The Arab-Israeli Military Balance in 2000

CSIS______Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 For updates: CSIS.ORG “Strategic Assessment” To comment: [email protected]

Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No quotation, reference, or further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission in each single case. The Arab-Israeli Conventional Balance 10/16/00 Page ii Center for Strategic and International Studies October 2000

Table of Contents

TREND IN TOTAL ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY SPENDING BY COUNTRY: 1967-1997...... 1

NATIONAL TRENDS IN ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY SPENDING IN CONSTANT DOLLARS: THE DECLINE IN ARAB FORCES AS

A SHARE OF TOTAL SPENDING: 1985-1997...... 2

CUMULATIVE TRENDS IN ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY SPENDING IN CONSTANT DOLLARS: THE DECLINE IN ARAB FORCES

AS A SHARE OF TOTAL SPENDING: 1985-1997 ...... 3

TREND IN PERCENT OF GNP SPENT ON MILITARY FORCES: 1983-1995: HALF THE BURDEN OF THE EARLY 1980S...... 4

SHIFTS IN ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS DELIVERIES BY COUNTRY: 1973-1999...... 5

NEW ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS ORDERS AND DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER COUNTRY: 1996-1999...... 6

ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS IMPORTS AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS: 1984-1997...... 7

NATIONAL TRENDS IN ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS DELIVERIES IN CURRENT DOLLARS ...... 8

NATIONAL TRENDS IN ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS DELIVERIES IN CONSTANT DOLLARS ...... 9

SHIFTS IN ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS DELIVERIES BY COUNTRY: 1973-1999...... 10

ARMS SALES AFFECTING THE ARAB-ISRAELI BALANCE...... 11

TOTAL NEW AGREEMENTS BY ARAB-ISRAELI BUYER: BEFORE AND AFTER GULF WAR...... 13

NEW ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS ORDERS BY SUPPLIER COUNTRY: 1987-1998 ...... 14

ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER COUNTRY: 1987-1998...... 15

ACDA REPORTING ON ARMS IMPORT DELIVERIES TO ISRAEL VS. US AID AND COMMERCIAL ARMS SALES: 1986-1996 ...... 16

ARMS TRANSFER DELIVERIES AFFECTING THE OVERALL ARAB-ISRAELI BALANCE: 1992-1996 ...... 17

THE COMPARATIVE SIZE OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COMMERCIAL ARMS SALES TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI RING

STATES: 1986-1996 - PART ONE ...... 18

THE COMPARATIVE SIZE OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COMMERCIAL ARMS SALES TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI RING

STATES: 1986-1996 - PART TWO ...... 19

THE ARAB-ISRAELI BALANCE:...... 20

FORCES IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI “RING” STATES IN 2000 -PART ONE...... 20

THE ARAB-ISRAELI BALANCE:...... 21

FORCES IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI “RING” STATES IN 2000 -PART TWO ...... 21

ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY DEMOGRAPHICS AND FORCES IN 2000...... 22

TOTAL ARAB-ISRAELI ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER: 1973-2000 ...... 23

ARAB ACTIVE VERSUS ISRAELI MOBILIZED ARMY MANPOWER: 1973-2000...... 24

ARAB-ISRAELI ARMORED FORCES IN 2000 ...... 25

ARAB-ISRAELI MAIN BATTLE TANKS: 1973-2000...... 26

ISRAEL VERSUS EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, AND LEBANON: OPERATIONAL TANKS BY TYPE ...... 27

ISRAEL VERSUS EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, AND LEBANON: HIGH QUALITY TANKS BY TYPE ...... 28

ARAB-ISRAELI OTHER ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES (LT. TANKS, AFVS, APCS, SCOUTS, RECCE, OAFVS): 1973- 2000 ...... 29

ISRAEL VERSUS EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, AND LEBANON: “TRUE AFVS”...... 30

OPERATIONAL ARAB-ISRAELI ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS IN 2000...... 31

ARAB-ISRAELI ARTILLERY FORCES BY CATEGORY OF WEAPON IN 2000 ...... 32

ARAB-ISRAELI ARTILLERY FORCES BY COUNTRY IN 2000 ...... 33

ARAB-ISRAELI TOTAL ARTILLERY STRENGTH 1986-2000...... 34

ISRAEL VERSUS EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, AND LEBANON: HIGH PERFORMANCE ARTILLERY IN 2000...... 35

ARAB-ISRAELI SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY BY CALIBER IN 2000...... 36

ARAB-ISRAELI TOWED ARTILLERY BY CALIBER IN 2000...... 37

ARAB-ISRAELI MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS BY CALIBER IN 2000 ...... 38

ARAB-ISRAELI AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE MANPOWER IN 2000...... 39

TRENDS IN TOTAL ARAB-ISRAELI COMBAT AIRCRAFT: 1973-2000...... 40

TOTAL OPERATIONAL ARAB-ISRAELI COMBAT FIGHTER, ATTACK, BOMBER, FGA AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT

BY TYPE IN 2000...... 41

HIGH QUALITY OPERATIONAL ARAB-ISRAELI COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN 2000 ...... 42

LOW/MODERATE QUALITY ARAB-ISRAELI COMBAT FIGHTER, ATTACK, BOMBER, FGA AND RECONNAISSANCE

AIRCRAFT IN 2000 ...... 43

UNARMED FIXED AND ROTARY WING RECCE, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, AND INTELLIGENCE AIRCRAFT IN 2000...... 44

OPERATIONAL ARAB-ISRAELI ATTACK AND ARMED HELICOPTERS IN 2000...... 45

ARAB-ISRAELI LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN 2000...... 46

ARAB-ISRAELI NAVAL MANPOWER IN 2000...... 47

ARAB-ISRAELI TOTAL NAVAL COMBAT SHIPS BY CATEGORY IN 2000...... 49

ARAB-ISRAELI MAJOR COMBAT SHIPS BY CATEGORY IN 2000...... 50

THE WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL “RING” STATES...... 51

JUDGED BY WESTERN STANDARDS: PART ONE ...... 51

THE WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL “RING” STATES...... 52

JUDGED BY WESTERN STANDARDS: PART TWO...... 52

LOSSES IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS: 1948-1982 - PART ONE...... 53

LOSSES IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS: 1948-1982 - PART ONE ...... 54

FORCE TRENDS IN ISRAEL - PART ONE ...... 55

FORCE TRENDS IN ISRAEL - PART TWO...... 56

ISRAELI MAJOR OPERATIONAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN 2000...... 58

ISRAELI ARMS DELIVERIES: 1985-1997...... 60

ISRAELI ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES BY MAJOR SUPPLIER: 1987-1996 ...... 61

NEW ISRAELI ARMS ORDERS AND DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER COUNTRY: 1996-1999...... 62

ISRAELI ACTIVE AND TOTAL (ACTIVE & RESERVE) MILITARY MANPOWER: 1973-2000...... 63

ISRAELI CONCERNS ABOUT READINESS AND FORCE QUALITY ...... 64

ISRAELI CONCERNS OVER ISRAEL’S MILITARY EDGE: VIEWS EXPRESSED IN INTERVIEWS WITH GENERAL ITZCHAK

MORDECHAI (MOD), LT. GENERAL AMNON LIPKIN-SHAHAK (COS), MAJOR GENERAL MATAN VILANI (DCOS),

AND REAR ADMIRAL MICHA RAM (FORMER COMMANDER OF THE NAVY) - PART ONE ...... 65

ISRAELI CONCERNS OVER ISRAEL’S MILITARY EDGE: VIEWS EXPRESSED IN INTERVIEWS WITH GENERAL ITZCHAK

MORDECHAI (MOD), LT. GENERAL AMNON LIPKIN-SHAHAK (COS), MAJOR GENERAL MATAN VILANI (DCOS),

AND REAR ADMIRAL MICHA RAM (FORMER COMMANDER OF THE NAVY) - PART TWO...... 66

ISRAELI CONCERNS OVER ISRAEL’S MILITARY EDGE: VIEWS EXPRESSED IN INTERVIEWS WITH GENERAL ITZCHAK

MORDECHAI (MOD), LT. GENERAL AMNON LIPKIN-SHAHAK (COS), MAJOR GENERAL MATAN VILANI (DCOS),

AND REAR ADMIRAL MICHA RAM (FORMER COMMANDER OF THE NAVY) - PART THREE...... 67

ISRAELI CONCERNS OVER ISRAEL’S MILITARY EDGE: VIEWS EXPRESSED IN INTERVIEWS WITH GENERAL ITZCHAK

MORDECHAI (MOD), LT. GENERAL AMNON LIPKIN-SHAHAK (COS), MAJOR GENERAL MATAN VILANI (DCOS),

AND REAR ADMIRAL MICHA RAM (FORMER COMMANDER OF THE NAVY) - PART FOUR...... 68

MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY STRENGTH OF KEY PALESTINIAN FACTIONS AND THE HIZBOLLAH ...... 69

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY PARAMILITARY FORCES IN 2000...... 70

OTHER PRO-PLO/PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY PALESTINIAN PARAMILITARY FORCES IN 2000 ...... 71

ANTI-PLO/PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY PALESTINIAN PARAMILITARY FORCES IN 2000 ...... 72

CIA PROFILE OF GAZA AND WEST BANK - PART ONE ...... 73

TABLE 7.2 ...... 75

CIA PROFILE OF GAZA AND WEST BANK - PART TWO ...... 75

CHANGES IN ISRAELI SETTLERS IN GAZA AND THE WEST BANK: 1992-1998 ...... 76

STATUS OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN 1994-1997 ...... 77

THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI BALANCE IN 2000 - PART ONE...... 78

THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI BALANCE IN 2000 -PART TWO...... 79

ISRAELI VERSUS SYRIAN OPERATIONAL FORCE STRENGTH IN 2000 ...... 80

TRENDS IN SYRIAN-ISRAELI MILITARY SPENDING: 1985-1997 ...... 81

ANNUAL TRENDS IN SYRIAN ISRAELI ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES: 1985-1997 ...... 82

NEW SYRIAN-ISRAELI ARMS ORDERS AND DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER COUNTRY: 1996-1999...... 83

SYRIAN-ISRAELI ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES: 1985-1997 ...... 84

FORCE TRENDS IN SYRIA - PART ONE...... 85

FORCE TRENDS IN SYRIA - PART TWO...... 86

SYRIAN MAJOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN 2000 ...... 87

SYRIAN ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES BY MAJOR SUPPLIER: 1987-1998 ...... 88

THE SYRIAN RECAPITALIZATION CRISIS: ARMS DELIVERIES DURING 1985-1996 ...... 90

CURRENT STATUS OF LEBANESE MILITARY FORCES...... 92

FORCE TRENDS IN LEBANON - PART ONE ...... 93

FORCE TRENDS IN LEBANON -PART TWO...... 94

LEBANESE MAJOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN 2000...... 95

TRENDS IN LEBANESE MILITARY SPENDING: 1986-1997...... 96

TRENDS IN LEBANESE ARMS IMPORT DELIVERIES: 1985-1997 ...... 97

LEBANESE ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES BY MAJOR SUPPLIER: 1996-1999 ...... 98

LEBANESE ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES BY MAJOR SUPPLIER: 1987-1997 ...... 99

DEVELOPMENTS IN HIZBOLLAH MILITARY FORCES IN LEBANON IN 1998-2000...... 100

THE JORDANIAN-ISRAELI BALANCE - PART ONE ...... 101

THE JORDANIAN-ISRAELI BALANCE - PART TWO ...... 102

ISRAEL VERSUS JORDAN IN 2000...... 103

TRENDS IN JORDANIAN-ISRAELI MILITARY SPENDING: 1984-1997 ...... 104

TRENDS IN JORDANIAN-ISRAELI ARMS IMPORT DELIVERIES: 1985-1997...... 105

NEW JORDANIAN- ISRAELI ARMS ORDERS AND DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER COUNTRY: 1996-1999 ...... 106

THE JORDANIAN RECAPITALIZATION CRISIS: ARM DELIVERIES: 1985-1997...... 107

JORDANIAN ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES...... 108

BY MAJOR SUPPLIER: 1987-1998 ...... 108

FORCE TRENDS IN JORDAN - PART ONE...... 109

FORCE TRENDS IN JORDAN - PART TWO ...... 110

JORDANIAN MAJOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN 2000 ...... 112

ISRAEL VERSUS JORDAN AND SYRIA:...... 113

THE “EASTERN FRONT” BALANCE - PART ONE...... 113

ISRAEL VERSUS JORDAN AND SYRIA:...... 114

THE “EASTERN FRONT” BALANCE -PART TWO...... 114

ISRAEL VERSUS JORDAN & SYRIA IN 2000...... 115

ARAB-ISRAELI BORDERS ...... 116

ARAB-ISRAELI GEOGRAPHY...... 117

THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI BALANCE - PART ONE...... 118

THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI BALANCE - PART TWO ...... 119

ISRAEL VERSUS EGYPT IN 2000...... 120

TRENDS IN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI MILITARY SPENDING: 1984-1997 ...... 121

TRENDS IN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ARMS IMPORT DELIVERIES: 1983-1997...... 122

NEW EGYPTIAN- ISRAELI ARMS ORDERS AND DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER COUNTRY: 1996-1999...... 123

FORCE TRENDS IN EGYPT – PART ONE ...... 124

FORCE TRENDS IN EGYPT – PART TWO ...... 125

EGYPTIAN MAJOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN 1998 ...... 126

EGYPTIAN ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES BY MAJOR SUPPLIER: 1987-1998 ...... 127

THE BROADER ARAB-ISRAELI BALANCE: PART ONE ...... 128

THE BROADER ARAB-ISRAELI BALANCE: PART TWO ...... 129

ISRAEL VERSUS EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, AND LEBANON ...... 130

ALGERIAN, IRANIAN, IRAQI, AND LIBYAN FORCES IN 2000: PART ONE...... 131

ALGERIAN, IRANIAN, IRAQI, AND LIBYAN FORCES IN 2000: PART TWO ...... 132

THE “PERCEPTUAL BALANCE”: MILITARY DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST...... 133

THE “PERCEPTUAL BALANCE”: MILITARY FORCES OF THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST ...... 134

LIBYA’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ...... 135

EGYPT’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ...... 139

ISRAEL’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ...... 143

SYRIA’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ...... 155

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No quotation, reference, or further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission in each single case. Trend in Total Arab-Israeli Military Spending by Country: 1967-1997 (in $Current Millions)

20000

18000

16000

14000

12000

Israel

10000

8000

6000

Syria

4000

Egypt

2000

Jordan

Lebanon 0 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,” Washington, GPO, various editions, Table I. Note that the author has made extensive estimates for Syria and Lebanon, and that the ACDA data differ in definition over time. The author has made extensive adjustments using editions in an attempt to make the data more comparable over the entire period, but this is not fully possible for the period from 1967- 1973.

National Trends in Arab-Israeli Military Spending in Constant Dollars: The Decline in Arab Forces as a Share of Total Spending: 1985-1997 (In Constant 1997 $US Millions)

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000 Israel Syria

0 Egypt

85 Jordan 86 87 88 89 90 91 Lebanon 92 93 94 95 96 97

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Lebanon 100 75 75 120 150 370 400 471 428 541 556 561 465

Jordan 849 899 813 626 523 471 478 470 477 535 581 609 626 Egypt 4420 4160 4380 3600 2160 1840 2070 2150 2230 2190 2180 2170 2180 Syria 7445 5878 4280 4000 5240 5045 4720 4500 3870 4260 4210 3920 3400 Israel 10910 9850 8400 8280 8060 8620 7040 8730 8880 8330 9440 9490 9340

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995,” Washington, GPO, 1996, Table I.

