Early draft: work in progress

Planning the European architecture: the contribution of

Katia Caldari University of Padova

Cette coopération dépendra, bien entendu, de la sagesse des hommes, qui siégeront au Conseil des Ministres et à la Commission européenne, et de ceux qui, dans les capitales, définiront les positions des différents gouvernements. Mais le facteur essentiel sera la volonté politique de poursuivre la construction européenne (1958: 276)

Introduction Robert Marjolin played a pivotal role in the reconstruction of after WWII and in the construction of the European Community: he was Deputy Commissioner of the French Plan from 1946 to 1948, Secretary-General of the Organization for the European Cooperation (OEEC) from 1948 to 1955 and Vice-President of the European Economic Community (EEC) Commission from 1958 to 1967. Nonetheless, in the literature his contribution to the European project is rather overshadowed and his efforts to build a united Europe are often neglected. To briefly describe Marjolin’s character, three terms seem to me more fitting: socialist, liberal, and planner. In 1929, at the age of 18, he joined the French Socialist Party (SFIO, Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière) and became active militant in the Quinzième Section and in the Jeunesse Socialiste. When student at the University la Sorbonne, in 1931, he also joined: the socialist students movement – placing himself on the very (and sometimes extreme) left side of the movement (Marjolin, 1989: 28) –, the Cooperative Movement of Consumers1, and Révolution Constructive, a group of socialist intellectuals founded with the publication of a volume manifesto in 1932. Although sometimes in disagreement with some socialist positions2 from which he distanced himself, he remained a true socialist with the attention given to social questions and the efforts he made to foster policies (first at national and then at European level) that could combine economic choices with social needs.

1 At that time, it was more a “social philosophy” than “a grouping of shops” (1989: 30). Marjolin published an article in the movement’s journal Le Cooperateur in France (dated September 12, 1931) that was titled “The forces of the future” and contained the text of a speech he made in Nancy in summer 1931 on the occasion of a visit to the “Cooperators of Lorraine”. 2 Most notably with the 1936-37 Blum Government of the Front Populaire: see Marjolin 1938; 1989.

1 While militating in the socialist milieus, Marjolin – between 1934 and 1936 – is introduced to the liberal thought, especially through the influence of Charles Rist3 who took him as economics Editor in the Institut of Recherches Economiques et Sociales (ISRES). During this period Marjolin went often to the London School of Economics, with which ISRES had a collaborative arrangement, and participated into the meetings of the Reform Club, a liberal institution where he met among the others Lionel Robbins (1989: 115). It is in this very period that Marjolin starts to study economics (leaving his previous field of interest: philosophy) and becomes convinced of the importance of free competitive markets. In his life, he has always ranked himself among the exponents of liberalism (1989: 281) without however rejecting the socialist principles that formed his background. It is indeed this blend of socialism and liberalism that affects Marjolin’s opinion about State intervention and engenders his position towards economic planning. Before WWII, in France, planning was sustained by several socialists (among them the group of Révolution Constructive): Marjolin initially gave his own support to this idea but then he refused it as a possible means to overcome the ongoing economic crisis. After the war however, he became a strong supporter of economic planning to be conceived as indicative planning, that is a planning compatible with free market and competition. According to Marjolin, planning was the only way to properly rebuild the destroyed country after the war but also more generally the unavoidable tool which must second free competition and markets. In his autobiography, Marjolin underlines those major undertakings that absorbed most of his energies after WWII: the French Plan, the and the Common Market (1989: 159). However distinct, they are strictly interconnected and dealt with by Marjolin as a unique strategy in which we find the attention for social questions; the support of free competition but also the emphasis on the limits of free markets and on the need for state intervention with long-term actions in the form of economic planning. The common thread which links these three commitments is his awareness of the urgency to build the European Union to be understood as an economic, social and political union. The French Plan In 1946 Marjolin became Deputy Commissioner alongside Jean Monnet4, first General Planning Commissioner, in the General Planning Commissariat and overall responsible for the design of the first Plan of Modernization and Equipment (1946-1952)5.

3 Liberal economist, particularly interested into monetary questions (but see Arena 2000), was part of the Mont-Pèlerin society (Denord and Swartz 2010) and had several bonds with bank capitalism (Denord 2001). 4 The co-partnership between Marjolin and Monnet developed during the war when they went (Monnet as member of the French Committee of National Liberation and Marjolin as collaborator of Alphand who was named Committe’s Director of economic affairs) to Washington in 1943 on behalf of General De Gaulle – at that time head of French Committee of National Liberation – to organize the supply of food, raw material, and capital goods for France after the war. In 1944 Marjolin was promoted head of the French Supply Mission to the United States and was directly responsible to Monnet becoming one of his closest collaborators. 5 The Plan was promulgated by decree without being submitted to the Parliament. The Plan Commissariat was responsible to the Prime Minister’s office and it was considered a permanent delegate of the head of the Government; the General Commissioner had a small staff, a modest budget and did not have a ministerial rank, although he had a large influence on most economic matters. Since the beginning, the General Planning Commissariat, for technical aspects of planning and projections, heavily relied both on qualified specialized groups and on members of the Modernization Commissions and their sub-

