Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place Author(S): Harvey Molotch Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol

The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place Author(s): Harvey Molotch Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Sep., 1976), pp. 309-332 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2777096 . Accessed: 13/11/2013 18:09

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place'

Harvey Molotch Universityof California,Santa Barbara

A city and, moregenerally, any locality,is conceivedas the areal expressionof the interestsof some land-basedelite. Such an elite is seen to profitthrough the increasingintensification of the land use of the area in whichits membershold a commoninterest. An elite competeswith other land-based elites in an effortto have growth-inducingresources invested within its own area as opposed to thatof another.Governmental authority, at thelocal and nonlocal levels,is utilizedto assistin achievingthis growth at the expenseof competinglocalities. Conditions of communitylife are largelya con- sequenceof thesocial, economic, and politicalforces embodied in this growthmachine. The relevanceof growthto the interestsof various social groupsis examinedin thiscontext, particularly with reference to the issue of unemployment.Recent social trendsin oppositionto growthare describedand theirpotential consequences evaluated.

Conventionaldefinitions of "city," "urban place," or "metropolis"have led to conventionalanalyses of urban systemsand urban-basedsocial problems.Usually traceableto Wirth'sclassic and highlyplausible formu- lation of "numbers,density and heterogeneity"(1938), therehas been a continuingtendency, even in more recent formulations(e.g., Davis 1965), to conceiveof place quite apart froma crucialdimension of social structure:power and social class hierarchy.Consequently, sociological researchbased on the traditionaldefinitions of whatan urbanplace is has had verylittle relevance to theactual, day-to-day activities of thoseat the top of local powerstructure whose priorities set the limitswithin which decisionsaffecting land use, the publicbudget, and urbansocial life come to be made. It has not been veryapparent from the scholarshipof urban social sciencethat land, the basic stuffof place, is a marketcommodity providingwealth and power,and that some veryimportant people conse- quentlytake a keeninterest in it. Thus, althoughthere are extensivelitera- tureson communitypower as well as on how to defineand conceptualize a cityor urbanplace, thereare fewnotions available to linkthe twoissues coherently,focusing on the urbansettlement as a politicaleconomy. This paper aims towardfilling this need. I speculatethat the political

1 I have had the benefitof criticalcomments and assistancefrom Richard Appelbaum, Richard Baisden, Norman Bowers, Norton Long, Howard Newby, Anthony Shih, Tony Pepitone, Gerald Suttles,Gaye Tuchman, and Al Wyner.

AJS Volume 82 Number2 309

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology

and economicessence of virtuallyany givenlocality, in thepresent Amer- ican context,is growth.I furtherargue that the desirefor growth provides the key operativemotivation toward consensus for members of politically mobilizedlocal elites,however split they mightbe on otherissues, and that a commoninterest in growthis the overridingcommonality among importantpeople in a given locale-at least insofaras they have any importantlocal goals at all. Further,this growthimperative is the most importantconstraint upon available optionsfor local initiativein social and economicreform. It is thus that I argue that the veryessence of a localityis its operationas a growthmachine. The clearest indicationof success at growthis a constantlyrising urban-areapopulation-a symptomof a patternordinarily comprising an initialexpansion of basic industriesfollowed by an expandedlabor force, a risingscale of retail and wholesalecommerce, more far-flungand in- creasinglyintensive land development,higher population density, and increasedlevels of financialactivity. Although throughout this paper I indexgrowth by the variablepopulation growth, it is thisentire syndrome of associatedevents that is meantby the generalterm "growth."2 I argue that the meansof achievingthis growth,of settingoff this chain of phenomena,constitute the centralissue for those seriouspeople who care about theirlocality and who have the resourcesto make theircaring felt as a politicalforce. The cityis, forthose who count,a growthmachine.

THE HUMAN ECOLOGY: MAPS AS INTEREST MOSAICS I have arguedelsewhere (Molotch 1967, 1973) that any givenparcel of land representsan interestand thatany givenlocality is thusan aggregate of land-basedinterests. That is, each landowner(or personwho otherwise has some interestin the prospectiveuse of a givenpiece of land) has in minda certainfuture for that parcel which is linkedsomehow with his or her own well-being.If thereis a simple ownership,the relationshipis

2 This association of related phenomena is the common conceptualization which students of the economic development of cities ordinarilyutilize in their analyses (see, e.g., Alonso 1964, pp. 79-81; Leven 1964, pp. 140-44; Brown 1974, pp. 48-51; and Durr 1971, pp. 174-80). As Sunquist remarks in the context of his study of population policies in Western Europe, "The key to population distributionis, of course, job availability.A few persons-retired,notably, and some independentpro- fessionalssuch as artists,writers and inventors-may be free to live in any locality they choose but, for the rest,people are compelled to distributethemselves in whatever pattern is dictated by the distributionof employment opportunities.Some investorsmay locate their investmentin areas of surplus labour voluntarily,and so check the migrationflow, and others may be induced by governmentassistance to do so. But if neitherof these happens-if the jobs do not go where the workersare -the workersmust go to the jobs, if they are not to accept welfareas a way of life. When population distributionis an end, then,job distributionis inevitablythe means" (1975, p. 13).

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The City as a GrowthMachine straightforward:to the degree to which the land's profitpotential is enhanced,one's own wealthis increased.In othercases, the relationship may be more subtle: one has interestin an adjacent parcel, and if a noxioususe shouldappear, one's own parcel may be harmed.More subtle stillis the emergenceof concernfor an aggregateof parcels: one sees that one's futureis boundto the futureof a largerarea, thatthe futureenjoy- mentof financialbenefit flowing from a givenparcel will derivefrom the generalfuture of the proximateaggregate of parcels. When this occurs, there is that "we feeling" (McKenzie 1922) which bespeaks of community.We need to see each geographicalmap-whether of a smallgroup of land parcels,a wholecity, a region,or a nation-not merelyas a de- marcationof legal, political,or topographicalfeatures, but as a mosaic of competingland interestscapable of strategiccoalition and action. Each unit of a communitystrives, at the expenseof the others,to enhancethe land-usepotential of the parcelswith which it is associated. Thus, forexample, shopkeepers at bothends of a blockmay competewith one anotherto determinein frontof whichbuilding the bus stop will be placed. Or, hotel ownerson the northside of a city may competewith thoseon the southto get a conventioncenter built nearby(see Banfield 1961). Likewise,area units fightover highwayroutes, airport locations, campus developments,defense contracts,traffic lights, one-way street designations,and park developments.The intensityof groupconsciousness and activitywaxes and wanes as opportunitiesfor and challengesto the collectivegood rise and fall; but whenthese coalitionsare of sufficiently enduringquality, they constitute identifiable, ongoing communities. Each memberof a communityis simultaneouslythe memberof a numberof others; hence,communities exist in a nestedfashion (e.g., neighborhood withincity within region), with salience of communitylevel varyingboth overtime and circumstance.Because of thisnested nature of communities, subunitswhich are competitivewith one anotherat one level (e.g., in an interblockdispute over wherethe bus stop shouldgo) will be in coalition at a higherlevel (e.g., in an intercityrivalry over wherethe new port shouldgo). Obviously,the anticipationof potentialcoalition acts to con- strainthe intensityof conflictat morelocal loci of growthcompetition. Hence, to the degreeto whichotherwise competing land-interest groups collude to achieve a commonland-enhancement scheme, there is community-whetherat the level of a residentialblock club, a neighborhood association,a cityor metropolitanchamber of commerce,a state develop- mentagency, or a regionalassociation. Such aggregates,whether consti- tuted formallyor informally,whether governmental political institutions or voluntaryassociations, typically operate in the followingway: an at- temptis made to use governmentto gain those resourceswhich will enhance the growthpotential of the area unit in question.Often, the