Cumulative Trends in Arab-Israeli Military Spending in Constant Dollars: The Decline in Arab Forces as a Share of Total Spending: 1985-1997 (In Constant 1997 $US Millions)

100%

80%

Israel

60%

40%

Syria

20%

Egypt

Jordan

Lebanon 0% 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, various editions, Table I.

Trend in Percent of GNP Spent on Military Forces: 1983-1995: Half the Burden of the Early 1980s

Israel Syria 0 Jordan 83 Egypt 84 85 86 87 88 89 Lebanon 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Lebanon 4.1 3.5 4 3.5 4 3.9 3.8 3 Egypt 13.4 13.7 12.8 11.7 8.9 7.3 4.3 3.1 4 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.2 3 2.8 Jordan 15.6 14.9 15.5 15.4 14.8 12 12 10.8 10.7 8.8 8.3 8.6 8.7 9 9 Syria 21.8 22.7 21.8 18 11.7 15.8 14.4 14.6 11.1 9.7 7.8 8 7.4 6.7 5.6 Israel 22.2 24.5 20.3 17.3 14.2 13.6 13.2 13.2 9.4 11.7 11.2 9.8 10.5 10.1 9.7

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,” various editions, Table I.

Shifts in Arab-Israeli Arms Deliveries by Country: 1973-1999 (In $US Current Millions)

1973-1977 1978-1982 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1996 1996-1999 12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0 Israel Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

1973-1977 3,956 1,748 448 51 3,600 1978-1982 4,400 4,200 2,400 170 9,800 1982-1986 3,700 7,640 3,355 585 10,830 1987-1991 5,040 4,235 1,100 35 5,955 1992-1996 6,100 9,300 320 100 910 1996-1999 4,500 3,900 300 100 300

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, various editions and Richard F. Grimmett, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, Washington, Congressional Research Service, various editions.

New Arab-Israeli Arms Orders and Deliveries by Supplier Country: 1996-1999 ($Current Millions)

Syria-Deliveries

Syria-Agreements

Lebanon-Deliveries

Lebanon-Agreements

Jordan-Deliveries

Jordan-Agreements

Egypt-Deliveries

Egypt-Agreements

Israeli-Deliveries

Israel-Agreements

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000

Lebano Lebano Israel- Israeli- Egypt- Egypt- Jordan- Jordan- Syria- Syria- n- n- Agree Delive . Agree Delive . Agree Delive . . Agree Delive Agree Delive ments ries ments ries ments ries ments ries ments ries

Other 200 300 100 100 100 China 400 Russia 400 400 300 300 200 Other Europe 200 100 Major West Europe 100 700 100 100 100 100 100 US 4200 3500 5800 3200 300 200

0 = less than $50 million or nil, and all data rounded to the nearest $100 million. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS, from Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Developing Nations, Congressional Research Service, various editions.

Arab-Israeli Arms Imports as a Percent of Total Imports: 1984-1997 (In Percent)

Syria 10 Jordan 0 Egypt

84 85 Israel 86 87 88 89 90 91 Lebanon 92 93 94 95 96 97

84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Lebanon 8.5 2.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0 0.1 0 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5 Israel 8.1 10.9 10.2 15.3 12 9.7 8.3 8.6 7.9 7.1 4.4 2.6 2.9 3.5 Egypt 17.6 30.9 17.3 26.3 12.7 13.5 14.1 20.4 19.4 24.4 16.7 17.9 13 12 Jordan 9 22.9 25.7 19.4 17.9 16 5.8 3.2 1.2 1.1 1.5 2.2 2.7 3.2 Syria 53.4 37.8 40.3 81 58.7 52.8 39.6 28.9 11.2 6.8 0.9 1.9 1.1 1.7

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, “ Table II, various editions.

National Trends in Arab-Israeli Arms Deliveries in Current Dollars ($US Current Millions)

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

Egypt

Lebanon

72 73 75 76 78 79 81 82 84 85 86 88 89 91 92 94 95 97

Lebanon 20 20 10 10 20 20 50 50 240 40 10 10 5 5 1 10 50 40 Jordan 30 60 60 180 170 100 110 110 230 625 625 490 340 80 40 50 80 130 Syria 280 130 380 625 120 160 260 260 210 150 110 130 110 800 390 50 90 70 Israel 300 230 725 975 900 480 120 925 775 100 110 180 140 160 160 110 775 110 Egypt 550 850 350 150 400 625 575 210 160 140 150 110 100 160 160 170 210 160

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, GPO, Washington, various editions.

National Trends in Arab-Israeli Arms Deliveries in Constant Dollars ($97 Constant Millions)

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 Egypt

85 86 Syria 87 88 89 90 91 Lebanon 92 93 94 95 96 97

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Lebanon 76 15 13 13 6 2 6 3 11 11 52 41 40 Jordan 991 860 686 619 414 176 91 44 43 53 83 122 130 Syria 2254 1595 2613 1643 1339 1113 906 432 302 53 93 61 70 Israel 1720 1495 2874 2275 1704 1640 1812 1774 1728 1163 802 940 1100 Egypt 2690 2098 2613 1390 1217 1522 1812 1774 2159 1798 2174 1728 1600

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, GPO, Washington, various editions.

Shifts in Arab-Israeli Arms Deliveries by Country: 1973-1999 (In $US Current Millions)

1973-1977 1978-1982 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1996 1996-1999 12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0 Israel Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

1973-1977 3,956 1,748 448 51 3,600 1978-1982 4,400 4,200 2,400 170 9,800 1982-1986 3,700 7,640 3,355 585 10,830

1987-1991 5,040 4,235 1,100 35 5,955 1992-1996 6,100 9,300 320 100 910 1996-1999 4,500 3,900 300 100 300

Arms Sales Affecting the Arab-Israeli Balance (Millions of Current US Dollars)

Recipient Country US Russia PRC Major West All Other European All Others Total European New Arms Transfer Agreements 1987-1990 Israel 2,300 0 0 0 0 0 2,300 Egypt 5,900 500 0 0 100 0 6,500 Jordan 100 200 100 100 200 100 800 Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 5,300 0 0 100 200 5,600

1991-1994 Israel 3,000 0 100 1,200 0 0 4,300 Egypt 4,000 300 0 200 100 200 4,800 Jordan 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 500 0 0 200 200 900

1995-1998 Israel 2,600 0 0 100 0 200 2,900 Egypt 4,500 400 0 100 0 0 5,000 Jordan 300 300 0 0 0 100 700 Lebanon 100 0 0 100 0 0 200 Syria 0 200 0 0 100 0 300

1996-1999 Israel 4,200 0 0 100 0 200 4,500 Egypt 5,800 400 400 100 0 0 6,700 Jordan 300 300 0 100 0 100 800 Lebanon 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 Syria 0 300 0 100 100 0 500

Arms Transfer Deliveries 1987-1990 Israel 2,400 0 0 0 0 0 2,400 Egypt 2,300 500 100 400 200 200 3,700 Jordan 200 400 100 400 100 100 1,300 Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 5,000 0 0 200 0 5,200

1991-1994 Israel 2,800 0 100 400 0 0 3,300 Egypt 4,400 100 0 0 100 200 4,800 Jordan 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Syria 0 1,000 0 0 100 300 1,400

1995-1998 Israel 2,400 0 0 100 0 300 2,800 Egypt 4,000 500 0 200 200 100 5,000 Jordan 200 0 0 0 0 100 300 Lebanon 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 Syria 0 100 0 0 100 100 300

1996-1999 Israel 3,500 0 0 700 0 300 4,500 Egypt 3,200 400 0 100 200 0 3,900

Jordan 200 0 0 0 0 100 300 Lebanon 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 Syria 0 200 0 0 0 100 300

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS, from Richard F. Grimmett, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, Washington, Congressional Research Service, various editions. All data are rounded to nearest $100 million. Major West European states include Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

Total New Agreements By Arab-Israeli Buyer: Before and After Gulf War (In $US Current Millions)

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 Israel Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

87-90 2300 6500 800 NA 5600 91-94 3900 4500 100 NA 1000 95-98 4800 4900 400 200 300

0 = less than $50 million or nil, and all data rounded to the nearest $100 million. Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Developing Nations, Congressional Research Service, various editions.

New Arab-Israeli Arms Orders by Supplier Country: 1987-1998 ($Current Millions)

Syria 95-98

Syria 91-94

Syria 87-90

Lebanon 95-98

Lebanon 91-94

Lebanon 87-90

Jordan 95-98

Jordan 91-94

Jordan 87-90

Egypt 95-98

Egypt 91-94

Egypt 87-90

Israel 95-98

Israel 91-94

Israel 87-90

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000

Lebano Lebano Lebano Israel Israel Israel Egypt Egypt Egypt Jordan Jordan Syria Syria Syria n 87- n 91- n 95- 87-90 91-94 95-98 87-90 91-94 95-98 87-90 95-98 87-90 91-94 95-98 90 94 98

All Others 0 0 200 0 0 100 100 100 0 0 0 200 400 0 China 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Russia 0 0 0 500 300 400 200 300 0 0 0 5300 500 200 All Other European 0 0 0 100 400 0 200 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 Major West European 0 1100 100 0 200 100 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 US 2300 2700 2600 5900 3600 4500 100 300 0 0 100 0 0 0

Arab-Israeli Arms Deliveries by Supplier Country: 1987-1998 ($Current Millions)

Syr 95-98

Syr 91-94

Syr 87-90

Leb 95-98

Leb 91-94

Leb 87-90

Jor 95-98

Jor 91-94

Jor 87-90

Eg 95-98

Eg 91-94

Eg 87-90

Is 95-98

Is 91-94

Is 87-90

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000

Is 87- Is 91- Is 95- Eg 87- Eg 91- Eg 95- Jor 87- Jor 95- Leb 87- Leb 91- Leb 95- Syr Syr Syr 90 94 98 90 94 98 90 98 90 94 98 87-90 91-94 95-98

All Others 0 100 300 200 0 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 200 100 All Other European 0 0 0 200 300 200 100 0 0 0 0 200 400 100 Major West European 0 400 100 400 0 200 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 China 0 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Russia 0 0 0 500 100 500 400 0 0 0 0 5000 1000 100 US 2400 2200 2400 2300 4500 4000 200 200 0 0 100 0 0 0

ACDA Reporting on Arms Import Deliveries to Israel vs. US Aid and Commercial Arms Sales: 1986-1996 (In $US Current Millions)

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

ACDA Arms Deliveries 480 2000 1100 1200 700 625 850 1100 1000 870 900 Military Aid 1723 1800 1800 1800 1792 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 FMS Deliveries 164 1,229 754 230 146 239 721 782 446 329 388 FMS Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Commercial Sales 401 1025 475 997 387 169 27.9 41.8 1.2 3.2 8.3 MAP Aid Deliveries 0 0 0 0 0 115 0.6 44.7 0 0 0 IMET Program 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.8 0 0 Total US Deliveries 567 2256 1231 1229 536 524 750 869 448 332 397

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,” Washington, GPO, 1996, various editions; and DSAA database.

Arms Transfer Deliveries Affecting the Overall Arab-Israeli Balance: 1992-1996 (Millions of Current US Dollars)

Supplier Israel Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria Iran Iraq Libya

1992-1994

United States 2600 3800 90 50 0 0 0 0 Canada 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Germany 310 5 0 0 0 40 0 10 United Kingdom 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other Western Europe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Russia 0 30 0 0 300 1000 0 0 Eastern Europe 0 210 0 0 170 30 0 20

China 0 0 0 0 30 525 0 50 Other East Asia 0 0 5 0 80 110 0 0 Middle East 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 Others 0 5 5 0 0 40 0 0

Total 2970 4060 100 50 600 1765 0 80

1994-1996

United States 2,600 5,000 170 90 0 0 0 0 France 0 130 0 0 0 0 0 0 Germany 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other NATO 5 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 Other Western Europe 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0

Russia 0 210 0 0 110 320 0 0 Other Eastern Europe 10 150 0 0 0 80 0 0

China 0 0 0 0 0 500 0 0 Other East Asia 0 10 0 0 10 50 0 10 Middle East 0 0 70 0 80 10 0 10 Others 80 5 0 0 10 5 0 0

Total 2,865 5,675 245 90 230 1,025 0 25

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995,” Washington, GPO, 1996, Table III and “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1997,” Table III, Internet edition.

The Comparative Size of US Military Assistance and Commercial Arms Sales to the Arab- Israeli Ring States: 1986-1996 - Part One

87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Israel

Foreign Military Financing Program 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 Payment Waived 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0 1,800.0

FMS Agreements 100.5 130.9 327.7 376.7 361.4 98.4 163.3 221.4 664.8 883.3 524.9

Commercial Sales 1.024.8 474.8 997.2 387.3 169.1 27.9 41.8 33.96 14.2 7.7 32.2

FMS Construction ------Agreements

FMS Deliveries 1,229.6 754.1 230.3 146.3 239.0 720.6 782.0 446.6 329.1 388.2 504.2

MAP Program - - - 74.0 43.0 47.0 491.1 166.0 80.0 22.0 - MAP Deliveries - - - - 114.7 0.6 44.7 - - - 2.0

IMET Program/ Deliveries 1.9(0) 1.7(0) 1.9(0) 2.1(0) 1.1(0.2) 0.6(0) 0.5(0) 0.8(0) 0.8(0) - -

Egypt

Foreign Military Financing Program 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0. Payment Waived 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0

FMS Agreements 330.9 1306.1 2646.3 969.5 1.631.7 631.5 447.3 443.0 1.051.7 1,397.7 1,065.5

Commercial Sales 55.4 73.1 252.5 206.0 75.6 31.0 18.7 9.6 3.7 1.7 3.2

FMS Construction Agreements 112.4 118.8 65.1 48.2 269.7 107.5 14.0 1.4 15.4 61.6 21.4

FMS Deliveries 955.1 473.0 296.8 368.1 482.3 1,026.7 1,238.6 890.0 1,536.4 1,112.4 1,180.7

MAP Program ------13.5 - - . MAP Deliveries ------1.4 - - .

IMET Program/ Deliveries 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.7 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0

The Comparative Size of US Military Assistance and Commercial Arms Sales to the Arab-Israeli Ring States: 1986-1996 - Part Two

87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Jordan Foreign Military Financing Program - - 10.0 67.8 20.0 20.0 9.0 9.0 7.3 100.3 30.0 Payment Waived - - 10.0 67.8 20.0 20.0 9.0 9.0 7.3 100.3 30.0 DoD Guaranty 81.3 ------

FMS Agreements 33.9 28.7 9.4 26.7 0.4 6.9 15.6 39.1 15.0 216.6 18.3 Commercial Sales 73.4 18.3 23.5 12.1 0.9 2.0 1.3 1.0 1.4 3.2 3.3 FMS Deliveries 49.7 55.4 59.5 42.1 22.9 19.5 25.0 31.5 47.0 15.7 52.3 MAP Deliveries 1.1 0.8 - - 0.4 - 0.1 - - 16.0 20.8 IMET Program/ Deliveries 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.7

Lebanon FMS Agreements 4.9 0.5 - - - - 3.4 29.7 65.0 16.1 22.0 Commercial Sales 0.1 0 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.1 FMS Deliveries 12.1 11.9 3.9 2.0 0.3 1.3 4.9 3.6 40.9 31.7 33.0 IMET Program/ Deliveries - 0.3 0.3 0.1 - - 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5

Syria FMS Agreements ------Commercial Sales ------FMS Deliveries ------

Source: Adapted from US Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), “Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts”, Department of Defense, Washington, various editions.

