Planning the European Architecture: the Contribution of Robert Marjolin
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Early draft: work in progress Planning the European architecture: the contribution of Robert Marjolin Katia Caldari University of Padova Cette coopération dépendra, bien entendu, de la sagesse des hommes, qui siégeront au Conseil des Ministres et à la Commission européenne, et de ceux qui, dans les capitales, définiront les positions des différents gouvernements. Mais le facteur essentiel sera la volonté politique de poursuivre la construction européenne (1958: 276) Introduction Robert Marjolin played a pivotal role in the reconstruction of France after WWII and in the construction of the European Community: he was Deputy Commissioner of the French Plan from 1946 to 1948, Secretary-General of the Organization for the European Cooperation (OEEC) from 1948 to 1955 and Vice-President of the European Economic Community (EEC) Commission from 1958 to 1967. Nonetheless, in the literature his contribution to the European project is rather overshadowed and his efforts to build a united Europe are often neglected. To briefly describe Marjolin’s character, three terms seem to me more fitting: socialist, liberal, and planner. In 1929, at the age of 18, he joined the French Socialist Party (SFIO, Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière) and became active militant in the Quinzième Section and in the Jeunesse Socialiste. When student at the University la Sorbonne, in 1931, he also joined: the socialist students movement – placing himself on the very (and sometimes extreme) left side of the movement (Marjolin, 1989: 28) –, the Cooperative Movement of Consumers1, and Révolution Constructive, a group of socialist intellectuals founded with the publication of a volume manifesto in 1932. Although sometimes in disagreement with some socialist positions2 from which he distanced himself, he remained a true socialist with the attention given to social questions and the efforts he made to foster policies (first at national and then at European level) that could combine economic choices with social needs. 1 At that time, it was more a “social philosophy” than “a grouping of shops” (1989: 30). Marjolin published an article in the movement’s journal Le Cooperateur in France (dated September 12, 1931) that was titled “The forces of the future” and contained the text of a speech he made in Nancy in summer 1931 on the occasion of a visit to the “Cooperators of Lorraine”. 2 Most notably with the 1936-37 blum Government of the Front Populaire: see Marjolin 1938; 1989. 1 While militating in the socialist milieus, Marjolin – between 1934 and 1936 – is introduced to the liberal thought, especially through the influence of Charles Rist3 who took him as economics Editor in the Institut of Recherches Economiques et Sociales (ISRES). During this period Marjolin went often to the London School of Economics, with which ISRES had a collaborative arrangement, and participated into the meetings of the Reform Club, a liberal institution where he met among the others Lionel Robbins (1989: 115). It is in this very period that Marjolin starts to study economics (leaving his previous field of interest: philosophy) and becomes convinced of the importance of free competitive markets. In his life, he has always ranked himself among the exponents of liberalism (1989: 281) without however rejecting the socialist principles that formed his background. It is indeed this blend of socialism and liberalism that affects Marjolin’s opinion about State intervention and engenders his position towards economic planning. Before WWII, in France, planning was sustained by several socialists (among them the group of Révolution Constructive): Marjolin initially gave his own support to this idea but then he refused it as a possible means to overcome the ongoing economic crisis. After the war however, he became a strong supporter of economic planning to be conceived as indicative planning, that is a planning compatible with free market and competition. According to Marjolin, planning was the only way to properly rebuild the destroyed country after the war but also more generally the unavoidable tool which must second free competition and markets. In his autobiography, Marjolin underlines those major undertakings that absorbed most of his energies after WWII: the French Plan, the Marshall Plan and the Common Market (1989: 159). However distinct, they are strictly interconnected and dealt with by Marjolin as a unique strategy in which we find the attention for social questions; the support of free competition but also the emphasis on the limits of free markets and on the need for state intervention with long-term actions in the form of economic planning. The common thread which links these three commitments is his awareness of the urgency to build the European Union to be understood as an economic, social and political union. The French Plan In 1946 Marjolin became Deputy Commissioner alongside Jean Monnet4, first General Planning Commissioner, in the General Planning Commissariat and overall responsible for the design of the first Plan of Modernization and Equipment (1946-1952)5. 3 Liberal economist, particularly interested into monetary questions (but see Arena 2000), was part of the Mont-Pèlerin society (Denord and Swartz 2010) and had several bonds with bank capitalism (Denord 2001). 4 The co-partnership between Marjolin and Monnet developed during the war when they went (Monnet as member of the French Committee of National Liberation and Marjolin as collaborator of Alphand who was named Committe’s Director of economic affairs) to Washington in 1943 on behalf of General De Gaulle – at that time head of French Committee of National Liberation – to organize the supply of food, raw material, and capital goods for France after the war. In 1944 Marjolin was promoted head of the French Supply Mission to the United States and was directly responsible to Monnet becoming one of his closest collaborators. 5 The Plan was promulgated by decree without being submitted to the Parliament. The Plan Commissariat was responsible to the Prime Minister’s office and it was considered a permanent delegate of the head of the Government; the General Commissioner had a small staff, a modest budget and did not have a ministerial rank, although he had a large influence on most economic matters. Since the beginning, the General Planning Commissariat, for technical aspects of planning and projections, heavily relied both on qualified specialized groups and on members of the Modernization Commissions and their sub- 2 The General Planning Commissariat was established to deal with the reconstruction problem and the country’s recovery after the war: French economy after the war was in a very difficult and distressing condition (Monnet, 1976: 335) and it needed a deeply reasoned and efficient action to retrieve and develop. Accordingly, the focus was on productive investments and, given the limited resources, an order of priorities was established with preference given to some basic sectors (coal, electricity, steel, transport, cement, and agriculture). The Plan outlined some targets (in terms of national output) for these six sectors that were to be considered as imperative, whereas those for all the other sectors were simply indicative (Premier Plan 1946-47: 35). Giving precedence to investments and production implied to put in the background consumption and to limit state borrowing on capital market not to reduce the capital available for investment. The Plan involved therefore measures of austerity and severity. Marjolin, who supported these decisions within the Monnet’s team6, wrote a number of articles in the Revue de Dèfence Nationale (Marjolin 1989: 163-5) in order to clarify the choices of the Plan7: in a Keynesian perspective8, Marjolin notes that in order to improve the population’s living standards and assure prosperity to the country, it was necessary first to relaunch production (through investments) and to modernize the productive methods, by following the examples of Britain and moreover the United States (1989: 165-65). Notwithstanding the alleged “concert” organized through the Plan9, some important measures of dirigisme were indeed not excluded in so far as along with some nationalizations – reputed not as aims in themselves but as means for collective progress (Monnet, 1976: 345) – the Plan recognized to the state a dominant influence over the direction of investments in all the sectors10 and several direct and indirect instruments to affect and control national economic activities11. In all his interventions on the Plan, Marjolin underlines the strategic function of nationalizations and the vital role of commissions, according to Monnet’s idea of “économie concertée”. These commissions gathered together representatives of employers, workers and civil servants. The Commissions were specialized for sectors of activity. Their structure was made of the Chairman (usually a representative of the Grand Corps d’État); general rapporteurs with only a few representatives of the private sector; and the members with representatives of employers and trade unions. All of them were appointed by decision of the Minister of Finance on suggestion of the General Commissioner (see on this Hackett & Hackett 1963). 6 Besides Marjolin there were Etienne Hirsch, Paul Delouvrier, Jean Fourastié, Alfred Sauvy, Félix Gaillard and Jacques Dumontier. 7 Those choices were indeed rather criticized; for instance in Alfred Sauvy’s article on le Monde (29 December 1946) titled “Le Facteur Humain dans le Plan Monnet” the neglect