres 99

3.2.1 Administrative Interference of non-Muslim Places of Religious 99 Worship

3.2.2 Banning of Literature and Words 103

3.2.3 Religious Status, Government Intervention and the Family 107

3.2.3(a) Religion, courts and burial rites 107

3.2.3(b) Conversion, divorce, child custody and the religion of 109 the child 3.2.3(c) Separating spouses because of different religions 111

3.2.3(d) Religious status and MyKad 112

3.3 Response to Intrusion: Protest from civil society and Cabinet Memo 115

3.4 Increasing Tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims 118

3.5 Conclusion 120

CHAPTER 4 - A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE 122 COLONIAL ERA

4.1 Imperialism and Missions in the Peninsula, 1511 - 1824 122

4.2 The British and Christianity in the Peninsula, 1824 - 1957 125

4.3 Mission Work among the non-Malays in Peninsular Malaysia 127

4.3.1 Evangelism 128

4.3.2 Mission schools 129

4.3.3 Social-welfare ministries 132

4.4 Eschewing Politics in Favour of Evangelism 134

4.5 Conclusion 137

CHAPTER 5 - CHRISTIANITY AND THE MIDDDLE CLASS 138

5.1 Industrialisation and the Rise of the Middle Class 139

5.2 The Middle Class and the Emergence of “New Politics” 145

5.3 The Growth of Christianity and the Middle Class, 1960-2000 155

5.4 Empowering the Laity: Middle Class Participation in the Church 158

5.5 Social Activism and the Laity 163

5.5.1 Evangelical Churches and Social Activism 163

5.5.2 The Archdiocesan Office for Human Development Kuala 168 Lumpur

5.5.3 The Bangsar Lutheran Church 171

5.6 Conclusion 172

CHAPTER 6 - MISSION SCHOOLS AND THE STATE: 177 MARGINALISATION AND RESPONSE

6.1 The Post-colonial State and Education: Nationalization and 178 Islamisation

6.1.1 Attempts at Consolidating the Educational System during the 179 Waning Years of British Colonial Rule

6.1.2 Nationalizing Education in the Post-independence Era: The 181 Razak Report 1956 and the Education Report 1960

6.1.3 Post-1960s Development in the Field of Education: Mahathir’s 183 legacy

6.2 Mission Schools and the Government 185

6.2.1 Loss of Control over Mission Schools by Mission Authorities 188

6.2.2 Inadequate Public Funding 196

6.2.3 The Loss of Prestige: The transition from English-medium to 200 Malay-medium in mission schools

6.3 Mission Authorities and Their Response to the Government 201

6.3.1 Reasserting Their Rights: Overcoming bureaucratic roadblocks 202

6.3.2 Reclaiming the Christian Ethos 208

6.3.3 Staying Put or Opting Out of the Public Schooling System? 210

6.3.4 The Results of the Policy of Engagement 212

6.4 The Limits of the Policy of Engagement 213

6.4.1 A Brief History of Chinese-medium Schools 214

6.4.2 The Relationship between the Government and Chinese- 216 medium Schools

6.4.3 Mission Schools by Comparison 219

6.5 Conclusion 221

CHAPTER 7 - ENGAGING THE GOVERNMENT: THE CHRISTIAN 224 COMMUNITY’S RESPONSE TO ISLAMISATION

7.1 Government-Church Relationship in Malaysia, 1957-2001 225

7.1.1 Government-Church Relationship during the 1960s and 1970s 226

7.1.2 The Era of Islamisation, the 1980s onwards 229

7.2 The Christians’ Response towards the State’s Islamisation Policy 231

7.2.1 The Formation of the Christian Federation of Malaysia (CFM) 232

7.2.2 CFM’s Response to the Government 234

7.2.3 The Politics of Ecumenism: The relationship between CFM and 238 its component members

7.3 Working with Other non-Islamic Religious Communities 239

7.4 The case of NECF and the Evangelicals 241

7.4.1 Evangelical churches Response to the Islamisation Project 241

7.4.2 National Evangelical Christian Fellowship (NECF) 245

7.5 The Changing Response of Christians 250

7.5.1 The Islamic State Debate 251

7.5.2 Seeking Judicial Review: The Catholic Herald and Sidang Injil 254 Borneo cases

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7.5.3 Engaging in the Political Process: Run up to 2008 General 256 Elections

7.5.4 Engaging Civil Society 259

7.5.5 Shifting Responses and a Divided Community 264

7.6 Conclusion 269

CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSION 271

8.1 The Persistence of Religion in the Public Sphere: The Malaysian 272 experience

8.2 Theoretical Implications of the Malaysian Case Study 276

REFERENCES 280

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LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 5.1 Malaysia – Gross Domestic Product by Industry, 1970-2005 139 (in percentages)

Table 5.2 Employment by Industry, 1970 – 2005 (in percentages) 140

Table 5.3 Employment by Major Occupational Group, 1970 – 2000 (in 141 percentages)

Table 5.4 Peninsular Malaysia - Distribution of Employed Labour 142 Force by Occupation and Ethnic Group, 1957 (in percentages)

Table 5.5 Peninsular Malaysia - Distribution of Employed Labour 143 Force by Occupation and Ethnic Group, 1970, 1986 and 2000 (in percentages)

Table 5.6 Percentage of Votes for Opposition Parliamentary 151 Candidates in Peninsular Malaysia, 2004 and 2008 General Elections

Table 5.7 Growth of Malaysian Population and Christian Adherents, 155 1960-1980

Table 5.8 Growth of Malaysian Population and Christian Adherents, 156 1980-2000

Table 5.9 Distribution of Population by Religion in 2000 156

Table 5.10 Christians in Malaysia by Ethnic Group, 2000 157

Table 6.1 Number of Mission Schools according to State and School 185 Type as of 2008

Table 6.2 Number of Students in Missionary Schools according to 186 State and School Type as of January 2008

Table 6.3 Number of candidates taking Bible Knowledge as 210 examination subject

Table 7.1 Church activities attended by Evangelicals during the 244 previous twelve months period prior to 2001

MODERNITI, ISLAMISASI PIMPINAN NEGARA DAN RESPONS

MASYARAKAT BUKAN-MUSLIM: SATU KAJIAN KES MASYARAKAT

KRISTIAN DI SEMENANJUNG MALAYSIA

ABSTRAK

Sebahagian besar daripada abad ke-20 telah menyaksikan para sarjana yang mengkaji agama berpendapat bahawa moderniti akan menyebabkan agama disingkirkan dari ruangan awam. Namun demikian, peristiwa-peristiwa seperti

Revolusi Iran ke peranan agama Katolik dalam konflik-konflik politik di Amerika

Latin yang tercetus dalam dekad 80an membuktikan bahawa agama masih memainkan peranan yang penting dalam ruangan awam. Tesis ini menghujahkan bahawa agama masih memainkan peranan dalam kehidupan awam dan politik masyarakat Asia Tenggara masakini. Dengan menggunakan kes Malaysia, tesis ini menghujahkan bahawa Malaysia tidak sahaja mengalami kebangkitan agama di kalangan pelbagai komuniti agama di negara ini walaupun mengalami proses modernisasi tetapi juga ia tidak berundur ke ruangan persendirian. Sebaliknya, proses modenisasi memudahkan agama masuk ke ruangan awam. Kebangkitan Islam di akhir dekad 70-an menyaksikan sesetengah pihak Muslim memanggil supaya kerajaan and masyarakat diIslamisasikan. Panggilan ini telah menyebabkan kerajaan

Barisan Nasional yang diketuai UMNO melaksanakan dasar Islamisasi untuk mempertahankan hegemoninya atas masyarakat Melayu-Muslim. Dasar Islamisasi telah menyaksikan peningkatan campur tangan kerajaan bukan sahaja dalam bidang agama Islam tetapi juga dalam bidang keagamaan bukan-Islam. Akibatnya masyarakat bukan-Islam mula mengalami sekatan bukan sahaja dalam bidang agama mereka tetapi juga dalam kehidupan sehari-harian mereka. Tidak menghairankan mengapa masyrakat bukan-Islam mula beralih kepada agama mereka sebagai satu

x sumber daya politik dalam usaha mengatasi masalah ini. Tesis ini akan menumpukan perhatian kepada masyarakat Kristian di Semenanjung Malaysia dalam usaha menyelidik cara-cara bagaimana komuniti ini menggunakan agama untuk mencipta ruang yang membolehkan mereka untuk membebaskan diri dari gangguan kerajaan dalam bidang agama dan kehidupan sehari-harian mereka. Tesis ini menghujahkan bahawa agama merupakan satu titik tumpuan untuk memobilisasi masyarakat bagi menghadapi keadaan sosial dan politik yang mereka hadapi. Sebagai kesimpulan, tesis ini mengutarakan hujah bahawa bertentangan/konflik berdasarkan agama dalam ruangan awam disebabkan oleh ketegangan yang timbul dari pengejaran moderniti.

MODERNITY, STATE-LED ISLAMISATION AND THE NON-MUSLIM

RESPONSE: A CASE STUDY OF CHRISTIANS IN PENINSULAR

MALAYSIA

ABSTRACT

For a better part of the 20th century, scholars who studied religion held the opinion that religion would gradually lose its public significance in the face of modernisation. However, events in the past few decades have proved otherwise.

From the Iranian Revolution to the role of Catholicism in political conflicts throughout Latin America in the 1980 have patently demonstrated religion still plays an important role in the public sphere. This thesis takes the position that religion still remains an important precinct in the public life and politics of contemporary

Southeast Asian societies. Using the case of Malaysia, I argued that not only did the country experienced religious revivalism across the various faith communities despite the rapid modernisation that was taking place here but also it did not retreat to the private sphere. Indeed, it facilitated the entry of religion into the public sphere.

Islamic revivalism in the late 1970s among the Malay-Muslim community witnessed the call by certain quarters of the community for the Islamisation of the state and society. This in turn has egged the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional government to implement its own Islamisation policy in order to maintain its hegemony over this critical group in society. The resultant policy has brought about an increasing intrusion of the government not only into the Muslim religious field but also into the non-Muslim religious field. As a result, non-Muslims began to experience a growing restriction not only of their religious spheres but also of their everyday lives. Not surprisingly, they began to turn to religion as a political resource in an attempt to find

xii some sort of political footing to negotiate this increasing restriction. Focusing on the

Christian community in Peninsular Malaysia, this thesis seeks to study the ways in which this community used religion to create space that enable them to manoeuvre the increasing intrusion by the government into their religious sphere and everyday lives. This thesis takes the position that religion provides a focal point in mobilising people to respond to the social and political circumstances which they find themselves in. Indeed, the central theoretical position forwarded by this thesis is that religious based contestations/conflicts in the public sphere are due to the tensions that arise out of the pursuit of modernity.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Secularisation, Politics and Religion

Modernisation, it was once argued, would dislodge religion from its once prominent place in the public life of contemporary Southeast Asian societies. Religion would retreat to the private sphere leaving the public sphere to “secular” forces such as the nation-state and the market along with other cultural, institutional and ideological features of modernity (Casanova, 1994).

This thesis takes a different position. It argues that religion still remains an important precinct in the public life and politics of contemporary Southeast Asian societies despite the rapid modernisation that is taking place in this region. Any understanding why this is so must take into account the role of the state in the modernisation process.

In other words, individuals and communities find themselves drawn into the operations of state power. One of the forces that drive the state is the need to mould its diverse local population to a modern nation. This exercise together with its symbolic and material trappings invites boundary-making which rejects or exclude symbols and practices considered foreign to the wholeness that the state seeks to impose on society.

Consequently, the national public discourse tends to focus on the wholeness of the nation at the expense of the fact that society is characterized by diversity. More often than not, such discourses on national wholeness tend to be grafted in ideologies that emphasize on exclusionary identity based on ethnicity, language and religion (George and Willford, 2005, pp. 13-14).

It is, however, a mistake to view the state as omnipotent in its intervention in society as if it is “guided ... by a single will ... or by a kind of uniform animating spirit with an overwhelming power to enforce its ideological vision or to construct knowledge as it sees fit” (Steedly, 1999, p. 443). It does well to remember that the nature of the state itself is complex, and often fragmented, which lead to contradictions, limits and failures not only in its intervention in society but also at the ideological level.

On the surface, the overwhelming presence of the state may obscure the fact that people have the capacity to respond to the social and political circumstances they find themselves in. Such capacity provides opportunities for individuals and communities to take advantage of – or succumb to – the state.

The question that guides this thesis is: In what ways do people use religion to create space to escape the state's intensifying reach into everyday life? Such activity does not mean that people are taking an oppositional or resistant stance against the state.

Rather, as George and Willford (2005, p. 11) put it:

Individuals and groups can be quite calculating or complicit in using the state (and its internal contradictions) in advancing their interests, religious or otherwise, in an effort to find some kind of political footing in relation to the state.

1.1 Religion, Ethnicity and Politics in Contemporary Malaysian Society

Malaysia offers an interesting case study for our purpose. As with many other post-colonial societies, the question of identity is deeply embedded in the nation’s political discourse which had deeply affected the political, social and economic structures of the country.

Identity in the national political discourse takes the form of ethnicity as the country is characterized by a plural society. With the granting of independence by the

British in 1957, the Malaysian post-colonial state had devoted much of its energy in trying to transform its diverse population into a modern nation.

However, as Geertz (1973a) had noted almost fifty years ago, the state's attempt at nation-building will inevitably run into the shoals of primordial sentiments (traditional identities and loyalties) that have a more concrete reality than that of the abstract notion of nation-state. What resulted from this encounter is a complex interplay between the state's nation-building project and these traditional identities and loyalties which would deeply affect the political, social and economic structures of Malaysian society.

Therefore, the Malaysian state's project that aimed at wholeness is mired with the contingencies of a plural society that reflect a basic division between the indigenous

Malays and non-Malays.1 One needs to look no further on this issue than at the Federal

Constitution of Malaysia. As with other modern constitutions, it explicitly carries the modern notions of citizenships in the document.

1 See Cheah (2002). 3

Interestingly, the same document also defines who is a Malay. Such definition carries with it certain social and political privileges.2 On the other hand, the constitution is silent on a definition of a non-Malay, presumably because it is the anti-thesis of the official definition of a Malay. And in so doing, the founding document of Malaysia has officially created two basic categories in which to place its citizens.

Consequently, ethnicity played an important component in forming social identities in Malaysia where social relationships are largely determined by “kaum” or

“bangsa” (race, ethnicity). Apart from serving as an identity marker that helps one to identify oneself vis-à-vis others, ethnicity also served a political purpose, i.e. a tool of the state for the purpose of political control and resource allocation (Ackerman and Lee,

1990, p. 4).

Although modernisation has transformed the social and economic structures of the country, religion has remained deeply embedded in Malaysian society (Nagata,

1984; Ackerman and Lee, 1990). Like ethnicity, religion is deeply intertwined with the individual's sense of self which complicates the picture with the increase of potential for political mobilization (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 4).

The joining of ethnicity and religion in the country has dichotomized the religious sphere into two separate fields, i.e. Muslim and non-Muslim. The Muslim field is principally a Malay domain since all Malays are by definition Muslim by birth. Those who voluntarily leave this field lose the social and political privileges as well as face state sanctions, implying that Malay-Muslim identity is materially and politically reinforced (Ackeman and Lee, 1990, p. 4).

2 See Article 160 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 4

The non-Muslim field, on the other hand, is basically a non-Malay domain where identity and ethnicity are more loosely defined, and more importantly, it is not under- girded by any political and material privileges. Non-Malays are free to associate themselves with any religion of their choosing although typically a Chinese is a

Buddhist-Taoist while an Indian a Hindu.

However religions such as Christianity have attracted followers from non-Malays in general. Religious affiliation among non-Malays does not carry any material and political privileges. Although the connection between religion and ethnicity is loose in the non-Muslim field, “there is an undefined sense of solidarity among non-Malays that they are not Muslims” (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 5).

The relationship between the Malays and non-Malays in the present period have assume a greater significance as the latter are confronting the Malays on the question of the rights of non-Islamic religions. The root of this conflict can be traced back to the mid-1970s when Islamic fundamentalism began to spread among urban Malay youths.3

Generally speaking, this phenomenon can be partially attributed to the rising Islamic consciousness among Muslim societies worldwide as well as to the alienating effects of modernisation on the Malays (Nagata, 1984; Chandra, 1987; Shamsul, 1997).

More importantly, given heightened ethnic consciousness in the country after the

May 13 racial riots, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism among Malay youths can be interpreted as an attempt by the Malays to use Islam as an ethnic boundary to distinguish themselves against the non-Malays (Nagata, 1984). The use of Islam is unsurprising, as

3 I’m aware that the term “Islamic fundamentalism” is a contentious term which some have interpreted in a pejorative sense. However, in this thesis, fundamentalism simply means revisiting its ‘cumulative body of ritual, behavior, and thought that reaches back to the time of origins’ (Ruthven, 2004, p. 15) as a response towards modernity. 5

it has served as a vehicle of political expression for the Malays in previous times. As

Ackerman and Lee (1990, p. 6) pointed out: “Relatively speaking, the Malays – despite their factions and conflict – are more united politically under the banner of Islam ... The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the 1970s has revitalized Malay ethnicity”.

The growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism among the Malays egged on the state to respond by initiating its own Islamisation agenda that aimed at “moralizing economic and social policies through a modernist interpretation of Islam. One consequence of this moralizing Islamic discourse has been an increasing reification of ethnic and religious boundaries through their bureaucratic codification and materialization of political representation” (Willford, 2005, p. 45). This, in turn, has brought about the increasing encroachment of the state in the everyday life of not only the Malays but also the non-Malays.

Unsurprisingly, Islamic revivalism and the state’s Islamisation policy brought about a parallel religious revivalism among the non-Malays that is partially a response to the alienating effects of modernity and as an act of re-affirming one’s social identity in the face of what is happening in the Malay-Muslim religious field (Ramanathan, 1996;

Loh, 2003). As a result, everyday interactions in contemporary Malaysia are mediated by cultural distinctions centred upon ethnicity and religion.

Religion has become an important political resource for individual and groups as they attempt to create space that enable them to manoeuvre the increasing encroachment of the government into their everyday lives (Nagata, 1984; Ramanathan, 1996; Lee and

Ackerman, 1998; Loh, 2003; Willford, 2007).

1.2 Research Question and Methodology

This thesis is interested in looking at the ways in which non-Malays use religion in an attempt to create space that enable them to manoeuvre the increasing encroachment by the government into their everyday lives. More specifically, it will focus on the

Christians in the country. The central question which this thesis seeks to answer is: How are the Christians responding to the state’s Islamisation project which is increasingly encroaching on their religious and everyday life spheres?

It should be noted that Malaysia is geographically divided between the peninsula and Sabah together with Sarawak. This thesis focuses on the Christians in the peninsula rather than Sabah and Sarawak (where Christians make up for more than half of the total population of both states combined).

There are two reasons why Christians in the peninsula – who form a small proportion of the population in this geographical – are chosen as the focus of this study.

Firstly, the emphasis on the ethno-religious marker in the politics of peninsula is markedly stronger than it is in Sabah and Sarawak. Such emphasis on the ethno-religious marker is most clearly seen in the recent high court ruling over the issue on the right of non-Muslims, i.e. Christians, to use the word “Allah.” On 31st December 2009, the high court ruled in favour of the Catholic newspaper, the Catholic Herald, that it had the right to use the word “Allah” in its Bahasa Malaysia section in spite of the ban by the government.

Immediately after the ruling, a few churches in the peninsula experienced a rash of attacks on its buildings all over the peninsula where the cause of the attack was the court’s ruling. Some Muslim non-government organizations organized public protests against the ruling and in the blogosphere and traditional media; there were heated debates on the issue which highlighted the ethno-religious contradictions that have beset society in the peninsula. By focusing on the Christians in the peninsula, the thesis throws into sharp relief the research question at hand.

Secondly, modernisation in Malaysia has proceeded unevenly with the peninsula experiencing a rapid pace of urbanization and economic development as compared with

Sabah and Sarawak. Urbanization and economic development coincide with the rise of the middle class in the peninsula. As I will point out in the next section, the rise of the middle class and its participation in religion highlights the role of the middle class in transforming lay participation in churches. In so doing, they have also transformed the way in which the community responds to the state’s increasing encroachment into their religious sphere.

From a methodological standpoint, this thesis will utilize the qualitative approach in data collection.4 The primary instrument which I used to collect the data for analysis is the interview. I interviewed Christians across the denominational line and those from the clergy and laity. In addition, some of the interviewees serve in institutions such as the Christian Federation of Malaysia, the Methodist Education Council, etc. The

4 This thesis does not bring any methodological innovation to the table. The methodology which I have employed in this thesis is based on the standard approach as expounded in standard methodological texts. For this thesis, I have consulted Blaikie (2000); Esterberg (2002); and Seale, et al (2006) on the standard methods of data collection in the qualitative methodology. 8

interviews were designed to elicit opinions as well as individual and institutional responses to the state’s encroachment on their religious sphere.

In addition to the interview, I have also used the participant–observation method as another means towards data collection. My primary research site was a small evangelical Protestant church located in the heart of Kuala Lumpur which I have observed for the past two years. Apart from this primary research site, I have also participated in a few conferences organized by some Christian organizations to discuss issues that confront the community.

In addition to the two instruments which I have used, data collection was further complemented by the use of secondary literature and primary documents which I have collected during my time in the field and in the library. Once the data had been collected, I analyzed the data to generate the answer to the research question which I have posed.

1.3 Literature Review

This section serves two objectives. Firstly, it will review the major theoretical works on the relationship between religion and society. The aim here is to gain a broad overview of our current state of knowledge in this area, and therefore, provide us with an entry point into this thesis proper. Secondly, it will also construct a theoretical framework with which to frame the analysis of this thesis.

1.3.1 Modernisation, Secularisation and the Death of Religion

Casanova (1994, p. 211) argued that secularisation theory has served as the

“main theoretical and analytical framework through which the social sciences have viewed the relationship of religion and [society]” and “may be the only theory which was able to attain a truly paradigmatic status within the modern social sciences. … indeed, [it] is so intrinsically interwoven with all the theories of the modern world that one cannot discard [it] without putting into question the entire web, including much of the self-understanding of the social sciences” (Casanova, 1994, p. 17).

This situation is unsurprising as this theory can trace its intellectual ancestry all the way back to the founding fathers of the social sciences where “[i]n one form or another, … was shared by all the founding fathers: from Karl Marx to John Stuart Mill, from Auguste Comte to Herbert Spencer, …, from Emile Durkeheim to Max Weber, from Wilhelm Wundt to Sigmund Freud, …, from Robert Park to George H. Mead”

(Casanova, 1994, p. 17). As a result, the “consensus was such that not only did the theory remain uncontested but apparently it was not even necessary to test it, since everybody took it for granted. This means that [secularisation theory] often served as the unstated premise of many of the founding fathers’ theories, it itself was never either rigorously examined or even formulated explicitly and systematically” (Casanova, 1994, p. 17).

Nonetheless, the foundations for the latter formulation of this theory can be found in the works of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Both scholars shared

… the view that the old historical religions cannot survive the onslaught of the modern world. Both take for granted that, in Durkheim’s worlds, ‘the old gods are growing old or already dead’ and that, in any case, they will not be able to compete with the new gods, which Durkheim believed modern societies would create for themselves, or the modern polytheism of values and its unceasing and irreconcilable struggle which, according to Weber, has resulted from the process of differentiation of the various secular spheres as they press to realize their own ‘internal and lawful autonomy.’ The old churches, for Weber, remain only as a refuge for those ‘who cannot bear the fate of the times like a man’ and are willing to make the inevitable ‘intellectual sacrifice’ (Casanova, 1994, p. 18).

It was through the works of such scholars such as Peter Berger (1969), Thomas

Luckmann (1967) and Bryan Wilson (1982) among others – drawing on the insights of

Weber and Durkheim – that this theory began to be systematically formulated.

However, it should be noted that one of the major difficulties in discussing the theory of secularisation is that there is no one accepted formulation of the theory as such. Rather, the so-called theory is but a plurality of formulations. This has led critics such as Hadden (1987, p. 598) to argue that secularisation theory is nothing more than “a hodgepodge of loosely employed ideas” rather than a formal theory as such.5

On the other hand, Tschannen (1991) had demonstrated that there exists a sufficient consensus among the theorists that qualifies secularisation theory to be understood as a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense (Kuhn, 1970). The theory contains “a very broad set of assumptions and analytical categories” (Tschannen, 1991, p. 395) shared by all the theorists even though they may disagree in the details.

5 See also Shiner (1966). 11

Broadly speaking, all accounts of the theory of secularisation share a single narrative concerning the trajectory of religion in the modern world. According to Haynes

(1997, p. 713), secularisation theory

… implies a unidirectional process, whereby societies move from a sacred condition to successively areligious states; the sacred becomes increasingly social and politically marginal. … secularisation was an integral facet of modernisation, a global trend. Everywhere, …, religion would become privatised losing its grip on culture, becoming a purely personal matter, no longer a collective force with mobilising potential for social change.”

At the core of this theory lies the proposition that modernisation is the key determinant that will ensure the long-term decline of the social significance of religion in the modern world. Herbert (2003, p. 35) puts it in the following statement:

‘Modernisation’ itself is a complex and contested concept that refers to a range of interrelated processes operating at economic, political, social and cultural levels and originating in Western Europe since the fifteenth century, … at an economic level these developments include the expansion of the capitalist system and the spread of industrialization, enhanced in the second Industrial Revolution (from 1850) by the widespread application of scientific knowledge and possibly entering a new stage, with the emergence of increasingly service-oriented and information-based economies. Politically, they include the emergence of nation states and the development of bureaucracy to deepen their power, but also the development of representative institutions and concepts of individual rights. At a social level they include the breakdown of face-to-face communities (Gemeinschaft) by urbanization and increased mobility, leading to modern society (Gesellschaft) of strangers and anomie …, but also unprecedented individual opportunities.

More specifically, modernisation brings with it three processes that will ensure the gradual decline of religion. We will now look at each of these processes separately in order to gain a fuller understanding of secularisation theory.

1.3.1(a) Social Differentiation

The central feature of modernisation is the process of social differentiation which

Tschannen (1991, p.404) identified as “absolutely central to all the secularisation theories, without exception.” Briefly, social differentiation refers to “the increasing division and specialization not only of labour but also of many areas of human activity”

(Herbert, 2003, p. 35).

Modernisation requires that society develops a series of social spheres, e.g., politics, economics, education, legal etc, where each sphere became differentiated from one another as each follows its own internal logic or what Weber calls as their “internal and lawful autonomy” (quoted in Casanova, 1994, p. 20).6 What follows from this process was that

[some] of [these] spheres, particularly the emerging modern absolutist state and the emerging capitalist economy, were more lawful and more autonomous than the others. It would probably show as well that it was their differentiation from one another, their mutual dependence and their clashes, that more than anything else dictated the dynamics of the whole process. Actually, these two secular spheres, states and markets, now tended to dictate the very principles of classification which served to structure the new modern system (Casanova, 1994, pp. 20-21).

At the same time, religion “came fully into its own, specializing in ‘its own religious’ function and either dropping or losing many other ‘nonreligious’ functions it had accumulated and could no longer meet efficiently” (Casanova, 1994, p. 21).

What resulted from this process was the declining importance of religion in different aspects of social life. For example, medieval Christianity opposes the practice of usury – charging interest for monetary loans – which it considered as “sinful.” With the advent of modern capitalism, such behaviour is considered as part of the normal economic practice in modern society which has discarded the dictates of religious logic of such behaviour in favour of its own “internal and lawful autonomy,” i.e., maximizing profit.

6 Italics in the original. 13

To sum up, social differentiation brought about a condition where religion gradually loses control over various aspects of social life which became increasingly

“secularized” which the Oxford Dictionary defined as “not concerned with religion.”

This definition, perhaps, gives the best encapsulation of the fate of religion in the modern world.

1.3.1(b) Privatisation

The next feature associated with modernisation is that of “societalization” which refers to the process of “human life [becoming] increasingly enmeshed and organized, not locally but societally (that society being most evidently, but not uniquely, the nation state)” (Wilson, 1982, p. 154). More specifically, it refers to the breakup of small rural communities that follows from industrialization where religion had served to bind such communities together.

With industrialization came urbanization which resulted in the disengagement of religion from the larger urban communities. Religion could no longer function as the integrative force, in the Durkheimian sense, of society. The process of social differentiation witnessed the emergence of new social spheres that began to supplant the governing religious sphere by fragmenting daily social life into the public and the private spheres. Whereas in pre-modern society, religion had governed the conduct of daily life ranging from the marketplace to everyday behaviour, now it finds itself relegated to the realm of the private that is irrelevant to the conduct of the public sphere, which is based on the criteria of instrumental logic (Wilson, 1982).

Conversely this situation that takes place in the objective realm of the social world is also replicated in the subjective realm of the individual consciousness. Religion could no longer provide a plausible structure (that is provide a meaningful universe for the individual), to borrow a concept from Berger (1969), to support a religious worldview. In its place is the rational worldview with its utilitarian conception of the world.

What is significant about this process is that the quest “[for] subjective meanings is a strictly personal affair. The primary ‘public’ institutions (state, economy) no longer need or are interested in maintaining a sacred cosmos or public religious worldview”

(Casanova, 1994, p. 37). This was because each sphere operates under its own “internal and lawful autonomy” based on rationality rather than the dictates of theology.7 In the end, religion became a matter of private faith which is of no concern to the political life of modern societies.

1.3.1(c) Rationalisation

The final aspect which is associated with modernisation is “rationalisation.” This process refers to the abandonment of the religious worldview which emphasises the supernatural and the adoption of a rational worldview which emphasize natural causes in understanding the workings of the world around the individuals (Weber, 1958; Berger,

1969; Wilson, 1982). As a result, religion becomes increasingly anachronistic in a world where the rational worldview takes hold of the mind of people.

7 See Weber (1958) for a classic treatment of this theme. 15

Given these three processes of modernisation, it is unsurprising that secularisation theory maintains that religion would lose its hold over social life and gradually retreat from the public sphere (Shelledy, 2004, p. 150). Herbert (2003, p. 35) puts it more succinctly when he said: “[m]odernization is at the heart of secularisation theory: it is the deep structure leading to the long-term decline of the social significance of religion.”

Unsurprisingly then, social scientists – before the 1980s – do not generally consider religion as a substantive area of research. Greatly influenced by secularisation theory, they “[perceive] the process of modernisation … as one of fundamental change from a traditional socio-political order to a modern one. [They argued] that modernisation generates new integrative symbols and structures and fosters the process of secularisation; in short, religion and religious values are destined to lose their place with the advent of modernisation” (Verma, 2002, p. 89).8

1.3.2 Shattering the Orthodox Consensus

For almost a century since the late 19th century, secularisation theory reigned supreme in the study of religion in the modern world. It was considered the orthodox consensus among social scientists on the fate of religion in the modern world.

However, beginning with the 1980s, the orthodox consensus was irrevocably shattered when religions worldwide, rather than withdrawing, began to actively participate in society socially as well as politically with events such as the rise of the religious right in America as a political force, the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in

Islamic societies, the political agitation of the Solidarity movement in Poland, and the

8 See Almond and Powell (1966) for a classical statement of secularisation theory in political science. 16

involvement of the Catholic Church in political conflicts in Latin America (Casanova,

1994, p.3).9

In this section, I will be reviewing some of the key alternative theories that have emerged in this area in order to give us a broad understanding of the current theoretical understanding among social scientists on the fate of religion in the modern world.

1.3.2(a) Rational Choice Theory

One recent challenge mounted against the theory of secularisation was by a group of American sociologists (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985; Iannaccone, 1992a; Finke and Iannaccone, 1993; and Warner, 1993). They argued that modernisation is irrelevant to the survival of religion in the modern world. Instead it was argued that the “rates of religious beliefs and practice follow cycles over long period of time (hundreds of years) and are largely determined by market conditions” (Herbert, 2003, p. 43).

Known as the “supply-side” or “religious economy” theory – based on the rational choice theory found in economics – its basic insight is that

… religious regulation and monopolies create lethargic religions … but that capable religions thrive in pluralistic, competitive environments. Capable religions thrive because their religious ‘entrepreneurs’ capitalize on unregulated religious environment to aggressively market their religions to new ‘consumers’; in these environments religious ‘firms’ (denominations and traditions) that possess superior organizational structures (denominational polities), sales representatives (evangelists and clergy), products (religious message), and marketing (evangelistic) techniques flourish. Those that do not cannot successfully compete and so decline numerically. Nonetheless, with pluralism and competition, at the aggregate level, the total amount of religious participation in the society increases, since more and more religious consumers are induced into participation by the variety of religious products that satisfy their needs and wants (Smith,1998, p. 73).

9 For a sample of the burgeoning literature on the vitality of religion in the modern world, see Tamney (1979), Marty and Appleby (1991), Casanova (1994), Martin (1996), Smith (1998), Berger (1999), Kim (2000), and Jenkins (2002). 17

Using this theory, Finke and Stark (1992) argued that American churches were able to increase their membership from the end of the eighteenth century to the present day because it has never established a state religion, i.e., religious monopoly, while the opposite can be observed from the Western European experience. Church membership has declined exactly because state churches there struggled to maintain their position as a religious monopoly where choice is restricted.

1.3.2(b) Strictness Theory

A variation of rational choice theory, the “strictness theory” looks at the “micro- level normative demands and expectations that different religious groups impose on their members” (Smith, 1998, p. 71) as an explanation for religious vitality. Briefly, this theory argues that “strict” religious groups will thrive while “lenient” religious groups suffer decline in membership. The two most important proponents of this theory are

Dean Kelley (1972) and Laurence Iannaccone (1992b; 1994).

Using statistics and graphs, Kelly (1972) demonstrated that since the 1960s mainline-liberal Protestant churches in the United States have faced numerical decline while at the same time conservative churches are experiencing growth. The reason suggested was that the former are lenient while the latter are strict.

According to Kelly (1972), the business of religion is to provide its adherents with meaning and a religious group can only thrive if it can deliver on its promise

(Kelly, 1972, p. 36-46). As a caveat, he pointed out that such meanings are not merely religious ideas and concepts which “do not require anything of those who espouse them”

(Kelly, 1972, p. 52). Rather religious ideas and concepts demand commitment in terms of lifestyle and value system.

As Kelly (1972, pp. 52-53) puts it:

We want something more than a smooth, articulate verbal interpretation of what life is all about. Words are cheap; we want explanations that are validated by the commitment for the other persons. … What costs nothing accomplishes nothing. If it costs nothing to belong to a community, it can’t be worth much. So the quality that enables religious meanings to take hold is not their rationality, their logic, their surface credibility, but rather the demand they make upon their adherents and the degree to which that demand is met by commitment.10

Unsurprisingly, mainline-liberal Protestant churches are faltering exactly because they are “lenient,” i.e., espousing relativistic beliefs and values together with an appreciation for a plurality of lifestyles and views. Apparently, such leniency has produced a membership that is characterized by “lukewarmness (indecisiveness and reluctance to sacrifice for the group), individualism (personal autonomy, resistance to discipline, readiness to leave the group), and reserve (reluctance to share faith with others or insights and convictions with the group)” (Smith, 1998, p. 72).

By contrast, the conservative wing of Christianity in America is “strict,” i.e., demand high levels of conformity in terms of beliefs and lifestyles. It has produced a membership that is characterized by “high levels of commitment (willingness to sacrifice for the religious group), discipline (willingness to obey leaders and accept discipline) and missionary zeal (eagerness to spread the faith)” (Smith, 1998, p.72).

As a result, “lenient groups, by making few demands, fail to authenticate for their followers the meanings their faith espouses, they tend over time to weaken and decline. Strict religious groups, on the other hand, successfully generate satisfying meaning and so thrive and grow” (Smith, 1998, p. 72).

10 Italics in the original. 19

Iannaccone (1992b; 1994) also contends for the “strictness” thesis but from a different point of view. He argued that certain religious groups grow and thrive in modern society not because it offers richer meanings for its adherents but rather they screen out free riders – people who want to enjoy the benefits of the religious group while contributing little to the group.

He argued that it is not possible in a strict and demanding religious group for a member to enjoy religious benefits, e.g., worship services, pastoral care and counselling as well as wedding and funeral services without at the same time contributing a proportionate amount of time, energy and money back to the church.

Such “investments” are necessary for the group to generate such “collective goods” in the first place. As a result, such groups that screen out free riders are able to enjoy a high degree of commitment, solidarity and investment among its members. In turn, this enables such religious organizations to grow and thrive in modern societies. By contrast, lenient religious groups that do not screen out free riders will generate fewer religious benefits as too many free riders take more than what they give thereby creating an environment of apathy and disinterest among its members which will lead to the decline of such religious organizations (Iannaccone, 1994).

Although rational choice theory and strictness theory do not directly address the issue of the relationship between religion and politics, it would seem that both theories share the fundamental assumption made by secularisation theory, namely politics is demarcated from personal faith.

1.3.2(c) Subcultural Identity Theory of Religious Strength

Smith (1998) in his study of religious vitality in America noted that

“[c]ontemporary American Evangelicalism is thriving. It is more than alive and well. … it appears to be the strongest of the major Christian traditions in the United States”

(Smith, 1998, p. 20).11 The question is why this traditional religious movement is thriving in a society that epitomizes modernity when conventional wisdom in the sociology of religion has argued the decline of religion in modern society.

Using the following dimensions as indicators for religious vitality:

(1) faithfully adhere to essential Christian beliefs; (2) consider their faith a highly salient aspect of their lives; (3) reflect great confidence and assurance in their Christian beliefs; (4) participate regularly in a variety of church activities and programs; (5) are committed in both belief and action to accomplishing the mission of the church; and (6) sustain high rates of membership retention by maintaining members' association with the tradition over long periods of time, effectively socializing new members into that tradition, and winning new converts to that tradition (Smith, 1998, p. 21).

Smith (1998) discovered that evangelical Christians scored high in all the dimensions above.12 This discovery begs the question stated above. Offering what he calls a

“Subcultural Identity Theory of Religious Strength,” and contrary to the secularisation theory, he argued that

American evangelicalism…is strong not because it is shielded against, but because it is—or at least perceives itself to be—embattled with forces that seem to oppose or threaten it. Indeed, evangelicalism…thrives on distinction, engagement, conflict, and threat. Without these, evangelicalism would lose its identity and purpose and grow languid and aimless. Thus … the evangelical movement's vitality is not a product of its protected isolation from, but of its vigorous engagement with pluralistic modernity (Smith, 1998, p. 121).

11 Evangelicals are a subgroup within Protestant Christianity which is essentially conservative. They cut across denominational lines and sometimes are founded outside of denominations. 12 In this study, Smith (1998) together with a team of researchers conducted 130 two-hour interviews in the summer of 1995 which was then followed by a telephone survey of 2,591 respondents between January and March of 1996 where 2,087 identified themselves as Protestant Christians. Then, in the summer of 1996, follow-up face-to-face interviews were conducted with 96 respondents who identified themselves as evangelicals from the phone interviews after which an additional 85 evangelicals from local evangelical churches were also interviewed. Finally, a phone interview was conducted with eight people who identified themselves as fundamentalists and six who had identified themselves as liberal Christians, Smith (1998) 21

His theory, in a nutshell, can be stated in the following propositions.

Religion survives and can thrive in pluralistic, modern society by embedding itself in subcultures that offer satisfying morally orienting collective identities which provide adherents meaning and belonging. … In a pluralistic society, those religious groups will be relatively stronger which better possess and employ the cultural tools needed to create both clear distinction from and significant engagement and tension with other relevant outgroups, short of becoming genuinely countercultural (Smith, 1998, pp. 118- 119).13

In other words, he is simply saying that evangelicals are thriving because they draw their group identity by identifying an out-group or groups (often menacing) where they then draw real and symbolic boundaries between themselves and such groups. As a result, religious vitality is maintained in the face of modernisation.

1.3.2(d) Religion in a Postmodern World

One word that has gained increasing currency within social-scientific discourse in recent years is “postmodern.” At the risk of simplifying the concept, postmodern denotes a condition of scepticism towards what Lyotard (1986) calls “metanarratives” or background stories that give justification to the quest for truth or certainty (e.g., science and religion). Unsurprisingly, some social scientists offer an explanation on religious vitality based on the postmodern perspective.

Using empirical data derived from the World Values Surveys (1981 and 1991) – a comparative study of 43 societies around the world – Inglehart (in Herbert 2003, p. 45) relates the process of modernisation to cultural changes (which include religious changes). He argued that modernisation theory as expounded by secularisation theorists is roughly correct for one phase of modernisation, but that it fails to capture the changes that occur as populations in advanced industrial societies reach a point where increases in material wealth no longer convert into perceptions of an increased quality of life

13 Italics in the original. 22

(Herbert, 2003, p. 45). At this stage, issues such as the environment, spirituality, etc, become more important as it has an impact on the quality of life.

Here, we are witnessing a shift from “materialist values” to what he calls as

“postmaterialist values”:

The term ‘Postmaterialist’ denotes a set of goals that are emphasized after people have attained material security and because they have attained material security … The emergence of postmaterialism does not reflect a reversal of polarities but a change of priorities: Postmaterialists do not place a negative value on economic and physical security – they value it positively, like everyone else; but, unlike materialists, they give even higher priority to self-expression and to quality of life (Inglehart, 1997 cited in Herbert, 2003, p. 45).

Inglehart calls this process “postmodernisation” which have various features that are associated with cultural postmodernism, i.e., “a revalorization of tradition, a renewed emphasis on culture, a decline in ‘metanarratives’ (certainty-giving stories), whether in science, religion or the nation, which proceed from the earlier process of modernisation which have succeeded in bringing about economic growth but at the expense of quality of life” (Herbert, 2003, p. 45). As a result,

Postmodernisation represents a shift in survival strategies, from maximizing economic growth to maximizing survival and well-being. … [N]o strategy is optimal for all conditions. Modernisation … probably also increased psychological stress. … Postmodernisation, on the other hand, has a mildly negative linkage with economic growth, but a strong positive linkage with subjective well-being. With the transition from Modernisation to Postmodernisation, the trajectory of change seems to have shifted from maximizing economic growth to maximizing the quality of life (Inglehart, 1997 cited in Herbert, 2003, p. 46).

Such a context, he goes on to suggest, may be fertile grounds for religions that can accommodate such zeitgeist which usually means newer forms of religions such as the New Age movement, new religious movement and new styles of traditional religions rather than the traditional authoritarian religions, e.g., Roman Catholicism (Herbert,

2003: 46). Religion then, as this theory seems to imply, is becoming a personal choice which carries no public significance.

1.3.2(e) Glifford Geertz and Karen Armstrong on the Persistence of Religion in the

Modern World

Geertz (1973b) begins by pointing out that humanity is by nature a creature that seeks to find meaning for his existence through religion. The function of religion is “to synthesise a people’s ethos – the tone, character and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood – and their world view – the picture they have of the way things in sheer reality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order” (Geertz, 1973b: 89).

In other words, religion provides people with a narrative frame from which to make sense of the world around them and thereby finding their place in the world. By fulfilling this function, religion is able to persist in the modern world despite the rise of the modern rational mindset.

Karen Armstrong (2000) in her book “The Battle for God” extended Geertz’s insight by forwarding the political implications of the global resurgence of religion.

Religion provides a narrative frame for the individual to find meaning and thereby orienting him/her to the world in which they live.

Modernisation did not relegate religion either in the dustbin of history or into the private sphere of beliefs. Rather religion had entered into the public sphere making it heard and not ignored by the state. The persistence of religion in the modern world was due to the fact that it essentially provides people with what she calls “mythos” which

“provided people with a context that made sense of their day-to-day lives” (Armstrong,

2000, p. xv).

Modernisation with its overemphasis on rationality displaced mythos in the modern world. This left people bereft of a resource which can help them make sense of their everyday lives. Disoriented, some have chosen to return to religion to access mythos to overcome the sterile world of rationality. However, this turn is not a return towards pre-modern forms of religion but was rather “modern forms of faith that was often highly innovative, ready to jettison centuries of tradition” (Armstrong, 2000, p.

279).

This turn towards religion is not a matter of personal conversion alone but carries with it political overtones that had drawn a battle line in society between the religious and the secular. The former, feeling embattled, have decided that they must take the battle of bringing God back into history from which he had been excluded by the secularist in an attempt to preserve their vision of the world from being destroyed by modernisation. It is ironic to note that while the religious rejected the spirit of modernity, they did not reject the modern tools provided by modernity in achieving their aims (Armstrong, 2000).

More importantly, she argued this turn towards religion is not a throwback to the pre-modern forms of faith but rather a specific modern response to the pitfalls of modernity which threatens to bring nihilism. Such response is not just a personal conversion of the individual towards a private faith but an active faith that seeks to participate in the political sphere in the name of God in order to preserve what is perceived as an attempt to exclude the sacred from the rest of society, and hence, a threat to their worldview. In so doing, religion has entered back into the political arena against the prediction of secularisation theory (Armstrong, 2000).

1.3.2(f) Casanova’s Post-secularisation Thesis

Unlike the recent challenges against the theory of secularisation, Casanova

(1994) argued that by rejecting the theory of secularisation, social scientists are simply throwing the baby together with the bathwater out of the bathtub.

He suggested that this state of affairs was due to the fallacy of confusing the

“historical processes of secularisation proper with the alleged and anticipated consequences which those processes were supposed to have upon religion” (Casanova,

1994, p. 19). He argued that most formulations of the theory have wrongly conflated three related but distinct processes:

1. Social differentiation by which various social spheres became autonomous from

the religious sphere, each performing its own specialized functions.

2. The decline of religion where religious beliefs and practices is doomed towards

oblivion in the modern world.

3. The relegation of religion to the private sphere.

Briefly, Casanova (1994) argued that (1) is correct but (2) and (3) will only follow if there is a church-state alliance. However, if a religion embraces modernity as expressed by the process of social differentiation, i.e., renouncing its traditional claim in dictating all aspects of social life in favour of specializing in “religious” functions, while at the same time accept the role of being one player among many in the public square then it will prosper in the modern world.

As he puts it:

… it could be said that the more religions resist the process of modern differentiation, … the more they will tend in the long run to suffer religious decline, … But … those religions, by contrast, which early on accept and embrace the modern principle of differentiation will also tend to accept the modern denominational principle of voluntarism and will be in a better position to survive the modern process of differentiation and to adopt some form of evangelical revivalism as a successful method of religious self-reproduction in a free religious market (Casanova, 1994, p. 214).

Therefore, it is not modernisation that doomed religion but “the historic attempt to preserve Christendom in every nation-state and thus to resist modern functional differentiation that nearly destroyed the churches in Europe” (Casanova, 1994, p. 29).

The resurgence of the divine in the worldly affairs of men in recent years was due to the fact that religion refused to be relegated to the realm of the private but “had thrust itself into the public arena of moral and political contestation” (Casanova, 1994, p.

3) or the emergence of public religions.

What we are witnessing today is a trend towards “deprivatisation of religion” where:

[social] movements … which are either religious in nature or are challenging in the name of religion the legitimacy and autonomy of the primary secular spheres, the state and the market economy. Similarly, religious institutions and organizations refuse to restrict themselves to the pastoral care of individual souls and continue to raise questions about the interconnections of private and public morality and to challenge the claims of the subsystems, particularly states and markets, to be exempt from extraneous normative considerations. One of the results of this ongoing contestation is a dual, interrelated process of repoliticization of the private religious and moral spheres and renormativization of the public economy and political spheres (Casanova, 1994, pp. 5- 6).

Through his case studies of Roman Catholicism in Spain, Poland, Brazil and the United

States as well as American Evangelical Protestantism, Casanova (1994) presented a case of deprivatisation of religion where “religious traditions … are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of secularisation had reserved for them” (Casanova, 1994, p. 5).

1.4 A Critique of the Current State of Knowledge

Asad (2003, pp. 181-182) in his survey of the literature in this field noted that

“[m]any contemporary observers have maintained that the worldwide explosion of politicized religion in modern and modernizing societies proves that [secularisation theory] is false. Defenders of the [theory] have in general retorted that the phenomenon merely indicates the existence of a widespread revolt against modernity and a failure of the modernisation process”.14 Our current state of knowledge of this field, in other words, is in a state of flux where there is no consensus among social scientists on whether religion is thriving in the modern world or simply experiencing a temporary reprieve before being consigned to the grave of history, in the modern world.

What is however certain is that the burgeoning literature in this field has brought back to life a research area that was once thought to be moribund with the emergence of a cacophony of new theories in the last two decades, each competing among themselves and with secularisation theory, in trying to explain the vitality (or temporary reprieve) of religion in the modern world.15 More importantly, the current debate has opened up new perspectives in understanding the role of religion in the modern world.

Important as current debate is in widening our perspective in this field, nonetheless we should be cautious in applying all these theories wholesale outside the original context from which they were developed. Asad (2003) argued that the conception of religion developed in the social scientific literature of the past hundred

14 For a general overview of the current developments on the state of knowledge in this area, see Sherkat and Ellision (1999). 15 See Lechner (1991); Wilson (1985; 1994); Dobbelaere (1999) and Phillips (2004) for scholars who still consider the soundness of secularisation theory. 28

years was based on the Western conception (and historical experience) of religion in social life.

The Western conception, which found its way into the social scientific understanding of religion, was founded on the political doctrine of secularism which

“arose in modern Euro-America” (Asad, 2003, p.1) which requires the “separation of religious from secular institutions in government’’ (Asad, 2003, pp. 1-2) that informs the

Western modernisation project.

In short, the current social-scientific discourse on the role of religion in the modern world is essentially a reading of the Western experience of modernity. The question that we must ask is whether the current stock of theories in this field can be applied to the non-Western (and post-colonial) context where the experience of modernity differs from that of the West?

The answer, I believe, must be a “no”. It cannot be denied that the current debate has reinvigorated this area of study within the social sciences, opened up new vistas in understanding the role of religion in the modern world. Nonetheless to apply wholesale such theories in the non-Western context would only distort our understanding of the role of religion in non-Western (and post-colonial) societies.

It can be added that the current crop of theories tends to ignore the colonial and post-colonial historical developments of non-Western societies. These historical developments have created a different outcome of the fate of religion in these societies.

Rather than being relegated from the public square, religion remains an important

precinct in the public life of such societies.16 In the next section, I will be reviewing a body of work that addresses the blind side of the current literature in this area.

1.5 Religion and the Public Sphere in Post-colonial Societies

Judging from the growing corpus of recent social-scientific studies on religion, it would seem that religion is alive and well in the modern world. More so, when we take into account the fact that the post-colonial states that emerged from the wreckage of the old colonial order after the Second World War devoted much of their energies towards bringing modernisation and nation-building – a secular enterprise – to their own societies.

Although religion has played an important role in engendering and nurturing nationalist movements in colonial states (particularly in Southeast Asia), nonetheless as the struggle for independence unfolds, nationalists with secularist leanings began to take over the struggle and led their respective countries to independence (von der Mehden,

1968).

Unsurprisingly, when the secular nationalists inherited the state bequeathed by the colonialist where they proceeded to model their newly independent state along the lines of their former colonial overlords which stressed on the necessity of modernisation and nation-building as well as adopting a stance of neutrality towards religion. Given the focus of the newly independent post-colonial states which have devoted its energies towards “secular” pursuits, it was unsurprising why they attempted to keep religion out of the political sphere.

