Prelims /007 7/22/03 11:40 am Page i
Against Global Apartheid South Africa meets the World Bank, IMF and International Finance
Patrick Bond
Zed Books Ltd London and New York
UCT PRESS University of Cape Town Press Prelims /007 7/22/03 11:40 am Page ii
Against Global Apartheid: 2nd edition South Africa meets the World Bank, IMF and International Finance was first published by UCT Press (Pty) Ltd, PO Box 24309, Lansdowne 7779, South Africa and outside South Africa by Zed Books Ltd, 7 Cynthia Street, London N1 9JF, UK and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010,USA in 2003.
This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. In terms of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, no part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means (including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system) without permission in writing from the publisher.
© UCT Press, 2001, 2003
Second edition 2003
ISBN 1 919 71382 4 UCT Press, limp ISBN 1 842 77393 3 ZED Books, limp ISBN 1 842 77392 5 ZED Books, Hb
Cataloging - in - Publication Data is Available from the British Library
US CIP has been applied for from the Library of Congress
Copy editing by Alex Potter of FPP Productions Proofreading and indexing by Jan Schaafsma Cover design by The Pumphaus Design Studio cc Typesetting by RHT desktop publishing cc, Durbanville Printed and bound in South Africa by Formeset Printers
Acknowledgements Cover photograph of Jubilee protest courtesy of Business Day. All other ptotographs courtesy of Ben Cashdan
Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave, a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10010 www.zedbooks.demon.co.uk Prelims /007 7/22/03 11:40 am Page iii
Contents
Preface ...... vi Acknowledgements ...... xvi Acronyms ...... xxiii
Part one: Powers and vulnerabilities ...... 1 Chapter one: Global crisis, African oppression ...... 3 1. Introduction ...... 3 2. Global crisis, and crisis displacement ...... 4 3. The African crisis continues ...... 17
Chapter two: Southern African socio-economic conflict ...... 31 1. Introduction ...... 31 2. Origins of the regional proletariat ...... 33 3. Structural socio-economic and environmental decline ...... 39 4. Workers, organisations and class politics ...... 44 5. Capital accumulation and regional visions ...... 48
Chapter three: Bretton Woods bankruptcies in Southern Africa . . . . 54 1. Introduction ...... 54 2. From Bretton Woods to the debt crisis ...... 57 3. Shaping Southern African development ...... 61 4. From projects to policy in Southern Africa ...... 67
Chapter four: Foreign aid, development and underdevelopment . . . . 80 1. Introduction ...... 80 2. Dependency and leverage ...... 81 3. Currency risk on loans ...... 84 4. Civil society expectations ...... 86 5. Attributing blame ...... 87 Prelims /007 7/22/03 11:40 am Page iv
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Part two: Elite contestation of global governance ...... 91 Chapter five: The global balance of forces ...... 93 1. Introduction ...... 93 2. The pro-status-quo forces ...... 96 3. Forces for change (?) ...... 104 4. Alliances falter ...... 107
Chapter six: Ideology and global governance ...... 116 1. Introduction ...... 116 2. Explaining globalisation ...... 119 3. Globalisation’s techno-economic fix? ...... 121 4. Ideology and self-interest ...... 127
Chapter seven: Pretoria’s global governance strategy ...... 134 1. Introduction ...... 134 2. ‘Globalisation made me do it’ ...... 135 3. Mbeki v. ‘the globalisation of apartheid’ ...... 138 4. Towards – or against – ‘global solidarity’? ...... 146
Part three: Economic power and the case of HIV/AIDS treatment . 153 Chapter eight: Pharmaceutical corporations and US imperialism . . 154 1. Introduction ...... 154 2. US government pressure points ...... 157 3. Drug companies pressure the US government ...... 166 4. Resistance ...... 170
Chapter nine: Civil society conquest, state failure ...... 177 1. Introduction ...... 177 2. Pharmaceutical pricing and street politics ...... 178 3. A political economy of South African AIDS ...... 179
Part four: Globalisation? – or internationalism plus the nation state? 191 Chapter ten: The ‘Fix-it-or-nix-it’ debate ...... 193 1. Introduction ...... 193 2. The World Bank under siege ...... 196 3. Reformers run into trouble ...... 201 4. Strategic divergences on the left ...... 207 5. After the IMF/World Bank have gone: Local/national/regional development finance? ...... 210 Prelims /007 7/22/03 11:40 am Page v
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Chapter eleven: The Third World in the movement for global justice 215 1. Introduction ...... 215 2. The world against Washington ...... 216 3. Lessons of Zapatismo ...... 220 4. Does Africa need Washington? ...... 225 5. South-South-North alliances against global finance/commerce ...... 231
Chapter twelve: The case for locking capital down ...... 240 1. Introduction ...... 240 2. Comparative capital controls ...... 243 3. A brief history of South Africa’s domestic finance and uneven development ...... 252 4. Exchange control options for South Africa ...... 271 5. Conclusion: From global apartheid to democratised investment ...... 280
