CHAPTER 1 1 TAKING OVER AT AITAP E

HE campaign was fought in an elongated triangle of countr y T bounded on the north by the sea, on the south by the River , and in the west more or less by a north-south line through Aitape . Round Aitape the swampy coastal plain extends inland for about eight miles before reaching the foothills of the Torricelli Mountains, but the plain narrows east of Aitape and thereafter the mountains reach down almost to the beach . North from the Torricellis a series of rivers flow rapidly to the sea, all o f them subject to sudden flooding. To the south the streams run into the Sepik, a huge river navigable for some 300 miles by vessels drawing abou t 10 feet of water. Between these south-flowing streams lie a series of stee p heavily-timbered ridges and spurs ; round Maprik, however, they becom e slightly less rugged and there are wide areas of kunai grasslands .

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Wasambu• S~ ghAosap a

sep staa

Along the narrow coastal plain between the base of the mountains and the shore the tracks ran along the edge of the beach or a little distance inland, and the surface was often either loose sand or muddy quagmire . In heavy rain the rivers flooded swiftly and violently and swept down grea t pieces of driftwood which could break through low-level bridges . Only men on foot could move in the mountains rising abruptly on the southern flank. Often the tops of the spurs leading into these ranges were only a

272 TAKING OVER AT AITAPE 1944 few feet wide and offered a multitude of sites for defensive position s exceedingly difficult for infantry to attack or for artillery to range on to . There were a few miles of motor road in the neighbourhood of Aitap e and Wewak and a motor road between Marui and Maprik, which before the war had been an administrative centre and the site of an airfield . In the coastal area the population was sparse but the fertile hill countr y south of the Torricellis was fairly thickly populated, its many villages bein g connected by a network of foot tracks. In this area in October 1944 was deployed the XVIII Japanese Army , greatly depleted after its defeat by the Australians in the long campaig n in which it was driven westward from Lae and Salamaua in 1943 and earl y 1944, and by the repulse in July 1944 of its attack on the American garrison protecting the airfield and harbour of Aitape . The Australian Intelligenc e staffs believed in October that the XVIII Army had dwindled to about 30,000. (The true figure was about 35,000 .) Lieut-General Adachi's army headquarters were known to be some miles west of Wewak . About 2,000 base troops and infantry were believed to be on Kairiru and Musch u Islands. The 51st Division (Lieut-General Hidemitsu Nakano) was though t to be deployed in the coastal area from the Sepik to about Karawop ; the 20th Division (Lieut-General Masutaro Nakai) about the But and Dagu a airfields and inland to the Maprik area ; the 41st Division (Lieut-Genera l Goro Mano) forward of the Anumb River from the coast to Balif, wher e its headquarters were established . It was believed that some 3,000 bas e troops had been dispersed in small groups in the mountains east of th e 20th Division's area with instructions to live off the country . Broadly speaking the 6th Australian Division considered that it face d three depleted Japanese divisions each reduced to about the strength o f a reinforced brigade group . The Australians knew, however, that they them- selves were far better equipped, particularly with heavy weapons . They were well fed, and had excellent medical services, and would have fairl y strong air support and probably a moderate amount of naval support . The Japanese, on the other hand, were short of food, and many were sick . They had no air or naval forces and there was no hope of any arriving.

The 3rd Base Sub-Area, commanded by Lieut-Colonel J . T. Lang, was to provide a base for the , and a reconnaissance party fro m this unit arrived at Aitape on 15th September. Transports carrying supplie s and part of the unit arrived between 12th and 15th October, and whe n the 6th Division itself began to arrive the base was ready to serve them .' Because of the shortage of ships and the means of unloading them — a shortage that would hamper the operations for months—the division could be only trickled into Aitape. Three months and a half elapsed between the arrival of the advanced party and the arrival of the las t

1 The 3rd Base Sub-Area at this stage included 36 units and detachments ranging in size from th e 17th Works Company, 484 strong, to a Field Security Detachment of three men . Among the units were : the 2/11th General Hospital, 3rd/14th Field Ambulance, 19th Ordnance Depot , 15th Mobile Laundry, Docks Operating Company, 127th Brigade Workshops, 126th Genera l Transport Company. Aitape-Wewak