16 See Willford and George (2005) for a collection of essays on this issue in the Southeast Asian region. See Meyer (2004) and van der Veer (2002) for a review of the same issue in Africa on South Asia respectively. 30

Nonetheless, such attempts towards separation between religion and the state were not as rigorous as in the West. Religion still has a place within the political order of the newly independent nation-state. For example, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia contained Islamic provisions where the government was obliged and empowered the government to “ensure that the necessary framework for the administration of Islamic affairs is put in place” (Malik Imtaz, 2007, p. 34).

Malaysia was not the only country in Southeast Asia to put in a religious provision in its constitution. Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar also provided a religious provision in their constitutions (Go, 2002, pp. 569-570). Even in the avowedly secularist state like Indonesia, its official ideology – the Pancasila – started with the principle of belief in God. Since the founding of the Indonesian Republic, Islam had remained a potent force in its political landscape.17

In the case of Malaysia, the issue of religion did not figure prominently in

Malaysian political discourse between 1957 and the mid-1970s. However, the emergence of Islamic revivalism in the late 1970s fundamentally altered the country’s political landscape where religion moved from the periphery to the centre of the political arena. How then, are we to account for the trajectory in which religion has taken in this country?

It is the contention of this thesis that the reason why religion had survived (and thrived) in the modern world in spite of modernisation is paradoxically because it is a modern response to the pitfalls that modernity brings about and one cannot ignore the role of state in co-opting religion for its own purpose.

17 See Means (2009); Porter (2002); Barton (2002); Hefner (2001); Barton & Fealy (1996); and Ramage (1995). 31

1.5.1 Theoretical Insights from Southeast Asian Studies

Clifford Geertz (1973a) in his classic essay “The Integrative Revolution,” pointed out that post-colonial societies were often inhabited by different groups of people whose solidarity is based on primordial sentiments. He defined primordial sentiments as a shared group identity based on “blood, race, language, locality, religion, or traditions” (Geertz, 1973a, p. 258).

The problem arises when post-colonial states attempt to create a modern nation- state which requires people give up their allegiance to their group and transfer it to the state where they will participate in the modern political sphere as citizens. Such attempts only serve to bring primordial sentiments to the fore as people begin to feel their group identity is being threatened. Consequently, the political sphere became mired with primordial sentiments, e.g. tribalism, race, religion, etc, as each group seeks to defend their traditional identity in the face of the state’s attempt to forge a national identity – based on modern lines – upon them (Geertz, 1973a). In short, modernisation in post- colonial societies serves only to entrench religion in the public sphere.

Coming from the perspective of Southeast Asian studies, George and Willford

(2005) in the opening essay of the book entitled “Spirited Politics: Religion and Public

Life in Contemporary Southeast Asia” calls to attention the theoretical failure of secularisation theory in explaining the recent developments in this region. Modernisation they argued did not bring forth a trend towards secularisation but rather brings to attention the salience of religion in the public sphere.

For both of them, contemporary Southeast Asian societies are marked by

“political public spheres defined by norms of national belonging and religious affiliation” (Bowen, 1995, p. 1050) where the primary reason for this would seem to be the spread of nationalism and the rise of nation-states which have created a new zone of cultural politics where “individuals, collectivities, and state institutions recruit and direct cultural expression toward reflexively sought social identities, political-economic goals, and ideological ends” (George and Willford, 2005, p. 10). As a result:

localities and local lives have been brought into a reconstituted through an unceasing entanglement with the nation-state, no less than with the mass-media, global markets, transnational religious movements, and the myriad dilemmas of modernity. Although the rhetoric of nationalism typically has had the purpose of consolidating a people and a citizenry through idioms of belonging, such consolidation is never assured is never assured. The nation-state extends its bureaucratic and coercive presence into and across locales as a display and exercise of its own legitimacy, even as it distends the very horizons of the local. As a result, contemporary violence, conflict, and turmoil do not have a life as local phenomena alone, but reveal intricate ties to state concerns, intrigues, and interventions. Indeed, the nationalistic imagination offers cultural frameworks for recasting local events as national ones, and vice-versa. In short, the nation-state has become the dominant socialpolitical institution for placing collectivities and individuals “in the world” – for making them legible to each other, and for drawing them into the current of modernity (George and Willford, 2005, p. 10).

More importantly, they bring to attention the role of the state in facilitating the entry of religion into the political sphere. For the state, in its attempt to create a modern nation-state, had entangled religion into its operation of power. Religion becomes a concern of the state, not just a matter of private convictions. As a result, the state had increasingly lengthened its reach into the everyday lives of its citizens where matters once considered as affairs in the private realm now command the attention of the state.

However, such attempts at intervening in the everyday lives of people are never totally assured of success as people too can use religion to find some manoeuvring room against the state. Such activities are not necessarily oppositional or resistant activities but rather based on the fact that people can be quite calculating in using the state to

advance their own interests – religious or otherwise – all aimed at finding some kind of political footing (Willford and George, 2005, p. 11). Through this dialectic, religion began to take a life of its own in the political sphere of contemporary Southeast Asian societies.

Just as the post-colonial state seeks to utilize religion and ethnicity for its own purpose, so too can individuals and groups use the same to create room to manoeuvre against the state in order to advance their own interests. This is especially so since modernisation has opened up new avenues for political articulation (particularly on personal and communal identity) and mobilization.

Lee and Ackerman (1997) noted that religion had remained deeply embedded in the everyday life of Asian societies even as they are being transformed into modern industrial societies. Such embeddedness had made religion ideally suited for the task of placating the anxiety of losing one’s communal identity within the context of rapid social changes brought about by modernisation. This is particularly true for the middle- class which emerged from the state-led modernisation process. More than other classes in society, members of the middle-class experienced the fragmentation of social identity as well as the tensions brought about by modernity most acutely.

Given the embeddedness of religion in culture, it is unsurprising that members of this class turn to religion as an activity for self-reflection on the dilemmas of modernity because of their literate and technically proficient background. Participation in religion often becomes an activity for identity-making as well as a means for overcoming the dilemmas of modernity (Lee and Ackerman, 1997, p. 7).

Although the quest for identity-making may begin as a personal quest to overcome the anxiety over the fragmentation of social identity caused by modernisation

– especially by the middle-class –such a quest often runs counter to the state’s agenda.

As a result, religion is firmly placed in the public sphere as issues on national identity, and the role of religion in the construction of such identity is being brought up.18

1.5.2 Religion and the Public Sphere in Southeast Asia

Chong (2010) noted the scholarship on the relationship between politics and religion can be divided between Islam and the rest. This is unsurprising given the political and cultural history of this region and the abiding interdisciplinary interest on

Islam. Given the enormous amount and depth of the scholarly corpus in this area, it is not practical for me to give a detailed account on the literature. Rather this section will offer a brief historical overview of the relationship between Islam and Christianity in this region as a way of locating this thesis within the Southeast Asian context. After which, I will then offer an episode of religion entering the public sphere. Keeping in line with the subject of the thesis, I will be looking at the case of Christian involvement in the public sphere in Singapore.

18 See Nagata (1984); Ackerman and Lee (1990). 35

1.5.2(a) A brief history of the relationship between Islam and Christianity in Southeast

Asia

From a historical point of view, Southeast Asia formed one of the major overland and maritime routes between India and China particularly in the Malaysian Peninsular and the Indonesia archipelago. With economic interaction came the inevitable cultural diffusion between the people of this region with the traders and settlers who came from

India. The kingdoms that arise here owe much of their initial religious and political ideas to Hinduism (and latter Buddhism) which can be traced back to the first century A.D.

(Ackerman and Lee, 1990, pp. 14-19; McAmis, 2002, pp. 7-9).

However, by the fourteenth century, a new civilisation began to exert its influence in this region. As the demand for spices from Southeast Asia and goods from

China by Europeans began to rise, both Arab and Indian Muslim traders established and strengthen their trading links with the kingdoms in the Malay kingdoms in the peninsula and the surrounding archipelago in order to meet this demand. With the growing contact between Muslim traders and the local people, Islam began to find converts among the rulers in this region which led to the conversion of the Malay world to this religion that started somewhere in the fifteenth century albeit one that synthesised Hindu-Buddhist elements (Means, 2009, pp. 21-26).

The fall of Melaka in 1511 to the Portuguese signalled the advent of Western imperialism in Southeast Asia which would last well into the mid-twentieth century.

Christianity arrived at the back of the Western powers that came into this region. The early encounter between Islam and Christianity has been one of violent encounter in the history of this region.

The Portuguese, the earliest Western power to arrive in this region, came with the twin goals of wresting control of the maritime trade route from Muslim traders and to convert the people in Southeast Asia to Christianity from their base in Malacca.

Unsurprisingly, the Portuguese met with stiff resistance from the surrounding Malay-

Muslim kingdoms while the early Christian missionaries made little headway in converting the local people to their religion as Islam had became deeply entrenched in their society where Christians remains a minority event to this day. The exception to this rule was the Philippines (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, pp. 26-28).

When the Spaniards conquered the Philippines in the sixteenth century, they initiated a policy of mass-conversion of the local populace to Christianity which was largely successful. However, as they moved further down south in the Philippine archipelago, they encountered two well-established Muslim kingdoms, i.e. the sultanate of Sulu and the Magindanau Confederation, both who resisted the Spaniards who threaten their economic interest as well as their religion. The conflict between the

Filipino Muslims and the Spanish would drag on inconclusively for three hundred years until the latter was ejected by the Americans in 1898 (Means, 2009, pp. 33-36).

In the seventeenth century, the Dutch replaced the Portuguese as the master of

Malacca where they also established a foothold in the Indonesian archipelago. The

British also established a foothold in this region in Singapore and Penang at about the same time. In 1824, both powers signed the Anglo-Dutch treaty which divided the peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago into two spheres of influence where the latter be handed over to the Dutch while the former was given to the British (Means, 2009, p.

45).

Unlike the Spanish, both the Dutch and the British did not initiate a policy of converting the local population to Christianity. On the contrary, both colonial powers were accommodative to Islam to ensure the local Muslim population did not resist colonial rule (Means, 2009, pp. 38-51).19

The relationship between the minority Christians and majority Muslims in

Indonesia and Malaysia during colonial rule was characterised by what Furnivall (1956) called as a plural society, i.e., a society where different ethnic groups co-exist without interacting with one another except in the marketplace.

The relationship between Christians and Muslims were rather different in the case of the Philippines. In 1898, the Spanish was embroiled in a war with the United

States which led to the Americans taking over the Philippines in the same year. Initially, the Americans encountered heavy resistance from nationalist Filipinos but such resistance was quickly crushed and American rule was quickly established in most part of the archipelago (Means, 2009, pp. 37-37).

However, in southern Philippines, they encountered armed and passive resistance from the local Muslim population who saw the Americans as infidels. This conflict would drag until the Philippines were granted independence in 1946. In order to pacify the southern part of the archipelago, the Americans initiated a transmigration policy of moving Christian settlers from the north to Mindanao. These settlers were supposed to be given lands that were unoccupied. However, because of the large numbers of settlers coming to Mindanao, the situation quickly turned into land-grabbing and questionable land transaction at the expense of the local Muslim population (Means, 2009, pp. 37-38).

19 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the British religious policy. 38

Inevitably, this “led to great distress among Muslims who believed that Christian immigrants were encroaching upon and stealing their traditional lands. These disputes involved numerous armed confrontations, with both Christians and Muslim communities forming self-defense private militias dedicated to violence against their rivals” (Means,

2009, p. 38). This policy would continue on even after the Philippines were granted independence as a means to counterbalance Muslim aspirations for an independent nation. Consequently, violent conflict between both communities continued on until today (Means, 2009, p. 38).

The post-independence years, particularly in the past two decades, witnessed the relationship between these two faith communities in Indonesia and Malaysia became increasingly conflict ridden (and in some cases it turned violent). In both cases, the conflict was brought about by internal and external factors.

The 1970s witnessed an Islamic revivalism in both Indonesian and Malaysian societies. This resulted in an increasing Islamic presence in the public sphere which required the state to pay attention to the Islamist agenda. Unsurprisingly, the Christian minority felt themselves being marginalised by the increasing influence of Islam in the body politic of both countries. In addition, the ethnic and regional differences in both faith communities complicated the matter further.

On the international stage, the American military response towards the

September 11, 2001 attack in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan has further strained the relationship between Muslims and Christians in this region. The former viewed the American military response as a “Christian” aggression towards the

Muslim world which has fuelled violent conflict in certain parts of the Indonesian archipelago.20

Although Christians formed a minority in this region, nonetheless Goh (2005, p

15) noted:

Christianity is a minority religion in all countries in Southeast Asia except the Philippines ... Yet against this fact, it is important to recognize that Christianity brought (and continues to bring) a social effect that contribute widely to the educational, medical and social life of the countries of Southeast Asia, an effect which extended far beyond the ranks of those who actually converted to Christianity, and which may play a significant role in creating and predicting future social transformations of Southeast Asian countries in an age of globalization.21

In the closing decades of the twentieth century, Christianity (particularly the newer evangelical denominations) has managed to attract large urban congregations using modern communication technologies together with sophisticated marketing and management techniques which not only have social consequences but also carries political implications as well.

1.5.2(b) The Case of Singapore

Unlike its neighbours, the Singapore state did not turn to the “cultural artefacts and imaginaries of ancient traditions or creative transformations of ethno-religious traditions into nationalist discourses” (Goh, 2010, p. 57) for its nation-building project.

Instead, the state grounded its national imaginary on the ethos of modernity which calls for rapid industrialisation to achieve material prosperity and progress. As a developmental state, it has uncompromisingly disciplined and mobilised its self- regulating citizens to fulfil its developmentalist agenda (Goh, 2010, p. 57).

20 See Aritonang (2006) for a history of the Muslim-Christian relationship that spans from the sixteenth century until 2003. 21 For an overview of Christianity in Southeast Asia, see Goh (2005). See Chapter 4 and 6 on the contributions of Christianity in the area of social welfare in Malaysia. 40

The Singapore state is inherently secular by nature where it embraced the politics of pluralism together with the values of a free market. Its policy of governance is based on the path of secularism where religion and culture are considered as part of the private domain free from state interference except when it is detrimental to the interests of the state. What the state has done so far is to ensure that no religious bodies stray away from the realm of social-welfare and into the realm of politics (Tham, 2008, p. 16-17). This is because the state is conscious of the fact that religious differences can reinforce the ethnic identities of its citizens which could disrupt the social cohesion of its plural society. At the same time, it is acutely aware that religion is a potent instrument for political mobilisation to protest or oppose the state (Tan, 2008, p. 58).22

Indeed, the rapid modernisation of the city-state did not witness a shift towards secularisation but rather increased religiosity among its people (Tan, 2008, pp. 56-58).

More importantly, religion is closely identified with specific ethnic group (Tong, 2008).

Unsurprisingly, the state keeps religion under surveillance with an eye for intervention when it deemed necessary, all hallmarks of the state’s policy towards religion.

It is within this context that we will examine an episode of Singaporean

Christians’ engagement with their government. Christianity has flourished in post- colonial Singapore. According to the 2000 census report Christianity registered a ten percent growth over other major religions in the city-state (Tan-Chow, 2007, p. 16). As a non-ethnic based religion, Christians come from all ethno-linguistic groups. However, given the numerical dominance of the Chinese in the population, the majority of the

22 See Tan (2008) for a discussion of the legislative framework which allows the state to intervene in the religious sphere. 41

Christians are Chinese.23 Another important point to note is the sociological profile of these Christians. They are primarily drawn from the ranks of the socially mobile,

English-speaking and well-educated strata of Singaporean society. In fact, university graduates form the largest cohort of Christians in the country (Tan-Chow, 2007, p. 16).

In short, Christianity is the religion of the middle class.

Although Christianity have been established in Singapore since the days of

British colonial rule, it was in the last few decades where churches that are evangelical and charismatic have experienced the fastest growth. They are followed by mainstream churches who embraced charismatic renewal and evangelism (Goh, 2010, p. 55).24 One of the main characteristics of charismatic evangelical churches is their emphasis on personal thaumaturgical experiences such as ecstatic behaviour, glossolalia or speaking in tongues, exorcism, prophecy and healing in church services and in the daily lives of its members (Lee and Ackerman, 1997, p. 129). Such experiences are not limited to the numinous realm but overflow into the temporal realm in the guise of material prosperity as a sign of God’s grace (Hwa, 1997, p. 209).

This emphasis on personal thaumaturgical experiences and material prosperity has led charismatic Christians “to acquiesce in the status quo to enjoy the fruits of decades of [Singaporean] development, particularly with the rise of [...] middle class consumption, and the display of ostentatious consumption as a sign of God’s presence to revive the church” (Goh, 2010, p. 76). Although material success signifies God’s grace on the Christian but they are “called to display the success to edify and evangelize” (Goh, 2010, p. 76). In short, a privatised middle class religion.

23 They are followed by Indians and Eurasians. There are also Malay speakers who are not ethnically Malay but Christians of Indonesian descent and Peranakan Chinese (Tan-Chow, 2007, p. 16). 24 See also Tan-Chow (2007). 42

However, evangelical charismatic theology has also been appropriated by some church leaders as a means for engaging in the public domain. For example, Reverend

Lawrence Khong of Faith Community Baptist Church tells Christians that “... Scripture calls us to take stand and fight as armed warriors against the spiritual rulers of darkness

... Loving and exalting Jesus, while we love and bless others in His name ... will defeat the devil and his schemes” (quoted in Goh, 2010, p. 77).

Such outcry is not restricted to mere rhetoric but have been put into practise in his church. The structure of the Faith Community Baptist Church is “structured like the military” (Goh, 2010, p. 77). The basic unit of the Church is the cell group where three to four cell groups formed a sub-zone led by a volunteer pastor. In turn, ten sub-zones formed a zone which is pastured by a full-time pastor, while five or more zones form a district congregation led by a seasoned pastor. The congregations come together for the main service every Sunday in the charismatic fashion to re-energise their faith while calls are made to members to “give and serve sacrificially” (Goh, 2010, p. 77).25

Goh (2010, p. 77-78) observed Khong’s approach,

[i]n contrast to the individualism in the theology of blessings, the thrust of Khong’s [approach] has been communitarian. Cell groups are communal guerrilla units experiencing “body life through the gifts of the Holy Spirit” that seek to infiltrate society and ‘penetrate the community through body evangelism’” ... Khong’s [approach] resonates with the communitarian ideology and the “Asian values” promoted by the states in the 1990s.

Khong’s message and church organisational strategy demonstrates the latent potential of Christians to mobilise effectively to engage in the public domain which carries political implications.

25 See also Khong (2000) for his account of the growth strategy employed by Faith Community Baptist Church. 43

In 1995, Khong initiated the LoveSingapore movement designed to bring into fruition his organisational strategy within the larger Singaporean context in an attempt to evangelise the nation.26 The LoveSingapore movement linked different Christian groups who shared similar concerns by providing them with a menu of prayer and community service events which culminate in a series of main events surrounding National day.

This movement managed to attract a third of the Protestants to support its activities where its goal was to “Christianise” Singapore so that the city-state would be the centre of the evangelisation of Asia (Goh, 2010, pp. 78-80).

“Prayerwalk” forms the major annual public event of the movement. The event involves believers converging in specific localities to pray while walking around the borders of the targeted area in an attempt “to claim the city for Christ.” The first

National Day prayerwalk was held in 1995 with pastors prayer-walking in the city centre while congregations conducted the same activities in the local neighbourhood. Then in

1998, this activity was expanded into a charity walkathon involving 40,000 believers congregating in the downtown area. By 2000, the number of believers involved in prayerwalk increased to 60,000 (Goh, 2010, p. 79).

Goh (2010, p. 79-80) observed that the effect of the movement was that it made

Christians conscious of the nation as a place, infusing otherwise highly urbanised space of instrumentalized for capitalist competition with the significance of collective ownership and heritage. This has been a perennial concern of the state because of the country has seen substantial emigration of the middle-class citizens feeling little attachments to a city that was built up in a few decades on a clear-and-build urbanization plan. At the local, decentralized level of public housing townships, individual churches have drawn strength and method from LoveSingapore to “take responsibility for the community”

26 http://www.lovesingapore.org.sg/ retrieved on 5/6/2010. 44

Through the LoveSingapore movement, Charismatic evangelicals has forged ecumenical unity through shared theological views and social action which have propelled them into the public domain on the back of a social imaginary based on a religious vision, i.e. “Christian” Singapore. Such discourse runs counter to the state’s political discourse, i.e. religion as belonging in the private domain and the need to maintain social harmony in a pluralistic society.

Up to this point, the charismatic evangelicals have managed to avoid confrontation with the state which is wary of such display of religion in public spaces with the explicit message of “Christianising” Singapore. However, up to this point, the charismatic evangelicals have managed to avoid confrontation with the state by adopting a transparent strategy to achieve its goal in order to forestall suspicion by the state. In addition, the movement also emphasised that its participants are “God-fearing people who feel passionately for Singapore ... [and are] committed to be active citizens to care for one and all” (Goh, 2010, p. 81). Although the movement have so far avoided in entering in the political realm proper nonetheless its potential for doing so is an ever present reality which might lead to confrontation with the state.

Indeed, Christians have demonstrated their ability to mobilise on issues which they feel as threatening their religious worldview such as the state’s liberalising policies to create a cosmopolitan city-state with an open culture. In 2003, the charismatic evangelicals joined forces with the conservatives in lobbying the government against shifting its policy which favours the hiring of “homosexual” civil servants in 2003 and to decriminalise sexual acts between men in 2007 (Goh, 2008, p. 83).27

27 See also Tan (2008). 45

1.6 Coda: Modernity, Religion and the Public Sphere

This thesis puts forward the proposition that the persistence of religion in post- colonial Southeast Asian societies is due to the modernisation process. Contra secularisation theory, as the modern rational mindset began to take hold in the consciousness of people, religion – rather than becoming archaic – becomes even more important as some people began to turn towards it as a resource for overcoming the pitfalls of modernity, i.e. anomie and nihilism. Religion also serves as an important resource to circumvent the social marginalization and exclusion faced by certain groups in society.28

The turn towards religion is not simply a return to the pre-modern forms of faiths but rather it is a modern response to modernity. Such a turn is also not a simple matter of private conversion – again contra secularisation theory – but rather carries with it political overtones as the religious perceive their world is under threat from the forces of modernisation and have decided to enter the political sphere in the name of God

(Armstrong 2000).

On the other hand, George and Willford (2005) reminded us of the role of the state in facilitating the entry of religion in the political sphere. They argued that the state have co-opted religion for its own purpose which consequently witnessed the increasing reach of the state into the everyday lives of its citizens in what would constitute as affairs of the private sphere. Nonetheless, such intervention does not guarantee control as people also can use religion to find ways to limit such intervention. Therefore, the central focus of this thesis is to look at the ways in which people use religion to provide

28 See the set of essays in Willford and George (2005). 46

“room for manoeuvre amid the shadows and light of the nation-state” (George and

Willford, 2005, p. 11).

Finally, Lee and Ackerman (1997) pointed out that the role of the participation of the middle class, particularly with their literate and technical proficiency background, in religion brings with it certain political and social ramifications as in the case of

Singapore. In latter chapters, I will be looking into the case of Malaysia.

In short, religion matters in the modern world. It matters not only because it serves a psychological need, i.e. providing a meaningful framework which an individual utilises to orient himself towards his world, more so in a time where rapid material and social changes are happening around him. Religion matters because it provides the individual with a communal identity from which he gains solidarity with those of the same community – whether racial, ethnic or religious – and provide him with a boundary from which to distinguish himself and his fellow members from other communal groups who live with him in the same society particularly within a post-colonial context.

Yet, religion also serves the purpose of the state. For the state, the issue of nationhood is not mere rhetoric but a necessity in which to politically mobilize its citizenry for its own purposes as they “now become an integral part of an autonomous and differentiated polity that … touches [their lives] at every point” (Geertz, 1973a, p.

269).

CHAPTER 2

Modernity, Religion and the State

Modernisation, it was once argued by scholars, would lead the newly independent nation-states in the second half of the 20th century to emulate the experience of their former colonial masters, and in the process towards secularisation as well. It was

... reckoned that nationalism and nation-building, the global rise of capitalist markets, and the broadening reach of mass-media, along with the other cultural, structural, and ideological features of modernity, would so swamp religious communities, institutions, and ideas that they would become unmoored from their once-prominent place in defining and legitimating political and cultural orders. Religion, in this scenario, was to become a “private” concern, and, for this reason, largely sequestered from the central and transcendent, “secular” energies of public culture and the modern nation-state (George and Willford, 2005, p. 9).1

However the reality was that religion was never displaced from the public life of these newly formed nation-states of the post-Second World War period. Scholars who studied this field have belatedly noted that rather than the trend towards secularisation, religion had played an important role in the social and political terrains of these nation-states which differed from the West’s experience of modernity.2

This chapter will examine one such case, i.e. Malaysia. Here, I will trace the path to modernity taken by the country and point out how this path diverged from the

Western experience of modernity which led to the side-lining of religion from the public life of modern Western nation-states.

1 See Rostow (1960) and Almond and Powell (1966) for a classic statement of modernisation theory. 2 See, for example: Keyes, Kendall and Hardacre (1994); Hefner and Horvatich (1997); Lee and Ackerman (1997); Berger (1999); and Willford and George (2005).

More specifically, it seeks to map out the transformation of the Malaysian political landscape (particularly in the peninsula) which has witnessed Islam becoming increasingly prominent in the nation’s public life. The focus of this chapter is to sketch the increasing alignment of state and religion which has given communal politics – which has dominated the nation’s political discourse since its independence

– a religious gloss in recent decades.

2.1 Modernity, Religion and the Makings of a Plural Society in British Malaya

Historically speaking, Islam entered into the peninsula in the late 14th century when mass conversion was brought about by the conversion of the royal courts of the feudal Malay states. Unsurprisingly, there emerged an official Islam that not only emanated from but also was controlled by the same courts (Syed Ahmad, 2002, p.

80). However the conversion to Islam of these feudal states did not mean the total abandonment of the traditional religious, social and political structures which were essentially based on the Hindu-animist tradition but rather one in which Islam was fused with the existing structures in which the Malay rulers serve as political and religious leaders within their kingdoms (Husin Mutalib, 1990, pp. 12-13).3

In this pre-colonial period, the structure of traditional Malay society in the peninsula was similar to that of the feudal Western societies, wherein religion was deeply woven into the social and political fabric of society.4 The traditional fabric of the Malay society began to unravel when the Western colonial powers reconfigured the political structure of the traditional Malay society along the lines of a modern state in the guise of the colonial state. The imposition of modern political structures here has resulted in a different historical trajectory in the formation of the relationship between the state and religion in this country, as compared to the West.

3 See also Milner (1983); Andaya and Andaya (1982); and Gullick (1958) 4 See Ackerman and Lee (1990), particularly Chapter 1; Milner (1983); and Andaya and Andaya (1982), chapters 1 and 2.

2.1.1 Islam and the British Colonial State

Historically speaking, the peninsula experienced three different sets of

Western colonial overlords starting with the Portuguese in the 16th century, followed by the Dutch a century later, and lastly the British in the late 18th century until 1957.

It should be noted that the impact of colonialism did not occur simultaneously to all the Malay states in the peninsula, nor was it uniform in its intensity. With the exception of Melaka, Pulau Pinang and Singapore, the interior of the peninsula did not fall under British colonial rule until the last quarter of the 19th century. Although the presence of Western traders and trading posts – which were established at the start of the 16th century – have certainly affected the traditional Malay society, nonetheless, it was only when the British began to impose colonial rule throughout the peninsula that significant changes to the traditional Malay society occurred

(Andaya and Andaya, 2001, pp. 160-209; Means, 2006, p. 18).5

The British implemented a policy of indirect rule which focused on

“preserving those structures of authority that were controlled by a Malay ruling class in various sultanates (kerajaan) under the rule of the raja or sultan” (Seyyed Vali,

2001, p. 32) while at the same time stripping them of real power which was to be transferred to a British adviser (Andaya and Andaya, 2001, pp. 174-177). To further co-opt the Malay ruling class, their children were given a Western education and recruited into the colonial administrative machinery.

However the British did not totally strip the Malay rulers of all power for they still retained control over Malay customs and religion. They not only refrained from interfering in the matters of custom and religion but also actively helped the

Malay rulers to consolidate their power in the religious sphere by establishing a

5 The Portuguese and Dutch did not expand their imperial rule over the borders of Melaka.

50 modern bureaucracy to administer the religious practices of their subjects. The result was “improved collection of religious taxes and management of religious endowments, Islamic courts, and pilgrimages to Mecca” (Seyyed Vali, 2001, p. 34).

Additionally the British also encouraged the formation of the Majlis Ugama Islam

(Islamic Religious Council) to assist the rulers in the management of Islamic affairs which became the basis of a modern-styled religious bureaucracy in the Malay states

(Seyyed Vali, 2001, p. 34).

For the first time, religion came into its own with its own function that was separated from the political. The jurisdiction of Islam would be that of personal and customary matters such as family and inheritance laws which would apply to the

Malay community only (Neo, 2006, p.101).6

Although narrow in its jurisdiction, the British were careful to pay deference to Islam as the religion of the state in matters of ceremony and public holidays, as well as providing some measure of financial support to Islamic institutions. The

British also enforced a decree prohibiting Christian missionaries from proselytising

Malays (Means, 2006, p. 22). On the broader societal level, the British introduced a modern state apparatus – such as a modern legal system and modern administrative machinery – in the peninsula which marked a clear distinction between state and religion, i.e. British prerogatives focused on civil matters while the Malay rulers in the area of Malay customs and religion (Seyyed Vali, 2001, p. 33).7

At a stroke, the British had effectively modernised the Malay states by giving them a political structure that is recognisably modern. Paradoxically, the moment in which the mosque and state were being separated under the British, Islam was brought back into the operations of state power.

6 See. Casanova (1994), Chapter 1. 7 See Ahmad Fauzi (2004).

This was because the British discovered early in their contact with the Malays that Islam plays an important role in Malay society and co-operation from the Malays would be jeopardised if Islam appeared to be threatened. This policy was designed to assuage the Malays that their traditional way of life would not be destroyed under colonial rule (Means, 2006, p. 23). In any case, the policy of bolstering the religious authority of the Malay rulers and providing a modern religious bureaucracy (albeit limited to matters of custom and religion) had the effect of strengthening the ties of

Islam to the Malays which gave birth to the myth of Malay sovereignty as embodied by the Malay rulers.8 This policy had served to keep the general Malay community politically content until 1946 when a radical departure from this policy would awaken the nationalist sentiments among the Malays and brought about calls for independence.9

One of the unintended consequences of the imposition of modernity by

British colonial rule into the peninsula was its linkage to the wider world through modern communications and transport. This resulted in the influx of new religious ideas – particularly those that arose in the Middle East – concerning the relationship between modernity and religion as well as the discourse on nationalism and anti- colonialism based on pan-Islamic doctrines. Unsurprisingly, these new religious ideas began to find their way into the Malay community which also began to gradually change the ways which the Malay-Muslim community viewed their religious faith, institutions and practices (Means, 2006, p. 19).10

8 See Muhammad Ikmal (1996) and Chandra Muzaffar (1992). 9 See Cheah (2002) particularly Chapter 1. 10 See also Roff (1967).

These ideas gave birth to a new group of religious elites called Kaum Muda

(Young faction) in the early 20th century. They sought to reform Islam as practiced in the peninsula – which was essentially a syncretism of Hindu-animism with Islam – to conform to these new ideas. The Kaum Muda faced opposition from the more traditional religious elites called Kaum Tua (Old faction) who had the support of the conservative Malay ruling class which ensured that the former did not gain mass support from the Malay community (Means, 2006, p. 20). Although defeated, the

Kaum Muda initiated sentiments of nationalism and anti-colonialism which would later develop into a nationalist movement in the immediate post-Second World War

II period (Syed Ahmad, 2002, p. 81). 11

2.1.2 The Makings of a Plural Society and the Emergence of a non-Islamic Religious

Sphere

Another important change which the British brought to the peninsula was the introduction of the colonial economy, which revolved around tin-mining and rubber- plantation. Because the British did not want to disturb the political status-quo of the

Malay community, the colonial state introduced an immigration policy to secure labour for the tin mines and rubber plantation that sprung up along the West coast of the peninsula. The Chinese and Indians came to the peninsula to work in both these sectors.12

Therefore, even as the economy in the peninsula was being transformed, the composition of its population was being altered from one that was homogenous, i.e.

Malays, to a plural society. More importantly, it also created an economy that was characterised by an ethnic division of labour which saw the non-Malays (and in particular the Chinese) involved in the modern urban-economic sector, where they

11 See Roff (1967) for a discussion of the role in which Islam played in fanning ideas on nationalism in the peninsula, 12 See Andaya and Andaya (1982) Chapter 6.

53 gradually climbed up the economic ladder by moving into the business and professional occupations while the Malays were kept in the traditional rural- agricultural sector. The only group of Malays that was involved in the modern sector was the aristocratic Malays who formed part of the colonial administrative machinery.

The transformation of the traditional feudal Malay society to a modern plural society in the peninsula impacted on the political and social dynamics of post- independence Malaysian society. However, British attitude towards these immigrants at that time was that they were temporary economic sojourners who served the economic interests of the colonial state and nothing more. Unlike the Malays, they were not privileged with any political rights because “the British regarded the

Malays as the legitimate owners of the land, while the non-Malays were seen as temporary guests” (Crouch, 1996, p. 16).

With regards to the non-Islamic religious sphere, the British maintained a policy of religious freedom for non-Malays and were careful to show impartiality to all non-Islamic religions although the colonial state did favour Christianity implicitly, if for no other reason than being sensitive to Western missionaries.

Nonetheless, the colonial government did not interfere with the establishment of non-

Muslim places of worship. Nor were there attempts to stop missionary work in the areas of education and healthcare among the non-Malays particularly by Christian missionaries (Means, 2006, p. 22).13 The colonial government policies discussed above were aimed at ensuring political stability and extraction of economic resources to the British imperial centre and were designed to further the interests of the imperium.

13 See also Ackerman and Lee (1990), pp. 26-33.

The major consequence of these policies on the local society was that it set the ground for a post-colonial society in which people were separated not only linguistically and culturally, but also economically. The most important consequence of British colonial rule is the legacy of political and social arrangements that would be based on ethnicity in post-independence Malaysia.

2.2 Malaya on the Eve of Independence, 1946-1957: The emergence of ethnic politics

British presence in the peninsula was briefly interrupted in the Second World

War when they were forced to vacate its colonial possession for three years because of the Japanese invasion in Southeast Asia. On returning to the peninsula at the end of the Second World War, the British government initiated a plan that sought to consolidate all the separate administrative units into a single centralised government known as the Malayan Union (MU).14

Unlike the pre-World War II policy on non-Malays, the MU proposal offered equal citizenship rights to both the Malays and non-Malays where the various communities would enjoin as citizens of a centralised state, i.e. the Malayan Union.

Citizenship to the new polity would be determined by the principles of jus soli and equal citizenship rights regardless of ethnicity. Also, the sovereignty of the sultans in the Malay States would be transferred to the central government. This plan aimed at preparing the people here for independence in the near future in which “citizenship could later become the basis of an enduring nationality” (Cheah, 2002, p. 14).

14 Before 1946, the colonial administration of the peninsula was divided into three distinct political entities, i.e. The Straits Settlements, the Federation of Malay States and the Unfederated Malay States.

This plan provoked mass protests from the Malay community led by the very group which the British had absorbed into its colonial administrative apparatus, i.e. the Malay aristocracy, who feared that the British was planning to create an independent state which would see them losing their sovereignty to the non-Malay communities. This group viewed this plan as a betrayal by the British because it meant that “the non-Malays, having had little if any political authority before the

War, were now to be made as much the masters of the country as the Malays themselves” (Ratnam , 1967, p. 75).

This group of traditional Malay elites led the Malays in an organised mass civil protest under the newly formed United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) in 1946 against MU.15 Given the strong pressure from the organised resistance of the

Malays under the leadership of UMNO, the British was forced to abandon the MU plan and led the British to negotiate with the sultans and the leaders of UMNO for a new political framework that would eventually be adopted as the basis for a new independent state in the near future.

As a result of this negotiation, the British agreed to restore sovereignty to the

Malays, i.e. guaranteed that the post-colonial state would be in the hands of the

Malays, but was firm on insisting that the non-Malays must be granted citizenship, albeit with very restrictive conditions, in the new political framework. This negotiation led to the Federation of Malaya Agreement in July 1947 which would take effect in February the following year. The new political entity, unlike MU, would uphold the political primacy of the Malays within a federal polity that comprised different ethnic groups in its population albeit with stricter citizenship conditions for non-Malays (Cheah, 2002, pp. 15-22).

15 See Funston (1980) for a discussion on the early years of UMNO.

The non-Malays’ reaction towards the proposed Malayan Union was lukewarm at best. The Chinese community, for example, were more concerned about losing their Chinese nationality rather than acquiring the citizenship of the proposed polity (Andaya and Andaya, 2001, p. 268; Cheah, 2002, pp. 14-15). As Lennox Mills puts it, “The Chinese showed no interest in the Union and made no attempt to defend a policy which was so much to their advantage” (quoted in Cheah, 2002, p. 15).

However, not all Malays accepted the proposal that was worked out between the traditional Malay elites, i.e. the Malay rulers and UMNO leadership. Leftwing

Malay intelligentsia and activists opposed the Federation of Malaya plan.16 This group of Malays viewed the agreement as a hindrance to the formation of a truly

Melayu (Malay) nation.17 As Ariffin Omar (2009, p. 50) puts it:

The Federation of Malaya Agreement did not create a nation state nor did it bring about unity amongst the various communities. It was not a Melayu nation nor was it a Malayan nation. It was just a political arrangement leading to the birth of a new political entity. The mythical sovereignty of the sultans as well as the individuality of the states was maintained. Malay special privileges were upheld. And a strong central government with legislative powers was established under British control. Citizenship was made more restrictive because of Malay fears that the Chinese would overwhelm them and also because there were doubts at that time as to the loyalty of the Chinese towards the Malays states. But by no means can the Federation of Malaya be considered a triumph for the Malays because sovereignty was not in their hands. There were no national symbols such as a national language, a flag or a national identity that would be accepted by all. The federal council was established and its members were nominated by the British. Even though the English name of the political entity that replaced the Malayan Union was known as the Federation of Malaya, legally it was named Persekutuan Tanah Melayu thus maintaining the illusion that the British had conceded the creation of a Melayu nation.

In direct opposition to the new political agreement reached between the

British and the traditional Malay elites, leftwing Malays from Parti Kebangsaan

Melayu, the Angkatan Pemuda Insaf and the Angkatan Wanita Sedar came together to form the Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (PUTERA) that aimed at immediate self- government for a Melayu nation (Ariffin Omar, 2009, p. 51).

16 See Rustam A. Sani (2008) for a study of the origins of leftwing Malay nationalists. 17 See Rustam A. Sani (2008).

On the other side of the divide, some non-Malay leaders also viewed the

Federation of Malaya Agreement as being disadvantageous to the non-Malay communities. The plan would exclude a large number of non-Malays in the new political entity from what they considered should be a pan-Malayan nation-state.

They formed the All-Malayan Council of Joint Action (AMCJA) in order to have their voices heard in the new political entity (Ariffin Omar, 2009, p. 51). The

AMCJA was made up of moderates such as Tan Cheng Lock and left-leaning groups such as the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) and the Malayan Communist Party

(MCP) (Andaya and Andaya, 2001, p. 268).

Both PUTERA and AMCJA banded together in the first significant multi- ethnic coalition to put forth a counter-proposal that seeks to create a nation that united various peoples in the land, in contrast to the one that was being worked out between the British and the traditional Malay elites, i.e. the Federation of Malaya

Agreement. The PUTERA-AMCJA presented the British with the “People’s

Constitutional Proposals” in March 1947 (Cheah, 2002, p. 20).

Briefly, the proposal called for equal political rights for all who were willing to become citizens in the land. However, they had to forego other nationalities and sever other political connections, apart from pledging total loyalty and allegiance to the new nation (Ariffin Omar, 2009, p. 51). In addition, it also called for elected state councils and constitutional monarchies, advancement of Malays, protection of Malay customs, and immediate self-government (Andaya and Andaya, 2001, p. 269).

What is interesting about the PUTERA-AMCJA proposal was that the proposed nationality of the new nation-state was to be called Melayu as recognition to the newly constituted nation’s historical past and cultural origins. The term itself was meant to transcend ethnic boundaries with emphasis being placed on nationhood

58 for all the peoples in the land. Nonetheless, there were many Chinese who feared that the PUTERA-AMCJA’s proposal of nationhood meant that they would lose their ethnic identity (Ariffin Omar, 2009, p. 51; Cheah, 2002, p. 21)

The British rejected the proposal forwarded by PUTERA-AMCJA. The coalition fell apart quickly, after the Federation of Malaya Agreement was put into effect, because the British made every attempt to undermine its influence and weaken it. Several of the organisations were proscribed by the British and its leaders were arrested and detained (Ariffin Omar, 2009, p. 55). The abolition of the MU and its replacement by the Federation of Malaya represents the high tide of Malay nationalism which seeks to limit the citizenship as well as political powers of the new polity to Malays only (Andaya and Andaya, 2001, p. 268).

Four months after the establishment of the Federation of Malaya, the British colonial state was forced declared a State of Emergency in June 1948. This came in the wake of industrial violence by workers and trade unions, which was blamed on the MCP. This resulted in the proscription of the MCP and led to the arrests and detentions of several thousands of people suspected of being communists or communist sympathisers. The MCP responded by launching an armed insurgency

(Cheah, 2002, p. 22).

As a result, Malay nationalism was curbed by the escalating communist insurgency which had a largely Chinese-based support that necessitated inter-ethnic co-operation if this threat was to be overcome. The British brought pressure to bear on UMNO and the Malay rulers that “they did not intend to grant independence to an exclusively Malay government that have would little chance of guaranteeing stability in the future” (Crouch, 1995,p. 17). This ultimatum made UMNO leadership rethink of a future where the Malays needed to come to some sort of political

59 understanding and co-operation with the non-Malays, if independence was to come and the communist insurrection defeated. As a result, UMNO began to cast around for suitable partners in order to find a political solution to these problems.

2.2.1 The Birth of the Alliance Party

In 1949, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was formed as a welfare organisation led by English-educated Chinese businessmen whose political leanings made them anti-communist and pro-British. The MCA leadership, particularly its

President Tan Cheng Lock, believed that the interests of the Chinese community can only be protected by political involvement and cooperation with other communal organisations. Unsurprisingly, the MCA was soon transformed from a welfare organisation to a political party that represented the Chinese community in Malaya

(Andaya and Andaya, 2001, p. 275; Crouch, 1996, p. 44).18

The political leaning of MCA made it the natural partner which UMNO was looking for. What followed was the birth of the Alliance Party. In the 1952 Kuala

Lumpur municipal election, UMNO entered into a temporary alliance with the MCA to contest in the first ever election held in the country. Given the overwhelming electoral support that the alliance gained, this temporary measure became permanent given the exigencies of electoral politics and the demands of the British. Later, it admitted the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) – which had similar political leanings

– to its ranks. The Alliance coalition contested and won every national election between 1955 and 1969 (Crouch, 1996, pp. 17-18). With the birth of the Alliance

Party, there was now a working coalition between the leaders of major ethnic groups in colonial Malaya and the ground was now set for pursuing independence for

Malaya which this coalition started to pursue in 1952.

18 See Heng (1988) for a history of the MCA.

2.3 Independence and the Crystallisation of Ethnic Politics, 1957 – 1969

Given the historical forces that shaped colonial Malayan society where ethnicity was the salient feature, the granting of independence required that any post- colonial political arrangement had to satisfy the interests of two different groups, i.e. ensuring Malay political sovereignty in the independent state and securing citizenship and the political rights for the non-Malays. Only by securing both interests could political stability be achieved, and hence, governance in the newly independent state.19

For this reason, the Constitution is an important part of Malaysian history as it was intended “to provide a viable basis for ethnic understanding and good government. Behind it there was a great deal of bargaining, mainly among ethnic groups and political parties” (Milne and Mausy, 1999, p. 14) to ensure that interests of the Malays and non-Malays were secured.

The result of the bargaining was the creation of a new state called the

Federation of Malaya where its founding document, i.e. the Constitution of 1957, provided for a government that was to be based after the British parliamentary system with the exception that it would be a federal rather than unitary state. And in line with Western liberal democratic political philosophy, it also spelled out the provisions for political rights, the power and limits of government, etc.

However, in a notable departure from the British tradition, the Federal

Constitution specified that the state would have the trappings of a Malay state where the Malay rulers would become the constitutional monarchs of their respective states as well as taking turns at becoming the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the constitutional monarch of the federation for a specific period. It also laid out provisions for the

19 See Crouch (1996); Milne and Mauzy (1999); and Cheah (2002). See Puthucheary (2008) on a discussion of the origins of ethnic bargaining.

61 special position of the Malays which carries certain material and political privileges

(Cheah, 2002, p. 37).20 The constitution also provided for citizenship rights (albeit with restriction) that encompassed non-Malays and the provision for an open electoral system which extends the electoral franchise to non-Malays.

Materially speaking, the Constitution of 1957 reflects the bargaining that took place between the two most dominant communal political parties of its day, i.e.

UMNO and MCA. The Chinese would be granted more liberal conditions for becoming citizens in the newly independent state, which in turn, would allow the

Chinese to have greater electoral strength. However this greater electoral strength and a strong presence in the local economy would be off-set by the fact that the

Malays, via UMNO, would retain political power not only through the trappings of a

Malay state but also control (although not explicitly written into the Constitution) the office of the Executive branch and key positions of the administrative machinery.

Furthermore, it was expected that the socio-economic lot of the more backward

Malay community would be addressed by the government (Milne and Mausy, 1999, p. 18).21

With the framing of the Constitution and the granting of independence by the

British, a new sovereign state emerged on 31st August 1957. On the more practical side, with its almost overwhelming electoral support in the first general election in

1955, the Alliance Party formed the first government to rule the newly independent country where power sharing was based on a modified consociational model where

20 As I have noted in chapter 1, the Federal Constitution defines who is a Malay in Article 160. 21 See Ratnam (1967) for a discussion on how independence was achieved and the creation of a “Westminster-type” of political institutions in the country. See also Means (1976) and Cheah (2002).

62 inter-elite co-operation and bargaining ensured a coalition government (with UMNO as the dominant partner) in the nation’s political system.22

The Alliance Party power sharing model ultimately projects the state as the ultimate guardian of Malay political hegemony and socio-economic interests of the

Malays while at the same time guarding the rights of non-Malays. Although the country was territorially extended in 1963 to include Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore

(the latter would separate two years later) and changed its name from Malaya to

Malaysia, nonetheless, the Alliance Party government’s policy was towards maintaining the political status quo.

Between 1957 and 1969 the government was “more concerned about maintaining the relatively harmonious racial status quo which it might have upset by taking vigorous measures on behalf of the Malays” (Crouch, 1995, p. 18) even though it was committed to advance the socially and economically backward Malay community. However, the ethnic division of labour in the country which saw the non-Malays being largely involved in the modern urban-economic sector

(particularly in business and professional occupations) and the majority of Malays involved in traditional rural-agricultural sector were disadvantaging the latter economically. As a result, the Malays pressured the government to do more to advance their social and economic interests and a predictable reaction among non-

Malays who viewed such actions as prejudicial to their own interests (Cheah, 202, p.

50).23

22 See von Vorys’ (1975) for a discussion on the post-independence political arrangement of the country. 23 See Cheah (2002) particularly Chapter 3 for a discussion on the rising ethnic tensions and the subsequent aftermath. See also von Vorys (1975); Milne and Mauzy (1973); and Means (1991).

All this led to social tensions within the country and came to a head in the general election of 1969 which witnessed the Alliance Party losing half its electoral support even though it managed to retain power. As a result, the racial riots of May

13 of the same year took place because Malays perceived the results of the election as a sign that they had lost political power. This incident would mark the changing of the government policy that actively helps the Malays even though it must take into considerations non-Malay interests.

2.4 State led-modernisation, Ethnicity and the Challenge of Islamic Revivalism,

1969-1980

The post-1969 period witnessed the introduction of the New Economic Policy

(NEP) which was designed to help the socially and economically backward Malay community through state intervention. The NEP had two major prongs.

The first prong was to eradicate poverty irrespective of race by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities while the second prong aimed at restructuring society by eliminating the identification of occupation with race in order to eliminate the ethic division of labour introduced from colonialism. It was assumed that the social and economic disparity between the Malays and non-

Malays, particularly the Chinese, was the source of ethnic tensions in the country. By reducing and eventually eliminating this disparity, it was hoped that further ethnic conflict will be avoided. Within these two broad objectives, the NEP was also envisaged as a vehicle to help create an urban professional Malay middle class and the related Malay entrepreneurial and shareholding class (Crouch, 1996, p. 25).

Given its objectives, the NEP saw the partial abandonment of the laissez-faire policies towards one which favoured the state’s intervention in all sectors of society which resulted in major transformations of the political, economic and social terrains of Malaysian society. Simply put, the NEP signalled an intensive state-led modernisation program in the country on behalf of the socially and economically marginalised Malay community.24

In order to create an urban professional Malay middle class, the government intensified its recruitment of Malay youths into local universities as well as sponsoring a large group to further their tertiary studies overseas (Nagata, 1984, p.

57).25

One of the unintended results of this education policy was that it profoundly affected the mostly rural students who flocked in large numbers to urban areas where centres of higher education were located. Most of these students found themselves in an alien cultural environment and a competitive academic setting which they were unprepared for. However, within the same halls of learning, there existed Islamic student bodies which welcomed these students into their circles, helping them to adjust to their new environment. It was through these Muslim student bodies that these students were reacquainted with Islam, which helped some to cope with the psychological dislocation that they were experiencing (Nagata, 1984, p. 57; Zainah

Anwar, 1987, pp. 10-31).

At first, the turn towards Islam may have served as a coping mechanism in an alien environment but they soon discovered another dimension of Islam. Coming into contact with new religious ideas and re-interpretations of the relationship between

Islam and modern society and inspired by events such as the Iranian revolution, they

24 See also Shamsul (1986). 25 See also Nagata (1984) particularly Chapter 3.

65 soon discovered the political and social potential of Islam in overcoming the social and political ills caused by modernisation and the transformation of society in accordance with the tenets of the Islamic faith (Crouch, 1996, p. 172).26

Imbibed as they were with these new religious ideas during their campus days, it was not surprising that when they graduated, they carried their new found convictions into society at large (Nagata, 1984, p. 72). Their goal was to re-establish

“Islamic values, Islamic practices, Islamic institutions, Islamic laws, indeed Islam in its entirety, in the lives of Muslims everywhere, it is an attempt to re-create an

Islamic ethos, an Islamic social order, at the vortex of which is the Islamic human being, guided by the Quran and the Sunnah” (Chandra Muzaffar, 1987, p. 2). They formed the main cadres of the dakwah movements which sought to realise this goal.

2.4.1 Dakwah Movements as Carriers of Islamic Revivalism in the Country

Briefly, dakwah can be understood as a mission to convert non-Muslims to the faith or revitalising the flagging spirits of lapsed Muslims (Nagata, 1984, p. 81).

