JANUARY 2012 HASC COMMITTEE PRINT 112-4 LEAVING GUANTANAMO POLICIES, PRESSURES, AND DETAINEES RETURNING TO THE FIGHT As of September 2011, the US government believed that 27 percent of former GTMO detainees were confirmed or suspected to have been engaged in terrorist or insurgent activities. SUSPECTED OR CONFIRMED Abu Sufyan al-Azdi Abdallah Saleh Ali Abdullah Zakir, ISN 8 al-Shihri, 372 al-Ajmi, ISN 220 SNAP SHOTS OF KUWAIT *Repatriated in 2007 *Repatriated in 2007 *Repatriated in 2005 *Top Taliban military AFGHANISTAN AFGHANISTAN SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI *Leader in al-Qaida in *Conducted a suicide commander in Helmand REENGAGEMENT Arabian Peninsula bombing in Iraq in 2008 province orchestrating terrorist targeting, recruiting, and attack training, planning, and preparation SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS of the COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Rob Wittman, Chairman Virginia K. Michael Conaway Jim Cooper, Ranking Member Texas Tennessee Mo Brooks Robert E. Andrews Alabama New Jersey Todd C. Young Mark S. Critz Indiana Pennsylvania Thomas J. Rooney Colleen Hanabusa Florida Hawaii Mike Coffman Colorado ….we have been very selective in terms of returning people. One of the things we have discovered over time is that we are not particularly good at predicting which returnee will be a recidivist. Some of those that we have considered the most dangerous and who have been released or who we considered dangerous and potentially going back into the fight have not, and some that we evaluated as SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES FEBRUARY 17, 2011 not being much of a danger or much of a risk Senate Armed Services Hearing: “To receive testimony on the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year we have discovered in the fight.1 2012 and the Future Years Defense Program.” 1. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, February 17, 2011, Senate Armed Services Hearing: “To receive testimony on the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2012 and the Future Years Defense Program.” “A Statement by the United States Government,” New York Times, April 24, 2011 (issued in connection with the decision by the newspaper and other organizations to publish documents obtained illegally by Wikileaks). Both the previous and the current Administrations have made every effort to act with the utmost care and diligence in transferring detainees from Guantanamo. Both Administrations have made the protection of American citizens the top priority and . we will continue to work with allies and partners around the world to mitigate threats to the U.S. and other countries . GEOFF MORRELL PENTAGON PREss SECRETARY AMBASSADOR DAN FRIED SPECIAL ENVOY FOR CLOSURE OF THE GUANTANAMO DETENTION FACILITY II LEAVING GUANTANAMO Contents 02 Executive Summary 04 Methodological and Stylistic Notes 06 Snapshots of Reengagement 10 Reengagement: The Basics 12 Definitions 14 FINDING 1: Mechanisms to reduce the GTMO population were first contemplated when the facility was established in 2002. However, procedures to accomplish this took about eight months to finalize, and were spurred by persistent concerns that some detainees should not be held. 20 FINDING 2: After the first review process began, political and diplomatic pressures to reduce the GTMO population became apparent, resulting in releases and transfers. 23 Russia 28 Foreign Prosecution 30 Pakistan 32 Saudi Rehabilitation Program 37 FINDING 3: Pressure to reduce the GTMO population accelerated in the second Bush term, before reengagement dangers became more apparent. 45 A Success Story 50 Litigation Pressures 57 FINDING 4: While the GTMO transfer and release process instituted by the Obama administration differed in some respects from what preceded it, there are sufficient continuities so that the threat of reengagement may not be lessened in the long term. 66 Conclusion and Recommendations 68 Dissenting Views 78 Appendix Classified Annex UNDER SEPARATE COVER HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 1 Executive Summary and Introduction In March 2011, Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon and Ranking Minority Member Adam Smith directed the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee to undertake an in-depth, comprehensive bipartisan investiga- tion of procedures to dispatch detainees from the Guantanamo Bay detention facility (GTMO) over the past decade. This necessarily included an examination of mechanisms intended to prevent former detainees from reengaging in terror-related activities. In conducting this study, committee staff travelled to eleven countries, interviewed nearly every senior official directly involved in these matters in both the Bush and Obama administrations, received briefings from the Department of Defense and Department of State, consulted with eighteen subject matter experts, met with two former detainees, and reviewed thousands of pages of classified and unclassified documents. Subcommittee Members convened a hearing, three Member briefings (including one that was classified), and travelled to several relevant locations. This report finds that the Bush and Obama administrations, in reaction to domestic political pressures, a desire to earn goodwill abroad, and in an attempt to advance strategic national security goals, sought to “release” or “transfer” GTMO detainees elsewhere. Those “released” were judged a sufficiently low threat that they were sent to countries with no expectation of follow up. “Transferred” detainees, because they were assessed as relatively more dangerous, were conveyed with the expectation that some process would be applied in the receiving nation to mitigate the threat they potentially posed. Despite earnest and well-meaning efforts by officials in both administrations, properly evaluating detainees and ensuring that their cases were handled appropriately by receiving countries was, and remains, a challenge. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) estimated in September 2011 that 27% of the 600 former detainees who have left GTMO were confirmed or suspected to be presently or previously reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activities. This total percentage has consistently increased. Furthermore, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence noted in 2010 that the Intelligence Community “assesses that if additional detainees are trans- ferred from GTMO, some of them will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities.” Five of 66 detainees who left GTMO in the 20 months between February 2009 and October 2010 are confirmed (two) or suspected (three) by ODNI of involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities. Although two of the five were released pursuant to court orders, this nonetheless yields a seven and one half percent reengagement rate. Although it is difficult to compare two disparate groups of former detainees (a smaller pool which left GTMO relatively recently and a much larger pool which has been gone for a much longer period), the reengagement rate indicates that challenges remain. 2 LEAVING GUANTANAMO This report posits four findings: • Finding 1. Mechanisms to reduce the GTMO population were first contemplated when the facility was established in 2002. However, procedures to accomplish this took about eight months to finalize, and were spurred by persistent concerns that some detainees should not be held. • Finding 2. After the first review process began, political and diplomatic pressures to reduce the GTMO population arose, resulting in releases and transfers. • Finding 3. Pressures to reduce the GTMO population accelerated in the second Bush term, before reengagement dangers became fully apparent. • Finding 4. While changes in the GTMO transfer and release process instituted by the Obama admin- istration differed in some important respects from the Bush administration, there are sufficient continu- ities so that the threat of reengagement may not be lessened in the long term. In addition to chapters discussing each finding in depth, this report includes several companion articles illustrating specific issues. A classified section sets forth material which cannot be reproduced here. Three recommendations are offered: • The Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence collaborate to produce a report (in classified and unclassified versions) to congressional committees of jurisdiction assessing factors causing or contribut- ing to reengagement; including a discussion of trends, by country and region, where reengagement has occurred; • The Department of Defense and Department of State produce a report (in classified and unclassified versions) to congressional committees of jurisdiction assessing the effectiveness of agreements in each country where transfers have occurred; • Congress continue the certification requirements on GTMO transfers which are contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. No. 112-81; 125 Stat. 1561 [2011]), at least until receiving and reviewing the specified reports; Additional action as outlined in the classified annex. HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 3 Methodological and Stylistic Notes This study is based primarily upon 19 interviews with current and past key policy makers and staffers from the White House, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State, as well as hundreds of pages of declassified documents, and some secondary sources. A large volume of classified information provided to the committee was also evaluated. That data forms, in part,