Beyond Islamists & Autocrats

PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL REFORM POST ARAB SPRING Beyond Islamists & Autocrats sedition,” intellectuals and writers “for acting as arrows Saudi Arabia’s Virtual Quest for against enemies of religion, country, and the nation,” Citizenship and Identity and the Ministry of Interior’s security forces “for shield- HALA ALDOSARI ing the nation by striking against whoever threatens the security of the state.”3 Nevertheless, the state seemed unsure of how to Inside the Saudi kingdom, political uncertainty has often guard against the possible development or growth of ac- triggered a surge in public demands. For instance, the tivism. In the end, a series of fatwas (religious edicts) and 1990 protest movement regarding the ban on women royal decrees provided the religious and legal founda- driving occurred during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Like- tion for the prohibition of all forms of dissent. At first, the wise, the 2003 petitions for political reform came on the country’s supreme scholar, Grand Mufti Abdul Aziz ibn heels of 9/11.1 And more recently, in the wake of the Arab Abdullah al-Sheikh, warned the country’s youth against uprisings of 2011, Saudi Arabia again witnessed a sud- following the path of Egypt’s January 25 revolution, de- den revival of political dissent. Petitions for transition to a scribing it as a “Western conspiracy aimed at weakening constitutional monarchy were submitted, political and hu- the region and destroying religion by instilling doubts man rights organizations announced, small-scale protests and sedition between the rulers and the public.”4 organized, and calls for revolution posted online.2 Later, in January 2014, a more formal response in- Yet Saudi Arabia’s online activism presented a mis- cluded the passage of laws drafted years before and the leading picture: in reality, few groups were active. This issuance of royal decrees against any existing or poten- was evident in the late King Abdullah’s first public ad- tial dissent.5 The antiterrorism and anticybercrimes laws dress to the Saudi people after the Arab Spring: were used to systematically target activists on charges that ranged from defaming the reputation of the state, insult- I am so proud of you. Words are not enough to ing Islam, and disobeying the ruler to using the Internet commend you [for not taking to the streets]; after to harm the unity and stability of the state.6 The state shut God, you represent the safety valve of this nation, down numerous independent media outlets while spon- and you struck at that which is wrong with the truth soring massive public relations and lobbying campaigns.7 and at treachery with loyalty. In general, Saudi law is uncodified in the tradition of His speech specifically praised Saudi religious scholars early Islamic jurisprudence, whereby the judge is the in- “for prioritizing the word of God over the callers for strument of the law. However, the antiterrorism and anti- © 2016 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A series that explores how non-Islamist Arab political actors might facilitate progress toward reform and democratic transition. Beyond Islamists & Autocrats cybercrimes laws were exceptions that created the basis varying degrees of loyalty to the ruling family among for legal persecution of activists and dissenters.8, 9 The different groups of citizens. king and interior minister ordered travel bans, legal ha- Facilitating this Saudi patronage culture is a political rassment, imprisonment, and executions as needed10 to system that falls somewhere between a tribal structure ensure a tight grip on society in all domains, particularly and a modern state. Whereas the kingdom has minis- that of online social communication. tries, municipalities, bylaws, and regulations, the king To help secure loyalty, the king offered a generous and his circle retain absolute authority to override other- 514 billion Saudi riyals (about $137 billion) in benefits wise binding laws, international treaty commitments, or to key groups, including those expected to rebel due to other apparently official decisions. Although, as noted, unemployment or limited income.11 At the same time, laws have been intentionally kept uncodified, those that sixty thousand new jobs were developed for the Interior are codified are phrased loosely to allow for flexibility of Ministry alone to counter any perceived revolutionary interpretation and, therefore, political control over the threats. An anticorruption institution, Nazaha, was es- legal system. tablished in an apparent response to the demands of the The story of Saudi Arabia, as portrayed by state text- Islamic awakening stalwarts’ call for islah, or reform.12 books and media, is one of warring tribes and a vast Religious institutions—the traditional supporters of the land unified by the wise King Abdul Aziz al-Saud in a monarchy—received massive funds to expand their exist- quest to implement Salafism, a puritanical form of Is- ing resources. For instance, the king awarded 500 mil- lam. In this view, the Saudi people are the obedient sub- lion