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology governmentallevel whereaction is neededis at least one level higherthan the communityfrom which the activismsprings. Thus, individualland- ownersaggregate to extractneighborhood gains from the citygovernment; a clusterof cities may coalesce to have an effectiveimpact on the state government,etc. Each locality,in strivingto make thesegains, is in com- petitionwith other localities because the degreeof growth,at least at any given moment,is finite.The scarcityof developmentalresources means thatgovernment becomes the arena in whichland-use interest groups com- pete forpublic money and attemptto moldthose decisions which will deter- minethe land-useoutcomes. Localities thus competewith one anotherto gain thepreconditions of growth.Historically, U.S. citieswere created and sustainedlargely through this process;3it continuesto be the significant dynamicof contemporarylocal political economyand is criticalto the allocationof public resourcesand the orderingof local issue agendas. Governmentdecisions are not the only kindsof social activitieswhich affectlocal growthchances; decisionsmade by privatecorporations also have major impact. When a national corporationdecides to locate a branchplant in a givenlocale, it sets the conditionsfor the surrounding land-usepattern. But evenhere, government decisions are involved:plant- locationdecisions are made withreference to such issues as labor costs, tax rates,and the costsof obtainingraw materialsand transportinggoods to markets.It is governmentdecisions (at whateverlevel) thathelp deter- mine the cost of access to marketsand raw materials.This is especially so in thepresent era of raw materialsubsidies (e.g., the mineraldepletion allowance) and relianceon governmentapproved or subsidizedair trans- port,highways, railways, pipelines, and port developments.Government decisionsinfluence the costof overheadexpenses (e.g., pollutionabatement requirements,employee safety standards), and governmentdecisions affect the costs of labor throughindirect manipulation of unemploymentrates, throughthe use of police to constrainor enhanceunion organizing,and throughthe legislationand administrationof welfarelaws (see Piven and Cloward1972). Localitiesare generallymindful of thesegovernmental powers and, in additionto creatingthe sortsof physicalconditions which can best serve industrialgrowth, also attemptto maintainthe kindof "businessclimate" that attractsindustry: for example,favorable taxation, vocational training, law enforcement,and "good" labor relations.To promotegrowth, taxes shouldbe "reasonable,"the police forceshould be orientedtoward protectionof property,and overtsocial conflictshould be minimized(see

3 For accounts of how "boosterism" worked in this manner, see Wade (1969) and Harris (1976).

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The City as a GrowthMachine Rubin 1972, p. 123; Agger,Goldrich, and Swanson 1964, p. 649).4 In- creasedutility and governmentcosts caused by new developmentshould be borne (and theyusually are-see, e.g., Ann ArborCity PlanningDe- partment[1972]) by thepublic at large,rather than by thoseresponsible forthe "excess" demandon the urbaninfrastructure. Virtually any issue of a majorbusiness magazine is repletewith ads fromlocalities of all types (includingwhole countries)trumpeting their virtues in just these terms to prospectiveindustrial settlers.5 In addition,a key role of electedand appointedofficials becomes that of "ambassador"to industry,to communi- cate, usually with appropriateceremony, these advantagesto potential investors(see Wyner1967).6 I aim to make the extremestatement that this organized effort to affect the outcomeof growthdistribution is the essenceof local governmentas a dynamicpolitical force. It is not the only functionof government,but it is the key one and, ironically,the one mostignored. Growth is not,in the presentanalysis, merely one amonga numberof equally importantcon- cernsof politicalprocess (cf. Adrian and Williams 1963). Amongcon- temporarysocial scientists,perhaps only Murray Edelman (1964) has providedappropriate conceptual preparation for viewinggovernment in such terms.Edelman contraststwo kinds of politics.First thereis the "symbolic"politics which comprises the "big issues" of public morality and the symbolicreforms featured in the headlinesand editorialsof the daily press. The otherpolitics is the process throughwhich goods and servicesactually come to be distributedin the society.Largely unseen, and relegatedto negotiationswithin committees (when it occurs at all withina formalgovernment body), this is the politicswhich determines who,in material terms,gets what, where, and how (Lasswell 1936). This is thekind of politics we musttalk about at thelocal level: it is thepolitics

4 Agger et al. remark, on the basis of their comparative study of four U.S cities: "[Members of the local elites] value highly harmony and unity-'pulling together.' They regard local communityaffairs as essentiallynonpolitical, and tend to associate controversywith 'politics.' An additional factor reinforcingthe value of harmonyin many communities. . . is the nationwide competitionamong communitiesfor new industries.Conflict is thoughtto create a highlyunfavourable image to outsiders,an image that mightwell repel any prospectiveindustry" (1964, p. 649). 5 See, e.g., the May 19, 1974, issue of Forbes, which had the followingad placed by the State of Pennsylvania: "Q: [banner headline] What state could possibly cut taxes at a time like this? A: Pennsylvania [same large type]. Pennsylvaniaintends to keep showing businessmenthat it means business. Pennsylvania.Where business has a lot growingfor it. . . ." The state of Maryland ran this ad in the same issue: "Maryland Finances the Training. . . In short, we can financepractically everything you need to establish a manufacturingplant. . .." 6 The city of Los Angeles maintainsan office,headed by a formerkey business exec- utive, with this "liaison" role as its specifictask (see "L.A.'s Business Envoy Speaks Softly and Sits at a Big Desk," Los Angeles Times [August 26, 1974]).

