Lebanon's Stubborn Resistance to Change

Mediterranean Politics | Middle East Lebanon’s Stubborn Resistance to Change oussama Safa Lebanon six weeks later, although for many it turned Political Analyst out to be a disappointing uprising that left unfinished Former Director of the Lebanese Center business. It was later revealed that the March 14 Panorama for Policy Studies, Beirut leaders, themselves wily politicians and the movers and shakers of Lebanon’s sectarian political system, Amidst the winds of change rapidly sweeping from overlooked major political reforms and focused on the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean down to preserving their hold on power. Subsequently, the the Arabian Sea, Lebanon is plunging into political legislative elections held in June 2005, following 2011 immobility following a government crisis that unseat- what was arguably one of the largest demonstra- Med. ed incumbent Prime Minister Saad Hariri and left the tions in Lebanon’s modern history, brought cosmetic country with yet another void in its executive branch changes to the composition of the first parliament of government. The recent standoff between two after thirty years of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. deeply divided political camps is but an illustration of With the country divided between two camps – Lebanon’s perpetual and recurrent crisis in political March 8 and March 14 – essentially led by Shiites governance. It is also the culmination of six years of and Sunnis respectively, five years of instability en- 183 tumultuous political upheaval between the opposi- sued, characterised by the assassination of anti-Syr- tion, led by the deposed Prime Minister, and the new ian political and media figures, a war with Israel and majority, led by the pro-Iranian Hezbollah. dangerous sectarian clashes reminiscent of Leba- The seeds of the ongoing crisis were sewn on Feb- non’s fifteen-year civil war. The period stretching ruary 14 2005, when Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri from 2005-2011 has also witnessed successful was killed by a massive car bomb on Beirut’s sea- Arab mediation of internal conflicts led by Qatar, a front. Though unsubstantiated, accusations con- series of UN Security Council Resolutions and the cerning the assassination were made against Syria, founding of a hybrid international tribunal to try the whose forces had been stationed in Lebanon since assassins of Rafiq Hariri. 1976. Syrian heavy-handedness in Lebanon had put the late Hariri at odds with the country’s policies in Lebanon. Events culminated in a colossal demon- a History of Political Malaise stration on March 14 2005 demanding that Syrian forces leave Lebanon and that an international in- Lebanon’s chronic political ills have weighed heavily vestigation be opened into the assassination. Pro- on the governance system’s ability to keep pace with Syrian demonstrators had previously taken to the the rapid changes taking place around it. This has streets on March 8 to pledge their allegiance and translated into an irrecoverable fragility that stands in show their gratitude for Syria’s support of Hezbol- the way of the country’s attempts to reform itself and lah. The assassinated Prime Minister’s son, Saad reinvent its political system. Culturally and economi- Hariri, assumed leadership of the anti-Syrian move- cally, Lebanon remains a gateway for Europe to the ment, backed by a constellation of political factions. Arab East. The country boasts a modern system of Dubbed later as the Cedar Revolution for independ- education, a strong and vibrant banking system, and ence and sovereignty, the 14 March demonstrations an unparalleled – though not flawless – financial, hastened the departure of all Syrian forces from medical and tourist service infrastructure. The country’s multilingual, pluralistic society and historically Lebanon’s longest civil war from 1975-1990 ended friendly culture render Lebanon a top destination for with a creative power-sharing accord that was never businesses seeking to establish a presence in the fully implemented, aimed at giving the country a seri- Eastern Mediterranean. ous chance to build a modern democratic state. Known as the Taif Agreement, it stopped short of becoming a peace-building blueprint for Lebanon Lebanon’s chronic political ills and opened the way for warlords to become the new have weighed heavily on the political elite. Governance became a matter of deal- governance system’s ability to making between sectarian leaders, most of whom were driven by the desire to consolidate their newly- keep pace with the rapid changes gained positions and ensure self-preservation. Syrian taking place around it forces were stationed in Lebanon to guarantee that the Taif Agreements be selectively implemented to serve their design to maintain tutelage over the post- Panorama Dating back to the latter part of the 19th century, war political system. Hence, subsequent electoral the make-up of the country, which was known as laws and gerrymandering were tailored to serve pro- and limited to Mount Lebanon and Beirut, included Syrian politicians and