It should be noted that this movement is not monolithic in terms of its organisation or ideology but rather a loose movement made up of diverse ideas, organisations and activities, each in its own way promoting the cause of Islam.27

Of the various dakwah movements in the country, two stood out in the period between 1970s and 1980s, i.e. Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic

Youth Movement or ABIM) and Darul Arqam. ABIM was an outgrowth of

Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar Islam SeMalaysia (National Association of

Malaysian-Muslim Students or PKPIM), which has been organising Islamic activities

26 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss in detail the overall political, social and cultural significance. This has already been done by other scholars, most notably the following: Barraclough (1983); Nagata (1984); von der Mehden (1986); Chandra Muzaffar (1987); Zainah Anwar (1987); Husin Mutalib (1990); Shamsul(1997); Peletz (1997); Peletz (2002); Ahmad Fauzi (2002) and (2003); Kahn (2003), Martinez (2004); Means (2006); Norani Othman (2008); Norani Othman (2009); and Kessler (2008), 27 See Nagata (1984) particularly Chapter 4 for a discussion of the various dakwah movements in Malaysia of this period. See also Jomo and Ahmad Shabery (1992) and Ahmad Fauzi (2002).

66 among university students since its founding in 1961 (Ahmad Fauzi, 2003, p. 61).28

This movement was formed in 1971 through the efforts of the Faculty of Islamic

Studies at Universiti Kebangasaan Malaysia (Malaysia National University) and was duly registered as a voluntary association under the Societies Act in 1972 (Nagata,

1984, p. 88; Means, 2009, p. 86).29

The movement’s message was revivalist in nature where its primary goal was the propagation of Islam in Malaysia. Although it never openly called for the establishment of an Islamic state, it advocated bringing about socio-political changes based on Islamic teachings. Toward this end, it established Islamic secondary schools

(Yayasan Anda) that used the government curriculum intended for drop out students who wished to re-take the government examinations to gain admission into public universities. Apart from the standard curriculum, it also added an additional subject, i.e. Islamic principles which focused on the cultural, political and economic aspects of Islam. These schools provided a base for ABIM, a ready cadre that would carry and propagate its message into the university campuses (Seyyed Vali, 2001, pp. 87-

88; Jomo and Ahmad Shabery, 1992, p. 86).

ABIM’s best known president, Anwar Ibrahim, started as the movement’s public relations officer, later its secretary and its president between 1974 and 1982.

Between 1974 and 1975, the movement was inactive because of the detention of

Anwar for his role in the Baling protests (Nagata, 1984, p. 88).30 During his tenure as president, ABIM created a formidable organisational structure to disseminate its ideas throughout the country as well as recruit new members among the Malay youths and urban professionals. By the mid-1970s its membership stood at 40,000

28 See also Zainah Anwar (1987). 29 See Zainah Anwar (1987). 30 The Baling protest were large student demonstrations based on allegations that Malay peasants in the Baling area of Kedah was starving because of poverty due to depressed price of rubber (Means, 2009, p. 87).

67 members with 100 branches around the country as well as gaining international recognition from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran (Seyyed Vali, 2001, pp. 87-88).31

Although ABIM primarily operated as a dakwah movement nonetheless it was a trenchant critic of the UMNO-dominated BN government where the latter was criticised as being superficial in its implementation of Islamic policies. It also called for Islamisation of the government and society (Chong, 2006, p. 28). At the heart of its social and political critique was the belief that Islam was the panacea for all the social and economic woes brought about by the state-led modernisation program

(Seyyed Vali, 2001, p. 87).32

The Darul Arqam movement was another popular dakwah movement.

Established in 1971, its leader, Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad, was critical of other dakwah movements (particularly ABIM), which he viewed as attempting to create an

Islamic state through seminar rooms and slogans only. For him, the creation of an

Islamic state can only come about with the establishment of an Islamic society. Such a society, in turn, can only come about by creating a community of families and individuals who practise the true teachings of Islam (Jomo and Ahmad Shaberry,

1992, p. 82).

Such a community would require its members to shun “Western” influences while living together in communes in accordance with its interpretation of Islamic tenets. One of its main achievements was the creation of communes that ran its own development projects and businesses as well as social amenities such as clinics and schools offered an alternative development model to that of the state’s capitalist development program. More importantly, the Darul Arqam model offered a way to overcome problems of uneven distribution of wealth and psychological dislocation

31 See. Nagata (1984, pp. 87-104) and Jomo and Ahmad Shabery (1992, pp. 85-93). 32 See. Nagata (1984, pp. 95-103).

68 often associated with the capitalist development model (Nagata, 1984, pp. 104-

116).33

Darul Arqam’s believed that the transformation of Malaysia into an Islamic state would be affected by the gradual missionary efforts of dakwah rather than through participation in electoral politics (Ahmad Fauzi, 2010, p. 66). Between 1972 and 1978, the movement experienced rapid growth where it succeeded in attracting thousands of followers (particularly educated youths) by offering a new approach to the establishment of an Islamic state through the creation of an Islamic society as evidenced by its communes (Jomo and Ahmad Shabery, 1992, p. 83).

Generally speaking, the dakwah movements that emerged in this period – particularly ABIM – had challenged UMNO’s hold on the Malay community and its secular view of Malaysian politics by offering an Islamic alternative to the question of how to improve the socio-economic position of the Malays. ABIM had charged that the NEP policy of the UMNO-led BN ruling party had failed to deliver its promise of uplifting the Malays from its marginalised position. Instead NEP only encouraged corruption, nepotism and secularism that only benefited a select few among the Malays (Seyyed Vali, 2001, p. 88).

Although the dakwah movements differ in their outlook, organisational structure and method in propagating Islam, they all agree that Islam is the panacea for all the social and economic ills brought about by modernity and call for the establishment of an Islamic state in the country. In so doing, such movements attracted youths who were seeking alternative socio-economic development models that put Islam at its centre.

33 See Ashaari Muhammad (1993).

2.4.2 The Ethnic Dimension of Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia

Although Islamic revivalism in the country has a socio-economic dimension in its appeal towards the educated younger Malays, any understanding of Islamic revivalism in Malaysia is not complete without placing it within the context of a society characterised by ethnic dichotomisation in which religion can serve as an ethnic marker that differentiates a Malay from a non-Malay. As Chandra Muzaffar

(1987, p. 23) puts it:

When a society is totally dichotomised in the ethnic sense, identity becomes a matter of paramount importance. Each community becomes overly conscious of its own ethnic identity. It seeks out qualities or characteristics which it believes are unique to its existence in order to articulate its identity. Language, cultural forms or practices and religion are among the usual media of expression.34

Before the 1970s, the Malay language and culture had served as ethnic boundaries that distinguished a Malay from a non-Malay. By the 1970s, the government had made the position of the Malay as the national language unassailable by promoting Malay as the sole medium of instruction for all levels of the national education system (Zainah Anwar, 1987, p. 80). As a result, there emerged a new generation of non-Malays who were articulate in the national language that once was a preserve of the Malays. This resulted in the loss of Malay language as an ethnic boundary that could be used to differentiate Malays from non-Malays (Zainah

Anwar, 1987, pp. 80-81).

Because “there is a strong desire to seek out distinguishing identity symbols”

(Chandra Muzaffar, 1987, p. 24), the turn to religion – in this case Islam – was unsurprising. Within the context of an ethnically-divided society that just underwent the trauma of the May 13, 1969 racial riots, the need to find an alternative ethnic boundary was perhaps important. Unsurprisingly then, Islam was viewed as such a resource because “[t]hrough prayers, fasting, laws of marriage and inheritance,

34 See also Nagata (1984) and Shamsul (1997).

70 rituals of birth and death, manner of dress, choice of forbidden and permitted food and drinks, Islam serves to project an exclusive identity for the Malays of which the

Chinese have no part” (Zainah Anwar, 1987, p. 81).

Nagata (1984, pp. 85-86) offered the most succinct observation on the relationship between the Malay ethnic identity with Islam when she noted that the dakwah movements

[s]imply put, … include the rekindling of the religious spirit and entrenchment of Islamic values in Malay society. Their target is invariably the “born” Muslim – principally Malay – population, … , they make little attempt to recruit or interest non-Malays, despite the intent of the original spirit of dakwah. Dakwah in Malaysia is particularistic, not universalistic and aims at the remobilisation of Malay interests and consciousness as a distinctive community.

In addition, the post-1969 Malays were in a stronger political position, to demand that state and society should reflect a greater Malay/Muslim identity.

2.4.3 Malay Politics and the Politicisation of Islam

The Islamic revivalism that was taking place in the Malay community was something that UMNO could not ignore. From the mid-1970s onwards, UMNO began to display its Islamic credentials among the Malay (and Muslim) segment of the population. Keeping in mind the other half, the non-Malay segment, of the population, UMNO’s message dwell on the themes of how much the UMNO-led

Barisan Nasional (National Front) government has done for Islam on the one hand, and the danger of religious extremism in a plural society on the other.35 In essence, it projected the importance of supporting the UMNO’s brand of moderate Islam

(Chandra Muzaffar, 1987, pp. 5-6).

35 The Alliance Party was enlarged in 1973 to include a larger coalition of political parties. The enlarged coalition changed its name to Barisan Nasional (National Front) or BN.

The increasing display of religious credentials by UMNO in its rhetoric was not only caused by the increasing inroads made by the dakwah movements, particularly by ABIM (under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim) among middle-class

Malays but also because of the need to counter its political rival Partai Islam

SeMalaysia’s (PAS) use of an Islamic platform to challenge UMNO’s political hegemony over the Malays.

PAS was founded in 1951. Many of its founding members came from

UMNO’s religious bureau who quit the party to found their own because of a disagreement over the nature of the post-independent state. PAS was founded on the platform of establishing a state that would Islamise state and society. However despite its Islamic roots and rhetoric, PAS did not explicitly articulate an Islamic system of governance in the first three decades of its existence (Jomo and Ahmad

Shabery, 1992, p. 93). Rather, its discourse was coloured more by ethnic considerations that were wrapped around its Islamic terminologies

Since its founding, PAS has portrayed the UMNO-led BN as unIslamic and undemocratic. It also accused the ruling party, i.e. UMNO together with its non-

Muslim coalition partners, as promoting policies that are contrary to Islam and encouraging immoral Western cultural influences in the country. PAS also criticises foreign and Chinese control of the economy at the expense of the Malay peasantry while benefiting a select few within UMNO (Syed Ahmad, 2002, pp. 85-86). Its primary support comes from the northern Malay-belt states of Perlis, Kedah,

Kelantan and Terengganu (Liew, 2007, p. 108; Syed Ahmad, 2002, p. 85.).

More damaging for UMNO was the influx of many former ABIM members to PAS which was viewed as a natural progression in their commitment to establish an Islamic state in the political sphere (Mausy and Milne, 1986, p. 89; Seyyed Vali,

2001, p. 90). PAS began to emphasise its commitment to Islam while shedding its

Malay nationalistic outlook beginning from the late 1970s. As a result, more so than before, PAS began to explicitly articulate the establishment of an Islamic system of governance and accordingly the position of non-Muslims that new theocratic order

(Husin Mutalib, 1990, pp. 111-114).36

ABIM, on the other hand, “criticised the government under UMNO leadership, arguing that existing policies served to perpetuate un-Islamic colonial traditions and secular practices which separated religion from political, social and economic issues” (Jomo and Ahmad Shabery, 1992, p. 85). Like its political counterpart, ABIM too sought the establishment of an Islamic state.

Given the ideological challenge of PAS-ABIM between the late 1970s and early 1980s, UMNO’s inherently secular ideology – based on the protection of the interests of the Malay community – found itself on the defensive in a changing political climate where religion gradually seeped into the national political discourse with the growing momentum of Islamic revivalism throughout this period.

It was a challenge which UMNO could not ignore at its peril. In the case of

PAS, its political platform – from its founding – calls for the establishment of an

Islamic state based on the Quran and the Sunnah (Chandra Muzaffar, 1987, p. 55).

Ideologically, PAS “is committed to an untainted, untarnished Islam, an Islam that is pure and pristine. It shares the same rhetoric [as with the dakwah movements] about the evil character of secularism and all other Western ideologies. … Nationalism, the

36 See Husin Mutalib (1990) for a discussion on PAS’s view of the Islamic state.

PAS leadership regards as a particularly dangerous force since it is the ideology of the group in power” (Chandra Muzaffar, 1987, p. 56).

Perhaps the most potent vitriolic hurled against UMNO (by PAS) is portraying it as kafir (infidel) because “UMNO has failed to establish an Islamic

State, because it does not uphold the syariah, because it does not want to implement

Islamic laws and rules, [thus] it is beyond the pale of Islam” (Chandra Muzaffar,

1987, p. 85).

Sensing the shifting ground that is slowly favouring religious discourse over ethnicity, UMNO reacted by displaying its own religious credentials.37 Thus, the

UMNO-led BN government under the administration of Hussein Onn in the 1970s began to implement government sponsored Islamic related programs such as Islamic instruction, publication of Islamic literature and the establishment of an Islamic

Research Centre and Islamic Missionary Foundation (Khoo, 1995, p. 161).

In addition, Islamic studies was given increasing attention in institutions of higher learning such as the establishment of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

(National University of Malaysia or UKM) which included a Faculty of Islamic

Studies in 1970 and the Islamic Teachers’ College in 1975 (Nelson, 2008, pp. 208-

209). It also elevated the secretariat for the National Council of Islamic Affairs to a full division in the Prime Minister’s Department in 1974 (Syed Ahmad, 2002, p. 87).

The government controlled media introduced religious programs in broadcast media, all of which aimed at bolstering its Islamic credentials as part of the government’s reaction to counter the Islamic revivalism that was gaining ground among the Malays in the country.38

37 As with PAS, UMNO also experienced an influx of former Muslim student activists into its ranks which gave rise to calls for a more religious political line in the party. See Mohamad Abu Bakar (1986) for a discussion on the religious shift within UMNO. 38 See Funston (1980) for a summary of the government’s Islamic activities in the 1970s.

Ironically, as the government began to respond towards Islamic resurgence in the 1970s, it “becomes part of the Islamic resurgence [where government-initiated] activities on behalf of Islam [became one of the] manifestations of the resurgence”

(Chandra Muzaffar, 1984, p. 5) where Islamic discourse began to fill a major part of the Malaysian political system. As the 1980s began, the government began to institutionalise Islam throughout the state and society via a government-led

Islamisation program.

2.5 Stat-led Islamisation Program during the Mahathir-Badawi Administrations between 1981 and 2009

Generally speaking, the government’s policy towards Islamic resurgence in

Malaysia before the Mahathir administration in 1981 was essentially reacting to the entry of Islam into the public sphere. However, with the ascension of Dr. Mahathir

Mohamad as the fourth premier of the country in 1981, the BN government’s policy towards Islam began to shift to a more pro-active approach of meeting the challenge of Islamic revivalism towards the government by introducing an Islamisation policy on its own terms.39

On the ideological front, the Mahathir administration promoted a vision of

“modernist” Islam as the guiding principle of its governance and material advancement for society. At its core, this official view of Islam was designed to instil an “Islamic ethic” among Malay-Muslims that would enable them to flourish and prosper in the modern world and thus restoring the glorious past of Islam (Khoo,

1995, pp. 164-174).40 Such vision would, of course, be in line with the government’s modernisation program. In addition, the government’s version of Islam was also meant to reduce the emphasis on Malay-centrism while giving universalistic Islam a

39 See also Means (2009) particularly chapter 7. 40 See. Mahathir Mohamad (1986) for Mahathir’s own views on Islam. See also Martinez (2003).

75 more prominent role in the nation-building process, i.e. a globally-oriented, modern and united Malaysians, as promoted by Mahathir’s “Vision 2020” (Hamayotsu, 2004, p. 229).41

On the more practical front of politics, the government employed the strategy of coerce and co-opt to meet the challenge posed by the various Islamic groups that challenged UMNO’s hegemony. The most important figure who was co-opted into

UMNO was Anwar Ibrahim – an influential Islamic activist and president ABIM – in

1982. With Anwar safely in the fold, it was not long before ABIM was co-opted by the government into its Islamic agenda (Milne and Mausy, 1999, p. 85).42

And in so doing, the government gained two benefits. Firstly, it countered the potential PAS-ABIM alliance’s political threat to UMNO’s political hegemony among the Malays via the religious route. Secondly, the government was able to bolster its Islamic credentials by presenting Anwar Ibrahim in its ranks. Doubtless, just as he was being co-opted for public relations purpose, Anwar also provided the input that helped shape UMNO’s policy on Islam (Milne and Mausy, 1999, p. 85).

Apart from co-opting, the government’s repressive machinery was also utilised to meet the challenge of Islamic resurgence that refuse to toe to line. The best known example of the use of coercion was the repression of Darul Arqam. Using the

Internal Security Act (ISA), the state arrested the leaders of this movement and declared it illegal in 1994 because it alleged that this movement deviated from the true teachings of Islam (Means, 2009, pp. 131-132; Ahmad Fauzi, 2010, p. 67). The government viewed the movement’s growing attraction among the Malay community together with its version of Islam (which ran counter to the government’s version) as a cause of concern. This concern together with the growing speculation that its

41 See also Khoo (1995, pp. 327- 338) for a discussion on Mahathir’s view of nationhood and the Malays. 42 See Ahmad Fauzi (2007).

76 founder, Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad, would enter the political fray sparked the repressive measures taken by the government (Milne and Mausy, 1999, pp. 87-88;

Ahmad Fauzi, 2010, pp. 66-67).

Perhaps the most important front of the government’s Islamisation policy was its program of institutionalising Islam in society and in the government particularly in the areas of education, finance and administrative system.43 In the area of education, the International Islamic University (IIU) was established in 1982 where its educational philosophy was based on Islam. Although an Islamic university, it accepts non-Muslims into its campus as long as they accept the philosophical and religious foundation of the university (Khoo, 1995, pp. 175-177). The government also introduced compulsory courses on Islam in the state funded universities as well as in streamlining religious (Islamic) education at all levels of the national education system to ensure that it is in line with the government’s version of Islam

(Hamayotsu, 2005).44

In addition, the state also founded and funded two institutions that aimed at promoting the government’s Islamic agenda. They were Institut Kajian Dasar

(Institute of Policy Development or IKD) and Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia

(Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia or IKIM).

IKD, which was established in 1985, was given the task of carrying out human development training among student leaders, youth activists, junior managers and civil servants. IKIM, which was established in 1992, was to serve the two fold tasks of channelling “the challenge of Islamic resurgence along state-defined lines,

43 See also Ahmad Fauzi (2007). 44 For a detailed discussion of the state’s education policy with regard to religious education, see Hamayotsu’s (2005) study on the relationship between Islam and the government, particularly Chapter 5.

77 and to establish dialogue with non-Muslims both inside and outside” the country

(Milne and Mausy, 1999, p. 86).

In the area of finance, the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad was established in

1982 as an “Islamic bank”, i.e. its business dealings were based on Islamic teachings.

It is hoped that through this bank and its deliberate religiously sanctioned economic activities, Muslim funds will be mobilised to generate wealth for the Muslim community as well as encouraging thrift among Muslims (Khoo, 1995, pp. 177-

179).45

With respect to bureaucracy, the policy of assimilating Islamic values into the civil service was introduced in order to make it more accountable and efficient through slogans such as “kepimpinan melalui teladan” (leadership by example) and

“bersih, cekap dan amanah” (clean, efficient and trustworthy) and mandating that civil servants wear a name tag as well as introducing the punch card among others

(Khoo, 1995, pp. 179 – 181). However, the most important aspect of the institutionalisation of Islam in the government was the expansion of the bureaucracy that involved government agencies overseeing Islamic affairs. The most important expansion in this area was reforming and modernising the Islamic judicial system

(syariah judicial system) at the federal level.

Generally speaking, the Malaysian judiciary system is based on the British legal system in which the syariah judiciary was added into – but was separated from and subordinated to – the civil judiciary system. The syariah courts’ jurisdiction was limited to Muslims and in matters relating to family and inheritance as well as in some Islamic criminal offences such as drinking, deviant worship and sexual offences. While in matters concerning criminal laws, these courts have only limited

45 See also Mohd Aslam (2005) for a more detailed discussion on the development of Islamic economic institutions in Malaysia.

78 jurisdiction. This is in direct contrast to the civil courts which range of jurisdiction is not only wide but also have the power to review and overturn the decisions made in the syariah courts if conflict of jurisdiction arises (Hamayotsu, 2005, pp. 119 –

121).46

In addition, under the Malaysian federal system, the administration of Islam falls under the head of the respective states, i.e. the sultan, and therefore the syariah courts is not under the purview of the federal government unlike the civil judiciary.47

Ahmad Ibrahim (2000, p. 194), an influential scholar on the syariah judiciary, noted the inferiority of the syariah judiciary in the following statement:

… the syariah courts were for a long time neglected and forgotten. There was no independent judicial and legal service for them and the judges and officers belonged to the general administrative service and were subject to control of the [state government’s] Religious councils and the religious departments. The judges of the syariah High Courts did not have the independent status, remuneration and terms of service of the civil judges. The facilities provided for the syariah courts were far below those provided for the civil courts.48

However, all these changed in the 1980s when the federal government (under the Mahathir administration) instituted an intensive program to reform the syariah judiciary in the constitutional, legislative and administrative fronts. On the constitutional front, the Federal Constitution was amended in 1988 to give more powers to the syariah courts. The amended article in question was Article 121(1) where a new clause (1A) was inserted which ensured that civil courts would no longer have any jurisdiction on matters that fall under the syariah courts.

46 See the Federal Constitution of Malaysia; particularly part IX the Judiciary under which Article 121 (1) is located. Briefly, the article stated that the civil judiciary ‘shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law’. In other words, the Syariah courts are inferior and subordinated to the civil courts. 47 Unlike certain federal political systems such as the United States where there is a parallel judiciary system under the purview of the federal and state governments, the Malaysian civil judiciary is strictly the responsibility of the federal government. 48 See Ahmad Ibrahim (2000).

On the legislative and administrative fronts, federal religious authorities took the initiative to push various state legislatives to adopt its Administration of Islamic

Law Enactment which brought about the re-organisation and streamlining of the administration and enforcement of Islamic laws (Neo, 2006, p. 107). In addition, the federal government also created the Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia

(Department of Syariah Judiciary Malaysia or JKSM) under the Prime Minister’s office in 1988 as an administrative instrument to absorb all the syariah personnel who were employed by individual state governments to the federal civil service under the Skim Guna Sama Perkhidmatan Pegawai Syariah (Common Use Service

Scheme for Syariah Officials) as well as recruiting better qualified personnel and coordinating the administration and enforcement of Islamic laws (Hayamotsu, 2005, pp. 120-123).49 All these measures had effectively strengthened the hands of the federal government with regard to administrative decisions with regards to the religious bureaucracy (which falls under the purview of state governments) as well as giving it a status on par with that of the civil judiciary (Hamayotsu, 2005).

The culmination of the BN government-led Islamisation program under the

Mahathir administration was the official announcement made by the Prime Minister at the annual general assembly of a member political party of the ruling coalition in

September 2001 that Malaysia is an Islamic state (Martinez, 2004, p. 29).50 And then in June 2002, Dr. Mahathir made another announcement to the effect that Malaysia was “an Islamic fundamentalist state” because the government adhered to the fundamental teachings of Islam (Walters, 2007, p. 232).

49See http://www.jksm.gov.my/jksmportal/ (the department’s website) for a more detailed description of the department’s mission and responsibilities. 50 See also Mohamad Sharir’s (2008) article “Malaysia Negara Islam” (Malaysia is an Islamic State). The author was the director of Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM or Development of Islamic Development Malaysia). The article was originally published in 2002 by JAKIM.

These announcements and other similar announcements by Dr. Mahathir ended the ambiguous status of the relationship between Islam and the state since the resurgence of Islam that started in the 1970s. When Dr. Mahathir stepped down as

Prime Minister in 2003, he was succeeded by Abdullah Badawi who continued the policy of his predecessor albeit with minor modifications when he announced the concept of “Islam Hadhari” or “Civilizational Islam” as the guiding principle of the government with regard to Islam (Kessler, 2008, p. 73).

Islam Hadhari seeks to bring the faithful back to the basic principles of the faith as prescribed by the Quran and the Hadith that form the foundation of Islamic civilisation. The principles of Islam Hadhari are: faith and piety in Allah; a just and trustworthy government; a free and independent people; mastery of knowledge; balanced and comprehensive economic development; a good quality of life; protection of the rights of minority groups and women; cultural and moral integrity; safeguarding the environment; and strong defences (Walters, 2007, pp. 235-236).51

In introducing Islam Hadhari, Badawi hoped to ease concerns non-Muslims might have had over the Islamisation policy introduced by Mahathir’s administration.

Briefly, Islam Hadhari seeks to assimilate and practice Islamic values in government and society in order to better prepare Muslims to meet the challenges of the modern world and, at the same time, take into account of the interest of non-Muslims are safeguarded.52 Although much has been made of Islam Hadhari by the Badawi

51 See also Chong (2006). 52 As the premier explained in a forum in Sydney: Islam Hadhari [i]s compatible with modernity and yet firmly rooted in the noble values and injunctions of Islam. It is an approach that values substance and not form ... Islam Hadhari in Malaysia will provide a way in which the Government hopes to administer to the well-being of the country and welfare of its multi-racial and multi- religious population ... We are confident that Islam Hadhari can help bring Muslims into the modern world and integrate them into the modern economy ... Islam Hadhari is also consistent with democracy because it is about living in peace with and respecting each other in society. It is certainly an exhortation to the Muslims to treat well and fairly with their non-Muslim fellow citizens in all their dealings (quoted in Yeoh, 2005, p. 637).

81 administration, Kessler (2008, p. 78) noted that this concept “is woefully unexplained and unelaborated.” As a result, the Badawi administration has left the government’s Islamisation program initiated by the previous administration largely intact with a few cosmetic changes (Norani Othman, 2008, pp. 264-265).

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the increasing prominence of Islam in

Malaysian pubic life can be traced to the fact that modernisation in Malaysia did not bring about a total divorce between state and religion as with the Western nation- states. Malaysia experienced two contradictory trends at the same moment when it entered into the modernisation process. On the one hand, modernisation brought about the unravelling of the fabric of pre-modern Malay society in the peninsula where religion was deeply woven into its social and political life. This process resulted in religion coming “fully into its own, specialising in ‘its own religious’ function and either dropping or losing many other ‘nonreligious’ functions it had accumulated and could no longer meet efficiently” (Casanova, 1994, p. 21).

On the other hand, at the moment in which religion became separated from the political and its jurisdiction was being confined to the private sphere imposed by the creation of a modern colonial state apparatus in the peninsula, the same state brought back religion into the operations of state power, via the establishment of the

Majlis Ugama Islam (Islamic Religious Council) and the preservation of Malay customs, as a policy to ensure its rule over the natives.

These two contradictory trends have greatly affected not only the colonial but also post-colonial social and political terrains of the country. More importantly, the interaction between these two trends has enabled religion to maintain a position in the post-independence Malaysian public life. Admittedly it was ethnicity rather than religion that drove the nationalist movements in the last few years of British rule.

Nonetheless, religion soon penetrated deeply into the nation’s political discourse and practice, as I have attempted to show in this chapter.

Islam’s penetration into the nation’s political discourse was a consequence of the government-led modernisation program – in the form of the NEP – where one of its goals was to create a Malay middle class by sponsoring thousands of Malay students to institutes of higher learning locally and abroad in the 1970s. The unintended consequence of this policy was these students came into contact with religious ideas that were coming out of the larger Muslim world.

In brief, these ideas put forward the thesis that the political, social and spiritual problems of modern Muslim societies were caused by uncritical acceptance of modernity. The only way to overcome these problems was to order Muslim societies in accordance with the tenets of Islamic faith. Influenced by these ideas, these students would form the main cadres of the dakwah movements that flourished between the mid-1970s and 1980s. With the dakwah movements gaining grounds among the Malays (particularly the middle class), these movements together with

PAS’ – its erstwhile political rival – use of Islam as its political platform threatened the secular-nationalist UMNO hegemony over the Malay community.

It was unsurprising why the UMNO-led government in the mid-1970s onwards began to increasingly sponsor Islamic programs in a bid to bolster its

Islamic credentials. However, it was in the 1980s onwards – with the ascension of

Dr. Mahathir as the fourth Premier – that the government initiated an Islamisation policy in order to meet the Islamic challenge head-on. Since then, Islam has become a major factor in the politics of the UMNO-led government.

Therefore any understanding of the increasing re-alignment of the state with

Islam and the resultant government-led Islamisation program of government and society must take into account the country’s entry into modernity and its consequences as discussed in this chapter. The following chapter will look at the effect this re-alignment of state and Islam has on society where both chapters will form the context of the Christian response to the government’s Islamisation program.

CHAPTER 3

The State, Islamisation and Society

In the previous chapter, I have argued that the Malaysian path to modernization did not lead to secularization as with the historical experience of the

Western nation-states. Modernization did not displace religion from the public life of the country. In fact, religion – in this case Islam – became an important precinct in the body politic of the nation-state.

Since the 1980s, the Malaysian state has begun to shift its focus of governance from ethnicity to religion, which has profound consequences in the ways which the state governs its population. Michel Foucault reminded us that all modern states have profound effects on its citizens by attempting to mould its citizens through its policy of governance.1

In this chapter, I will argue that as the Malaysian state began to lean towards

Islam in its governance, it has not only brought about an enlarged role of Islam in the public life of the nation but also an increasing intervention by the government into those areas of everyday lives of its citizens in the name of Islam, particularly in recent years – such intervention into the everyday lives of the citizens is considered as the private sphere and is contrary to modern democratic theory and practice, and therefore off limits to state intervention.

1 See Foucault’s (1995) Discipline and Punish for a classic discussion on this subject. Also see Foucault (2003) on the concept of governmentality which extends the insight first formed in Discipline and punish text. This concept was one of the last themes in his corpus. Since then, it had been extensively explored by other scholars. Cf. also Inda (2008) and Dean (2010). 85

More specifically, this chapter will argue that the shift towards the religious in the state’s policy of governance had extended the reach of the state into the most intimate parts of the life of its citizens such as religious identity, marriage and even burial rites among others which had made even the most private lives of citizens a matter of state scrutiny and intervention in the name of religion. However, such scrutiny has the effect of dividing the population into two groups, i.e. the Muslim

(and pre-dominantly Malay) citizens and the non-Muslim (and non-Malay) citizens.

And in so doing, the religious in Malaysia has profound political consequences not only for state governance but also in the lives of its citizens

3.1 Surveillance and Discipline among the Muslim Community

Since the Mahathir administration, the government had actively pursued a policy of Islamisation, which had resulted in the government actively seeking to impose its authority in the public and private lives of Muslims in the country.2 In this section, I will be looking at the ways in which the government intervenes in the lives of Muslims.

3.1.1 Surveillance and Discipline in the Public and Private Lives of Muslims

As I have discussed in the last chapter, each state has its own statutes that provide for an Islamic religious administration in terms of syariah laws and enforcement of such laws as well as a federal Islamic religious administration that co-ordinate the administration and enforcement of syariah laws.3 Syariah laws can also be established through fatwas, i.e. formal legal opinions issued by Islamic jurists on religious questions for their examination. Once published in government gazette, fatwas are binding and enforceable (Farid Sufian, 2003, p. 43).4

2 See Chapter 2. 3 Cf. Federal Constitution of Malaysia, State List (Second List, Ninth Schedule). 4 See also Hamayotsu (2005), pp. 121-132. . 86

One of the trends in recent years has been a push by various state authorities for the legal codification of “Islamic norms, values and morals” state statutes. These laws were specifically meant to be applied to Muslims where they were prohibited to engage in immoral behaviour such as “prohibition of alcohol, gambling and khalwat

(close proximity between men and women who are not related to each other by blood); the enforcement of fasting during the month of Ramadan; observance of prayers; being subject to “decency” requirements and other stipulations” (Suara

Rakyat Malaysia, 2004, p. 161).5

These laws were subsumed under the syariah criminal laws of the various states and were to be enforced by the religious department of the respective state.

Although the enforcement was not as consistent or widespread as criminal laws of the country, its enforcement has caused much controversy especially in the recent past few years particularly as state religious authorities attempt to enforce such laws on the Muslim community.

Generally speaking, the most common offence is khalwat. For example, the

Chairman of the Terengganu Education, Religious and Syariah Implementation

Committee revealed that in 2001, the state religious authorities had arrested 465

Muslim couples for khalwat. Seventeen of these couples faced charges in syariah courts while the rest had to attend religious classes or counselling. Similarly, the

Kota Baru Municipal Council’s Islamic Development Department director revealed that in the first six months of 2003, some 59 couples were fined, mostly for “sitting too close to a person of the opposite sex in the parks” and in some cases for dressing

“indecently” (SUARAM, 2004, p. 161-162).

5 All references to Suara Rakyat Malaysia will be abbreviated to SUARAM as it is commonly known. This abbreviation is also used to identify its publications. 87

However, the enforcement of syariah criminal laws by the state religious authorities are not confined to instances of Muslims violating morality as defined by

Islam such as khalwat but increasingly on activities of everyday life which the authorities deemed as “unIslamic.” Instances of the enforcement on “UnIslamic” activities have generated much controversy as the action taken by the authorities have been viewed by some quarters in civil society as infringing upon the rights of

Muslim citizens of the country, particularly in the past ten years.

In 1997 the Selangor Islamic Religious Department (Jabatan Agama Islam

Selangor or JAIS) arrested three Muslim women for participating in a beauty pageant contest. They were publically handcuffed before being taken away for questioning.

In June 2000 the same department detained 31 Muslims who were at three outlets that served alcohol but subsequently all the charges were dropped. Later in the same year, JAIS charged two pub singers for “insulting Islam” by being in a premise where alcohol is served but the charges were later dropped (Lee, 2008, p. 108).

In January 2005, the Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (Federal

Territory Religious Authority or JAWI) conducted a raid on a disco which resulted in the arrest and detention of 100 Muslim youths. The raid caught the media’s attention because of the way which these youths were treated during their detention which involved several hours of verbal abuse and humiliation in the lockup, some of them were later charged with “indecent behaviour.” A year later on New Year’s Eve, the authorities raided and arrested 388 young people in a nightclub in Kuala Lumpur for attending a "black metal” concert which was not illegal at that time (Lee, 2008, p.

109).

In the same month, the National Fatwa Council ruled that “black metal” culture was against the principles of Islam and could lead its followers to apostasy

(The Star, 24/1/2006). Such actions have not only caught the attention of the public but also the cabinet. In March 2005, the cabinet decided that all future raids by the religious authorities must follow certain conditions, such as gaining prior police approval and having a senior police officer in the religious raiding party (The Star,

25/3/2005).

Of the many instances where the government intervened in policing the

“moral” lives of Muslims in the country, the controversy that brought the issue to public attention was the decision taken by JAWI in 2006 to form a “snoop squad” which was tasked with looking out for “indecent behaviour” among Muslims in public. This move brought about a cabinet decision three days later – and was published in the media – ordering JAWI to disband the moral snoop squad as the cabinet felt that the existing law was sufficient to deal with the issue of public indecency and that such a move infringes upon the privacy of individuals (The Sun,

19/1/2006 and The New Straits Times, 19/1/2006).

However JAWI responded that it wanted to go ahead with its plans to form a snoop cum counselling squad which went against the cabinet’s decision. The department said that it would brief the Minister in the Prime Minister’s department in charge of Islamic affairs on the function of such squads which was not only to collect information on those who committed “indecent acts” but to educate the public against “unhealthy activities” too (The Star, 20/1/2006). After the media attention had died down, the department launched an enforcement hotline to receive

complaints on syariah offenses by the public in August 2008. It also beefed up its enforcement personnel from the current 30 to 100 staff by October 2008.6

From the evidence available, it seems that the state religious departments have largely ignored the guidelines set by the cabinet and has continued conducting raids on its own. In August 2008, JAIS again conducted a raid on its own in a pub in

Shah Alam. Following a public tip off that the pub allowed Muslims to consume alcohol in its premise, officers from JAIS raided the pub and warned all patrons not to leave which was then followed by an order to surrender their identity card to the officers. Subsequently, 55 Muslims were detained for an hour and forty-eight of them were summoned on suspicion of alcohol under the syariah criminal procedure

(State of Selangor) enactment 1995 and the rest were charged with alcohol consumption.7

Apparently, intervention by religious authorities is no longer restricted to issues of “indecent” behaviour in public spaces. It has also expanded into private spaces as well. In October 2008, the National Fatwa Council ruled that “pengkid,” where a girl behaves or dresses like a boy, is forbidden in Islam.8 This ruling was then followed by another which ruled that the practice of yoga was forbidden to

Muslims.9

6 The Nut Graph, http://www.thenutgraph.com/dilemma-of-moral-policing retrieved on 25/10/2008. 7 The Nut Graph, http://www.thenutgraph.com/dilemma-of-moral-policing retrieved on 25/10/2008. 8 The Nut Graph, http://thenutgraph.com/national-fatwa-council-forbids-tomboyism retrieved on 5/3/2009. 9 The Nut Graph, http://thenutgraph.com/fatwa-on-yoga-out-soon retrieved on 5/3/2009. 90

Both cases drew protests not only from the general public but also by certain sectors of the Muslim community such as Sisters in Islam (SIS), some middle class

Malays, and those who were affected. They claimed such fatwas violate their rights.10 Subsequently, the National Fatwa Council was forced to rescind the ban on yoga because the protest not only had the support of some Malay middle class groups but also support of the royalty as well.11

3.1.2 Surveillance and Discipline Against “Deviationist” Islamic Sects

While Islam is the official religion in the country, the government endorses only the teachings of the Sunni mazhab (denomination). The teachings of Shi’ite

Islam (the other major mazhab) are forbidden for Malaysian Muslims. According to

Abdullah Md Zin, the Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department in October 2004, this policy was necessary to maintain the unity of Muslims in the country considering the differences between the teachings of Sunni and Shi’ite Islam. Consequently,

Shi’ite Muslims have been detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA). According to the same minister, between 2 November and 7 November, 10 Shi’ite Muslims were detained under ISA (SUARAM, 2009, p. 116).

In addition, syariah criminal laws make it an offence for a Muslim to own books or have an opinion that is contrary to the official interpretation of Islam as provided by the state’s religious scholars. All other interpretations and practice of

Islam is disallowed. Religious authorities at state and federal levels exert a powerful influence not only over the administration of Islamic matters but also over what is considered as “orthodox” Islam. Islamic sects are often labelled as “deviationist”

10 For example, see the Sisters in Islam press statements in the Nut Graph “Fatwa on tomboys is regressive” (http://www.thenutgraph.com/fatwa-on-tomboys-is-regressive retrieved on 21/12/2009) and “Fatwas shouldn’t be laws” (http://www.thenutgraph.com/fatwas-shouldnt-be-law retrieved on 25/10/2009). Women rights groups were also in the forefront of the protests against these fatwas (http://www.thenutgraph.com/fatwa-on-tomboys-violates-constitution 25/10/2009). 11 http://www.reuters.com/article/lifestyleMolt/idUSTRE4AP2CA20081126 retrieved on 5/3/2009. 91

although the criteria for considering “deviationist” are not spelled out clearly.

Members of such sects can be arrested and detained for “rehabilitation” to turn them back to the path of orthodoxy (SUARAM, 2004, p. 113).12

Over the years, there have been many reported cases of surveillance together with arrests, detentions and rehabilitation of members of “deviationist” sects in order to ensure that Muslims follow the path of orthodoxy as prescribed by the state’s religious authorities. For example, in 2002, Abdul Hamid Zainal Abidin (then

Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department in charge of Islamic affairs) stated that the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam

Malaysia or JAKIM which is under the purview of the minister) had been able to

“rehabilitate” hundreds of followers from 125 “deviationist” sects who had been sent to an aqidah (faith) rehabilitation centre in Negeri Sembilan (SUARAM, 2004, p.

113).

A good example of the state’s surveillance and disciplining of those who strayed from the path of “orthodox” Islam is the case of the Al-Arqam movement.

The movement was banned by the Malaysian government after the National Fatwa

Council – a body of religious scholars – issued a fatwa stating that Al-Arqam was a deviationist sect on August 1994. Almost immediately, its members and leaders were detained and sent to aqidah rehabilitation centres for the purpose of religious

“rehabilitating” while the movement’s leader, Ashaari Muhammad, was detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in September 1994. He was only released in

2004. With various restrictions imposed on his movement, the various actions taken by the government virtually destroyed the movement (SUARAM 2007, p. 122).

12 Generally speaking, the Muslim world is divided into two branches, i.e. the Sunni and the Shi’ite. In Malaysia, the Shi’ite form of Islam is disallowed and its followers are subjected to the same treatment accorded to the “deviationist.” Some Shi’ites are detained under the Internal Security Act for allegedly being “militant” Shi’ites. See Aliran’s ISA watch for a list of such people detained under the act at www.aliran.com. 92

Ever since the release of Ashaari Muhammad, the government has alleged that there had been several attempts to revive the banned movement. In 2006, the government had conducted several raids on the premises of Rufaqa Corporation; the business arm of a movement called Rufaqa, which it alleged is the reincarnation of the Al-Arqam movement in different guise. Since 2007, the government, through state religious authorities, have kept a close surveillance on the activities of the movement and its members whom it suspects of attempting to revive the teachings of

Al- Arqam (National Evangelical Christian Fellowship Malaysia, 2008c, p. 170).13

Throughout 2007, it was reported that the members of the Rufaqa movement have been arrested on various offences that involved allegations that they have deviated from the “true” teachings of Islam. For example, in March 2007, JAIS raided the premises of Rufaqa Corporation, where the authorities seized several items, including books and posters of the former Darul Arqam leader Ashaari

Muhammad. The raid was carried out in accordance with a state gazette which bans all publicity materials of Al-Arqam (SUARAM, 2007, p. 123).

And then on November 1st, that same year, the Jabatan Agama Islam Pulau

Pinang (Penang Islamic Religious Affairs Department or JAIPP) raided a Hari Raya gathering of the Rufaqa Corporation. JAIPP claimed that the gathering was a violation of the state’s Islamic enactment which had gazetted the movement as an illegal organization. The officials from JAIPP detained 51 individuals at the gathering. When released, they were required to appear before JAIPP to be interviewed and have their statements recorded on November 5th. On appearing before JAIPP and having their statements recorded, 43 people were hauled up before

13 All references to the National Evangelical Christian Fellowship Malaysia will be abbreviated to NECF from this point onwards. This is because NECF is the common abbreviation used not only to identify this body, i.e. NECF Malaysia, but also used to identify its publications. See also Ahmad Fauzi (2010), pp. 69-73. 93

the syariah court on the charge of breaking the state’s Islamic laws (SUARAM,

2007, p. 123).

In another instance, Abdullah Mohd. Zain (the Minister in the Prime

Minister’s Department in charge of Islamic affairs) brought national attention to the

Sky Kingdom cult and its leader Ayah Pin in October 2004. The minister claimed that there were a sizeable number of Malay-Muslims among its members; that several of these members have renounced Islam and that this group is a threat to

Muslim unity. According to him, JAKIM had categorized the Sky Kingdom as a deviant group and would take action against this deviationist movement (SUARAM,

2004, p. 114).

In fact, even before the announcement by the minister, the state religious authorities had already taken action against the Sky Kingdom and Ayah Pin.

Founded in the early 1980s with a commune located in Terengganu, the movement was declared as deviationist in a fatwa that was pronounced in 1995. Ayah Pin was reported to have been sentenced to 11 months in prison and fined RM 2,900 by a

Terengganu syariah court in June 2001 after pleading guilty to a charge of insulting

Islam (SUARAM, 2004, p. 114). The religious authorities hoped that his arrest and subsequent conviction in 2001 would halt the movement’s growth. However, upon his release, the movement resumed its activities and continued to attract new followers from among university students and Orang Asli.

Following the minister’s remark, action was taken against members of the

Sky Kingdom in July 2005 when the Terengganu state religious authority together with the police raided their commune and arrested 21 of its members. They were charged under the state’s syariah criminal law for defying the fatwa declaring that

Ayah Pin’s teachings were deviationist. In a follow up action, another 59 members

were arrested and 49 were charged in court. In addition, the state authorities moved in to demolish structures found in the commune which were deemed “unIslamic.”

However Ayah Pin was able to evade arrest. Three of his wives were later arrested and charged with the same offence, together with the others for practising deviationist teachings. It was reported that more than 1,000 of the members of the cult were detained and sent for religious rehabilitation (SUARAM, 2005, p. 96).

The latest case of state surveillance and discipline was against the Ahmadiyah community who are found mainly in Selangor. This sect considers its founder, Mirza

Ghulam Ahmad, as a prophet, and is considered heretical by mainstream Islam. In

1975, the Selangor fatwa council issued a fatwa declaring the sect as non-Muslim.

However, the sect’s religious ritual is almost non-distinguishable from the mainstream practice of Islam here and their followers (an estimated 2,000 members) are Malays. Their identity cards identified them as Muslims and their children have to attend Islamic Studies classes in primary and secondary schools.14

Although it is considered heretical by the religious state authorities, members of the sect had been upfront about their beliefs as they propagate their faith to the larger Islamic community. They do not attempt to disguise or hide their headquarters.

Their actions brought the Ahmadiyah sect to the attention of the Selangor state religious authorities. In December 2008, the Selayang Municipal Council tried to make them remove the kalimah syahadat (Islamic creed) from their headquarters.

And in April 2009, the Majlis Agama Islam Selangor (Selangor Islamic Affairs

Council or MAIS) officially prohibited the followers of the Ahmadiyah sect in the state from performing Friday prayers in their own headquarters in Batu Caves.15

14 The Nut Graph, http://www.thenutgraph.com/living-with-the-ahmadiyah retrieved on 1/10/2009. 15 The Nut Graph, http://www.thenutgraph.com/living-with-the-ahmadiyah retrieved on 1/10/2009. 95

3.1.3 Disciplining Apostasy: Muslim who wants out of Islam

Although the Federal Constitution under Article 11 guarantees freedom of religion, the government does not recognize any Muslim who attempt to renounce

Islam and embrace another faith. To date, most states in the country do not have any provision that provide for Muslims to convert out of the religion. Instead, most states make apostasy under the syariah laws an offense (Kairos, 2004, p. 41). The penalty for apostasy varies from state to state. In some states, apostasy carries a prison sentence while in others, a prior detention for the purpose of “rehabilitation” is imposed (MCCBCHST, n.d.: 2).

However, the popular method for converting out of Islam was to make a

Statutory Declaration that one has left Islam, although in practical terms, such document is not recognized by government departments. As a result, the official document of such people, e.g. identity cards and passports, still recognize them as

Muslims (NECF, 2008, p. 128). In effect, the government does not recognize any

Muslim who renounced his or her faith.

There have been various attempts to resort to legal redress in the civil courts to overcome this administrative roadblock to recognize a citizen’s right to freedom of religion – in this case, the right to convert out of Islam – but all attempts have ended in the courts declaring that the civil courts have no jurisdiction to hear applications by Muslims to renounce Islam, and that only the syariah courts can decide whether a person can renounce Islam.16 To date, the syariah court has permitted only one case where a Muslim Chinese convert was allowed to renounce Islam and return to her original faith, i.e. Buddhism. This occurred in May 2008. However, the syariah court did not grant her application to change the religious status of her identity card from

16 The landmark case being Soon Sing Bikar Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim) Kedah [1999] which set the legal precedent that the civil court has no jurisdiction in matters of Islamic faith. 96

Muslim to Buddhist on the grounds that the court does not have jurisdiction on this issue (The Star, 9/5/2008). This case aside, the syariah courts do not allowed for any

Muslim to renounce their faith which carries a punishable sentence.

A good example of the syariah court’s attitude towards apostasy is the case of

Kamariah Ali, Daud Mamat, Mad Yacob Ismail and Mohamad Ya, four Malay-

Muslims who were convicted by the syariah court for deviant religious practice and were sentenced between two and five years in prison in 1992. Their appeal against conviction was rejected in 1996 but their prison sentences were commuted. However, they were required to report monthly to state religious authorities and to attend religious classes for five years until repentance was pronounced by the syariah court.

However, in 1998, all four renounced Islam through a Statutory Declaration and were hauled before the Kelantan syariah court in 2000 to face the charge of renouncing Islam and failing to comply with the syariah court’s order to repent.

They were sentenced to three years in prison for contempt of the syariah court

(SUARAM 2005, p. 95).

In a bid to overturn the syariah court’s conviction, they filed a habeas corpus

(a legal action that seeks release from unlawful detention) in the civil high courts but the application was struck out. The process of appeal dragged on for several years and when it reached the Federal Court, the latter ruled that the Statutory of

Declaration to renounce Islam “does not exempt them from charges being brought against them in Syariah Court in respect of acts contrary to Syariah law” (SUARAM,

2005, p. 95). In other words, the syariah court holds jurisdiction over Muslims even when they wish to renounce the religion.

However, the most controversial case on apostasy to date was the so-called

Lina Joy case which serves to highlight the administrative and legal difficulties of any Muslim who seeks to renounce Islam to embrace another faith. In 1999 a Malay woman by the name of Azalina Jailani sought legal redress to recognize her conversion to Christianity. Born a Muslim, Azalina converted to Christianity in

1990, where she followed the usual route of renouncing Islam, i.e. making a

Statutory Declaration. She then applied to the National Registration Department

(NRD) to change her given name to Lina Joy – to reflect her new found faith – and to remove her designation as a Muslim. Although she was successful in changing the name in her identity card, the NRD refused to change the religious status stated in her new identity card. The NRD argued that this was in line with the directive that a

Muslim is not allowed to change his or her Muslim name to a non-Muslim name unless there is a certificate from the syariah court certifying that the person has left

Islam (NECF, 2008a, p. 128).

This resulted in Lina Joy seeking judicial redress to remove the word Islam in her identity card because the information contained in the card was filed away in a computer system which can be retrieved by any government department, which makes it impossible for Lina Joy to marry her Christian boyfriend. She was legally bound by the syariah laws that prohibits a Muslim marrying a non-Muslim except if the latter converts to Islam (The Star, 25/6/2006).17 The case made it all the way to the Federal court where the judgement passed down was that a Muslim cannot renounce his or her Islamic faith through the civil courts but must obtain a certificate

17 This was not much a problem when the old identity card was used as its information was filed in the NRD archive which makes it time consuming to access by other government departments. Generally, the NRD would approve the application for those who converted out of Islam to change the name in the identity card but their new identity card would still identify them as Muslims. 98

from the syariah court in order to remove “Islam” from her identity card (The Star,

31/5/2007).

In all the cases discussed above, we can observe that the government has actively sought to scrutinize and intervene not only in the public life but increasingly the private lives of Muslims. The depth of this intervention is unprecedented and the frequency of such intervention had been increasing of late.18 And increasingly, such intervention has imported on non-Muslims too.

3.2 The spill over to Non-Muslim Social and Religious Spheres

Although the government seeks to impose its authority over the lives of the

Muslim (and largely Malay) community, nonetheless, its surveillance and disciplining of the Muslim community have also affected the non-Muslim (and non-

Malay) community. This has stirred up a few controversies in the past few years.

3.2.1 Administrative Interference of non-Muslim Places of Religious Worship

Generally speaking, the government respects the non-Muslims’ right to worship. However, the applications by non-Muslims to build new places of worship tend to be a slow and arbitrary process (SUARAM, 2005, p. 102). Take for example, the experience of the Latter Rain Church. “We bought a piece of land in Selangor twenty years ago with the goal of constructing a church building on it” said Reverend

Dexter Low.19 “Following the building by-laws, we applied for a permit with the local authorities to build the church at that time but it was only recently that we were given the green-light to start construction” he continued.