Afterword ...... 293
Index ...... 314 Preface /007 7/22/03 11:39 am Page vi
Preface
[Southern African countries] were pressured into implementing [IMF and World Bank] programmes with adverse effects on employment and standards of living … The RDP must use foreign debt financing only for those elements of the programme that can potentially increase our capacity for earning foreign exchange. Relationships with international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund must be conducted in such a way as to protect the integrity of domestic policy formulation and promote the interests of the South African population and the economy. Above all, we must pursue policies that enhance national self- sufficiency and enable us to reduce dependence on international financial institutions. (African National Congress Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1994)1
Introduction: International financial pressure points The words above were amongst many in the first African National Congress (ANC) campaign platform, the RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme), that conveyed progressive ambitions – infused with informed scepticism about global financial power – for South Africa’s future. How quickly this particular promise was broken!2 I recall distinctly entering into fierce debates in January–February 1994 with an ANC official based at party headquarters in Luthuli House, in the seedy Joubert Park section of central Johannesburg. The stony fellow responsible for banking/finance policy,3 under the supervision of Trevor Manuel and Tito Mboweni, was terribly upset with our tortuous formu- lation on foreign debt, especially the idea of ‘self-sufficiency’, which was arrived at after many attempts by the RDP drafting team. Sensing trouble, leaders of the SA National Civic Organisation (SANCO), which I served as RDP editor, went back to their base for mandates. The word came back: the provision hostile to international finance could not be dropped. RDP repre- sentatives of the Congress of SA Trade Unions (Alec Erwin) and SA Communist Party (Jeremy Cronin) overrode the neo-liberal ANC official. The ANC’s formal political representative (Max Sisulu) concurred. But good RDP rhetoric could not disguise bad practice by those like Manuel and even Erwin, when they became intent upon international Preface /007 7/24/03 2:51 pm Page vii
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financial integration. (And in any case, the discursive victory was merely a symbolic – not decisive – incident.) Beginning in mid-1990, ‘reconnaissance missions’ from the Washington-based financial institutions were already undermining the integrity of domestic policy formulation, and ambitiously promoting the interests of international financial and corporate capital. This book tells that broader story, tracing it forward into the post-apart- heid era. Indeed, by early 2001, George Soros confirmed during an inter- view with film-maker Ben Cashdan at the Davos World Economic Forum that, ‘Today South Africa is very much in the hands of international capital.’4 But from illegitimate domination, resistance inevitably emerges. A few minutes prior to Soros’ confession, on an international satellite transmission that linked Davos to Porto Alegre’s World Social Forum, Soweto political activist Trevor Ngwane had, face to face, accused the financier of indirectly putting a massive squeeze on Pretoria’s budget. In turn, fiscal austerity was the most proximate national cause of water cut-offs, a failure to install pipes to households without access, and a resulting cholera outbreak that, within ten months, infected more than 100 000 people, killing more than 200. I come from South Africa. We still had a hope that liberation would bring houses, jobs and good education for our people. But since our government got closer to the World Bank and people like George Soros, we have lost a million jobs. As I am talking we had an outbreak of cholera because the government was forced by the likes of Soros to introduce privatisation of basic services like water and electricity. Ngwane ‘actually has a point, because South Africa has to meet the requirements of international capital’, acknowledged Soros. I think South Africa is following pretty sound macroeconomic policies, but is not able to generate sufficient growth to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people. And there is something wrong with this … Because actually, the global market, as it functions, is really an uneven playing field. The centre is much better situated than the periphery countries. And it is better situated not just because it is wealthy, but also because it controls the system. Ngwane, Soros and the politicians who sit uncomfortably in between will make further appearances in this book, as I document global uneven devel- opment, inequality, financial crisis and some of their implications for ordinary South Africans. Soros, to his credit, has always spoken frankly of the threat that inter- national capitalism poses to society. On occasion, Thabo Mbeki and his colleagues have said much the same. But repeatedly, the outcome has always appeared to any attentive observer as a case of ‘talking left, acting right’. Preface /007 7/22/03 11:39 am Page viii