2 The General Planning Commissariat was established to deal with the reconstruction problem and the country’s recovery after the war: French economy after the war was in a very difficult and distressing condition (Monnet, 1976: 335) and it needed a deeply reasoned and efficient action to retrieve and develop. Accordingly, the focus was on productive investments and, given the limited resources, an order of priorities was established with preference given to some basic sectors (coal, electricity, steel, transport, cement, and agriculture). The Plan outlined some targets (in terms of national output) for these six sectors that were to be considered as imperative, whereas those for all the other sectors were simply indicative (Premier Plan 1946-47: 35). Giving precedence to investments and production implied to put in the background consumption and to limit state borrowing on capital market not to reduce the capital available for investment. The Plan involved therefore measures of austerity and severity. Marjolin, who supported these decisions within the Monnet’s team6, wrote a number of articles in the Revue de Dèfence Nationale (Marjolin 1989: 163-5) in order to clarify the choices of the Plan7: in a Keynesian perspective8, Marjolin notes that in order to improve the population’s living standards and assure prosperity to the country, it was necessary first to relaunch production (through investments) and to modernize the productive methods, by following the examples of Britain and moreover the United States (1989: 165-65). Notwithstanding the alleged “concert” organized through the Plan9, some important measures of dirigisme were indeed not excluded in so far as along with some nationalizations – reputed not as aims in themselves but as means for collective progress (Monnet, 1976: 345) – the Plan recognized to the state a dominant influence over the direction of investments in all the sectors10 and several direct and indirect instruments to affect and control national economic activities11. In all his interventions on the Plan, Marjolin underlines the strategic function of nationalizations and the vital role of

commissions, according to Monnet’s idea of “économie concertée”. These commissions gathered together representatives of employers, workers and civil servants. The Commissions were specialized for sectors of activity. Their structure was made of the Chairman (usually a representative of the Grand Corps d’État); general rapporteurs with only a few representatives of the private sector; and the members with representatives of employers and trade unions. All of them were appointed by decision of the Minister of Finance on suggestion of the General Commissioner (see on this Hackett & Hackett 1963). 6 Besides Marjolin there were Etienne Hirsch, Paul Delouvrier, Jean Fourastié, Alfred Sauvy, Félix Gaillard and Jacques Dumontier. 7 Those choices were indeed rather criticized; for instance in Alfred Sauvy’s article on le Monde (29 December 1946) titled “Le Facteur Humain dans le Plan Monnet” the neglect of some important issues is underlined: “Cette considération ne paraît guère avoir retenu l'attention, si l'on en juge par la désaffection qui frappe les productions les plus vitales. Nous n'en retiendrons que deux : le lait et le logement.” 8 See below fn. 13. 9 The term “économie concertée”, due to Hirsch, was largely used by Monnet (Monnet 1976: 373) to characterize his approach and to distinguish it from the experiments of “économie dirigée” or “économie corporative”. Accordingly, the plan would be executed with the collaboration of all the national vital elements, that is the cooperation of experts on the one hand and the representatives of professional unions (workers, entrepreneurs) (Monnet 1976: 344). 10 It was for instance maintained: “Pour la· mise en œuvre du plan, il faut prévoir des méthodes d'exécution variables suivant les secteurs de l'économie, méthodes qui, cependant, doivent toutes s'inspirer du principe que la modernisation est une obligation pour toutes les activités du pays, et que nos ressources limitées en matières, main d’œuvre et moyens financiers doivent être utilisées en priorité pour l'exécution du plan” (Premier Plan: 102). 11 Controls of licensing, selective tax treatments, privileged subsidies, financing of (public and private) industry through the FDES (Fund for Economic and Social Development) and so forth.

3 government in the country’s economic development to “shape the course of the economy as a whole” (1989: 169). Critical of the pre-war conception of planisme as an ideological construct which aimed to replace the market forces (1989: 62), during the war Marjolin started to consider economic planning as an unavoidable tool to reconstruct the country, to modernize its productive apparatus, and to assure France a place among the great economies12. Following Keynes’ insights13, Marjolin thought that laissez faire was unable to assure full employment either in the short or in the long run (1989: 121) where for laissez faire he did not mean only economic liberalism but “any regime in which there is no rational central intervention, no government intervention guided by an overall plan” (1989: 121). Without rejecting liberal capitalism but endorsing the doctrine of compensatory action by the state14, Marjolin thought that “without some measure of organization the system would inevitably break down” (ibidem) and that state intervention was essential15 although it should not substitute free enterprise. Soon after the war state coordinating and shaping activities (i.e. the Plan) were urgent (and justifiable) due to the shortage of resources and the economic emergency. But planning did not disappear after the First Plan: it became instead a standard tool of economic policy which characterized France for several decades. From the Second Plan (1954-1957) on, the imperative contents started to diminish, and the tasks changed and began to include several aspects that initially were neglected (scientific and technical research, reconversion of manpower, organization of agricultural products market, but also housing, health, education and regional aspects). Marjolin’s commitment to French planning ended with the First Plan but he remained convinced that planning was “a valuable instrument for bringing together the viewpoints of the different social groups and of the government and one which the state could use to maintain or introduce the maximum of degree of harmony in the social life of the country” (1989: 170). As we will see below, this was the underlying conviction with which Marjolin met also his European commitments. The Marshall Plan Marjolin defines as “a nightmare” (1989: 143-158) the economic, political and social chaos which characterized the interwar period16. The term nightmare is referred to

12 When working with Alphand (in 1942-43), Marjolin contributed – along with E.Hirsch - to a Memorandum for the design of a national plan to be implemented after the war. Among the principles suggested we find also nationalizations in which state “might vary investment as it saw fit and prevent big industry with its monopolising tendency from exerting for its benefit, which was not that of the community, a dominating influence on the direction of the economy” (quoted in Marjolin 1989: 124). 13 Marjolin had a Keynesian background: the thesis for his agrégation in political economy (supervisor G. Pirou) was titled “Prix, Monnaie et Production: Essai sur le mouvements économiques de longue durée” and it proposed a development of Keynes’ General Theory into a long-term framework (see on this Arena 2000). 14 He underlines: “If aggregate demand proved insufficient, government should intervene either through investment or investment encouragement, or through stimulation of consumption” (1989: 121). 15 The indispensable role of the state is emphasized already in the thirties; in an article published in l’ Europe Nouvelle on June 5, 1938 Marjolin writes: “It is for the State to define the general interests of France and ensure that they are observed. The essential prerequisite of any policy of national rehabilitation is reestablishment of the power of the State” (quoted in Marjolin 1989: 78) 16 The observation of this nightmare was the ground of Marjolin’s first steps into economics that he took in 1934, after renouncing to philosophy (1989: 46), but a decisive push for such a choice was due to the experience he had in the United States. Thanks to a scholarship, Marjolin spent one