274 TAKING OVER AT AITAPE 1939-4 4 fighting units. G.H.Q. allocated ships piecemeal to the task . The first was the Gorgon, which left Brisbane with base troops on 4th October. There- after one ship arrived at Aitape on 19th October, two on 22nd October (with the 2/6th Cavalry (Commando) Regiment and others), one o n 23rd October, one on 5th November, one on the 6th, one on the 11th , two on the 12th . By that time the and a good part of th e divisional troops had arrived. The whole 19th Brigade had arrived b y 19th November, the 17th Brigade by 7th December and the 16th b y 31st December . The 6th Division—the senior formation of the A .I.F.—had fought in Cyrenaica and Greece in 1940 and 1941 but since then had not been in action as a complete division. In the intervening three years and a hal f most of its units had seen much fighting both in the Middle East an d New Guinea, but some had not been in battle since Crete in May 1941 . Five of its battalions had fought in Crete ; two, and the divisional cavalry , in Syria. For four months in 1942 the division had ceased to exist; part of it was in Ceylon, part in Australia, and its commander and staff wer e controlling Northern Territory Force . Its 16th Brigade fought in Papua in 1942 and its 17th Brigade in the Wau-Salamaua operations in 1943 . The 19th Brigade spent many months as part of Northern Territory Forc e and had not yet fought against Japanese. The divisional commander, Major- General Stevens, and two of the infantry brigadiers—R . King of the 16th and Martin2 of the 19th—had not been in action in New Guinea . Stevens had led a brigade in the Syrian campaign ; King a battalion in Cyrenaica , Greece and Syria ; Martin a battalion at Giarabub and in Tobruk. The third brigade commander, M . J . Moten, however, had led his brigad e during the long and exacting Wau-Salamaua operations of 1943 . In all battalions a substantial number and in some a majority of the officers and a small percentage of the other ranks had served in this division since 1939, and most of Stevens ' general and administrative staff were in that category . His G.S.O .1, Lieut-Colonel J. A. Bishop, had serve d on a brigade staff in North Africa, Greece and Syria, and in 1943 ha d commanded the 2/27th Battalion in the Ramu Valley . Lieut-Colonel Murphy,3 his senior administrative officer, was a former regular soldie r who had retired in 1923, joined the A.I.F. as a lieutenant in 1940 and, in two years, had become a lieut-colonel . He had served in the Middle East and had come to the 6th Division after twelve months as an instructo r at the Senior Staff School .4

2 Brig J . E . G . Martin, CBE, DSO, ED, QX6049 . CO 2/9 Bn 1939-41 ; Comd 19 Bde 1941-45 . Civil engineer ; of Rockhampton, Qld ; b . Brisbane, 17 Apr 1904. 5 Lt-Cot W. C . Murphy, OBE, NX354. 2/2 Fd Regt ; DAQMG I Corps 1941-42 ; AA&QMG 6 Div 1942-45 . Advertising manager ; of Willoughby, NSW; b. Melbourne, 28 Feb 1901 . S The senior principal appointments on the staff of the 6th Division in December 1944 were : GOC Maj-Gen J. E . S . Stevens ; GSOI Lt-Col J . A. Bishop ; GSO2 Maj E . Logan ; Snr LO Maj N. M . Symington ; AA&QMG Lt-Col W. C . Murphy ; DAAG Maj D . S . I. Burrows ; DAQMG Maj C . V. I . Barnden ; Legal Officer Maj J . R. Nosworthy ; ADMS Col H . M . Fisher ; ADO S Lt-Col C. R. Thomson ; CEME Lt-Col W . H . Mence . The CRA was Brig J . Reddish, th e CO Sigs Lt-Col L . N . Tribolet and the COASC Lt-Col J . Talbot.