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The larger point of all this will become clearer in Parts 1–3 of this book. Put briefly, it is, simply, that the democratic transition in South Africa to an important degree hinged not only on pressures for political liberation. Just as crucial was acknowledgment by ANC deal-makers that the trade-off for the big business community’s belated rejection of apartheid was economic liberalisation – i.e. release of local capital from apartheid’s laager, whether through dramatically lower corporate taxes (down from 48% in 1994 to 30% by 1999), lower tariffs on imports, or the lifting of controls that had prevented capital flight. Crudely put, big business basically said, ‘You chaps can have the state, but let us get our money out of here!’ Not only did the financial looting of South Africa follow apace, but also the country’s economic, social, cultural and policy environment was – and continues to be – enormously influenced by global economic processes and institutions. Yet what is termed ‘globalisation’ brazenly contradicts society’s strong motivation for more equitable development to redress the massive residual disparities of apartheid. The detrimental influence of international economic integration is most strongly felt through new financial, trade and investment vulnerabilities, but also in social policy that follows inter- national norms, and to a certain extent in political-cultural subordination to the global markets. As President Mbeki himself put it in mid-2000, ‘The globalization of the economy resulting among other things in rapid move- ments of huge volumes of capital across the globe, objectively also has the effect of limiting the possibility of states to take unilateral decisions.’5 The narrowing of national sovereignty is most evident when a country falls foul of the likes of George Soros. So let us take a quick look at what exactly happens.
In the hands of international capital South Africans are repeatedly told that since 1994, ‘sound macroeconomic policies’, including rapid financial and trade liberalisation, ensured ‘stabil- ity’ and the highest international regard. It is as if by repeating the mantra often enough, the harsh underlying reality can be disregarded. Yet many of us who served the ANC and South African government will never forget at least two moments during Nelson Mandela’s 1994–9 presidency, moments of terrible panic that reflected both unique local frail- ties and – thanks to the vagaries of international finance – the more general brittleness of ‘emerging market’ economies. In the first example, in February 1996, a decision to drop capital controls eleven months earlier suddenly proved disastrous. The two main macro- economic managers, Reserve Bank governor Chris Stals and finance minister Chris Liebenberg, abolished the ‘financial rand’ exchange-control mecha- nism in March 1995. The finrand, a market-related dual exchange rate, had Preface /007 7/22/03 11:39 am Page ix
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served as South Africa’s main barrier to damaging global financial flows for nearly a decade. In August 1985, foreign banks fled immediately after PW Botha’s finger-wagging ‘Rubicon’ speech, so the finrand substantially slowed subsequent capital flight by serving as a tax on outflows.6 As a result of its 1995 demise, sufficient ‘hot money’ flowed into South African shares that year to fund half the trades on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.7 But in early 1996, the hot money flooded back out, leading to a currency crash of more than a quarter of the rand’s value over several months, set off by a ‘sell’ report emanating from Zurich bankers that was induced by a false rumour that Mandela was ill. The Reserve Bank quickly lost R5 billion of its hard-currency reserves, representing a drop in import coverage from two months’ worth to less than one month’s by mid-1996. The value of the rand slid from R3.60 to the US$ in January 1996 to R4.40/$ in March, to R4.70/$ in December. In order to stem the outflow and stabilise the rand, interest rates were hiked dramatically over a few weeks. In ‘real’ (after-inflation) terms, the prime interest rate paid by leading firms rose from 12% to nearly 15% in May 1996, a level only once surpassed in modern South African history (in mid-1998). The adoption of the homegrown structural adjustment programme Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Gear) followed soon after, as a direct response to international investor demands. ‘Just call me a Thatcherite’, whimpered Mbeki at the Gear press conference on 14 June, begging the markets to stabilise. But self-humiliation was not enough, as the currency slide continued for several more months. No matter the painful and surprising experience of 1996, South Africa’s macroeconomic managers failed to learn from their experience. The second post-apartheid rand crash