4 the way in which the end of War I was dealt with and to the huge number of “errors, misjudgements and missed opportunities” (1989: 144) that have ultimately resulted, through the Great Depression, into the Second World War17. The most troublesome aspects were, in his view, the efforts imposed to Germany along with the neglect of the strict interdependence existing among the European countries (both “victors and vanquished”, 1989: 146); the isolation chosen by the United States of America that refused to join the League of Nations and to forgive (partly at least) the inter-allied debt (1989: 148) with the consequent lack of international cooperation; the growth of protectionism with the consequent “disintegration of the world economic trading and monetary system” (1989: 157). From this nightmare Marjolin has drawn an important lesson and the awareness – shared with Monnet and his small team – that progress and development could occur only in a context of international and European collaboration. French planners were well aware that French recovery and development were impossible without the American aids (Marjolin 1989: 176; Monnet 1976: 381-83; Hirsch 1988: 89-115) and that the French Plan would remain “stillborn” (Marjolin 1989: 178) without an aid that could be assured for a period of several years, rather than the occasional bilateral aids America was giving in the immediate post-war. Accordingly, they started to weave the canvas that would have brought to the birth of the Marshall Plan: Marjolin and Monnet made several trips to the United States18 in order to discuss the gravity of the economic situation in Europe and the possible connected risks for world equilibrium (Marjolin 1989; Monnet 1976). As a result of also those discussions, on June 5, 1947 the US Secretary of State General Marshall, speaking at the Annual Harvard Commencement, stated the American will to help Europe along with the conditions required for that help: among them there was the request for a coherent European plan19. The Committee of European Economic Cooperation gathered in on July 12, 1947 to prepare a report to be submitted in the following September to the United States. French delegate and “unofficial secretary general” (1989: 184) of the Paris Conference was Marjolin who had to coordinate the work of the different countries involved and to produce a final report: the European Recovery Program (ERP) that was finally accepted on April 3, 1948 when President Truman signed the Foreign Assistant Act. The first

year (from 1932 to 1933) in America where he studied the US labour movement and trade unionism (Marjolin 1935), in so far as he believed that “a powerful labour movement is essential to a smoothly functioning society” 1989: 42). It is also true that he endorsed the Saint-Simonian principle of solidarism among the classes that he took from Elie Halevi. 17 In Marjolin’s words: “the First and the Second World Wars were one and the same war, interrupted from 1919 to 1939 by a truce, itself marked by the Great Depression from 1929 onwards. A real nightmare” (1989: 144). 18 Monnet was very familiar with the American culture and politics. In the interwar period he was a League of Nations official and part of the executive committee in an American bank (Kuisel 1981: 220). Between 1943 and 1945 he was in Washington as head of the staff of the French Supply Council and there gathered the people of his post-war team. Marjolin’s connections and bonds with American politicians, economists and officials have always been extremely frequent and particularly tight since his early experience with the Rockefeller Foundation. 19 In Marshall’s words: “It would be neither fitting not efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations” (Department of State Bulletin, XVI, 15 June 1947: 1160).

5 French “Modernization and Equipment” Plan became therefore a complementary element of the ERP. Marjolin was then asked to chair the Committee to draw up the charter of the organization which had to implement the ERP and was appointed Secretary-General of the Organization for the European Cooperation (OEEC) in April 1948. When dealing with the institutional features to be given to the OEEC, three main different positions emerged: the one expressed by the British who promoted an intergovernmental organization with a Council of ministers that would have taken all the decisions by unanimous vote and a secretary general with no real authority but only with the power to enforce the decisions taken by the Council; the French position was instead for introducing a supranational element and giving the power to take some decisions to the Secretary general; finally the Americans, besides the supranational element, supported the use of the majority vote. At the end, the British proposal prevailed on the others. As such the OEEC had, according to Monnet, a “congenital weakness”: lacking a supra-national organism; for him “the idea that 16 sovereign countries effectively did cooperate was a pure illusion” (1976: 392); moreover the possibility that each member country could refrain from implementing the decisions taken by the Conseil, “was contrary to the spirit of community” (Monnet, 1976: 394). The only solution would have been, for Monnet, to create a “West federation” which could seriously result into a truly European common effort (1976: 393-6). According to his idea, each European recipient country should have an equivalent of the French Plan to ease the distribution of the American aids. These different plans then should be inserted into a “European pyramid of economic control” (Gillingham 2003: 21) through the OEEC controlled by a supra- national institution20. Marjolin as well thought that a political union was the most reasonable and de facto unavoidable goal for the European countries, but he realized, more than Monnet, that the time was not ripe for such a step. Moreover, as will we see in the following section, he did not share Monnet’s functionalist approach and perspectives21 and followed a different path in the attempt to build the European union. Although in his memoirs, Marjolin often underlines that the unanimous vote was never a real obstacle to the OEEC decisions and activity, he also admits that the main aim of the OEEC – to establish a truly European four-year plan – was a failure (1989: 200). That Plan never materialized. What emerged instead was a number of principles “designed to guide the economic policies of the member countries. The so-called plan consisted of the sort of clichés favoured by international organizations, and sometimes by national governments: financial and monetary stability in all the member countries, rapid export growth, reduction of non-essential imports…, elimination of intra-European imbalances and so forth”, 1989: 200-201). According to Marjolin, the problem was that “Europe did not exist in the sense that there would have been a single economic policy, or at least coordinated economic policies” (1989: 200). Coherently, “European planning …was practically non-existent. It was never to see the light of day” (1989: 201).

20 Monnet’s idea remained unsuccessful and the European Recovery Program followed its own criteria to distribute money to the European countries, whereas the OEEC became the main promoter of free trade with and within the European countries and in 1961 it was transformed in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development which became sponsor of global liberalization (Gillingham 2003). 21 In his autobiography, Marjolin often distances himself from Monnet’s and other fervent Europeans’ opinion on the steps to take towards European integration. However, it should be noted that his distance is more formal than substantive in so far as Marjolin’s perplexities concerned more the feasibility rather than the convenience of those steps.