The Arab-Israeli Balance: Forces in the Arab-Israeli “Ring” States in 2000 -Part One

Category/Weapon Israel Syria Jordan Egypt Lebanon

Defense Budget (In 1999, $Current Billions) $6.7 $2.9 $0.488 $2.2 $0.56

Arms Imports: 1995-1998 ($M) New Orders 2,900 300 700 5,000 200 Deliveries 2,800 300 300 5,000 100

Mobilization Base Men Ages 13-17 276,000 1,007,000 269,000 3,560,000 210,000 Men Ages 18-22 269,000 970,000 242,000 3,364,000 196,000

Manpower Total Active 173,500 316,000 104,000 450,000 67,900 (Conscript) 107,500 - - 320,000 27,400 Total Reserve 425,000 396,000 35,000 254,000 - Total 598,500 7120,000 139,000 704,000 67,500 Paramilitary 6,050 8,000+ 10,000 230,000 13,000

Land Forces Active Manpower 130,000 215,000 90,000 320,000 65,000 (Conscripts) 85,000 - 250,000+ 27,400 Reserve Manpower 400,000 300,000 30,000 150,000 - Total Manpower 530,000 515,000 120,000 470,000 65,000

Main Battle Tanks 3,800 3,450 904 3,855 304 (Fixed & Storage) 0 (1,200) 300 - -

AIFVs/Armored Cars/Lt. Tanks 400 3,305 54 982(220) 67 APCs/Recce/Scouts 5,900 1,500 1,400 3,205(1,075) 1,281 WWII Half-Tracks 500(3,500) 0 0 0 0

ATGM Launchers 1,225 3,390+ 640 2,350 250

SP Artillery 1,010 450 406 251 0 Towed Artillery 420 1,480 115 971 151 MRLs 200+ 480 0 156 23 Mortars 7,740 4,500+ 800 2,400 280+

SSM Launchers 48 62 0 24 0

AA Guns 850 2,060 368 1,074 220 Lt. SAM Launchers 1,298 4,055 965+ 2,146 -

The Arab-Israeli Balance: Forces in the Arab-Israeli “Ring” States in 2000 -Part Two

Category/Weapon Israel Syria Jordan Egypt Lebanon

Air & Air Defense Forces Active Air Force Manpower 37,000 40,000 13,000 30,000 1,700 Active Air Defense Command 0 60,000 0 80,000 0 Air Force Reserve Manpower 20,000 92,000 - 90,000 - Air Defense Command Reserve Manpower 0 - 0 70,000 0 Aircraft Total Fighter/FGA/Recce 459(250) 589 93 583 (3) Fighter 0 310 41 337 0 FGA/Fighter 405) 0 0 0 0 FGA 25) 154 50 133 0 Recce 10 14 0 20 0 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 6 0 0 5 0 Electronic Warfare (EW) 37 10 0 10 0 Fixed Wing 37 0 0 6 Helicopter 0 10 0 4 Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) 3 0 0 2 0 Combat Capable Trainer 19 111 2 85 3 Tanker 8 0 0 0 0 Transport 36 29 16 32 2 Helicopters Attack/Armed 133 72 16 129 0 SAR/ASW 6 - - - - Transport & Other 160 110 49 158 16 Total 299 182 65 287 16 SAM Forces Batteries 28 130 14 38+ 0 Heavy Launchers 79 728 80 628 0 Medium Launchers 0 60 0 36-54 0 AA Guns 0 4,000 - 72+ -

Naval Forces Active Manpower 6,500 6,000 480 20,000 1,200 Reserve Manpower 5,000 4,000 - 14,000 0 Total Manpower 11,500 10,000 480 34,000 1,200 Submarines 4 3 0 4 0 Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes 3 2 0 11 0 Missile 3 2 0 9 0 Other 0 0 0 2 0 Missile Patrol 14 10 0 24 0 Coastal/Inshore Patrol 36 10 3 15 7 Mine 0 5 0 14 0 Amphibious Ships 1 3 0 3 0 Landing Craft/Light Support 4 5 3 9 2 Fixed-wing Combat Aircraft 0 0 0 0 0 MR/MPA 0 0 0 0 0 ASW/Combat Helicopter 0 24 0 24 0 Other Helicopters ------Note: Figures in parenthesis show additional equipment known to be in long-term storage. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

Arab-Israeli Military Demographics and Forces in 2000

Country Total Population Males Reaching Males Between the Ages of Males Between 15 and 49 Military Age 13 and 17 18 and 22 23 and 32 Total Medically Fit Each Year

Egypt 61,703,000 694,000 3,560,000 3,122,000 4,984,000 17,757,000 11,507,000 Israel 6,007,000 50,700 278,000 269,000 516,000 1,474,000 1,206,000 Jordan 5,020,000 50,000 269,000 2420,000 439,000 1,114,000 793,000 Lebanon 4,277,000 - 210,000 196,000 385,000 926,000 573,000 Palestinian 2,900,000 - 163,000 140,000 233,000 - - Syria 16,404,000 189,000 1,007,000 823,000 1,208,000 4,061,000 2,272,000

Iran 72,644,000 767,000 4,438,000 3,694,000 5,582,000 17,203,000 10,217,000 Iraq 23,846,000 260,000 1,457,000 1,237,000 1,828,000 5,460,000 3,058,000 Algeria 29,600,000 360,000 1,923,000 1,740,000 2,780,000 8,238,000 5,047,000 Libya 6,203,000 62,000 362,000 301,000 458,000 1,327,000 816,000

MILITARY FORCES (Total Active Equipment Inventory, including some items in storage)

Country Total Active Total Active Tanks OAFVs Artillery Combat Armed Manning Army Manning Aircraft Helicopters

Egypt 450,000 320,000 3,855 4,187 1,378 583 129 Israel 173,500 130,000 3,800 6,300 1,630+ 459 133 Jordan 98,650 90,000 1,204 1,454 521 93 16 Lebanon 67,900 65,000 304 1,348 174 (3) 0 Palestinian (35,000) (35,000) - 45 - - - Syria 316,000 215,000 4,650 4,805 2,410 589 72

Iran 513,000 450,000 1,440 1,065 2,948 295 100 Iraq 382,500 350,000 2,900 4,400 1,980 353 120 Algeria 124,000 107,000 890 1,680 727 181 63 Libya 65,000 35,000 985 2,620 1870 420 65

Note: Totals count all equipment, much of which is not operational. They should not be confused with estimates of operational equipment holdings. Light tanks are counted as OAFVs. Artillery counts towed and self-propelled tube weapons and multiple rocket launchers, but not mortars. Only combat aircraft in combat, COIN, or OCU units are counted, not other trainers or aircraft. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman, CIA World Factbook, 1998 and IISS, Military Balance, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000.

Total Arab-Israeli Active Military Manpower: 1973-2000

500000

450000

400000

350000

300000

250000

200000

150000

100000

50000 Egypt 0 Syria Israel Jordan Lebanon

73 75 78 80 82 85 87 89 92 94 96 99

Lebanon 15250 15300 7800 23000 23750 17400 16700 22300 36800 44300 48900 55,100 Jordan 72,850 80,250 67,200 67,500 72,800 70300 80300 85250 99400 98600 98650 90,000 Israel 125000 156000 164000 169600 174000 142000 141000 141000 175000 172000 175000 175000 Syria 132,00 177,50 227,50 247,50 222,50 402,50 407,50 404,00 408000 408000 421000 320000 Egypt 298000 322500 395000 367000 452000 445000 445000 448000 410000 440000 440000 450000

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance, various years. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author.

Arab Active versus Israeli Mobilized Army Manpower: 1973-2000

700

600

500

400

300

200

Israel Total

100 Egypt Active

Syrian Active

0 Israel Active

Jordan Active

Lebanon Active

73 75 76 78 79 81 82 84 85 87 89 90 92 93 95 96 98 99

Lebanon Active 14 14 17 7 8 22.3 22.3 19 15 15 21 21 35.7 40 43 47.4 54 53.3 Jordan Active 68 75 61 61 60 65 65 68 63.8 70 74 74 85 90 90 90 87 90 Israel Active 94.5 135 135 138 138 135 135 104 104 104 104 104 134 134 134 134 131 134 Syrian Active 120 150 150 200 200 170 170 240 270 300 300 300 300 300 315 315 215 215 Egypt Active 260 275 295 350 350 300 320 315 320 320 320 320 290 310 310 310 320 320 Israel Total 275 375 375 375 375 450 450 600 584 598 598 598 499 499 499 490 490 499

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance, various years. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author.

Arab-Israeli Armored Forces in 2000

3800

4650 Israel

Tanks 1204

3855

304

400 Syria

3305

AIFVs 444 982

Jordan

I 5900

1500

APCs/OAFVs 1400

3,205

1281 Egypt

500

Half-Tracks 0 Lebanon 0

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000

Half-Tracks APCs/OAFVs AIFVs Tanks

Israel 500 5900 400 3800 Syria 0 1500 3305 4650 Jordan 0 1400 444 1204 Egypt 0 3,205 982 3855 Lebanon 0 1281 67 304

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon discussions with US experts.

Arab-Israeli Main Battle Tanks: 1973-2000

5000

4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500 Syria 1000 Israel 500 Egypt 0 Jordan

Lebanon

73 74 76 77 79 80 82 83 85 86 88 89 91 92 94 95 97 98 2000

Lebanon 60 60 60 54 50 90 105 200 240 350 300 300 315 315 304 Jordan 420 490 490 500 500 595 569 580 795 790 979 1131 1131 1131 1141 1141 1141 1141 1204 Egypt 1880 2000 1945 1850 1600 1600 2100 1910 2159 2250 2425 2425 3190 3090 3234 3500 3700 3700 3855 Israel 1700 1900 2700 3000 3050 3050 3600 3600 3600 3660 3850 3794 4488 3890 3895 4095 4300 4300 3800 Syria 1170 1600 2300 2500 2600 2920 3990 4200 4200 4200 4050 4050 4350 4600 4500 4600 4600 4600 4650

Note: The totals include large numbers of vehicles that are in storage or are fixed in place. In 2000, these included 300 M- 47/M-48A5s for Jordan, 1,200 tanks for Syria and an unknown number for Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon. Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, various years. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author. Data differ significantly from estimated by US experts.

Israel Versus Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon: Operational Tanks by Type

9000

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 Israel Total Arab Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

T-54/T-55 1952 840 212 900

Centurion/Tariq 800 280 280

M-47/M-48 92 92 M-48A5 300

Ramses II 260 260 Ti-67(T-54/55) 200

Magach 7 400

T-62 100 1500 500 1000 Khalid/Chieftain 270 270

M-60 400

T-72 1500 1500 M-60A1 300 400 400

M-60A1/A-3 354 354 M-60A3 600 1300 1300

Merkava 1100

M-1 555 555

Note: The totals include large numbers of vehicles that are in storage or are fixed in place. In 2000, these included 300 M- 47/M-48A5s for Jordan, 1,200 tanks for Syria and an unknown number for Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon. Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, various years. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author. Data differ significantly from estimated by US experts.

Israel Versus Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon: High Quality Tanks by Type (High Quality Tanks include T-62s, T-72s, M-60s, M-1s, Merkavas)

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 Israel Total Arab Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

T-62 100 1500 500 1000 M-60 T-72 1500 1500 M-60A1 300 400 400 M-60A1/A-3 354 354 M-60A3 600 1300 1300 Merkava 1100 M-1 555 555

Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, various years. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author. Data differ significantly from estimated by US experts.

Arab-Israeli Other Armored Fighting Vehicles (Lt. Tanks, AFVs, APCs, Scouts, Recce, OAFVs): 1973-2000

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

Israel 2000 Egypt

Syria 0 Jordan

Lebanon

73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99

Lebanon 80 139 111 80 80 418 490 470 417 382 754 1025 1080 1080

Jordan 400 580 860 870 952 1182 1182 1230 1259 1160 1125 1304 1324 1324 Syria 1100 1170 1700 1700 1700 2200 3000 3900 3950 3950 4300 4750 4510 4510

Egypt 2075 2630 2700 2780 2780 3030 3000 3230 3235 3290 4345 4389 4941 4941

Israel 4600 6965 8000 8000 8000 8000 8000 1030 1078 1078 9480 9400 9800 9880

Note: Includes APCs, scouts cars, half-tracks, mechanized infantry fighting vehicles, reconnaissance vehicles and other armored vehicles other than tanks. The totals include large numbers of vehicles that are in storage or not operational. In 2000, they included 3,000-3,500 half tracks for Israel, 220 BMP-1s and 1,075 BTR-60/OT-62s for Egypt, and an unknown number for Lebanon, and Syria. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance, various years. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author

Israel Versus Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon: “True AFVs” (AFVs include Light Tanks, MICVs, AIFVs, and Reconnaissance)

5000

4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 Israel Total Arab Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

Ferret 170 170 AML-90 67 67 Scorpion 19 19 BDRM-2 Rkh 85 85 BDRM-2 1150 300 850 YPR-765 310 310 BMR-600P 260 260 BMP-3 25 25 BMP-2 135 35 100 BMP-1 2250 2250 Commando Scout 112 112 Ramta, RBY, BDRM 400

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author on the basis of comments by US experts.

Operational Arab-Israeli Armored Personnel Carriers in 2000

Israel

Syria

Jordan

Egypt

Lebanon

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000

Lebanon Egypt Jordan Syria Israel

APCs/OAFVs 1281 3,205 1400 1500 5900 Half-Tracks 0 0 0 0 500

Includes APCs, scouts cars, half-tracks, mechanized infantry fighting vehicles, reconnaissance vehicles and other armored vehicles other than tanks. The totals do not include large numbers of vehicles that are in storage or not operational. In 2000, they included 3,000-3,500 half tracks for Israel, 1,075 BTR-60/OT-62s for Egypt, and an unknown number for Lebanon, and Syria Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author on the basis of comments by US experts.

Arab-Israeli Artillery Forces by Category of Weapon in 2000

1,600

1480

1,400

1,200

1,010 1,000 971

800

600

480 450 420 406 400

251 200 200 151 156 115

23 0 0 0 SP Arty Towed Arty MRLs

Israel 1,010 420 200 Egypt 251 971 156 Jordan 406 115 0 Lebanon 0 151 23 Syria 450 1480 480

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US experts.

Arab-Israeli Artillery Forces By Country in 2000

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0 Israel Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

MRLs 200 156 0 23 480 Towed Arty 420 971 115 151 1480 SP Arty 1,010 251 406 0 450

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts.

Arab-Israeli Total Artillery Strength 1986-2000 (Towed and Self Propelled Tube Artillery of 100 mm+ and Multiple Rocket Launchers)

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500 Syria Israel 0 Egypt Jordan

Lebanon

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000

Lebanon 58 58 69 69 112 112 90 230 180 180 180 180 180 174 Jordan 194 194 247 274 326 462 468 493 485 485 485 485 521 521 Egypt 2000 1700 1560 1560 1560 1458 1618 1371 1543 1543 1543 1543 1543 1378 Israel 1281 1281 1361 1360 1395 1420 1520 1784 1650 1650 1650 1650 1710 1630 Syria 2000 2200 2400 2400 2436 2466 2616 2560 2560 2560 2560 2560 2560 2410

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts..

Israel Versus Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon: High Performance Artillery in 2000

Modern Self Propelled Artillery

1200 1107

1010 1000

800

600

450 406 400 251

200

0 0 Israel Total Arab Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

Multiple Rocket Launchers

700 659

600

480 500

400

300

200 200 156

100 23 0 0 Israel Total Arab Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts.

Arab-Israeli Self-Propelled Artillery By Caliber in 2000

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0 Israel Syria Egypt Jordan Lebanon

203 mm 36 136 175 mm 140 155 mm 800 175 240 152 mm 50

130 mm

122 mm 400 76 105 mm 34 30 100 mm

Note: Israel is phasing out its 175-mm weapons. Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts.