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology of distribution,and land is the crucial (but not the only) variablein this system. The people who participatewith theirenergies, and particularlytheir fortunes,in local affairsare the sortof personswho-at least in vast dis- proportionto theirrepresentation in thepopulation-have the most to gain or lose in land-usedecisions. Prominent in termsof numbershave long been the local businessmen(see Walton 1970),7 particularlyproperty ownersand investorsin locally orientedfinancial institutions (see, e.g., Spaulding 1951; Mumford1961, p. 536), who need local government in theirdaily money-making routines. Also prominentare lawyers,syndica- tors,and realtors(see Bouma 1962) who need to put themselvesin situa- tionswhere they can be mostuseful to thosewith the land and property resources.8Finally, there are thosewho, although not directlyinvolved in land use, have theirfutures tied to growthof the metropolisas a whole. At least,when the local marketbecomes saturated one of the fewpossible avenues for businessexpansion is sometimesthe expansionof the sur- roundingcommunity itself (see Adrianand Williams1963, p. 24).9 This is the generaloutline of the coalitionthat activelygenerates the community"we feeling"(or perhapsmore aptly, the "our feeling")10that comes to be an influencein the politicsof a given locality.It becomes manifestthrough a wide varietyof techniques.Government funds support "boosterism"of varioussorts: the Chamberof Commerce,locality-promo- tionads in businessjournals and travelpublications, city-sponsored parade

7 The literatureon communitypower is vast and controversialbut has been sum- marized by Walton: he indicates,on the basis of 39 studies of 61 communities,that "the proportionof businessmenfound in the leadership group is high irrespective of the type of power structurefound" (1970, p. 446). It is my argument,of course, that this high level of participationdoes indeed indicate the exercise of power on behalf of at least a portionof the elite. My analysis does not assume that this portion of the elite is necessarilyalways united with others of high status on the concrete issues of local land use and the uses of local government. 8Descriptions of some tactics typically employed in land-use politics are contained in McConnell (1966), Tolchin and Tolchin (1971), and Makielski (1966), but a sophisticatedrelevant body of literaturedoes not yet exist. 9 Thus the stance taken by civic business groups toward growthand land-use matters affectinggrowth is consistentlypositive, although the intensityof commitmentto that goal varies. In his study of New York City zoning,Makielski indicates that "the general businessgroups . . . approached zoning froman economic viewpoint,although this often led them to share the Reformer'sideology. Their economic interestin the city gave them a stake in a 'healthy,''growing community' where tax rates were not prohibitive,where city governmentwas 'efficient,'and where some of the problems of the urban environment-a constrictinglabour force,congestion, and lack of space -were being attacked" (1966, p. 141). A similar dynamic has been observed in a medium-sizeMexican city: "Despite many other differences,basic agreementon the primacy of stabilityand growth provides a basis for a dialogue between government and business" (Fagen and Tuohy 1972, p. 56). 10 Bruce Pringlesuggested the latter phrase to me.

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The City as a GrowthMachine floats,and stadia and otherforms of supportfor professional sports teams carryingthe localityname. The athleticteams in particularare an extra- ordinarymechanism for instilling a spiritof civic jingoismregarding the "progress"of the locality.A stadiumfilled with thousands(joined by thousandsmore at home before the TV) screamingfor Cleveland or Baltimore(or whatever)is a scene difficultto fashionotherwise. This enthusiasmcan be drawnupon, with a glossyclaim of creatinga "greater Cleveland,""greater Baltimore," etc., in orderto gain generalacceptance for local growth-orientedprograms. Similarly, public school curricula, children'sessay contests,soapbox derbies,spelling contests, beauty pag- eants, etc., help build an ideologicalbase for local boosterismand the acceptanceof growth.My conceptionof the territorialbond amonghu- mans differsfrom those cast in termsof primordialinstincts: instead, I see this bond as socially organizedand sustained,at least in part, by thosewho have a use forit (cf. Suttles1972, pp. 111-39). I do not claim that thereare no othersources of civic jingoismand growthenthusiasm in Americancommunities, only that the growth-machine coalition mobilizes what is there,legitimizes and sustainsit, and channelsit as a political forceinto particularkinds of policydecisions. The local institutionwhich seems to take primeresponsibility for the sustenanceof these civic resources-themetropolitan newspaper-is also the mostimportant example of a businesswhich has its interestanchored in the aggregategrowth of the locality.Increasingly, American cities are one-newspaper(metropolitan daily) towns (or one-newspaper-company towns), and the newspaperbusiness seems to be one kind of enterprise forwhich expansion to otherlocales is especiallydifficult. The financial loss sufferedby the New York Times in its futileeffort to establisha Californiaedition is an importantcase in point.A paper's financialstatus (and that of othermedia to a lesserextent) tendsto be wed to the size of the locality." As the metropolisexpands, a largernumber of ad lines can be sold on thebasis of theincreasing circulation base. The local news paperthus tends to occupya ratherunique position: like manyother local businesses,it has an interestin growth,but unlikemost, its criticalinterest is not in the specificgeographical pattern of thatgrowth. That is, the crucial matterto a newspaperis notwhether the additionalpopulation comes to resideon the northside or southside, or whetherthe moneyis made througha new conventioncenter or a new olive factory.The newspaper has no axe to grind,except the one axe whichholds the communityelite together:growth. It is forthis reason that the newspapertends to achieve

11 Papers can expand into other industries,such as book publishingand wood har- vesting.The point is that, compared with most other industries,they cannot easily replicate themselves across geographical boundaries through chains, branch plants, and franchises.

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology a statesman-likeattitude in thecommunity and is deferredto as something otherthan a special interestby the special interests.Competing interests oftenregard the publisheror editoras a generalcommunity leader, as an ombudsmanand arbiterof internalbickering and, at times,as an en- lightenedthird party who can restrainthe short-termprofiteers in the interestof more stable, long-term,and properlyplanned growth.12The paper becomes the reformistinfluence, the "voice of the community," restrainingthe competingsubunits, especially the small-scale,arriviste "fast-buckartists" among them.The papers are variouslysuccessful in theircontinuous battle with the targetedspecial interests.'3The media attemptto attain thesegoals not only throughthe kind of coveragethey developand editorialsthey write but also throughthe kindsof candidates theysupport for local office.The presentpoint is not thatthe paperscon- trol the politicsof the city,but ratherthat one of the sourcesof their special influenceis theircommitment to growthper se, and growthis a goal aroundwhich all importantgroups can rally. Thus it is that,although newspaper editorialists have typicallybeen in the forefrontexpressing sentiment in favorof "the ecology,"they tend neverthelessto supportgrowth-inducing investments for their regions. The New York Times likes officetowers and additionalindustrial installations in the city even more than it loves the environment.The Los Angeles Times editorializesagainst narrow-minded profiteering at the expenseof the environmentbut has also favoredthe developmentof the supersonic transportbecause of the "jobs" it wouldlure to SouthernCalifornia. The papers do tend to support"good planningprinciples" in some formbe- cause such good planningis a long-termforce that makes foreven more potentialfuture growth. If the roads are not plannedwide enough,their narrownesswill eventuallystrangle the increasinglyintense uses to which the land will be put. It just makesgood sense to plan, and good planning for"sound growth" thus is the key "environmentalpolicy" of the nation's local media and theirstatesmen allies. Such policiesof "good planning" should not be confusedwith limitedgrowth or conservation:they more typicallyrepresent the opposite sort of goal. Often leaders of public or quasi-public agencies (e.g., universities, utilities)achieve a role similarto that of the newspaperpublisher: they becomegrowth "statesmen" rather than advocatesfor a certaintype or

12 In some cities (e.g., Chicago) it is the political machine that performsthis func- tion and thus can "get thingsdone." Political scientists(e.g., Edward Banfield) often identifysuccess in performingthis functionas evidence of effectivelocal government. 13 In his study of the historyof zoning in New York City, Makielski remarks:"While the newspapersin the city are large landholders,the role of the press was not quite like that of any of the other nongovernmentalactors. The press was in part one of the refereesof the rules of the game, especially the informalrules-calling attention to what it consideredviolations" (1966, p. 189).