6 Notwithstanding the limits in the OEEC countries’ coordination and some incidental difficulties as those produced by the Korean war (1950), the Marshall Plan was undoubtedly successful and “by 1952 the European reconstruction was virtually over” (1989: 245). However, according to Marjolin, there were still very important things to do: European countries should become totally independent from American aids (1989: 241); they should reach levels of productivity and living standards closer to those existing in the United States; they should deepen their union starting from a customs union. The latter was considered the conditio sine qua non for the previous ones, but it was strongly opposed by Britain and actively promoted by few; therefore “the movement towards the European unification had come to a standstill” (1989: 246). As Marjolin notes “I could see nothing in the OEEC context that would be able to provide the necessary impetus. That is why in 1952 or at any rate in 1953, I decided to leave OEEC” (ibidem). The Common Market Marjolin officially left the OEEC in 1955, starting to teach political economy at the University of Nancy but above all “campaigning for a European customs union” (1989: 247) through the publication of a series of articles in the newspaper Paris-Press- l’Intransigeant under the general title of “Les chances de la France dans l’Europe de demain”. In these articles, Marjolin strongly underlines the need for France to give up protectionism and to form a customs union22 with the other European countries because only a very large European market could allow the development of large-scale industry and therefore to assure France’s growth and economic progress: the model to follow were clearly the United States and their outstanding economic expansion (1989: 278) due to their methods of production and organization but also to their market dimension. While supporting the idea of a customs union, Marjolin was sceptical of the existing ECSC, which was direct expression of Monnet’s strategy23. Marjolin recognized that ECSC achieved some important goals and that it represented a crucial step toward a united Europe and a revolution in the Franco-German relations (1989: 273). However, the ECSC implied, through the powers given to the High Authority, a “pooling of sovereignty” which could not remain limited to coal and steel otherwise “great difficulties might arise, for it is practically impossible to administer these two industries without influencing considerably the rest of the economy” (1953: 54). This is why according to Marjolin, the normal and necessary development for the success of the Schuman Plan should be towards the creation of a European (political) federation (1958: 269). He deeply believed in necessity to achieve a political European union and in the lectures held at Duke University in the fall of 1951, Marjolin encouraged even the creation of a European Army that “would be of great assistance in furthering that development” (1953: 56). However, whereas Monnet did believe in the theory of “engrenage” or the spill-over effect, according to which once made a first step in the direction of economic integration, the other steps and most notably the political integration would almost naturally follow,

22 “The issue has to be put squarely: either a certain number of European states agree to set up a customs union, or all the discussions about European integration are just so much talk that will not succeed for long in concealing the general infirmity of purpose. The only way of demonstrating beyond all possible doubt that things are really moving is to decide immediately to form such a trading body. This is not a decision that can be taken in steps, even if its implementation is phased over a period that may be fairly long.” (1989: 252-53) 23 According to Monnet’s functionalist approach, the European economic integration should proceed by sectors as the ECSC for the iron and steel industry and gradually reach the political unity.

7 Marjolin did not24 (1989: 266). He was indeed a pragmatic, wise, and very circumspect politician, who was able to understand whether certain actions were opportune or not and when. This explains therefore pretty well his scepticism towards the project of the European Defence Community (EDC) which was strongly promoted by Monnet but that, when officially proposed (1954), it fell into a complete failure. Marjolin had a strong sense of timing and prospect which characterized his activity especially in his European commitments. Nonetheless, he himself, as we will see below, fell into error. In February 1956 Marjolin became adviser to Foreign Minister of the new Mollet government and started his “Common market adventure” (1989: 255) with the involvement into the negotiations of the Rome Treaty. Marjolin actively contributed to the difficult and delicate task of having the Spaak Report accepted. Marjolin’s opinion on the Report was “positive but guarded” (1989: 285) once again not because he did not share the main contents of the report25 but because he was aware of the political climate and public opinion hostility to the removal of protection which the agreement would have engendered. Accordingly, in his view, the Report had to be refined and amended. It was essential, for Marjolin, to give the “new treaty a purely economic character, ignoring the grand principles and political goals which in the years from 1950 to 1954 had fired the enthusiasm of the Europeans but which in 1956 were arousing hostile reactions in large segments of public opinion” (1989: 296). The failure of the Pleven Plan for the EDC project (1954) was telling. Accordingly, the Rome Treaty was not made as an extension of the Treaty of Paris (as Monnet wished) and the term High Authority was carefully dropped out26. The issues under discussion during the negotiations were highly critical27 and dividing even among the “Europeans”28, but thanks to Adenauer’s capacity to compromise (1989: 301) and the efforts made by the team involved, the Rome Treaty could come to light. During the negotiations, Marjolin worked very hard to make the Treaty conditions more appealing to the French government without arousing opposition among the other negotiating countries. He tried to meet the requirements of the French government which were synthetized in a Memorandum presented in May 1956 and well summarized in a speech made by Mendes France in the National Assembly on January 195729 (1989: 284-297): accordingly Marjolin suggested adding a text that “would help to allay French fear” and that actually became the “Protocol relating certain provisions of concern to France” which was annexed to the Treaty (1989: 300). He also proposed, when dealing with the problem of agricultural policy, to substitute the word “preference” (appreciated by France but unbearable to the other partners) with the “more innocuous” (Gillingham, 2003: 47) and more generally acceptable term “non-discrimination”

24 He labelled Monnet’s concept of “Federal United States of Europe” as a “simplistic notion”: not because of its content but because it was too unrealistic and did not highlight the several difficulties it implied. (1989: 174 but also 267-8). 25 On the contrary, Marjolin praised the “excellent job” done and that was especially “due to Pierre Uri” (1989: 283). 26 The text of the Rome Treaty neglects also other issues included instead in the Spaak Report, as for instance the pooling of the air transport and the creation of a postal union. 27 Especially for some highly controversial topics as agriculture or overseas’ relations. 28 The debate focused in particular on whether to give priority to the creation of the Common Market as many “Europeans” wished or to focus on the Euratom project, as Monnet strongly encouraged (1989: 298). 29 Available on: https://www.cvce.eu/obj/discours_de_pierre_mendes_france_sur_les_risques_du_marche_commun_paris _18_janvier_1957-fr-c81bfdc2-20a9-4eaa-82ec-c2117fa1f3c2.html