Arab-Israeli Towed Artillery By Caliber in 2000

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0 Israel Syria Egypt Jordan Lebanon

203 mm 180 mm 10 175 mm 155 mm 150 40 60 152 mm 70 130 mm 100 700 420 25 122 mm 100 600 551 43 105 mm 70 50 25 100 mm

Note: Syria has 100 additional 122-mm weapons in storage. Jordan has 25 additional 203-mm weapons in storage. Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts.

Arab-Israeli Multiple Rocket Launchers By Caliber in 2000

600

500

400

300

200

100

0 Israel Syria Egypt Jordan Lebanon

290 mm 28 240 mm 30 227 mm 48 160 mm 50 122 mm 50 280 156 23 107 mm 200

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts.

Arab-Israeli Air Force and Air Defense Manpower in 2000

90000

80000 80000

70000

60000

55000

50000

40000 40000 37000

30000 30000

20000

13500

10000

1700

0 Israel Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

Air Force 37000 30000 13500 1700 40000 Air Defense 80000 55000

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts.

Trends in Total Arab-Israeli Combat Aircraft: 1973-2000

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0 Israel Syria Egypt Jordan Lebanon

73 74 76 77 78 80 81 82 84 85 86 88 89 90 92 93 94 96 97 98 2000

Lebanon 18 18 27 21 21 7 8 3 7 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Jordan 52 50 66 78 76 58 84 94 103 121 119 114 111 104 113 106 102 97 97 97 93 Egypt 620 568 488 368 612 363 290 429 504 427 443 441 517 475 492 546 551 567 572 572 583 Syria 326 300 440 395 392 395 448 450 503 500 483 448 499 558 639 639 591 579 589 589 589 Israel 488 466 543 549 543 535 602 634 550 684 629 577 574 553 662 662 478 449 448 448 459

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts.

Total Operational Arab-Israeli Combat Fighter, Attack, Bomber, FGA and Reconnaissance Aircraft by Type in 2000 (Does not include stored, recce, unarmed electronic warfare and AC&W, trainer, and armored transport aircraft)

1200

MiG-29 Su-24 F-16C/D

1000 F-16A/B F-15I F-15C/D F-15A/B Mirage 2000 F-4/2000

800 MiG-25 F-4E Kfir Mirage F-1 Su-20 Mirage V 600 PRC J-7 Alphajet F-5E/F A-4N MiG-23 MiG-21 400 PRC J-6 Bulldog

200

0 Israel Total Arab Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts.

High Quality Operational Arab-Israeli Combat Aircraft in 2000 (Does not include recce, stored, unarmed electronic warfare and AC&W, trainer, and armored transport aircraft)

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

0 Israel Total Arab Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

MiG-29 20 20 Su-24 20 20 F-16C/D 128 114 143 F-16A/B 109 51 35 16 F-15I 25 F-15C/D 27 F-15A/B 44 Mirage 2000 21 21 F-4/2000 50 MiG-25 36 30

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts.

Low/Moderate Quality Arab-Israeli Combat Fighter, Attack, Bomber, FGA and Reconnaissance Aircraft in 2000 (Does not include stored, recce, unarmed electronic warfare and AC&W, trainer, and armored transport aircraft)

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0 Israel Total Arab Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

F-4E 20 28 28 Kfir 26 Mirage F-1 25 25 Su-20 90 90 Mirage V 84 84 PRC J-7 53 53 Alphajet 41 41 F-5E/F 50 50 A-4N 45 MiG-23 134 134 MiG-21 266 88 170 PRC J-6 44 44 Bulldog 3 3

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts.

Unarmed Fixed and Rotary Wing Recce, Electronic Warfare, and Intelligence Aircraft in 2000

0 Israel Total Arab Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

Commando 2E ECM 4 4 Beech 1900 MR 2 2 Beech 1900 Elint 4 4 C-130H Elint 2 2 E-2C AEW 5 5 King Air 2000 EW 10 D0-28 EW 15 IAI-200 Elint 3 RC-12D Elint 6 B-707 Phalcon AEW 6 B-707 EW/Elint 3 MiG-21H/J 22 14 8 MiG-25R 6 6 Mirage 5SDR 6 6 RF-4E 10

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts..

Operational Arab-Israeli Attack and Armed Helicopters in 2000

100

0 Israel Total Arab Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria

Mi-25 49 49 SA-342K/L 91 69 0 23

AH-64A 42 36 36

AH-1F/S 36 16 16 AU-1G 21

Hughes 500D 30

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts.

Arab-Israeli Land-Based Air Defense Systems in 2000

Country Major SAM Light SAM AA Guns

Egypt 664 launchers 2,100 SA-7 Ayn as Saqr 200 ZPU-2/4 14.5 mm 40/282 SA-2 20 SA-9 280 ZU-23-2 23mm 53/212 SA-3 26 M-54 Chaparral SP 118 ZSU-23-4 SP 23mm 14/56 SA-6 14/36 Crotale 36 Sinai SP 23mm 12/78 I Hawk 18 Amoun Skyguard/ 200 M-1939 37mm (4 Div./100 Btn.) RIM-7F 200 S-60 57mm 36 quad SAM 40 ZSU-57-2 SP 57mm Ayn as Saqr 14/- Chaparral 2000 20mm, 23mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, 100mm 36 twin radar guided 35mm guns Sinai radar-guided 23mm guns

Israel 3/18 Patriot Bty. 250 Stinger 850 20 mm: including 20mm, 17/102 I Hawk Bty. 1,000 Redeye Vulcan, TCM-20, M-167 8/48 Chaparral 35 M-163 Vulcan/ 8 Stinger Bty. (IAF) Chaparral 100 ZU-23 23mm 60 ZSU-23-4 SP M-39 37mm L-70 40mm 8 Chaparral Bty. (IAF

Jordan 2/14/80 I Hawk SA-7B2 368 guns 50 SA-8 100 M-163 SP 20mm 50 SA-13 52 ZSU-23-4 SP 300 SA-14 216 M-42 SP 40mm 240 SA-16 250 Redeye

Lebanon None SA-7 20mm SA-14 ZU-23 23mm 10 M-42A1 40mm

Syria 25 Ad Brigades 35 SA-13 2,060 Guns 130 SAM Bty. 20 SA-9 650 ZU-23-2 11/60/480 SA-2/3 4,000 SA-7 400 ZSU-23-4 SP 11/27/200 SA-6 60 SA-8 300 M-1938 37mm 1/2/48 SA-5 675 S-60 57mm 10 ZSU-5-2 SP 25 KS-19 100mm

Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance,. Light SAMs and AA guns Weapons below line for Egypt, and Israel are weapons operated by air force.

Arab-Israeli Naval Manpower in 2000

25000

20000 20000

15000

10000

6500 6000

5000

1200 480

Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts..

Arab-Israeli Total Naval Combat Ships by Category in 2000

0 Israel Total Arab Syria Jordan Egypt Lebanon

Submarines 4 7 3 4 Destroyers 1 1 Frigates 8 2 8 Corvettes 3 0 Missile Patrol 14 34 10 24 Other Patrol 36 38 10 3 18 7 Mine 18 5 13

Amph 1 15 3 12 Landing Craft/Support 4 25 3 20 2 MR/MPA ASW/Combat Helicopter 48 24 24 Other Helicopter

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts.

Arab-Israeli Major Combat Ships by Category in 2000

0 Israel Total Arab Syria Jordan Egypt Lebanon

Submarines 4 7 3 4 Destroyers 1 1 Frigates 8 2 8 Corvettes 3 0 Missile Patrol 14 34 10 24

Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance and Jane’s Fighting Ships, various editions.

The Warfighting Capabilities of the Individual “Ring” States Judged By Western Standards: Part One

Capability & Quality US Israel Syria Jordan Egypt Lebanon

Active Manpower · Officer quality VG-E G-E P-VG M-E P-E N · NCO Quality VG-E G P-M M-E P-E N · Enlisted quality G-VG G-VG VP-M M-G P-M N

Reserve Manpower · Officer quality G G-VG P M P N · NCO Quality G G P P P N · Enlisted quality G G VP P VP N

Combined operations VG VG VP P P N

Land Forces · Combined arms G-VG G-VG P-M M P-M N · Advanced Maneuver VG-E G-VG P-M M P-M N · Armored Warfare VG VG P-M M P-M N · Infantry Warfare G G P-VG G P-G N-M · Advanced Artillery E G P P P-G N · Heliborne VG VG P-M P P-M N · Advanced Night VG VG P P P N · Unconventional VG E M-E M M-E N · C4I/BM E VG P P P-M N · Sustainability VG VG P M P-M N · Standardization E VG M P VP-M N · Interoperability E VG P M P-M N

Naval Forces · Combined Operations VG-E M VP N VP N · Anti-Ship Missile G-E G P-M N P-M N · ASW G-E P VP N VP N · Offensive Mine P-M P M N P N · Defensive Mine P P P N P N · Amphibious VG M P N P N · C4I/BM E M P N P N · Sustainability VG P-M P N P N · Standardization E G G N P G · Interoperability VG P P N P G

E = Excellent, VG = Very Good, G = Good, M = Moderate, P = Poor, VP = Very Poor , N = Negligible

The Warfighting Capabilities of the Individual “Ring” States Judged By Western Standards: Part Two

Capability & Quality US Israel Syria Jordan Egypt Lebanon

Air Forces · Combined Operations E VG P P P-M N · Day air defense E E P-G P-G P-VG N · AWX/BVR air defense E E VP N VP-M N · Day attack E E P P P-M N · Close support E VG P M P-M N · Advanced anti-armor VG VG VP VP VP-P N · Night/AWX attack E VG VP P P-M N · Reconnaissance E E P P P-M N · Electronic warfare E G P N P N · Attack helicopter G-E G P P P VP · C4I/BM VG-E E VP P-M P-M N · Sustainability VG E VP P P-M N · Standardization E E M P VP-M N · Interoperability VG VG P P VP-M N

Strategic Mobility · Air VG M VP VP P-M N · Sea G P N N N N · Prepositioning M - - - - -

Counterproliferation · Missile Defense P-M P-M N N N N · Bio. Offensive N N P N P N · Bio. Defensive VP-N P P N P N · Chem. Offensive VP P M N P N · Chem. Defense M-G P-M P-M N P N · Nuclear Offensive E E N N N N · Nuclear Defensive M-VP N N N N N · Conventional Retaliation VG E P VP P N

E = Excellent, VG = Very Good, G = Good, M = Moderate, P = Poor, VP = Very Poor , N = Negligible

Note: Interoperability refers to the Israeli ability to interoperate broadly with other Gulf and Western forces, and Arab country ability to operate flexibly with other Arab forces. Standardization refers to whether equipment pool in a given service in given country is standardized enough to permit effective cross-service and resupply. C4I/BM refers to overall command, control, communications, intelligence, and battle management capabilities.

Losses in the Arab-Israeli Wars: 1948-1982 - Part One

A. 1948-1973 Wars

1948 1956 1967 Arab Israel Araba Israel Arab Israel

Killed 4,800 4,500 1,000 189-210 4,296 750-983 Wounded 25,000 15,000 4,000 899 6,121 4,517 ------Total 40,000 21,000 5,000 1,088-1,109 10,417 5,267-,5,500

Equipment Losses

Main Battle Tanksc -- -- 30 40 965-1,000 200-394 Aircraft -- -- 215-390 15-20 444-500 40 Combat Vessels -- -- 2 0 ? 0

B. Land, Air, and Naval Losses: 1973 War

Israel Total Egypt Syria Jordan Iraq Other Arab Arab Casualties

Killed 2,838 8,528 5,000 3,100-3,500 28 218-260 100 Wounded 8,800 19,549 12,000 6,000 49 600 300 Prisoners/Missing 508 8,551 8,031 370-500 -- 20 ? 500 Equipment Losses

Main Battle Tanksd 400-840 2,554 1,100 1,200 54 100-200 ? Other Armor 400 850+ 450 400 -- ? ? Artillery Weapons ? 550+ 300 250 -- ? ? SAM Batteries -- 47 44 3 -- -- ? Aircraft 102-103 392 223 118 -- 21 30 Helicopters 6 55 42 13 -- ? ? Naval Vessels 1 15 10 5 ------

Losses in the Arab-Israeli Wars: 1948-1982 - Part One

C. Losses in the 1982 War Israel Total Arab Syria PLO Killed 368 3,000 1,000 2,000 Wounded 2,383 6,000 3,000 3,000 Total 2,751 11,000 4,000 7,000 Prisoners of War 7 - 250 -

Tanks, OAFVs, and Trucks - - - 2,600e Tanks 150 - 350-400 - OAFVs 175 - 350-400 - Artillery Weapons - - - 1,700 e Aircraft 2 92 92 0 Helicopters 3 - ? 0 Munitions (Tons) - - - 6,000 e a. Includes only Egyptian casualties in fighting with Israel. Equipment losses include total Egyptian losses, including those to France and the United Kingdom. b. Prisoner of war and missing data are too unreliable to be included. c. Lower end of range often reflects losses that could not be returned to combat by the end of war. Higher end shows "kills" that put tank temporarily out of combat. d. Lower end of range often reflects losses that could not be returned to combat by the end of war. Higher end shows "kills" that put tank temporarily out of combat. e. Totals are equipment and munitions captured by Israel. No total is available for combat losses.

Sources: Estimates for 1948-1973 losses differ widely from source to source, which is the reason for not comparing all data in the same section of the table. The figures shown are adapted from Trevor Dupuy, Elusive Victory, New York, Harper and Row, 1978; Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israel Wars, New York, Random House, 1982; and from various editions of the Born in Battle Series, Tel Aviv, Eshel Drammit. The estimates for 1982 are drawn from Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume I, Boulder, Westview, 1990, pp. 152-153, data provided by the IDF Spokesman and Embassy of Lebanon, and Yezid Sayigh, “Israel’s Military Performance in Lebanon, June, 1982,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Fall 1983).

Force Trends in Israel - Part One

Category/Weapon 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Manpower

Total Active 156,000 169,600 142,000 141,000 172,000 175,000 (Conscript) (125,000) (125,300) - (110,000) (138,500) (138,500) Total Reserve 275,000 - 370,000 504,000 430,000 430,000 Total Actives & Reserves 400,000 400,000 512,000 645,000 602,000 605,000

Paramilitary 9,000 9,500 4,500 6,000 6,050 6,050

Land Forces

Active Manpower 135,000 135,000 104,000 104,000 134,000 134,000 (Conscripts) (120,000) (120,000) (88,000) (88,000) (114,700) (114,700) Reserve Manpower 240,000 - 310,000 494,000 365,000 365,000 Total Reserve & Active Manpower 375,000 375,000 414,000 598,000 499,000 499,000

Main Battle Tanks 2,700 3,050 3,600 4,288 4,095 4,300 (Static & In Storage) ------

AIFVs/Armored Cars/Lt. Tanks 365 80+ 300 400 400 400 APCs/Recce/Scouts 3,000* 4,000* 4,000 5,980 5,980 5,980 WWII Half-Tracks * * 4,000 4,400 3,500 500(4,000)

ATGM Launchers - - - - 1,005 1,005

SP Artillery 660** 228 488 816 1,150 1,150 Towed Artillery ** 950 570 579 400 400 MRLs ** - 180 175 160 160

Mortars 900+ 900+ - 2,740 2,740

SSM Launchers - - - 112 100+ 48-96

AA Guns 900+ 900+ 850+ 850 850+ Lt. SAM Launchers - - - 945+ 945+

Air & Air Defense Forces Active Air Force Manpower 16,000 38,000 28,000 28,000 32,000 37,000 Active Air Defense ------Reserve Manpower 4,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 20,000 20,000 Air Defense Command Reserve ------

* Includes all types of other armed vehicles except tanks and self-propelled artillery * Includes all medium and heavy self-propelled and towed weapons.