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The City as a GrowthMachine intralocaldistribution of growth.A universitymay requirean increasein the local urban populationpool to sustainits own expansionplans and, in addition,it may be inducedto deferto othersin the growthmachine (bankers,newspapers) upon whomit dependsfor the favorablefinancial and public-opinionenvironment necessary for institutional enhancement. There are certainpersons, ordinarily conceived of as membersof the elite,who have muchless, if any,interest in local growth.Thus, forexample, thereare branchexecutives of corporationsheadquartered elsewhere who, althoughperhaps emotionally sympathetic with progrowth outlooks, workfor corporations which have no vestedinterest in the growthof the localityin question.Their indirectinterest is perhapsin the existenceof the growthideology rather than growth itself. It is thatideology which in facthelps make themrevered people in the area (social worthis oftende- finedin termsof numberof people one employs)and whichprovides the rationalefor the kind of local governmentalpolicies most consistent with low businessoperating costs. Nonetheless,this interestis not nearlyas strongas the directgrowth interests of developers,mortgage bankers, etc., and thuswe find,as Schulze (1961) has observed,that there is a tendency for such executivesto play a lesserlocal role than the parochial,home- grownbusinessmen whom they often replace. Thus, because the cityis a growthmachine, it drawsa special sort of personinto its politics.These people-whetheracting on theirown or on behalfof the constituencywhich financed their rise to power-tend to be businessmenand, amongbusinessmen, the moreparochial sort. Typically, theycome to politicsnot to save or destroythe environment, not to repress or liberatethe blacks, not to eliminatecivil liberties or enhancethem. They mayend up doingany or all of thesethings once theyhave achievedaccess to authority,perhaps as an inadvertentconsequence of makingdecisions in otherrealms. But thesetypes of symbolicpositions are derivedfrom the fact of havingpower-they are typicallynot the dynamicswhich bring people to powerin the firstplace. Thus, people oftenbecome "involved" in government,especially in thelocal partystructure and fundraising, for reasons of land businessand relatedprocesses of resourcedistribution. Some are "statesmen"who thinkin termsof thegrowth of thewhole com- munityrather than thatof a morenarrow geographical delimitation. But theyare thereto wheel and deal to affectresource distribution through local government.As a resultof theirposition, and in part to developthe symbolicissues whichwill enable them(in lieu of one of theiropponents or colleagues) to maintainthat positionof power,they get interestedin suchthings as welfarecheating, busing, street crime, and theprice of meat. This interestin the symbolicissues (see Edelman 1964) is thussubstan- tiallyan aftereffectof a need forpower for other purposes. This is not to say that such people don't "feel strongly"about these matters-theydo

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology sometimes.It is also the case that certainmoral zealots and "concerned citizens"go into politicsto rightsymbolic wrongs; but the moneyand othersupports which make themviable as politiciansis usuallynonsym- bolic money. Those who come to the forefrontof local government(and those to whomthey are directlyresponsive), therefore, are not statisticallyrepre- sentativeof thelocal populationas a whole,nor even representativeof the social classes whichproduce them. The issues theyintroduce into public discourseare not representativeeither. As notedby Edelman,the distributive issues, the matterswhich bring people to power,are more or less deliberatelydropped from public discourse(see Schattschneider1960). The issues whichare allowedto be discussedand the positionswhich the politicianstake on themderive from the worldviews of thosewho come fromcertain sectors of the businessand professionalclass and the need whichthey have to whipup publicsentiment without allowing distributive issues to becomepart of public discussion.It followsthat any political changewhich succeeded in replacingthe land businessas the key determi- nantof thelocal politicaldynamic would simultaneously weaken the power of one of themore reactionary political forces in thesociety, thereby affecting outcomeswith respect to thoseother symbolic issues which manage to gain so much attention.Thus, should such a changeoccur, there would likely be more progressivepositions taken on civil liberties,and less harassmentof welfarerecipients, social "deviants,"and otherdefenseless victims.

LIABILITIES OF THE GROWTH MACHINE Emergingtrends are tendingto enervatethe localitygrowth machines. First is the increasingsuspicion that in many areas, at many historical moments,growth benefits only a smallproportion of local residents.Growth almost always bringswith it the obviousproblems of increasedair and water pollution,traffic congestion, and overtaxingof natural amenities. These dysfunctionsbecome increasingly important and visibleas increased consumerincome fulfills people's otherneeds and as the naturalcleansing capacitiesof the environmentare progressivelyovercome with deleterious material.While it is by no meanscertain that growth and increasedden- sityinevitably bring about socialpathologies (see Fischer,Baldassare, and Ofshe 1974), growthdoes make such pathologiesmore difficultto deal with.For example,the larger the jurisdiction, the more difficult it becomes to achievethe goal of schoolintegration without massive busing schemes. As increasingexperience with busing makes clear,small townscan more easily have interracialschools, whether fortuitously through spatial prox- imityor throughmanaged programs.

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The City as a GrowthMachine In addition,the weightof researchevidence is that growthoften costs existingresidents more money.Evidently, at various populationlevels, pointsof diminishingreturns are crossedsuch that additionalincrements lead to net revenuelosses. A 1970 studyfor the city of Palo Alto, Cali- fornia,indicated that it was substantiallycheaper for that city to acquire at fullmarket value its foothillopen space than to allow it to becomean "addition"to the tax base (Livingstonand Blayney 1971). A study of Santa Barbara,California, demonstrated that additional population growth wouldrequire higher property taxes, as well as higherutility costs (Appel- baum et al. 1974). Similarresults on the costs of growthhave been ob- tainedin studiesof Boulder,Colorado (cited in Finkler1972), and Ann Arbor,Michigan (Ann Arbor City Planning Department1972) .14 Sys- tematicanalyses of governmentcosts as a functionof citysize and growth have been carriedout undera numberof methodologies,but the use of the units of analysis most appropriatefor comparison(urban areas) yields the findingthat the cost is directlyrelated both to size of place and rateof growth,at least formiddle-size cities (see Follett1976; Appel- baum 1976). Especially significantare per capita police costs, which virtuallyall studiesshow to be positivelyrelated to bothcity size and rate of growth(see Appelbaumet al. 1974; Appelbaum1976). Althoughdamage to the physicalenvironment and costsof utilitiesand governmentalservices may rise withsize of settlement,"optimal" size is obviouslydetermined by the sortsof values whichare to be maximized (see Duncan 1957). It may indeed be necessaryto sacrificeclean air to accumulatea populationbase largeenough to supporta majoropera company. But the essentialpoint remainsthat growthis certainlyless of a financialadvantage to the taxpayerthan is conventionallydepicted, and that most people's values are, accordingto the surveyevidence (Hoch 1972,p. 280; Finkler1972, pp. 2, 23; Parke and Westoff1972; Mazie and Rowlings1973; Appelbaumet al. 1974,pp. 4.2-4.6) moreconsistent with small places than large. Indeed, it is ratherclear that some substantial portionof themigrations to thegreat metropolitan areas of the last decade has been morein spite of people's values than because of them.In the recentwords of Sundquist:"The notioncommonly expressed that Ameri- cans have 'votedwith their feet' in favorof thegreat cities is, on thebasis of everyavailable sampling, so muchnonsense.. . . What is called 'freedom of choice'is, in sum,freedom of employerchoice or, moreprecisely, freedomof choicefor that segment of thecorporate world that operates mobile