8 (Marjolin 1989: 302)30. When the Rome Treaty came into effect (January 1, 1958) Marjolin was appointed Vice-President of the European Commission31. Marjolin (1989: 308-358) divides his experience at the Commission in two phases: (a) “The Honey Moon”, from 1958 to 1962 and (b) the “Times of Crisis”, from 1963 to 1967. In the first phase, the Honey moon, reasons of divergences and tension32 did not lack but they did not lead to open conflicts. Marjolin recognizes especially the importance of “Adenauer’s determination to do nothing that might distance him from Paris” (1989: 311) and of the effective cooperation inside the Commission. But the success of this period was especially due, for Marjolin, to “the fact that theological quarrels were temporarily forgotten” (1989: 316) and therefore the contrast between the different views on the future institutional asset of Europe did not hamper the first steps of the implementation of the Treaty. However, these contrasts became increasingly evident and critical in the second phase. Two main failures characterize, according to Marjolin, the period between 1963 and 1967: the first one is De Gaulle’s attempt to build in 1962 a Franco-German Europe; De Gaulle’s undertaking failed because of his will to exclude Britain, his attitude towards NATO and, last but not the least, the appointment of , as new German Chancellor in 1963. The second failure involves the attempt to start a federalist Europe with supranational institutions in 1965 that resulted into the empty chair crisis and the so-called Luxemburg compromise. In his autobiography, Marjolin details his opinion on these two critical events. As for the first failure, he affirms that he could not understand and share De Gaulle’s position on NATO (1989: 329-30) especially for the doubtful advantages derived from an eventual departure (which actually occurred in 1966) from the Atlantic Alliance. On the other hand, he shares – although more implicitly than explicitly – De Gaulle’s decision to exclude Britain from the Common Market. Not only because Britain complicated the already complex path towards a common agricultural policy (1989: 336), but also because Britain was inherently contrary to the idea of a federal Europe (1989: 343). The latter reason seems to be the more important to Marjolin who, when pondering the effects of Britain’s admission to the Common market (which occurred in 1973), commented: “The entry of Britain, Ireland and Denmark…reinforced the egocentrity of governments, their tendency to attach importance only to what might satisfy a national interest, at the expenses of the efforts to consolidate European unity; it weakened the Community’s institutions to some extent by the mere fact of having increased the number of members; it helped to make the Luxemburg compromise a sacrosanct practice” (1989: 360). Finally, as for Erhard, Marjolin could not agree with his perspective: defined in his memoirs as “a convinced Americanist, advocate of the common Market membership for Britain, fervent of free trade on a world scale, lukewarm (– not to say negative – , p. 281) over the European Economic Community” (1989: 331), Erhard became indeed one of the main obstacles to his project, as we will see in the next section. Relying upon the success obtained between 1963 and 1964 in terms of steps towards economic unity (most notably the consolidation of the common agricultural

30 As strategic and wise politician, Marjolin knew pretty well the importance of the right words; when he proposed his idea of planning at European level, he used the more neutral term programming rather than planning (see on this Caldari forthcoming). 31 Along with and , the other two vice-presidents and President . 32 In particular, there was a deep contrast on the role of the European institutions between the supporters of a Federal Europe and those of the idea of “Europe of the states”. This contrast became increasingly manifest with the question of Britain’s admission or not into the community.

9 policy), in 1965 part of the tried to make a step forward towards a federal (political) union. In a speech held at the European Parliament on the 24th march, President Hallstein proposed to endow the Community with its own resources and consequently to increase the power of the Parliament that could amend the decisions in budget matters by majority vote (see on this Bossuat 2012; Gillingham 2003; Warlouzet 2010). This proposal was promoted by Hallstein33 backed by Mansholt and it was prepared in secret even from the other commissioners, included Marjolin (Marjolin; Moravcsik 1998: 228). The proposal was refused outright by the French government and caused the well-known empty chair crisis which could be solved only with the Luxemburg compromise34, in January 1966. As Vice-President of the European Commission, Marjolin was unavoidably involved in this action, which he criticized very strongly. As he recalls: “I found myself in disagreement with most of my colleagues. Not that my basic instincts were any different from theirs, but their attempt not only to increase the budgetary powers of the Strasbourg assembly…but also and above all to become an arbiter between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers, thus greatly increasing the Commission’s powers, struck me as premature and certain to end in a humiliating defeat” (1989: 348). Hallstein’s speech and proposal are criticized for the “unusual manner of procedure”35 (1989: 349) and are labelled “as an absurdity” (1989: 350). Once again, Marjolin had a clear sense of timing and knew that for the time being, French Government but also the other European partners would not accept anything similar: “I knew.., given the sentiment prevailing not only in Paris but also in Government and civil service circles in the other capitals, that there was not the slightest chance of the project’s being accepted, or even of its being considered seriously. I feared that far from furthering the construction of Europe, it would prove to be a seriously retrograde step” (1989: 350). Marjolin’s awareness was indeed further prompted by the events that directly affected him in the same period. Europe à la Marjolin Marjolin resigned from the European Commission in 1967, devoting himself, in the following years, mainly to business36. He was involved again into European matters only in a couple of occasions: in 1974, when he was asked by the Commission to head a group of experts to study the problems posed by the creation of the European and

33 The substance of this proposal was already established in the document “Initiative 1964”, which Hallstein elaborated as a working plan to be developed in the following years (see on this Warlouzet 2010: 386-90). 34 Marjolin himself wrote much of the drafting of a Memorandum that resulted into the text of the Luxemburg agreement (1989: 352- 58). 35 The usual Community rule prescribed in fact that the Council of Ministers should be the first (and surely before the Parliament) to hear any proposal advanced by the Commission. 36 He was nonexecutive-director or adviser to a number of companies as Shell, IBM, General Motors and many others. When he left the European Commission, he was in doubt whether to return to the University or to follow the political career. The former was discarded because teaching was too far from his main experiences and as he notes “I have always thought that to be a good teacher, one has to devote oneself entirely to being a teacher and to a life’s work that stems directly from this or is very closely linked to it” (1989: 376). The political career was ruled out especially because of his unhappy electoral experience he had in 1962 when he applied for the socialist party in the constituency of Moulins (Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes) (1989: 377-81).

