atnd h dprue f l Sra fre from forces Syrian all of departure the hastened ence and sovereignty, the 14 March demonstrations Dubbed later as the for independ- factions. of political by a constellation backed ment, move- anti-Syrian the of leadership assumed Hariri, Saad son, Minister’s Prime assassinated The lah. Hezbol- of support ’s for gratitude their show and allegiance their pledge to 8 March on streets the to taken previously had demonstrators Syrian Pro- assassination. the into opened be vestigation in- international an that and leave forces Syrian that demanding 2005 14 March on stration in in Events Lebanon. culminated a demon- colossal had put the late Hariri at odds with the policies country’s Lebanon in heavy-handedness Syrian 1976. since Lebanon in stationed been had forces whose Syria, against made were con- assassination the cerning accusations unsubstantiated, Though front. sea- Beirut’s on bomb car massive Hariri a by Rafiq killed was Minister Prime when 2005, 14 ruary Feb- on sewn were crisis ongoing the of seeds The majority, ledbythepro-IranianHezbollah. tion, led by the deposed Prime Minister, and the new opposi- the between upheaval political tumultuous of years six of culmination the also is It governance. political in crisis recurrent and perpetual Lebanon’s two deeply divided political camps is but between an illustration of standoff recent The government. of branch executive its in void another yet with country ed incumbent Prime Minister Saad Hariri and left the immobility following a government crisis that unseat- political into plunging is Lebanon Sea, Arabian the to down Mediterranean Eastern and Southern the from sweeping rapidly change of winds the Amidst for Policy Studies, Beirut O Change to Lebanon’sResistance Stubborn Mediterranean Politics |MiddleEast F Political Analyst ormer DirectoroftheLebaneseCenter ussama Safa assassins ofRafiqHariri. the try to tribunal international hybrid a of founding the and Resolutions Council Security UN of series a Qatar, by led conflicts internal successful of mediation Arab witnessed also has 2005-2011 stretching from The period war. civil fifteen-year non’s Leba- of reminiscent clashes sectarian dangerous and with war a figures, media and political ian sued, characterised by the assassination of anti-Syr- en- instability of years five respectively, Sunnis and Shiites by led – essentially – 14 March camps and 8 March two between divided country the With after thirtyyearsofSyrianhegemonyoverLebanon. parliament first the of composition the to changes tions in Lebanon’s modern demonstra- history, brought cosmetic largest the of one arguably following was what 2005, June in held elections legislative the Subsequently, power. on hold their preserving on focused and reforms political major overlooked and shakers of Lebanon’s sectarian political system, movers the and politicians wily themselves 14 leaders, March the that revealed later was It business. out to be a disappointing uprising that left unfinished turned it many for although later, weeks six Lebanon medical and tourist service infrastructure. – financial, The coun- flawless not though – unparalleled an education, a strong and vibrant banking system, and of system modern a boasts country The East. Arab the to Europe for gateway a remains Lebanon cally, economi- and Culturally system. political its reinvent the way of the country’s attempts to reform itself and translated into an irrecoverable fragility that stands in has This it. around place taking changes rapid the on the governance system’s ability to keep pace with Lebanon’s chronic Lebanon’s A HistoryofPoliticalMalaise political ills have weighed heavily weighed have ills political

183 Med.2011 Panorama 184 Med.2011 Panorama during the second half of the twentieth century. twentieth the of half second the during history modern Lebanon’s punctuated powers, side out- by backed wars, communal periodic as time of test the withstand not did formula this Clearly ness. Lebanon’s weak- its from derived was argued, was position. it strength, their win to encouragement and support foreign who sought often ing minorities vy- between governing for consensus on relying of dangers the knew undoubtedly Pact National the of creators The intervention. foreign of a need constant for hence and conflict and bickering continued for recipe a – sects major its of leaders the tween be- consensus-based became effectively ernance the Prime Sunni. system Minister, Lebanon’s of gov- and Shiite parliament, of speaker the Maronite, be Republic the of President elite, the that political specified which Lebanon’s by 1943 in established was Pact National the as known agreement man’s size their gentle- in A the population. post-independence to according sects various the to er-sharing pow- apportioned that constitution a by companied ac- was 1926 in Lebanon Greater of creation The today. role that has under continued guises different to this a powers, foreign for battleground proxy a became unwillingly Lebanon Britain, degree lesser a to and heavy interference from the Ottoman Empire, With confrontation. periodic of and instability ongoing cause a become to pot melting Lebanon’s led own, its of narrative distinct a proclaiming and time from a at power the foreign protection each seeking minorities, sectarian opposing of gathering The ers. oth- many among Druze and Shiites Sunnis, tians, Chris- Maronite notably most minorities, competing included Beirut, and Lebanon Mount to limited and as known was which