14 A usefulbibliography of growthevaluation studies is Agelasto and Perry (undated). A study with findingscontrary to those reportedhere (Gruen and Gruen Associates 1972) limits cost evaluation to only three municipal services and was carried out in a city which had already made major capital expendituresthat provided it with huge unused capacities in water, schools, and sewage.

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology enterprises.The real question,then, is whetherfreedom of corporatechoice shouldbe automaticallyhonored by governmentpolicy at the expenseof freedomof individualchoice where those conflict" (1975, p. 258). Taking all the evidencetogether, it is certainlya ratherconservative statementto make that undermany circumstancesgrowth is a liability financiallyand in qualityof lifefor the majorityof local residents.Under such circumstances,local growthis a transferof qualityof lifeand wealth fromthe local generalpublic to a certainsegment of the local elite. To raise the questionof wisdomof growthin regardto any specificlocality is hence potentiallyto threatensuch a wealthtransfer and the interests of thosewho profit by it.

THE PROBLEMS OF JOBS Perhaps the key ideologicalprop for the growthmachine, especially in termsof sustainingsupport from the working-classmajority (Levison 1974), is the claim that growth"makes jobs." This claim is aggressively promulgatedby developers,builders, and chambersof commerce;it becomes a part of the statesmantalk of editorialistsand politicalofficials. Such peopledo notspeak of growthas usefulto profits-rather,they speak of it as necessaryfor making jobs. But local growthdoes not,of course, make jobs: it distributesjobs. The United States will see next year the constructionof a certainnumber of new factories,office units, and highways-regardlessof wherethey are put. Similarly,a givennumber of auto- mobiles,missiles, and lampshadeswill be made, regardlessof wherethey are manufactured.Thus, the numberof jobs in this society,whether in the buildingtrades or any othereconomic sector, will be determinedby rates of investmentreturn, federal decisions affecting the moneysupply, and otherfactors having very little to do withlocal decisionmaking. All thata localitycan do is to attemptto guaranteethat a certainproportion of newlycreated jobs will be in thelocality in question.Aggregate empioy- mentis thusunaffected by theoutcome of thiscompetition among localities to "make" jobs. The labor forceis essentiallya singlenational pool; workersare mobile and generallycapable of takingadvantage of employmentopportunities emergingat geographicallydistant points.15 As jobs develop in a fast- growingarea, the unemployedwill be attractedfrom other areas in suffi- cientnumbers not only to fillthose developing vacancies but also to form

15 I am not arguingthat the labor forceis perfectlymobile, as indeed there is strong evidence that mobility is limited by imperfectinformation, skill limitations,and cultural and family ties. The argumentis rather that the essential mobility of the labor force is sufficientlypronounced to make programsof local job creation largely irrelevantto long-termrates of unemployment.

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The City as a GrowthMachine a work-forcesector that is continuouslyunemployed. Thus, just as local growthdoes not affectaggregate employment, it likelyhas verylittle long- termimpact upon the local rate of unemployment.Again, the systematic evidencefails to showany advantageto growth:there is no tendencyfor eitherlarger places or morerapidly growing ones to have lowerunemploy- mentrates than otherkinds of urban areas. In fact,the tendencyis for rapid growthto be associatedwith higherrates of unemployment(for generaldocumentation, see Follett 1976; Appelbaum1976; Hadden and Borgatta1965, p. 108; Samuelson1942; SierraClub of San Diego 1973).16 This patternof findingsis vividlyillustrated through inspection of rele- vantdata on themost extreme cases of urbangrowth: those SMSAs which experiencedthe mostrapid ratesof populationincrease over the last two intercensusdecades. Tables 1 and 2 show a comparisonof population growthand unemploymentrates in the 25 areas whichgrew fastest during the 1950-60 and 1960-70 periods.In thecase of bothdecade comparisons, halfof the urbanareas had unemploymentrates above the nationalfigure forall SMSAs. Even the 25 slowest-growing(1960-70) SMSAs failed to experience particularlyhigh rates of unemployment.Table 3 reveals that although all wereplaces of net migrationloss less than half of the SMSAs of this grouphad unemploymentrates above the nationalmean at the decade's end. Justas strikingis the comparisonof growthand unemploymentrates forall SMSAs in Californiaduring the 1960-66 period-a timeof general boomin the state.Table 4 revealsthat among all Californiametropolitan areas thereis no significantrelationship (r = -17, z - .569) between 1960-66 growthrates and the 1966 unemploymentrate. Table 4 is also instructive(and consistentwith other tables) in revealingthat while there is a wide divergencein growthrates across metropolitan areas, thereis no comparablevariation in the unemploymentrates, all of which cluster withinthe relativelynarrow range of 4.3%o-6.5%. Consistentwith my previousargument, I take thisas evidencethat the mobility of labor tends to flattenout cross-SMSAunemployment rates, regardless of widelydiverg- ing rates of localitygrowth. Taken together,the data indicatethat local populationgrowth is no solutionto the problemof local unemployment. It remainspossible that for some reasoncertain specific rates of growth may be peculiarlyrelated to lowerrates of unemploymentand that the measuresused in this and cited studiesare insensitiveto thesepatterns.

16 This lack of relationshipbetween local population change and unemploymenthas led others to conclusionssimilar to my own: "Economists unanimouslyhave agreed that the only jurisdictionthat should be concernedwith the effectsof its policies on the level of employmentis the Federal government.Small jurisdictionsdo not have the power to effectsignificant changes in the level of unemployment"(Levy and Arnold 1972, p. 95).