18 See Malaysian Human Rights Reports (various years). 19 Reverend Dexter Low is the founder and CEO of the Latter Rain Church. The interview was conducted on 13/5/2009. 99

Apart from administrative difficulties in constructing non-Muslim places of worship, such construction projects can also face the obstacles of protest by local

Muslim communities which can delay if not stop such construction projects. Perhaps the most well-known case concerning the administrative difficulties and the political sensitivities of getting permission to build a church is the case of the proposed

Catholic Church in Shah Alam.

In 1977 the Catholic Church applied to the Selangor state government for land to build a church. The state government eventually approved and sold a piece of land in Selangor for this purpose in 1985. Formal approval for building the church was given by the Shah Alam Municipal Council in May 1993 and construction started in June of the year. On 16 August 1993, the Mentri Besar of Selangor received a memorandum sent by a coalition of Muslims in the district protesting the building of a church in Shah Alam. Within three days, the Mentri Besar instructed the municipal council to withdraw its approval of the proposed church building

(Chew, 2000, p. 272).

This resulted in the stopping of the church building project that was already underway. What followed were a few rounds of appeals and negotiations by the

Catholic Church with the state government that dragged on until 2001 when a compromise was reached and the church was built on an alternate place in the city.20

In another case, an Anglican church which had applied to the Kajang

Municipal Council to relocate a church from the town area of Kajang to a new housing project in the suburbs also experienced similar administrative difficulties.21

The local Malay-Muslim residents submitted a petition to the municipal council protesting the proposed relocation of the Anglican church citing that the majority of

20 http://www.divinemercyshahalam.com/history.htm retrieved on 10/10/2008 21 Malaysiakini, http://www.malaysiakini.com/print.php?id=33721 retrieved on 13/5/2006. 100

the residents in the suburb in question were Muslims and that their religious sensitivities should be considered.22

In the event, the municipal council decided to reject the application “on administrative grounds.” A spokesman for the council said: “We reject the application because the status of the land is residential and the area a residential one.” He also commented that: “The church was not included in the area's layout regulations.” Nonetheless, the same official also admitted “that the rejection of the application was also due to the protests by local residents.”23

In a third case, which occurred in August 2009, a group of Malay-Muslims brought the head of a cow to the office of the Selangor state government secretariat to protest against the planned relocation of a Hindu temple to a residential area in

Petaling Jaya. The majority of the residents in the affected area are Malay-Muslims who did not want the Hindu temple to be relocated there.24 Following the protest, a dialogue was held a few days later between the Menteri Besar (together with Shah

Alam MP Khalid Abdul Samad and Batu Tiga assemblyman Rodziah Ismail) and the residents of the affected area. The dialogue ended with no resolution as the Malay-

Muslim residents were adamant that the temple should not be relocated to their residential area (The Sun, 6/9/2009). The Selangor state government was forced to cancel the relocation plan to the affected area and look for another location to relocate the Hindu temple (The Sun, 9/9/2009).

22 Malaysiakini, http://www.malaysiakini.com/print.php?id=33721 retrieved on 13/5/2006. 23 Malaysiakini, http://www.malaysiakini.com/print.php?id=33721 retrieved on 13/5/2006. 24 The Malaysian Insider, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/index.php/malaysia/36272-protesters- threaten-bloodshed-over-hindu-temple retrieved on 20/9/2009. 101

Apart from the difficulties in gaining approvals for the construction of non-

Muslim places of worship, established non-Muslim places of worship may face threats of demolition by municipal councils. The Hindu Rights Action Force

(Hindraf) reported that between 22 February and 30 November 2006, seventy four

Hindu temples were demolished, threatened with demolition, served with eviction notices or forced to relocate next to sewage tanks. Apparently, many of these temples were established prior to 1957, and in some instances had been in existence for more than a hundred years (NECF, 2008b, p.152).

For example, in March 2006 the Negeri Sembilan state authorities announced their intention to demolish the 150 year old Sri Maha Mariamman temple in

Senawang because the temple was not registered with the state authorities. The temple committee sought a court injunction against the pending demolition. Their lawyer, P. Waythamoorthy, argued that the temple was built by Indian immigrants brought over by the British. The British landowners had given permission for the building of the temple. The temple land was then acquired by the state government and gazetted as a road reserve in 1956. According to Waythamoorthy, the temple was built long before the establishment of the National Land Code 1960 which was subsequently used by the state authorities to rule that the temple was “unlawfully” occupying a road reserve (SUARAM, 2007, p. 92).

The spate of demolition of Hindu temples caused great unhappiness among

Hindu devotees and it was reported that Hindraf brought the matter to the attention of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the Malay rulers, the cabinet and relevant authorities and parties. Despite the sixty or more memoranda submitted throughout 2006, there has been no official reply from the government (NECF, 2008b, p. 152).

102

In December 2006, on behalf of Hindraf and Hindus, lawyer P. Uthayakumar, filed a suit against the federal and state governments over the demolition of Hindu temples as well as seeking injunction over any demolition of temples in the future, until the matter was resolved (NEF, 2008b, p. 152). However, the demolition of

Hindu temples continued. In October 2007, the hundred year old Sri Maha Mariaman

Hindu temple was torn down in Shah Alam as part of an operation to evict villagers to make way for redevelopment in that area. Devotees were up in arms over this issue which led to the arrest of 19 persons with many others injured during the arrests

(SUARAM, 2007, p. 131).

The demolition of non-Islamic places of worship involved more than Hindu temples.25 In December 2005, an Orang Asli community at Kuala Masai, Johor, lodged a police report against the state authorities for demolishing a newly constructed church in their commune. The authorities claimed that the church was built on state government land but the community responded that the authorities failed to provide any documents or a court order when they demolished the church

(SUARAM, 2006, p. 102).

3.2.2 Banning of Literature and Words

Although the national language of Malaysia is the Malay language (Bahasa

Malaysia) nonetheless since the 1980s nine states in the Peninsula have legislated enactments that restrict the use of various terms and expressions in the national language by non-Muslims. These words are said to be reserved solely for the use of

Muslims and cannot be associated with a non-Islamic religion.26

25 See the various year reports of SUARAM’s Malaysian Human Rights report as well as the NECF religious liberty reports for cases of the demolition of non-Muslim places of worship. 26 The Malay words which non-Muslims are prohibited from using varies from state to state. Nonetheless, the words listed in the different enactments are: Akhirat; Allah; Al-Quran/Quran; Al- Sunnah; Azan; Baitullah; Dakwah; Fatwa; Firman Allah; Fitrah; Hadith/Hadis; Haji/Haj; Hajjah; Hauliak; Ibadah/Ibadat; Imam; Injil; Kaabah; Kadi; Karamah/Qaramah; Khalifah; Khutbah; Masjid; 103

Perhaps the most sensitive word in the Bahasa Malaysia vocabulary is the word “Allah” (God) which appears to be the property of Muslims according to state’s interpretation. Datuk Abdullah Mohd Zin, the Minister in charge of Islamic affairs, stated on 31st December 2007 that the word “Allah” can only be used by Muslims because “the use of the word 'Allah' by non-Muslims may arouse sensitivity and create confusion among Muslims in the country” (The New Straits Times, 5/1/2008).

The use of any banned words by non-Muslims can bring about action not only by the state government but also that of the federal government.

It was reported that in February 1986, the Catholic Sabah (a Catholic newspaper) received a letter from the Home Affairs Ministry forbidding the use of certain Malay words in their publication. The case was taken up by the Catholic

Bishops who decided that Catholic Sabah continue on using those words in its publication (Tan, n.d, p. 9). As a result, the newspaper experienced difficulties in getting its annual publishing permit renewed. The paper then had to repeatedly negotiate with the authorities to get its permit renewed. After a long delay, the paper finally managed to get its permit renewed in May 1988 (Chew, 2000, p. 281).

The same issue cropped up again in December 2007 when The Catholic

Herald (the major newspaper of the Malaysian Catholic Church) faced problems in getting its annual publishing permit renewed. This problem was caused by the use of the word “Allah” in the newspaper’s Bahasa Malaysia (Malay-language) section.

The use of this word, according to the Deputy Minister of Internal Security Johari

Baharum, is forbidden outside the context of Islam and would only confuse people

(SUARAM, 2009, p. 119).

Mubaligh; Mufti; Mussabaqah; Mussala; Nabi; Qiblat; Rasul; Salat/Solat; Sahadah/Syadah; Sheikh; Surau; Syariah; Tabligh; Ulama; Wahyu; Wali; Zakat. Some Malay words are used by Christians, particularly the native Christians from Sabah and Sarawak, who use them in their Malay language worship service. Those words are Allah, firman, iman, nabi, rasul, wahyu. (Kairos, 2004, pp. 52-53). 104

It was reported that the Internal Security Ministry had asked the newspaper to remove its entire Bahasa Malaysia section or risk getting its permit not renewed.

However, the ministry reversed its earlier decision and renewed the newspaper permit without any condition. However, on 4th January 2008, the federal cabinet decided that The Catholic Herald could not use “Allah” it is publications. The

Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department Abdullah Mohd Zin said that the cabinet’s decision was because “the word ‘Allah’ refers to God according to the

Muslim faith. ... [Its use] by non-Muslims may arouse sensitivity and create confusion among Muslims in the country” (The Sun, 4/1/2008)

The banned words are not just related to Bahasa Malaysia but also to any language that contains such words. For example, in April 2003 the Home Ministry banned the Iban language translation of the bible Bup Kudus used by many Iban

Christians in Sarawak because it contains words “Allah Tala” which meant “God” in that language. The word was banned as it was similar to the Arabic word “Allah

Taala.” JAKIM found the usage of the word inappropriate as the words were commonly used by Muslims to refer to “God” as well. It was thought that these words can cause confusion among Muslims and therefore the offending literature must be banned (SUARAM, 2003, p. 166).

The banning of the use of certain words in Bahasa Malaysia inevitably meant that the sacred scripture of the Christians which had been translated in different languages faces difficulties in getting the Bahasa Malaysia version printed in the country. There is no Bahasa Malaysia version of the bible. Hence Christians use the

Bahasa Indonesia version (Alkitab) which is imported from the neighbouring country. In December 1981, the Home Affairs Ministry banned the importation of

Alkitab under the Internal Security Act but after much protest from Christians the ban

105

was partially lifted. Under the concession, the book was allowed to be imported by certain bookshops. (Chew, 2000, p. 280).

Nonetheless, the importation of such books still faces administrative difficulties at the implementation level. For example, the Customs department seized one thousand Alkitab in Port Klang in 2003 which remained in its possession for two years when it was first reported. No official reasons were given for its seizure.27

Generally speaking, the issue of the bible in Bahasa Malaysia does not really affect Christians in the peninsula who rely on English, Chinese and Tamil versions.

However Christians from Sabah and Sarawak generally use the national language for worship and communication. The government also maintained a policy of banning certain religious books on grounds that such books were either twisting the facts and true Islamic teachings or containing elements that would mislead the faithful and humiliate the prophets. The problem with this policy is that it affects non-Muslims as well, as some of the books banned were Christian publications (NECF, 2008c, p.

171).

For example, a consignment of Sunday school educational materials of the

Sabah Sidang Injil Borneo (SIB) Church was confiscated by the Customs

Department and subsequently handed over to the Ministry of Internal Security in

August 2007. The reason for the confiscation according to the ministry was that the materials contained prohibited Malay words such as “Allah” and “Solat” (prayer) among others which it deems as being the property of the Islamic faith. In fact, the materials were destined for Sabahan Christians, made up of non-Malay Bumiputeras, who have used Bahasa Malaysia as their medium in their liturgy, prayer and sermons for generations (NECF, 2008c: 171).

27 Malaysiakini, http//www.malaysiakini.com/print.php?id=36732 retrieved on 17/5/2006. 106

3.2.3 Religious Status, Government Intervention and the Family

Perhaps the most controversial area where non-Muslims are affected by the state’s regulation of the Islamic sphere is in the area of family, particularly when a spouse converts to Islam. In this section, I will be discussing how this has affected the non-Muslim’s lives.

3.2.3(a) Religion, Courts and Burial Rites

Maniam Moorthy, born and raised as a Hindu, generated a controversy about the status of his religion after his death. Moorthy served with the Malaysian Armed

Forces and apparently had converted to Islam during this time. However, he never informed his family of his conversion. Moorthy met with an accident in November

2005 and passed away on 20th December 2005 (Berita NECF, January – February,

2006).

The trouble arose for his wife S. Kaliammal when she was informed by a military official on December 1st that her husband had converted to Islam, and that upon death, he would be given a Muslim burial rite. This was the first time that she was informed that her husband had converted to Islam. As result, the hospital refused to release the body to either party until they received a court order declaring the status of his religion (Berita NECF, Jan. – Feb. 2006).

This resulted in a legal tussle between his widow and the Federal Territory

Religious Department (JAWI) for the custody of his body. On 21st December

Kaliammal sought legal redress in the Kuala Lumpur High Court to declare that her husband was a Hindu and that his body should be released to her to be given a Hindu burial rite. Given the urgency of the case, the court set the date for hearing on 29th

December the same year. However, on 22nd December, JAWI sought a declaration from the Kuala Lumpur syariah court that Moorthy was a Muslim without reference

107

to his widow. The syariah court ruled that Moorthy was a Muslim and ordered the hospital to release the body to the JAWI officers for Muslim burial rites (Berita

NECF, January – February. 2006).28

Because of the objections by Kaliammal, the hospital did not release the body to religious officers from JAWI until the civil court hearing which was brought forward to 27th December. However the civil court ruled that they had no jurisdiction and could not act to review the judicial decision of the syariah court. In other words, the court essentially dismissed Kaliammal’s claim for legal redress. Hence

Moorthy’s body was released to officials from JAWI and was buried on the same day.29

This case highlighted a host of issues surrounding the status of non-Muslims, particularly their lack of rights in both the syariah and civil courts in matters of religion. Non-Muslims do not have locus standi in the syariah court while the civil courts had indicated its preference not to intervene on issues related to Islam. Taken together, it simply meant that non-Muslims do not have legal recourse over family matters involving both Muslims and non-Muslims (SUARAM, 2006, p. 103). In the aftermath of the incident, the Ministry of Defence promoted Moorthy from corporal to sergeant posthumously and announced that his widow and family would receive the full monthly pension that comes with the rank (The Star, 4/1/2006).30

This event repeated itself on 21st January 2008 when the body of Gan Eng

Gor was taken away by the police from a Chinese funeral parlour in Negeri Sembilan after his son, a Muslim convert, lodged a police report, claiming that his father had converted to Islam in July 2007. However, the deceased’s wife and seven other

28 Under syariah laws, non-Muslims have no locus standi before the syariah court. 29 Malaysiakini, http//www.malaysiakini.com/print.php?id=45050 retrieved on 5/13/2006. 30 A convert can only make a will of one third of his inheritance and estate to his/her non-Muslim family while the remaining will be administered under Islamic law. 108

children (all of whom were Buddhists) stated that they had no knowledge of the alleged conversion. They filed a petition in the High Court contesting the claim made by the Muslim convert son that Gan was a Muslim. The High Court rejected the petition claiming it had no jurisdiction on the matter as a syariah court had already ruled that Gan was a Muslim (SUARAM, 2009, p.120).

In June 2009, the Penang religious authorities claimed the body of B.

Elangesvaran, whom they claimed has converted to Islam, for burial in the Muslim rite. Elangesvaran’s family declared that they had no knowledge of the deceased’s conversion and that he was a practising Hindu. They went to the Penang High Court for legal redress only to hear the judge rule that the court had no jurisdiction over the matter as a syariah court had earlier ruled that the deceased is a Muslim (SUARAM,

2009, p. 120).

3.2.3(b) Conversion, Divorce, Child Custody and the Religion of the Child

The conversion of one non-Muslim spouse to Islam can also create problems for the non-Muslim spouse particularly if they choose to divorce, even more so when their children are involved. The granting of custodial rights and also the status of the children’s religion can become problematic as the cases of Shamala Sathiyaseelan and R. Subashini can attest.

Shamala Sathiyaseelan and Dr Jeyaganesh C Mogarajah, both Hindus, married with Hindu wedding rites in 1988 and had their marriage registered with the appropriate civil authorities. In 2002, the marriage broke down as a result of her husband converting to Islam and taking a Muslim wife. Three months later, Dr.

Jeyaganesh (now Muhammad Ridzuan) filed for divorce. The civil court granted custody right to his wife (Rizal, 2004, p. 7).

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However, the father (Ridzuan) then obtained an ex-parte custodial order for the children issued by the Shah Alam syariah court based on the reasoning that the father had converted to Islam and had the children converted as well in order to get custody of the children in 2003.31 This resulted in the father keeping the children and the mother pursuing legal redress through the civil court to set aside the syariah court’s order on the grounds that the children were not Muslims (Rizal, 2004, p. 7).

The civil court in the end ruled it had no jurisdiction on whether the children had in fact converted to Islam as it falls under the juridical ambit of the syariah court in 2004 (NECF, 2008d, p. 134). Nonetheless, the civil court gave joint custody to both parents with Shamala obtaining the right of day to day custody of the children but on condition that she must not teach her children the Hindu religion, failing which she loses her custodial right (Rizal, 2005: 8-9).

The scenario repeated itself in 2006 in the case of R. Subashini and T.

Saravanan. Originally both were Hindus who married in a civil ceremony in 2001.

They had two sons. In May 2006, Saravanan converted to Islam and decided to divorce his Hindu wife through the syariah court. He obtained the custodial right to his eldest son whom he claimed had been converted to Islam. The syariah court granted an ex-parte interim custody and allowed dissolution of the marriage through the syariah court. In response, Subashini filed a divorce petition at the civil high court, seeking dissolution of marriage, custody of both children and an injunctive order to stop the husband from converting the children without her permission in

August 2007 (SUARAM, 2007, p. 130).

31 It should be noted that marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims are forbidden by syariah courts in Malaysia and are thus ruled to be broken unless both parties convert. 110

The case which went all the way to the Federal Court ended with a ruling that the civil court had jurisdiction over the dissolution of marriage but that it had no jurisdiction on the issue of the conversion of a child to Islam by a parent as it falls under the jurisdiction of the syariah court (Rizal, 2004, pp. 8-9).

3.2.3(c) Separating Spouses Because of Different Religions

In April 2007, JAIS put P. Marimuthu and his family of six children (all

Hindus) in limbo when they discovered that his wife of 21 years, Raimah Bibi, was a

Muslim. It was reported that Raimah was adopted by an Indian-Muslim family when she was young and was a practising Hindu. Her identity card never indicated that she was a Muslim until it was changed to the new MyKad where her name was changed to Rahimah Bibi Nordin and identified as a Muslim. However, the couple never applied for a correction in the new identity card even though they were married in a

Hindu temple. Moreover all the birth certificates of their children, had recorded that

Raimah was an Indian-Hindu (NECF, 2008c, p. 167).

The inaction by the couple was a costly mistake when they attempted to enrol their children in schools which required them to submit their identity cards to the

Education Department. It was only then that the authorities discovered the religious status of Raimah which resulted in JAIS detaining Raimah and five of her children in a rehabilitation centre (NECF, 2008c, p. 167). This resulted in, Marimuthu, filing a habeas corpus application, claiming that his family members were Hindus, and that the department had no authority to detain them. However, before the case came before the court, a settlement was reached where Marimuthu was given custody of the children who will be raised as Hindus. However he had to be separated from

Raimah who, reportedly, agreed to remain a Muslim (The Sun, 3/5/2007).

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Yet another case is that of Revathi Masoosai, who was born to Indian Muslim parents with the given Muslim name Siti Fatimah. Revathi claimed that she was raised as a Hindu by her grandmother and started to use the Hindu name Revathi

Massosai in 2001. She married Suresh Veerappan – a Hindu – in 2004 according to

Hindu rites but did not legally register the marriage as Suresh did not convert to

Islam. They then had a daughter (NECF, 2008c, pp. 180-181).

In 2006, Revathi attempted to legally change her name and the status of her religion through the Melaka syariah court. When she turned up for a hearing in 2007, she was detained by the court officials and was taken to a rehabilitation centre. Her daughter was also seized by state religious authorities who granted custody of the child to her Muslim mother. Some months later, she was brought before a syariah court which ruled that she must stay with her Muslim parents and her child, and that she cannot convert out of Islam. In addition, she must undergo continual counselling sessions (NECF, 2008c, pp. 167 & 180-181).

3.2.3(d) Religious Status and MyKad

All Malaysians are required by law carry the official identity card of Malaysia.

The card can be obtained through an application with the National Registration

Department (NRD), which will register certain information about the applicant with the department’s database, e.g. ethnicity and religion among others. In 2001, the government introduced a new identity card – called MyKad – to replace the older identity card. The information in MyKad, unlike the older card, is stored in a computer database which can be retrieved by all government departments. Hence any errors in MyKad can prove detrimental to the interests of its owner.

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In July 2006, Kandasamy Sayapu died in Banting Hospital after suffering a heart attack. His family brought his body back and notified the police. Upon discovering the deceased MyKad stated his religion was Islam, the police took custody of the body and told the family that the matter can only be resolved by the

Selangor Islamic Religious Department (JAIS). JAIS would later declare that Sayapu was not a Muslim and the reason for his MyKad stating that he was a Muslim was because the NRD had arbitrarily put his religion as Muslim on the basis of his name

“Sayapu,” which was thought to be a Malay name (NECF, 2008b, p. 151).

A year earlier, there were complaints concerning errors on the religious status, particularly among Christians, in the newly introduced MyKad. Attempts to rectify this error were met with a host of bureaucratic hurdles which required them to produce proof of the religion which they verbally affirmed and that they would have to pay a penalty to have the error corrected. The matter was only resolved when the minister involved announced that such problems would be resolved by filling in a form without having to pay any penalty (NECF, 2008e, p. 143).

Although a minor problem, it does illustrate, the inability of bureaucrats to distinguish the manner which non-Islamic religions are professed and practiced in this country. Unlike Islam, there is no central regulating body for any specific non-

Islamic religions. Profession of a non-Islamic religion is a matter of conscience without involving any administrative process (NECF, 2008e, p. 143). More importantly, it points to the potential difficulties and hassles which individuals have to go through in order to rectify mistakes in their MyKad with regard to their religious status, particularly if it accidentally states its possessor as a Muslim.

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The religious status of a child can be problematic too if they had been accidently switched by birth between Muslim and non-Muslim parents. In June 2007,

Zulhaidi (Eddie) – an ethnic Chinese man who was accidently switched at birth and given to a Malay Muslim family – filed a suit at the high court against the NRD for failing to respond to his request to delete the word “Islam” from his MyKad.

Zulhaidi, who left his Malay family at the age of 13, wanted to renounce Islam and follow the religion of his biological parents. DNA testing confirmed that he was the son of a Chinese couple. However, the director of Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia

Department (Jakim) – Department of Islamic Development Malaysia – was reported to have said that the syariah courts had the authority to determine if DNA testing could be used as justification to renounce Islam (NECF, 2008c, p. 164).32

In November 2009, the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism,

Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST) highlighted the case of

Banggarma Subramaniam. Banggarma, who is also known as Siti Hasnah

Vengarama Abdullah, said she was converted by a welfare home at the age of seven.

Asserting that she has lived a life as a Hindu, and was married in a Hindu ceremony in 2001, she faces difficulties in registering her marriage with the National

Registration Department as she was listed as a Muslim (The Star, 26/11/2009).

The welfare home disputed her claim by alleging that she was converted by her father, an allegation which she denied (The Sun, 25/11/2009). She was told by the welfare home to settle the matter in the syariah court. Commenting on the issue, the

Penang Islamic Council advised Banggarma that she had to go through the standard procedure to leave Islam and to undergo counselling (The Star, 26/11/2009).

32 At the time of writing, the court has yet to hear the case. 114

The MCCBCSHT objected to Banggarma going to the syariah court, and also the advice by the Penang Islamic Council, arguing that her conversion was invalid as she was a child at the time and did not understand the implications of her conversion.

The MCCBCSHT argued that she should not be subjected to the normal procedure of leaving Islam as she was not a Muslim and her right to choose her own religion should be respected by the government.33

3.3 Response to Intrusion: Protest from civil society and cabinet memo

As the government became increasingly assertive in attempting to regulate the Islamic religious sphere and the spill over of this regulation onto the everyday lives of non-Muslims occurred, certain quarters (primarily non-Muslims and non-

Malays) of civil society have called upon the government to clarify the boundaries of the intervention of religious authorities on the private sphere of its citizens, as well as the competing jurisdictions of the civil and syariah courts. This was necessary since in at least the cases discussed above, the civil court declared itself incompetent to decide on issues related to Islam.

Perhaps the most important initiative in response to this conundrum was by the Malaysian Bar Council which proposed the establishment of an Inter-Religious

Council (IRC), a statutory body that would play, among others, an advisory role to the government in resolving problems that arise with regards to the right of freedom of religion in 2001.34 Under the auspices of the Malaysian Bar Council, a Pro-tem

Committee was formed to steer the formation of the proposed IRC, by drafting a bill that would be presented in a national convention for ratification. Once ratified, the

33 The Nut Graph, http://www.thenutgraph.com/let-banggarma-choose-her-own-religion retrieved on 8/12/2009.The case has yet to be resolved during the time of writing. 34 See “Draft Interfaith Commission of Malaysia Bill February 2005” in S. Hadi Abdullah and Sieh (2007), for a list of proposed roles which the commission was supposed to play. 115

draft bill would then be presented to the government to be tabled in Parliament to pave the way for the formation of the IRC (Lim, 2007, pp. 13-18).

The proposal was heralded with much media attention in February 2005 when it was presented at a national convention participated by interested parties, e.g. religious and secular organisations. The draft bill was ratified where the name of the statutory body was renamed as the Interfaith Commission (IFC) which was then presented to the then Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, to table the bill in the legislature.35 Although the Premier was originally receptive to the idea of setting up the IFC, following the protests by Muslim NGOs against the proposal, the Premier advised that it was not the time to set up an IFC as it would be a “setback to the religious unity and harmony in the country” (The Sun 22/2/2005; The New Straits

Times 25/5/2005; The Star 25/5/2005).

In May 2004, a group of 13 NGOs formed a coalition known as “Article 11” in the aftermath of the Shamala ruling.36 “Article 11” was committed to the position of the Federal Constitution as the supreme land of the country and the right of freedom of religion as guaranteed in the Federal Constitution.37 In 2006, Article 11 attempted to organize a series of campaigns throughout the country in order to promote awareness of an open letter that called on the government to uphold the supremacy of the Constitution in the wake of concerns raised by recent court cases involving M. Moorthy and S. Shamala, and the increasing claims of Malaysia as an

35 See S. Hadi Abdullah and Sieh (2007) for snapshots of the views for and against the proposed commission. 36 The NGOs involved were: All Women's Action Society (AWAM); Bar Council Malaysia; Catholic Lawyers Society; Interfaith Spiritual Fellowship; Malaysian Civil Liberties Society, Protem Committee (MCLS); Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism (MCCBCHS); National Human Rights Society (HAKAM); Pure Life Society; Sisters In Islam (SIS); Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM); Vivekananda Youth Movement, Seremban; Women's Aid Organization (WAO); and Women's Development Collective (WDC). 37 http://www.article11.org/01AboutUs.htm retrieved on 14/11/2008 116

Islamic state. The campaign ended in failure because of protests and disruption from

Muslim groups.

For example, Article 11’s forum to discuss this issue in Penang on May 14

2006 came to an abrupt end because of protests by a group of Muslims. Some 300 to

500 protesters were present outside the venue of the forum demonstrating with placards and chants. The police had deployed its personnel outside the venue to control the situation. The forum, which was attended by about 250 people, started as scheduled. However, a group of protesters came into the venue and heckled and disrupted the meeting indoors, despite appeals to allow the forum to continue peacefully. To contain the situation, police advised the organisers to end the forum.

As a result, the forum ended two hours before the scheduled time (Aliran, 2006, p.

6).

On 21 July, the Article 11 forum in Johor Bahru proceeded without any untoward incident with an overwhelming police presence quelling the fears of a violent clash with the anti-apostasy protesters. The 300 protesters were reportedly members of the opposition party PAS and non-governmental organisations from as far as Kuala Terengganu, Penang, Kota Baru and Alor Star. They were calling for a total elimination of any attempt to form an IFC (inter-faith council). They also demanded for the Police Act to be used to halt proceedings. The group, led by Johor

PAS commissioner, Dr. Mahfuz Mohamad, marched right up to the hotel steps chanting various slogans in Malay and Arabic interspersed with do’a (prayer) and recital of Qur’anic verses (NECF, 2008b, p. 157).

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The government viewed Article 11 negatively. It was reported in the press that the Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi stated that public discussion on interfaith issues was detrimental to society. “[I]f the discussions are not kept in check or contained, they are bound to raise tension in our multi-religious society. Religious issues are even more sensitive than ethnic issues” (The Star, 26/7/2006).

Apart from the response by certain quarters in civil society, the cabinet itself was split in its opinion with regards to this issue. On 19 January 2006, nine non-

Muslim cabinet ministers submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister urging for a review of the constitution and laws to ensure that the religious rights of the non-

Muslim (and non-Malay) minority are protected (The New Straits Times, 20/1/06).

However, the memo was retracted by the ministers involved the next day after a meeting with the Prime Minister who assured the ministers that there would be a cabinet meeting to resolve this issue but there would be no review of the constitution or laws on this matter (The Star, 22/1/2006).

3.4 Increasing Tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims

The spill over of the government’s Islamisation project into the non-Muslims’ sphere of religion and everyday lives has led to the worsening of inter-ethnic relationships in the country (Lee and Ackerman, 1997: 24-27; Ramanathan, 1996).

For the past few years, there has been increasing public protests by Muslims and non-Muslims on several related issues.

On the side of the non-Muslims, the Hindu community was the most active in mounting public protests against the state’s intervention in their religious and social spheres. Between 2006 and 2009, Hindraf (Hindu Rights Action Force) – a Hindu

NGO – had organized a series of “public protest” in the streets of Kuala Lumpur that bear reminiscence of the reformasi protests of the late 1990s as they were met by the

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riot police. The Muslims, in turn, have organized their own public protests against what they perceive as “threats” against Islam such as the Article 11 forum as discussed above.

Public protests from both sides have only increased mutual suspicion among the different religious communities in the country. The Silibin incident is a clear example of this mutual suspicion. On July 5th, 2006, a large crowd of angry Muslims

(that included representatives from several Muslims NGOs) gathered outside the

Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Silibin, Ipoh to stop an alleged mass conversion ceremony of Muslims to Christianity based on an unfounded rumour (NECF, 2008b, p. 155).

It is significant that this rumour has been triggered by the dissemination of an unfounded rumour via short messaging service (sms) to which the demonstrators responded. It was then discovered that the Church was holding a “first holy communion” ceremony for some 110 Indian children. However, the crowd refused to disperse as they wanted to wait for the event to be over. The police responded by sending a team of riot police to keep watch over the situation (NECF, 2008b, p. 155).

Although the Silibin church made a police report on the matter and the police investigation have reportedly been concluded, no charges have been filed.

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3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the government’s turn towards the religious in its policy of governance had not only opened up the most private areas of the lives of its citizens to its scrutiny but also to its intervention. The government’s scrutiny and intervention towards the Muslims (and predominantly Malays) were deemed politically necessary because of the need to maintain intra-communal unity among the Malays under the hegemony of UMNO as well as burnishing the UMNO-led government the religious credentials that it needed to meet the Islamist challenge head-on.38

Such actions were initially directed towards the Muslim-Malay community but its effects have spilled over to affect non-Muslims as well, particularly in the past few years, as discussed in this chapter. It should be noted that government intervention in the lives of its citizens is not a new phenomenon.

Indeed it can be said that in the post-May 13th racial riots of 1969, the government had actively intervened in the lives of its citizens on behalf of the more socio-economic backward majority group, i.e. the Malays, in order to bring about parity with the non-Malays. This had led the non-Malays to become gradually conscious of their status as a minority group as the increasing administrative intervention by the government into their socio-economic activities subjected them to greater governmental regulation (Ackerman and Lee, 1990: 63).

38 See Husin Mutalib (1990) and Muhammad Ikmal (1996) on the role of Islam providing the cement for Malay-Muslim unity. 120

However, the situation was made more acute beginning in the 1980s, when the government began to intensify its Islamisation agenda. Consequently non-

Muslims began to perceive that they were not only an ethnic minority, but also a non-Muslim religious minority living in an environment that is politically hostile to their interests.

This growing realization of being an ethnic and religious minority within society led non-Malay and non-Muslims to respond to the government’s increasing scrutiny and intervention into their private spheres, and to the government’s public stance which seems increasingly unsympathetic to their interests. In the chapters that follow, I will focus on the responses of the non-Malay and non-Muslims, particularly from the Christian quarter, to the government-led Islamisation program of government and society.

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CHAPTER 4

A Brief History of Christianity in the Colonial Era

The discussion in this chapter will focus on the developments of Christianity in the country between 1511 and 1957. The purpose of this chapter is to locate Christianity in the peninsula within its historical context, thereby setting the stage for the next chapters that focus on the Christians’ engagement with the post-colonial state.

4.1 Imperialism and Missions in the Peninsula, 1511 - 1824

Historically speaking, Christianity was a relative late comer to this region when compared with Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. Unlike the latter religions, the first contact that the local population in Southeast Asia had with Christianity was a violent event, arriving as it did, on the back of Western imperialism. In the case of Malaysia,

Christianity followed Western colonial penetration that came in three successive waves, i.e. Portuguese, Dutch and British to the peninsula.

Roman Catholicism was the earliest form of Christianity that arrived in the peninsula following the Portuguese who conquered Melaka in 1511. Portuguese temporal interest of gaining foreign conquest was coupled with the spiritual interest of gaining souls for the Roman Catholic faith. Unlike latter Western imperial powers, the expansion of Portuguese imperialism was driven not so much as “… to carve out large empires or colonies … an enterprise, in any case, impossible of achievement by a nation with a population of less than a million. Trade and trade alone was the ruling consideration” (Stephen Neill quoted in Williams, 1976, p. 75).

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Portuguese imperial expansion was driven by the desire to control the lucrative trade routes – the highly sought after spices, silk and ceramics from China and Southeast

Asia – in the Indian Ocean, which was monopolized by Muslim traders. In order to break the Muslim traders’ monopoly in this lucrative trade, the Portuguese needed key harbours to serve as naval bases and trading posts. In 1509, the Portuguese conquered

Goa on the west coast of India before proceeding to conquer Melaka in 1511. Both conquests ended the Muslims’ trade monopoly as the Portuguese imposed trade restrictions on them (Means, 2009, pp. 31-33).

Such restrictions resulted in deep antagonism not only among Muslim traders but also among the local population (who were mostly Muslims) as they had benefited from the previous trading system. This resulted in open warfare between the Portuguese and local Malay kingdoms where Islam became a unifying force that influenced Muslims to resist the intervention of European traders and colonial regimes in this region. It also created antipathy among the locals, as Islam had became firmly entrenched, towards

Christianity which was viewed as the religion of the Western colonial regimes

(Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 26).

Unsurprisingly, the Portuguese–sponsored missionaries into this region were unable to attract the Malays to the Catholic faith. However, Catholicism managed to gain a foothold in the peninsula through the conversion of Eurasians in Melaka. The

Portuguese made Melaka a Catholic city with “… nineteen churches and chapels, including a cathedral, conducted by Jesuits, Dominicans, Franciscans and secular priests

[serving] 20,000 Catholics” (Williams, 1976: 77). By the late sixteenth century, the city became a major centre for missionary activities in Asia (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p.

26). 123

The Portuguese presence in Melaka did not last long. In the late sixteenth century, the Dutch exerted pressure on the Portuguese empire which culminated in the conquest of Melaka in 1641. Because the Dutch professed to a rival confession of the

Christian faith, i.e. Protestant Calvinism, they initiated a policy that aimed at dismantling the Catholic presence here (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 27).

In place of Catholicism, the Dutch encouraged the propagation of Protestant

Calvinism under the aegis of the Dutch Reformed Church in areas under their control but no significant missionary work was ever established. As a result, Protestant

Calvinism only managed to convert a small minority within the Eurasian community.

Catholicism remained the religion of choice among Eurasians (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, pp. 27-28).

When the Dutch vacated Melaka in favour of the British as a consequence of the

Anglo-Dutch Settlement of 1824, it marked the decline of the Dutch Reformed Church in this city-state. Catholicism, on the other hand, had proven to be more resilient in surviving not only the decline of the Portuguese power but also the active campaign of repression by the Dutch in Melaka. Thus, by the time the British arrived on the scene,

Catholicism had established firm (albeit small) foothold here through the presence of the

Eurasian community in Melaka.

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4.2 The British and Christianity in the Peninsula, 1824 - 1957

The expansion of the Catholic faith in Asia in the sixteenth century relied heavily on the patronage of the Portuguese and Spanish monarchies that sponsored missionaries to this part of the world. When the Dutch conquered Melaka in 1641, Rome realized that the political decline of Portugal and Spain in the seventeenth century would ensure the inevitable decline of state sponsored missions in this region (Williams, 1976: 80). In

1622, Rome formulated a new policy that aimed at eliminating the need for state sponsorship by putting missions directly under its control with the establishment of the

Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of Faith. Consequently, Catholic mission ties with particular colonial powers were severed, while their relationship with Rome was conversely strengthened (Williams, 1976, p. 81).

By the end of the eighteenth century, Rome sent missionaries from the Paris

Foreign Missions (Societe des Missions Etrangeres de Paris) or the MEP, an arm of the

Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of Faith, to propagate the Catholic faith in

Southeast Asia. In 1662, MEP French missionaries established a base in Thailand for this purpose. However, they were expelled by Thai authorities in 1779 (Chew, 2000, p.

83).

This resulted in two French MEP missionaries settling down in Kedah in 1781 where they established a Catholic mission. The mission served a community of eighty

Catholics, some exiles from Thailand while others had come from Melaka. The following year, one of the French missionaries returned to Thailand as the political climate improved there. The other missionary led the whole community to Penang in

1786, when the Island fell into the hands of the British. This community would establish a Catholic presence on the Island (Williams, 1976, pp. 93-96). 125

Between 1807 and 1809, two French missionaries brought eleven Chinese seminarians from China and obtained permission to transfer the Asian seminary (which had been founded in 1665) in Thailand to Penang. The seminary – the College General – was established in 1810. Its goal was to train local priests throughout Asia (Roxborogh,

1992a, pp. 11-12).

The MEP steadily gained influence in the peninsula at the expense of the older

Portuguese missions during the nineteenth century. In 1888, Rome recognized the authority of the MEP over the peninsula (which included Singapore). The Portuguese were, however, allowed to maintain control of their churches and flocks in Melaka and

Singapore. However, they would be under the jurisdiction of the MEP (Williams, 1976, pp. 97-99).

Protestant missionaries became active in the peninsula in the nineteenth century where the London Missionary Society (LMS) pioneered the Protestant missions in the peninsula. The LMS focused their attention towards the Malay and Chinese communities in the Straits Settlements between 1815 and 1846. Because missionary work among the Malays produced few converts, attention was shifted towards the

Chinese. The LMS withdrew from the peninsula between 1846 and 1881 to focus their attention to China, which left the field open for Catholic missionaries to propagate their faith throughout the peninsula and Singapore (Ackerman and Lee, 1990: 29). However, other Protestant missionaries from the Anglican, Methodist and Presbyterian denominations as well as independent Protestant missionaries stepped in to fill the

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Protestant void left by the LMS from the mid-nineteenth century onwards (Williams,

1976, pp. 100-101).1

On the whole, Catholic and Protestant missionaries rarely expanded their activities outside of the Straits Settlements because of the political instability of the interior. However, the situation changed when the “Forward Movement” policy was initiated in 1874, which saw the British gradually annexing the whole of the peninsula thereby making missionary activities possible outside the Straits Settlements. However, because of the treaties between the British and Malay rulers, missionary work among the

Malays was effectively limited. The British was committed to the “policy of upholding

Islam in the Malay states, unofficially discouraged any missionary work among Malays”

(Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 30).2 As a result the missionaries focused their attention on the non-Malay migrant population.

4.3 Mission Work among the non-Malays in Peninsular Malaysia

In general, the strategy adopted by the Christian missionaries to propagate

Christianity among the non-Malays rested on two planks. The first plank was through the setting up of ministries that aimed at offering social services to the local community.

The second plank was the traditional proselytizing (or evangelizing) activities that focused on the urban Chinese and Indian migrant workers brought in to serve the expanding colonial economy.

1 See also the collection of essays in Hunt, Lee and Roxborogh (1992) for a history of the different denominations that settled in the peninsula. 2 See also Williams (1976) and Kana (2004). 127

4.3.1 Evangelism

Following the British flag, Christian missionaries began to establish churches and missions in urban centres in the west coast of the peninsula between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The missionaries focused their attention among the Chinese and Indians migrant workers brought to the peninsula to satiate the growing demand for labour by British commercial interests (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 30).

Because of the diversity in languages and dialects among the migrant population, the missionaries were compelled to organize their activities along ethnic and linguistic lines. The missionaries allocated separate personnel and resources to cater to the particular needs of the various groups. This resulted in the institutionalization of distinct sections of the Christian churches along ethnic and linguistic lines where “[s]peakers of

Chinese dialects and Tamil generally attended to separate branches or services of the same church. Only the English-speaking sections of the churches were multiethnic”

(Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 30).

However, the influence of Christianity on the larger migrant population was minimal as only a small portion came into contact with the missionaries and a smaller number still converted to this religion. The vast majority remained committed to the various folk religions brought over from southern India and southern China (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 32).3

3 See also Williams (1976). 128

Under the British colonial state, the Christian churches were characterized by a leadership that was “foreign in character, although lip service was given to the goal of training indigenous church leadership. French, British, and American missionary organizations financed and controlled the major institutions through which Christianity were propagated on the peninsula” (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 31). This “foreign” presence might have stifled the growth of Christianity here because of dependence on foreign funding and personnel as well as the inadequate training and mobilization of local Christians (Chan, 1992, p. 360).

The close identification of Christianity with colonial rule had influenced the perception of the local population that it was an essentially “Western religion” which they do not want to be associated with. Throughout the British colonial presence in the peninsula, Christianity was only a marginal religion in society. It was estimated that the

Christian population in British Malaya, based on the population census of 1931, constituted 1.9% of the total population or 71,066 out of the total population of 3.8 million (Chan, 1992, p. 355).

4.3.2 Mission schools

British annexation of the peninsula led to the growth of new urban centres in the west coast which attracted an influx of mainly Chinese migrant workers who came to find employment in these centres. Social services in urban areas, however, were almost non-existent as it was not in the interests of the colonial state to provide them (Hunt,

1992, pp. 332-333).

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Christians, on the other hand, have a long tradition of providing social welfare.

Because Christian missionaries were concentrated in urban areas, it was unsurprising that they would actively be involved in social-welfare activities such as establishing orphanages, welfare homes, medical clinics and hospitals as a medium of evangelism.

However, it was in the field of education, that these Christian missionaries left their most significant mark on the local colonial society (Pappu, 1996, p. 18).

These schools (also known as mission schools) were viewed by Christian missionaries as an important means in proselytisation (Philip Loh, 1975: 56). Mission schools contributed much to the expansion of English education from the late 19th century up until the early years of post-independence of the country. For example, in the

Official Year Book of the Federation of Malaya 1967, the post-independence state acknowledged the contributions of these schools in the following words,

… the Mission Schools particularly those under the direction of the Roman Catholic Christian Brothers and the American Methodist Church were chiefly responsible for the rapid advancement in English education and by 1914, some three-fourths of the boys receiving education were in those schools. The Missions were also pioneers in the education of girls and fought resolutely against conservative opposition and prejudices (quoted in Pappu, 1996, pp. 10-11)

Although the primary goal of mission schools was to propagate the Christian faith nonetheless religious indoctrination took second place to the emphasis of offering a sound education to their students. Rather than aggressively proselytizing, these schools sought to introduce Christian values to their students (Philip Loh, 1975).

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As a result, the local populace became appreciative of the sound education offered by these schools. The spirit of mission schools and its reception by the local population in general is perhaps best exemplified in a paragraph quoted by Pappu (1996, p. 22) on the Catholic Teaching Orders found in a Catholic publication which stated that the

… aim of the Mission Schools was to secure for all students an all-round education with special emphasis on moral training and character formation. The high educational standards and ideals of the sound moral training, characteristic of these schools from the very beginning, secured such esteem and demand that people of all races and religions … were generous in helping to provide the Mission with land and assist in the building of these schools in various parts of the country.

More importantly, the growing demand for English-education, white collar personnel by the European dominated commercial interests and the colonial administration encouraged the local population to seek an English education for their children as a means for upward social mobility (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 31).

Mission schools were founded by private organizations and were financially supported by school fees and an annual grant as well as the occasional donation of land by the British colonial state (Chang, 1973, p. 22; Chew: 2000, p. 211). These schools remained private and independent until the early 20th century when the colonial government was forced to take over these schools because of financial difficulties.

However, the mission schools’ management retained control while the colonial government took all the school fees and bankrolled the whole cost of running these schools. Although part of the colonial education system, the government’s presence was felt in mission schools through receiving annual financial grants, school inspection by educational authorities, and getting a dollar for a dollar contribution for any approved construction of new building. In addition, teachers in mission schools with the perquisite

131 qualifications were placed on the same salary scale as government teachers (Chang,

1973, pp. 22-23).

During the British colonial era, mission schools occupied an important position in the colonial order through its role in educating and shaping the outlook of the local urban middle class in which a common language, i.e. English, together with a degree of familiarity with Christian teachings and values, permeated throughout this class.

Unsurprisingly, mission schools enjoyed a widespread influence and prestige in British colonial Malaya (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 31).

4.3.3 Social-welfare ministries

Although less influential than mission schools nonetheless social-welfare ministries operated by the missionaries and churches have also left their mark in the

Malayan colonial society. Although the social-welfare ministries were operated across the denominational lines nonetheless it was the Catholics who led the way in this field.

The classic Catholic response to social-welfare was to form communities on the basis of a particular religious vocation. These orders could be as broad as a general commitment to evangelism or as narrow as a commitment to work among a particular group, e.g. orphans, the elderly, etc. Communities of men or women would form a variety of religious orders for this purpose. The first of these orders came in the 1850s to establish mission schools while others came at other periods, particularly after the

Second World War (Hunt, 1992, p. 338).

132

The Little Sisters of the Poor is a community that offers home and care for the elderly in addition to their normal vocation of a monastic religious life (Hunt, 1992:

339). The Franciscan Missionaries of Mary, on the other hand, have a wider mission which includes evangelism, pastoral care, social work, medical care and education for the poorest in society. One of their well known legacies is the Assunta Hospital in

Petaling Jaya. The Brothers of St. Gabriel founded the Monfort Boys Town which helps boys who are orphaned and from poor family by providing them with vocational education for a better future (Chew, 2000, pp. 30-32).

Protestant missionaries also contributed to the social-welfare ministries in British colonial Malaya. The Methodist Women’s Foreign Missionary Ministries (WFMS) set up girl’s schools to improve the socio-economic status of women in British colonial

Malaya. The girls’ schools were closely tied with the “rescue work” of WFMS missionaries. The WFMS set up hostels and orphanages to take in abandoned female babies and young girls in dire straits to save them from the fate of being sold into slavery or prostitution (Hunt, 1992, pp. 334-335).

The Anglican and Methodist churches began the medical ministry at the start of the 20th century. The Anglican Church established its first clinic in the 1920s in Melaka and later other clinics were established in Singapore. At that time, the rural Malay community did not have access to modern medical aid and the clinic served more than

10,000 patients in a year. The Methodist Church established its own clinic in Sitiawan in the 1930s (Hunt, 1992, p. 337).

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Apart from churches and missionaries, other organizations such as the Young

Men Christian Association (YMCA) and the Salvation Army also established their presence in British Malaya at the turn of the 20th century. Organizations such as these provided their own social-welfare programs that complemented the efforts of the churches and missionaries in providing social-welfare for the urban poor.

4.4 Eschewing Politics in Favour of Evangelism

The policy of the British colonial state had indelibly left its mark in the formation of Christianity in the country. Firstly, the colonial state provided the opportunity for missionaries to expand Christianity throughout the peninsula by gradually annexing all the Malay states under its control. This colonial expansion out of the Straits Settlements into the interior provided political stability and protection for the missionaries to do their work.

However they were prohibited from proselytizing the Malays which left them to focus their attention on the influx of non-Malay migrant workers from China and India who were being brought in to serve the colonial economy. What this resulted in was the polarization of the colonial religious field where the colonial state regulates the religious faith of one segment of the local population, i.e. Malay-Muslim, while leaving the other segment, i.e. non-Malays, opened to Christian proselytisation. As a result, Malaysian

Christians – unlike other religions in the country – are not linked to a single ethnic community.

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Secondly, because the British did not favour any Christian denomination (unlike the Portuguese and Dutch), it led to a situation which enabled all the different denominations to set up missions here to proselytize the non-Malay segment of the population. Therefore, the Christian community here was not monolithic but rather fragmented, not only along denominational lines, but also by language and dialects, as well as class. Properly speaking, a local Christian “community” never existed but rather communities segregated along the lines pointed out.

Thirdly, there existed a close tie between Christianity and the colonial state. The annexation of the whole peninsula under British rule enabled Christian missionaries to establish churches and schools (albeit among the non-Malay segment of the population who tended to concentrate on the West coast). Finally, the church-state relationship during this period was mostly tranquil with the church enjoying a position of prestige and privileges (Kana, 2004, p. 73). The church focused its attention on proselytisation and delivering social services eschewing involvement in the political sphere (Williams,

1976, p. 117).

Indeed, Christians as a community were not directly involved in the post-World

War II political events that subsequently led to the independence of the country in 1957.

The only time when Christians found themselves drawn into the political arena was during the waning years of British rule. As the country started preparing for independent rule, the Christian community began to involve themselves in the political process in order to have a say in the subsequent post-colonial political order. The Malayan

Christian Council (MCC) –which provided a forum for discussion and platform for making Christian views known submitted a memorandum to the Reid Commission

135 which had been given the task of drafting the constitution for an independent Malaya

(Hunt, 1992, p. 349).

In the memorandum, the MCC urged the Commission to safeguard certain fundamental rights by enshrining them in the constitution. More specifically, the MCC urged that all persons be “equally entitled to freedom of conscience, and have the right to freely profess, practise and propagate any religion” (Kana, 2004, p. 73). This was tantamount to seeking freedom of religion for all individuals without interference from the state.

The Commission’s final draft declared Islam as the official religion of the state and that Malays were to be Muslims alongside their special position and privileges

(Kana, 2004, p. 75). The draft was accepted with some minor modifications and became the Constitution of the newly independent nation-state in 1957. On the other hand, the

Constitution also guaranteed the right for freedom of religion under Article XI which can be interpreted as the non-interference of the state into non-Islamic religious affairs.

More importantly, the Alliance Party gave the assurance that although Islam is the official religion of the state, it did not imply that “the State is not a secular state” (Kana,

2004, p. 76).