occurred over a few weeks beginning in April 1998. Global investors fled the ‘emerging markets’ following the East Asian and Russian collapses, and South Africa again faced financial crisis. Most spectacularly, Stals wasted more than R30 billion in hard currency reserves one weekend in June when he unsuccessfully tried to defend the rand from attack by local and foreign sellers. The rand’s fall continued, from R5.10/$ in May to R6.70/$ at its low point in July, before it stabilised at R6.20/$ in subsequent months. More so than in 1996, this badly affected the JSE, whose all-share index dropped nearly 40% from its April 1998 peak of 8 200, to a low of less than 5 000 in August. In addition, net bond purchases switched from an inflow of nearly R10 billion in the first quarter of 1998 to an outflow of nearly R16 billion in the third quarter. This was the key factor in the drop in Reserve Bank foreign reserves from an import cover of more than three months to just over two months from April to September 1998. To attract funds back to South Africa, Stals raised the Reserve Bank’s main lending rate from 14.8% in April to 21.8% in August. Preface /007 7/22/03 11:39 am Page x
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To break – or to shine – the chains of global apartheid? These incidents were merely the two most important surface manifestations of South Africa’s decline. There were many other economically suicidal exposures to global processes in the years immediately following democ- racy in 1994, leaving South Africa with an international competitiveness ranking of 43rd out of 49 major countries in the main Swiss business school’s 2001 competitiveness survey.8 And at a deeper level, as Chapter one will show, further damage was wrought by the general international economic slowdown that had begun around three decades earlier, amplified at the turn of the century by a massive glut in unutilised production capacity worse than at any other time since the 1930s.9 On the one hand, in this context, growing foreign trade amplified South Africa’s own long-standing economic crisis – particularly deindustrialisa- tion and job loss. On the other hand, a trade surplus with Africa reached an extreme level, causing untenable balance of payments problems and de- industrialisation in the region. The neo-liberal regional policy generated rising geopolitical tensions and lured economic refugees from neighbouring lands, in turn contributing to world-class xenophobia amongst South African workers. There was, moreover, a net outflow of international direct investment from South Africa during the first five years after apartheid, while the uneven dribs and drabs of incoming foreign investment were largely of the merger/acquisition variety rather than long-term investments projects. Most of the country’s biggest companies – Anglo American, Old Mutual, Gencor/Billiton, South African Breweries, Didata – took the gap, relisting to conduct their primary stock-market trading in London, or in the case of De Beers, delisting entirely in 2001. Simultaneously, economic advice from international financiers boiled down to persistent demands for macro- economic policies conducive to South Africa’s increased global vulnera- bility. A regular declaration of ‘impotence’ was the response to these pressures from South Africa’s political leaders, especially Mandela, Mbeki, Manuel, trade minister Alec Erwin and approximately a dozen others with key ideo- logical and functionary responsibilities. (Manuel actually used the word, in an interview, when discussing state job creation capacity.)10 Parts three and four of this book consider the debate over whether Pretoria had or has room for manoeuvre, and whether it was necessary to take the strategic turn towards neo-liberalism chosen by key state officials when confronted by the ever-tightening chains of the global economy. I borrow here the metaphor that then Archbishop Desmond Tutu taught my fellow anti-apartheid activists at Johns Hopkins University in early 1986, when he encouraged us to increase the pressure for ‘divestment’ by universities (and other aspiring socially responsible shareholders) on Preface /007 7/22/03 11:39 am Page xi
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companies with active South African operations. At the same time, a few miles up the I-95 highway in Philadelphia, an inner-city preacher, Rev. Leon Sullivan, was conducting an entirely different crusade: to help multinational corporations continue operating within South Africa, but under a half- hearted code of conduct committing them to conduct their own operations in a somewhat less explicitly racist manner. Tutu referred to Sullivan’s gambit as ‘shining the chains of apartheid’, and confirmed that the demo- cratic forces would fight on until apartheid’s chains were completely broken. Thabo Mbeki unabashedly terms the international political-economic system ‘global apartheid’. The next logical question is: are Mbeki, Manuel, Erwin and their colleagues aiming to ‘break’ the chains of 21st-century global apartheid, or merely to provide a glossy, New South Africa ‘shine’?