country, the of make-up the century, 19th the of part latter the to back Dating taking placearoundit keep pacewiththerapidchanges governance system’s abilityto have weighed heavily onthe Lebanon’s chronic politicalills Eastern Mediterranean. the in presence a establish to seeking businesses for destination top a Lebanon render culture friendly historically and society pluralistic multilingual, try’s other communities, particularlytheSunnis. armed presence. This was a factor that did not sit well with toHezbollah’s thanks increased influence ’s Lebanon, from pullout Syrian the after ticularly par- and Lebanon, South of liberation the Following day. this to such as remained has and Lebanon in no force military strongest in the became time, Hence, forces. armed regular the of pense ex- the at apparatus security and shrewdness tary mili- its build to Lebanon over collaboration Iranian Syrian- close a from benefited Hezbollah Lebanon. armed resistance against Israeli occupation of South successful a led 2000 until which Hezbollah, Shiite exclusively pro-Iranian, the of power military the in The post-war years also saw an exponential increase ing 52billiondollarsin2011. satisfy reach- control of and out spiralled elites, power-hungry reconstruction finance to gigantic borrowing from resulting debts, Lebanon’s quently, Conse- required. accountability or transparency no with interests latter’s the serve to leaders sectarian rebuilding funds were carefully apportioned between post-war fact, In areas. peripheral in education and development on spent little very with infrastructure, reconstruction projects and on modernising Beirut’s recovery was characterised primarily by massive spending on economic for drive post-war A day. this to issues unresolved remain war the after missing left people 17,000 and families displaced ternally and a half. The unspoken atrocities, thousands of in- ties, who had been engaged in fratricide for a decade communi- various country’s the between onciliation rec- meaningful conduct to effort serious any mied sty- and 1990 in issued was law amnesty blanket A Syrian politicians and ensure that they retain power. lawsand gerrymandering were tailored toserve pro- electoral subsequent Hence, system. political war serve their design to maintain tutelage over the post- to implemented selectively be Agreements Taif the that guarantee to Lebanon in stationed were forces gained positions and ensure self-preservation. Syrian weredriven bythe desire toconsolidate their newly- whom of most leaders, sectarian between making deal- of matter a became Governance elite. political and opened the way for warlords to Lebanon become the new for blueprint peace-building a becoming of short stopped it Agreement, Taif state. the as democratic Known modern a build to chance ous fully implemented, aimed at giving the country a seri- with a creative power-sharing accord that was never ended 1975-1990 from war civil longest Lebanon’s placed on the commonalities that exist between its between exist that commonalities the on placed emphasis with richness, of source a being of stead closed circle of sectarian and communal leaders. In- a among dividends economic and influence litical po- apportions which arrangement unspoken an on relies system governance Lebanese the processes, negotiation and mechanisms resolution conflict with self-equipped supposedly is system consensus a While issues. political conflicting Lebanon’s resolve the ites. Once more, outside intervention was needed to confirming Shi- armed thereby the by tactics bullying of fears former’s fighters, Hezbollah by following a Doha brief armed takeover of in Sunni west Beirut mediation Qatar-led with ended standoff The economy. the to blow debilitating a dealt that district business Beirut’s of heart the in sit-in long pro-Hezbollahthe ShiiteSpeaker 18-month-anand walking out from government, a parliament closure by ministers Shiite included and country the paralysed that ensued crisis political severe A system. litical triumphantandseeking toimpose itswrit onthe po- feeling Hezbollah with ended war The devastation. in infrastructurecountry’s the left and civilians cent non in July 2006, which took the lives of 1,200 inno- Leba- and Israel between war a sparked Hezbollah when aggravated further were differences Political once moreattheheartofcommunalconflict. Lebanon, armed resistance led by one community is in Today fighters. Sunni of composed dominantly seeking an unfair advantage, since the PLO was pre- of accused Sunnis the was it Lebanon South from Israel against attacks cross-border waging began (PLO) Organization Liberation Palestine the when seventies, early and sixties late the In communities. other over advantage unfair an with therefore and remaining, sect armed only the as Shiites the saw essentially who communities non-Shiite by choice leaders. of its target the became of quickly Hezbollah armed The allegiances foreign the between contradictions the and consensus country’s the fragility of the exposed Lebanon from exit hasty ia’s post-Taiftional Syr- well. reasonably worked system the between governing elite and conflicts ensured that Lebanon’s dysfunc- frequent the of arbitrators facto de became officers Syrian them. behind ests inter- sectarian of web wide a with elite entrenched deeply a formed had 2004 by who leaders, litical po- country’s the between relations calibrated had Syrian 1990-2004, Between Post-Syrian R egime presence in Lebanon in presence oiin h upr ad n lcig n serious any