The Constitution as it was drawn up would have far-reaching ramifications for

Christians. However, in the early years of independence, Christians did not concern themselves with the implications of the nation’s Constitution as the community was experiencing rapid changes that required their attention.

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4.5 Conclusion

The rejection of MCC’s memorandum simply demonstrated the marginality of

Christianity within the larger colonial society. Its presence in the peninsula was

largely dependent on Western colonialism and support from the Portuguese, Dutch

and finally the British. For example, without the support of the British, Christian

expansion from its foothold in Melaka to the rest of the peninsula from the mid-

nineteenth century onwards would have been impossible.

Moreover, it was British colonial interests and policy that dictated the shape

of the Christian community here. Throughout this period, Christianity was not able

to attract a large following among the non-Malays (preferring as they did to their own

folk religions which they brought from the home country. There was also the

perception that Christianity was a Western religion).

With the passing of the colonial order, Christianity no longer enjoyed support

from the state. However, in place of state support, Christianity began to experience

rapid growth among the local non-Malay segment of the population. In the following

chapters, I will be discussing the impact of the government’s intrusion on the

Christian’s sphere of religion and how Christians negotiate with the state to evade

such intrusions.

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CHAPTER 5

Christianity and the Middle Class

Lee and Ackerman (1997) pointed out that the effects of modernization in

Asia differ from the West. Modernization in the West has resulted in religion losing its public significance, i.e. secularisation where religion is relegated to the realm of private conscience. Here in Asia, modernization did not relegate religion to the realm of private conscience. It had the opposite effect. As they put it:

... the reproduction of secularisation in the East does not necessarily mean the demise of religious tradition. On the contrary, it implies the importation of new values and ideas that compete with established religions, thus possibly prompting religious revivalisms as nationalist expressions against Western secularisation (Lee and Ackerman, 1997, p. 6).

More importantly, they pointed out that modernization in Asia has increased the power of non-religious professionals and organizations to drive the “systematic codification of cultural identities and religious worldviews in the urban middle class”

(Lee and Ackerman, 1997, p. 7). Religious participation, for the literate and technically proficient middle class, often requires self-conscious reflection (Lee and

Ackerman, 1997, p. 7). They added:

The cultural traditions entangled with religion, as well as the religious beliefs themselves, become objects of reflection. The embeddedness of religion in culture invites identity-making activity as an extension of religious practice, which today has come to rely on sophisticated technical means for its consolidation and propagation (Lee and Ackerman, 1997, p. 7).

In short, middle class participation in religion has transformed the religious landscape in Asia. Post-colonial developments in Malaysian Christianity did not escape the observations made by Lee and Ackerman (1997). In this chapter, I will be looking into the middle class participation in Christian revivalism and the consequences of such participation for the community in the peninsula.

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5.1 Industrialisation and the Rise of the Middle Class

Malaysia in the past twenty to thirty years has experienced rapid economic growth which has transformed the country’s dependency on agriculture and mining to Malaysia’s emergence as a second generation Newly Industrialized Country

(NIC).1

Table 5.1:

Malaysia – Gross Domestic Product by Industry, 1970-2005 (in percentages)

1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 Agriculture & forestry 29.6 23.5 18.5 7.8 6.0 Mining & quarrying 14.4 10.6 9.6 5.4 4.5 Manufacturing 14.6 20.1 26.7 32.5 34.9 Construction 4.5 5.2 3.4 2.4 2.4 Services 36.9 40.6 41.8 51.9 52.3 Total 100 100 100 100 100 (Source: Khong & Jomo, 2010, p. 6)

Table 5.1 shows the changing structure of the Malaysian economy between

1960 and 2005. The Table shows the manufacturing and services sectors are not only the fastest growing sectors of the economy in the period mentioned but also contributed the most to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while the agricultural and mining sectors’ contribution to the GDP became less important in the same period.

1 See also Jomo (1990; 2007). 139

Table 5.2: Employment by Industry, 1970 – 2005 (in percentages)

1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 Agriculture & forestry 53.5 39.6 26.0 20.0 12.0 Mining & quarrying 2.6 1.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 Manufacturing 8.7 15.7 19.9 23.9 29.5 Construction 2.7 5.6 6.3 7.4 8.1 Services 32.5 37.4 47.3 48.2 50.0 Total 100 100 100 100 100 (Source: Khong & Jomo, 2010, p. 6).

Table 5.2 shows the distribution of employment by industry between 1970 and 2005. The Table highlights the structural transformation of the country’s economy where a clear majority of the population are employed in the manufacturing and service sectors. Only a minority is still employed in the agricultural and forestry and mining and quarrying sectors.

Comparing the percentage of people employed in the manufacturing sector and the agricultural and forestry sector in 1970 and 2005, we can observe the importance of the manufacturing sector to Malaysia’s economy. In 1970, the manufacturing sector employed 8.7% of the total employment of the country while the agricultural and forestry sector employed 53.5%. By 2005, the manufacturing sector employed 29.5% while employment for the agricultural and forestry sector declined to 12%.

140

Table 5.3:

Employment by Major Occupational Group, 1970 – 2000 (in percentages)

Occupational group 1970 1980 1990 2000 Professional & technical 4.8 6.0 8.8 11.0 Administrative & managerial 1.1 1.1 2.4 4.2 Clerical workers 5.0 7.3 9.8 11.1 Sales workers 9.1 9.8 11.5 11.0 Service workers 7.9 8.7 11.6 11.8 Agriculture workers 44.9 38.7 28.3 18.1 Production workers 27.3 28.5 27.6 32.8 Total 100 100 100 100 (Source: Loh, n.d., p. 10)

The transformation of Malaysia’s economy and changes to its distribution of employment (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2) has, in turn, affected the structure of Malaysian society. Table 5.3 shows how the structural changes in the economy have influenced the country’s distribution of occupational groups.

The most significant feature in this Table is the increase in the number of production workers, i.e. those involved in the manufacturing sector, has increased from 27.3% in 1970 to 32.8% in 2000. During the same period, agricultural workers suffered a decline from 44.9% in 1970 to 18.1% in 2000. Other occupational groups also experienced a small increase between 1970 and 2000.

All three Tables taken together indicated the growth of the middle class in

Malaysia. Some scholars have estimated the proportion of the middle class by adding those workers involved in the professional and technical, administrative and managerial and clerical occupational groups plus half of those involved in the sales and services. With the numbers added up, the size of the middle class appears to have increased from 19.4% in 1970 to 37.3% in 2000 (Loh, n.d.: 4).2 In short, there is a sizeable middle class in the structure of Malaysian society.

2 For a discussion on the formation of the middle class in Malaysia, see Abdul Rahman (1995; 1996, 2002); Kahn (1991, 1996); and Aihara (2009). 141

Table 5.4:

Peninsular Malaysia - Distribution of Employed Labour Force

by Occupation and Ethnic Group, 1957 (in percentages)

1957 Malay Chinese Indian Total Professional & 2.7 3.3 2.3 3.1 technical (41.0) (38.3) (11.0) (100)

Administrative & 0.4 2.0 1.0 1.2 managerial (17.6) (62.4) (12.2) (100)

Clerical & related 1.7 3.7 4.0 2.9 (27.1) (46.2) (19.9) (100)

Sales & related 2.9 15.9 10.0 8.6 (15.9) (66.1) (16.8) (100)

Service & related 7.3 8.0 7.6 8.6 (39.7) (33.3) (12.8) (100)

Agricultural & 74.2 38.3 50.2 56.4 related (62.1) (24.3) (12.8) (100)

Production, 10.6 28.3 24.6 18.9 transport & related (26.5) (53.5) (18.9) (100) labourers TOTAL 100 100 100 100 (47.2) (35.7) (14.4) (100) Note: Value in bracket denotes the percentage share of each ethnic group for that occupational category. (Source: adapted from Khong & Jomo, 2010, p. 37).

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Table 5.5:

Peninsular Malaysia - Distribution of Employed Labour Force by Occupation and Ethnic Group,

1970, 1986 and 2000 (in percentages)

1970 1986 2000 Malay Chinese Indian Total Malay Chinese Indian Total Malay Chinese Indian Total Professional & 4.3 5.2 4.9 4.8 8.9 6.9 7.0 8.1 13.6 9.6 10.1 11.0 technical (47.1) (39.5) (10.8) (100) (58.8) (30.0) (9.9) (100) (63.9) (25.8) (7.6) (100)

Administrative & 0.5 1.9 0.8 1.1 1.8 4.2 2.0 2.7 3.0 7.4 2.8 4.2 managerial (24.1) (62.9) (7.8) (100) (35.8) (56.0) (5.6) (100) (37.0) (52.3) (5.5) (100)

Clerical & related 3.4 6.3 8.1 5.0 10.1 10.4 8.2 10.0 12.2 12.3 11.5 11.1 (35.4) (45.9) (17.2) (100) (54.3) (36.4) (8.6) (100) (56.8) (32.9) (8.6) (100)

Sales & related 4.7 15.3 9.5 9.1 7.1 19.7 10.3 11.6 8.0 18.4 9.0 11.0 (26.7) (61.7) (11.1) (100) (32.5) (59.2) (7.7) (100) (37.3) (49.8) (6.8) (100)

Service & related 6.8 8.6 10.9 7.9 13.9 10.2 13.6 12.6 13.2 8.6 12.1 11.8 (44.3) (39.6) (14.6) (100) (59.4) (28.6) (11.4) (100) (57.7) (21.8) (8.5) (100)

Agricultural & related 62.3 21.2 41.0 44.8 34.7 13.6 28.7 26.7 21.5 6.3 15.1 18.1 (72.0) (17.3) (9.7) (100) (69.8) (17.9) (11.4) (100) (61.2) (10.3) (6.9) (100)

Production, transport 18.0 41.6 24.7 27.3 23.5 34.9 32.2 28.4 28.5 37.4 39.4 32.8 & related labourers (34.2) (55.9) (9.6) (100) (44.5) (43.1) (12.0) (100) (44.7) (33.8) (10.0) (100) TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 (51.8) (36.6) (10.6) (100) (53.5) (34.9) (10.6) (100) (51.5) (29.7) (8.3) (100) Note: Value in bracket denotes the percentage share of each ethnic group for that occupational category. (Source: adapted from Khong & Jomo, 2010, p. 37)

143

Tables 5.4 and 5.5 looked at the distribution of occupation by occupation and ethnic group in 1957, 1970, 1986 and 2000. The middle class emerged during the early twentieth century as a result of the introduction of colonial capitalism and the expansion of the colonial state in British Malaya. When the peninsula gained its independence in 1957, there was a nascent middle class in post-colonial Malaya. The middle class was made up largely from the Chinese community. The middle class among the majority Malay community was mainly made up of a small group of government administrators (Abdul Rahman, 2001, p. 83).

This can be observed in Table 5.4. In 1957, the proportion of Chinese in the administrative and managerial occupation stands at 62.4% compared with the Malays at 17.6%. The same trend can also be observed with other middle class related occupations such as the clerical, sales and service groups. The Chinese proportion in the clerical and related occupation stands at 46.2% compared with the Malays at

27.1% while in the sales and related occupation, the Chinese proportion stands at

66.1% compared to the latter’s 15.9%. It is only in service and related occupation that the Malay proportion stands higher than the Chinese, i.e. 39.7% to 33.3%.

However, from the 1970s onwards, the percentage share of Malays in this occupation grew from 17.6% in 1957 to 24.1% in 1970, to 37.0% in 2000 (Table

5.5). There is also a significant increase in other middle class related occupational groups as well.3

3 See Table 5.5 on the clerical, sales and service occupation groups. 144

The expansion of the Malay middle class was due to the implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the industrialisation policy beginning from

1970. The NEP committed the government to help expand the Malay middle class as a way to level the unequal socio-economic playing field among the Malays and non-

Malays while the industrialisation policy transformed the economic structure of the country from one that was based on agriculture and mining to an industrialised one.4

In short, both policies contributed to the growth of a Malay middle class.

The non-Malays also benefitted from the economic transformation of the country. In 1970, the percentage of Chinese in the administrative and managerial occupation group was at 62.9%. Although the figure had declined to 52.3% in 2000 nonetheless their share in this group still remains significant (Table 5.5). The same results can be observed in other occupation groups that are associated with the middle class (Table 5.5). In short, the middle class has grown rapidly since the 1970s that cuts across the racial lines and constitutes a significant sector in Malaysian society.

5.2 The Middle Class and the Emergence of “New Politics”

Loh (2002) argued that Malaysia’s successful transition into the NIC tier not only transformed the socio-economic structures of the nation but also changed its political discourse. The nation’s political discourse shifted “from a pronounced pre-

1990s preoccupation with exclusivist ethnic issues and inter-ethnic competition to rather more common socio-economic concerns raised by rapid growth and mass consumerism” (Khoo & Loh, 2002, p. 8).

4 See Abdul Rahman (1996). 145

Consequently, a discourse of developmentalism now dominates among critical groups in Malaysian society. This discourse valorises sustained economic growth to ensure improved material conditions of living but spreads the culture of mass consumerism. This in turn brought about an appreciation of the value of political stability which many Malaysians now believe can only be sustained by a strong Barisan Nasional (BN) government. More significantly, this sentiment is widely shared by non-Malays who were previously critical of the affirmative policies of the BN government. This is particularly true after the 1990s when the measures taken by the government to liberalise the economy to ensure growth, facilitated largely for utilitarian reasons, various measures of cultural liberalization (Loh, 2002, pp. 28-38; 41-45).

He suggested that developmentalism can be seen as a cultural by-product of an economic dirigisme successfully undertaken by a developmental state. At the same time, the spread of mass consumerism, which forms part of developmentalism, has pushed forward a “discourse of the individual” where certain groups increasingly withdraw from the public sphere into their private spaces. They are primarily concerned with personal achievements and personalised expressions of identity. As a result, many citizens hold a self-limiting view of political participation that does not lead to protest against the authoritarian tendencies of the state, but rather rallying behind the ruling party, i.e. BN (Loh, 2002, pp. 34-38; pp. 45-50).

The middle class, who forms an important sector of society, embraced developmentalism because they reap the economic benefits that came about. As

Abdul Rahman (2001, pp. 87-88) noted, most members of this group are first generation middle class, who experienced rapid upward intergenerational mobility in the past three decades because the economy was undergoing rapid industrialisation

146

and also due to the affirmative action policies undertaken by the government on behalf of the Malays in the 1970s. This class is highly affluent with a consumer oriented lifestyle. Ideologically, they tend to be conservative with a preference towards the political status quo which they perceived as having delivered the

“economic goods” rather than change (Abdul Rahman, 2001, pp. 89-90).

Although there is a tendency within the middle class that veers towards supporting the political status-quo, nonetheless, Saravanamuttu (2001) suggested that certain groups within the middle class have been active in championing various issues connected to social democracy, human rights and the environment.5 He contended that Malaysian middle class political actors – via civil society – have developed “a multi-ethnic, multi-class praxis of sorts in galvanising civil society to resist excessive state surveillance, dominance and outright repression over the citizenry” (Saravanamuttu, 2001, p. 104).

Since the 1980s, a small group within the middle class have organised themselves into NGOs, to promote an alternative discourse of participatory democracy. These NGOs were often multi-ethnic in orientation and often avoided racial-baiting, which dominates the national political scene. Although they participate in the formal political system, i.e. involving the government, the electoral process and political parties, they also participate in the non-formal political process of civil society such as petitions, workshops and publications among others (Loh,

2009a, pp. 43-44).

5 See Lev (1993). 147

However, Malaysian NGOs suffered a major setback when the Mahathir administration launched a mass crackdown on dissent in October 1987, codenamed

Operasi Lalang (Weeding Operation). In the operation, the government arrested 106

Malaysians – representatives of NGOs, unionists, opposition leaders, educationists,

Church social activists – under the Internal Security Act (ISA). Many were incarcerated without trial for two to three years. Consequently, the momentum towards a participatory democracy in the country was halted (Loh, 2009a, p. 45).

With rapid economic growth that occurred between the late 1980s and 1997

Malaysian politics was normalised. Economic affluence and the fear of coercive laws caused many citizens (particularly the middle class) to put the ruling BN party back in power in subsequent elections (Saravanammutu, 2001, p. 110).

However, in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the “Anwar

Saga” – the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim as the Deputy Prime Minister, his expulsion from UMNO and subsequent arrest, trial and sentencing to jail – the push for a participatory democracy in the country in the guise of the Reformasi (Reformation) movement re-emerged (Loh, 2009a, pp. 45-46; Saravanamuttu, 2001, pp. 111-113).

Like the NGOs of the 1980s, the Reformasi movement was multi-ethnic in orientation which involved people from all walks of life. More importantly, it brought to the fore the participation of the middle class once more. The defining moment for the Reformasi movement was when its leaders re-organised themselves as a political party, Parti Keadilan Nasional (National Justice Party), in 1999.6 The changed political landscape also enabled the formation of a coalition of opposition political parties under the Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Coalition or BA) banner which promoted the deepening of democracy in the country in the 1999 general

6 In 2003, Parti Keadilan Nasional merged with Parti Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People’s Party) to form the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party or PKR). 148

election. Many former NGOs leaders joined one or another of the BA political parties to engage in party and electoral politics (Loh, 2009a, pp. 45-46).

A related development was the proliferation of NGOs which also made their voices heard as the 1999 general election approached. These NGOs were critical of

BN and its policies but they did not associate themselves with BA although they did voice their concerns to both coalitions as they were not directly concerned with the outcome of the election but with the agenda which they championed (Loh, 2009a, p.

47-48).

The opposition fared well in the 1999 General Elections with PAS gaining the most seats in the opposition’s side of the parliament. Nonetheless, cracks began to emerge in BA when PAS pushed for an Islamic state agenda which strained its relationship with other coalition partners, particularly the Democratic Action Party

(DAP). In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy in New York in 2001, DAP began to voice its concern over PAS’ Islamic state agenda which caused the party to pull out of BA. Increasingly non-Muslims and also Muslims began to be concerned over the allegations of the connection between PAS and extremist Muslim groups such as the

Jemaah Islamiyya, allegedly al-Qaeda’s proxy in Southeast Asia.

As a result, many Malaysians began to view BN (particularly UMNO) as the voice of moderate Islam. This resulted in a massive swing of support back to BN in the 2004 General Elections which wiped out the opposition’s gain in the previous election.7 However, the 2008 general elections once again saw the resurgence of a new opposition coalition, called Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance or PR). PR managed to deny BN its traditional two-thirds majority in the parliament and won an unprecedented five state governments.

7 See Gomez (2006). 149

More significantly was BN’s loss of the state governments in Penang and

Selangor – two of the most industrialised states in the country – to PR. The defeat of

BN in these two states is telling because of the high proportion of the middle class is concentrated here. In short, the urban middle class have withdrawn their support from the ruling coalition because they perceived that the BN-government has failed to deal effectively with issues such as religious conflicts, economic and political scandals as well as the rising cost of living, crime and corruption (Saravanamuttu,

2008, p 39).8

8 See the essays in Ooi, Saravanamuttu & Lee (2008) for a discussion of the 12th General Elections on the causes of BN’s disastrous showing and its implications for Malaysian politics. 150

Table 5.6

Percentage of Votes for Opposition Parliamentary Candidates in Peninsular

Malaysia, 2004 and 2008 General Elections*

State % Opposition Change

2004 2008 2004-2008

Perlis 36.3 39.9 + 3.6

Kedah 40.2 53.2 +13.0

Kelantan 48.7 55.0 +6.3

Terengganu 43.6 44.7 +1.1

Penang 43.2 63.0 +19.8

Perak 40.5 53.3 +12.8

Pahang 32.3 40.5 +8.2

Selangor 34.0 55.4 +21.4

FT Kuala Lumpur 41.2 62.0 +20.8

Putrajaya 11.7 24.4 +12.7

Negeri Sembilan 30.1 45.1 +15.0

Melaka 28.8 42.6 +13.8

Johor 20.4 34.7 +14.3

Peninsular Malaysia 36.2 50.2 +14.0

*excluding independent candidates. (Source: adapted from Philip Khoo, 2008, p. 4)

Table 5.6 shows the percentage of votes for opposition Parliamentary candidates in the 2004 and 2008 General Elections. As can be observed, the 2008

General Elections witnessed the opposition coalition gaining support across all states in the peninsula. The most significant gains came from the more urbanised states such as Penang, Selangor and Kuala Lumpur when compared with the 2004 General

Elections.

151

Looking at the ebb and flow of middle class politics and its impact on the nation’s political scene since the 1980s, one can detect that Malaysian politics has undergone a transformation. Although, ethnicity remains a salient aspect of national politics, it is not the be-all and end-all of the Malaysian politics. Rather, a new discourse of participatory politics has gained ground, particularly among the middle class (Loh, 2009b, p. xvi).

In short, the political discourse of the middle class straddles between developmentalism and participatory politics. On the one hand, the rapid economic growth which the country experienced in the past three decades has undoubtedly consolidated the middle class. Bound by improved living conditions brought about by the government’s economic policy, members of this class – irrespective of ethnicity – shared a common interest in pursuing rapid economic growth, which is contingent upon political stability that is associated with BN rule (Loh, 2009b, p. xix).

On the other hand, some scholars have noted that the middle class is associated with the championing various issues that are linked with a political discourse associated with justice, accountability, popular participation, greater freedom and autonomy, e.g. participatory democracy. Such discourse tends towards creating an awareness and concern towards universalistic values that transcends ethnicity (Lev, 1993; Saravanamuttu, 2001).

152

This has circumscribed somewhat the dominance of ethno-religious discourse in Malaysian politics. What has emerged is a “new politics” that encourages the development of participatory politics not only in the nation’s formal political system but also within the non-formal political process of civil society. More importantly, the middle class played a crucial role in fostering this development.9

The participation of the middle class in the non-formal political process of civil society was not restricted to NGOs with secular agendas but the religious as well. Nagata (1984), Zainah Anwar (1987) and Ahmad Fauzi (2002) pointed out the dakwah movements were essentially a Malay-Muslim middle class movement. The activities of these religious NGOs were not confined to missionary activities but also to offer an alternative political discourse (based on the teachings of Islam) to that of the ruling party, i.e. the UMNO-led BN coalition.

During the early years of its existence, ABIM was well known to hold anti- establishment views, which included opposition against the NEP because of its racial bias, and organising student protests against rural peasant poverty (Ahmad Fauzi,

2007, p.448). Other Islamic NGOs such as Sisters-in-Islam (SIS) was formed to champion the rights of Muslim women according to the teachings of Islam which eventually expanded to include wider issues of democracy and human rights.10 In short, religion became a site for new politics.

9 See Loh (2002, 2009). 10 http://www.sistersinislam.org.my retrieved on 5/3/2010. 153

Middle class involvement in religion also transformed the nature of religious leadership. Traditionally, leadership in a religious institution belongs to the clergy with the faithful being content as passive followers. However, with the rise of the middle class, the clergy’s traditional monopoly on religion has been broken with the middle class beginning to take over the leadership of religious institutions.11 Unlike, the traditional clergy-led religious organisations which focused on religious instruction and missionary activities, the newer middle class led religious organisations tend to add social activism in addition to the traditional religious activities as part of its agenda.12 As a result, religious organisations looked more like their secular NGOs counterpart albeit with a religious agenda that govern their social activism.

For example, a significant number of ABIM’s members were professionals with diverse educational backgrounds (Ahmad Fauzi, 2003, p. 63).13 Unsurprisingly, its activities were not confined to dakwah activities but also in social activism such as education in an effort to uplift the socio-economic future of poor Malay youths and operating the Koperasi Belia Islam (Muslim Youth Cooperative or KBI) which specialises in capital-raising and financial schemes for the poor (Ahmad Fauzi, 2003, pp. 64-67).

As I will show in the rest of this chapter and the following two chapters, middle class participation in religion and its consequences are not limited to Islam only but can also be observed in other religions, in this case Christianity, as well.

11 For a discussion on the traditional leadership structure of Islam in colonial Malaya, see Gullick (1958). See also Lee and Ackerman (1997), particularly Chapter 3. 12 See Nagata (1984) and Ahmad Fauzi (2002). 13 See also Zainah Anwar (1987). 154

5.3 The Growth of Christianity and the Middle Class, 1960-2000

The period of rapid economic growth in the country coincided with Christians adding significant numbers to their fold among the urban non-Malay segment of the population.14

Table 5.7:

Growth of Malaysian Population and Christian Adherents, 1960-1980

Year Total Population (“000) Christians As percentage of total population 1960 8,205 364,241 4.4 1965 9,534 458,393 4.8 1970 10,863 555,877 5.1 1975 12,307 628,602 5.1 1980 13,763 690,229 5.0 (Source: adapted from Chan, 1992, p. 362)

Table 5.7 shows the growth of Christians in Malaysia vis-à-vis the total population between 1960 and 1980. Using 1960 as our baseline of the growth of this community in the post-colonial period, we can observe that the number of Christians has grown significantly between 1960 and 1980 as compared with the British colonial period. In 1921 there were only 50,612 Christians out of the estimated 2.95 million people in the peninsula, or 1.7% of the population in the peninsula. A decade later, Christians still made up only 71,066 out of 3.82 million of the total population, or 1.9% of the population (Chan, 1992, p. 355).

14 See Ackerman and Lee (1990). 155

Table 5.8:

Growth of Malaysian Population and Christian Adherents, 1980-2000

Year Total Population (“000) Christian Adherents As percentage of (“000) total population 1980 13,070.4 843.0 6.4 1990 17,498.1 1,412.3 8.1 2000 23,274.7 2,126.2 9.1 (Source: Saw, 2006, p. 19)

Between 1980 and 2000 the Christian population continued to experience growth in terms of absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total population

(Table 5.8).15 In fact by the year 2000, Christianity had become the second largest minority religion in Malaysia, after Buddhism (see Table 5.9).

Table 5.9:

Distribution of Population by Religion in 2000

Religion Number (‘000) Percentage Islam 14,049.4 60.4 Buddhism 4,467.5 19.2 Confucianism/Taoism/Others 615.1 2.6 Hinduism 1,457.9 6.3 Christianity 2,126.2 9.1 Tribal/Folk Religion 195.8 0.8 Others 88.4 0.4 No Religion 194.4 0.9 Unknown 80.0 0.3 Total 23,274.7 100 Note: include citizens and non-citizens (Source: Saw, 2006, p. 19)

15 It should be noted that Tables 5.7 and 5.8 use different methodologies in calculating the growth of Christians in the country. Nonetheless both Tables give us a sense of the rapid growth of Christians in the country in the post-independence period. 156

Table 5.10 shows Christians in Malaysia by ethnic group in 2000. Non-Malay

Bumiputera forms the largest grouping of Christians in the country (64.3%) followed by the Chinese (27.3%) and the Indians (6.6%). However given the geography of the country, non-Malay Bumiputeras largely reside in Sabah and Sarawak while Chinese and Indian Christians reside mainly in the peninsula. As such, Chinese and Indian

Christians form the bulk of Christians in the peninsula.16

Table 5.10:

Christians in Malaysia by Ethnic Group, 2000*

Ethnic Group Number Percentage Non-Malay Bumiputera 1,276,196 64.3 Chinese 540,731 27.3 Indian 131,048 6.6 Others 35,331 1.8 Total 1,981.4 100 *Citizens only. (Source: Loh, n.d., p. 9)

Returning to Table 5.5, we can observe that a significant number of Chinese and, to a lesser degree, Indians, belong to the middle class. Hence, we can infer that the growth of Christians between 1960 and 2000 (Tables 5.7 and 5.8) – that churches in the peninsula, essentially composed an increasing number of middle class

Christians. Such middle class participation has had two important consequences for churches in the peninsula. Firstly, it resulted in the laity becoming more active in participating in areas of the church that was once the exclusive preserve of the clergy. Secondly, they replenished the financial and human resources which had fallen as foreign missionaries and clergy departed from the country after independence.

16 The NECF survey of evangelical churches in 2001 reported that the racial breakdown of Christians in churches in the peninsula was as follows: 71% were Chinese; 19.8% Indians; 2.5% were non-Malay Bumiputeras; 3.3% were foreigners; 3.4% were local “Others.” 157

5.4 Empowering the Laity: Middle class participation in the church

Post-independence was a time of change for the Christians. Firstly, it brought an end to the dominance of foreign missionaries in the ecclesiastical leadership of mainstream Christianity, i.e. mainline Protestant and Catholic churches. The early years of independence was a period of transition for churches where its leadership was gradually being indigenized as a reflection of the changing local situation. This transition was hastened by the post-independence government’s policy of discouraging the entry of foreign missionaries and religious workers into Malaysia through strict enforcement of immigration requirements (Chew, 2000, p. 204). Visas were only granted to foreign missionaries with the understanding that they would be training local personnel who would take over the position left vacant by the same departing missionary. The transition period witnessed a shortage of trained local clergy which led to the establishment of local seminaries as a response to the demand for indigenous leadership. However, the local seminaries could not produce the numbers needed to fulfil the demand (Lee and Ackerman, 1997, p. 124).

Secondly, the early years of the post-colonial period witnessed the establishment of independent churches within the Protestant wing of the Christian community. Unlike the leadership of mainstream churches (mainline Protestant and

Catholic) which is based on ecclesial hierarchy, the independent churches (also known as evangelicals) were managed by a lay leadership. Evangelicals tend to eschew social activism in favour of evangelism (proselytizing).

158

Indeed, Lee and Ackerman (1997, pp. 125-126) have noted that:

[e]vangelism entails transformation of the local community into a Christian community. In view of this understanding, evangelical Protestants activists insist that Christian teachings and worship are not confined to official church premises but are to be increasingly practices within the diverse informal contexts that constitute the fabric of everyday life. [...] These groups have the capacity to carry out worship as well as missionary work ... A small intimate group of family members, neighbours, friends, or workmates meeting for Bible study and prayer can conduct the activities essential to both church and mission at the local level with minimum resources.17

Unsurprisingly, the newer evangelical churches experienced the growth in terms of church membership. That said the Catholic Church remains the largest denomination in the country because of its long history and by virtue of the fact it is the most cohesive organizationally, with access to more material and personnel resources.

The growth of the evangelical churches can be observed when we compare the Protestant and Catholic annual growth rates. The Protestants annual growth rate was 7.1% compared with the Catholics’ which experienced annual growth rate of

3.5%. Since the majority of the Protestant churches are affiliated with evangelical churches (77.3%), it may be concluded that the evangelicals in particular account for the growth in the increased number of Christians among the local population (Lee and Ackerman, 1997, p. 124).18

There are various factors that contributed to the vigour of the evangelical churches. They include a more flexible structure to enable these churches to adapt to the changing circumstances of the post-independence period and the emphasis on evangelism rather than engaging in social activities which characterize mainline churches (Chan, 1992p. 364). In addition, the lesser dependence on professional clergy – particularly expatriates – in favour of the lay ministry enabled the

17 Central to any evangelical church is the home or cell group. This group consist of a few church members who live nearby and will meet once a week to conduct Bible study and prayer. The home or cell group is also responsible for the pastoral care of its members. 18 See also Johnstone (1993) and Chan (1992). 159

evangelical churches to offset the decreased availability of foreign missionaries and clergy, and the shortage of trained local clergy needed to service the mainstream churches, particularly during the early years of post-independence (Chan, 1992, pp.

364-367).19

The growing popularity of evangelical churches can also be attributed to the fact that the majority of these churches were influenced by the charismatic movement. At its simplest, this movement emphasized thaumaturgical experiences such as ecstatic behaviour, glossolalia or speaking in tongues, exorcism, prophecy and healing in church services and in the daily lives of its members. Such experiences strongly appealed to the sensibility of the urban (non-Malay) English- speaking middle class (Ackerman and Lee, 1997, p. 129). Members of the middle class found the charismatic movement appealing because it provides a locus of meaning to compensate for dissolution of a meaningful social world brought about by rapid modernization in the country (Lee and Ackerman, 1997, pp. 128-130).20

The rise of the evangelical Christians has reshaped the Christian missionary activities through intense lay participation in evangelism and worship. It left a strong impression among mainstream Christians (Catholics and Protestants) on the vitality of evangelical Christianity. Many Catholic laypeople, for example, when comparing themselves with the evangelical Christians “have perceived the need to improve their scriptural knowledge and methods of organizations as well as to increase their commitment to the church’s mission, which is now understood to involve the whole church” (Lee and Ackerman, 1997, p. 131).

19 See also Roxborogh (1992) and Hwa & Hunt (1992) on accounts of the difficulties experienced by mainstream churches in acquiring or producing clergy to minister to the local churches. 20 See also Ackerman and Lee (1990). 160

It was unsurprising that the charismatic movement would slowly find its way into the life of mainstream churches. The charismatic movement was introduced to the wider Christian community:

through a series of well-publicized, interdenominational revival meetings held in first- class hotels in Kuala Lumpur and other major cities on the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia. These charismatic revival meetings, which became frequent events in the mid-1970s, were conducted by visiting foreign evangelists, usually sponsored by ... American-based [Charismatic] revival organizations. ... The interdenominational revival meetings attracted large numbers of middle-class Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists, and members of other established Protestant denominations who demonstrated an interest in seeking [thaumaturgical experiences] (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, pp. 72-73).

For the Catholic Church, the move towards more laity participation in the life of the church began with the Second Vatican Council’s reforms in the mid-1960s which encouraged the mobilization of the laity to participate in a wide variety of church functions ranging from the administrative to the spiritual as the needs arose

(Ackerman, 1993, p. 140).21 The developments in official Roman Catholic policy have enabled lay Catholics in Malaysia to become more active participants in the life of the church.

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (CCR) is the Catholic’s answer to the

Protestant evangelical charismatic movement. Originated in the United States in the late 1960s, the CCR reached Malaysian shores by the mid-1970s. The local Catholic hierarchy recognized the potential of the CCR in encouraging more lay participation in the life of the church. This movement was seen as an effective response to the problem of the shortage of trained clergy that the Catholic Church was experiencing

(Ackerman and Lee, 1990, pp. 73-74).

21 For an abstract on the Catholic teachings on the laity, see Kuek (2008). 161

This was in line with the reforms of Vatican II of encouraging more lay participation. In 1976, the local Catholic hierarchy adopted an explicit policy of identifying promising lay leaders, particularly among Catholic youths, who were given guidance and increased responsibilities. This policy was designed to mobilize the Catholic laity through the development of lay leaders (Chew, 2000, pp. 252-261).

Promoting the CCR was intended to further the policy of encouraging more lay participation. It was also meant to be a counter-weight to the inroads the evangelical

Charismatic were making among the lay Catholics who were attending charismatic prayer meetings organized by evangelical Charismatics (Ackerman and Lee, 2990, p.

74).

Like its counterpart, the CCR is essentially a lay movement which emphasized thaumaturgical experiences among its members. More importantly, the

CCR provided relief for the thinly spread and overburdened clergy in the country by taking over some of their responsibility in accordance with the policies of Vatican II

(Ackerman, 1993, p. 140).22

Furthering the policy of developing a more lay-oriented church, the Catholic hierarchy in 1986 reorganized its parishes as lay-administered Basic Ecclesial

Communities (BECs). The BEC is the basic unit of the local church and a mechanism for the laity to participate in the Catholic Church. A BEC comprises of a group of Catholic families who meet regularly for prayer and bible study under an elected lay leader somewhat similar to the home/cell group of evangelical churches

(Chew, 2000, p. 372).23 The BEC was meant to further the laity’s knowledge of scripture and as a means for social action towards the marginalized in society

(Ackerman, 1993: 142-143).

22 See Ackerman and Lee (1990), particularly Chapter 3, on the workings and authority structure of the CCR. See also Loo (2004). 23 See footnote 15. 162

5.5 Social Activism and the Laity

Historically, one of the major ministries of the all churches in the country is the concern of social welfare. All mainstream churches in Malaysia, without exception, can trace its social welfare ministries back to the days of British colonial rule.24 Social activism in those days was led by foreign clergy or missionaries who were supported by foreign missionary bodies in the West. With independence, the local churches continued the tradition of social activism albeit with local personnel and finances.

More importantly, the shift from foreign personnel and finances towards local resources coincided with the rise of the middle class in the country. As a result, social activism in the church witnessed greater involvement of the laity. This trend can clearly be observed among all churches regardless of denominations. In this section, I will be looking at three case studies that highlight this trend among the churches in the peninsula.

5.5.1 Evangelical Churches and Social Activism

The major distinctive features of evangelical churches are its emphasis on scriptural authority, a laity rather than a clergy oriented leadership, and the emphasis on evangelism (proselytisation). The majority of evangelical churches are influenced by the charismatic movement and the adoption of modern management and marketing techniques as well as active involvement of its members in all areas of church ministries. The major constituent of the evangelical churches is the English- speaking urban middle-class.25 The size of the evangelical churches varies from house churches with a membership of ten members to mega churches where membership runs into the thousands.

24 See Chapter 4. 25 See Lee and Ackerman (1997). 163

Traditionally, evangelical churches have a pietistic outlook which gives emphasis towards evangelism as the primary mission of the church. Social and political issues tend to be ignored. Church activities centred on personal edification of its members through Sunday worship, bible study and prayer groups as well as corporate and personal evangelism.26 For example, sermons in a typical evangelical church service tend to focus on topics such as the importance of evangelism, doctrines and issues pertaining to personal conduct.

However the 1980s witnessed a shift in evangelical churches. A number of these churches began to devote their attention to social concerns as a way of extending evangelical outreach to the local community. Social activism in evangelical churches takes the form of setting up foster homes, drug rehabilitation centres, providing tuition for the poor children, organizing seminars on issues such as health, social concerns, etc.27

26 The Assemblies of God (AOG) – one of the largest evangelical denomination in the country – Tenets of Faith article concerning the Church and its mission stated: “Since God's purpose concerning man is to seek and to save that which is lost, to be worshipped by man , and to build a body of believers in the image of His Son, the priority reason for being of the Assemblies of God as part of the Church is: (a) To be an agency of God for evangelizing the world, (b) To be a corporate body in which man may worship God, and (c) To be a channel of God's purpose to build a body of saints being perfected in the image of His Son” (http://www.ag.org.my/tenets.htm retrieved on 3/3/2010). 27 The bigger evangelical churches in the peninsula would have a specific ministry towards social welfare. For example, The Assemblies of God social ministry ranges from foster homes, care for senior citizens, drug rehabilitation centres, home for destitute and homeless women, a centre for children with learning disability and a community tuition centre (http://www.ag.org.my/social.htm retrieved on 12/6/2009). While the Charis Christian Centre, an evangelical church located in Cheras, has a social ministry that provides dialysis treatment for the poor, a mobile clinic that offers free medical, legal and other aids to the poor in Cheras, operating free classes for underprivileged children, running an orphanage and a centre for women in need of assistance (http://www.charis.org.my/social- concern.html retrieved on 12/6/2009). I visited a recently established Baptist church in a suburban area in Petaling Jaya on 31/5/2009 where its social ministry takes the form of offering tuition and computer lessons to children who live in the poorer part of the neighbourhood. 164

Social activism is not confined to big evangelical churches but also in the smaller ones as well. The Kuala Lumpur Evangelical Church (KLEC) is a small evangelical church located in the heart of Kuala Lumpur. The church founded in

2000 has a congregation size of around fifteen members. KLEC saw its priority was in evangelism. However, unlike other local evangelical churches, KLEC focuses its attention on international students in private universities and colleges. More specifically, the church targeted international students from mainland China.28

Church activities centre on Sunday worship and the weekly prayer cum bible study group held in the houses of church members as well as providing weekly English classes to foreign students among their midst.

Its ministry expanded in 2008 to include Myanmar refugees who have flocked to the country. The Myanmar ministry involves providing monthly financial aid to Myanmar teachers who operate a school for the Myanmar children nearby and playing the occasional host to some of Myanmarese who come to KLEC for Sunday worship as well as helping out in the events organized by Myanmarese such as helping to find suitable venues and providing finances to help run these events. In addition, there is the occasional pastoral visit to those who were arrested by government authorities.29

Occasionally, individual church members gave money to emergencies that arose out of the Myanmar refugee ministry. “I remember in August 2008, a group of

Myanmar refugees, who were hiding out in an illegal camp somewhere in Sg. Ara, pleaded the church to help provide basic foodstuff for them to survive” said Mr. C, a

Chinese member of KLEC.30 “Each of us did what we could. I bought ten bags of

28 The late 1990s and early 2000s saw an influx of international students from mainland China into the private tertiary education sector. 29 Field observation of KLEC between September 2007 and December 2009. 30 Interview with Mr. C was conducted on 9/12/2009. 165

rice for them. Others bought other foodstuffs and donated other necessities such as used clothes, mosquito net, etc” he added. “Why did I do it? I suppose it is what God would expect a Christian to do” C said.

“Our original mission was to evangelise foreign students. The Myanmarese ministry came about by accident. We came across some of these refugees, and when we saw their needs, we can’t turn our back to them. So we decided to do what we can to help them. That was how it started and now our church has two ministries, i.e. evangelising foreign students and helping the Myanmarese refugees in our limited ways” said Mr. K, a Chinese elder of the congregation.31

When asked how KLEC can sustain two ministries given the size of its congregation, K replied “The church has a healthy bank balance and together with the offerings we collect every Sunday, I do not foresee KLEC getting into any financial difficulties for the next few years. I know that a couple of our members do give financial and other types of assistance directly to some of these refugees as well.”

Social activism in evangelical churches are no longer restricted to individual churches and denominations but increasingly churches located in the same are cooperating together to provide social services to the local community. A good example of such inter-church cooperation is the project initiated by the Cheras Pastor

Fellowship (whose members are clergy who cut across the mainline-evangelical

Protestant divide) which aimed at “transforming community through impacting our services to them,” said Pastor K.K. Looi. 32 He said “our goal is to share Christ to the community through service rather than the traditional method of evangelism such as passing out tracts and sharing the gospel message directly. We pooled our resources

31 Interview with Mr. K was conducted on 2/12/2009. 32 Pastor K.K. Looi is the senior pastor of Charis Sanctuary (AOG) and the secretary of the Cheras Pastor Fellowship. The interview was conducted on 8/5/2009. 166

together with this goal in mind. At the end of the day, if they become interested in knowing more about Christ then we will share with them.”

“One of our major projects is the annual community fair which we had organized for the past five years. The fair provides free public services such as free health screening, counselling on personal issues and exhibitions by non- governmental organizations and the police as well as evangelism” he said. The

Fellowship has also initiated projects such as neighbourhood watch, providing tuition for poor children and providing basic necessities, e.g. rice, sugar, etc, to the hardcore poor in the area regardless of race. Inevitably, such projects require that the churches deal with the local authorities which have generally been smooth running, even well received.33

At the national level, the institution that reflects the social engagement of the evangelicals is the Malaysian Christian Association for Relief (Malaysian CARE) which was formed in late 1978 with the support of the evangelical community.

Malaysian CARE is involved in providing social service for the urban and rural poor, running drug rehabilitation centres, and providing public education to encourage the involvement and support of Christians towards the organization.34 The evangelicals’ involvement in social ministries are self-funded and managed with no government involvement.

33The community project by the Cheras Pastor Fellowship was also well received by Datuk Tan Chan Ho – the former Member for the Parliament for Bandar Tun Razak constituency (MCA) – who allowed the Cheras Pastor Fellowship to use the MCA centre in his constituency for the tuition project – interview with Pastor Looi K.K on 8/5/2009. 34 http://www.malaysiancare.org/index.cfm?menuid=2 retrieved on 12/6/2009. See also Young (1991) on the history of Malaysian CARE. 167

5.5.2 The Archdiocesan Office for Human Development Kuala Lumpur

Historically, the Catholic Church led the Christian community in providing social welfare in the country since the British colonial days through its religious orders.35 In an effort to consolidate its social welfare ministry, the Catholic Church in peninsula started the Catholic Welfare Services (CWS) in 1952. The CWS was tasked with the responsibility of providing charity and welfare for the poor in society.

In 1980, the CWS became Catholic Welfare Service/ National Office for

Human Development (CWS/NOHD) in accordance with peninsula Catholic

Church’s "Aggiornamento-Renewal" of 1976 as a response to the Vatican II call for reform in the Church (Chew, 2000: 252). The CWS/NOHD was to reflect the church’s commitment to human development as part of its mission rather than just providing charity and social welfare (The Sun, 20/5/2005). The CWS/NOHD serves as the co-ordinator and networker for all Catholic institutions and bodies involved in charity, social welfare and development in the country in order to realise the social teachings of the Catholic Church (Chew, 2000, p. 36).

With the growing demands of each of the CWS/NOHD’s social welfare and development programs, it was decided in 2005 by the three bishops of the peninsula, i.e. Penang, Kuala Lumpur and Melaka/Johor, that separate offices should be set up to run the social welfare and development program at the diocese/archdiocese level.

As a result, the Archdiocesan Office for Human Development (AOHD) was created for this purpose in the archdiocese of Kuala Lumpur.36

35 See Chapter 4. 36 Interview with Mr. Anthony Wee, the Executive Secretary of AOHD Kuala Lumpur, conducted on 17/11/2009. 168

“The AOHD Kuala Lumpur runs quite a number of programs. For example, our community service centre [located in Jalan Bukit Nanas, K.L.] runs the Welcome

Caring Services Feeding Program which feeds about 150 homeless people daily. We do not discriminate anybody but in order to respect the religious background of these people, we make sure that the food that we serve is halal and do not contain beef” said Mr. Anthony Wee, the Executive Secretary of AOHD Kuala Lumpur.

“The AOHD also operates a centre that caters to the needs of autistic children and provides shelter and treatment for drug addicts and people with HIV/AIDS among others. Our work is not restricted to charity but also advocacy for the marginalized in society in line with the social teachings of the Catholic Church. We just started a women’s desk to deal with women’s issues. Of course, we also propagate the church teachings on social justice” he added.

“We work closely with NGOs and the government. We do not discriminate in our ministry. For example, there was a case when the police contacted us to ask us whether we could provide shelter for a group of illegal migrants who had been caught and were in the process of being charged in court. So we provided them with shelter and food. This is part of the work that AOHD does” Wee said.

Inevitably the cost of running such programs is quite high. “Our feeding program easily costs RM 200,000 annually. Our autistic centre costs us around RM

400,000 annually” Wee said. “And then, there is our urban and rural outreach program. We arrange transport for people to be brought to certain parishes where we conduct medical screening up to eighty people per day. We charge RM 1 for each screening while we pay RM 200 for each screening conducted. However, we consider the money we spend on the programmes as worthwhile investment. Service

169

to the poor is simply part of what the Catholic Church teaches on social justice” he added.

When asked about how AOHD financed its programs, Wee replied:

Basically our funds come from the annual Lenten Campaign collection organized by the Archdiocese. Of course, there also the smaller contributions for some of our programs. For example, the wealthier parents of children in our autistic centre will contribute some money to the running of the centre. And then we get donations in kind.

Our feeding program costs RM 200,000 but we only pay RM 150,000. Why? Because there are people who donate in kind. Some fellow might come and say: “I will give you a couple of bags of rice” or another may say: “Every month I will send two hundred eggs.” And then we have volunteers who come to cook for the homeless. And every year, the Latin American Catholic expatriate community, wives of ambassadors really, will hold a couple of sales where the proceeds are donated to us. But our main income comes from our annual Lenten Campaign. This year the collection amounted to a million ringgit which is comfortable for what we are doing. We do not really face problems in raising funds for our cause.

In order to bring down costs, the AOHD makes it a policy to ensure that its administrative costs should not be higher than 10%. “This is in line with the church policy which requires outfits like us should keep administrative costs down. Our administrative cost is around 7%.” Wee said. “How do we do it? Most of our staffs are volunteers where we tithe our time to do the ministry here. I am a volunteer myself. It started when my bishop asked me to help in running the AOHD KL as I’ve experience in the corporate world. What I do here is to ensure things are working and all the procedures are followed and everything is accounted for” he said.

“If you look at our feeding programmes for the homeless, almost all the staff in this program are volunteers who come by once or twice a week to prepare the food served to the homeless. The same can be said of our other programmes as well. We get lawyers, doctors, and other professionals to help out in our programmes as well”

Wee added.

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“Of course, we do have some part-timers and full-timers who are employees in the AOHD Kuala Lumpur. However, the bulk of the people who help out in our programmes are volunteers. This arrangement essentially cuts down our administrative costs. Because we derive our income mostly from donations, we were able to get tax exemption for most of our income. Some of our office equipment come from donations which also cut down our administrative costs” he added.

5.5.3 The Bangsar Lutheran Church

The Bangsar Lutheran Church (BLC) was started on April 2000 as a new way of expressing the Christian faith in modern society.37 “Right from the beginning BLC was envisioned to be different from other churches to accommodate those who will not fit there. I believe that churches tend to be activity based and too inward looking” said Reverend Sivin Kit, the pastor of BLC.

“The ethos of BLC is not how many times you come to church in a week but it is how your faith works in your life. So, our evangelism is based on building relationships rather than just preaching it to people around us” he said. “BLC’s concern is not just about evangelism but also social concern as well. So right from the start, it had been decided that BLC will give a certain amount of its finances to social ministries such as World Vision, etc” Reverend Sivin said.

BLC housed a congregation of 80 to 100 members. Apart from the normal church programmes, e.g. Sunday worship, prayer meetings and bible studies, the church also involved itself with causes that are not identifiably “Christian.”38 “For example, two years ago we co-operated with a secular NGO called ‘Protect and Save the Children in organising an even and when they needed some space to organise

37 Interview with Reverend Sivin Kit, pastor of BLC, was conducted 15/3/2010. 38 Interview with Reverend Sivin Kit was conducted on 15/3/2010. 171

their event, we let them use the church premise without charge as our contribution to this cause” he said.

“Much of our efforts to social causes are seasonal projects but we maintain a long-term relationship with World Vision and United Voice through financial contributions. The other way which we go about it is by supporting the project which our church members are involved in. For example, one of our church members came into contact with a group of refugees a year ago and brought it to our attention. As a result, the church started a pastoral visit and gave aid to this group” Reverend Sivin added. “I think we probably have thirty church members who are very committed to certain social causes. Their involvement is probably stems from the fact they are either volunteers or working with the NGO concerned. The church tries to support them in whatever way that we can” he said. “I also make it a point to get involved in

‘non-Christian’ causes as a way of leading by personal example” he added.39 The church is financially autonomous, i.e. its collected offerings from church members are enough to fund the day to day operations of BLEC and its social causes.40

5.6 Conclusion

One of the major developments in post-independence Peninsular Malaysian

Christianity was the changing role of the laity in the running of churches.

Traditionally, it was the foreign clergy and missionaries that led the local churches with the laity being passive followers. However, in the post-independence era, the number of foreign clergy and missionaries began to gradually decline because of the government’s decision to impose strict conditions on foreign religious workers.

39 Reverend Sivin Kit is well known within the Christian circle as a social activist who gets involved in a variety of causes. For example, he worked with COMPLETE (the Coalition of Malaysian NGOs against Persecution of Palestinians) in January 2009 to protest the Israeli military actions against the Palestinians which caused deaths and hardships among the latter (The Star, 17/1/2009). 40 Interview with Reverend Sivin Kit conducted on 15/3/2010. 172

Locally trained clergy was in short supply as the seminaries could not produce the required number of trained personnel to fulfil the demands of local churches.

It was inevitable that the church would look to the laity to take over some of the ministries which had been the traditional preserve of the clergy. This can clearly be seen in the reforms of the Malaysian Catholic Church in line with Vatican II. This trend was further accelerated by the growth of evangelical churches in the country with its lay-oriented ecclesiastical structure. The participation of the laity in the life of the church has transformed the way in which this institution operates. More importantly, the shift in emphasis towards the laity coincided with the rise of the middle class in the country.

