ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: PETROAGRESSION DECONSTRUCTED: VARIATIONAL PROPOSITIONS Yavor Hristov Ivanchev, Doctor of Philoso
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ABSTRACT Title of dissertation: PETROAGRESSION DECONSTRUCTED: VARIATIONAL PROPOSITIONS Yavor Hristov Ivanchev, Doctor of Philosophy, 2018 Dissertation directed by: Professor Paul K. Huth Department of Government and Politics It is widely believed that "petrostates," or countries whose economies rely heavily on oil exports, are at greater risk from external aggression. This popular view has made frequent recourse to the neo-Malthusian intuition that, in a world of material scarcity, resource predation will be rampant. Recent empirical research, however, has shown that petrostates are neither more common targets of military attack nor particularly peaceful members of the international community. In fact, available statistical analyses overwhelmingly suggest that, in terms of conflict initiation, these states are mostly on the offensive in world politics—a phenomenon often referred to as "petroagression." Despite this finding, little is known about what accounts for variation in petrostate belligerence. Not all petrostates are international troublemakers, and their propensity to threaten or use military force has varied both across geography and over time. This dissertation attempts to explain this within-group variation, using two conceptual experiments. The first heeds to the internal organization of petrostates, examining how differences in their regime institutions could mediate (strengthen or weaken) the conflict-inducing effects of oil income. It is argued that, because of certain compositional and identity characteristics of their ruling coalitions, petrostates with personalist institutions would be more potent conflict initiators than comparable oil exporters of nonpersonalist institutional makeup. The second conceptual experiment abstracts from petrostates' internal attributes, exploring potential sources of variation in their external environments. Adopting a system–subsystem perspective, this analysis proposes that, all else equal, exogenous structural variables—in particular, superpower penetration in regional subsystems containing petrostates—could account for differences (spatial and temporal) in those states' conflict behavior. Although the dissertation's main thrust is theoretical, empirical evidence providing preliminary support for these variational propositions is also offered. PETROAGRESSION DECONSTRUCTED: VARIATIONAL PROPOSITIONS by Yavor Hristov Ivanchev Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2018 Advisory Committee: Professor Paul Huth, Chair Professor Kurt Finsterbusch Professor Scott Kastner Professor George Quester Professor Shibley Telhami © Copyright by Yavor Hristov Ivanchev 2018 Dedication To my parents, Ekaterina and Hristo, and my brother, Yasen, for nurturing my interest in creative pursuits from an early age. ii Acknowledgments For the eventual completion of this project, I owe many. My deepest gratitude goes to my wife, Marta, for her unwavering support over the years, and my children, Martin and Ana, for enduring my poor parenting while showing nothing but affection. I am also in great debt to my academic advisor, Dr. Paul Huth, whose patience, wisdom, and steady guidance have kept me from giving up. At critical points of this project, I also received invaluable help and encouragement from the distinguished members of my dissertation committee; from our amazing graduate program coordinator, Ann Marie Clark; and from distant associates who were kind enough to answer questions from a complete stranger. My sincere thanks go to all of them. All errors and omissions herein are my own. iii Table of Contents Dedication.......................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgments............................................................................................................. iii Table of contents............................................................................................................... iv List of tables...................................................................................................................... vi 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Preliminaries......................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Purpose, theoretical approach, and contribution .................................................. 4 1.3 Roadmap............................................................................................................. 10 2 The conflict-inducing effects of oil: what we know and do not know ..................... 12 2.1 Oil and interstate conflict: an assessment of the literature ................................. 12 2.1.1 From scarcity to resource wars ................................................................... 14 2.1.2 From abundance to petroagression ............................................................. 22 2.2 Gaps in extant petroagression theory: the problem of variation ........................ 29 3 Theory and hypotheses ............................................................................................. 38 3.1 The domestic dimension..................................................................................... 38 3.1.1 Beyond the democracy–autocracy dichotomy ............................................ 40 3.1.2 Domestic institutions, personalism, and oil ................................................ 45 Discretionary resources ......................................................................................... 48 Decisional constraints ........................................................................................... 56 A note on diversion ............................................................................................... 68 3.2 External sources of variation .............................................................................. 70 3.2.1 The relevant environments .......................................................................... 72 3.2.2 Structural bounds, superpower penetration, and regional orders ................ 77 Penetration imposed .............................................................................................. 81 Penetration invited ................................................................................................ 88 3.3 Hypotheses ......................................................................................................... 90 4 Quantitative analysis ................................................................................................. 92 4.1 Petrostate sample and regional classification ..................................................... 93 4.1.1 Sample......................................................................................................... 93 4.1.2 Regions ....................................................................................................... 97 4.2 Dependent variable: militarized disputes ........................................................... 99 4.3 Independent variables ....................................................................................... 103 iv 4.3.1 Personalism ............................................................................................... 103 4.3.2 Superpower penetration ............................................................................ 105 4.4 Control variables .............................................................................................. 109 4.5 Results .............................................................................................................. 112 5 Case study analysis: Libya (1969–2005) ................................................................ 122 5.1 General patterns................................................................................................ 126 5.2 Regional penetration ........................................................................................ 131 5.2.1 Colonial legacies, structural realities, and superpower interests .............. 133 5.2.2 From early struggles to lasting penetration ............................................... 136 5.2.3 Polarization and structural transformation ................................................ 142 5.3 The Sanusi monarchy: a prelude to Qaddafi's rule ........................................... 147 5.4 Libya's foreign policy, 1969–2005 ................................................................... 154 5.4.1 Navigating the bipolar condition (1969–89) ............................................. 154 U.S. conciliation.................................................................................................. 157 Soviet alignment ................................................................................................. 162 5.4.2 Conflict behavior (1969–89) ..................................................................... 168 Military engagements.......................................................................................... 170 Aggressive diplomacy, subversion, and terrorism .............................................. 184 5.4.3 Putting the brakes on: the bind of the unipole (1990–2005) ..................... 193 6 Conclusion .............................................................................................................