1944 DIVISION ' S ROLE 275 Air support was to be given by No . 71 Wing, R .A.A.F., commanded by Wing Commander Coopers (but after 27th March by Group Captain Hancock6 ) . It included Nos . 7, 8 and 100 Squadrons, equipped with Beauforts and had been operating in support of the American forces a t Aitape. Tactical reconnaissance was to be performed by one flight of No. 4 Squadron with Boomerang and Wirraway aircraft .' Support was also to be given by aircraft from the American Combat Replacement an d Training Centre at Nadzab . Limited numbers of supply aircraft were allotted, as will be recorded later. The instructions which General Blarney gave to General Sturdee i n August have been mentioned earlier, with their indication that in al l New Guinea areas the Australian garrisons would be more active tha n the American garrisons had been . In consequence General Sturdee o n 18th October issued to General Stevens an operation instruction in whic h he defined the division ' s role thus : (a) To defend airfield and radar installations in the Aitape-Tadji area ; (b) To prevent movement westward of Japanese forces in the area and seiz e every opportunity for the destruction of these forces ; (c) To give maximum help to A .I.B. and Angau units in the area in thei r tasks of gaining Intelligence, establishing patrol bases and protecting the native population . These A .I.B. and Angau units had been active in the Sepik-Aitap e triangle since the time of the landing of American forces at Aitape i n April 1944, and the 6th Division came into an area where, from the outset , practically all the deep patrolling had been done by groups of Australians . In the Aitape area, prior to the arrival of the Division (said the report of th e 6th Division), Angau long-range patrols operated without troop support and, fo r their own protection, inaugurated a type of guerilla warfare . Selected village native s called "sentries" were taught to use grenades and Japanese rifles . The sentries, beside s furnishing Intelligence . . . accounted for large numbers of enemy . This system was continued . As each area was freed the sentries were rewarded and returned to their villages .

The plan for the relief of XI American Corps provided that the corp s headquarters and a regiment of the 32nd Division should depart on 10th September, the 31st Division and the remainder of the 32nd on 10t h October, and the 43rd Division and 112th Cavalry Regiment on 10t h November . Actually the last American troops were not taken off until later than that. As mentioned, the first Australian fighting unit to arrive at Aitape was the 2/6th Cavalry (Commando) Regiment (Lieut-Colonel Hennessy $ )

6 W Cdr E . W. Cooper, AFC. Comd 73 Sqn 1943, 7 Sqn 1944, 71 Wing 1944-45 . Wholesale frui t merchant ; of Ashfield, NSW ; b. Summer Hill, NSW, 29 Mar 1915. c Air Marshal Sir Valston Hancock, KBE, CB, DFC . Comd 1 Bombing and Air Gunnery Schoo l 1940-42 ; Director of Plans, Allied Air HQ 1942-43 ; SOA Western Area 1943-44 ; Comd 100 Sq n and later 71 Wing 1945 . AOC Malaya 1957-59 ; Chief of Air Staff since 1961 . Regular air force officer ; b . Perth, 31 May 1907 . 7 After 19th March when this flight departed the Beauforts did this work until 18th April whe n a detachment of No . 5 Squadron arrived . s Lt-Col E . C. Hennessy, DSO, MC, NX8676 . 6 Cav Regt ; CO 2/6 Cav (Cdo) Regt 1944-45 . Of Pine Rocks, via Orange, NSW ; b . Lithgow, NSW, 8 Sep 1910 .

276 TAKING OVER AT AITAPE 1944 and, pending the transfer of command to General Stevens, General Sturdee , with the concurrence of the American commander, instructed Henness y to relieve the American outpost at Babiang and assist the Angau patrol s farther forward. The 2/6th Cavalry (Commando) Regiment as a unit had not served in New Guinea before but contained many who had, having absorbed in a reorganisation one of the old Independent companies — the 2/7th, now the 2/7th Commando Squadron . The 43rd American Division, which now formed the main part of the Aitape garrison, was maintaining standing patrols at Aiterap, Kamti an d Palauru as well as Babiang. It had two companies forward of th e Driniumor River and the remainder of the division either lightly mannin g the "main line of resistance" (or perimeter defences) or training . At this stage the A .I.B. had patrols based at Mai Mai and Makru and ther e was an Angau patrol at the headwaters of the Harech River and anothe r at Yapunda.