One of the areas in which middle class lay Christians are actively involved in is in the church’s social ministry (once the preserve of the clergy). Not only are they found in the ranks of volunteers serving in this ministry but also within the ranks of decision-makers and administrators as well. The participation of lay Christians in this area are unsurprising if we take into consideration that the middle class shows greater awareness and concern for universalistic values that cut across ethnicity (Lev, 1993).

It is the middle class that forms the nucleus with civil society that championed causes such as participatory democracy, human rights and the environment in the country

(Saravanamuttu, 2001, p. 104).

However, it would be a mistake to assume that the source of the laity’s involvement in the church’s social activism comes solely from the secular language of human rights. It should be remembered that Christianity has a long tradition in social activism that dates back to its founding. Over time, the church has developed teachings related to the social responsibility of individual Christians and the church.

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For example, the social teachings of the Catholic Church are based on a few key themes. Among the relevant themes, for our purpose here, are: a) Dignity of the human person - Belief in the inherent dignity of the human person is the foundation of all Catholic social teaching. Human life is sacred, and the dignity of the human person is the starting point for a moral vision for society. This principle is grounded in the idea that the person is made in the image of God. The person is the clearest reflection of God among us; b) Common good and community - The human person is both sacred and social. We realize our dignity and rights in relationship with others, in community. Human beings grow and achieve fulfilment in community. Human dignity can only be realized and protected in the context of relationships with the wider society; c) Option for the Poor - The moral test of a society is how it treats its most vulnerable members. The poor have the most urgent moral claim on the conscience of the nation. We are called to look at public policy decisions in terms of how they affect the poor. The "option for the poor," is not an adversarial slogan that pits one group or class against another. Rather it states that the deprivation and powerlessness of the poor wounds the whole community; d) Rights and responsibilities - Human dignity can be protected and a healthy community can be achieved only if human rights are protected and responsibilities are met. Every person has a fundamental right to life and a right to those things required for human decency – starting with food, shelter and clothing, employment, health care, and education. Corresponding to these rights are duties and responsibilities -- to one another, to our families, and to the larger society; and

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e) Economic justice - The economy must serve people, not the other way around. All workers have a right to productive work, to decent and fair wages, and to safe working conditions. They also have a fundamental right to organize and join unions.

People have a right to economic initiative and private property, but these rights have limits. No one is allowed to amass excessive wealth when others lack the basic necessities of life.41

Similar teachings can be found among mainline Protestant churches such as the Methodists and Lutherans.42 Even among the evangelical churches (which give emphasis to evangelism as the church’s primary mission), most would assent and put into practise the Lausanne Covenant of 1974 which affirmed the evangelical churches’ social responsibility towards society. In the section on Christian social responsibility, the document stated:

We affirm that God is both the Creator and the Judge of all people. We therefore should share his concern for justice and reconciliation throughout human society and for the liberation of men and women from every kind of oppression. Because men and women are made in the image of God, every person, regardless of race, religion, colour, culture, class, sex or age, has an intrinsic dignity because of which he or she should be respected and served, not exploited. Here too we express penitence both for our neglect and for having sometimes regarded evangelism and social concern as mutually exclusive. […] The message of salvation implies also a message of judgment upon every form of alienation, oppression and discrimination, and we should not be afraid to denounce evil and injustice wherever they exist. When people receive Christ they are born again into his kingdom and must seek not only to exhibit but also to spread its righteousness in the midst of an unrighteous world. The salvation we claim should be transforming us in the totality of our personal and social responsibilities. Faith without works is dead43.

41 http://www.osjspm.org/major_themes.aspx retrieved on 1/3/2010. For a complete summary of the Catholic social teachings please go to http://www.osjspm.org/major_themes.aspx. 42 See http://communitarianparty.org/2009/01/summary-of-lutheran-social-teaching.html for a summary of the Lutheran social teachings while the Methodist’s version can be found in http://archives.umc.org/interior.asp?mid=1836. Within the local context, Malaysian Care stated its vision: To be the visible expression of the holistic mission of Christ to the poor and needy (http://www.malaysiancare.org/index.cfm?menuid=2 retrieved on 12/3/2010). 43http://www.lausanne.org/covenant retrieved on 16/3/2010. 175

In short, the laity participation in the life of the church not only has transformed the way which the church as a religious institution operates, i.e. changing the emphasis from clergy to laity in the running of church activities and replacing the financial and human resource gap left by foreign missionaries who departed from the country after independence, but also are gradually transforming the way Christians are responding to the steady encroachment of the state into their religious sphere. The next two chapters will discuss the responses which Christians have taken towards the state.

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CHAPTER 6

Mission Schools and the State: Marginalization and Response

Since the 1980s, the state’s Islamisation policy has increasingly affected the non-Muslims in the country as well. As I have discussed in chapter three, the state’s intervention on behalf of Islam has affected not only the religious sphere of non-

Muslims but also the private space of everyday life such as marriage, child custody, etc. The increasing assertion of Islam into the nation’s political discourse has caused much anxiety among non-Muslims especially with regard to their rights on practicing their faith and related activities. As a result, non-Muslims have taken steps to secure some space free from state intervention.1

In the case of the Malaysian Christian community, the state’s increasing intrusion into their religious sphere is, perhaps, most keenly felt in the field of education. The community had established a strong presence in this field that dates back to British colonial times. Known as “mission schools”, they had traditionally enjoyed a large measure of autonomy as well as maintained a distinctive Christian identity during British rule. Inevitably, when independence was granted in 1957, the post-colonial state began to focus its attention on these autonomous mission schools for the purpose of using them for public ends. As a result, mission schools gradually lost their autonomy as well as their distinctive identity as a Christian institution. In this chapter, I will be discussing the ways in which mission schools attempt to recover a measure of the autonomy which they once enjoyed.

1 See Lee and Ackerman (1997) and Ramanathan (1996). 177

6.1 The Post-Colonial State and Education: Nationalization and Islamisation

During British colonial rule, education was a rather haphazard affair with the creation of vernacular schools in Malay, Chinese and Tamil together with English- medium schools. State intervention in education was minimal with attention focused primarily on Malay vernacular schools and English-medium schools while the Tamil vernacular schools were virtually neglected. The Chinese vernacular schools, on the other hand, were an independent entity outside the oversight of the colonial state

(Chang, 1973, pp. 9-11).2

With independence in 1957, the newly independent state inherited an educational system that had four independent streams that served the various races in the country. In stark contrast to its predecessor, the post-colonial state viewed education as “a vehicle for promoting national unity, social equality, and economic development” (Lee, 2004, p. 437). Unsurprisingly, it took an abiding interest in education. Steps were taken to create an institution, i.e. the Ministry of Education

(MOE), to provide oversight and policies in the field of education in order to achieve its agenda of nation-building and development. In this section, I will be discussing the steps taken to consolidate the fragmented education system between 1950 and

2003 in order to provide the context for discussing the state’s intervention into mission schools.

2 However, from 1920 onwards, the British colonial state began to regulate the Chinese-medium schools as it was a hotbed of China oriented political activities that threatened British interests in the peninsula. See Tan (1997) particularly chapter 1. 178

6.1.1 Attempts at Consolidating the Educational System During the Waning Years of British Colonial Rule

In the immediate years that followed after the Second World War, the British colonial government focused much of its attention in rebuilding a society that was devastated by war. Among the areas given special attention was the education system. Given the rather haphazard arrangement of the then existing education system, the colonial government decided to consolidate the existing system under the

Cheeseman Plan. The plan called for the continuation of the existing educational streams in English, Malay, Tamil and Chinese and that the English language made a compulsory subject in all vernacular schools. However, this plan was abandoned with the abolition of the Malayan Union in 1949 (Choong, 2008, pp. 20-21).

In 1950, a committee under the chairmanship of L.J. Barnes – from Oxford

University – was set up to study and examine the education system in colonial

Malaya. The committee presented its report – called the Barnes Report, 1951 – to the colonial authorities. It recommended the abolishment of vernacular schools which catered to different ethnic groups in favour of a bilingual national-type school using

English and Malay as the only two media of instruction. Its recommendation was based on the view that schools should be used as a means to build a common nationality from a heterogeneous population in colonial Malaya (Choong, 2008, pp.

21-22; Kua, 1985, pp. 59-60; Tan, 1997, pp. 57-58).

In direct contrast to the Barnes Report, 1951, was the conclusion reached by the Fenn-Wu Report published in the same year. While the Barnes committee was working on its report, the colonial authorities created another committee under Dr.

W.P. Fenn and Dr. Wu Teh-yao that was tasked to look at Chinese education in

Malaya. The Fenn-Wu Report recommended that the Chinese vernacular schools be

179 maintained and that such schools be given a quantum increase in government aid to help them evolve into “truly Malayan schools.” This would ensure that these schools would become “equal partners with other schools” in the future of the educational system of the country (Tan, 1997, p. 58).

As a follow up to both reports, the colonial authorities set up a Central

Advisory Committee (CAC) to study the recommendations of these Reports. In the end, the CAC adopted almost wholesale the Barnes Report. It recommended the creation of “national schools” in which the medium of instruction for primary schools was either Malay or English. The medium of instruction for secondary schools would be English (Tan, 1997, pp. 59-60). It also recommended that public funds should be given to “national schools” only. Funding to vernacular schools, on the other hand, should only be given as long as there are not enough national schools to serve the educational needs of the country (Tan, 1997, p. 60).

Also, the CAC recommended that the colonial government should through

“persuasion and inducement” try to “modulate existing Vernacular schools so that

“eventual transmutation into acceptable National schools will be natural and voluntary” (quoted from Tan, 1997, p. 60). In short, the colonial authorities envisioned a unified educational system with English as the dominant medium of instruction. The CAC recommendations became the basis of the Education

Ordinance of 1952.

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6.1.2 Nationalizing Education in the Post-independence Era: The Razak Report,

1956 and the Education Report, 1960

In 1955, the Alliance Party won the first general election of the country which paved the way for a transition to a post-colonial political order. Almost immediately, the Alliance-led government formed a committee to review the education policy. The result was the Report of the Education Committee 1956 or the Razak Report 1956.

The importance of this Report cannot be overemphasized as it would set the tone of the government’s involvement in the field of education.

The objective of the Report was:

[t]o examine the present educational policy of the Federation of Malaya and to recommend any alterations or adaptations that are necessary with a view to establishing a national system of education acceptable to the people of the Federation as a whole which will satisfy their needs and promote their cultural, social, economic and political development as a nation, having regard to the intention to make Malay the national language of the country whilst preserving and sustaining the growth of languages and culture of other communities lining in the country (Federation of Malaya, 1956, p. 1)

In short, the Report viewed education as an important means for achieving political unity, social integration and economic development for the soon to be independent nation. The Report essentially recommended the soon to be independent nation-state to take gradual steps in unifying the existing streams of education into a single education system with a common syllabus and examination using Malay as the primary medium of instruction in order to achieve its agenda of economic development and nation-building (Choong, 2008, pp. 23-24). The Report was accepted by the Alliance-led government and was legislated as the Education

Ordinance 1957, which set a national educational policy for an independent Malaya.

This Report put on notice that the soon-to-be independent government would actively take steps to centralize education under its direction. Even before its promulgation as the Education Ordinance, the government through the MOE began to act on the proposals set out in the Report in order to consolidate the various

181 educational streams into a single education system with the ministry being responsible for its oversight (Tan, 1997, pp. 180-182).

Following the recommendation that the Report of the Education Committee

1956 should be re-examined not later than 1959, the newly independent government established in 1959 a committee under the chairmanship of the then Minister of

Education, Abdul Rahman Talib, with this task in mind. The committee presented its

Report – Report of the Education Review Committee 1960 or the Rahman Talib

Report 1960 – a year later. In the report, the committee concluded that the educational policy as defined by the Education Ordinance, 1957 had been faithfully and successfully carried out in the years leading up to the presentation of the Report

(Chang, 1973, p. 51).

Building upon the successful implementation of the policies outlined by its predecessor, the Rahman Talib Report 1960 recommended certain modifications be made to the existing educational policy. Among the key recommendations was the immediate implementation of a single education system using Malay as the primary means of instruction with the MOE as the sole institution responsible for the development and oversight of the nation’s education (Choong, 2008, p. 33).3 This

Report was accepted and legislated as the Education Act, 1961. The objective of this

Act – as with its predecessor – was to establish a national system of education with

Malay as the national language in order to promote cultural, political and economic advancement in the country (Choong, 2008, p. 34), i.e., the government was given the license to actively intervene in the field of education to fulfil the national agenda of national development and nation-building.

3 See the Report of the Education Review Committee 1960 for details of the recommendations proposed. 182

The implementation of the Education Act of 1961 marked a watershed for the nation’s education system as it marked the government intensifying its pace in consolidating the fragmented education system into a unified national education system. In the years that followed, the government successfully carried out its policy of consolidating the various independent streams into a single public schooling system. And with this success, came the inevitable policy of active intervention in the schools in order to achieve its agenda of development and nation-building.

6.1.3 Post-1960s Development in the Field of Education: Mahathir’s legacy

As the longest serving premier of the country, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad has impacted virtually all sectors of Malaysian society; the education sector was no exception. In fact, his influence in the education system began during his tenure as the Education minister between 1974 and 1978 and extended throughout his tenure as the Prime Minister between 1981 and 2003. During this period, the country’s education system experienced a series of reforms designed to supplement the nation’s drive towards modernization.

Of the many educational reforms initiated by Mahathir, none was as important as the democratization of education. The Cabinet Committee Report on the

Review on the Implementation of Education Policies or the Mahathir Report was submitted to the cabinet in 1979. Among the key proposals of the Report was the recommendation that the number of years of schooling be extended from nine years to eleven years. This policy was implemented in 1991 when the Sijil Rendah

Pelajaran (SRP) examination was replaced by the Penilaian Menengah Rendah

(PMR) examination. The new public examination, taken at the Form Three secondary school level, allows students to proceed to the upper secondary level regardless of their performance in the PMR. This enables students to complete five

183 years rather than three years of secondary education. Under this new policy, the education system has become less elitist in an attempt to provide equality in educational opportunities to a wider sector of Malaysian society (Lee, 2004, p. 438).4

Another important development during the Mahathir years was the widening of the scope of education to include pre-school, primary, secondary, post-secondary and special education with the introduction of the Education Act of 1996. As a result, the educational bureaucracy was expanded to manage the burgeoning education system in the country. In the past twenty years, public expenditure for education was around nineteen to twenty percent of the total annual budget. The Malaysian educational bureaucracy is highly centralized. Central control is deemed highly desirable to ensure that the quality of educational services provided remains uniform throughout the country. Among other things there occurs control over areas such as curriculum and public examinations (Lee, 2004, p. 439).

As with other sectors of the government, the educational sector did not escape the Islamisation program that was implemented during the Mahathir administration.

Islamic values were introduced into the school curriculum where subjects like

Islamic Studies for Muslims and Moral Education for non-Muslims were introduced.

The government also allowed various Islamic bodies to set up religious schools,

Sekolah Agama Rakyat (SAR). Most of these schools teach religious knowledge using the Arabic language. However, in the light of the 9/11 incident, these schools were absorbed into the national education system in 2002 (Lee, 2004, p. 446).5 In the next section, I will discuss how the government’s consolidation and intervention in the field of education has affected mission schools.

4 See Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia (1979) Laporan Jawatankuasa Kabinet Mengkaji Pelaksanaan Dasar Pelajaran for a detailed discussion of all the proposals recommended by the Report. 5 See also M. Bakri Musa (2004) and Abdul Razak and Schier (n.d.). 184

6.2 Mission Schools and the Government

Mission schools today still occupy an important position in the country’s public schooling system. The following tables below demonstrate its current position within the country’s public schools.

Table 6.1

Number of Mission Schools according to State and

School Type as of 2008

State SK SJK (C) SJK (T) SMK Total

Johor 9 4 7 20

Kedah 3 4 7

Melaka 7 3 8 18

N. Sembilan 3 2 5

Pahang 5 4 9

Perak 31 1 1 21 54

Perlis 1 1

Pulau Pinang 13 1 13 27

Sabah 43 7 25 75

Sarawak 110 5 13 128

Selangor 15 10 25

WP Kuala Lumpur 24 2 1 12 39

WP Labuan 2 2

Grand Total 264 23 2 121 410

Note: SK refers to national primary school; SJK refers to national type primary school which uses either Chinese (C) or Tamil (T) as its medium of instruction; SMK refers to the national secondary school. (Source: Yin, 2008, Annexure A).

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Table 6.2

Number of Students in Missionary Schools according to State

and School Type as of January 2008

SK SJK (C) SJK (T) SMK Total

Johor 4,804 3,166 5,823 13,793

Kedah 1,755 2,577 4,332

Melaka 3,238 1,272 7,969 12,479

N. Sembilan 1,871 2,872 4,743

Pahang 2,910 2,560 5,470

Perak 15,404 2,109 744 23,026 41,283

Perlis 490 490

Pulau Pinang 7,050 1,788 12,652 21,490

Sabah 18,497 1,769 21,027 41,293

Sarawak 27,119 4,201 17,879 49,199

Selangor 8,784 15,733 24,517

WP Kuala Lumpur 9,198 431 170 11,565 21,364

WP Labuan 819 819

Grand Total 101,120 14,736 914 124,502 241,272

Note: SK refers national primary school; SJK refers to national type primary school which uses either Chinese (C) or Tamil (T) as its medium of instruction; SMK refers to the national secondary school. (Source: Yin, 2008, Annexure A).

As can be observed from the tables 6.1 and 6.2 above, there are 410 mission schools with approximately a quarter of a million students and fifteen thousand teachers all over the country in 2008.6 That said, the prestige and influence which the schools once held during the days of British rule has since declined. The most visible

6 More specifically, there are 15, 349 teachers in mission schools as of 2008 (Yin, 2008, Annexure A). 186 decline of the of importance mission schools in the education system is the declining number of schools and students. In 1999, there were 551 mission schools with

361,944 students compared with 410 mission schools that housed 241,272 students in

2008 (Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, Bahagian Perancangan dan Penyelidikan

Dasar Pendidikan, 2000, p. 1).

The decline can be traced back to the legislation of the Education Act, 1961 which signalled the government’s intention to be involved in the field of education.

Then, privately managed schools, such as mission schools, were given the option of either becoming part of the public education system or remaining private. Schools that opted to become part of the public school system had to conform to the stipulations laid down by the Act in return for public funding, while those that opted to remain private would not be given any financial aid by the government.

All mission schools opted to become part of the public schooling system as they lacked the financial resources to operate as private schools (Chew, 2000, p.

284).7 Nonetheless, the managing authorities of these schools did not totally surrender their schools to the MOE which they had so painstakingly built during the

British colonial era. Under the provision of the Education Act, 1961, mission schools were given the status of “assisted schools” which means that the ownership of the land and school buildings would remain in the hands of the owners, i.e. mission authorities that founded and manage these schools, while the MOE would use the school buildings without paying rent. In return for using the land and school buildings free of rent, the owners would receive partial financial assistance which will be utilized for the purpose of maintaining or extending school buildings (Yin,

2008, p. 1).

7 This was confirmed with my interview with Ms. Yin Kam Yoke, a member of the Malayan Christian Schools’ Council (MCSC) an umbrella body which represents the various mission authorities in the country, conducted on 6/1/2009. 187

More importantly, the status of “assisted schools” ensured that the mission authorities preserved a measure of autonomy in the running of mission schools. This decision was probably based on the experience of the state-mission schools relationship during the British colonial era and the early years of independence where these schools had received public financial support albeit with minimum state oversight. However, looking back in hindsight, the relationship between the state and mission schools became increasingly lopsided in favour of the government.

6.2.1 Loss of Control over Mission Schools by Mission Authorities

Since their founding in the late nineteenth century, mission schools have enjoyed a large measure of autonomy from the colonial government with regards to its management. They continued to enjoy this autonomy during the early years after independence. The Board of Governors, the management of mission schools had the authority to hire and fire teachers and to determine the appointment of a school principal. They also had a say over the use of their premise and the way the school is managed as well as on the enrolment of students into mission schools (Yap, 2008, pp. 1 and 4).

However, with the implementation of the Education Act, 1961, the autonomy enjoyed by the mission authorities gradually eroded. The loss of autonomy was particularly felt with the implementation of the Aziz Commission Report 1971 which ended the mission authorities’ right to hire and fire teachers as well as to determine the appointment of the school principal.

Before 1971, the teachers at mission schools were divided between those who were appointed by the MOE and those who were hired directly by the Board of

Governors under the Unified Teaching Service (Chew, 2008, p. 213). The former, as part of the civil service, enjoyed perks such as pension and free medical treatment

188 that did not extend to those employed under the Unified Teaching Service category.

Inevitably, there was unhappiness among those under the Unified Teaching Service which led to a move by the Teachers’ Union to petition the government to make such teachers part of the civil service (Chew, 2000, p. 213). This resulted in the setting up of the Abdul Aziz Commission and the resultant Aziz Commission Report 1971. The report recommended that teachers under the Unified Teaching Service be absorbed into the civil service and that all future appointments of teachers be put under the purview of the MOE (Yin, 2008, p. 1). As a result, the Board of Governors lost the right to hire and fire teachers as well as to determine the appointment of the school principal.

From the perspective of the mission authorities, the loss of this autonomy was most keenly felt over the question of the appointment of the school principal because school principals play a vital role in “determining the direction, tone and general well-being of a school” (Yap, 2008, p. 3). Given the long history of mission schools, the mission authorities of these institutions were anxious to get principals who would be sympathetic to its history in order to ensure that its tradition and ethos would be maintained (Yap, 2008, p. 3). Inevitably, the ideal candidate from the perspective of the mission authorities should be a Christian.8

In order to allay the fears over this issue, the ministry came to an understanding with the mission authorities through the “principle of maximum consultation.” Under this principle, mission authorities were to be consulted by the

MOE over the appointment of a school principal should a vacancy occur. More importantly, they were given the right to nominate their preferred candidate – with

8 Interview with Brother Ambrose Loke FSC of the De La Salle Brothers, conducted on 22/11/2008. The De La Salle Brothers founded and operate the Lasallian mission schools in the country. This point was also emphasized to me in my interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Council of Education K.L., conducted on 22/10/2008, as well as my interview with Ms. Yin conducted on 6/1/2009. 189 the appropriate level of seniority – to the MOE to be considered as principal should a vacancy arise. This principle was duly implemented during the early 1970s where the

MOE usually deferred to the wishes of the mission authorities with regard to the candidate to be promoted as school principal (Chew, 2000, p. 214). In addition,

Catholic mission schools were given an additional concession by the MOE. Teachers and principals from religious orders were allowed to remain in these schools until the age of 65 provided they were in good health (Chew, 2000, p. 284; Pappu, 1996, p.

28).

However, with the passage of time, the principle of maximum consultation gradually fell into disuse as the MOE began to bypass the mission authorities on the posting of new principals to mission schools. “When we offered our schools to the government, it was agreed that the principle of maximum consultation would be observed. But the principle is not always observed in all our schools. This has affected the ethos of our schools.” said Brother Anthony Rogers, FSC.9

This move by MOE was brought about by the introduction of a more systematic promotion process that requires decisions be made within the ministry, essentially side-lining the mission authorities (Chew, 2000, p. 214).10 More importantly, the promotion process was not made public which further hampered the mission authorities’ ability to propose alternate candidates for the position of principal in mission schools which meant that the MOE, by default, ended up nominating its own candidate as principal in mission schools.

9 Interview with Brother Anthony Rogers, FSC Director of the De La Salle Brothers in Malaysia, conducted on 4/11/2008. 10 See also Yin (2008) and Yap (2008). 190

“It is the policy of the MOE to consider only candidates at the level of DG-52 for promotion as principals. The problem we face is most of our proposed (Christian) candidates are at a level below, i.e. DG-48.” said Ms. T, a member of the Methodist

Council of Education.11 “We have appealed to the ministry to use its discretionary powers to fast track the promotion of our candidates to the pre-requisite level to enable them to be considered for promotion as principals to mission schools. But our appeals have been largely ignored.” she added.

This difficulty is further compounded by the Ministry’s practice of only selecting candidates from its promotion list of those who are being considered for the

DG-52 level. However, this list is not accessible to the mission authorities making it quite challenging for them to propose nominees to the MOE for consideration as principals (Chew, 2000, p. 214; Yin 2008, p. 4).

As there were more Malay-Muslims entering the teaching profession as compared to non-Malays, it was inevitable that the majority of the candidates chosen by the MOE to fill the vacant position of principal in mission schools were Malay-

Muslims. Such choice can sometimes be awkward for an institution that had been shaped by Christian ethos and traditions if these principals are not sympathetic to its history. There had been cases where Christian symbols had been removed and certain practices rooted in school traditions discarded by such principals (Pappu, 1996, p. 29;

Chew, 2000, p. 285).12

11 Interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Council of Education K.L., conducted on 22/10/2008. 12 Examples of such unilateral actions involve the removal of crosses that had adorned mission schools and changing of school colours by some principals, causing much unease among the mission authorities (The Sunday Star, 4/7/2008). 191

This situation is exacerbated by the large influx of Malay-Muslim teachers to mission schools. By the mid-1990s the ratio of Malay-Muslim teachers in mission schools was at 40% (Chew, 2000, p. 284). This large influx of Malay-Muslim teachers have an effect on the “Christian” identity of mission schools as they may not appreciate the history of such schools. Consequently, mission schools could no longer serve as a platform for Christians to propagate their faith and the indirect transmission of Christian values as had been done during the British colonial era.

The loss of the right to have a say on the staffing of teachers and principals was especially difficult for Catholic mission schools. Traditionally, their teaching staff and principal are filled by members of the religious orders. However, in 1988

MOE issued a directive requiring all principals from the religious orders who reached the age of 55 and above to retire immediately. They could, if they wish, be retained as teachers (Chew, 2000, p. 284). Inevitably, when principals from religious orders retire, the vacant position would then be filled by a candidate selected by the ministry.13

In addition, new appointments or transfer of teachers from the religious orders to Catholic mission schools was subjected to the approval of the MOE which had, since the 1980s, become more difficult to obtain (Pappu, 1996, p. 28). The imposition of stricter migration policy had also made it difficult for teachers from religious orders to come into the country to work in such schools. In 1969, the

Immigration Department issued a directive to all religious missions in Malaysia which stated that the government will not grant permanent residence to missionaries and religious workers. This group of foreigners may work in the country on three

13 In the case of the Lasallian mission schools, the retirement of Brother Paul Ho, FSC as principal of St. Xavier’s Institution in Penang in 2009 marks the end of the Brother principal in these schools (The Sunday Star, 26/10/2008). The Lasallian schools were among the earliest and most well known mission schools in the country. 192 tours with each tour not exceeding four years. There must be a break of six months before the start of another tour while the period of the last tour will depend on the number of years that have been granted to them. The maximum number of years for the three tours is ten years (Chew, 2000, p. 203). Such policy effectively put to an end the practice of placing of teachers from the religious orders to Catholic mission schools.

Furthermore, the closure of two Catholic teacher training institutions, i.e. St.

Joseph’s Training College in Penang and the Bukit Nanas Convent Teachers’

College in Kuala Lumpur, in 1970 a decade after their founding, effectively stopped a steady supply of teachers trained in the ethos of Catholic mission schools (Chew,

2000, p. 214). Since that time, all teachers came from the government’s teacher training institutions where they are imbued with values that reflect the government’s goals in education.

Parallel to the loss of a say in determining the placement of teachers and the appointment of principal in mission schools was the loss of the traditional right of mission authorities to admit students to their schools. Because of the “prestige” enjoyed by mission schools, many of these schools (particularly those in urban areas) were designated by the MOE as “Controlled Schools.” This meant that the power to admit students to these schools lies solely within the state education department.

Neither the mission authorities nor the principal of mission schools had any say over the question of admission into mission schools (Pappu, 1996, p. 28).

193

Mission schools at the secondary level could no longer ensure the direct enrolment of students from their traditional “feeder”, i.e., primary mission schools.

In some cases, some of these students come from families that had long been associated with a mission school for a few generations. And there had been cases where children of those that served in the Board of Governors in mission schools were denied admission into the same schools (Yap, 2008, p. 4). The state education department – in line with the government’s policy of improving the socio-economic conditions of the Malays – had directed an influx of Malay students into some of these schools in order to leverage the academic achievements of missionary schools as well as to ensure a more even distribution of students to schools that are less

“prestigious” (Pappu, 1996, pp. 52-52).

The loss of control over the question of admission had an adverse effect on mission schools where raising funds for the purpose of maintaining and upgrading such schools from the wider Christian community had become extremely difficult.

Christians are reluctant to give financial support as they perceive mission schools nowadays as “just another public school” supported by public funds through the taxes which they contribute to, rather than a “Christian” institution which receives only partial financial support from the government. In addition, it also made it difficult for such schools to forge a strong bond between the school and its alumni (a potential source of financial support), where members can have their own children admitted to their former school (Yap, 2008, p. 4).

Given the large influx of Malay-Muslim students and teachers into mission schools with Islamic resurgence as the social and political backdrop, many of the religious activities in mission schools that had their roots in history and tradition of the school were discontinued. For example, mission schools could no longer hold

194 chapel service nor could they, in most cases, form Christian clubs and societies within school compounds (Yap, 2008, pp. 3-4).14 Islamic religious instruction, on the other hand, is carried out within the school compound as one of the compulsory subjects for Malay-Muslim students in public schools. In place of non-Islamic religious instruction for non-Muslim students, the Ministry of Education introduced the compulsory subject called “moral education” in the 1980s. It had been observed that the majority of the teachers of this subject are Malay-Muslims and that there is a tendency for a bias towards Islam when this subject was taught (Chew, 2000, p. 285).

Mission schools today are, for all intents and purposes, de facto public schools under the control of the government albeit without receiving the amount of financial support that public schools get as befitting its status as “assisted schools.”

As a result, such schools have lost much of their “Christian” identity.

The mission schools’ identity as a “Christian institution” has made it vulnerable to charges of being a tool of the Church in proselytizing its students. The large influx of Muslim-Malay students and the increasing assertion of Islam in the nation’s political discourse, made such a charge politically sensitive. Indeed, the issue was brought up in Parliament as recently as 29th October 2007 when a Member of Parliament from UMNO charged that such schools are attempting to proselytize its Malay-Muslim students and called for the removal of all Christian symbols in mission schools. Such a charge is more than likely baseless as mission schools today are de facto under government control which makes proselytisation impossible. In

14 This was also confirmed in my interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Council of Education K.L., conducted on 22/10/2008. Brother Anthony Rogers, FSC Director of the De La Salle Brothers, also noted the same point during my interview with him conducted on 4/11/2008. 195 addition, the tradition of these schools emphasized academic excellence rather than proselytizing as their main objective. 15

6.2.2 Inadequate Public Funding

Mission schools in the country occupy a grey area within the public schooling system and this is particularly problematic in terms of getting financial assistance, in the form of “capital grant,” from the MOE. Generally speaking, these schools conform to the stipulations found in the Education Act, 1961 and its successor the

Education Act, 1996. This means that these schools follow the national curriculum as set by the Ministry of Education and its teachers and students fall under the purview of the ministry as well.

However, the land and the buildings belong to the mission authorities which had founded and managed the mission schools. Although these schools receive a certain amount of financial assistance from the government, the amount given is not enough to carry out maintenance and repairs on the wear and tear that these buildings experience over their long use (Yin, 2008, p. 2; Yap, 2008, p. 5).

15 To quote verbatim the MP who raised the issue, Tuan Syed Hood bin Syed Edros [BN-Parit Sulong]: Yang Di-Pertua, I would like to touch on a matter regarding the Ministry of Education, which are Christian missionary schools like Convent, La Salle, Methodist, and so forth. I was made to understand that the Board of Directors at these schools are partially administered by churches in foreign countries, for example in the Vatican City. I was also made to understand that the application to build a ’surau’ in some of these schools had to go through the approval of these Board of Directors whereby they are partially administered by the church. Therefore, it shames me that the school administrations are still controlled by the church. I was also made to understand that many Muslim parents send their kids to these schools, and that they have complained that sometimes, the school is started with church songs. I do not know if this is true, but what I discovered from these parents are the display of religious symbols. I feel disappointed that in an Islamic country, Malaysia, if I go to a convent school, the statue of St. Mary is displayed in the front of the school. .. Not only statues, but fellow Yang Berhormat, go and see for yourselves, Christian crosses are displayed in front of schools. I do not understand the Ministry of Education, did the officers not see that, or is it our policy to allow such a thing? Nevertheless, I, as a responsible person to my religion, race, and country, I state my views that these statues need to be demolished, these crosses need to be destroyed and church influences in these schools need to be stopped. Also, the funds that are collected at these schools. Do we have a report? If possible, the ministry should reveal the funds for these schools. I was made to understand that these schools are also sponsored by the church (http://www.assuntaalumni.com/media/071128.html retrieved on 2/10/2008).

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Indeed, a study conducted by the MOE in 1999 on the financial allocation to mission schools stated that these schools were allocated less than 13% of the total capital grant per annum allocated for “assisted schools.” And it was admitted in the

Report that the allocation was not enough to maintain the buildings which had fallen into a state of disrepair because of their age. However, the same Report noted that policy dictated that MOE is obliged to contribute less than 50% of the cost to any maintenance project of an assisted school if the land is not owned by the government.

The ministry will only contribute more than 50% of the cost of the maintenance project only if the land belongs to the government (Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia,

Bahagian Perancangan dan Penyelidikan Dasar Pendidikan, 2000, p. 1).16

As the land of all mission schools are owned by the mission authorities, it was unsurprising why the ministry rejected the request of giving more financial support to the maintenance and upgrading the mission schools. The solution which the MOE offered to overcome the shortage of funds in maintenance project was that mission schools hand over their land and buildings to the government (Yin, 2008, p.

2).

The solution offered by the ministry was unacceptable to the mission authorities who considered the fact that they gave the MOE unencumbered use of the land and buildings of their schools, usually categorized as prime land, which made these schools for all intents and purposes, a public school albeit without owing the land and buildings. Therefore, it was only right that the government bore the cost of the maintenance work to upkeep these old buildings. More importantly, by surrendering their rights as owners of the lands and school buildings to the MOE, it could lead to their losing whatever remaining influence they have in mission schools.

16 For example, when the Methodist Girls Secondary School in Ipoh wanted to build a new school hall costing RM 800,000 in 2000, it managed to raise RM 400,000 hoping to get a matching amount from the MOE. However, it was only given RM 50,000 and had to raise the remainder (The Star, 4/7/2004). 197

Such an option is considered unacceptable by the mission authorities at this time

(Yin, 2008, p. 2).

As Brother Anthony Rogers, FSC puts it:

Our school buildings are old and in need of repairs but the amount given by the government for repairs and maintenance are not enough. We have to find ways to raise funds ourselves. But by right, our students are taxpayers’ children. Why is it the government send taxpayers’ children to our school and yet not give us enough money for repairs? We can’t go on and on to raise money on our own to maintain these buildings. If the government has the right to send taxpayers’ children to our schools then we have the right to receive financial grants for repairs and maintenance.17

Apart from the difficulty of getting financial support for maintenance and upgrade of school buildings from the Ministry, mission schools also faced financial difficulties in paying utilities and providing basic furniture to students and teachers as the ministry considers these items as the responsibility of the Mission Authorities too (Yin, 2008, p. 3). “I know of a school in Teluk Intan where the headmaster told me that all his desks are thirty years old … all falling apart or broken. The school doesn’t get financial assistance for desks. Let’s not talk about fixing the toilet or building a science lab as they don’t get any financial grant for any of these.” said

Brother Anthony Rogers, FSC.18

In addition, mission authorities are deprived of a possible source of income derived from rental of school premises such as the canteen, bookshop, special facilities such as badminton courts, etc which is considered as part of the school, and therefore as government income which the mission authorities have no access to

(Yap, 2008, p. 5).

17 Interview with Brother Anthony Rogers, FSC Director of the De La Salle Brothers, conducted on 4/11/2008. 18 Interview with Brother Anthony Rogers, FSC Director of the De La Salle Brothers, conducted on 4/11/2008. 198

Increasingly, mission schools are facing the uncertainty of the status of the land which they occupy. The land which mission schools are built on falls under two basic categories, i.e. leasehold and freehold church land. The former in particular, are clearly designated for the purpose of education and nothing else. Given the age of mission schools in the country, a large proportion of the leasehold land are nearing their expiry dates or have even expired.19

Applications for renewing the land lease are littered with bureaucratic red tape. Mission authorities are required to get a letter of approval from the MOE to renewal the lease which is then submitted to the relevant authorities of the state governments for approval (Ketua Pengarah Tanah and Galian Persekutuan, 2002).

Such applications are sometimes unsuccessful and such schools have been taken over by the government when their lease expire (Yap, 2008, p. 6). The uncertainty over the land status and the financial burden to renew the lease has made it difficult for mission authorities to continue investing in mission schools.20

The financial resource of the mission authorities are further taxed with the annual quit rent paid to state governments. Although the National Land Council in

October 1999 had decided to reduce the quit rent of assisted schools (which include mission schools) to the nominal fee of RM 1 per annum, nonetheless the process of implementing this decision has been slow and many schools are still paying a hefty amount of quit rent (The Star, 20/4/2008). It is interesting to note that the decision to allow assisted schools to pay nominal quit rent of RM 1 was made in October 1999

19 Many of the land leases of mission schools will expire within the next 5 to 10 years. The point was highlighted to me by Ms. Yin Kam Yoke, a member of the MCSC, in my interview conducted on 6/1/2009. Ms. T, the member of the Methodist Council of Education K.L., also pointed out the same fact to me with regards to Methodist mission schools in my interview conducted on 22/10/2008. 20 So far the state has maintained the status-quo with regards to lapsed land leases. Two Methodist mission schools, in Wilayah Persekutuan and Penang respectively, continue to operate even though their lease have lapsed – interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council K..L., conducted on 22/10/2008. 199 but the circular from the Ketua Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Persekutuan was only dated 2002.

6.2.3 The Loss of Prestige: The transition from English-medium to Malay-medium in mission schools

Since its founding in the late 19th century up until the early years of independence, mission schools had always been associated with an English-medium education which made such schools prestigious as they offered a route towards middle-class respectability and employability for their students. However, this association between mission schools and English-medium education was gradually broken with the introduction of the Education Act, 1961 and the National Language

Bill, 1967 which signalled the government’s determination to use the Malay language as the sole medium of instruction for public schools as befitting its status as the national language. In 1970, the government phased out the English-medium mission schools so that by 1982 they would become Malay-medium schools.

Since the 1960s, mission authorities had gradually lost control of its schools to the MOE which had gradually displaced the importance of mission schools in the nation’s public schooling system. Mission schools today look no different from their counterparts, i.e. government schools, where the government controls virtually all aspects of their operations except for maintenance and upgrading of school buildings which it considers as part of the responsibility of the mission authorities. The loss of control of missionary schools to the government meant that Christians have lost one of the major means of propagating their faith and the indirect transmission of

Christian values to society. More importantly, it had increasingly reduced the influence and prestige Christians enjoyed in the colonial era.

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6.3 Mission Authorities and Their Response to the Government

The increasing marginalization of mission schools with the changes in education policies at the start of the 1970s has been a cause of great concern for the mission authorities. They have not only lost much control over the mission schools but have also experienced a shortage of funds required to upkeep crumbling school buildings as well as for the refurbishing of these schools with basic furniture such as tables and chairs for teachers and students. In addition, the prestige which mission schools held during its heydays under British colonial rule until the days of early independence had declined to the point where most of these schools were no longer considered premier schools, apart from losing their distinctively Christian identity.

Looking back in hindsight, the increasing penetration of the government in mission schools was inevitable, given the post-May 13 political environment. The

1970s witnessed the state beginning to actively intervene in the social and economic spheres in an attempt to close the socio-economic disparity between the Malays and non-Malays. Given the strategic position of mission schools, i.e. its numbers and urban location as well as its reputation, it was unsurprising why the government focused its attention in gaining control of these schools.

The increasing concern by the mission authorities over the way which their autonomy had been eroded came to a head in the late 1980s when they began to take steps to reclaim their lost autonomy. The Catholic Church, which owned the largest number of mission schools in the country, organized a “National Consultation of

Catholic Education in Malaysia” in 1986. The aim of the consultation was to re- examine the role of Catholic involvement in the field of education in light of the changes in the educational policies and its effect on the Catholic mission schools that had taken place in the country. At the end of deliberations, the participants of the

201 consultation proposed that the Catholic Church make every effort to maintain the

Catholic mission schools and their distinctive identity and ethos. The resolution of the consultation was later approved by the Conference of Bishops and the Major

Superiors of Religious Congregations which represent the Catholic community in the country (Pappu, 1996, pp. 76-77).

The consultation also proposed the setting up of a Council that will be responsible for developing and coordination of the church’s involvement in the field of education. This Council was set up in the same year and was called the Malaysian

Catholic Education Council (MCEC) (Pappu, 1996, p. 78). Other denominations quickly followed the example of the Catholics. Education Councils became the primary agency for the mission authorities to deal with the problem of increasing marginalization of mission schools by the government.

6.3.1 Reasserting Their Rights: Overcoming bureaucratic roadblocks

From the perspective of the mission authorities (and by extension the education Councils), mission schools rightfully belong to them. As owners, the mission authorities have given the MOE permission to use their premises and surrounding land as public schools without receiving any rental. The progressive loss of control over these schools and the inadequate public funding to maintain and refurbish school premises had given rise to complaints by the mission authorities that they had lost a say in the running of mission schools, which was promised to them in return for joining the public schooling system.21

21 See Yin (2008) and Yap (2008). The same position was emphasized to me during my interviews with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council K.L., conducted on 22/10/2008 and by my interviews with Brother Anthony Rogers, FSC and Brother Ambrose Loke, FSC of the De La Salle Brothers conducted on 4/11/2008 and 22/11/2008 respectively 202

An important aspect of the autonomy promised to mission authorities was the principle of maximum consultation. This principle gave mission authorities, via the education Councils, a say in the appointment of the principal in mission schools.

Although the principle was respected by the MOE in the 1970s nonetheless over the course of time it had fallen by the wayside as the ministry began to unilaterally post its own candidates as principals to mission schools often without consulting the mission authorities. In addition, the implementation of new policies on promotion and posting of teachers by the MOE made it hard for the mission authorities to identify candidates whose names they can forward to the ministry to be their preferred candidate.

As mentioned earlier, the relationship between the MOE and the mission authorities became more and more lopsided with regards to the running of mission schools which resulted in the formation of education Councils by the mission authorities. One of the important responsibilities of these Councils was to find ways for the mission authorities to insert some influence on the appointment of principals to their schools. For this reason, the education Council found it prudent to pursue a policy of negotiation with MOE and going through the proper bureaucratic process in order to achieve some measure of control over this issue.

In practice, this policy meant that the education Councils’ had to maintain an up-to-date list of existing principals in mission schools and taking note of those nearing the retirement age. “One of the major tasks at the Methodist Council of

Education is to keep track of principals who are about to retire in our schools.” said

Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Council of Education.22 “We start the process of looking for a suitable candidate a year ahead of a retiring principal.” she added.

22 Interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Council of Education K..L. was conducted on 22/10/2008. 203

“Ideally, the candidate should be a Christian. If possible, we want someone from the same denomination as that of our education Council or an alumnus from one of our schools who would be familiar with the ethos and tradition of the school.” said Brother Ambrose Loke, FSC of the De La Salle Brothers.23 “Once a candidate has been identified, we will approach the person to consult whether she would agree to our proposal to submit her name to the state education department for consideration as principal in the mission school.” he added.24

Once a candidate has been identified, the education Council would submit the name of their candidate to the Pengarah (Director) of the state education department and sometimes even to the Director-General of the Ministry of Education for consideration. Apart from submitting their preferred candidate, the education Council would also meet up with these senior decision-makers in order to get their candidate accepted as the principal of the mission school. However, the final decision lies with the Pengarah or the Director-General.25

The success of the education Councils in pushing for their candidate rests on a case-by-case basis depending on the nod of approval given by the individual

Pengarah of the state education department or the Director-General at that time. The

Council is not privy to the decision-making process and is only informed of the decision after it has been made. There are times when they were informed that their candidates are not suitable only at the last moment. This gave them very little time to find alternative candidates. Nonetheless, there have been cases where they have been

23 Interview with Brother Ambrose Loke, FSC of the De La Salle Brothers, conducted on 22/11/2008. Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, who I interviewed on 22/10/2008 also emphasized the same point. Ms. Yin Kam Yoke, a member of the MCSC, reiterated this point in my interview with her on 6/1/2009. 24 Ms. T, the member of the Methodist Council of Education K..L. gave a similar account in an interview conducted on 22/10/2008. 25 Interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008. 204 successful in getting their candidates appointed as principals.26 In any case, it was reported that these senior officials will receive representatives from the Council to present their case and give them a hearing.27

Although, the Council gets a hearing from the senior officials of the MOE, who are at times even sympathetic to their point of view, nonetheless the major obstacle in pressing their candidates to the MOE is at the level of the middle-level officials who may not understand the position of the mission schools.28 As a result, the Councils do not only focus on meeting with the senior officials but also make it a point to establish (where possible) a good working relationship with the middle level officials of the MOE. This is because it is this group of officials that can expedite or hinder the Councils’ case of presenting their case to the MOE.29

These Councils also act as the central body to resolve problems that affect their respective mission schools such as renewing land leases that are about to expire and helping these schools to get emergency funds from the MOE to repair buildings due to old age, termite infestation, and leaking toilets among others. As with the case of the principle of maximum consultation, the Council’s policy remains that of negotiation and navigating the bureaucratic pathways of the government to get the desired result. For example, in the case of renewing expiring land leases, the Council will meet with officials from the state government’s land department to negotiate

26 Interview with Brother Ambrose Loke, FSC of the De La Salle Brothers, conducted on 22/11/2008. I was also told that it was relatively easier for the Council to nominate their candidates as principals for secondary schools as compared with primary school as the state department usually preferred their own candidate as principal in primary schools. The same point was corroborated in my interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council K.L., conducted on 22/10/2008. 27 Interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council K.L., conducted on 22/10/2008. The same answer was also given in a written reply by Mr. Yap Kok Keong, Chairman of the Malayan Christian Schools’ Council, on 6/1/2009. 28 Interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008 and was corroborated in my interview with Brother Ambrose Loke, FSC of the De La Salle Brothers, conducted on 22/11/2008. 29 Interview with Ms. Yin Kam Yoke, a member of the Malayan Christian School Council, conducted on 6/1/2009. Brother Ambrose Loke, FSC of the De La Salle Brothers and Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council K.L., both concurred on the need to have a good working relationship with official from the MOE in interviews conducted 22/11/2008 and 22/10/2008 respectively. 205 downwards the fee to renew the expiring land lease.30 Success or failure in each case apparently, is dependent on the understanding and goodwill of the officials involved.

Apart from working as representative of their respective mission authorities, the Councils also worked as a group known as the Malayan Christian Schools

Council (MCSC) which functions as a lobby group. As representative of the education Councils, MCSC seeks to reclaim the autonomy which mission schools once enjoyed through the policy of engaging senior officials of the MOE. Indeed, after many years of presenting their case to these senior officials, the MCSC was invited for a consultation with the Economic Planning and Research Division of the ministry in late 2008 to present the problems encountered by mission schools in their dealings with the ministry.31

Apart from engaging senior officials of the MOE, the MCSC have also attempted to engage sympathetic members of the Federal Cabinet in order to present the case of mission schools. Such attempts are unsurprising because some members of the cabinet are alumni of mission schools or are Christians.32 This engagement usually takes the form of dialoguing with sympathetic members of the cabinet as well as building personal channels of communication with them. This policy has borne fruit as it has enabled MCSC to bring their case to the attention of the Minister of

Education through the intermediary of these sympathetic cabinet members. For example, in 1999, the MCSC was able to meet the then Minister of Education, Najib

30 Interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008. So far, in the case of Selangor, the Methodist Education Council had not encountered much problem in getting the land lease of two schools renewed at substantially reduced fee by the state government, in return for the promise of maintaining the land as schools. There is one Methodist school in Kuala Lumpur where its lease had expired but the status quo had been maintained. In this case, the land had not been claimed back by the Federal authorities – interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008.. 31 Email communication from Ms. Yin Kam Yoke, a member of the Malayan Christian Schools’ Council, on 1/11/2008. 32 For example, the sixth Prime Minister, i.e. Najib Tun Razak, is an old boy of St. John’s Institute, K..L. 206

Tun Razak, through the arrangement of Dr. Lim Keng Yaik (then Minister of

Primary Industries) to present the problems which mission schools faced when dealing with the MOE.33 It was reported that the meeting was cordial and the

Minister was sympathetic to the problems faced by mission schools. Reportedly, the

Minister assured the MCSC that the status-quo that was promised when these schools joined the public schooling system would continue.34

Although the MCSC did not have direct contact with the then Minister of

Education, Datuk Seri Hishammuddin bin Tun Hussein Onn, who served between

March 2004 and April 2009, they did have access to the Minister through his special assistant who deals directly with not only the MCSC but also the education

Councils.35 The other Minister who has been sympathetic to the cause of mission schools is Tan Sri Bernard Dompok, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, who had presented a paper on the problems faced by mission schools as well as proposals to overcome these problems to the Federal Cabinet in late 2008 (Daily

Express News, 7/7/2008).36

Such personal channels of communication to sympathetic members of the cabinet had, from time to time, helped overcome the bureaucratic roadblocks in resolving some urgent problems faced by mission schools. For example, the current

(2010) Deputy Minister of Education, Datuk Dr. Wee Ka Siong, had asked the

MCSC to contact him directly should they face any problems in their dealings with the MOE. The promise has been translated into actions in a few instances. In 2007 a

33 Lim Keng Yaik is an old boy of St. Michael’s Institution, Ipoh. 34 Interview with Ms. Yin Kam Yoke, a member of the Malayan Christian Schools’ Council, conducted on 6/1/2009. 35 Interview with Ms. Yin Kam Yoke, a member of the Malayan Christian Schools’ Council, conducted on 6/1/2009 and Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008. The minister is an old boy of St. John’s. 36 Bernard Dompok is a Sabahan Catholic whose sympathies to the mission schools was confirmed in my interview with Ms. Yin Kam Yoke, a member of the Malayan Christian Council, conducted on 6/1/2009. 207 mission school in Perak faced the problem of termite infestation which led to the

Public Works Department and the state health authorities condemning the building as unsafe and was torn down. The Methodist Education Council contacted Datuk Dr.