10 Monetary Union (EMU)37; and in 1978 when the European Council asked him to be part of the group of “three wise men” to find out how to better the European Institutions38. In his memoirs Marjolin maintains that he left Brussels because he was “convinced that the creative phase was essentially over and about to give way to a period of pure administration that [he] was not tempted to experience personally” (1989: 309). He recalls that an analogous reason made him to leave the OEEC in 1955, certain that other people could and would have done his work as much as well. However, in an interview39, when explaining his resignation from the Commission, if on the one hand he excludes possible political reasons, on the other hand he also maintains that he needed retreating to reflect on the way in which he could give his contribution to the following steps of the European construction towards what he calls the final objective, that is the political union of Europe. The facts that he finally decided to dedicate himself to business and that only marginally he was involved into European questions – on which he gave rather negative evaluations – lead us to think that among the reasons behind his decision there may be something more than the ones openly admitted. To better understand these reasons, it may be helpful to approach Marjolin’s own project about Europe. Between 1962 and 1963 Marjolin started to directly promote the introduction of a form of economic planning at European level. On October 24, 1962, Marjolin presented a Memorandum in the European Economic Commission where he underlines the urgency for a communitarian Action Programme which should go beyond a customs union and would take into account some long-term common targets. This proposal is further developed and explained in a speech40 given at a conference he organized in Rome on November 30, 196241. Here Marjolin enumerates the reasons why for him a European programming was in need and enlightened its main features. Given the existence of market imperfections that prevent the free play of market forces and the automatic regulation of market mechanism, the need to assure a truly harmonic development within

37 The report written in 1974 on what Marjolin defines “the illusion of EMU” (1989: 361) substantially reveals his customary pragmatism. Against the enthusiasm of those (“the Europeans”) who believed that after the 1969 Hague Summit the creation of a single currency was at hand and moreover that it would have taken (quickly) to the political union, the report unveiled a much less optimistic situation and contained rather negative conclusions. What Marjolin and the other two experts note in the report is that: “Although some progress of a technical nature has been accomplished, the Study Group is of the opinion that on balance the enterprise taken in 1969 has failed….Europe is not nearer to EMU than in 1969… When one speaks of Europe, one is speaking essentially of a geographical entity situated between the USA and the URSS, composed of states which trade very actively with one another, but which, in most cases, behave in national affairs and in world affairs each according to its individual learning and affinities…” (1989: 362). This failure was due for them to adverse events (the international monetary crisis) but especially “to the absence of any real understanding of what was involved” so far that most governments thought that EMU was just “an extension or development of the customs union” (1989: 363). But the two things were deeply different and moreover EMU implied some degree of political union that, once again, Marjolin saw not seriously dealt with at that time (1989: 364). 38 Among the critical aspects, the 1978 Report underlines the bureaucratic heaviness of the European machinery and the increasing inter-governmental switch of the Community; in this regards it is noted: “the mood of the negotiation itself has become narrowly national, and hence more intergovernmental in character. These are symptoms of the general evolution in States’ attitudes that has weakened the standing of the more ‘supranational institutions’ and increased the significance of the Council relative to the Commission within the Community machine” (1989: 368). 39 Available on https://youtu.be/2cNOpa5J19I. 40 It anticipated the content of the official communication he presented at the Commission of the European Council on 25 July 1963. 41 Among the several participants from different countries we find: W.Hallstein, von Der Groeben, P.Uri, C.Gruson, E.Hirsch, F.Perroux, J.Rueff, P. Mendes-France, J.Tibergen.

11 all the countries of the community was the most important problem economic policy had to face. In order to achieve the true harmonisation of the different countries’ economies as envisaged in the Rome Treaty, it was not sufficient, he points out, to resort only to cyclical and monetary policies but it was necessary to elaborate long run development strategies: moreover it was imperative to have a European (long term) development policy for some particular sectors as energy, transport, and education42 and to foster collective investments – along with the private ones – that had to be designed for the whole community according to a long run perspective. His proposal was severely opposed by Germany, whose position is well represented by Ludwig Erhard, Minister for Economic Affairs from 1949 to 1963 and Federal Chancellor from 1963 to 1966. In a speech given at the European Parliament on the 20th of November 1962 Erhard severely criticizes Marjolin’s Action Programme for its “dangerous centralizing perspective”. He points out that what the Rome Treaty envisaged was just a “coordination of the national economic policies” whereas the Action programme refers to a “fusion” of the economies and to a strict coordination of the social policies (p. 52). Moreover, and this was the worst aspect for Erhard, it implied a form of medium-long term planning which was considered as a “backward method”43; according to Erhard it was impossible to have both competition and market on the one hand and planning on the other, as instead supposed in the French conception of “indicative planning”. According to Erhard, it was not planning that the European project needed to evolve but a new constitutional form and a true, free, and undistorted competition (pp.51- 53). Facing this strong and influential opposition, Marjolin, nonetheless, was able to create in 1964 the Committee for the Medium-Term Economic Policy (MTEPC), which was designated to develop and further his “action programme”. However, the Committee ended up dealing only with competition policy (Marchal 1968: 745) and it became just a “talk-shop for macroeconomic forecasting” (Holland 1980: 37). As noted by Marjolin himself, the serious implementation of a “medium-term economic policy .. remained a dead letter” (1989: 347). The MTEPC produced three main programmes: to understand the difference from the functions originally envisaged by Marjolin and those finally experienced, it is sufficient to compare the first (1966-1970) with the third (1971-75) programmes. The first programme44 focuses on the need to “concert” (p.1520) the different economic and social policies (income distribution, regional development, labour conditions, sectorial structures) according to a long-term perspective. In the speech Marjolin gave at the European Parliament on January 19, 1965 to present this programme, he stressed that its main feature was a strict link between the economic and the social aspects45 and that it gave particular attention to the pressing necessity (“impérieuse