Advance to Yambes and the Danmap, October-Decembe r

Little information was available to the division from American sources (wrot e Stevens later) as the Americans had had no real contact with the enemy since . . . July and August 1944 . It appeared, however, that no organised Japanese force was in the coastal area west of Babiang. Inland and south of the Torricelli Mountains a n Angau patrol had twice been driven out of Tong and there was clear evidence tha t a considerable enemy force was moving westwards . It was considered, therefore, that the enemy had moved a large proportion of his forces inland in order t o gain control of the valuable food producing areas there . Several of the main north-

Oct-Nov SEARCH FOR INFORMATION 277 south tracks were evidently being used as lines of communication between their coasta l and inland forces, the most westerly being the track Abau, Malin, Walum, Amam . 9 With the object of supplementing his information about the enem y Stevens decided that from the outset there should be vigorous patrolling . Thus, on 27th October, the 2/ 10th Commando Squadron (Major Wray l ) relieved a company of the 172nd American Regiment at the outpost at Babiang, at the mouth of the Dandriwad, and, with the help of natives , built a new camp . Thence patrols were carried out each day . On 1st November one of these, at Suain village 10 miles to the east, found 1 2 dead Japanese who appeared to have died of starvation . On 2nd November a new phase opened when a patrol of six officers and 30 others unde r Captain Short2 set out along the Old German Road—the road travellin g along or near the shore to Wewak and originally formed during the Germa n possession of this part of New Guinea—with the task of clearing the coasta l area as far east as the Danmap River and establishing a base there . It discovered that throughout the area Japanese were moving about in smal l groups, sometimes unarmed. At Suain Plantation early on the 3rd thre e were surprised while cooking a meal and killed. A few minutes later two well-equipped Japanese were encountered and one was killed and on e escaped. Beyond Suain village two Japanese, only one of them armed, wer e surrounded and captured . That day and the next other parties were seen ; altogether the patrol saw about 40 Japanese, killed 11 for certain an d probably 2 more, and had only one of its own men wounded . The fact that the Japanese were surprised at nearly every encounter suggeste d that they were outpost groups who had been wandering about the are a unmolested for so long that they had become careless . On 3rd November another ambitious patrol set out . It was guided by Captain Cole 3 of Angau and included Captain Woodhouse 4 of the com- mando squadron, seven other ranks of the squadron, and some nativ e police, and its task was to examine the possibility of establishing a base with a dropping area and landing strip for light aircraft near Yasua r Mission at Tong, deep in the Torricellis . The patrol was in touch wit h native sentries posted about Kombio, Worn and Yambes and gained a good knowledge of the enemy's dispositions ; Yasuar Mission was suitable as a squadron base but the nearest area in which a landing ground coul d be made was found to be eight hours away. On 10th November, after the patrol had been at Yasuar Mission for tw o days, natives reported that Japanese patrols were about, and on the mornin g of the 12th eight Japanese emerged from the jungle and began advancin g on the mission where the Australians, forewarned, were manning thei r

B 6th Australian Division Report on Operations Aitape-Wewak Campaign, 26 Oct 44-13 Sep 45 . 1 Maj C . H. W. Wray, NX12264 . 6 Cav Regt ; OC 2/10 Cdo Sqn . Farmer ; of Maclean, NSW ; b. Maclean, 14 Nov 1915 . 2 Capt L . T . Short, SX11735 . 6 Cav Regt and 2/10 Cdo Sqn . Insurance inspector ; of Westbourn e Park, SA ; b . Adelaide, 17 Oct 1912 . 9 Capt R . R . Cole, MC, NGX46 ; Angau. Patrol officer ; of Ashfield, NSW ; b . Dubbo, NSW, 4 Nov 1914 . 4 Capt M. C . Woodhouse, VX8346 . 6 Cav Regt and 2/10 Cdo Sqn . Bank officer ; of Brighton, Vic ; b . Kialla, NSW, 26 Jul 1908.