Saudi riyals (about $133 million) to restore mosques jects, or rayah, following their shepherd or guardian, around Saudi Arabia, 200 million riyals (about $53 mil- wali al-umr—the singular term for uli al-umr, a group lion) to support Quran memorization societies, 300 mil- of rulers. The plural form is cited from the Quran, in lion riyals (about $80 million) to support centers of Is- God’s command for Muslims to follow the orders of lamic preaching and guidance, 200 million riyals for the Allah, his prophet Muhammad, and the ruling group Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention (Quran, al-Nisaa 4:59). The Quran always mentions a of Vice to finish building centers across the kingdom, group of rulers, never a single ruler. Religious reform- and 200 million riyals to fund three hundred new jobs ers have argued that these rulers should represent the and build new branches for the ifta, or “religious edicts,” will of the people. The king, however, through religious 13 department. In the end, no meaningful civil or political institutions that report to him, manages to delegate reforms were pursued. absolute power to himself as the people’s ultimate wali al-umr. CONTESTING THE SAUDI STATE This power structure is reinforced and replicated at Historically, Saudi rulers have secured their monopoly different levels of society, including in national institu- on the state by three means: regional and local part- tions and the family. For example, the religious Council nerships, collection of ample oil rent, and support from of Senior Scholars dominates religious decisionmaking, powerful Western patrons.14 Inside and outside the and men dominate women in families as their guard- kingdom, members of the royal family have blood, busi- ians. Submission to the king and his appointed guard- ness, and patronage relationships with key religious and ians is therefore expected from the ideal Saudi citizen. In other leading figures. For example, King Abdullah did return, the privileges and entitlements of citizenship are not stop at supporting the Bahraini king with battalions awarded based on religious affiliation, loyalty to the king, during the island nation’s popular February 14 revolu- and gender.16 Those serving the king in a military or civic tion; he also arranged the marriage of his daughter to capacity, members of religious institutions, and men in the sheikh’s son.15 The patronage system, empowering general have been granted higher citizenship privileges certain groups at the expense of others, has created than others, namely religious minorities and women. HALA ALDOSARI 2 SAUDI ARABIA'S VIRTUAL QUEST Beyond Islamists & Autocrats In Saudi Arabia, most dissent movements arise from establish broad leverage for such a venture, royal patron- a desire to challenge this enforced identity rooted in fe- age circles have been expanded to include new business alty to the crown and its precepts. Such movements of- leaders, social entrepreneurs, online “social influencers,” ten appear cloaked in religious garb. In turn, when the religious leaders, and women. Consequently, competition royal family perceives a threat to its political security, it for royal privileges among social groups has intensified. often acts to accommodate the very forces underlying Here, the king is seen by society at large as the ultimate that threat, sometimes without realizing the collateral arbiter in empowering any of these groups or potentially damage entailed. Of all such instances, the state has saving one from the others. National belonging, there- acted most affirmatively, and perhaps damagingly, when fore, remains problematic when the monarchy enforces it comes to Islamic extremism. unequal distribution of citizenship rights. In 1979, the Saudi leadership embraced radical Islam Today, several distinct categories of activists are press- in response to several events: Iran’s Islamic Revolution, ing the authorities for expanded civil and political rights. the siege of Mecca by a radical Saudi Salafist, Shiite This essay addresses two of them. One is the network riots in the kingdom’s Eastern Province, and the need to of human rights activists—the most diverse and inclu- recruit jihadists in Afghanistan to counter communism. sive group—encompassing many Shiites, liberals, and As a result, large segments of Saudi society were radi- women; the Shiite rights movement and women’s rights calized. Ideologies associated with the radical Islamic movement are addressed separately in this piece. The Sahwa (awakening) movement—characterized by a re- second category comprises social entrepreneurs, who jection of U.S. troops on Muslim lands, a literal, rigid advocate a cultural transformation to resist politically interpretation of Islamic teachings, and an expanded forced norms. Although outside the scope of this proj- role for clergy in the state’s social, economic, and po- ect, two other categories of activists warrant mention: litical domains—became prevalent in Saudi education, the national Arabism movement, composed of youth in- media, and religious institutions.

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