blocking in hand upper the position op- the gave it since dysfunction, and logjam litical idential elections, creating yet another cause for po- power in the new government formed after the pres- veto third blocking unprecedented the given were 8 March Furthermore, parliament. in seats their retain toral law ensuring that incumbent communal leaders elec- 50-year-old a of adoption the over consensus included also agreement The end. an to came date man- Lahoud’s Emile President when left vacancy, eight-month an following Republic the of President diated intervention, produced a consensus to elect a me- Qatari the by sponsored Agreement, Doha The what bindsitssocietytogether contradictions whileignoring displays itsdifferences and Lebanon’s pluralistsystem often between itsvarioussects, on thecommonalitiesthatexist richness, withemphasisplaced Instead ofbeingasource quently preventitfromreformingitself. subse- and system governance fragile Lebanon’s over grip a maintain that lines fault political the of to ambitions wrest control over Lebanon. Syrian-Iranian This is but an illustration serving as weapons its retaining on insistence Hezbollah’s sees hand, other the on coalition, 14 March The tribunal. cised politi- a as perceives it what supporting by God of Party the weaken to conspiracies foreign facilitating communities. Hezbollah accuses the Sunni-led Sunni March 14 camp of and Shiite Lebanon’s tween Hariri’s be- tensions high already for exacerbated have murder responsible was Hezbollah that tions no evidence has been published, rumoured accusa- consequently and revealed, been have investigation tional news outlets. While no official accounts of the the assassination began to appear in certain interna- ac- to Hezbollah connecting investigation leaked the of counts after, Shortly Hariri. Minister Prime of assassination the in hand Syrian a of reports leaked following Lebanon for Tribunal Special the of utes In 2006, the UN Security Council approved the stat- ing whatbindsitssocietytogether. ignor- while contradictions and differences its plays dis- often system pluralist Lebanon’s sects, various

185 Med.2011 Panorama 186 Med.2011 Panorama through a single prism equating the problems of of problems country, many states every in the region share griev- the equating prism single a through Africa. North and region the observe to inaccurate be would East it While Middle the in countries Lebanon will catch the uprising fever that is gripping of Proponents Lebanon’s FutureinanUnstable ing Lebanononceagainintoagovernmentcrisis. send- veto, third blocking the using by government from down supporting the tribunal, Hezbollah brought down the back to refused Hariri Minister Prime When God. of Party the get to out tool pro-Israeli a been mislead by false witnesses and that the court is the tribunal on the grounds that the investigation had with collaboration of forms all of end the demanded also They court. international the with cooperation its annul Lebanon that demanded latter the eratives, gan of impending indictments against Hezbollah op- the over debate Special Tribunal for Lebanon intensified and talk be- the As opposition. the of the hands in third blocking the with formed was cabinet the when meaning any of elections the voided tion opposi- Hezbollah-led the with consensus of uisites req- the Instead, cabinet. a form and govern to lead comfortable a them allowed have would democracy normal a in which members, parliament 128 of out 70 of majority clear a 14 March afforded elections these of result The elections. legislative 2009 the in rule of law were never more flagrantly displayed than the of impossibility the and institutions of futility The its liking. to not were that government the by taken decisions h dmn ter wne whether wonder theory domino the R egion continue, withnoendinsight. will crises cyclical for craving Lebanon’s then, Until ten Taif Agreement. and a timetable for the implementation of the forgot- out phase to process outlined clearly a a law; electoral with representative and start fair democratic, must Lebanon in reforms future Any tutional processesareclearandrespected. another reason to expedite reforms to ensure consti- balance; the in hangs of government future Lebanon’s fate the dynamics, regional to linked extricably taken place. Since Lebanon’s political situation is in- regimes have fallen and several other uprisings have Arab two then Since January. in government a form ity for billionaire former Prime Minister Najib Mikati to major- parliamentary minimum a secure to managed government, – intimidation Hezbollah of help the Hariri with – 8 March the of collapse the Following violence asameanstoanend. using about qualms no have who elites entrenched deeply by protected is and history of years hundred will succeed. Lebanon’s sectarian culture has over a it chance little is there changes drastic and specific ily growing until the time of writing, unless it identifies tarian system.” While the movement has been stead- sec- the down “bring to marches of campaign a ed formed group of a few thousand activists have start- newly A apparatus. security stifling a of oppression the suffer Lebanese the do nor system; democratic a of building the for way the up open to down bring neighbours. Lebanon has no single political figure to its with shared entirely not are but revolt, to reason enough constitute that issues socio-political of set erty. Oddly, Lebanon stands out with an incongruent pov- and freedom of lack repression, against ances