278 TAKING OVER AT AITAPE Oct-Nov weapon-pits . All eight were killed. The patrol then withdrew and was back at Babiang on the 14th. Meanwhile between the 7th and 10th Captain Welsh's troop of the . 2/ 10th Squadron set out with the task of destroying any enemy west o f the Danmap area and in the mountain ridges above the German Road . Because the going was so difficult and the available carriers could not cope , the patrol concentrated on the coastal area where it killed four Japanese , including a captain, and captured a prisoner, weapons, and many docu- ments, without loss to itself. Such patrols continued . On the 10th a Japanese officer and a Chinese coolie surrendered to a small patrol . On the 15th a group of 32 under Short, probing towards Balup, engaged a Japanese party for 45 minutes , and drove it off killing 6 (but losing Trooper Le Brun,'' killed) . On the 19th a patrol of 57 led by Lieutenant Mackinnon, ? inland from Luain , killed 10 Japanese, and captured three; and observed an air strike on the east side of the Danmap River . Some of the Japanese killed or captured were in good condition bu t most were ill-nourished, and their main occupation seemed to be to fin d food; on the 20th a patrol found "positive evidence of cannibalism" in th e foothills south of Suain . Some men were unarmed, and often they were living in twos and threes near sago swamps . The prisoners, who all belonged to the 41st Division, gave much information . The area as far east as the Anumb was occupied by the 237th Regiment then comprising two bat- talions each about 300 strong . The 238th and 239th Regiments in the Womisis area were each from 700 to 1,000 strong . Two prisoners sai d that some men were so hungry that they were eating human flesh, and on e that he himself had done so. The 20th Division between the Anumb an d But was about 7,000 strong and the 51st Division, farther east, with head- quarters near Wewak, was probably stronger . Throughout this period the 2/9th Commando Squadron (Captai n Boyd8 ) had been manning the observation posts at Palauru, Kamti an d Aiterap, where it had relieved a company of the 172nd American Regi- ment on 27th October, and maintaining frequent patrols from those posts southward over the Torricellis, but without meeting any Japanese . By 30th November the commando squadrons had killed 73 Japanese, foun d 12 dead, taken 7 prisoners ; and had lost one man killed and one wounded . Meanwhile on 8th November General Stevens had opened his head - quarters at Aitape . Already, under an arrangement with the outgoin g American commander, he had issued general instructions to his brigades : the 19th was to relieve the regiment of the 43rd American Division o n the Driniumor, the 17th was to relieve the units of the 43rd Division that

5 Capt N . B . Welsh, NX16024 . 6 Cav Regt and 2/10 Cdo Sqn . Grazier ; of Coogee, NSW ; b . Tallangatta, Vic, 14 Dec 1909 . Tpr N. S . Le Brun, VX76818 ; 2/10 Cdo Sqn . Bricklayer ; of Richmond, Vic ; b. Sorrento, Vic, 24 Apr 1910 . Killed in action 15 Nov 1944 . v Capt A . G . Mackinnon, TX2133 . 6 Cav Regt and 2/10 Cdo Sqn. Farmer ; of Conara, Tas ; b . Launceston, Tas, 1 May 1916 . s Capt D . G . Boyd, NX12295 . 6 Cav Regt, 2/9 Cdo Sqn (acting OC 2/10 Cdo Sqn 1945) . Article d clerk ; of Peak Hill, NSW ; b. Belfast, N Ireland, 3 Aug 1911 .