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TABLE 1

GROWTH ANDUNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR 25 FASTEST-GROWINGSMSAs, 1950-60 (%)

UnemploymentRate, MetropolitanArea Rate of Growth 1960 1. Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood,Fla ...... 297.9 4.7 2. Anaheim-SantaAna-Garden Grove, Calif. .. 225.6 4.6 3. Las Vegas, Nev...... 163.0 6.7* 4. Midland, Tex...... 162.6 4.9 5. Orlando, Fla ...... 124.6 5.1 6. San Jose, Calif...... 121.1 7.0* 7. Odessa, Tex...... 116.1 5.6* 8. Phoenix, Ariz...... 100.0 4.7 9. W. Palm Beach, Fla .98.9 4.8 10. Colorado Springs,Colo .b...... 92.9 6.1* 11. Miami, Fla ...... 88.9 7.3* 12. Tampa-St. Petersburg,Fla ...... 88.8 5.1 13. Tucson, Ariz...... 88.1 5.9* 14. Albuquerque,N. Mex...... 80.0 4.5 15. San Bernadino-Riverside-Ontario,Calif. 79.3 6.7* 16. Sacramento,Calif ...... 74.0 6.1* 17. Albany, Ga ...... 73.5 4.4 18. Santa Barbara, Calif...... 72.0 3.6 19. Amarillo, Tex...... 71.6 3.3 20. Reno, Nev...... 68.8 6.1* 21. Lawton, Okla. 64.6 5.5* 22. Lake Charles, La .62.3 7.8* 23. El Paso, Tex.61.1 6.4* 24. Pensacola, Fla .54.9 5.3* 25. Lubbock, Tex ...... 54.7 3.9 Total U.S . .18.5 5.2

SOURCE.-U.S. Bureau of the Census 1962, tables33, 154. * Unemploymentrate above SMSA nationalmean.

Similarly,growth in certaintypes of industriesmay be morelikely than growthin othersto stimulateemployment without attracting migrants. It may also be possiblethat certainpopulation groups, by reasonof cul- turalmilieu, are less responsiveto mobilityoptions than othersand thus providebases forexceptions to thegeneral argument I am advancing.The presentanalysis does not precludesuch futurefindings but does assert, minimally,that the argumentthat growthmakes jobs is contradictedby theweight of evidencethat is available.17 I concludethat for the average workerin a fast-growingregion job securityhas much the same status as for a workerin a slower-growing region: thereis a surplusof workersover jobs, generatingcontinuous

17It is also true that this evidence is based on federal data, accumulated through the work of socially and geographicallydisparate persons who had purposes at hand differentfrom mine. This importantreservation can only be dealt with by noting that the findingswere consistentwith the author's theoreticalexpectations, rather than antecedentsof them. At a minimum,the resultsthrow the burden of proof on those who would argue the opposite hypothesis.

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TABLE 2

GROWTH AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES OF THE 25 FASTEST-GROWING SMSAs, 1960-70 (%)

UnemploymentRate, MetropolitanArea Rateof Growth 1970 1. Las Vegas, Nev ...... 115.2 5.2* 2. Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove, Calif. .. 101.8 5.4* 3. Oxnard-Ventura,Calif ...... 89.0 5.9* 4. Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood,Fla ...... 85.7 3.4 5. San Jose, Calif...... 65.8 5.8* 6. Colorado Springs, Colo.b...... 64.2 5.5* 7. Santa Barbara, Calif...... 56.4 6.4* 8. W. Palm Beach, Fla ...... 52.9 3.0 9. Nashua, N.H ...... 47.8 2.8 10. Huntsville,Ala .46.6 4.4 11. Columbia, Mo .45.8 2.4 12. Phoenix, Ariz.45.8 3.9 13. Danbury, Conn.44.3 4.2 14. Fayetteville,Ark .42.9 5.2* 15. Reno, Nev.42.9 6.2* 16. San Bernadino-Riverside-Ontario,Calif . 41.2 5.9* 17. Houston, Tex.40.0 3.0 18. Austin, Tex .39.3 3.1 19. Dallas, Tex.39.0 3.0 20. Santa Rosa, Calif.39.0 7.3* 21. Tallahassee, Fla. 38.8 3.0 22. Washington,D.C . 37.8 2.7 23. Atlanta, Ga. 36.7 3.0 24. Ann Arbor, Mich.35.8 5.0* 25. Miami, Fla .35.6 3.7 Total U.S ...... 16.6 4.3

SOURCE.-U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972, table3, SMSAs. * Unemploymentrate above the SMSA nationalmean. anxietyover unemployment18 and the effectivedepressant on wageswhich any lumpenproletariatof unemployedand marginallyemployed tends to exact (see, e.g., Bonacich 1975). Indigenousworkers likely receive little benefitfrom the growthmachine in termsof jobs; their"native" status gives themlittle edge over the "foreign"migrants seeking the additional jobs whichmay develop. Instead, they are interchangeableparts of the labor pool, and the degreeof theirjob insecurityis expressedin the local unemploymentrate, just as is thecase forthe nonnative worker. Ironically, it is probablythis very anxiety which often leads workers,or at least their unionspokespeople, to supportenthusiastically employers' preferred policies of growth.It is the case thatan actual declinein local job opportunities, or economicgrowth not in proportionto natural increase,might inducethe hardshipof migration.But this price is not the same as, and is less severethan, the price of simpleunemployment. It could also rather

18 For an insightfultreatment of joblessness with respect to the majority of the Americanwork force,see Levison (1974).

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TABLE 3

GROWTH, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND NET MIGRATION RATES FOR THE 25 SLOWEST-GROWING SMSAs, 1960-70 (%)

Rate of Net Unemployment, SMSA Growth Migration 1970

1. Abilene, Tex...... -5.3 -19.7 3.6 2. Altoona, Pa...... -1.4 - 6.6 3.5 3. Amarillo, Tex...... -3.4 -19.5 3.4 4. Brownsville-Harlingen-SanBenito, Tex. -7.1 -32.1 6.6* 5. Charleston,W. Va ...... -9.3 -19.0 4.1 6. Duluth-Superior,Minn.-Wis ...... -4.1 -10.9 7.3* 7. Gadsden, Ala...... -2.9 -12.4 7.3* 8. Huntington-Ashland,W. Va.-Ky.-Ohio ..... -0.4 - 9.7 5.1* 9. JerseyCity, N.J...... -0.5 - 7.5 4.7* 10. Johnstown,Pa ...... -6.4 -11.8 4.9* 11. McAllen-Pharr-Edinburgh,Tex ...... -0.3 -25.4 5.9* 12. Midland, Tex...... 3.4 -19.1 3.5 13. Montgomery,Ala ...... 0.9 -11.1 3.8 14. Odessa, Tex...... 0.9 -16.7 4.3 15. Pittsburgh,Pa ...... -0.2 - 7.0 4.3 16. Pueblo, Colo...... -0.4 -12.3 5.9* 17. St. Joseph, Mo ...... -4.0 - 9.2 3.9 18. Savannah, Ga ...... -0.3 -13.3 4.3 19. Scranton,Pa ...... -0.2 - 1.8 5.2* 20. Sioux City, Iowa ...... -3.2 -13.5 4.4* 21. Steubenville-Weirton, Ohio-W. Va...... -1.3 - 8.9 3.7 22. Utica-Rome, MY...... -1.7 -11.2 5.7* 23. Wheeling, W. Va.-Ohio ...... -4.0 - 8.3 4.2 24. Wichita Falls, Tex...... -2.6 -15.1 4.0 25. Wilkes-Barre-Hazleton,Pa...... -1.3 - 3.5 4.0 Total US...... S...... 16.6 ... 4.3