42 These issues were indeed dealt with in the original Spaak Report but put in the background with the following changes, necessary for its acceptance. As we have seen above, Marjolin himself worked on those changes, but it is clear that for him that was an unavoidable but temporary operation. 43 Strong of Germany’s economic success he maintains: “the programme which allowed us to take Germany from its ashes and ruins? I have certainly not tackled this task armed with medium and long-term projects but through free pricing and also by invigorating competition, I have established a free economy that has unleashed all its forces…” (Parlement Européen 1962: 54). 44 In the Committee that worked for the first programme there was also the General Planning Commissioner Pierre Massé. 45 “Le programme européen de développement devra associer étroitement à la croissance économique, une politique sociale hardie” (Cahiers Mensuels de Documentation Européenne, Février, 1965, n. 2: p.25)

12 nécessité”) of a incomes policy46; that it implied unavoidably a global long term (multi- year) perspective; and moreover that it was conceived as a fundamental step towards the creation of a (politically) federal or federated Europe47. The third programme, instead, refers mainly to the monetary union established at the Summit of the Hague (1969), without mentioning any “concert” of sectorial or social policies or any long-term outlook. The idea of political European union was indeed at that time already drop out. Clearly Germany’s position, however influential, cannot alone explain Marjolin’s failure. The 1965 crisis underlined in fact the existence of several critical issues, the scarce will of governments to give away even a little portion of their own sovereignty, the vague and imprecise opinion about the possible next steps towards European Integration, and a general obscurity of what to regard as “European Union”. Moreover, there was in that period a significant switch towards a more neoliberal and ordoliberal positions (see on this Denord 2016; Hien and Jorgers 2017) and the idea of planning at European level disappeared48 whereas in France49 it gradually but definitely lost its main features and started the so-called “déplanification souple” (Bauchet, 1966). Within these circumstances, Marjolin started to have serious “doubts about the possibility, and perhaps even the utility…of coordinating national economic policies” (1989: 347). Against his “convictions as to the need for economic planning” (1989: 121), any idea of economic and social planning was denied ex ante, except for some light form of programming which did not implied any comprehensive common strategy of development for the countries involved. Furthermore, the conception of a political union at European level was increasingly marginalized and with it its more resolute supporters as Monnet50,

46 “Si l'on veut atteindre cet objectif de stabilité, les conditions suivantes doivent être remplies : - le partage des fruits de l'expansion économique doit être efficace et équitable; - les partenaires sociaux devraient être consultés lorsque sont prises les grandes décisions de politique économique qui doivent déterminer la grandeur du produit national brut et la façon dont il sera distribué”. (Cahiers Mensuels de Documentation Européenne, Février, 1965, n. 2: p.25). 47 “Les organes qui ont été mis en place constituent un ensemble administratif complet qui pourrait devenir un instrument de conception et d'exécution de la politique de développement économique d'un État moderne européen, érigé en fédération ou en confédération”. (Cahiers Mensuels de Documentation Européenne, Février, 1965, n. 2: p.25). 48 European integration developed about the coordination of some macroeconomic aspects leaving aside most of the elements that the idea of planning à la Marjolin involved and that never again became part of the European agenda. The main ones are the following three that are among them strictly interconnected: (a) long run perspective; (b) consideration of collective and social goods; (c) discretionary interventions due to the danger and limits of any automatism (see Caldari forthcoming). 49 This neo and ordo-liberal transformation found a rather fertile milieu in France well represented by Jacques Rueff’s idea of “institutional market” and Maurice Allais’ concept of “competitive planning” (Denord 2016; Diemer 2012 and 2014). Not without regret, the economist Claude Gruson noted: “Le diplomates Français n’ont pas compris la nécessité de la programmation européenne et ont laissé aux techniciens la charge d’en démontrer l’utilité et d’en amorcer la réalisation avec des dérisoires moyens” (1968: 353-54). A turn towards a neo-liberal approach occurred also at political level, where for instance the new Minister of Finance M. Debré (with the third Pompidou government, 1966-1967) was very critical of any idea of super-nationality and replaced Giscard d’Estaing, who was instead a fervent advocate of the idea of Federal Europe. 50 Monnet’s project of Europe was progressively marginalized, especially after the failure of the project for the European Defence Community (Monnet 1976: 587-88). After his resignation from the High Authority of the ECSC in 1954, Monnet pursued his idea through the creation in 1955 of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe (Monnet 1976). However, notwithstanding his further successes (most notably the push given to the Rome Treaty and the creation of Euratom), Monnet’s United States of Europe never materialized.

13 Hallstein51, Uri52, and Hirsch53. Due to his long-lasting experience, Marjolin remained an authoritative reference for European questions and as we have seen he was sometimes involved as “wise man” in the study of some matters. However, he did not any longer have a direct role and especially he did not contribute actively for the development of his idea of Europe. But what was in essence this idea? It is during the war that Marjolin develops the fundamentals of his idea of Europe. In a note sent to Monnet in 1944 and titled “The economic and political organization of western Europe”, he notes that “preservation of the democratic regime and its adjustments to changed circumstances would be particularly difficult if western Europe remained segmented” (quoted in 1989: 125). Moreover, in the light of war experience and France’s defeat, largely due to its economic but especially military weakness, Marjolin dreamt “a political and military Europe whose first and foremost function would be to ensure its own defence” (1989: 128). Clearly, he did not overlook the importance of an economic unification; in the same note he in fact prefigures: “In the economic sphere, the unification of Europe would be marked by a progressive dismantlement of all barriers to the free circulation of goods, persons, and capital, by a rational division of labour among the different regions, by a progressive equalization of living standards across the continent … the European economy as a whole would receive an extraordinarily powerful impetus from unification of the European market” (quoted in 1989: 128). However, following the reasoning developed in that note, the political and military unification were considered the necessary condition to properly build an economic union and to make it properly work. This point is substantially repeated more than twenty years later in the interview mentioned above where Marjolin makes it clear that the existing economic union was to be considered only a partial step towards the true final objective. Without the following necessary steps towards a political union, European union would remain just “an illusion”: Marjolin’s critical attitude towards the moves made at European level after his resignation from the Commission (see fn 37 and 38) is indeed rather eloquent. Concluding remarks Marjolin’s autobiography remained unfinished due to his sudden death (April 15 1986) but it was published right away (1986, with the title Le Travail d’une vie) and soon translated and published in English (1989). The title chosen for the English version “Robert Marjolin, architect of European Unity” well highlights the efforts of his life-time. Nonetheless, in the literature, it is somewhere noted that “Marjolin [was] hardly a strong- pro-European but the individual most strongly favourable to liberalization on economic grounds” (Moravcsik, 1998: 119). In this paper, we have seen, instead, that building a