Force Trends in Israel - Part Two

Category/Weapon 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Air & Air Defense Forces (Continued)

Aircraft Total Fighter/FGA/Recce 481 535 684 (90) 553 449 459(250) Fighter 0 0 0 0 0 0 FGA/Fighter 275 265 402 393(+83) 373(+120) 405 FGA 200 200 130 121(+14) 50(+150) 25 Recce 6 14 15 14 22 10 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 4 4 4 4 6 Electronic Warfare (EW) - 10 26 36 37 Fixed Wing 37 Helicopter 0 Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) 0 0 5 3 3 Combat Capable Trainer 25 74 123 48 14-24 19

Tanker 2 2 2 7 8 8 Transport 54-98 58-70 45 58 47 36

Helicopters Attack/Armed/ - 6 58 74 116 133 ASW/SAR - - 37 2 2 6 Transport & Other 97 145 92 143 145 160 Total 97 151 187 219 263 299

SAM Forces Batteries 15 15 15 17 17 28 Heavy Launchers 90 60 60 68 68 79 Medium Launchers ------

Naval Forces Active Manpower 5,000 6,600 10,000 9,000 6,000-7,000 6,500 Reserve Manpower 1,000 3,400 10,000 1,000 10,000 5,000 Total Manpower 6,000 10,000 20,000 10,000 16,000-17,000 11,000

Submarines 2 3 3 3 2 4 Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes 0 0 6 0 3 3 Missile 0 0 6 0 3 3 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 Missile Patrol 18 22 24 26 23 14 Coastal/Inshore Patrol 36 38 45 37 40 36 Mine 0 0 0 0 0 0 Amphibious Ships 0 3 3 0 1 1 Landing Craft/Light Support 10 6 9 9 4 4 Fixed-wing Combat Aircraft 0 0 0 0 0 0 MR/MPA 0 3 0 0 0 0 ASW/Combat Helicopter 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other Helicopters ------

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

Israeli Major Operational Military Equipment in 2000

Land Forces

Tanks 3800

AIFVs 400

APCs 6400

SP Arty 1010

Towed Arty 420

MRLs 200

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000

Air Forces

Total Combat Aircraft 459

Attack Helicopters 133

0 100 200 300 400 500

Naval Forces

Submarines 4

Major Surface - Missile 3

Major Surface - Other 0

Missile Patrol 14

Other Patrol 36

Mine Warfare 0.00

Amphibious Ships 1

Landing Craft 4

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts.

Israeli Arms Deliveries: 1985-1997 (In Constant 1996 US$ Millions)

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Israel 93 94 95 96 97

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Israel 1720 1495 2874 2275 1704 1640 1812 1774 1728 1163 802 940 1100

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,, GPO, Washington, various editions.

Israeli Arms Agreements and Deliveries By Major Supplier: 1987-1996 ($Current Millions) US Russia China Major West Europe Other Europe All Others 4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 Agreements: Agreements: Agreements: Deliveries: Deliveries: Deliveries: 87-90 91-94 95-98 87-90 91-94 95-98

All Others 0 0 200 0 100 300 Other Europe 0 0 0 0 0 0 Major West Europe 0 1100 100 0 400 100 China 0 100 0 0 100 0 Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 US 2300 2700 2600 2400 2200 2400

Total 2300 4300 4800 2400 3300 1900 Includes Gulf states, Arab-Israeli states, North Africa, and Yemen 0 = less than $50 million or nil, and all data rounded to the nearest $100 million. Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Developing Nations, Congressional Research Service, various editions.

New Israeli Arms Orders and Deliveries by Supplier Country: 1996-1999 ($Current Millions)

4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 Israel-Agreements Israeli-Deliveries

US 4200 3500 Major West Europe 100 700 Other Europe Russia China Other 200 300

Israeli Active and Total (Active & Reserve) Military Manpower: 1973-2000 ( Men and Women in Uniform)

700000

600000

500000

400000

300000

200000

100000

Active & Reserve Active Military

73 76 79 81 84 87 90 93 95 98

Active Military 125000 158500 165600 172000 141000 141000 141000 176000 172000 175000 Active & Reserve 275000 375000 375000 450000 600000 598000 598000 499000 499000 490000

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author.

Israeli Concerns About Readiness and Force Quality

· Israel doubled its presence in Southern Lebanon to 2,000 men. In 1997 the reinforcement came as a response to an increasingly effective campaign by the Hizbollah. Nevertheless, the Hizbollah forced the Israelis to restrict their movements for fear of ambush, and to begin to actively discuss withdrawal from Lebanon. The “proxy war” in Lebanon imposes a major drain on Israeli resources. · Reports like the 1997 report of the State Controller's office in the spring of 1997 stated there were serious deficiencies in the combat readiness of the IDF. Report said that training has deteriorated; many AFVs are not battle-ready; many air force helicopters have malfunctions; and that emergency stockpiles of weapons and ammunition have been depleted. · Senior officers like Major General Matan Vilnai have expressed concern that most IDF combat troops spend less time preparing for war and more time occupied with anti-terrorist and other duties. Officers who have risen to field commands have only been involved in Lebanon and the Intifada. While this experience has exercised their basic skills, it has no relevance to their efficiency in modern war. · The growing concern that older elements of the air force fighter fleet faces major fatigue problems. Geography and IDF operational philosophy involves more high-G loading than USAF fighters. Israeli-made 600 gallon jettisonable fuel tanks have increased stress of wing root sections. Israeli-designed weapon pylons and engine modifications also contribute to fighter fatigue. Due to fatigue there is a constant need within the IDF air force for new fighters and service life extension programs. · Some officers complain that the IDF involvement in the peace negotiations has put it in an awkward and controversial position. This has embroiled the IDF in controversial issues such as withdrawal from the West Bank and the Golan Heights. · Lt. General Amnon Shahak, the former Chief of Staff, warned in July, 1997, that training days had been cut by two-thirds in recent years, and that civil defense against a chemical and biological attack by Syria was inadequate. Similar warning surfaced during the 1998 budget debates.

Source: Various media reports.

Egypt · “Peace with contingency plans:” Can never ignore Egyptian “front,” but can never discuss it or publicly plan for it. · Risk of break down of peace process; radicalization of Egypt. · Parity in many aspects of equipment, particularly tanks, AFVs, and aircraft. · Growing understanding of C4I/BM, erosion of Israeli edge. · Potential problem of Patriot/SA-10 upgrade of air defenses. · E-2C, electronic warfare, F-16, BVR missile air defenses. · Knowledge of US methods and tactics, experience gained in training with US forces. · Lessons of Gulf War. · Ability to use commercial satellite technology.

Hizbollah/Proxy War in Lebanon · Improved ordnance and technology. ATGMs, SHORADs, long-range rockets, mines, night vision, radio control. Added Iranian shipments and Syrian support. · Loss of edge in LIC. Near parity in casualties, with far more sensitivity to losses on Israeli side. · Uncertain ability to cost-effectively deter/retaliate for attacks on Israel if withdraw from security zone. · Corruption and uncertain loyalty of much of SLA. · Uncertain future of Syria: “Fourth front” under Syrian control?

Iran · No Dongs, refueling, attacks on Israel. · Nuclear “time window”. · Support of Hizbollah/PIJ. · Ability to use commercial satellite technology. · Targeting and strike challenge posed to IDF for preemption and retaliation.

Iraq · Can strike Israel with missiles. · Retention of WMD capabilities, future break out. · Retention of missiles and long-range strike aircraft. · Break down in peace process, rapprochement with Syria and/or Jordan. · Ability to use commercial satellite technology. · Targeting and strike challenge posed to IDF for preemption and retaliation.

Israel · Break down of peace process; Palestinian despair. · Problems in obtaining adequate manpower intake and retention: 1/3 no longer serve as conscripts. 15% get early out. · Growing manpower costs. · Caserne mentality, lack of aggressive edge. Conscripts compete to serve in rear areas, near home, not in prestige combat units. · Bureaucratic problems: Colonels up by 17%, Brigadier Generals by 60%, Generals as a whole by 41%. High salaries and retirement bonuses for officers (Colonel earns $5,900 a month. Retirement bonus of $282,200 for Colonel as early as age 42.) · Loss of readiness due to funding issues. Dead-lined aircraft and armor, stockpiles down. Mordechai has publicly said it would cost $667 million in FY1998 to restore the IDF to proper readiness. · Time problems grow in relying on mobilization and this creates windows of vulnerability. · Shahak has warned of sharp decline in reserve training activity; loss of combat experienced cadres; poor reserve exercise performance and adaptation to new technology/C4I/BM systems. · Sensitivity to casualties. · “Who’s a Jew” divisions within Israel affecting military; Rabbis who interfere in operations dealing with settlements. · Last war was 1973 (1982). Loss of generations with combat experience. · Inadequate military spending. · Inability to fund “necessary” upgrades of OAFVs/APCs and helicopter force. · Loss of edge in stand-off attack capability, targeting, and electronic warfare? · What comes after E-2C, current ECM/recce aircraft/UAVs? · Underfunding of Navy, new for added ASW capability. · Shift of resources to security missions; Morale problems in dealing with Palestinians. · Vulnerability to attacks with WMD, particularly terrorism. · Hobson’s TABM: The financial cost of funding the Arrow versus the military risks of not having the Arrow. · Lag in Satellite program . · Uncertain future of defense industry; political interference in IDF force plans to serve needs of industry.

Jordan · Break down in peace process, rapprochement with Egypt, Syria and/Iraq. · Uncertain political future: After King Hussein? · Role in “new Intifada.” · Spoiler or added front role, particularly as gets new US equipment.

Libya · Minor “Spoiler” role.

New Intifada · Jibril · Rapid recruiting and training of suicide bombers. · Hamas/PIJ · Palestinian Authority security forces turn on Israel. · Trying to enforce isolation of Palestinian enclaves. Mid- to long-term LIC war similar to Northern Ireland.

North Korea · No Dong missile.

Syria · Fear Syria might make a lasting strategic shift away from the peace process. · Proxy war in Lebanon. · Shift of land forces to aid in sudden attack on Golan/Mt. Hermon-- “four hours from the border.” Shift of 14th Special Forces Division from Lebanon to Golan similar to steps taken in 1973. · Build-up of armored forces (1,500 T-72s), risk of surprise attack, “Golan grab.” · Air force minor threat, but major improvement to SAM defenses could affect balance. · Purchase of new missile craft and 27 naval attack helicopters. · Scud Cs, No Dongs? · VX gas. · Chemically armed missiles: Volley fire against key Israeli targets? · IDF estimate of at least 80 SSM launchers, many mobile and/or sheltered, and more than 1,000 missiles by 2000. · Biological weapons? · Ability to use commercial satellite technology. · Targeting and strike challenge posed to IDF for preemption and retaliation in dealing with SSM/WMD threat.

Israeli Concerns Over Israel’s Military Edge: Views Expressed in Interviews with General Itzchak Mordechai (MOD), Lt. General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak (COS), Major General Matan Vilani (DCOS), and Rear Admiral Micha Ram (Former Commander of the Navy) - Part Four Russia/Ukraine · Potential sale of advanced aircraft, refueling capabilities, AWACS. · Potential SA-10 system sale. · Security of nuclear materials.

Saudi Arabia · Purchase of submarines. · Qualitative parity in air with Tornadoes, F-15I, US support and training. Long-range strike and AWACS/BVR capability. · Patriot air defense system.

UAE · Potential transfer of AMRAAM to Arab country.

US · Uncertain future of 6th Fleet. · Decline in US defense investment, rate of modernization and innovation contributing to Israel’s edge. · Constant rises in real price of US weapons and military equipment. · Sales and technology transfer to Arab states; transfer of training, joint operations, C4I/BM capabilities. · Aid forever? · Role in nuclear Middle East? · Future size of power projection forces and resupply capabilities? · Fights over possible Israeli compromise of US Patriot and F-16 technology. · Arms control initiatives in terms of NPT, MTCR, CWC, BWC that challenge Israel’s nuclear edge without limiting Iran, Syria, etc.

Military and Paramilitary Strength of Key Palestinian Factions and The Hizbollah

Palestinian Authority · 35,000 Security and paramilitary pro-PLO forces enforcing security in Gaza and Jericho, including: · Public Security (14,000) – 6,000 in Gaza and 8,000 in West Bank · Civil police (10,000) – 4,000 in Gaza and 6,000 in West Bank · Preventive Security (3,000) – 1,200 in Gaza and 1,800 in West Bank · General Intelligence (3,000), · Presidential Security (3,000), · Military Intelligence (500), and · Additional forces in Coastal Police, Air Force, Customs and Excise Police Force, University Security Service, and Civil Defense. · Equipment includes 45 APCs, 1 Lockheed Jetstar, 2 Mi-8s, 2 Mi-17s, and roughly 40,000 small arms. These include automatic weapons and light machine guns. Israeli claims they include heavy automatic weapons, rocket launchers, anti-tank rocket launchers and guided weapons, and manportable anti-air missiles. · The PA wants 12,000 more security forces after further withdrawals. Israel has proposed some 2,000.

Pro PLO · Palestinian National Liberation Army (PNLA)/Al Fatah - 5,000-8,000 active and semi-active reserves that make up main pro-Arafat force, based in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen under the tight control of the host government. · Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) - Abu Abbas Faction - 300-400 men led by Al-Abbas, based in Syria. · Arab Liberation Front (ALF) - 300-400 men based in Lebanon and Iraq. · Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) - 400-600 men led by Naif Hawatmeh, which claims eight battalions, and is based in Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere. · Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) - 800 men led by George Habash, based in Syria, Lebanon, West Bank, and Gaza. · Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PSF) - 600-700 men led by Samir Ghawsha and Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, based in Syria.

Anti-PLO · Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) - 350 men in various factions, led by Assad Bayud al-Tamimi, Fathi Shakaki, Ibrahim Odeh, Ahmad Muhana, and others, based in the West Bank and Gaza. · Hamas - military wing of about 300 men, based in the West Bank and Gaza. · As-Saiqa - 600-1,000 men in pro-Syrian force under Issam al-Qadi, based in Syria. · Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC)/Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) - 300 men led by Abu Nidal (Sabri al-Bana), based in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. · Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) - 600 men led by Ahmad Jibril, based in Syria, Lebanon, elsewhere. · Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Special Command (PFLP-SC) - 50-100 men led by Abu Muhammad (Salim Abu Salem). · Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) - 4,500 men, based in Syria. · Fatah Intifada – 400-1,000 men led by Said Musa Muragha (Abu Musa). Based in Syria and Lebanon.

Hizbollah (Party of God), · About300-5000 actives with 3,000 men in support, Shi’ite fundamentalist, APCs, artillery, MRLs. ATGMs, rocket launchers, AA guns, SA-7s, AT-3 Saggers.

Source: Adapted from US Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998,” Washington, GPO, April 1999; IISS, Military Balance, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000,.

Palestinian Authority Paramilitary Forces in 2000

Public Security

Civil Police

Preventive Security

General Intelligence Total

West Bank

Military Intelligence Gaza

Presidential Security

0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000

Presidential Military General Preventive Civil Police Public Security Security Intelligence Intelligence Security

Total 3000 500 3000 3000 10000 14000 West Bank - - - 1800 6000 8000 Gaza - - - 1200 4000 6000

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts

Other Pro-PLO/Palestinian Authority Palestinian Paramilitary Forces in 2000

Palestine National Liberation Army: Arafat (Alg., Eg., Leb., Libya, Jordan, Iraq, Sud., Yem.)