Wee about the problem where he got the state education department to foot the bill for the Public Works Department to build new buildings for the school.37

6.3.2 Reclaiming the Christian Ethos

At the school level, efforts were taken by the education Councils to preserve the ethos and traditions of mission schools through the appointment of members to the mission schools’ Board of Governors which serves as the management of the schools. In fact, it is the board’s responsibility to manage school funds and maintain the school buildings to ensure its safety for the students, among others. From the perspective of the education Councils, the Board of Governors also serves as its representative responsible for preserving the school’s ethos and traditions, as well as serving as its “eyes and ears.” Through the appointment of its members to the board, the mission authorities gained a say on the running of the local mission schools.38

37 Interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008. 38 Interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008. In the case of the Methodist mission schools, the constitution of the Methodist Educational Council stated that the Board of Governors consisted of a Chairman appointed by the Bishop; the Presidents of the Annual Conferences (the national of the Methodist Church which is divided between the peninsula and Sabah together with Sarawak); two members nominated by the executive boards of the respective conferences; four members nominated by the Bishop with education background together with two members with managerial/legal/financial expertise who are members of the Methodist church; the Secretary of the Council of Trustees (the body who legally owned the mission schools); and the Education Secretary of the Methodist Education Council (Methodist Church in Malaysia, 1997). In practice, the Board consisted of a Chairman appointed by the Bishop, 3 members from the Annual Conferences, 3 local members of the Methodist church; up to 3 members from the Parents-Teacher Association; up to 3 members of the alumni and 2 members appointed by the state education department – interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008. 208

In the case of the Methodist education Council, other efforts taken to preserve the Christian presence in mission schools include promoting the formation of religious based societies such as the Christian Society and the Boy’s and Girl’s

Brigades.39 The Council has also taken steps in getting members of the Methodist church to be involved in mission schools such as becoming members of the Parents-

Teachers Associations, encouraging the alumni to become involved in the setting up of religious based societies, encouraging the local church to appoint chaplains to the nearby Methodist mission school to officiate chaplain service or even to use its premises for chaplain services for students in these schools, and encouraging the school principal to maintain the school’s traditions and symbols that adorn its halls.40

One of the interesting legacies which the mission schools had contributed to the nation’s education system was the provision of an examination paper for Bible

Knowledge in the Form Three and Form Five national examinations which was introduced in the 1960s. During its heydays in the 1960s, thousands of students read for this subject at Form Three and Form Five levels. However, the numbers dropped steeply: in 1987, only 500 plus students took the examination at the Form Five national examination level.41

Given the low number of students taking Bible Knowledge as an examination paper nowadays, the subject was phased out for the Form Three level in 1993 and for

Form Five level in 1994. However, it was re-introduced a year later for students at the form five level because of lobbying by the MCSC. Since its re-introduction, the

MCSC, in conjunction with the Teachers Christian Fellowship Malaysia (an

39 Interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008. 40 Interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008. The Methodist Education Council has produced a pamphlet to advice new principals of his/her duties with regards to the preservation of its values and traditions. In the case of the La Sallian mission schools, the Brothers of the order organized retreats and “formation sessions”workshops for teachers in its schools in order to inculculate its values to its teaching staff in order to preserve its ethos in La Sallian mission schools – interview with a Brother of the La Salle Teaching Order (22/11/2008). 41 Moey, n.d., www.tcfmy.org/project/tcfmy/media/2008/03/31/182400-402.pdf retrieved on 6/3/2007. 209 organization for Christian teachers) have been promoting this subject to churches around the country to encourage its members with school going children to take this subject at the Form Five national examinations. Since its re-introduction, the number of students taking this subject has seen some increase (see table 6.3).

Table 6.3:

Number of candidates taking Bible Knowledge as examination subject

Year No. of candidates

1996 50+

1998 150+

1999 200+

2004 400+

2005 600+

2007 900 (estimated)

Source: Moey, n.d., www.tcfmy.org/project/tcfmy/media/2008/03/31/182400-402.pdf retrieved on 6/3/2007

6.3.3 Staying Put or Opting Out of the Public Schooling System?

The increasing administrative control of the mission schools by the MOE together with the progressive loss of ethos and traditions of such schools had sparked off a debate among the various mission authorities and education Councils on the viability of maintaining the Christian presence in the public schooling system. Indeed there had been proposals by some quarters that the mission authorities surrender their claims of ownership of mission schools to the government, and relieve itself of the responsibility of educating the local population as it had done for over a century.42

42 Interview with Brother Anthony Rogers, FSC, Director of the La Salle Teaching Order, conducted on 4/11/2008. Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council also informed me of this option being considered in the debate on the future of its mission schools in an interview conducted on 22/10/2008. 210

However, the consensus among the mission authorities has been that education still remains an important avenue in which the Christian faith and values can be imparted to society at large.43 The other option that had been considered was taking all the mission schools “private”, but it was rejected as closing off educational opportunities for the poor which would have gone against the reason why these schools were founded in the first place.44 In addition, given the financial state in which mission schools are in, the question of whether these schools would be financially self-sustaining is open to question.

Nonetheless, some of the larger mission authorities have started their own private schools to cater for a growing demand for private education that came about as a result of the introduction of the government’s privatization policy in the 1980s.

For example, the Methodist education Council today has five private secondary schools in Ipoh, Klang, Sentul, Seremban and Melaka and two private colleges located in Kuala Lumpur and Sibu.45 The Catholic education Council, on the other hand, has a primary and secondary school called the Stella Maris located in Kuala

Lumpur.46

Apart from setting up private schooling, the Methodist Education Council is currently exploring the possibility of starting a school that caters for children with special education needs at the pre-school level.47 The De La Salle Brothers, on the other hand, is planning to set up an education institution which aims to provide “life skills training” to the poor and marginalized youths to enable them to gain

43 Interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008. Brother Anthony Rogers, FSC also echoed the same sentiment in my interview with him on 4/11/2008. 44 Interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008. 45 For the address and details of these schools and colleges please access the following webpage: http://bhd.bz/councilofeducation/#. 46 For the address and details of these schools please access the following webpage: http://stellmaris.edu.my 47 Interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008. 211 employment (Malaysian Lasallian Education Council, n.d., p. 15).48 No doubt such schools would be much welcomed by the Malaysian community given the lack of such schools that cater for specific needs.

6.3.4 The Results of the Policy of Engagement

The gradual loss of control of mission schools and the erosion of its identity as a Christian institution had forced mission authorities to respond to the government’s increasing presence in its schools in order to preserve a measure of autonomy which was promised to them when they joined the public schooling system. The response taken by mission authorities took the form of negotiating with the state in order to recover the autonomy which they had lost to the state.

This policy which had been in effect for more than a decade focuses on gaining access to senior officials of the MOE and sympathetic members of the cabinet to press their case as well as navigating the bureaucratic pathways of the government in order to regain a say in the appointment of school principals and resolving problems which mission schools face when dealing with the MOE. This policy is, in short, deliberately non-confrontational by using the official channels of communication in voicing its grievances to the government, and is apolitical, in that the mission authorities avoid involving political parties in pressing their claims.

This policy seems to have achieved a measure of success in the past few years with the government beginning to respond positively to the request of the mission authorities. In his keynote address to a symposium organized by the MCSC on

August 16th, 2008, the Deputy Minister of Education, Dr. Wee Ka Siong, assured the

MCSC that the Ministry takes seriously the problems highlighted in the memorandum submitted by the MCSC. He added that the Ministry was committed to

48 Brother Anthony Rogers, FSC, the Director of the De La Salle Brothers, also told this plan to me in my interview with him on 4/11/2008. 212 the principle of maximum consultation. In addition, a special unit would be created within the MOE to look at the problems experienced by mission schools and assist mission schools in the renewal of land lease at nominal fee (The Sunday Star,

17/8/2008 and The Star, 18/8/2008).

In late 2008, the government gave the MCSC a one-off financial grant of RM

50 million to help repair decrepit old school buildings. In effect, the government consequently changed its policy with regards to providing financial aid to the mission schools. The Board of Governors could apply and receive up to RM

200,000 from the government to finance various repair projects in their schools.49

6.4 The Limits of the Policy of Engagement

From the perspective of the mission authorities, its policy of patiently negotiating with the government which it pursued for well over a decade has finally borne fruit with the assurance by the MOE that it will uphold the principle of maximum consultation. The government’s provision of a one-off grant worth RM 50 million for repair of old school buildings in 2008 was also most encouraging.

That said, the timing of these developments is most significant. They occurred after the twelfth general election. In the election the BN lost its traditional two-thirds majority in the parliament because of the swing of non-Malay voters to the opposition parties. It would seem that the government’s move was motivated by the need to win back the non-Malay voters, albeit with some push from the mission authorities’ quarter.50

49 Interview with Ms. Yin Kam Yoke, a member of the Malayan Christian Schools’ Council, conducted on 6/1/2009. 50 For a study on the 12th General Election see Ooi, Saravanamuttu and Lee (2008). 213

The gradual encroachment by the government into mission schools stemmed from the fact that mission schools do not serve a particular community which could have given it financial independence and political support that it needed to deal with the encroachment by the government. Perhaps, the weakness of mission schools is best illuminated by comparing it with the Chinese-medium schools.

6.4.1 A Brief History of Chinese-medium Schools

Historically speaking wherever Chinese migrants have settled in significant numbers outside of their homeland, they would establish their own schools that use

Chinese as the medium of instruction. In the case of Malaysia, the first Chinese- medium school established here dates back to 1815. And as the number of Chinese migrants grew so did the number of Chinese-medium schools (Kua, 1985, p. 1).

Chinese-medium schools are organically tied to the migrant Chinese community in that they are supported by the local Chinese community and cater specifically to educating the children of the same community (Tan, 1997, pp. 8-15).

The British colonial state had maintained a policy of laissez-faire towards the

Chinese-medium schools. Generally speaking, these schools were left to their own devices although the British did introduce certain controls to ensure that such schools did not become breeding grounds for China–oriented political activities (Tan, 1995, pp. 18-24).51

During the early post–independent years, the government accepted the existence of vernacular and English-medium schools in the country. Nonetheless, the government’s goal was to gradually unite the various schooling streams into a single schooling system with the Malay language as its medium of instruction in an unspecified time frame in the future as stated in the Razak report in 1956. With the

51 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss steps taken by the British colonial state to control Chinese-medium schools. For a detailed discussion on this matter see Kua (1985) and Tan (1997). 214 promulgation of the Education Act, 1961, the government began its push for the creation of a single schooling system with the Malay language as its medium of instruction. The Chinese-medium schools were given the choice of joining the national schooling system in order to receive public financial aid or become private schools. The Chinese-medium schools split into two camps. Some opted to become public schools while others chose to become independent private schools. Since that time, Chinese-medium schools were divided into two systems, i.e. public and independent Chinese medium schools.

Since the 1970s, Chinese-medium schools in the country have become increasingly a popular choice among Malaysian Chinese parents. In 2000, it was estimated that 90% of Chinese parents sent their children to primary Chinese- medium schools. A significant number of these students would then continue their study in secondary Chinese-medium schools (Toh, 2007, p. 31). Such schools have become popular among the Chinese community because of a few factors.

Firstly, the 1970s was the period when all public schools in the country had begun to use Malay language as its medium of instruction. The Chinese viewed that the national language does not carry the same economic value as an English-medium education which in their minds is the language of commerce which carries with it social mobility for their children. Hence, the switch from English to the Malay language as the medium of instruction in mission schools had witnessed a decline of

Chinese children being enrolled in such schools.

Secondly, the natural inclination to preserve the linguistic and cultural heritage through Chinese medium-schools also played an important role in persuading Chinese parents to enrol their children to schools which have a marked

Chinese environment (Toh, 2007, pp. 31-32; Kua, 1985, pp. 131-132). Thirdly, the

215 better academic performance and perceived better discipline of Chinese-medium schools as well as the rise of China as an economic powerhouse in recent years, added to the allure of getting a Chinese-medium education (Toh, 2007, p. 32).

6.4.2 The Relationship Between the Government and Chinese-medium Schools

Unlike mission schools, Chinese-medium schools tend to have more leeway in its dealings with the government. As noted earlier, Chinese-medium schools are divided into government-assisted schools and independent private schools. MOE interference in independent Chinese-medium schools is non-existent as these schools do not receive any public funds which put them outside the purview of the MOE.

Although government-assisted Chinese-medium schools fall under the purview of the

MOE, it tends to have more leeway in its dealings with the MOE, in contrast to the example of the mission schools.

The Board of Governors in government-assisted Chinese-medium schools exert strong political influence which is further strengthened by the support given by the Parent-Teachers Association, Old Pupils’ Association, the Chinese media, guilds and association that include the Dong Jiao Zhong an influential educationist group that is made up by the United Chinese School Committees and the Federation of

Chinese School Teachers Union (Toh, 2007, p. 33).

Consequently, the Board of Governors still have an influence on the appointment of principals to their schools. One of the conditions that must be adhered to by the state education department, and by extension the MOE, is that any principal appointed to these schools must have a good command of Mandarin.

Failure to comply with this condition would invoke protest from the school Board concerned, which would be prominently featured in the Chinese press. If the protest is ignored by the state education department, the Parent-Teacher Association and the

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Old Pupils’ Association will join in the protest. The protest usually takes the form of calling for a press conference by the Chairman of the Board, followed by a signature campaign by parents and ex-students of the school (Toh, 2007, p. 33).52

If positive results are not forthcoming, the protest campaign then escalates with politicians from the governing and opposition joining the fray with the latter accusing the former of not defending the character of Chinese-medium schools.

Politicians from MCA and Gerakan will issue statements pressing the state education department and the MOE to heed the protest. Such campaigns usually get the desired results. Similar campaigns have been carried out to allow the school Board to appoint its own contractors to run its canteen and bookshop which have been acceded by the state education department on many occasions (Toh, 2007, pp. 33-34).

As can be observed from the above, the Chinese-medium schools have greater autonomy in their dealings with the state. This autonomy is derived from the fact that it had the strong support of the Chinese community who considered the right to receive an education in their mother tongue as sacrosanct. This means that

Chinese-medium schools can rely on the Chinese community for financial and political support, in turn strengthening its hand in dealing with interference by the government in its affairs.

Unlike mission schools, Chinese-medium schools have always been able to raise funds from the Chinese community which enables them to remain relatively independent of the government’s purse string. This enables such schools to have more freedom with regard to the management of its affairs. A good example of the community’s strong financial support in the cause of education would be the establishment of Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman by MCA in 2002 where the

52 See also Ng (2003). 217

Chinese community was able to raise, in a short period, RM 200 million towards this cause (The Sun, 1/4/2005).

More importantly, Chinese-based political parties – either in the ruling coalition or the opposition – cannot afford to ignore issues affecting Chinese-medium schools whether it concerns raising funds, objecting to policies that erode the character of these schools, or hampering their development. Parties like the MCA and Gerakan, component members of the ruling party Barisan Nasional, always project themselves as champions of Chinese education.53 They will stress on giving allocations to Chinese-medium schools including the independent Chinese-medium schools. In fact they are also involved in the process of raising funds for building additional blocks of new classrooms or relocating them to new sites. Opposition parties, like DAP, seek to project MCA and Gerakan as being unable to protect the rights of Chinese-medium schools, while projecting themselves as being a better protector of these schools.54 As a result, Chinese education has, from early on, been an important political issue for the Chinese community where its support for any

Chinese-based political parties is contingent on the ability of these parties to defend the community’s right for Chinese education (Toh, 2007, p. 35).55

53 For example, in the run-up to the 1999 General Election, two full-page advertisements appeared in Sin Chew (a Chinese daily) on 25 November 1999. One of the advertisements read: “The government’s open-minded education policy has provided more higher education opportunities for more than 600 private colleges which provided higher educational opportunities to Chinese students. Vote for BN if you want to enjoy better education.” On 26 November 1996, in Sin Chew, a full-page advertisement read: “You will pay a serious price for voting wrongly. Support BN to ensure the free development of Chinese education” (quoted from Ng, 2003: 101). See Ng (2003) for a discussion on the contest between BN and opposition to gain Chinese votes. 54 Again, in the run-up to the 1999 General Election, a full-page advertisement appeared in Sin Chew Malacca Edition on 28 November 1999, which urged Chinese voters to vote for a candidate from the opposition political party and for change since MCA’s success in “promoting” Chinese education was in establishing “six new Chinese primary schools in the last forty-two years” (quoted from Ng, 2003: 102). 55 See Ng (2003) for a discussion on the contest between BN and opposition parties to gain Chinese votes. 218

Although the MOE is much influenced by UMNO which seeks to impose a

Malay nationalist agenda on the education system, it cannot afford to ignore the political pressures of the Chinese community, including from its Chinese-based political partners like the MCA and Gerakan. If the MOE attempts to actively curb the development of Chinese education beyond a certain limit, it would certainly mean that MCA and Gerakan will lose their urban parliamentary seats to the opposition, particularly the DAP. Even UMNO is not immune as it may lose some parliamentary seats in mixed constituencies to PAS (Toh, 2007, p. 35). Such political considerations have given pause to the MOE in attempting to interfere too much in the administrative affairs of government-assisted Chinese medium schools.

6.4.3 Mission Schools by Comparison

When we compare mission schools with Chinese-medium schools, it is obvious that mission schools lack the support of a particular community which might have strengthened its hands in dealing with the MOE. The most logical constituency in which it might seek such support is the Christian community. However, support is not coming from this quarter as entrance to mission schools falls under the purview of the MOE. As a result, mission schools have not been able to maintain strong ties to this religious community because their children are not given priority in enrolling in such schools.56

Unlike, the Chinese-medium schools, there are no political parties in the country that actively champion the cause of mission schools. This is because given the small size of this community – which accounts for 10% of the total population – and the heterogeneous ethnic make-up of its members, the interests of this community does not appear in the political calculation of the race-based political

56 Interview with Brother Anthony Rogers, FSC conducted on 4/11/2008. 219 parties in the peninsula. Consequently, mission schools do not have much political leverage, in terms of political support, when responding to interference by the MOE.

Another potential constituency which the mission school might have attempted to gain support from is its alumni. Through its history, mission schools have produced elites across the ethnic boundaries in the country where they might have served as an important support group. However, it seems that mission schools have not been able to mobilize their alumni as a united group for this purpose.

Indeed, some of the Old Boys’ Associations have even questioned the rationale for them to raise funds for the schools. Brother Michael Jacques, FSC, who had served in various Lasallian mission schools, was quoted as saying that some of the Old Boys asked “Why do we, who are taxpayers, have to raise funds to finance schools that have been provided free to the Government to educate citizens of this country? The mission authorities have already provided the Government with the land and buildings, so why can't we get more help?” (The Sunday Star, 4/7/2004).57

With the erosion of the ethos and tradition of mission schools in the past two decades as a result of the policies of MOE and the Islamisation of state and society, the epsrit de corps which bound former students to mission schools is fast evaporating. This makes it even more difficult in the future for mission schools to rely on its former students to identify themselves with mission schools. More importantly, they might perceive such schools as government schools rather than as mission schools with their distinctive ethos and tradition; thus further eroding whatever support the Old Boys and Old Girls of mission schools might give.

57 The same sentiment was echoed to me in my interview with Ms. T, a member of the Methodist Education Council, conducted on 22/10/2008 and by my interview with Brother Anthony Rogers, FSC Brother Director of the La Salle Teaching Order, conducted on 4/11/2008. Both pointed out the same sentiment was shared by the parents whose children study in their schools with regards to fundraising. 220

6.5 Conclusion

Historically, Christians have contributed much to the development of the nation’s education system through mission schools. These schools have served the nation well in providing education to the local population from the days of British rule right up to today. During the days of British rule, mission authorities were given the autonomy to make decisions that affect mission schools under their control.

However, with independence, these schools were absorbed into the national education system. Consequently, mission authorities lost their autonomy as the government began to centralise the decision-making process in the hands of the

Ministry of Education.

As a result, mission authorities adopted the policy of negotiating with the government in order to regain the autonomy they lost. Among the steps taken by the mission authorities include forming the Malayan Christian Schools Council (MCSC) to act as an umbrella organisation to lobby the government on issues that affect mission schools, building personal relationships with senior and middle-ranking officials at the MOE and sympathetic cabinet members to press their case. At the school level, the mission authorities attempted to get church members of their affiliated denominations to be involved in the Board of Governors and the Parent-

Teacher Association, encouraging the formation of religious based societies in mission schools and opening student chapel services in nearby affiliated churches to keep alive the ethos of these schools.

221

Such policy has given the mission authorities some measure of success in preserving their autonomy from the government but it is dependent on the goodwill of the latter. The weakness of mission schools, as compared with the Chinese- medium schools, stem from the fact that they lack support from a particular constituency within society to shore up their autonomy against the government’s encroachment into mission schools. It is unsurprising why the measures taken by mission authorities to preserve their autonomy have been met with limited success.

Until mission authorities can find support from a particular constituency in society to strengthen their position in dealing with the government, as in the case of the support given by the Chinese community to the Chinese-medium schools, their option to find room to manoeuvre in the face of the government’s encroachment into mission schools is limited.

Recognising the need to court support from the wider society, the La Salle

Brothers saw that their educational mission is not confined to its members alone but also lay people who are associated with the Lasallian mission schools. The Brothers now speak of a “Lassallian family” to designate “all those who participate in the

Lasallian educational enterprises, especially those who are moving towards a sharing of the spirit and the mission of St. John Baptist de La Salle [its founder]” (Pappu,

1996, p. 87). In short, the laity will now share the responsibility with the Brothers in realising the educational mission of the order.

Since the 1990s, the La Salle Brothers initiated retreat programmes for teachers in Lasallian mission schools and interested lay people to acquaint them with the ethos of the order.58 In 2008, the Brothers initiated a three year restructuring plan

(2008-2010) to enable more laity participation not only in their educational activities

58 Interview with Brother Ambrose Loke FSC of the De La Salle Brothers, conducted on 22/11/2008. 222 but also in the decision-making process (Malaysian Lasallian Education Council, n.d., p. 20).

The plan called for the creation of the Malaysian Lasallian Education Council

(MLEC) which consists of the La Salle Brothers, a representative from each of the six Lasallian Regional Education Councils (LREC) and other members of the

Lasallian family who were either appointed or hold ex-officio posts in the various affiliated bodies. The MLEC is envisioned as the highest policy and decision-making body of the Lasallian education enterprise. The Malaysian Lasallian Education

Secretariat (MLES) would complement the MLEC by its task of implementing and co-ordinating all the Lasallian educational institutions and programmes (Malaysian

Lasallian Education Council, n.d., pp. 20-22).

It is hoped that through the three year plan, the Lasallian movement would be able to recruit more lay people to continue its education mission in the face of the government encroachment into the Lasallian mission schools and the declining numbers of Brothers in the country (Malaysian Lasallian Education Council, n.d.). It is too early to tell whether the Lasallian experiment will be successful in getting support from a sector of society to enable the Lasallian mission schools to negotiate on a more equal footing with the government on the issue of autonomy in its schools as in the case of the Chinese-medium schools. However, if the plan proved successful, it could provide the template for other mission authorities to copy in their dealings with the government on the same issue.

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CHAPTER 7

Engaging the Government: The Christian Community’s

Response to State-led Islamisation

The state-religion relationship in Malaysia is a complex affair where all non-

Islamic religious relations are mediated by the state’s preferential relationship with

Islam, as befitting Islam’s constitutional status as the official religion of the country.

Such status meant that the government is obliged and empowered to regulate and administer the Islamic religious sphere while staying out of any direct involvement in the non-Islamic religious sphere.1

As a result, administrative decisions involving Islam have been taken largely without considering the interests of other religions. It should be borne in mind that such decisions are not necessarily intentional or by design. Quite often, it is simply that the concerns of other religions do not fall within the ambit of the government because they have not been made as such, legally speaking. However, the practical effect of the government’s involvement in the Islamic religious sphere has been the increasing intrusion by the government into the non-Islamic religious sphere which has not only affected the religious activities of non-Muslims but increasingly into other aspects of their everyday lives as well. 2

The intrusion of the government in the religious and social spheres of the non-Muslims has provoked a response by the latter to circumvent such intrusion. In this chapter, I will be discussing the response by the minority Christian community.

The central argument advanced here is that the traditional approach of negotiation

1 Article 11 of the Federal Constitution guarantees freedom of religion in the country. There is no provision in the Federal Constitution that obliges and empowers the government to involve itself in the non-Islamic religious sphere with the exception of 11(4) which states that “[s]tate law and in respect of the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan, federal law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.” 2 See chapter 4. 224

and accommodation is now slowly changing to one that involves public engagement via participating in the formal political process and seeking judicial review to curb the government’s intrusion into the Christian religious sphere.

This chapter will sketch out a brief history of the government’s interference within the community’s religious affairs and the community’s responses to such interference from 1957 to 2009. Through this way, we can see the evolution of the community’s responses, particularly in the past few years.

7.1 Government-Church Relationship in Malaysia, 1957-2001

The government-church relationship in the post-independence period witnessed a change in the fortunes of the Christian community. Although a minority religion during British colonial rule, Christianity enjoyed privileges and support from the colonial government.3 However, the situation changed when independence was granted to Malaya in 1957. The privileges and support it enjoyed from colonial rule was withdrawn. Islam was declared the official religion of the newly independent nation-state. As the official religion of the government, Islam received support and privileges from the post-colonial government.

Christians, on the other hand, experienced increasing intrusion by the government into their religious sphere. The government’s intrusion was motivated by its agenda of supporting Islam as the official religion of the country. Its intrusion into the Christians’ religious sphere can be divided into two periods. In the first period during the 1960s and 1970s, the government intrusion was aimed at curbing proselytizing of Muslims by non-Muslims (particularly by Christians) in order to enforce the constitutional definition of a Malay for whom Islam is his/her religion.

The second period beginning from the 1980s onwards was a time when the

3 See Chapter 5. 225

government began to actively intervene, on behalf of Islam, into the religious affairs of non-Muslims. It was a period which witnessed an increasing curtailment of the

Christian religious sphere.

7.1.1 Government-Church Relationship During the 1960s and 1970s

The period between the decades of 1960s and 1970s was a time when the government’s presence was lightly felt among Christians. Nonetheless the government did make certain administrative decisions that affected the community.

The government’s presence was felt by the Christian community in two particular incidents.

The first incident was the swift enactment of Islamic laws in nearly all the

Malay states three years after independence. These laws were aimed at regulating the religious obligations of Muslims and prohibiting evangelizing among Muslims by non-Muslims. Any attempt to proselytize Muslims by non-Muslims would be considered as insulting Islam and the offender would be penalized (Ackerman and

Lee, 1990, p. 40). This decision by the government was unsurprising considering the fact that the majority ethnic group in the country, i.e. the Malays, were Muslims by birth. As a result, the connection between Islam and Malay carries considerable political weight which the government cannot ignore, particularly when it comes to upholding the position of Islam as the official religion of the country. This incident was a stark reminder that post-independence Malayan society was characterized by the close relationship between Islam and the Malays which carries government sanction.4

4 Under Article 160 of the constitution, a Malay is defined as a person who practice Malay culture, speaks the Malay language and is a Muslim. 226

The second incident was when the Malayan government decided beginning from 1960 that all regular religious broadcasts over the government-owned radio stations be discontinued. Among those affected was the Malayan Christian Council

(MCC) which broadcasted the Christian religious service. The MCC took up the matter with the government and protested against the decision to the then premier,

Tunku Abdul Rahman, but to no avail (Roxborogh, 1992, p. 303; Kana, 2004, pp. 76-

77).

The MCC became increasingly troubled over the government’s decisions which it argued was infringing upon the right for freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Constitution. In 1960, the President of the MCC rallied its member churches in a conference held in Kuala Lumpur to respond to the government’s intrusion in the religious sphere, in the name of defending “the Constitutional right of religious freedom, not in any narrow sectarian sense, but in the national interest, since a threat to religious freedom is a threat to all other freedoms guaranteed in the

Constitution” (quoted in Kana, 2004, p.77).

The General Secretary of MCC was even more frank in calling for action “in defence of the faith” and pledged that “the restrictive [...] laws of the Federation on religious liberty and the dissemination of the gospel of Jesus Christ ... should not be allowed to rest till the Churches are satisfied” (quoted in Kana, 2004, p. 77). For all its rhetoric, no proposed plan of action was formulated during the conference.

Indeed, the whole episode demonstrated the political impotence of the Christian community in the face of the government’s intervention in the religious sphere as subsequent events were to prove (Kana, 2004, p. 77).

227

By the end of the 1970s, Christians found themselves a minority religious group with restrictions, set by the government, on whom they can proselytize. It was also a time when the government withdrew whatever support the churches used to receive from the colonial government in favour of Islam. In fact, the government’s intrusion into the Christians’ religious sphere was to ensure that their proselytisation activities did not spill over to the Muslim-Malay community which the government argued could threaten the position of Islam in the country.

Except for this restriction on their proselytisation activities, Christians were free to carry out their religious activities without much interference from the government. Consequently, Christians accepted the status-quo of the limitations imposed on the government. Political inaction was the order of the day. So Christians devoted themselves to their own religious concerns and activities.

Christian political inaction towards the government’s imposition on its missionary activities was essentially an indication of the larger inaction of the larger non-Muslim and non-Malay community. The inaction on the part of the non-Malays was due to the ethnic bargaining that was achieved between the leaders of the three major ethnic communities in the years prior to independence. Simply put, the fundamental principle of the bargain was that the non-Malays were to be given the right to citizenship in exchange for political supremacy for the Malays. The supremacy of Islam was considered as one of the symbols of Malay political supremacy which should not be challenged by non-Malays as prescribed by the bargain (Ackerman and Lee, 1990, p. 41).5

5 See also Cheah (2002). 228

More importantly, the nation’s political discourse was dominated by ethnicity, particularly in the aftermath of the May 13th incident, where the religious aspect was overshadowed. The nation’s public domain was focused on the agenda of rectifying the socio-economic imbalance between the Malays and non-Malays rather than on the need to uphold Islam as the religion of the Federation. Nonetheless, the late 1970s witnessed signs of Islam moving into the public domain following the emergence of Islamic revivalism among university students (both abroad and at home).6 At the start of the 1980s, the government began to respond to this phenomenon by promoting its own Islamisation policy.7

7.1.2 The Era of Islamisation, the 1980s onwards

The ascension of Dr. Mahathir Mohammad as the fourth premier of the country in 1981 witnessed the intensification of the advancement of Islam in society by the government. Unlike the earlier years where the government’s intrusion was aimed at limiting Christian proselytisation activities among the Malay-Muslims without impinging on the Christians’ religious sphere, the Mahathir years saw the government steadily impinging on the Christians’ religious sphere as it advanced its

Islamisation agenda. Christians found themselves facing administrative decisions that effectively discriminated against them in areas such as application for a church, a burial site or the building of a church and other areas related to their religious practices (Chew, 2000, p. 271).

6 See Nagata (1984) and Zainah Anwar (1987). 7 See Chapter 3. 229

Indeed, such discrimination was not only highlighted by non-Islamic religious groups (including Christians) but also by the Sultan of Selangor who, on the occasion of his 57th birthday in 1984, commented:

I am very happy to see many mosques and suraus throughout the government, including Shah Alam. But I am very unhappy to see that there is not a single place of worship in Shah Alam for non-Muslims. … I am also aware that portions of land have been identified for non-Muslims’ places of worship but its conversion had been stopped, perhaps by the Selangor Government or the Selangor Government Development Corporation (PKNS) (quoted in Chew, 2000, p. 271).

In addition, Christians also experienced infringement by the government into their religious sphere proper. For example, they were forbidden to use certain words in the national language which were considered proprietary to the Muslim faith.

Another incident involved the arbitrary seizure as well as banning of religious materials by the government.8 At the broader societal level, Christians became increasingly concerned with the implications of the government’s Islamisation policies, beginning from the 1980s onwards which was crowned with an announcement by Dr. Mahathir on 29th September 2001 that Malaysia was an Islamic state (Martinez, 2004).9

At the heart of the Christians’ (and other non-Muslims’) concern was the infringement by the government into the fundamental right of freedom of religion as guaranteed in the Federal Constitution. The steps taken by the government to strengthen the position of Islam in the country and the specific instances of government intrusion into the religious and private spheres of non-Muslims were viewed as measures taken to marginalize non-Islamic religions in the country.10 The lack of official interests in their opinions reinforced such a view.

8 See Chapter 4. 9 See Chapter 3. 10 See also Paul Tan (2004); Riddell (2005); Lim (2007); and Ng (2008). 230

Robert Hunt (quoted in Riddell, 2005, p. 173) speaks for Christians in the country when he noted that:

Christians have felt systematically excluded from discussion and debate on Islamisation and its implications. Non-Muslim criticism, or even comment, on government policies promoting Islamisation has been regarded as highly offensive by Muslims, despite the fact that such policies impact the entire Malaysian society.

Christians were also concerned with the growing polarization between

Muslims and non-Muslims in the country. Islamic revivalism among the Malay-

Muslims has made the community more self-contained where religion became a key consideration for social interaction. As a reaction, non-Muslims began to place emphasis on their own religious identity as witnessed by a parallel revivalism of non-

Islamic religions among non-Malays during the 1980s.11 Unsurprisingly, social interactions between the different ethnic groups in the country became more and more infrequent (Riddell, 2005, p. 174).12

It was inevitable non-Muslims would begin to mobilize their co-religionists in an attempt to respond to, what they perceived as, the government’s infringement into the right of religious freedom in the country. What follows is a discussion of the steps taken by Christians in responding to the government’s Islamisation challenge.

7.2 The Christians’ Response towards the State’s Islamisation Policy

The increasing drift towards Islamisation and increasing government intrusion into the non-Islamic religious sphere have provoked concerns among church leaders across the denominational divide. Church leaders, recognizing the progressive marginalisation of Christianity since independence, came to the conclusion of the need for unity among the different denominations in order to be able to effectively

11 See Ackerman and Lee (1990). C.f. Ramanathan (1996) on a study of Hindu revivalism among the Indian community as a reaction to the government’s Islamisation policy. See also Willford (2005) and (2007). 12 See also Lim (2007). 231

respond to the increasing encroachment of the government into the non-Islamic religious sphere (Ackerman and Lee, 1990: 64).

7.2.1 The Formation of the Christian Federation of Malaysia (CFM)

As early as 1973, the Christian Council of Churches in Malaysia (CCM) – the

MCC changed its name in 1965 to better reflect the changes that had taken place in the country – extended overtures to the evangelicals and Catholics in order to form a more inclusive organization that would encompass the three wings of Christianity in

Malaysia. Its intention was to foster ecumenism among the wider Christian community that would also enable the community to form a united front to protect its religious space from the increasing intrusion of the government.13 However, the evangelicals and Catholics both rebuffed the CCM’s overture as both wings were suspicious of the latter’s link with the World’s Council of Churches (WCC), an ecumenical body which they regarded as being doctrinally unsound, i.e. liberal.

Despite their reservations, there was general consensus among all church leaders across the divide for greater ecumenical joint efforts, in view of the progressive marginalization of Christians (Kana, 2004, p. 84).

Realising the advantage of an umbrella organization that could unite them, evangelical church leaders decided in a conference in 1982 to form such an organization to represent them. This decision would give birth to the National

Evangelical Christian Fellowship (NECF) which was registered a year later with the

Registrar of Society (Berita NECF, May-June 2002).

13 Cf. Walters (2007) pp. 194-195 and Roxborogh (1992) for a brief history of the MCC/CCM. 232

Meanwhile, the CCM continued its efforts to bring both the Catholics and evangelicals together to create a national body. In 1982, the CCM organized a national conference which saw the participation of delegates from the entire spectrum of the community. The end result of the conference was a resolution to form a national Christian body. In 1985, leaders from the NECF, CCM and the Catholic

Church met together to fulfil the resolution. It was decided that the three Christian bodies, which represented the majority of Christians in the country, form the

Christian Federation of Malaysia (CFM) (Kana, 2004, p. 85).

The stated objectives of the CFM were (i) to bring together all Christians who accept the authority of the Holy Bible and who subscribe to the cardinal doctrines of

Christianity as set forth in the Apostles’ Creed; (ii) to reinforce and extend, where possible, through dialogue and consultation, the common areas of agreement among the various Christian groups in the country; (iii) to look after the interests of the

Christian community as a whole with particular reference to religious freedom and rights as enshrined in the Federal Constitution; (iv) to represent the Christian community in Malaysia on all matters that affect or are of interest to it; and (iv) to consult and work with Government and non-Government bodies (religious and secular) at all administrative levels, on matters of common interest and concern

(CFM, n.d., p. 2).

CFM was envisioned as the national body that will represent the voice of the community to the government. “We are committed to engaging the government through private and official channels to present our position and recommendations on issues that affect the religious liberties of non-Muslims as provided by the Federal

Constitution” said Bishop Ng Moon Hing, the current president of CFM.14 “However,

14 He is also the Anglican Bishop of West Malaysia. The interview was conducted on 27/5/2009. 233

we do not seek to engage the government on political issues because our mandate is to safeguard religious liberties in the country” he added.

7.2.2 CFM’s Response to the Government

As the national body representing Malaysian Christians, CFM actively sought to attract the government’s attention by releasing media statements at appropriate times and contexts, in order to present the community’s position on national issues, especially with regard to religious liberties.15 One of the major occasions where CFM releases its press statements is on National Day. For example, on Malaysia’s forty- fifth National Day in 2002, CFM called upon the government:

To continue to act against attempts by some to misuse religion for domination and to assert apartness which has profoundly affected the delicate fabric of harmony in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society (quoted in Riddell, 2005, p. 175).

General Elections are an important channel for CFM to get their message across to the government. In the run up to the 1999 General Election, for example,

CFM released a press statement urging Christians to vote on the basis of “how far views expressed and political programmes espoused meet with God’s standards and

Christian values” (quoted in Riddell, 2005, p. 177). The statement was a thinly veiled criticism against candidates who were campaigning on a specifically Islamist platform. CFM’s statement expressed the hope that:

The coming election campaign will be fair and that there will be no attempt by politicians to publicly misrepresent or miscast any particular religion, or, subject any particular religious community to unfair and adverse publicity for the purpose of political gain (quoted in Riddell, 2005, p. 177).

15 Interview with Bishop Ng Moon Hing on 27/5/2009. “CFM does not make much noise but we do make known our position to the government through press statements particularly our Merdeka Day message” said Mr. Tan Kong Beng, the Executive Secretary of CFM, in an interview conducted on 10/11/2008. 234

In the run up to the 2008 General Election, CFM released a press statement urging Christians “to vote wisely.” In the statement, CFM urged Christians “to pray for an election campaign that is clean, fair and that does not heighten ethnic and religious tensions [and] to encourage all eligible Christian voters to exercise their right to vote.”16 They also produced a brochure entitled “Vote Wisely in the 2008

General Election” which advised Christians to consider the track record and political manifestos of the respective political parties to judge whether they “reflect God’s standards and Christ-like values.”17

Press statements aside, CFM also attempts to engage the government by presenting their list of grievances concerning administrative decisions that affect the

Christian community. For example, in response to the government prohibition on the usage of certain terms in the national language which it deemed Islamic, the CFM drew up a memo to the then Premier, Dr. Mahathir, in 1989 stating:

It is inconceivable to us that the Bible in any translation can be regarded as a threat to national security in any country ... Nowhere else in the world, as we know, have people been forbidden to use words which are part of their National Language (quoted in Walters, 2007, p. 254)

In 2005, the CFM voiced their dismay to the cabinet concerning the statement made by Mohd. Nazri Abdul Aziz, a cabinet minister, who made a statement in

Parliament stating that Christians are not allowed the free use of the Bahasa

Malaysia and Bahasa Indonesia versions of the bible. The CFM argued that Bahasa

Malaysia is the national language of the country regardless of race or religion.

Therefore, the right of Christians to use the bible in the national language should not be an issue (Walters, 2007, p. 255).

16 http://www.ccmalaysia.org/reports/20080211vote_wisely.htm retrieved on 5/10/2008 17 http://www.ccmalaysia.org/reports/CFM-vote_wisely_English_final.jpg retrieved on 5/10/2008 235

As the national body that represents Christians in the country, the CFM is responsible for organizing the biennial national Christian conference which is aimed at providing a platform for church leaders from all sectors of the community to come together to discuss issues that confront the community, and to plan for joint action on these issues.18 “CFM also participates in dialogue with conservative and liberal

Muslim non-governmental organizations such as the Allied Coordinating Committee of Islamic NGOs (ACCIN) and Sisters in Islam (SIS) in order to facilitate dialogue and understanding with Muslims so as to improve Christian-Muslim relations” said

Mr. Tan Kong Beng, the Executive Secretary of CFM.19

As the national body of the community, CFM comprises representatives from the NECF, CCM and the Catholics. “CFM serves as a co-ordinating body for the

Christian community and does not come into direct contact with any local churches except through its component members” said Mr. Tan Kong Beng. “We don’t involve ourselves in resolving problems that local churches face in their dealings with local authorities. It is usually handled by the component bodies or the churches themselves” he added.

The CFM does, from time to time, step in to resolve local issues. An example of this was when the CFM engaged the Selangor state government, on behalf of the local churches, with regards to the problem of inadequate Christian public burial grounds in the state. Although Selangor has one of the highest concentrations of

Christians living within its borders, nonetheless, urban planning tended to overlook the needs of non-Muslims (Christians in particular) in providing for adequate

18 The last two conferences that were held in 2005 and 2009 centred on the theme of Islamisation and the Church’s response. The objective of both conferences was to find a joint response by the community to the increasing infringement of the government in their religious affairs. 19 Interview with Mr. Tan Kong Beng conducted on 10/11/2008. 236

cemeteries for the community. “There is, of course, the option of private burial grounds but not everyone can afford this option” said Mr. Tan Kong Beng.

“As the issue was particularly pressing for Christians in the Klang Valley”

Mr. Tan Kong Beng said, “the CFM took the initiative to meet with officials from the municipality and state government to resolve this problem.” The meeting resulted in the state government allocating the Christians two parcels of land in Puchong and

Bukit Rimau. However because of the protest by residents in those areas, the plan was shelved. The CFM then advised local churches in an area to form a Christian burial association to manage a Christian cemetery with the state government providing the necessary funds and land for this purpose. CFM then provided verification to the state government that the members of the association are

Christians.20

One of the changes that have occurred in Selangor after the 12th General

Election – which saw the opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) taking over the state government on March 8th, 2008 – was the CFM being consulted on matters pertaining to urban planning that affects Christians in the government. The Selangor state government action was unprecedented.21

However, at the national level, issues pertaining to the shortage of burial grounds and the building of new churches have yet to be resolved. In the event,

CFM’s attempts to engage the government on issues related to the administrative decisions that affect religious freedom of non-Muslims have only had limited success.

20 Interview with Mr. Tan Kong Beng conducted on 10/11/2008. 21 Interview with Mr. Tan Kong Beng conducted on 10/11/2008. 237

7.2.3 The Politics of Ecumenism: The relationship between CFM and its component members

Although the CFM’s main purpose is to serve as a platform for a unified

Christian position vis-à-vis the government, the organizational structure of CFM itself actually limits its effectiveness as a national body. The executive committee of the CFM is made up of members from the NECF, CCM and the Catholics. Any decisions taken by the executive committee must be referred back to the leadership of the NECF, CCM and the Catholics, to be ratified, before it officially becomes a decision of the CFM. As a result, the CFM seldom responds quickly enough to developing issues that affect the community.22

The problem of coming to a consensus is compounded by the fact that CFM is totally dependent on its constituent members for financial and other resources which hampers its effectiveness as an umbrella body.23 At the practical level, the CFM suffers the problem of lack of clear policy on its role vis-à-vis NECF, CCM and the

Catholics as much of its activities are duplicated by the three organizations.24

Recognizing the structural problems of CFM, the executive committee undertook a rationalisation of the organization.25 “CFM will no longer take on projects which its component members can do. We will only take on projects when the component

22 Bishop Paul Tan S.J. speech (the outgoing Chairman of CFM) presented to the Biennial General Conference of CFM held on 27th April 2009. In the same conference, the executive committee’s proposal that CFM be given more leeway in making decision on common issues was rejected by the majority of the delegates. 23 For example, in an age where new media is extensively used, the CFM does not have its own website in cyberspace. Until late 2008, the Executive Secretary and the Secretariat of the CFM were seconded from the CCM. The Secretariat itself is housed in the CCM headquarters in Petaling Jaya. The CFM only hired its own Executive Secretary in late 2008 and is now in the process of setting up its own research wing to help the CFM on its decision-making process. 24 Interview with Bishop Ng Moon Hing conducted on 27/5/2009. 25 Interview with Bishop Ng Moon Hing conducted on 27/5/2009. Bishop Ng also admitted that it would probably take another decade before the evangelicals, mainline and Catholic Christians can overcome their differing theological positions and experiences in order to achieve the CFM’s ecumenical objective. 238

members feel that they cannot do by leveraging on the resources of our component members” according to Bishop Ng Moon Hing.

Given the differing theological outlook and experiences of the three component members, CFM’s ecumenical goal is far from being accomplished.26 It has been commented that the CFM’s organizational design somewhat limits its impact. CCM spokespeople commented that CFM was “... a federation without rules, and therefore it lacks teeth. It produces no regular publications, and it has no government branches. The statements of one CFM group member tend to become generalized to the CFM as a whole” (quoted in Riddell, 2005, p. 172). Nonetheless, the CFM has, thus far, been able to speak with one voice on issues pertaining to religious liberties that affect Christians in the country (Kana, 2004, p. 86).

7.3 Working with Other non-Islamic Religious Communities

Running parallel to the attempt to achieve ecumenism among the various constituents in the Christian community is the effort by Christians and other non-

Islamic religious communities, e.g. Buddhists, Hindus and Sikhs, to come together under a national umbrella body in order to work together for the common goal of limiting the intrusion of the government into non-Islamic religious affairs.

An inter-religious body called the Malaysian Consultative Council of

Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism (MCCBCHS) was formed in 1983 for this purpose.27 In 2006, the body was enlarged with the inclusion of the Taoists resulting in its new MCCBCHST acronym. The aim of the council is to provide a platform for inter-religious dialogue and understanding, as well as for the non-Islamic religious communities to convey their views to the government on issues that affect non-Islamic religions (Walters, 2007, p. 203).

26 Interview with Bishop Ng Moon Hing conducted on 27/5/2009. 27 Naturally, the CFM is the Christian representative in the council. 239

The official stand of the MCCBCHST can be found in the document entitled

“Declaration on Freedom of Religion or Belief and on the Elimination of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion and Belief” published in 1988. In the document, the MCCBCHS stated:

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt or to change one’s religion or belief of one’s choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching (quoted in Riddell, 2005, p. 176).28

Since its inception, the MCCBCHST has attempted to present a unified stance to the government through organizing seminars and press statements. The aim of the

Council is to raise awareness among non-Muslims on the problem of the increasing encroachment of the government into their daily lives and the need to defend the right to freedom of religion in the country (Kana, 2004, pp. 86-87).29

Any discussion on the response of the Christian community to the government’s Islamisation policy cannot be limited to the CFM. Although the CFM is the national body for the Christian community, its relationship with the local churches is mediated through its component members, i.e. NECF, CCM and the

Catholic Church.30 Therefore, the next section will focus on the case of the component members and local churches in their response to the government. Here, I will be looking at the case of the evangelicals and the NECF in particular.

28 See also MCCBCHST (n.d.) Unity Threatened By Continuing Infringement of Religious of Freedom for a list of non-Muslim grievances on the government’s intrusion on their religious and private spheres. This document reiterates the MCCBCHST position on freedom of religion as proclaimed by the 1988 document produced above. 29 See http://harmonymalaysia.wordpress.com/ on the organizational structure, aims and objectives, and press statements of the MCCBCHST. 30 Interview with Mr. Tan Kong Beng conducted on 10/11/2008. 240

7.4 The Case of NECF and the Evangelicals

The evangelicals form an interesting case study on Christian responses to the government’s Islamisation project primarily because the trend within evangelical churches, e.g. laicisation and the charismatic movement is increasingly being felt in mainstream Christianity too, i.e. among mainline Protestants and Catholics (Lee and

Ackerman, 1997). In this section, I will first discuss the responses of the evangelical churches to the government’s Islamisation project after which I will be looking at the

NECF, the national body of the evangelical churches.

7.4.1 Evangelical Churches Response to the Islamisation Project

The major distinctive features of evangelical churches are their emphasis on scriptural authority, a laity rather than a clergy-oriented leadership, and the emphasis on evangelism (proselytisation). The majority of evangelical churches are influenced by the charismatic movement, the adoption of modern management and marketing techniques, and active involvement of their members in all areas of church ministries. The major constituent of the evangelical churches is the English-speaking urban middle-class.31 The size of the evangelical churches varies from house churches with a membership of ten members to mega-churches where membership runs into the thousands.

31 Cf. Lee and Ackerman (1997). 241

The political outlook of evangelical churches tends towards a church- government divide where its emphasis is on the spiritual welfare of its members, eschewing political involvement. Reverend Wong Kim Kong (the former secretary- general of NECF) in an interview with The Star newspaper has stated that the:

Church’s main concern is spiritual rather than political. Also, the church, as a whole, does not have a common political agenda to bind them together. I think the separation between the government and religion is a very clear doctrine of Christians. ... The church has to be apolitical and not be involved in the political process directly. The church is a neutral institution; we cannot take any political inclination towards any particular party or candidate. However, the biblical value of good government can be taught (The Sunday Star 20/1/2008).

Such a view is unsurprising given the emphasis on evangelism by the evangelical churches. Indeed, sermons in a typical evangelical church service tend to focus on topics such as the importance of evangelism, doctrines and issues pertaining to personal conduct. Social and political issues tend to be ignored. Church activities tend to centre on personal edification of its members through bible study and prayer groups as well as corporate and personal evangelism. However the 1980s witnessed a shift in evangelical churches. A number of these churches began to devote their attention to social concerns as a way of extending evangelical outreach to the local community.32

Although evangelical churches, like other non-Islamic religious institutions, experienced the increasing intrusion of the government into its religious sphere, nonetheless, the government’s presence – in practical terms – is felt mainly in the areas of constructing new places of worship and building codes, prohibiting the evangelization of Malays, and the banning of certain Christian literature. Generally, the local evangelical churches are accommodative of the government’s prohibition to evangelize Muslims by avoiding the Muslim community in their evangelical outreach program. The literature used for evangelism would have to carry the imprint

32 See Chapter 5. 242

“For non-Muslims only” while public events for evangelism outreach must state that the event is for non-Muslims only.

Whenever evangelicals construct new church buildings or renovate the existing church building, they would go about the formal process of getting the necessary approvals from local authorities and making appeals to the same authorities whenever they face problems in acquiring the approvals for their building projects.33 There have been cases where approvals were given only after a long period of appeal.34

Generally speaking, evangelicals tend to conform to the secularisation thesis where religion is placed in the private realm without much public relevance. This mentality was underlined in a survey report published by NECF in 2001. According to the survey, evangelical churches tend to give emphasis to evangelism. It was noted that 85.4% of evangelical churches reported their expenditure for evangelism and missions were the same or higher than for the previous years. It was also reported that 78.6% evangelical Christians feel at ease talking about their faith to others

(NECF, 2001).

Evangelicals tend to shy away from societal issues such as poverty and religious freedom. For example, it was reported that only 27.6% of evangelical pastors were personally involved in community care, social justice or non- governmental organizations while 11.2% of lay evangelicals were personally involved in the same area. The survey discovered that less than 2% of the

33 Interview with Reverend Dexter Low, the Founder and CEO of the Latter Rain Church of Malaysia, conducted on 13/5/2009. 34 For example, the Latter Rain Church of Malaysia has bought a piece of land somewhere in Selangor to build a new church building some two decades back. It was only recently that the church was given the green light by the local authority to start construction on the project – Interview with Reverend Dexter Low conducted on 13/5/2009. 243

evangelicals have ever contacted a Member of Parliament or take some action on public issue during the previous twelve months period (NECF, 2001).