51 After his attempt to force the federal turn which resulted into the empty chair crisis, Walter Hallstein became a sort of “scapegoat” (Moravcsik 1998: 230) for the contrasts within the European partners and he was forced (particularly by De Gaulle) to resign from the presidency of the commission, at the end of 1967. 52 Pierre Uri was one of the closest collaborators of Monnet; he was part of the General Planning Commissariat’s team; he played a crucial role in framing the Schuman Plan and in drafting the Spaak Report (Monnet 1976: 430-570; Uri 1991: 55-137). Disappointed for not being elected member of the European Commission or director of the ECSC High Authority (1991: 150-152), Uri resigned as ECSC delegate in 1959. 53 Étienne Hirsch, former manager of a chemical firm, cooperated with Fighting France during the war; and with in the postwar period. He was General Commissioner from 1952 to 1959 and President of Euratom from 1959 to 1961. Against Hirsch’s wish, his mandate was not renewed by the French government (Hirsch 1988: 174-5).

14 strong (economic, political, social and military) European union was Marjolin’s main goal since the years of the war. “His Europe” should have been a political union, grounded on common (long- term) projects and outlooks, which would achieve a remarkable economic development, social welfare and quality of living for all the parts involved. Marjolin’s Europe should not settle just for an economic and monetary union but develop into a political union; only a political union would allow to enhance long-term economic and social development projects and to reach the necessary social, economic and military security which would have prevented another meaningless tragedy for the European people. He was a liberal economist who advocated free competition and market mechanism to stimulate economic activity but who strongly believed – according to his socialist background – in the crucial role of state intervention to regulate the several market imperfections and to guarantee all those aspects that the market was unfitted to supply. The steps taken towards the European integration, especially after he left the scene, clearly did not match his idea of Europe. His disappointment, never too openly expressed, appears however manifest in a preparatory note for a last unwritten chapter of his autobiography, where Marjolin rather grimly notes: “I have worked a great deal. I started very low; I climbed very high (or fairly high) by an effort of will. At first, I did not understand what was happening to me. Then for a time I felt very proud of my achievement. Now I don’t know”. References Arena R. (2000), “Les économistes français en 1950”, Revue économique, 51(5): 969-1007. Bauchet P. (1966), La Planification française. Vingt ans d’expérience, Paris: éditions du Seuil. Bossuat G. (2912), La France et la Construction de l’Unité Européene, Paris: Armand Colin. Caldari K. (forthcoming), “From “planning” to “programming”: a lost opportunity for the European Project?”. Denord F. (2001), “Aux origines du néo-libéralisme en France: Louis Rougier et le Colloque Walter Lippmann de 1938”, Le mouvement social, 2(195): 9-34. Denord F. (2016), Le néo-libéralisme à la Française. Historire d’une idéologie politique, Marseille: Agone. Diemer A. (2012), “Aspects théorique et pratique de la concurrence dans l’œuvre de Maurice Allais” Cahiers d’économie politique, 1(62): 75-115. Diemer A. (2014), “Le néolibéralisme français ou comment penser le libéralisme au prisme des institutions”, Economie et Institutions, 20-21: 1-28. Gillingham J. (2003), European Integration, 1950-2003, Cambridge University Press. Gruson C. (1968), Origine et Espoirs de la Planification française, Paris: Dunod. Hackett J. And Hackett A.-M. (1963), Economic Planning in France, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Hien J. and C.Jorgers (eds) (2017), Ordoliberalism, Law and the rule of Economics, Oxford: Hart Publishing. Hirsch E. (1962), “French planning and its European application”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1(2): 117-127. Hirsch E. (1988), Ainsi va la vie, Lausanne: Centre Jean Monnet pour l’Europe. Holland S. (1980), Uncommon Market, London: Macmillan. Kuisel R.F. (1981), Capitalism and the State in Modern France, Cambridge University Press. Marchal A. (1968), “Le secteur public et l’économie de marché dans la C.E.E.”, Revue économique, 19(5): 737-764. Marjolin R. (1935), “La N.R.A. aux États-Unis”, in L’Homme Réel, n. 15-16 Syndicalisme et Corporations: 88-95. Marjolin R. (1938), “Reflections on the Blum Experiment”, Economica, 5(18): 177-191. Marjolin R. (1958), « Coopération intergouvernementale et autorité supranationales », Revue Économique, 9(2) : 267-77.

15 Marjolin R. (1959), “Il faut raccourcir la période de transition du Marché commun et unifier les politiques économiques et financières des États membre”, interview, Le Monde, September 22. Marjolin R. (1989); Architect of European Unity. Memoirs 1911-1986, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Monnet J. (1976), Mémoires, Paris: Fayard. Moravcsik A. (1998), The Choice for Europe, New York: Cornell University Press. Uri P. (1991), Penser pour l’Action, Paris: Éditions Odile Jacobs. Warlouzet L. (2010), Le choix de la CEE par la France. L’Europe économique en débat de Mendès France

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