Palestine Liberation Front: Tal al Yaqub (Syria)

Palestine Liberation Front: Al Abas (Iraq)

Maxium Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Hawatmah (Syr., Leb, etc.)

Democratic Front for the Minimum Liberation of Palestine: Abd Rabbu (Jor.)

Popular Struggle Front: Samir Ghansha (Syr.)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Habash (Syr., Leb., WB, Gaz.)

Arab Liberation Front: (Leb., Irq.)

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000

Arab Popular Front Popular Democratic Democratic Palestine Palestine Palestine Liberation for the Struggle Front for the Front for the Liberation Liberation National Front: (Leb., Liberation of Front: Samir Liberation of Liberation of Front: Al Front: Tal al Liberation Irq.) Palestine: Ghansha Palestine: Palestine: Abas (Iraq) Yaqub Army:

Maxium 700 200 600 400 150 Minimum 500 800 600 150 500 300 100 8000

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts

Anti-PLO/Palestinian Authority Palestinian Paramilitary Forces in 2000

Fatah Dissidents: Abu Musa (Syr., Leb.)

Fatah Revolutionary Council: Abu Nidal Group (Leb., syr., Irq., etc.) Maxium Hamas: (WB, Gaza)

Minimum Palestine Islamic Jihad: (WB, Gaza)

Palestine Liberation Front: Abd al-Fatah Ghanim (Syr.)

Palestine Liberation Army (Syr.)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP-GC): Jibril

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP-Special Command): (Leb., syr., Irq.)

As-Saiqa: al-Khadi (Syr.)

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500

Popular Popular Palestine Palestine Palestine Fatah Fatah As-Saiqa: Front for Front for Liberation Liberation Islamic Hamas: Revolutiona Dissidents: al-Khadi the the Army Front: Abd Jihad: (WB, (WB, Gaza) ry Council: Abu Musa (Syr.) Liberation Liberation (Syr.) al-Fatah Gaza) Abu Nidal (Syr., Leb.)

Maxium 100 Minimum 1000 50 600 4,500 300 350 300 1,000

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts

CIA Profile of Gaza and West Bank - Part One

Category Gaza West Bank Israel Jordan

Total Area (sq. km) 360 5,860 20,770 89,213 Land Area (sq. km) 360 5,640 20,330 88,884

Land Boundaries (km) 62 404 1,006 1,619 Egypt 11 - 255 - Gaza - - 51 - Iraq - - - 181 Israel 51 307 - 238 Jordan - 97 238 - Lebanon - - 79 - Saudi Arabia - - - 728 Syria - - 76 375 West Bank - - 307 97

Coastline (km) 40 0 273 26

Land Use (Percent) Arable 24 27 17 4 Permanent Crops 39 0 4 1 Meadows & Pastures 0 32 7 9 Forest & Woodland 11 1 6 1 Other 26 40 66 85 Irrigated (sq. km) 120 - 1,800 630

Population 1,112,654 1,611,109 5,749,760 4,561,147 (% 0-14 years) 52 45 28 43 (% 15-64 years) 46 52 62 54 (% 65+ years) 2 3 10 3 Growth Rate (%) 4.44 3.14 1.91 2.54 Birth Rate (per 1,000) 48.24 35.59 19.83 34.21 Fertility Rate (Per Woman) 7.46 4.78 2.68 4.64 Net Immigration Rate (per 1,000) 18.97 0 4.42 0 Death Rate (per 1,000) 3.80 4.2 6.16 3.85 Infant Mortality (per 1,000) 22.92 25.22 7.78 33.70 Life Expectancy (yrs.) 73.44 72.83 78.61 73.06

Ethnic Divisions Arab 99.4 83 19.9 98 Armenian - - - 1 Circassian - - - 1 Jew 0.6 17 80.1 -

Religion Christian 0.7 8 2.1 4 Jew 0.6 17 80.1 -

Muslim 98.7 75 14.6 96 Other - - 3.2 -

Table 7.2

CIA Profile of Gaza and West Bank - Part Two

Category Gaza West Bank Israel Jordan

Literacy - - 95 86.6

Labor Force - - 2,300,000 1,150,000 Construction (%) - 8.0 - 10.0 Agriculture (%) 13.0 13.0 2.6 7.4 Industry (%) 21.0 13.0 27.7 11.4 Commerce (%) - 12.0 25.9 10.5 Other Services (%) 66.0 54.0 12.6 52.0 Public Services (%) - - 31.3 -

GDP (PPE in $billion) 1.1 3.18 101.9 15.5 Real Growth Rate 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.2 GDP Per Capita ($US) 1,000 2,000 18,100 3,500 Inflation Rate (%) 8.8 7.6 5.4 3 Unemployment Rate (%) 26.8 17.3 8.7 20-30 Budget ($M) Revenues (816------816) 55,000 2,800 Expenditures (822------866) 58,000 3,000 Trade ($M) Exports (781------781) 22,100 1,500 Imports (2,100------2,100) 26,100 3,900 External Debt ($M) (108------108) 18,700 7,500 Economic Aid ($M) - - 1,241+ 1,097 Industrial Growth (%) - - 5.4 -3.4

Transportation Railroads (km) 0 0 610 677 Roads (km) - 4,500 15,464 8,000 Paved (km) - 2,700 15,464 8,000 Airports 1 2 31 17 Runways 1,500M+ - 1 7 14 Runways 3,000M+ 1 0 2 9

Telephones (%Use) 3.1 8 (2,600,000) (450,000) Television (%Use) 59 54 (2,250,000) (350,000) Radios (%Use) 95 82 - (1,100,000)

* In addition, there are 166,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank and 176,000 in Jerusalem, and 6,000 in Gaza.. ** Includes 166,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank, 6,000 in Gaza, 19,000 in Golan, and 176,000 in Jerusalem. Source: Adapted from CIA Internet Data Base as of October, 1999 by Anthony H. Cordesman

Changes in Israeli Settlers in Gaza and the West Bank: 1992-1998 (Not including Israelis in annexed Jerusalem)

Growth of Settlements West Bank Gaza Total

January 1, 1992 97,800 3,410 101,210 June 1, 1996 145,000 5,500 150,500 June 1, 1998 163,173 6,166 169,339 July , 1999 (CIA) 166,000 6,000 172,000

Population Increase 65,373 2,756 68,129

Percentage Increase 67% 81% 67%

Number of settlements gaining population since 1992 (–1996?) - - 109

Number of settlements losing population since 1992 (-1996?) - - 13

The CIA estimated that in July 1999 there 216 Israeli settlements and land use sites in the West Bank, 42 in the Golan heights, 24 I nthe Gaza strip, and 29 in East Jerusalem. In addition to the settlers shown, there were 19,000 in the Golan and 176,000 in East Jerusalem.

Status of Occupancy

Residential Units Empty Units Vacancy Rate in Percent West Bank CIA Estimate 41,000 9,939 26 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 31,763 3,312 10.4

Gaza Strip CIA Estimate 2,300 1,300 56 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 1,847 754 41 Katfi Bloc Settler Council 1,500 340 22 Peace Now, Nov, 96 - - 25 Golan Heights CIA Estimate - - 28 Golan Settler Council - - 6

Note: There are roughly 15,000 Israeli settlers in the Golan. Ariel Sharon called for at expansion of this total to 25,000 on September 26, 1996, and for building roughly 600 new dwelling units a year. The Likud government has indicated that Israel plans to increase the population of the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza by 50,000 over the next four years, and build 10,000 new dwelling units at a rate of 2,500 per year.

Source: Adapted from data developed by the Foundation for Middle East Peace and Ha’aretz. May 20, 1997 and May/June 1999. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author.

Status of Settlements in the Occupied Territories in 1994-1997

Growth of Settlements 1994 1995 1996 1997 - 1998 Settlement population beyond Green Line 290,00 301,000 313,000 - Settlements beyond Green Line 250 250 300 -

Settlers in West Bank 121,000 127,600 136,000 161,000 Yearly increase in settlers in West Bank 9,400 3,500 6,000 - Residential sites in West Bank 181 180 190 207

Israeli population in 20 neighborhoods of East Jerusalem149,000 153,700 166,800 180,000 Yearly increase in Israelis in East Jerusalem 9,000 4,700 2,600 -

Israeli population in 20 neighborhoods of Gaza Strip 4,800 5,000 5,000 6,000 Yearly increase in Israelis in Gaza Strip 300 200 0 -

Settlers in Golan Heights 14,700 14,800 15,000 17,000 Yearly increase in settlers in Golan 700 100 200 - Settlements in Golan 36 34 36 42

Israeli settlers as percent of total population in the Occupied Territories 12 11 13 -

Unoccupied housing units in existing Israeli settlements 15,000 15,600 17,000 - Housing starts in settlements beyond the Green Line 3,700 4,100 3,100 - Housing completions in settlements beyond the Green Line 2,600 3,800 3,500 -

Source: Adapted from statistical Yearbook, Jerusalem, 1996; US reports to Congress on the status of the disbursement of loan guarantees to Israel, and Foundation for Middle East Peace.

The Syrian-Israeli Balance in 2000 - Part One

Category/Weapon Israel Syria

Defense Budget (In 1999, $Current Billions) $6.7 $2.9

Arms Imports: 1995-1998 ($M) New Orders 2,900 300 Deliveries 2,800 300

Mobilization Base Men Ages 13-17 276,000 1,007,000 Men Ages 18-22 269,000 970,000

Manpower Total Active 173,500 316,000 (Conscript) 107,500 - Total Reserve 425,000 396,000 Total 598,500 7120,000 Paramilitary 6,050 8,000+

Land Forces Active Manpower 130,000 215,000 (Conscripts) 85,000 - Reserve Manpower 400,000 300,000 Total Manpower 530,000 515,000

Main Battle Tanks 3,800 3,450 (Fixed & Storage) 0 (1,200)

AIFVs/Armored Cars/Lt. Tanks 400 3,305 APCs/Recce/Scouts 5,900 1,500 WWII Half-Tracks 500(3,500) 0

ATGM Launchers 1,225 3,390+

SP Artillery 1,010 450 Towed Artillery 420 1,480 MRLs 200+ 480 Mortars 7,740 4,500+

SSM Launchers 48 62

AA Guns 850 2,060 Lt. SAM Launchers 1,298 4,055

The Syrian-Israeli Balance in 2000 -Part Two

Category/Weapon Israel Syria

Air & Air Defense Forces Active Air Force Manpower 37,000 40,000 Active Air Defense Command 0 60,000 Air Force Reserve Manpower 20,000 92,000 Air Defense Command Reserve Manpower 0 - Aircraft Total Fighter/FGA/Recce 459(250) 589 Fighter 0 310 FGA/Fighter 405) 0 FGA 25) 154 Recce 10 14 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 6 0 Electronic Warfare (EW) 37 10 Fixed Wing 37 0 Helicopter 0 10 Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) 3 0 Combat Capable Trainer 19 111 Tanker 8 0 Transport 36 29 Helicopters Attack/Armed 133 72 SAR/ASW 6 - Transport & Other 160 110 Total 299 182 SAM Forces Batteries 28 130 Heavy Launchers 79 728 Medium Launchers 0 60 AA Guns 0 4,000

Naval Forces Active Manpower 6,500 6,000 Reserve Manpower 5,000 4,000 Total Manpower 11,500 10,000 Submarines 4 3 Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes 3 2 Missile 3 2 Other 0 0 Missile Patrol 14 10 Coastal/Inshore Patrol 36 10 Mine 0 5 Amphibious Ships 1 3 Landing Craft/Light Support 4 5 Fixed-wing Combat Aircraft 0 0 MR/MPA 0 0 ASW/Combat Helicopter 0 24 Other Helicopters - - -

(Figures in parenthesis show additional equipment known to be in long-term storage. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

Israeli Versus Syrian Operational Force Strength in 2000 Land Weapons

7000 6,400

Israel Syria 6000

4805 5000

3800 4000 3450

3000 2410

2000 1630

1000

0 Tanks AFVs, APCs, & OAFVs Arty

Air Forces

700

589 600 Israel Syria

500 459 405 400 310 300

200 154 111 100 43 25 19 0 0 10 14 10 0 Total Fighters AWX/FGA FGA Recce AEW/EW Combat Trainers

Note: Total Artillery includes towed and self-propelled tube artillery and multiple rocket launchers. Total air forces include only operational fixed wing fighter, fighter-attack, and reconnaissance aircraft in combat units, less aircraft in combat training units. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance.

Trends in Syrian-Israeli Military Spending: 1985-1997 (In Constant $US 1997 Millions)

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

0 Israel 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 Syria 92 93 94 95 96 97

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Syria 7445 5878 4280 4000 5240 5045 4720 4500 3870 4260 4210 3920 3400 Israel 10910 9850 8400 8280 8060 8620 7040 8730 8880 8330 9440 9490 9340

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Washington, GPO, Table I, various editions.

Annual Trends in Syrian Israeli Arms Agreements and Deliveries: 1985-1997 ($97 Constant Millions)

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Syria 93 94 95 96 97

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Syria 2254 1595 2613 1643 1339 1113 906 432 302 53 93 61 70

Israel 1720 1495 2874 2275 1704 1640 1812 1774 1728 1163 802 940 1100

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, GPO, Washington,, Table II, various editions.

New Syrian-Israeli Arms Orders and Deliveries by Supplier Country: 1996-1999 ($Current Millions)

4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 Israel-Agreements Israeli-Deliveries . Syria-Agreements Syria-Deliveries

US 4200 3500 Major West Europe 100 700 100 Other Europe 100 Russia 300 200 China Other 200 300 100

Syrian-Israeli Arms Agreements and Deliveries: 1985-1997 ($Current Millions)

NEW AGREEMENTS: 1986-1997 7000

5800 86-89 6000 4800 5000 90-93

94-97 4000

3000 2300 1900 2000 1000 1000 300

0 Israel Syria

NEW DELIVERIES: 1986-1997 6000 5400 86-89 5000 90-93

94-97 4000

3000 2400 2300 2400 1900 2000

1000 300

0 Israel Syria

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS, from Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, , Washington, Congressional Research Service, various editions.

Force Trends in Syria - Part One

Category/Weapon 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Manpower

Total Active 177,500 247,500 402,500 404,000 423,000 320,000 (Conscript) ------Total Reserve 102,500 - 273,500 400,000 650,000 500,000 Total 280,000 - 676,000 804,000 1,073,000 820,000

Paramilitary 9,500 9,500 6,300 10,800 8,000+ 8,000+

Land Forces

Active Regular Manpower 150,000 200,000 270,000 300,000 315,000 215,000 (Conscripts) - (140,000) (135,000) (130,000) (250,000) - Republican Guards - - - 10,000 - Reserve Manpower 100,000 - 270,000 392,000 550,000 400,000 Total Reserve & Active Manpower 250,000 - 540,000 702,000 865,000 615,000

Main Battle Tanks 1,400 2,920 4,200 2,900 3,200 3,450 (Static & in Storage) - - (1,100) (1,200) (1,200)

AIFVs/Armored Cars/Lt. Tanks 70 700 1,400 2,800 3,310 3,010 APCs/Recce/Scouts 1,100 1,600 1,600 1,500 1,500 1,500 WWII Half-Tracks 0 0 0 0 0 0

ATGM Launchers - - - 1,100 3,390 3,390

SP Artillery 75 800* - 186 450 450 Towed Artillery 700 * - 2,000 1,630 1,630 MRLs 57 - - 250 480 480

Mortars - - - - 658+ 4,500+

SSM Launchers - 54 54 61 62

AA Guns - - 1,000 1,700 2,060 2,060 Lt. SAM Launchers - - - - 4,055 4,055

Air & Air Defense Forces Active Air Force Manpower 25,000 45,000 70,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 Air Force Reserve Manpower - - - - 92,000 92,000 Active Air Defense Command - (15,000) 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 Air Defense Command Reserve ------* Includes all types of towed and self-propelled artillery, but not multiple rocket launchers.