SOURCE.-U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972, table 3, SMSAs. * Unemploymentrate above SMSA nationalmean.

easilybe compensatedthrough a relocationsubsidy for mobile workers, as is nowcommonly provided for high-salaried executives by privatecorpora- tionsand in a limitedway generallyby the federaltax deductionfor job- relatedmoving expenses. Workers'anxiety and its ideologicalconsequences emerge fromthe largerfact that the UnitedStates is a societyof constantsubstantial joblessness,with unemployment rates conservatively estimated by theDepart- mentof Commerceat 4%-8%o of that portionof the workforce defined as ordinarilyactive. There is thusa gameof musicalchairs being played at all times,with workers circulating around the country,hoping to land in an emptychair at the momentthe music stops. Increasingthe stock of jobs in any one place neithercauses themusic to stop morefrequently nor increasesthe number of chairsrelative to the numberof players.The only way effectivelyto amelioratethis circumstance is to createa full-employ- menteconomy, a comprehensivesystem of drasticallyincreased unemploy- mentinsurance, or someother device which breaks the connection between

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TABLE 4 GROWTHAND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR ALL CALIFORNIASMSAs, 1960-66 (%)

Rate of Average Growth, Annual Unemployment SMSA 1960-66 Change Rate, 1966

Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove...... 65.0 8.3 4.3 Bakersfield.11.1 1.7 5.2 Fresno .12.3 1.9 6.5 Los Angeles-LongBeach .11.9 1.9 4.5 Modesto ...... Oxnard-Ventura .68.8 8.7 6.0 Sacramento.20.0 3.0 5.2 Salinas-Monterey .15.9 2.4 6.1 San Bernadino-Riverside. 27.9 4.0 6.2 San Diego .14.0 2.1 5.1 San Francisco-Oakland.11.1 1.7 4.4 San Jose .44.8 6.1 4.8 Santa Barbara .48.7 6.6 4.5 Santa Rosa ...... Stockton .12.5 1.9 6.3 Vallejo-Napa .20.6 3.0 4.4 California mean .27.47 3.80 5.25

SOURCES.-For averageannual changeand rate of growth,U.S. Bureau of the Census 1969, table 2; for unemploymentrate, 1966, State of California1970, table C-10. a person'shaving a livelihoodand the remotedecisions of corporateexecu- tives.Without such a development,the fear of unemploymentacts to make workerspolitically passive (if not downrightsupportive) with respect to land-use policies, taxationprograms, and antipollutionnonenforcement schemeswhich, in effect,represent income transfers from the generalpublic to varioussectors of theelite (see Whitt1975). Thus, formany reasons, workersand theirleaders should organize their political might more con- sistentlynot as partof thegrowth coalitions of thelocalities in whichthey are situated,but ratheras part of nationalmovements which aim to pro- vide full employment,income security, and programsfor taxation,land use,and theenvironment which benefit the vast majorityof thepopulation. They tendnot to be doingthis at present.

THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL INCREASE Localitiesgrow in populationnot simply as a functionof migrationbut also becauseof the fecundityof the existingpopulation. Some meansare obviously neededto providejobs and housingto accommodatesuch growth- eitherin the immediatearea or at some distantlocation. There are ways of handlingthis withoutcompounding the environmentaland budgetary problemsof existingsettlements. First, there are somelocalities which are, by manycriteria, not overpopulated.Their atmospheresare clean, water

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology suppliesplentiful, and trafficcongestion nonexistent. In fact,in certain places increasedincrements of populationmay spreadthe costsof existing road and sewersystems over a largernumber of citizensor bringan increasein qualityof publiceducation by makingrudimentary specialization possible. In the state of California,for example,the great bulk of the populationlives on a narrowcoastal belt in the southerntwo-thirds of the state.Thus the northernthird of the state consistsof a largeunpopulated regionrich in naturalresources, including electric power and potablewater. The optionchosen in California,as evidencedby the state aqueduct,was to movethe water from the uncrowded north to the dense,semiarid south, thus loweringthe environmentalqualities of both regions,and at a sub- stantiallong-term cost to thepublic budget. The oppositecourse of action was clearlyan option. The pointis thatthere are relativelyunderpopulated areas in thiscoun- trywhich do not have "natural"problems of inaccessibility,ugliness, or lack of population-supportresources. Indeed, the nation'smost severely depopulatedareas, the townsof Appalachia,are in locales of sufficientre- sourcesand are widelyregarded as aestheticallyappealing; population out- migrationlikely decreased the aestheticresources of both the migrantsto and residentsof Chicagoand Detroit,while resulting in the desertionof a housingstock and utilityinfrastructure designed to servea largerpopula- tion.Following from my more general perspective, I see lack of population in a givenarea as resultingfrom the politicaleconomic decisions made to populateother areas instead.If the processwere renderedmore rational, thesame investmentsin roads,airports, defense plants, etc., could be made to effecta very differentland-use outcome.Indeed, utilizationof such deliberateplanning strategies is the practicein some othersocieties and showssome evidence of success (see Sundquist1975); perhapsit could be made to workin theUnited States as well. As a long-termproblem, natural increase may well be phasedout. Ameri- can birthrates have been steadilydecreasing for the last severalyears, and we are on the vergeof a rate providingfor zero populationgrowth. If a stablepopulation actually is achieved,a continuationof the presentinter- local competitivesystem will resultin theproliferation of ghosttowns and unusedcapital stocksas the price paid for the growthof the successful competingunits. This will be an even moreclearly preposterous situation thanthe currentone, whichis givento produceghost towns only on occa- sion.

THE EMERGING COUNTERCOALITION Althoughgrowth has been the dominantideology in mostlocalities in the United States, therehas always been a subversivethread of resistance.