ensure that they retain power. competing minorities, most notably Maronite Chris- A blanket amnesty law was issued in 1990 and sty- tians, Sunnis, Shiites and Druze among many oth- mied any serious effort to conduct meaningful rec- 2011 ers. The gathering of opposing sectarian minorities, onciliation between the country’s various communi- each seeking protection from a foreign power at the ties, who had been engaged in fratricide for a decade Med. time and proclaiming a distinct narrative of its own, and a half. The unspoken atrocities, thousands of in- led Lebanon’s melting pot to become a cause of ternally displaced families and 17,000 people left ongoing instability and periodic confrontation. With missing after the war remain unresolved issues to heavy interference from the Ottoman Empire, France this day. A post-war drive for economic recovery and to a lesser degree Britain, Lebanon unwillingly was characterised primarily by massive spending on 184 became a proxy battleground for foreign powers, a reconstruction projects and on modernising Beirut’s role that has continued under different guises to this infrastructure, with very little spent on development today. and education in peripheral areas. In fact, post-war The creation of Greater Lebanon in 1926 was ac- rebuilding funds were carefully apportioned between companied by a constitution that apportioned pow- sectarian leaders to serve the latter’s interests with er-sharing to the various sects according to their no transparency or accountability required. Conse- size in the population. A post-independence gentle- quently, Lebanon’s debts, resulting from gigantic man’s agreement known as the National Pact was borrowing to finance reconstruction and satisfy established in 1943 by Lebanon’s political elite, power-hungry elites, spiralled out of control reach- which specified that the President of the Republic ing 52 billion dollars in 2011. be Maronite, the speaker of parliament, Shiite and The post-war years also saw an exponential increase the Prime Minister, Sunni. Lebanon’s system of gov- in the military power of the pro-Iranian, exclusively ernance effectively became consensus-based be- Shiite Hezbollah, which until 2000 led a successful tween the leaders of its major sects – a recipe for armed resistance against Israeli occupation of South continued bickering and conflict and hence for a Lebanon. Hezbollah benefited from a close Syrian- constant need of foreign intervention. The creators Iranian collaboration over Lebanon to build its mili- of the National Pact undoubtedly knew the dangers tary shrewdness and security apparatus at the ex- of relying on consensus for governing between vy- pense of the regular armed forces. Hence, in no ing minorities who often sought foreign support and time, Hezbollah became the strongest military force encouragement to win their position. Lebanon’s in Lebanon and has remained as such to this day. strength, it was argued, was derived from its weak- Following the liberation of South Lebanon, and par- ness. Clearly this formula did not withstand the test ticularly after the Syrian pullout from Lebanon, Iran’s of time as periodic communal wars, backed by out- influence increased thanks to Hezbollah’s armed side powers, punctuated Lebanon’s modern history presence. This was a factor that did not sit well with during the second half of the twentieth century. other communities, particularly the Sunnis. Post-Syrian regime various sects, Lebanon’s pluralist system often dis- plays its differences and contradictions while ignor- Between 1990-2004, Syrian presence in Lebanon ing what binds its society together. had calibrated relations between the country’s po- In 2006, the UN Security Council approved the stat- litical leaders, who by 2004 had formed a deeply utes of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon following entrenched elite with a wide web of sectarian inter- leaked reports of a Syrian hand in the assassination ests behind them. Syrian officers became de facto of Prime Minister Hariri. Shortly after, leaked ac- arbitrators of the frequent conflicts between the counts of the investigation connecting Hezbollah to governing elite and ensured that Lebanon’s dysfunc- the assassination began to appear in certain international post-Taif system worked reasonably well. Syr- tional news outlets. While no official accounts of the ia’s hasty exit from Lebanon exposed the fragility investigation have been revealed, and consequently of the country’s consensus and the contradictions no evidence has been published, rumoured accusa- between the foreign allegiances of its leaders. tions that Hezbollah was responsible for Hariri’s The armed Hezbollah quickly became the target of murder have exacerbated already high tensions be- choice by non-Shiite communities who essentially tween Lebanon’s Shiite and Sunni communities. Panorama saw the Shiites as the only armed sect remaining, Hezbollah accuses the Sunni-led March 14 camp of and therefore with an unfair advantage over other facilitating foreign conspiracies to weaken the Party communities.

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