Nov-Dec LARGER OPERATIONS ORDERED 279 were manning the main line of resistance, and the 16th was to be i n reserve . On 13th November General Sturdee 's instruction, quoted earlier, had been elaborated by one which required Stevens to conduct mino r raids and patrols by land, sea and air "within the resources available " , with the object of gaining information on which to base plans for futur e operations and at the same time maintain an offensive spirit in the troops. The relief of the American force was completed on 26th November, an d on that day Stevens assumed full command . Three days earlier he had sought approval to undertake two operations too large to be classed as "minor raids and patrols" : to cut the enemy's line of communicatio n through Malin-Walum-Womisis-Amam, and to destroy the enemy east o f the Danmap River, D-day to be not before 31st December . These proposals were approved by Sturdee on 13th December, by which date the 19t h and 17th Brigades had arrived at Aitape. In the background at this stage was always the consideration that it was possible that the division migh t be needed at short notice to reinforce I Australian Corps, and consequentl y it could not yet be committed to a major campaign in the Wewak area . On 27th November General Stevens had issued "Operation Order 1" . In it he expressed the opinion that the enemy would defend the Danmap River area to prevent movement along the coast ; and, inland, would us e harassing patrols to control the Maprik-Tong area for gardening an d foraging. The division's tasks (as mentioned) were to protect the airfiel d and radar stations; to give maximum assistance to Angau and A .I .B. patrols; and to prevent movement westward of the Japanese forces an d seize every opportunity for the destruction of those forces . It was wit h this third task in view that Stevens had sought approval of an operatio n to cut the enemy's line of communication from Malin to Amam. He ordered that the 19th Brigade, less most of the 2/11th Battalion, but plu s two companies of the 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion, the 53rd Fiel d Battery and other units and detachments, would relieve the 2/6th Com- mando Regiment at Babiang by 2nd December and maintain contact o n the Danmap River, establish a standing patrol at Afua, prevent enem y movement west of the Driniumor and protect the supply base at Yakamul .0 The 2/6th Commando Regiment would move the 2/7th Squadron to th e Tong area, maintain a base there and gain control of the immediat e vicinity, patrol southward and try to establish a forward base at Musu . The 17th Brigade Group, while improving and maintaining the main line of resistance for local defence of Aitape and the Tadji strip, would , when sufficient troops were available, relieve the 2/9th Squadron, reinforc e the Angau patrol at Yapunda, and be prepared to relieve the 2/7th Squadron at Tong, and patrol east to Musu, near Asiling . In divisional reserve with the 16th Brigade, would be the 2/6th Com- mando Regiment less two squadrons, and "C" Squadron of the 2/4t h Armoured Regiment .

9 The brigade would later have under command the 2/9th and 2/10th Commando Squadrons and the 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion less two companies ; and in support the divisional artillery les s a battery .

280 TAKING OVER AT AITAPE Nov-De c The 2/7th Commando Squadron (Major A . L . Goode) had relieved the 2/ 10th at Babiang by 25th November and in accordance with the above orders had moved south . On 1st December Captain Fleming's 1 troop of the 2/7th marched from Nialu (where Cole maintained a bas e for collecting information from native agents) to Yasuar Mission (a t Tong), the remainder of the 2/7th Squadron staying at Yakamul. That afternoon, when half the men were digging in and building huts and th e others standing to, Japanese opened fire from the jungle, killing one ma n and wounding Fleming . In the next five hours a trooper was killed and a police boy wounded. Next morning the enemy had gone. Lieutenant Harrop, 2 now in command, sent a request for reinforcement by the res t of the squadron . On the morning of the 4th Colonel Hennessy, Majo r Goode and eight others arrived at Tong; and Captain Byrne's 3 troop was on the way. Hennessy decided that Tong was tactically a sound position, the squadron headquarters were established there, and at midday the second troop arrived . Next day he ordered the squadron to clear th e Kumbun-Yourang area, farther south, place a troop at Youran g , and patrol south-east. Kumbun was occupied unopposed on the 7th . In the following days the squadron extended its area of control , establishing outposts at Yasile and Yambes . On 11th December an enem y patrol approached the perimeter held by Byrne's troop at Yambes . The Australians held their fire until the Japanese were 35 to 50 yards away , killed 6 and, during the day, 2 more . There were patrol clashes tha t day and on the 13th . At 1 .30 a.m . on the 15th an enemy force of a t least 35 attacked. This time the Australians let the leading Japanes e come to within three yards of the perimeter then fired with automati c weapons and threw grenades . After pressing the attack for a while th e enemy withdrew, dragging away their wounded and about 10 dead . On 12th December Stevens had issued an order that the 17th Brigad e would, as forecast, relieve the 2/7th Squadron at Tong with not les s than a company, and patrol south of the Torricellis west of a north-south line through Musu . From Tong it would patrol south to Mimbiok an d Yanatong, south-east to Musimbe and establish a base, and then patro l east and establish a base at Musu . The 2/7th Squadron would move t o a base at Makuir and reconnoitre a route via Chem to the Dandriwad Rive r and Babiang, establish a forward base on the Danmap about five mile s east of Makuir and carry out other reconnaissance . Thus by the middle of December the commando regiment had probe d forward in the coastal sector to the Danmap, over 40 miles from Aitape , and some 20 miles into the Torricellis without encountering very stron g bodies of enemy troops . In addition the parties led by Angau officers were maintaining an Intelligence network farther afield in the Torricellis .