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Treatedas romantic,or as somehowirrational (see Whiteand White1962), thisminority long was ignored,even in the faceof accumulatingjournalis- tic portrayalsof the evilsof bigness.But certainlyit was an easy observa- tion to make that increasedsize was relatedto high levels of pollution, trafficcongestion, and otherdisadvantages. Similarly, it was easy enough to observethat tax ratesin largeplaces werenot generallyless thanthose in small places; althoughit receivedlittle attention,evidence that per capita governmentcosts rise withpopulation size was provideda genera- tion ago (see Hawley 1951). But few took note, thoughthe very rich, somehowsensing these facts to be the case, managedto reservefor themselves small,exclusive meccas of low densityby tightlyimposing population ceilings(e.g., BeverlyHills, Sands Point, West Palm Beach, Lake Forest). In recentyears, however, the base of the antigrowthmovement has become muchbroader and in some localitieshas reachedsufficient strength to achieveat least toeholdsof politicalpower. The mostprominent cases seem to be certainuniversity cities (Palo Alto, Santa Barbara, Boulder, Ann Arbor),all of whichhave sponsoredimpact studies documenting the costs of additionalgrowth. Other localitieswhich have imposedgrowth controlstend also to be places of highamenity value (e.g., Ramapo,N.Y.; Petaluma,Calif.; Boca Raton,Fla.). The antigrowthsentiment has become an importantpart of thepolitics of a fewlarge cities (e.g., San Diego) and has been the basis of importantpolitical careers at the statelevel (including thegovernorship) in Oregon,Colorado, and Vermont.Given the objec- tiveimportance of theissue and theevidence on thegeneral costs of growth, thereis nothingto preventantigrowth coalitions from similarly gaining powerelsewhere includingthose areas of thecountry which are generally consideredto possess lower levels of amenity.Nor is thereany reason, based on the factsof thematter, for these coalitions not to furtherbroaden theirbase to includethe great majority of theworking class in thelocalities in whichthey appear. But, like all politicalmovements which attempt to relyupon volunteer labor to supplantpolitical powers institutionalized through a systemof vestedeconomic interest, antigrowth movements are probablymore likely to succeedin thoseplaces wherevolunteer reform movements have a real- istic constituency-aleisured and sophisticatedmiddle class witha tradition of broad-basedactivism, free from an entrenchedmachine. At least, this appears to be an accurateprofile of thoseplaces in whichthe anti- growthcoalitions have alreadymatured. Systematicstudies of the social make up of the antigrowthactivists are only now in progress(e.g., Fitts 1976), but it seems that the emerging countercoalitionis rootedin the recentenvironmental movements and re- lies on a mixtureof youngactivists (some are veteransof the peace and

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology civil rightsmovements), middle-class professionals, and workers,all of whomsee theirown tax ratesas well as life-stylesin conflictwith growth. Importantin leadershiproles are governmentemployees and those who workfor organizations not dependenton local expansionfor profit, either directlyor indirectly.In the Santa Barbara antigrowthmovements, for example,much supportis providedby professionalsfrom research and electronicsfirms, as well as branchmanagers of small "high-technology" corporations.Cosmopolitan in outlook and pecuniaryinterest, they use the local communityonly as a settingfor life and work,rather than as an exploitableresource. Related to thisconstituency are certainvery wealthy people (particularlythose whose wealthderives from the exploitationof nonlocalenvironments) who continue a tradition(with some modifications) of aristocraticconservation.'9 Should it occur,the changeswhich the death of the growthmachine will bringseem clear enoughwith respect to land-usepolicy. Local gov- ernmentswill establishholding capacities for their regions and thenlegis- late,directly or indirectly,to limitpopulation to thoselevels. The direction of any futuredevelopment will tend to be plannedto minimizenegative environmentalimpacts. The so-callednatural process (see Burgess1925; Hoyt 1939) of land developmentwhich has given Americancities their presentshape will end as the politicaland economicfoundations of such processesare undermined.Perhaps most important, industrial and business land usersand theirrepresentatives will lose, at least to some extent,the effectivenessof theirthreat to locate elsewhereshould public policiesen- dangerthe profitabilitythey desire. As the growthmachine is destroyed in manyplaces, increasinglyit will be the businessinterests who will be forcedto make do with local policies,rather than the local populations havingto bow to businesswishes. New optionsfor taxation, creative land- use programs,and new formsof urban servicesmay thus emergeas city governmentcomes to resemblean agencywhich asks what it can do for its people ratherthan what it can do to attractmore people. More specif- ically,a givenindustrial project will perhapsbe evaluatedin termsof its social utility-theusefulness of the productmanufactured-either to the localityor to the societyat large. Production,merely for the sake of local expansion,will be less likely to occur. Hence, therewill be some pressureto increasethe use value of the country'sproduction apparatus and forexternal costs of productionto be borneinternally.

19 Descriptionsof the social makeup of Americanenvironmentalists (who coincide as a group only roughlywith the no-growthactivists) and of their increasingmilitancy are contained in Nash (1967), Bartell (1974), Dunlap and Gale (1972), Faich and Gale (1971). For a journalistic survey of no-growth activities, see Robert Cahn, "Mr. Developer, Someone Is Watching You" (Christian Science Monitor [May 21, 1973], p. 9). A more comprehensivedescription is contained in Reilly (1973).

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This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 18:09:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The City as a GrowthMachine When growthceases to be an issue, some of the investmentsmade in the politicalsystem to influenceand enhancegrowth will no longermake sense,thus changing the basis upon whichpeople get involvedin government.We can expectthat the local businesselites-led by land developers and othergrowth-coalition forces-will tend to withdrawfrom local politics. This vacuum may then be filledby a more representativeand, likely,less reactionaryactivist constituency. It is noteworthythat where antigrowthforces have establishedbeachheads of power,their programs and policieshave tendedto be moreprogressive than their predecessors'- on all issues,not just on growth.In Colorado,for example, the environ- mentalistwho led the successfulfight against the WinterOlympics also successfullysponsored abortion reform and other importantprogressive causes. The environmentallybased Santa Barbara "Citizens Coalition" (with citygovernment majority control) represents a fusionof the city's traditionalleft and counterculturewith other environmental activists. The resultof the no-growthinfluence in localitiesmay thusbe a tendencyfor an increasingprogressiveness in local politics.To whateverdegree local politicsis the bedrockupon whichthe nationalpolitical structure rests (and thereis muchdebate here), theremay followreforms at the national level as well. Perhapsit will thenbecome possible to utilizenational insti- tutionsto effectother policies which both solidifythe deathof the growth machineat the local level and create nationalpriorities consistent with the new opportunitiesfor urban civic life. These are speculationsbased upon the questionablethesis that a reform-oriented,issue-based citizens' politicscan be sustainedover a long period.The historicalrecord is not consistentwith this thesis; it is only emergingpolitical trendsin the mostaffected localities and the generalirrationality of the presenturban systemthat suggest the alternativepossibility is an authenticfuture.

REFERENCES

Adrian, Charles R., and 0. P. Williams. 1963. Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making. Philadelphia: Universityof PennsylvaniaPress. Agelasto, Michael A., II, and Patricia R. Perry. Undated. "The No Growth Contro- versy." Exchange Bibliographyno. 519. Mimeographed.Box 229, Monticello, Ill.: Council of Planning Libraries. Agger,Robert, Daniel Goldrich,and Bert E. Swanson. 1964. The Rulers and the Ruled: Political Power and Impotence in American Communities.New York: Wiley. Alonso, William. 1964. "Location Theory." Pp. 79-81 in Regional Development and Planning,edited by John Friedman and William Alonso. Cambridge,Mass.: M.I.T. Press. Ann Arbor City Planning Department. 1972. The Ann Arbor Growth Study. Ann Arbor, Mich.: City Planning Department. Appelbaum, Richard. 1976. "City Size and Urban Life: A PreliminaryInquiry into Some Consequences of Growth in American Cities." Urban AffairsQuarterly. Appelbaum, Richard, JenniferBigelow, Henry Kramer, Harvey Molotch, and Paul Relis. 1974. Santa Barbara: The Impacts of Growth: A Report of the Santa

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