The survey also noted that evangelicals have a tendency to exist within a ghetto where their activities gravitate around their church and its activities. For instance, 40% reported that they attend church at least once a week while 56.2% attend church more than once a week. Table 1 below details the high involvement of evangelicals in church activities (based on multiple answers).35

Table 7.1:

Church activities attended by Evangelicals during the previous

twelve months period prior to 2001

Church activities Percentage

Adult Bible Classes/Sunday School 43.8%

Youth Meetings 22.4%

Mid-week Prayer Meetings 49.5%

House Fellowship or Cell Group Meetings 70.8%

Training Seminars in the Church 33.4%

(Source: NECF, 2000)

The survey also discovered that 48% of evangelicals rarely interact with

Muslims and 36% of evangelical churches did not organize any activities that involved interactions with non-Christians in their neighbourhoods (NECF, 2001).

35 One of the common refrains found among evangelicals is: “I am so busy with church work, how can I find time to involve myself with activities outside the church?” This comment was made to me by a few evangelical church leaders whom I had conversation with. 244

7.4.2 National Evangelical Christian Fellowship (NECF)

From the beginning, the National Evangelical Christian Fellowship was formed as a response to the government’s Islamisation policy. “NECF was formed because of the new urban by-laws that had been enacted in the early 1980s which prohibit the use of shop lots and residential houses and apartments from being used for religious purposes. The police advised us (evangelical churches) to form an organization to enable them to deal directly with our churches to resolve whatever problems that might arise from this issue.” said Reverend Dexter Low.36 “The other reason for forming NECF was to give the evangelical churches a representation to the government in order to voice our concerns. If we don’t speak up for evangelical churches, who will?” he continued.

The NECF’s stated objectives are (i) to provide a platform for fellowship and partnership among churches especially in missions, evangelism, Bible teaching and social action; (ii) to assist in spurring, under the hand of God, renewal and revival in

Malaysia; (iii) to provide a medium for the safeguard and spread of the Christian faith; and (iv) to represent the Christian community on issues and matters affecting the Church and society at large, in consultation and joint action with other Christian and religious bodies in the country.37

“The NECF is committed to engage the government to resolve issues that affect the evangelical community by working within the system.” Reverend Dexter

Low said. In practice this means that NECF will use intermediaries who have access to government official in order to find amicable solutions on these issues on a case to case basis. This approach has been well received by the government which had

36 Reverend Dexter Low is a founding member of NECF. The interview was conducted on 13/5/2009. 37 http://www.necf.org.my/index.cfm?&menuid=5 retrieved on 20/6/2009. 245

successfully resolved some of the problems faced by the community through back door negotiations. 38

NECF also has its own newsletter, Berita NECF, to inform its members on issues that affect the evangelical community. NECF also issues press statements on major issues affecting the community. It also organizes public and closed door talks on issues that affect the evangelical community.39 One of the NECF’s organizational assets is its emphasis on research as its leadership include a large proportion of professionals and academicians. NECF has the statistical and legal expertise which had enabled it to carry out social surveys and collect other forms of data which had contributed much to the NECF’s success in coordinating its missionary projects (Lee and Ackerman, 1997, pp. 132-133).40 Since 2004, the NECF research commission has published a yearly “Religious Liberty Report” which is also posted on its website for dissemination to the evangelicals and the wider Christian community.41

Although the NECF was envisioned to represent the evangelical community vis-à-vis the government on issues that affect its members, its involvement in the public sphere was limited to religious issues. Significantly, the wider political issues were avoided. The apolitical nature of NECF can be observed by the fact that the organization did not take a public stand on political issues of the day. NECF was silent during Operasi Lalang when 106 people (including a Malay-Christian convert

38 Interview with Reverend Dexter Low on 13/5/2009. 39 Its activities and press statements as well as its newsletter “Berita NECF” can be found at www.necf.org.my. 40 See for example NECF (2001) NECF Survey of Churches, Pastors and Christians Year 2001 for a survey of evangelicals in the country. 41 See NECF (2008) Religious Liberty After 50 Years of Independence for a compilation of papers on the government of religious freedom in the country. The appendices contain all the yearly religious liberty reports up to 2008. The online version can be found at http://www.necf.org.my/newsmaster.cfm?&action=news&menuid=154. 246

and Catholic activists) were arrested in 1987.42 The same can be said of the judicial crisis that erupted in the following year.43

Perhaps, the most conspicuous example of the apolitical stance of NECF was when Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (the Fourth Prime Minister) announced in late 2001 that Malaysia is an Islamic state. Again, NECF did not take any public stand on the issue as the thinking within its leadership was that the speech was a political ploy by

UMNO to retain Malay-Muslim support in its rivalry with PAS. It was assumed that this announcement would have no impact on the non-Islamic religious sphere.44

The apolitical stance of NECF is unsurprising given the nature of its constituency which has always taken the position that the church has no business in taking any political position in the public domain. Although evangelical Christians tended to be apolitical, the underlying political tendency of evangelicals is towards supporting the ruling establishment. A good example of this underlying tendency is the negative reception which the evangelical circle gave to one of its own leaders during the reformasi movement that was initiated by Anwar Ibrahim and his supporters on the occasion of his sacking as Deputy Premier and arrest on charges of corruption and sodomy in 1998.

During that time, the leaders of the evangelical community together with

NECF refrained from taking a public stand on what is perceived as a political issue.

However, one of its leaders, Mr. Goh Keat Peng – who had served in evangelical organizations such as the Scripture Union, Fellowship of Evangelical students and as the executive secretary of CFM – broke ranks by not only publicly taking a stand on

42 Interview with Reverend Anthony Loke, a lecturer at a theological seminary and a minster in a mainline Protestant church, conducted on 11/12/2008. 43 Interview with Reverend Dexter Low conducted on 13/5/2009. 44 Interview with Reverend Dexter Low conducted on 13/5/2009. 247

this issue but also became a founding member of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR). As a result, he was shunned by the evangelical circles.45

The political tendency of the evangelical Christians can clearly be observed in the run-up to the 2004 General Election. In March 2004, the NECF released a media statement urging Christians to fulfil their duty as citizens on polling day. The statement quoted a passage from the bible, namely Romans chapter 13, with an exhortation to Christians that the passage in question “teaches obedience to authorities as a Christian duty and responsibility.”46 The passage in question has traditionally been interpreted as rendering support to the political status-quo in the country.

The political attitude of evangelical Christians is, perhaps, unsurprising if we locate this community within the broad economic and political changes that were taking place between the 1980s and the early 1990s. It was a time when the country was experiencing rapid industrialization and liberalization of the economy which resulted in general economic prosperity for the nation. The resultant economic prosperity brought with it a shift in the nation’s political discourse from ethnicity to developmentalism (Loh, 2002).

45 Interview with Reverend Sivin Kit, Pastor of Bangsar Lutheran Church and a Christian activist, conducted on 14/4/2009. 46 The passage in Romans 13: 1-7 stated “Everyone must submit to governing authorities. For all authority comes from God, and those in positions of authority have been placed there by God. So anyone who rebels against authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and they will be punished. For the authorities do not strike fear in people who are doing right, but in those who are doing wrong. Would you like to live without fear of the authorities? Do what is right, and they will honor you. The authorities are God’s servants, sent for your good. But if you are doing wrong, of course you should be afraid, for they have the power to punish you. They are God’s servants, sent for the very purpose of punishing those who do what is wrong. So you must submit to them, not only to avoid punishment, but also to keep a clear conscience. Pay your taxes, too, for these same reasons. For government workers need to be paid. They are serving God in what they do. 7Give to everyone what you owe them: Pay your taxes and government fees to those who collect them, and give respect and honor to those who are in authority (New Living Translation).

248

Briefly, developmentalism refers to a discourse that emphasizes individual freedom in the pursuit of economic goods and activities without emphasizing the corresponding pursuit of individual liberty and civil rights. In short, there is a disjunction between private economic gains and public political goods that is usually associated with liberal democracy (Loh, 2002, p. 48).47

The discourse on developmentalism left its mark in the evangelical churches in the guise of the “prosperity gospel” that was making its rounds in the United

States during the 1990s. Briefly, prosperity gospel puts forward the point that God wants the individual believer to be successful in all areas of life particularly in the economic sphere by picking up a few biblical verses to support its theology.

Interestingly, the same message has nothing to say about collective public political goods which include the pursuit of justice, civil rights, etc.48

The evangelicals’ political attitude is, in part, due to the influence of its leadership. It should be remembered that the current generation of church leaders are either from the first or second generation of indigenous leadership who have lived through the tutelage of foreign missionaries (who led the local churches) who eschewed political involvement in favour of social outreach and evangelism. The shadow of the May 13th racial riots had also made them politically conservative.49

47 For a discussion of the shift of political discourse and the discourse on developmentalism see Loh (2002). 48 The internet is replete with materials on prosperity gospel whether those who advocate and criticize it from the evangelical perspective. 49 I have to thank Bishop Ng Moon Hing for making this point with reference to the mainline Protestant churches (27/5/2009). The same point can be applied to smaller denominations such as the Plymouth Brethren which was established in the 19th century. This denomination is generally considered to be within the evangelical camp. Some of the leaders of evangelical churches today are former Brethrens. For a history of this denomination see Lee (1992). 249

7.5 The Changing Response of Christians

To recapitulate, the period between the 1980s and the early 1990s was a time when religious revivalism across all religions swept the country (Lee and Ackerman,

1997). One crucial difference that separates Islamic revivalism from non-Islamic religious revivalism was the support given by the government to advance the cause of Islam in society. The 1980s witnessed the government initiating a policy that seeks to Islamize government and society which led to the increasing presence of

Islam in the nation’s political discourse. This policy was to culminate in the announcement by Dr. Mahathir Mohamad in 2001 that Malaysia was indeed an

Islamic state. Since that time, Islam has essentially become the state’s religion, albeit with the guarantee that freedom of religion for non-Muslims (and non-Malays) will be respected.

Non-Muslim religious communities have sought to engage with the government on its Islamisation policy since the 1980s through the MCCBCHS on the issue of the increasing intrusion of the government on the non-Islamic religious sphere, e.g. conversion of non-Malays to Islam and its legal implications to non-

Muslims, administrative decisions that affected the building of new places of worship, shortage of burial lands, etc. However, the announcement by Dr. Mahathir that Malaysia is an Islamic state in 2001 added a new sense of urgency among non-

Muslims to actively engage with the government on its policy of Islamisation and its implications on the rights of non-Islamic religions in the public sphere. The year

2001 also witnessed more active participation of the Christian community in the public sphere.

250

7.5.1 The Islamic State Debate

The active participation of Christians into the public sphere was triggered by two events that took place between 2001 and 2002. First, the PAS controlled state governments of Kelantan and Terengganu announced their intentions to set up

Islamic governments in their states. Second, and as a response to PAS, Dr. Mahathir announced that the country was already an Islamic state (Riddell, 2005, p. 182).

These events projected Christians into the public sphere where they registered their anxiety. The NECF articulated this anxiety through its periodical Berita NECF:

PAS’ public declaration of its intent to set up an Islamic government should it come into power has once again sent jitters through the non-Muslim community ... The resurgence, consolidation and expansion of Islam is expected to continue irrespective of whichever party is in control, an alarming trend to communities of other religious faiths. Generally, the Government is of the view that religious freedom – as enshrined in our federal constitution – is a pre-requisite for national harmony and integration. In reality, however, the practice is not consistent with this view (Berita NECF, September - October 2001).

The CFM also issued a statement in response to the Prime Minister’s announcement. It stated “the assurances by the Prime Minister and Barisan Nasional leaders that the constitution will not be tampered do not offer sufficient guarantee that Malaysia will not degenerate into something of the Islamic model which PAS is promoting. Rhetoric may lead to reality” (Catholic Asian News, March 2002). In similar vein, in 2002 the Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur –Anthony Soter

Fernandez – issued this press statement in his capacity as the President of the

MCCBCHS. He stated (quoted in Riddell, 2005, pp. 182-183):

... the [Constitutional] position of Islam being the religion of the Federation shall not imply that Malaya and Malaysia is not a secular government. In other words, Malaya and Malaysia is a secular government ... The Constitution of our country provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of the country and any law passed which is inconsistent with the Constitution shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void. In 1988, we deemed it necessary to come out with a declaration. More than thirteen years later, we are of the view the situation has become worse and therefore find it appropriate to reiterate our stand and urge the federal and all governments to respect the rights of every person to freedom of religion and recognize that Malaysia is constitutionally a secular government.

251

Apart from issuing press statements, other Christian responses included holding meetings and seminars to discuss their concerns and anxieties. All three component members of the CFM held forums between 2001 and 2002 on this issue

(Riddell, 2005, p. 184). For example, the NECF organized a forum of fifty leading evangelicals who issued a call for the Malaysian Constitution to be upheld and defended to ensure that the right to freedom of religion in the country would not be threatened by calls for an Islamic government (Berita NECF, September - October

2001).

Christian (and non-Muslim) anxieties were heightened after 2001 with the increasing intrusion of the government into the non-Islamic religious sphere. The anxiety reached its climax in 2005 when the controversial “Moorthy case” occurred.

Briefly, the Hindu family of the deceased Moorthy contested the claim of the Federal

Territory Islamic authorities that the deceased had converted to Islam and as such should be given Islamic burial rites as opposed to the wishes of the family that

Moorthy be given Hindu burial rites.

The case quickly gained public attention and became a contentious issue on the religious rights of non-Muslims which was coming into conflict with the government’s Islamisation policy. This controversy was followed by other cases such as the conversion of Lina Joy (a Malay-Muslim) to Christianity, as well as several divorce cases that involved a Muslim convert and his/her non-Muslim spouse and custody rights on the children which have implications for the religious upbringing of the children.

252

Accordingly, there occurred a marked shift in the non-Muslims’ response to the government’s Islamisation policy beginning from 2005. That year, the Hindu community formed the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf) that comprises a coalition of 30 Hindu non-governmental organizations. Hindraf called for an end to the destruction of Hindu temples and the encroachment of Islamic laws into the lives of non-Muslims. Since its formation, Hindraf has taken a confrontational stand against the government by organizing rallies on the issue of the religious rights of

Hindus climaxing in a massive demonstration in Kuala Lumpur in November 2007 although the demonstration was banned. The subsequent arrest of its leaders under the Internal Security Act (ISA) has resulted in a loss of its initial momentum.

The post-2005 period also witnessed growing public engagement by non-

Muslims over the political implications of the government’s policy on Islam in public forums such as in the Article XI movement and the initiative for setting up the

Interfaith Commission.50 The Christian community was not exempted from the changing trend in attitudes among the non-Muslim population. Indeed, the community’s response to the government’s increasing encroachment into its religious sphere resulted in a shift from using back channel negotiations and accommodation with the government to resolve issues amicably to a more public response to such intrusion. In this section, I will be looking at some of these responses.

50 See Chapter 3. 253

7.5.2 Seeking Judicial Review: The Catholic Herald and Sidang Injil Borneo cases

Among the many decisions taken by the government that affect the Christian community, perhaps the most contentious issue is the prohibition of the use of certain words in the national language, i.e. Bahasa Malaysia, by non-Muslims. This had resulted in the arbitrary confiscation of religious literature in Bahasa Indonesia which is essentially similar to the national language. Although the dominant language of the Christian community in the peninsula is English, Christians in Sabah and Sarawak predominantly use the national language in their church services. And since more and more Sabahans and Sarawakians have migrated to the peninsula in search of jobs and other opportunities, church services in the peninsula have also begun to be conducted in the national language too, to cater to these migrants.

The problem came to a head when the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2008 banned the Bahasa Malaysia version of the Catholic weekly “The Herald” for using the word “Allah” which belongs to the list of words proscribed for use by non-

Islamic religions.51 The newspaper responded by seeking a judicial review on the government’s decision. "We are asking the court to say the decision was wrong and quash it and declare that The Herald can use the word 'Allah' in its publication" said

Porres Royan, the newspaper's counsel.52

"The Constitution says Malay is the national language so why can't we use the national language in Malaysia?" said Father Lawrence, the newspaper editor, clarifying why the Catholic Church was seeking judicial review of the government’s decision. “More than 50 percent of our congregation are bumiputra and two of our bishops are bumiputra" he added.53 In short, the newspaper’s contention is that that

51 http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/new.php?n=14654 retrieved on 6/3/2009 52 http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asia/malaysia/2008/04/26/153686/Malaysia%27s-Catholic.htm retrieved on 12/7/2008 53 http://www.mysinchew.com/node/19712?tid=14 retrieved on 1/6/2009. 254

Malay language is the national language as enshrined in the constitution and

Christians (particularly those from Sabah and Sarawak) have the right to use the national language for religious purposes.

As a result, the church came before the judiciary in early 2008 seeking the right to challenge the decision of the Home Affairs Ministry. In April 2009, the High

Court granted the church the right to challenge the government on this issue.

Throughout this period, the newspaper continued publishing its Malay section using the word “Allah” when necessary.54 In a related case, the Sidang Injil Borneo (SIB)

Church of Sabah in January 2008 also sued the government over the seizure of their books which contain the word “Allah” by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The books were imported from Indonesia and were meant to be used solely for religious education of the children of the church. The books were seized in the Sepang Low

Cost Carrier Terminal on transit to Kota Kinabalu in August 2007.55

As with the Catholic Church, the SIB Church of Sabah sought a judicial review of the government’s ban on the use of the word “Allah” for non-Islamic religions. The church argued that there is no factual basis that this word is exclusive to Islam, which informed the policy that the word cannot be used in published materials of other religions. Furthermore, the church claimed that the Christian bumiputeras of Sabah and Sarawak have always used the word “Allah” in their religious services for generations in the Bahasa congregations. In addition, SIB has been using the Alkitab which contains the word “Allah” without any problem previously.56

54 The case is still on-going at the time of writing. 55 http://www.mysinchew.com/node/5666 retrieved on 13/6/2009. 56 http://www.mysinchew.com/node/5666 retrieved on 13/6/2009. 255

Although the ministry returned the books to its rightful owners subsequently, the church was still determined to seek a judicial review to resolve the right of

Christians to use the word “Allah” and other proscribed words in Bahasa by the government in their religious publications.57

7.5.3 Engaging in the Political Process: Run up to 2008 General Elections

Unlike the campaigning period of the nation’s previous general election where the Christian community avoided making a visible presence in the run up to the elections, the 12th General Election witnessed a markedly visible Christian presence and participation in the electoral process. The first visible public presence of the community was a letter issued by the CFM to the community at large encouraging them to exercise their right to vote. The letter stressed that considerations should be given to questions such as the “future for you and the generations to come” and “the citizens’ rights on freedom of religion, conscience and speech” among others when deciding which party to support.58

The same message was reinforced by a pastoral letter issued by the Catholic

Bishop of Penang, Antony Selvanayagam, through the official website of the Penang

Diocese highlighting the same points raised in the CFM letter.59

In addition to sending out letters to the community at large, churches across the denomination divide also organized dialogue sessions between the candidates and church members as well as talks on electoral issues by noted Christian public figures in the run up to the 12th General Elections. All these activities were well attended. 60

57 http://www.mysinchew.com/node/17871 retrieved on 13/6/2009. 58http://www.bobjots.org/2008/02/vote_wisely_campaign_from_the_christian_federation_of_malaysia .php retrieved on 2/7/2008. 59 http://www.penangdiocese.org/pages/the-bishop/messagesletters/pastoral-letter-on-the-election.php retrieved on 16/6/2009. 60 For example, the Oriental Heart and Mind Study Institute (a Christian organization) organized a talk on the upcoming election on 26th January 2008 at St. Paul’s Church (Anglican). It was so well attended that they had to shift from a small seminar room slated for the talk to a larger hall to 256

It should be emphasized that such sessions were scrupulously neutral with regards to campaigning for any particular political party. Instead the sessions were meant to be educational, so as to help the Christian voters decide how to vote, and a chance for them to get to know the political parties and their candidates. In addition, certain pastors and priests began to discuss the significance of the upcoming election in their sermons and prayers (collectively and individually), exhorted their members to come out to vote, and to consider the issues that affected the body politic (which include the issue of freedom of religion).

For example, the evangelical Latter Rain Church of Malaysia, had as early as

2000, used the pulpit to teach members to consider political principles (from a

Christian perspective), congregational prayer on political issues that affect the nation and approaching the Member of Parliament of their constituency (who happened to be a Christian) to give pastoral support and research input to issues which would be brought up to the Parliament for debate. During the run up to the 2008 election, “the church encouraged its members to exercise their right as voters on Election Day and also encouraged members who had not registered as voters to register with the

Election Commission as soon as possible” said Mr. Elijah Low, the Head of

Operations of the Latter Rain Church of Malaysia.61 The church also encouraged its members to consider issues like the candidate’s integrity, party positions, etc when considering whom to vote for.62

accommodate the size of the audience – the anecdote was related to me by a member of the church on 28/4/2009. 61Iinterview with Mr. Elijah Low conducted on 5/5/2009. 62 Interview with Mr. Elijah Low conducted on 5/5/2009. 257

“Some pastors were definitely more involved this time round through their messages in the pulpit by giving the congregations points to ponder on when they consider which party to support on election day.” said Reverend Sivin Kit, pastor of the Bangsar Lutheran Church and activist.63

Apart from churches mobilizing their members to participate in the upcoming elections, there were a few instances where individual members took the initiative to get their church involved. In one instance, Ms. A, an Indian evangelical Christian in her early fifties, attempted to persuade the church leadership and members to exercise their rights as voters.64Ms. A, in her capacity as a citizen, organized a “Get to know your MP” campaign in the Subang Jaya constituency. She also disseminated political news and information from the alternative media to her network of contacts apart from attending the political talks and forums that took place in the run up to the election. She also volunteered herself as a campaign staff for one of the political candidates contesting in the Kelana Jaya constituency.65

There have also been cases where the more partisan individual church members became volunteers for the candidate of the chosen political party in a given constituency.66 “I know of cases of Christians, particularly those ages 25 to 35, which actively campaigned for political parties of their choice. Some became party members as well.” said Reverend Sivin Kit.67 “Some of us were more involved, in the sense, we volunteered ourselves ... my church members, at least one-fourth of us, as counting and polling agents for political parties even though we have no political

63 Interview with Reverend Sivin Kit conducted on 14/5/2009. 64 Interview with Ms. A conducted on 19/3/2009. Interestingly, the leadership rebuffed her initiative to get the church involved in what was deemed as “a political affair “which has no spiritual implications. Her attempts to get the members to participate as voters also met with indifference. 65 Interview with Ms. A conducted on 19/3/2009. 66 Interview with Mr. L, a Christian who is a member of the Democratic Action Party, conducted on 8/11/2008. He told me an interesting anecdote where a friend of his who volunteered to help out in an opposition candidate’s campaign was chided by the wife of a senior pastor of her church for supporting the opposition and was advised to vote for the ruling party instead. 67 Interview with Reverend Sivin Kit conducted on 14/5/2009. 258

affiliation. We did it because we felt the need to be involved in the electoral process” he continued.

“Compared with the 2004 General Elections, Christians have definitely become more politically conscious and involved in the last elections. I was in a

[Lutheran] pastors’ prayer meeting where they talked about the elections and invited two politicians from the opposing sides to give their views on the elections. It was unheard of.” said Reverend Sivin Kit. “I also helped to organize some forums on the elections in my personal capacity and not as a pastor.” he added.

7.5.4 Engaging Civil Society

Christian engagement is not limited to the electoral process. It overflowed into civil society activities too. A significant involvement of the community was when individual Christians including members of the clergy participated in peaceful demonstrations on political issues such as electoral reform and the abolishment of the

Internal Security Act (ISA).68

Another significant involvement of the community was the participation of

Christians in candle light vigils in major urban centres of the country throughout

2008 demanding the repeal of the notorious Internal Security Act (ISA) and the immediate release of ISA detainees.69 An indication of the new involvement of the community in this protest were the special services and vigils held in certain churches for this purpose. Perhaps the most dramatic of these vigils was that conducted in the Cathedral of the Holy Spirit (Catholic) in Penang which was celebrated by half a dozen priests and attended by 800 people on September 15th,

68 “I think one reason which pushed Christians to be more involved in the political process prior to the March 8th elections was the Bersih rally where pastors and lay Christians participated in the public demonstration. I would have participated myself if not for some pressing business to attend to” said Reverend Sivin Kit in an interview conducted on 14/5/2009. 69 Interview with Mr. Tan Kong Beng conducted on 10/11/2008. 259

2008.70 The Saint Francis Xavier church (Catholic) also held a vigil on the same day not only to protest the ISA but also demanding a release of one of their parishioners,

Ms. Teresa Kok a Member of Parliament, who was detained on September 12th,

2008.71

As well, Christian extended to the use of new media and the setting up of new so-called “research organisations” outside the traditional institutional setting of the church. Among the earliest new research organisations was Kairos Research Centre which was formed in 1993 by a group of evangelical Christians. The objectives of

Kairos are (i) to encourage and facilitate Christian research and scholarship on issues relevant to Malaysian Christianity, and (ii) to contribute towards the intellectual development of Christian leaders and thinkers.72

Since its founding, Kairos has been involved in organizing forums on topics ranging from culture to politics and its implications for Malaysian Christians, the publication of its magazine “Understanding the Modern World through Christian

Eyes” which covers social, political and other issues of concern to the Christian community and other publications on topical issues that affect the community.73

The other significant Christian research organization is the Oriental Hearts and Mind Institute (OHMSI). “OHMSI was founded in 2004 with the aim of engaging in the public sphere from a Christian perspective” said Dr. K.J. John, the founder and director of OHMSI.74 “OHMSI is independent of the institutional church support because we don’t want to be tied down with the politics that comes with such

70 For a reporting of the event see http://anilnetto.com/christianity/catholic-cathedral-in-penang- denounces-isa/ retrieved on 10/3/2009. 71 http://www.cathnews.com.au/article.aspx?aeid=9008 retrieved on 10/8/2009. 72 http://www.cornerstone-msc.net/kairos/index.cfm retrieved on 10/8/2009. Kairos is funded by the same group of evangelical leaders – interview with Dr. Ng Kam Weng, the Director of Kairos, on 2/12/2008. 73 http://kairos-malaysia.org/index.cfm?menuid=62&parentid=9999 retrieved on 10/8.2009. 74 Interview with Dr. K.J. John conducted on 6/11/2008. 260

support. Our funding comes from donations from individual Christians and pastors.” he added.

Its stated aims are: (i) standing up for issues of public interest and articulating views on behalf of affected Malaysian communities; (ii) engaging communities to support or initiate action on specific issues relevant to them; and (iii) promoting scholarship and mentorship by developing and transforming worldviews.75

Between 2005 and 2007, OHMSI organized the “National Congress on

Integrity” which sought to engage Malaysian Christians on the issue of good governance.76 Themes of past congresses included “Corruption”, “Christian citizenship and Local Government”, “The Concept of Integrity from the Islamic and

Christian perspectives”, and “Federal Accountability and Local Government.”

OHMSI have also organized public forums on the 2008 elections and political duties of a Christian.77 “OHMSI also offer the Maxwell’s Million Leaders Mandate program to young people in order to develop the next generation of leaders which the country will need. The program is not limited to Christians. It is open to anyone who wishes to become a leader in his own right” said Dr. K.J. John.

“OHMSI is a young setup and we are still in the midst of developing our organization and exploring ways in which we can fulfil our aims. Ultimately, the vision of OHMSI is to become a critical think-tank for Malaysian Christians with a global recognition.” he added.

The spread of internet usage in Malaysia, particularly in the past five years, have enabled individual Christians to participate in the public sphere using this medium. In the past couple of years, there have been many websites and blogs created to comment on the nation’s political and social situation. The contents

75 http://www.ohmsi.net/index.cfm?menuid=3 retrieved on 10/8/2009. 76 Interview with Dr. K.J. John conducted on 6/11/2008. 77 http://www.ohmsi.net/ retrieved on 10/8/2009. 261

contained in most of these websites and blogs were personal in nature and do not offer much in terms of critical analysis of the contemporary political and social issues as compared with the website created by Aliran (a human rights non- governmental organization).78 Most of the electronic sites do not last long in cyberspace as they usually fall quickly into disuse because of the neglect of its owners to update their websites and blogs.

However, one noteworthy exception is the website “The Micah Mandate”

(TMM) created by a group of like minded pastors and Christian activists.79 The goal of TMM is to develop a “Christian-based public interest advocacy that seeks a transformation of our nation through justice, mercy and humility.”80 Since its founding a year ago, the website has offered commentaries on the political and social issues of the country from a Christian perspective.81

One of the interesting ways in which the community seeks to engage civil society is through the “Malaysia National Prayer Network” (MNPN) project. The project was launched on March 19th, 2008 by a group of Protestant church leaders aimed at mobilizing all believers, whether as individuals or as groups, to engage in prayer that “call upon God for revival of the Church and transformation of our nation.”82

78 See www.aliran.com for a sample of their content. Aliran also publishes a monthly magazine entitled “Aliran.” 79 See http://www.themicahmandate.org/ . 80 http://www.themicahmandate.org/about-us/ retrieved on 12/82009. 81 In the recent “Allah” controversy, the website posted commentaries by leaders of the Christian community on why Christians have the right to use the word “Allah” in their religious services. For example, Pastor Eu Hong Seng’s “Why I use Allah: A layman’s perspective” (http://www.themicahmandate.org/2010/01/why-i-use-allah-a-laymans-perspective/comment-page- 1/#comment-495). Pastor Eu is the Senior Pastor of Full Gospel Tabernacle, Subang Jaya and the Chairman of the NECF. 82 http://www.prayer.net.my/index.cfm?menuid=9 retrieved on 14/8/2009. 262

One of its aims is “to mobilise prayer channels to communicate specific and urgent national issues that may arise from [sic] time to time.” This project is noteworthy because for the first time church leaders are attempting to get Christians to use prayer on specific national issues as a corporate body.83 Traditionally, corporate prayer activity, i.e. prayer meetings, in the local churches is centred upon the needs of the church and its members while skirting around social and political issues of the day.

The MNPN, on the other hand, organizes corporate prayer which calls attention to specific political and social issues of the day that Christians should pray over. MNPN disseminates such prayer items through email to its list of contacts, on its website, and through its weekly prayer meetings in Kuala Lumpur and Petaling

Jaya. The project is a step forward by the community in engaging civil society. It is a reminder to Christians that they are part of the larger society and should be concerned with national issues that affects society.

Certain local churches have also begun to initiate projects that seek to contribute to a mutual understanding between Christians and Muslims on each other’s concerns and perspectives. In mid-June 2009, I attended a forum on interfaith dialogue hosted by a local church in Kuala Lumpur.

This event was a rarity in itself because half of the audience was Muslims and the other half non-Muslims (and mostly Christians) in a church with two Muslims and a Christian engaging in a dialogue on how to live together in a society with diverse faith chaired by the church’s pastor. The pastor later told me that the event was jointly organized by a Christian and Muslim organization which had approached him on the feasibility of his church hosting the event which he readily agreed. “I

83 See http://www.prayer.net.my/index.cfm?menuid=6 for a survey of the prayer items. It should be noted that the items are presented in a scrupulously neutral manner of presenting them as facts that required attention of the Christians for prayer. 263

think this is one of those rare moments when you can find Muslims and non-Muslims sitting together and talking to each other in a church setting.” he said.84

7.5.5 Shifting Responses and a Divided Community

The post-March 8th General Elections had seen the community becoming more aware of the need for Christians to publicly engage civil society on pressing political and social issues. This is best reflected in the changing political perception among individual Christians across the denominational divide.

Consider the case of Mr. B, a Chinese Catholic in his late twenties, who said that he is concerned with the impact of the government’s Islamisation policy on non-

Muslims.85 “Christians from all denominations should come together to discuss this issue and work out a plan on how the community should respond on this issue" he added.

Ms. P, a Chinese Catholic in her early thirties agreed. “The church is part of the larger community and cannot isolate itself. The church cannot take a backseat when there are cases of infringement of the right to freedom of religion in our society. The church cannot disassociate itself with what is happening in society. The church must take a stand on such cases” she said.86

Ms. A, an Indian evangelical Christian in her mid-fifties, added “I am distressed with what is happening in our politics in the last few years. Issues such as the infringement on the non-Muslim religious right, corruption and public scandals have made me more politically aware that Christians must involve themselves in the political process. I don’t mean joining political party or anything like that but

84 The conversation took place after the forum on 16/8/2009. 85 Interview with Mr. B conducted on 6/8/2008. 86 Interview with Ms. P conducted on 8/8/2008. 264

becoming citizens who are willing to participate as voters and engaging civil society to bring about a more just society.”87

Mr. Z, an Indian mainline Protestant in his mid-forties, added that “cases such as the right of Moorthy’s widow to bury her husband according to the Hindu rites should have been respected. We are seeing an increasing infringement by the government on non-Muslim’s religious rights. Christians need to politically engage the government to ensure our religious rights are not circumscribed.”88

Mr. M, a Chinese evangelical church leader in his mid-fifties, summed up this changing political awareness among Christians when he said that “Christians cannot ignore politics because our political process allows it. More importantly, I think the church must play a role in developing political consciousness in order to make

Christians better citizens.”89

Such awareness is not limited to the laity but also the clergy as well. “Many of the Lutheran pastors are from Perak. The recent Perak constitutional crisis really pushed a few of them off the edge ... and they shared with me their concern with what is happening there even though they are based here now. Even our Bishop, who is from Perak, is concerned with the political situation in Perak” said Reverend Sivin

Kit.90 “I became politically aware during the Moorthy case particularly with its implications for the right to freedom of religion in this country” he added.

Reverend Anthony Loke said “I do know of a couple of colleagues in my denomination who are concerned with the recent events [i.e. the government’s infringement on the non-Muslim religious sphere]. As for myself, I became more politically aware in 2000 when I started to do some research on Operasi Lalang and

87 Interview with Ms. A conducted on 19/3/2009. 88 Interview with Mr. Z conducted on 5/12/2008. 89 Interview with Mr. M conducted on 14/8/2008. 90 Interview with Reverend Sivin Kit conducted on 14/5/2009. 265

the community’s response towards that incident. Since then, I have taken an interest in the political events of the country, particularly those which have an impact on the community.”91

“The priest in the church which I attend is known for his strong views on the political situation in the country. He worked into his sermons and prayers political issues of the day” said Ms.P, the Chinese Catholic.92

Although there is a growing awareness among individual members of the community on the need to engage civil society and the political process, such awareness has not always been translated into action. “What I usually do is to email my circle of like-minded friends on news and issues that affect our community. I also attended some related public talks and seminars on issues of religious freedom” said

Mr. B, the Chinese Catholic. “As for me, I just follow the news of what is happening but I don’t get involved in protests or related activities” said Mr. Z, the mainline

Protestant.

Nonetheless, even among those who are committed to engagement, their responses vary. There are some who choose to participate in civil society or joining a political party. “I am upset with what is happening in the country. That is why I have participated in public rallies such as the anti-ISA vigils, BERSIH, Article XI. I am also a member of the Saya Anak Bangsa Malaysia movement. I believe that convictions alone are not enough. We must put them into action” said Ms. A, the

Indian evangelical.93 In a similar vein, Mr. R, a Chinese evangelical in his mid-

91 Interview with Reverend Anthony Loke conducted on 11/12/2008. 92 Interview with Ms. P conducted on 8/8/2008. 93 Interview with Ms. A conducted on 19/3/2009. 266

forties said “I have joined the Saya Anak Bangsa Malaysia movement because I am concerned with the racial polarisation that is happening today.”94

“I choose to join a political party in the opposition because I am fed up not only with the government infringing upon the rights non-Islamic religions but also the general political situation where political scandals are abound” said Ms. P, the

Chinese Catholic.

Others choose to work within the community. “I’m against ISA. What I do is

I talk about this issue not only in my classes but also in some churches. I also blog about why ISA should be abolished. Anyway, I also attended some anti-ISA candlelight vigils as a show of support on this issue” said Reverend Anthony Loke.

“I see my task as that of an educator. Someone who helps Christians to think about issues that affects them. The greatest threat to the community is the tidak apa

(apathy) attitude” he added. Of course, there are those who choose to engage both with civil society and within their own community such as Reverend Sivin Kit and

Dr. K.J. John as I have discussed earlier in this chapter.

The engagements of individual members of the community have not been greeted with unanimous support by everyone. Some consider such action as contrary to the spirit of the church. The focus of the church, for these Christians, should be the realm of the sacred, and politics has no right to intrude into the sacred realm. “I don’t think the church should involve itself in politics. If not, the church would find itself in a situation where it would not focus on spiritual concerns but worldly concerns” said Ms. J, a Chinese evangelical Christian in her early thirties.95 “I think the only

94 In a conversation which took place on 12/6/2009. Saya Anak Bangsa Malaysia movement advocates the concept of a Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian nation) and the need to respect diversity in the country through its projects (http://apps.facebook.com/causes/80669?recruiter_id=9041670 retrieved on 13/8/2009). 95 Interview with Ms. J conducted on 30/7/2008. 267

way to resolve our social and political problems is when we learn to love one another” she added.

Ms. C, a Chinese Catholic in her mid-fifties, agrees. “I don’t think it is proper for any priest to bring up political issues during Sunday mass. Some people will think that this is wasting time. What people want is something spiritual. I don’t like to go to a church where politics is discussed. This is not the venue for it” she said,

“there are other avenues to talk about it [politics]. Sunday mass should only focus on our spiritual needs.”96

“Not everyone in my church is comfortable with the sermons and prayer of our priest,” said Ms. P, the Chinese Catholic, “some have left for a church further down the road where the sermons and prayers leave out politics and social concerns.”97 Ms. A, the Indian evangelical Christian added: “I work with a Christian organization but every time I talk about the political situation that is affecting our country, my colleagues will politely turn to other topics. They are not interested in politics.”98

Reverend Sivin Kit, who pastors the Bangsar Lutheran Church, admits that

“not all members of my congregation are happy when I touch on the subject of politics in my sermons. A few of them have left the church.”99 “I would say that most pastors won’t preach politics in their sermons. Generally in Malaysia, most pastors will stay away from politics. It is very rare for them to speak about it. Speaking for my denomination, we have not really taken on politics as an area of concern.” said

Reverend Anthony Loke.100 “I think that this is partly because Christians have been

96 Interview with Ms. C conducted on 8/8/2008. 97 Interview with Ms. P conducted on 8/8/2008. 98 Interview with Ms. A conducted on 19/3/2009. 99 Interview with Reverend Sivin Kit conducted on 14/5/2009. 100 Interview with Reverend Anthony Loke conducted on 12/11/2008. 268

taught that politics deals with the temporal while the church deals with the spiritual.” he added.

7.6 Conclusion

The Christian community’s changing response to the government’s intrusion into their religious field is a reflection of the growing anxiety felt by the non-Muslim

(and non-Malay) community over the government’s policy of neutrality in the field non-Islamic religions. Ever since the implementation of the government’s

Islamisation policy in the early 1980s, non-Muslims began to experience a growing restriction not only in their religious field but also increasingly in their everyday life.

The anxiety of the non-Muslims reached its climax in late 2005 with cases such the Moorthy case and the forbidding of the use of certain religious words in the national language outside of the Islamic context among others. Such cases have sparked a growing awareness among non-Muslims on the need to engage the government using the courts and public demonstration as a way of responding to the increasing infringement of the government in their religious field and everyday life.

Although the Christian community’s response to the government may have been initially motivated by the intrusion of the government into its religious field, nonetheless, there are some for whom engaging the government meant more than just ensuring that their religious field is not intruded upon. They are also motivated by the pressing political issues of the day, e.g. strengthening democratic institutions and the increasing divide in society along racial lines.

269

It should be noted that there is as yet no consensus within the community on how best to respond to the government’s intrusion into the Christians’ religious sphere. The community is still divided as to whether Christians should actively engage with the government or not. That said, it is also evident that parts of the

Christian community have signalled that active engagement with the government must become a permanent part of their response to the government’s intrusion into the non-Islamic religious sphere.

270

Chapter 8

Conclusion

It was not that long ago when scholars accepted a certain narrative about modernity, i.e. secularisation theory. In this narrative, it was argued that modernisation would dislodge religion from its once prominent place in the public life of modern societies. Religion would retreat to the private sphere leaving the public sphere to “secular” forces such as the nation-state and the market along with other cultural, institutional and ideological features of modernity (Casanova, 1994).

In short, the advent of modernity signalled the disappearance of God from history and the relegation of religious beliefs to the realm of private conscience (if not being consigned to the grave) globally.

However, events in the closing decades of the 20th century proved otherwise.

The Iranian Revolution, the role of the Catholic Church in the demise of the

Communist regime in Poland (and the beginning of the end for Communist regimes in Eastern European states), the rise of the Christian right in American politics, and more spectacularly, the 9/11 attack on New York which inaugurated the new millennium, all bore witness to the fact that God still marches in history.

The failure of secularisation theory to anticipate the active participation of religion in the public sphere has resulted in a lively debate among scholars.

Secularisation theory which has served as the theoretical framework in the study of religion in the modern world for almost a century was displaced. In its place sprung a host of new theories in trying to explain why religion is thriving in the modern world in contrast with the older theory (which predicts the decline and fall of religion in the modern world). This thesis has aimed to contribute to the theoretical debate on why

271 religion has persisted in the public sphere despite modernisation by putting forward the case of Christianity in Malaysia.

8.1 The Persistence of Religion in the Public Sphere: The Malaysian experience

Unlike in the West, there exists a close relationship between religion and the state in this country. With Islam being the official religion of Malaysia, the state is obliged to put in place the necessary administrative structures for Islamic affairs.

However, such obligation does not exist for non-Islamic religions.

This has resulted in the country’s religious sphere being divided into two separate fields, i.e. Muslim and non-Muslim. The Muslim field is principally a Malay domain since all Malays are by definition Muslim by birth. Those who leave this field face state sanctions. The non-Muslim field, on the other hand, is basically a non-Malay domain where identity and ethnicity are more loosely defined. Non-

Malays are free to associate themselves with any religion of their choosing.

The relationship between the Malays and non-Malays in the present period has assumed greater significance with the rise of Islamic revivalism among the former, which can also be interpreted as an attempt by the Malays to use Islam as an ethnic boundary to distinguish themselves against the non-Malays (Nagata, 1984).

The growing influence of Islamic revivalism among the Malays, in turn, has egged on the UMNO-led BN government to respond by initiating its own

Islamisation policy that aimed at maintaining its political hegemony within the

Malay community. This has brought about the increasing intrusion of the government not only into the Muslim religious field but also into the non-Muslim religious field.1

1 See Chapter 4. 272

In turn, such intrusions have led to an increasing anxiety among non-Muslims over their implications. The government’s Islamisation policy was introduced beginning from the early 1980s. As a result, non-Muslims began to experience a growing restriction not only of their religious spheres but also of their everyday lives.

Not surprisingly, they began to turn to religion as a political resource in an attempt to find some sort of political footing to negotiate this increasing restriction

(Ramanathan, 1996; Lee and Ackerman, 1997; Loh, 2003; Willford, 2007).

In this thesis, I have argued that the turn towards religion in the public square is a manifestation of the growing influence of a literate and technically proficient middle class in the country. For the middle class, religious participation is more than just a mere private affair. It is a site where they consciously seek to practise social and political activism rather than just being contented with proselytisation. This link between the rise of the middle-class and activism has been noted by scholars who studied Islamic revivalism (Nagata, 1984; Zainah Anwar, 1987; Ahmad Fauzi, 2002 and 2003) as well as by scholars who focused on non-Islamic religions (Lee and

Ackerman, 1997).

Scholars such as Saravanamuttu (2001) have pointed out that certain groups within the middle class have been championing various issues connected to social democracy, human rights and the environment because they have shown greater awareness and concern for universalistic values that are associated with participatory democracy, or what Loh (2009) has called “new politics” in Malaysia.2

2 Also in Lev (1993). 273

In the case of the Christian community, the traditional approach of negotiation and accommodation with the government on issues that affect them, which had been practised since independence, has slowly given way to a more active engagement in the public square and civil society in an effort to find some room to manoeuvre around the government’s increasing restriction on their religious spheres and everyday lives.3

Although the Christian community’s response to the government may have been initially motivated by the intrusion of the government into their religious field, there are some for whom engaging the government meant more than just this issue.

They are also motivated by the pressing political issues of the day, e.g. strengthening democratic institutions and the increasing divide in society along racial lines.4

Indeed the line between the religious and the political is increasingly blurred as non-Muslims generally (and Christians specifically) continue their engagement with the government. As the 2008 General Election has demonstrated, non-Malay voters have abandoned the ruling coalition not only because of the growing anxiety over the government’s Islamisation policy but also because of the growing dissatisfaction with scandals linked to the ruling coalition (Saravanamuttu, 2008).

The Christian community’s recent engagement with the government must be viewed within this wider context.

The Christians’ changing response can be traced to the growing participation of the middle class in church related activities that was brought about by two developments that took place in the post-independence years. First, the early years after independence were a period of transition for churches wherein its leadership was gradually being indigenized as a reflection of the changing local situation.

3 See Chapters 6 and 7. 4 See particularly Chapter 7. 274

However, they experienced difficulties in getting qualified personnel as there was a shortage of trained local clergy to run local churches.

Second, the early years of the post-colonial period witnessed the establishment of independent churches within the Protestant wing of the Christian community. Unlike the leadership of mainstream churches (mainline Protestant and

Catholic) which is based on ecclesiastical hierarchy, the independent churches (also known as evangelicals) were managed by a lay leadership. Because of their emphasis on lay participation, these churches were able to overcome the problem of finding trained local clergy to help run their churches. Consequently, the independent

Protestant churches – or evangelical churches have experienced robust church growth.

The development of these churches left a strong impression among mainstream Christians (Catholics and Protestants) on the vitality of evangelical

Christianity. Unsurprisingly, mainstream churches also began to follow suit, albeit with suitable modifications to the requirements of a traditional ecclesiastical structure. In other words, lay participation was encouraged within churches in areas that were once the exclusive preserve of the clergy. Unsurprisingly, this move attracted middle class participation in almost all areas of church related activities given their literate and technically proficient background.

Lay participation in church related activities is most prominent in the area of social welfare which has historically been one of the major ministries of the church.5

However, in recent years with the growing controversies that involved the government’s Islamisation policy and its implications for non-Muslims, Christians began to participate in civil society and the formal political process as a way of

5 See Chapters 4 and 5. 275 engaging with the government not only on issues that affect the community but also on strengthening the democratic process in the country.6

It should be noted that there is as yet a consensus within the community as to how best to respond to the government’s intrusion into the Christians’ religious sphere as they are only beginning to engage the government on this issue in recent times. The community is still divided as to whether they should actively engage, in the name of religion, with regards to the government. Nonetheless, some aspects of the Christian community’s actions signal that active engagement will become an increasingly important form of response to the government’s intrusion into their religious spheres.

8.2Theoretical Implications of the Malaysian Case Study

By presenting the case study of Christianity in Malaysia, I have argued that the relegation of religion to the private sphere as theorised by secularisation theory and institutionalised in the political practise of Western nation-states is not replicated in non-Western contexts. In fact, religion remains firmly planted in the public life of contemporary Southeast Asian societies despite the rapid modernisation that has taken place.

This thesis takes its theoretical stand among the dissenters of secularisation theory. That said, the theoretical position of this thesis diverges from the alternative theories that have emerged in the literature. It is undeniable that the current crop of theories that have emerged from the current debate on the vitality of religion in the modern world have opened new theoretical vistas and re-energised social-scientific research in this field.

6 See Chapter 7. 276

That said, we should be cautious in applying all these theories wholesale outside the original context from which they were developed. These theories

(including secularisation theory) were based on the Western historical experience of modernity. Fundamental to the Western experience is the idea of secularism which requires the “separation of religious from secular institutions in government’’ (Asad,

2003, pp. 1-2) which forms the basic assumption of the theoretical literature in this field.

In so doing, there is a tendency in the theoretical corpus to ignore the colonial and post-colonial historical developments of non-Western societies. These historical developments have created a different outcome of the fate of religion in these societies. Rather than being relegated from the public square, religion remains an important precinct in the public life of such societies despite the rapid modernisation that was taking place.7

As Armstrong (2000) pointed out modernisation brings with it social and psychological dislocation which made people turn to religion as a way of making sense of their rapidly changing social world.

However, she argued this turn towards religion is not a throwback to the pre- modern forms of faith but rather a specific modern response to the pitfalls of modernity which threatens to bring nihilism. Such response is not just a personal conversion of the individual towards a private faith but an active faith that seeks to participate in the political sphere in the name of God in order to preserve what is perceived as an attempt to exclude the sacred from the rest of society, and hence, a

7 See Willford and George (2005) for a collection of essays on this issue in the Southeast Asian region. See Meyer (2004) and van der Veer (2002) for a review of the same issue in Africa on South Asia respectively. 277 threat to their worldview. In so doing, religion has entered back into the public sphere against the prediction of secularisation theory (Armstrong, 2000).

Religion provides a focal point in mobilising people to respond to the consequences of modernity. Indeed, this thesis takes the position that religious based contestations/conflicts in the public sphere are due to the tensions that arise out of the pursuit of modernity.

As I have pointed out in the case of Malaysia, Islamic revivalism among the

Malay-Muslim community in the past three decades has its root cause in the state’s modernisation policy which seeks, among other things, to elevate their socio- economic status. Inevitably such policy witnessed rapid socio-economic changes in the community together with its attendant social and psychological dislocation. It is therefore unsurprising why certain sectors of the community began to turn to Islam as a way to cope with the changes that was taking place around them.

Similarly, the revivalism of other religions in the country shared the same root-cause, i.e. the rapid modernisation that took place in the 1970s.8 Using the case of the Christian community, I have argued that the rise of the Charismatic phenomenon that cuts across denominations was due to its ability to give its adherents a sense of meaning and personal control over their rapidly changing world.9

However, religious revivalism that took place in the country was not a matter of private affair. In the case of the Muslim community, certain sectors began to push for the Islamisation of state and society. Such push egged the state to respond by introducing its own Islamisation policy as a way to ensure its hegemony over the

Malay-Muslim community.

8 See Lee and Ackerman (1997). 9 See Chapter 5. 278

This, in turn, increased the anxiety of the non-Muslim citizens over the implications of the state’s Islamisation agenda. As a result, non-Islamic religious communities began to mobilise themselves in order to find some kind of political footing with the state in an attempt to carve out some space from the increasing intrusion of the state not only in their religious sphere but also in their everyday lives.

In short, this thesis argued that individuals and groups in society use religion as a way to respond to the political and social circumstances which they find themselves in. Of all the classes in society, the middle class is perhaps the most strategically placed to take advantage of religion as a source of political mobilisation.

This is unsurprising given their literate and technically proficient background.

Middle class participation in religion has transformed the locus of religion from the clergy to the laity. Given their literate and technically proficient background, the middle class played a prominent role in the laity’s involvement in religious organisations. More importantly, members of this class are concerned with issues that are related to justice, accountability, popular participation, greater freedom and autonomy, e.g. participatory democracy.

Unsurprisingly, they brought such concern with them in their religious participation. As a result, religious activities are not restricted to just spiritual edification but also engagement with the wider civil society, as with their secular counterparts, albeit from a religious point of view.

Therefore, the prediction that religion would withdraw from the public sphere is premature. Forwarding the case study of Malaysia, I have argued that religion still remains a vital precinct in the public life of post-colonial Southeast Asian societies.

279

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