United We Stand...Divided We Fall Political Opposition Fragmentation
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The American University in Cairo School of Humanities and Social Sciences United we Stand...Divided we Fall Political Opposition Fragmentation Post-Mubarak A Thesis Submitted to the Department of Political Science In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts By Asmaa Samy Abdullah Mohamed Under the supervision of Dr. Kevin Koehler January 2017 1 This Work Is Dedicated To To those who went to streets in 2011 calling for ‘Bread…Freedom…Liberty’ and from whom I learnt the significance of unity…To those who sacrificed their lives starting from Khaled Said and Sayed Belal henceforth…To those who lost their eyes or any of their organs such as Ahmed Harara….To those who lost their freedom such as Alaa’ Abd El-Fattah, Ismail El-Iskandrani, Shawkan, Doma, etc. and from whom I learnt the meaning of sacrifice…To anyone dreamt or called for a just and democratic political system where everyone is equally represented and has a voice. 2 Table of Contents Abstract Acknowledgments Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………...…….7 2. Literature Review…………………………………………………………….10 3. Theoretical Framework…………………………………………………........22 4. Conceptual Framework…………………………………………………........24 5. Research Design……………………………………………………………...31 a. Case Selection: Egypt (11 February 2011 – 30 June 2013)………..…......31 b. Variable Operationalization……………………………………………....32 c. Measurement of Indicators…………...………………………………..…32 Chapter Two: Man on Horseback: The relation between SCAF and political opposition post-Mubarak 1. Introduction………………………………………………………………..…34 2. The Military under Mubarak: Most Privileged or Main Victim………..……35 a. The Military’s Position under Mubarak……………………………….....36 b. Military’s Reaction to 2011 Mass Demonstrations…………………....…39 c. Why the Military Defect from Mubarak……………………………...…..41 3. The Role of SCAF during Transition and its Relation with Different Political Actors……………………………………………………………………...…44 a. El-Bashri’s Constitutional Committee and March Referendum………….46 b. The Legal Framework of 2011/2012 Parliamentary Elections………...…49 c. Protests against Military Rule………………………………………….....58 4. Conclusion……………………………………………………………….......67 Chapter Three: Youth movements and alliances and their relation with political parties prior and after 25th January uprising 3 1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………..70 2. Youth Movements Prior to 25th January Uprising …………..………………72 a. The Egyptian Movement for Change/ Kefaya………………………...….72 b. 6 April Movement………………………………………………………...76 c. National Association for Change/Popular Campaign to Support El- Baradei…………………………………………………………………....79 d. We are All Khaled Said……………………………………………...…...80 3. Post-uprising Youth Alliances and their Relation with Political Parties….....81 a. Cross-ideological Reform Alliances……...……………………..………..82 b. Ideologist Reform Alliances…………………………………….………..89 4. Conclusion……………..………………………………………………..….102 Chapter Four: The impact of the conflict between Islamists and Secularists on opposition fragmentation 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………..…..105 2. The Political Landscape after the Uprising …………………………...…....108 3. The Relation between Islamists and Secularists Post-Mubarak…………....110 a. Pre-electoral Alliances in 2011/2012 Parliamentary Elections…..……..110 b. The Debate over Writing the Constitution………………...…………….118 c. The Peak of Polarization under Morsi…………………………...……...130 4. Conclusion…………….……………………………………………………137 Chapter Five: Conclusion……………………………………………………...141 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………….146 4 Abstract This thesis examines the causal factors behind the persistence of opposition fragmentation after the toppling of Mubarak and the collapse of the regime’s throbbing heart, the security apparatus. This is due to the importance of opposition unification not only in the toppling of autocrats but also in the success of any transition towards democracy. More urgency is brought to the puzzle due to the specific nature of the transitional period that was more in favor of different political forces compared to previous periods. This argues that three causal factors were behind the re- fragmentation of the opposition post-Mubarak: the continuation of regime manipulation by the SCAF, the failure of cooperation between youth movements and political parties, and the polarization between Islamists and Secularists. 