Capt R . S . Fleming, VX52857 . 2/4 and 2/7th Indep Coys, 2/7 Cdo Sqn . Compositor ; of Echuca , Vic ; b . Cobram, Vic, 29 Dec 1911 . 2 Capt C . O. Harrop, NX71006 ; 2/7 Cdo Sqn. Petrol depot superintendent ; of Bathurst, NSW ; b . Formby, Lanes, England, 30 Nov 1911 . 3 Maj E . F . Byrne, MC, NX58832 . 2/7 Indep Coy, 2/7 Cdo Sqn ; 9/Royal Sussex Regt 1945 . Sharebroker ' s clerk ; of Campsie, NSW ; b . Campsie, 23 May 1921 .

Nov-Apr SUPPLY PROBLEMS OVERCOME 28 1 Not only had the forthcoming actions to be fought either along a coasta l plain broken at intervals by rivers liable to flooding, or in inaccessible mountains, but the port was unsuited to the steady maintenance of a large force. By November the north-west monsoon was beginning and it would continue until April . The anchorage at Aitape offered practicall y no protection from the strong winds, and there was a heavy swell offshor e and a surf that sometimes was 6 feet high . There were no jetties and all off-loading or loading had to be done with landing craft . Bulldozers and tractors had to be used to hold the larger landing craft on to the beac h and prevent them from broaching . "The smaller landing craft could onl y dash in to the beach, take on a 21-ton motor truck which was waiting wit h its engine switched on, back out to a ship, take on 22 tons of stores , and then beach again momentarily to allow the motor truck to drive ashore. So a landing craft which was capable of carrying about 14 ton s of stores could only be loaded each trip with 21 tons!" } In addition not only was the port equipped with fewer craft than would have been needed to achieve a swift exchange of garrisons, but priorit y was, rightly, given to the combat-loading of the American formations whic h were destined for Leyte. While XIV American Corps was at Aitape it had control of 15 0 landing craft and in October was using each day 6 L .C.T's, 41 L.C.M's and 20 DUKW's . The initial planning for working the port at Aitape for the 6th Division provided for 6 L.C.T's, run by an Australian platoon , for handling normal maintenance cargo. But in fact a large force had t o be embarked and another one disembarked. The American craft did much of this work, but as the American force departed the number of landing craft diminished . By 27th December 30,000 tons of cargo, 270 vehicles and 2,000 men were awaiting unloading in five transports lying off Aitape , and it was evident that if unloading could not be hastened supplies ashor e would be exhausted in the first or second week of January . Sturdee sent a signal to Advanced L.H.Q. to this effect, and Advanced L .H.Q. to G .H.Q ., which expressed concern but directed that priority must still b e given to the forward movement of the Americans . By 2nd February only seven days' rations remained at Aitape. As a result of an appeal G.H.Q. directed that priority be given to unloading a transport carrying Australian rations . On 3rd February a company o f the 593rd American Boat and Shore Regiment arrived and unloadin g steadily improved until by April there was no undue delay in gettin g supplies ashore .

4 "The Wewak Campaign", by Major-General J. E . S . Stevens, United Service, November 1947,