Force Trends in Syria - Part Two

Category/Weapon 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Air & Air Defense Forces (Continued)

Aircraft Total Fighter/FGA/Recce 400 395 500 558 579 589 Bombers 4 0 0 0 0 0 Fighter 250 225 280 312 300 310 FGA/Fighter 0 60 0 0 9 0 FGA 140 110 193 170 154 154 Recce 0 0 10 6 14 14 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 0 0 0 0 0 0 Electronic Warfare (EW) 0 0 - 8 10 10 (Fixed Wing) (Helicopter) Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) 0 0 0 0 0 0 Combat Capable Trainer - 20 10-60 76-96 111 111

Tanker 0 0 0 0 0 0 Transport 9 17 23 28 34 49

Helicopters Attack/Armed 0 0 100 100 100 72 ASW/SAR 0 35 23 25 0 0 Transport & Other 60 82 160 155 118 110 Total 60 117 283 280 218 182

SAM Forces Batteries - 75 126 126 130 130 Heavy Launchers - - 658 640 728 728 Medium Launchers - - - 60 60 60 AA Guns ------

Naval Forces Active Manpower 2,500 2,500 2,500 6,000 8,000 6,000 Reserve Manpower 2,500 - 2,500 8,000 8,000 4,000 Total Manpower 5,000 - 5,000 14,000 16,000 10,000

Submarines 0 0 0 3 3(2) (3) Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes 0 0 0 2 2 2 Missile 0 2 2 2 2 2 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 Missile Patrol 6 18 22 12 18 10 Coastal/Inshore Patrol 12 9 7 8 11 10 Mine 1 3 4 9 7 5 Amphibious Ships - - 2 3 3 3 Landing Craft/Light Support - - - - - 5 Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft 0 0 0 0 0 0 MR/MPA 0 0 0 0 0 0 ASW/Combat Helicopter - - - 17 29 24 Other Helicopters ------Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

Syrian Major Military Equipment in 2000 Land Forces

Tanks 3450

AIFVs 3305

APCs 1500

SP Arty 450

Towed Arty 1480

MRLs 480

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000

Air Forces

Total Combat Aircraft 589

Attack Helicopters 72

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Naval Forces

Submarines 3

Major Surface - Missile 2

Major Surface - Other 2

Missile Patrol 10

Other Patrol 10

Mine Warfare 5.00

Amphibious Ships 3

Landing Craft 5

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

Syrian Arms Agreements and Deliveries By Major Supplier: 1987-1998 ($Current Millions)

US Russia China Major West Europe Other Europe All Others 6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 Agreements Agreements: Agreements: Deliveries: Deliveries: Deliveries: : 87-90 91-94 95-98 87-90 91-94 95-98

All Others 200 100 0 0 200 100 Other Europe 100 400 100 200 400 100 Major West Europe 0 0 0 0 0 0 China 0 0 0 0 0 0 Russia 5300 500 200 5000 1000 100 US 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 5,600 900 300 5,200 1,400 300

Includes Gulf states, Arab-Israeli states, North Africa, and Yemen 0 = less than $50 million or nil, and all data rounded to the nearest $100 million.

Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Developing Nations, Congressional Research Service, various editions.

The Syrian Recapitalization Crisis: Arms Deliveries During 1985-1996 ($97 Constant Millions)

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Syria 93 94 95 96 97

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Syria 2254 1595 2613 1643 1339 1113 906 432 302 53 93 61 70

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, GPO, Washington,, Table II, various editions.

Current Status of Lebanese Military Forces · Lebanese army is fragmented along sectarian lines and has been largely confined to an internal security role with the support of 25,000-35,000 Syrian troops. · Heavily influenced by Syria. Syrian military intelligence is believed to have many active agents in Lebanese forces and Lebanese military intelligence. · Total strength of roughly 67,900 · Army has 65,000 actives authorized, 11 infantry brigades, 1 Presidential Guard Brigade, 1 commando/ranger regiment, 3 special forces regiments, 2 artillery regiments, and 1 air assault regiment. · Equipment readiness and sustainability is improving, but is still poor. Standardization and spare parts situation very poor. · Main Battle Tanks: 92 M-48A1/A5, 212 T-54/T-55. · Other Armored Fighting Vehicles: 67 AML-90. · Armored Personnel Carriers: 1,164 M-113s, 80 VAB-VCI, 30 VAB-VTT, 35 Panhard M3/VTT. · Towed Artillery: 135 M-101A & 10 M-102 105mm; 33 M-1938, 10 D-30 122mm; 11 M-46, 130mm; 18 M-114A1, 35 M-198, 18 M-50 155mm · Multiple Rocket Launchers: 23 BM-21 122mm. · Mortars: 150 81mm; 130 120mm. · Anti-tank Weapons: ENTAC, Milan, and 20 BGM-71 TOW ATGMs; RPG-7s, M-65 89mm rocket launchers; M- 40A1 106mm recoilless rifles. · Air Force has some 1,700 actives. Has no real fixed wing combat capability. Limited fair-weather helicopter capability with limited survivability, firepower, and tactical skill. · Fighters: 3 Bulldog Trainers. · Attack Helicopters: 4 SA-342 with AS-11 and AS-12 air-to-surface anti-armor missiles in inventory, evidently no longer active. · Other Helicopters: 16 UH-1H. Operational status of 5 AB-212, 16 AB-205, 3 SA-330, 2 SA-318, and 4 SA-319 unclear. · Training Aircraft: 3 CM-170, 3 Bulldog · Transports: 1 Dove, 1 Turbo-Commander 690A. · Navy has some 1,200 personnel. Is largely ineffective except in light patrol role against smugglers and guerrillas. · Bases at Juniye, Beirut, and Tripoli. · Combat Ships: 5 UK-made Attacker in-shore patrol craft; 2 UK-made Tracker in-shore patrol craft; 27 armed boats. · Amphibious: 2 Sour-class LCTs, capable of carrying 33 troops each. · Ministry of Interior security force has 13,000 men. Includes Beirut and regional Gendarmerie and Judicial Police. Equipped with small arms, automatic weapons, and 30 Chamite APCs. · Customs: Equipped with 2 Tracker and 5 Aztec in-shore patrol craft.

Force Trends in Lebanon - Part One

Category/Weapon 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Manpower

Total Active 15,300 23,000 17,400 21,000 44,300 67,900 (Conscript) - - - - - (27,400) Total Reserve ------Total - - 17,400 21,000 44,300 67,500

Paramilitary 5,000 - 13,000 8,000 13,000 13,000

Land Forces

Active Manpower 14,000 22,250 16,000 21,000 43,000 65,000 (Conscripts) ------Reserve Manpower ------Total Reserve & Active Manpower 14,000 22,250 16,000 21,000 43,000 65,000

Main Battle Tanks 60 0 50 200 300 304 (Fixed & in Storage) ------

AIFVs/Armored Cars/Lt. Tanks 43 17 150 102 175 67 APCs/Recce/Scouts 180 80 420 340 740 1,28` WWII Half-Tracks 0 0 0 0 0 0

ATGM Launchers - - - - 200 250

SP Artillery 0 0 0 0 0 0 Towed Artillery 50 28 125 111 200 151 MRLs 0 0 0 - 30 23

Mortars - - 200+ 120+ 280+ 280+

SSM Launchers 0 0 0 0 0 0

AA Guns - - - - - 220 Lt. SAM Launchers ------

Force Trends in Lebanon -Part Two

Category/Weapon 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Air & Air Defense Forces Active Manpower 1,000 500 1,100 800 800 1,700 Reserve Manpower ------

Aircraft 19 Total Fighter/FGA/Recce 7 7 3 3 (3) Fighter 6(5) (9) 0 0 0 0 FGA/Fighter 0 0 0 0 0 0 FGA 13 7 7 3 3 0 Recce 0 0 0 0 0 0 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 0 0 0 0 0 0 Electronic Warfare (EW) 0 0 0 0 0 0 Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) 0 0 0 0 0 0 Combat Capable Trainer 0 0 0 0 0 3

Tanker 0 0 0 0 0 0 Transport 3 2 2 2 2 2

Helicopters Attack/Armed 0 4 4 1 4 0 ASW/SAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 Transport & Other 16 17 28 15 46 16 Total 21 32 16 50 16

SAM Forces Batteries 0 0 0 0 0 0 Heavy Launchers 0 0 0 0 0 0 Medium Launchers 0 0 0 0 0 0

Naval Forces Active Manpower 300 250 300 - 500 1,200 Reserve Manpower 0 0 0 - 0 0 Total Manpower 300 250 300 - 500 1,200

Submarines 0 0 0 - 0 0 Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes 0 0 0 - 0 0 Missile 0 0 0 - 0 0 Other 0 0 0 - 0 0 Missile Patrol 0 0 0 - 0 0 Coastal/Inshore Patrol 5 6 4 - 9 7 Mine 0 0 0 - 0 0 Amphibious Ships 0 0 0 - 0 0 Landing Craft/Light Support 1 1 1 - 2 2 Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft 0 0 0 - 0 0 MR/MPA 0 0 0 - 0 0 ASW/Combat Helicopter 0 0 0 - 0 0 Other Helicopters 0 0 0 - 0 0

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

Lebanese Major Military Equipment in 2000

Land Forces

Tanks 304

AIFVs 67

APCs 1281

SP Arty 0

Towed Arty 151

MRLs 23

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400

Air Forces

Total Combat Aircraft 3

Attack Helicopters 0

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5

Naval Forces

Submarines 0

Major Surface - Missile 0

Major Surface - Other 0

Missile Patrol 0

Other Patrol 7

Mine Warfare 0.00

Amphibious Ships 0

Landing Craft 2

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

Trends in Lebanese Military Spending: 1986-1997 (In Constant $97 Millions)

600

500

400

300

200

100

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 Lebanon 92 93 94 95 96 97

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Lebanon 100 75 75 120 150 370 400 471 428 541 556 561 465

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Washington, GPO, , Table I, various editions.

Trends in Lebanese Arms Import Deliveries: 1985-1997 ($97 Constant Millions)

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 Lebanon 94 95 96 97

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Lebanon 76 15 13 13 6 2 6 3 11 11 52 41 40

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, , GPO, Washington, various editions, Table II.

Lebanese Arms Agreements and Deliveries By Major Supplier: 1996-1999 ($Current Millions)

120

100

0 Lebanon-Agreements Lebanon-Deliveries

US 100 Major West Europe 100 Other Europe Russia China Other

Lebanese Arms Agreements and Deliveries By Major Supplier: 1987-1997 ($Current Millions) US Russia China Major West Europe Other Europe All Others 250

200

150

100

0 Agreements: Agreements: Agreements: Deliveries: 87- Deliveries: 91- Deliveries: 95- 87-90 91-94 95-98 90 94 98

All Others 0 0 Other Europe 0 0 Major West Europe 100 0 China 0 0 Russia 0 0 US 100 100

Developments in Hizbollah Military Forces in Lebanon in 1998-2000

· Roughly 2,500-3,500 men, heavily dependent on part-time and irregular forces. Many are now highly experienced, often well-educated forces. · Composed of a core of around 300 guerrillas. Has deliberately cut its force over the past years to prevent infiltration and leaks. · Hizbollah fighters are old by comparison to Israeli fighters. Any age up to 35, usually married, often university students or professional men. · Roughly 150 Iranian Revolutionary Guards as advisors. Heavily supplied and financed by Iran, but Syrian personnel seem to be involved in training and in coordinating with Iran. Iranian and Syrian coordination of support for military supply and possibly operations of Hizbollah seems to occur at the general officer, deputy minister level. · Iran has flown up to three 747 cargo jets monthly to Hizbollah via Syria in an effort to upgrade their arms capabilities. Weapons include the Russian-made Sagger and Strella antitank missiles. Iran's military camps in Lebanon appear to be offering training on the more advanced systems. · Conflicting intelligence reports estimate Iranian aid to Hizbollah to be between 65 and 100 million dollars a year. · Forces carry out an average of two operations a day against the SLA and Israeli forces. Some missions involve long-range shelling while others have included sophisticated roadside bombings and commando missions involving 40 well-trained guerrillas operating as a team. · Equipped with APCs, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, mortars, anti-tank guided missiles (including AT-3s), recoilless rifles, SA-7s, anti-aircraft guns. · Guerrilla mortar strikes have improved in both accuracy and range, indicating better range-finding systems, low signature weapons, and the use of mortar boosters that enable consistent hits for 2 to 3 miles. · New anti-tank weapons capable of burning through the armor plate of Israel's M-60 tanks. · Acquisition of anti-tank weapons with a longer range. · Supply of Katyusha rockets is estimated to have risen to 1,000. These include 30 Iranian produced 240mm rockets with a range of 40 km, according to Israeli intelligence reports. Most of the rockets are 120mm and 127mm variants with a maximum range of 22 km. · Improved radio detonated roadside bombs have been effective against the Israelis. Some are disguised as large rocks. The rocks are reportedly produced in Iran. · Hizbollah is now winning against Israel. More Israeli soldiers are being killed than Hizbollah fighters; Israeli retaliatory air strikes and raids are aiding Hizbollah by alienating Lebanese. Considerable Christian and Sunni support now for Hizbollah.

The Jordanian-Israeli Balance - Part One

Category/Weapon Israel Jordan

Defense Budget (In 1999, $Current Billions) $6.7 $0.4886

Arms Imports: 1995-1998 ($M) New Orders 2,900 700 Deliveries 2,800 300

Mobilization Base Men Ages 13-17 276,000 269,000 Men Ages 18-22 269,000 242,000

Manpower Total Active 173,500 104,000 (Conscript) 107,500 - Total Reserve 425,000 35,000 Total 598,500 139,000 Paramilitary 6,050 10,000

Land Forces Active Manpower 130,000 90,000 (Conscripts) 85,000 250,000+ Reserve Manpower 400,000 30,000 Total Manpower 530,000 120,000

Main Battle Tanks 3,800 1,204 (Fixed & Storage) - -

AIFVs/Armored Cars/Lt. Tanks 400 54 APCs/Recce/Scouts 5,900 1,400 WWII Half-Tracks 500(3,500) 0

ATGM Launchers 1,225 640

SP Artillery 1,010 406 Towed Artillery 420 115 MRLs 200+ 0 Mortars 7,740 800

SSM Launchers 48 0

AA Guns 850 368 Lt. SAM Launchers 1,298 965+

The Jordanian-Israeli Balance - Part Two Category/Weapon Israel Jordan

Air & Air Defense Forces Active Air Force Manpower 37,000 13,000 Active Air Defense Command 0 0 Air Force Reserve Manpower 20,000 - Air Defense Command Reserve Manpower 0 0 Aircraft Total Fighter/FGA/Recce 459(250) 93 Fighter 0 41 FGA/Fighter 405) 0 FGA 25) 50 Recce 10 0 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 6 0 Electronic Warfare (EW) 37 0 Fixed Wing 37 0 Helicopter 0 0 Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) 3 0 Combat Capable Trainer 19 2 Tanker 8 0 Transport 36 16 Helicopters Attack/Armed 133 16 SAR/ASW 6 - Transport & Other 160 49 Total 299 65 SAM Forces Batteries 28 14 Heavy Launchers 79 80 Medium Launchers 0 0 AA Guns 0 -

Naval Forces Active Manpower 6,500 480 Reserve Manpower 5,000 - Total Manpower 11,500 480 Submarines 4 0 Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes 3 0 Missile 3 0 Other 0 0 Missile Patrol 14 0 Coastal/Inshore Patrol 36 3 Mine 0 0 Amphibious Ships 1 0 Landing Craft/Light Support 4 3 Fixed-wing Combat Aircraft 0 0 MR/MPA 0 0 ASW/Combat Helicopter 0 0 Other Helicopters - -

(Figures in parenthesis show additional equipment known to be in long-term storage. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

Israel Versus Jordan in 2000

Land Weapons

7000 6,300

6000 Israel Jordan

5000

3800 4000

3000

2000 1630 1454 1204

1000 521

0 Tanks AFVs, APCs, OAFVs Artillery

Air Forces

500 459

450 405 400 350 300 Israel Jordan 250 200 150 93 100 41 50 43 50 25 19 0 0 10 0 0 2 0

Trends in Jordanian-Israeli Military Spending: 1984-1997 (In Constant $97 Millions)

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

85 Israel 86 87 88 89 90 91 Jordan 92 93 94 95 96 97

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Jordan 849 899 813 626 523 471 478 470 477 535 581 609 626 Israel 10910 9850 8400 8280 8060 8620 7040 8730 8880 8330 9440 9490 9340

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Washington, GPO, various editions, Table I.