5 Acknowledgments My gratitude goes first to my family without whom, I would not be in such position or reached this stage in my life. Thanks to my mother who taught me how to be an independent and responsible woman who always seek to do the best she can. Thanks to my father who has been a role model for a hard-worker, dedicated and cooperative professor to his students and who always encouraged me to work and improve myself. Thanks as well to my teachers at school and my professors at university whether in the bachelor degree or the master’s degree who contributed to my personality and my knowledge by their continuous help and advice. However, I owe a special debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Kevin Koehler who was a role model for a dedicated and cooperative professor to his students. Thanks for your patience throughout the way and for your continuous support and guidance which added a lot to my mentality and research capabilities. I would also like to give special thanks to Dr. Oliver Schlumberger and Dr. Nadine Sika for accepting to be my readers and for their helpful comments on the thesis; to Dr. Holger Albrecht for guiding me to find the theme of the thesis, for his comments on earlier drafts and for everything I learnt from him and widened my knowledge; and to Dr. Ahmed Abd Rabou for his continuous support and guidance and for being a model to the researcher who stick to the ethics of research away from any personal views or affiliations. Lastly, thanks to my sisters and my friends who supported me throughout the way and who believed in me whenever I doubt it. 6 Chapter One In early 2011, the fall of Ben Ali’s regime spelled tremendous change not only for Tunisia, but for the Middle East as a whole. Following the Tunisian uprising, uprisings took place in different countries such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Despite the various paths these uprisings took, their unexpected occurrence raised scholars’ expectations who thought that the “third wave of democratization” had finally knocked at the door of the Middle East1. Unfortunately these expectations were unfounded. Some authoritarian regimes succeeded to resist the wave of change (i.e. Syria and Bahrain), while the uprisings in other countries have either led to the failure of the state itself (i.e. Libya and Yemen), or to another form of authoritarian regime (i.e. Egypt). Of the six Arab Spring cases, only Tunisia seems to hold some potential of completing a democratic transition. These different outcomes revived the scholarly debate about the factors that influence authoritarian regime stability in time of crises and hence their prospects of survival or breakdown. It has been argued by most transitologists that divisions within the ruling elite are a “prior condition for political liberalization”2. However, the democratization trend that swept Latin America, South and East European countries in the 1970-1980s proved to scholars that opposition can play a role in overthrowing regimes. Hence, scholars started to focus on opposition under authoritarianism. Among those scholars is Przeworski who says: “imagine that the authoritarian regime suffers a loss of legitimacy but no alternative regime is accessible, that 1 Thomas Carother, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy 33, no. 1 (2002): 5 2 Dina S. Shehata, “Islamists and non-Islamists in the Egyptian opposition: Patterns of conflict and cooperation”, (PhD, Georgetown University, 2007), Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/304877799?accountid=8423 7 is, no coherent alternative is politically organized. What would happen? Nothing much”3. Accordingly, he argues that a regime will not collapse “until an alternative is organized in such a way as to present a real choice for isolated individuals”. For this reason, Cavatorta and Haugbølle argued that autocrats tend to fuel ideological and personal conflicts between opposition forces to keep them divided and thus, to maintain their stability4. Besides, autocrats use other tactics such as repression, co-optation, etc. to ensure the absence of any alternative. Despite that, Lust argued that “when political circumstances change, opposition elites are more likely to put aside personal conflicts, recognizing that while mutual cooperation may succeed, independent actions surely will not”5. The unification of opposition forces is not only crucial with regard to the toppling of authoritarian incumbents, but also with regard to the success of a transition towards democracy. According to Przeworski, anti-authoritarian forces must unite to bring down the regime but they must compete against each other under democracy6. However, if they divide too early, the result will be another form of authoritarianism. While if they did not divide at all, the new regime will be a mirror image of the old one: neither representative nor competitive7. Based on these considerations, I examine the fragmentation of the Egyptian opposition after Mubarak. When the opportunity arose in 2011, the opposition disregarded their differences and got united in opposition to Mubarak. After his fall, however, cleavages