Nixing not fixing global apartheid: A South African case study According to Pretoria’s critics, instead of fundamentally challenging global apartheid, the South African government has been lubricating the financial, trade and investment processes that are amongst the most damaging. Evidence is found not only in the enthusiastic local application of the Washington Consensus through the Gear strategy. In addition, key South African officials are lending legitimacy to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organisation (WTO) and like-minded institutions. At home, the same officials persist in denying the need to roll back free-market processes, even in areas such as patent protection on HIV/AIDS drugs (discussed below in Part three) and capital controls (Part four), where there is an overwhelmingly case for breaking global apartheid’s chains. However, even if Parts one and two of Against Global Apartheid offer a profoundly pessimistic account of South African and international macro- economic management, this by no means implies that pandering to inter- national elites is a permanent affliction. On the contrary, there is evidence to suggest that the free-market Washington Consensus ideology began to ebb during the late 1990s, and that popular resistance is already affecting not just state policies, but also the international balance of forces. Can the damage that has been done be reversed? I think it can, and therefore most of the second half of the book is devoted to exploring ways in which popular pressure exerted from below can end, not perpetuate, global apartheid. By way of concluding this preface, I want to reflect, for a moment, on a single case of concrete activism that is indicative of broader potentials. The university at which I teach, the University of the Witwatersrand (‘Wits’) in central Johannesburg, is presently the site of a ‘World Bank Preface /007 7/22/03 11:39 am Page xii
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Bonds Boycott’ campaign by students, staff and faculty. The short-run demand is simple: that university finance officials commit themselves never to buy bonds issued by the World Bank. (The World Bank gets 80% of its funding from investors like Wits.) From 1995, Wits officials could move 15% of the university’s R1 billion endowment offshore. Some of that money – the amount varies from day to day, depending on investment trends – is channeled into bonds issued by the World Bank and sold to Wits via international fund managers. The same is true of most major South African institutions, and indeed virtually all funds that have access to international capital markets buy at least a small share of internationally rated, top-grade World Bank securities. As Part four argues, the strategy of closing – ‘nixing’ – the World Bank and IMF is not a faulty one. And to that end, the World Bank Bonds Boycott is an inspired tactic, since it allows activists and ordinary people to get involved in fighting global apartheid every day in their own communities (not just at major demonstrations in Seattle, Prague, Washington, Quebec City and so on). As I will show in more detail in Chapter three, there are many reasons specific to South and Southern Africa why getting the World Bank to close up shop would be beneficial to local peoples. Borrowing the Wits activists’ rhetoric, I lay out below some of the reasons for bond-boycotting the World Bank. Specific crimes committed by the World Bank and IMF during South Africa’s apartheid era include: the World Bank’s US$100 million in loans to Eskom from 1951 to 1967 that gave only white people electric power, but for which all South Africans paid the bill; the World Bank’s point-blank refusal to heed a United Nations General Assembly instruction in 1966 not to lend to apartheid South Africa; IMF apartheid-supporting loans of more than $2 billion between the Soweto uprising in 1976 and 1983, when the US Congress finally pro- hibited lending to Pretoria; a World Bank loan to build dams in Lesotho that was widely acknowl- edged to ‘bust’ sanctions against apartheid South Africa in 1986, via a London trust; and IMF advice to Pretoria in 1991 to impose the regressive value-added tax (VAT), in opposition to which 3.5 million people went on a two-day stayaway.
Subsequently, neo-apartheid lending and policy advice by the Bretton Woods twins include: an $850 million IMF loan to South Africa in December 1993 that carried conditions of wage restraint and cuts in the budget deficit, which in turn hampered the transition to democracy; Preface /007 7/22/03 11:39 am Page xiii
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