Trends in Jordanian-Israeli Arms Import Deliveries: 1985-1997 ($97 Constant Millions)

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Jordan 93 94 95 96 97

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Jordan 991 860 686 619 414 176 91 44 43 53 83 122 130 Israel 1720 1495 2874 2275 1704 1640 1812 1774 1728 1163 802 940 1100

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, GPO, Washington, Table II various editions.

New Jordanian- Israeli Arms Orders and Deliveries by Supplier Country: 1996-1999 ($Current Millions)

4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 Israel-Agreements Israeli-Deliveries . Jordan-Agreements Jordan-Deliveries

US 4200 3500 300 200 Major West Europe 100 700 100 Other Europe Russia 300 China Other 200 300 100 100

0 = less than $50 million or nil, and all data rounded to the nearest $100 million.

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS, from Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Developing Nations, Congressional Research Service, various editions.

The Jordanian Recapitalization Crisis: Arm Deliveries: 1985-1997 ($97 Constant Millions)

1000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 Jordan 92 93 94 95 96 97

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Jordan 991 860 686 619 414 176 91 44 43 53 83 122 130

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, GPO, Washington, Table II, various editions.

Jordanian Arms Agreements and Deliveries By Major Supplier: 1987-1998 ($Current Millions) US Russia China Major West Europe Other Europe All Others 1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0 Agreements: Agreements: Agreements: Deliveries: Deliveries: Deliveries: 87-90 91-94 95-98 87-90 91-94 95-98

All Others 100 0 100 100 0 100 Other Europe 200 0 0 200 0 0 Major West Europe 100 0 0 400 0 0 China 100 0 0 100 0 0

Russia 200 0 300 400 0 0 US 100 100 300 200 100 200

Total 800 100 400 1,300 100 200

Includes Gulf states, Arab-Israeli states, North Africa, and Yemen 0 = less than $50 million or nil, and all data rounded to the nearest $100 million. Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Developing Nations, Congressional Research Service, various editions.

Force Trends in Jordan - Part One

Category/Weapon 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Manpower

Total Active 80,200 67,200 70,300 82,250 98,800 104,500 (Conscript) ------Total Reserve - - 35,000 35,000 35,000 30,000 Total Actives & Reserve - - 105,300 117,250 133,800 134,500

Paramilitary 10,000 10,000 11,000 17,000 10,000 10,000

Land Forces

Active Manpower 75,000 60,000 62,750 74,000 90,000 90,000 (Conscripts) ------Reserve Manpower - - 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 Total Reserve & Active Manpower - - 92,750 104,000 120,000 120,000

Main Battle Tanks 440 609 795 1,131 1,141 1,217 (Fixed & in Storage) - (260) (270) (300)

AIFVs/Armored Cars/Lt. Tanks 240 140 32 188 204 224 APCs/Recce/Scouts 440 962 850 1,244 1,100 1,100 WWII Half-Tracks 0 0 0 0 0 0

ATGM Launchers - 162 610 640 640 640

SP Artillery 55 173 144 237 370 406 Towed Artillery 160 90 91 89 115 115 MRLs 0 0 0 0 0 0

Mortars - 400 500 600 450+ 800

SSM Launchers 0 0 0 0 0 0

AA Guns 200 200 366 408 360 360 Lt. SAM Launchers - - - - 890 965+

Force Trends in Jordan - Part Two

Category/Weapon 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Air & Air Defense Forces Active Air Force Manpower 5,000 7,000 7,200 10,000 8,000 13,600 Active Air Defense - - - - (2,000) (3,400) Air Force Reserve Manpower - - - 5,000 5,000 - Air Defense Reserve Manpower 0 0 0 0 0 0 Aircraft Total Fighter/FGA/Recce 42 58 121 104 82 93 Fighter 18 24 35 32 30 41 FGA/Fighter 0 0 0 0 0 0 FGA 24 24 68 72 50 50 Recce 0 0 0 0 0 0 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 0 0 0 0 0 0 Electronic Warfare (EW) 0 0 0 0 0 0 (Fixed Wing) ------(Helicopter) ------Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) 0 0 0 0 0 0 Combat Capable Trainer/OCU 7 10 18 0 2 2 Tanker 0 0 0 0 0 0 Transport 11 9 10 13 20 14 Helicopters Attack/Armed 0 0 0 24 24 16 ASW/SAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 Transport & Other 13 17 38 32 20 46 Total 13 17 38 56 44 62 SAM Forces (operated by Army) Batteries 0 14 14 14 14 14 Heavy Launchers 0 - - 126 80 80 Medium Launchers 0 - 20 40 - - AA Guns ------

Naval Forces Active Manpower 250 200 350 250 600 480 Reserve Manpower ------Total Manpower 250 200 350 250 600 480 Submarines 0 0 0 0 0 0 Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes Missile 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 Missile Patrol 0 0 0 0 0 0 Coastal/Inshore Patrol 12 9 9 1 5 3 Mine 0 0 0 0 0 0 Amphibious Ships 0 0 0 0 0 0 Landing Craft/Light Support 0 0 0 0 3 7 Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft 0 0 0 0 0 0 MR/MPA 0 0 0 0 0 0 ASW/Combat Helicopter 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other Helicopters 0 0 0 0 0 0

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US and regional experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

Jordanian Major Military Equipment in 2000

Land Forces

Tanks 1204

AIFVs 54

APCs 1400

SP Arty 406

Towed Arty 115

MRLs 0

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600

Air Forces

Total Combat Aircraft 93

Attack Helicopters 16

0 20 40 60 80 100

Naval Forces

Submarines 0

Major Surface - Missile 0

Major Surface - Other 0

Missile Patrol 0

Other Patrol 3

Mine Warfare 0

Aphibious Ships 0

Landing Craft 3

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US and regional experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

Israel Versus Jordan and Syria: The “Eastern Front” Balance - Part One

Category/Weapon Israel Syria & Jordan Syria Jordan

Defense Budget (In 1999, $Current Billions) $6.7 $3.388 $2.9 $0.488

Arms Imports: 1995-1998 ($M) New Orders 2,900 1,000 300 700 Deliveries 2,800 600 300 300

Mobilization Base Men Ages 13-17 276,000 1,276,000 1,007,000 269,000 Men Ages 18-22 269,000 1,212,000 970,000 242,000

Manpower Total Active 173,500 420,000 316,000 104,000 (Conscript) 107,500 - - Total Reserve 425,000 431,000 396,000 35,000 Total 598,500 851,000 712,000 139,000 Paramilitary 6,050 18,000+ 8,000+ 10,000

Land Forces Active Manpower 130,000 305,000 215,000 90,000 (Conscripts) 85,000 - Reserve Manpower 400,000 330,000 300,000 30,000 Total Manpower 530,000 635,000 515,000 120,000

Main Battle Tanks 3,800 5,854 3,450 1,204 (Fixed & Storage) 0 (1,200) (1,200) -

AIFVs/Armored Cars/Lt. Tanks 400 3,359 3,305 54 APCs/Recce/Scouts 5,900 2,900 1,500 1,400 WWII Half-Tracks 500(3,500) 0 0 0

ATGM Launchers 1,225 4,030+ 3,390+ 640

SP Artillery 1,010 856 450 406 Towed Artillery 420 1,595 1,480 115 MRLs 200+ 480 480 0 Mortars 7,740 5,300+ 4,500+ 800

SSM Launchers 48 62 62 0

AA Guns 850 2,428 2,060 368 Lt. SAM Launchers 1,298 5,020+ 4,055 965+

Israel Versus Jordan and Syria: The “Eastern Front” Balance -Part Two

Category/Weapon Israel Syria & Jordan Syria Jordan

Air & Air Defense Forces Active Air Force Manpower 37,000 53,000 40,000 13,000 Active Air Defense Command 0 60,000 60,000 0 Air Force Reserve Manpower 20,000 92,000 92,000 - Air Defense Command Reserve Manpower 0 0 - 0 Aircraft Total Fighter/FGA/Recce 459(250) 682 589 93 Fighter 0 351 310 41 FGA/Fighter 405) 0 0 0 FGA 25) 204 154 50 Recce 10 14 14 0 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 6 0 0 0 Electronic Warfare (EW) 37 10 10 0 Fixed Wing 37 0 0 0 Helicopter 0 10 10 0 Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) 3 0 0 0 Combat Capable Trainer 19 113 111 2 Tanker 8 0 0 0 Transport 36 45 29 16 Helicopters Attack/Armed 133 88 72 16 SAR/ASW 6 - - Transport & Other 160 159 110 49 Total 299 182 65 SAM Forces Batteries 28 144 130 14 Heavy Launchers 79 808 728 80 Medium Launchers 0 60 60 0 AA Guns 0 4,000 4,000 -

Naval Forces Active Manpower 6,500 6,480 6,000 480 Reserve Manpower 5,000 4,000 4,000 - Total Manpower 11,500 10,480 10,000 480 Submarines 4 3 3 0 Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes 3 2 2 0 Missile 3 2 2 0 Other 0 0 0 0 Missile Patrol 14 10 10 0 Coastal/Inshore Patrol 36 13 10 3 Mine 0 5 5 0 Amphibious Ships 1 3 3 0 Landing Craft/Light Support 4 8 5 3 Fixed-wing Combat Aircraft 0 0 0 0 MR/MPA 0 0 0 0 ASW/Combat Helicopter 0 24 24 0 Other Helicopters - - - -

Note: Figures in parenthesis show additional equipment known to be in long-term storage. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

Israel Versus Jordan & Syria in 2000

Land Weapons

7000 Israel Syr/Jor Syria Jordan

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 Tanks AFVs/APCs Artillery

Air Forces

800

700 Israel Syr/Jor Syria Jordan 600

500

400

300

200

100

0 Total Fighters AWX/FGA FGA Recce AEW/EW Combat Trainers

Arab-Israeli Borders (Total Length Kilometers)

3 , 0 0 0

2 , 5 0 0

2 , 0 0 0

1 , 5 0 0

1 , 0 0 0

5 0 0

0 E g y p t I s r a e l J o r d a n L e b a n o n S y r i a G a z a W e s t B a n k

Land Boundaries in Kilometers Egypt - 255 - - - 11 - Gaza 11 51 - - - - - Israel 255 - 238 79 76 51 307 Iraq - - 181 - 605 - - Jordam - 238 - - 375 - 97 Lebanon - 79 - - 375 - - Libya 1,150 ------Saudi Arabia - - 728 - - - - Sudan 1,273 ------Syria - 76 375 375 - - - Turkey - - - - 822 - - West Bank - 307 97 - - - - Total 2,689 1,006 1,619 454 2,253 62 404

Coastline 2,450 273 26 225 193 40 -

Maritime Claims in Kilometers Contiguous 38.4 - - - 41 - - Territorial 15.2 15.2 4.8 15.2 35 - -

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from CIA, World Factbook, 1996, April, 1997, CD-ROM.

Arab-Israeli Geography (Total Territory in Square Kilometers)

1 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0

1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0

8 0 0 , 0 0 0

6 0 0 , 0 0 0

4 0 0 , 0 0 0

2 0 0 , 0 0 0

0 Egy pt Is r ael J or dan Lebanon Sy r i a Gaz a Wes t Bank

Area in Square Kilometers Total 1,001,450 20,700 89,213 10,400 185,180 360 5,860 Land 995,450 20,330 88,884 10,230 184,050 360 5,640 Irrigated 25,850 2,140 570 860 10,000 115 -

Land Use in % Arable 3 17 4 21 28 13 27 Permanent Crops 2 5 0.5 9 3 32 0 Meadows & Pastures 0 40 1 1 46 0 32 Forest 0 6 0.5 8 3 0 1 Other 95 32 94 61 20 55 40

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from CIA, World Factbook, 1996, April, 1997, CD-ROM.

The Egyptian-Israeli Balance - Part One

Category/Weapon Israel Egypt

Defense Budget (In 1999, $Current Billions) $6.7 $2.2

Arms Imports: 1995-1998 ($M) New Orders 2,900 5,000 Deliveries 2,800 5,000

Mobilization Base Men Ages 13-17 276,000 3,560,000 Men Ages 18-22 269,000 3,364,000

Manpower Total Active 173,500 450,000 (Conscript) 107,500 320,000 Total Reserve 425,000 254,000 Total 598,500 704,000 Paramilitary 6,050 230,000

Land Forces Active Manpower 130,000 320,000 (Conscripts) 85,000 250,000+ Reserve Manpower 400,000 150,000 Total Manpower 530,000 470,000

Main Battle Tanks 3,800 3,855 (Fixed & Storage) 0 -

AIFVs/Armored Cars/Lt. Tanks 400 982(220) APCs/Recce/Scouts 5,900 3,205(1,075) WWII Half-Tracks 500(3,500) 0

ATGM Launchers 1,225 2,350

SP Artillery 1,010 251 Towed Artillery 420 971 MRLs 200+ 156 Mortars 7,740 2,400

SSM Launchers 48 24

AA Guns 850 1,074 Lt. SAM Launchers 1,298 2,146

The Egyptian-Israeli Balance - Part Two

Category/Weapon Israel Egypt

Air & Air Defense Forces Active Air Force Manpower 37,000 30,000 Active Air Defense Command 0 80,000 Air Force Reserve Manpower 20,000 90,000 Air Defense Command Reserve Manpower 0 70,000 Aircraft Total Fighter/FGA/Recce 459(250) 583 Fighter 0 337 FGA/Fighter 405) 0 FGA 25) 133 Recce 10 20 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 6 5 Electronic Warfare (EW) 37 10 Fixed Wing 37 6 Helicopter 0 4 Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) 3 2 Combat Capable Trainer 19 85 Tanker 8 0 Transport 36 32 Helicopters Attack/Armed 133 129 SAR/ASW 6 - Transport & Other 160 158 Total 299 287 SAM Forces Batteries 28 38+ Heavy Launchers 79 628 Medium Launchers 0 36-54 AA Guns 0 72+

Naval Forces Active Manpower 6,500 20,000 Reserve Manpower 5,000 14,000 Total Manpower 11,500 34,000 Submarines 4 4 Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes 3 11 Missile 3 9 Other 0 2 Missile Patrol 14 24 Coastal/Inshore Patrol 36 15 Mine 0 14 Amphibious Ships 1 3 Landing Craft/Light Support 4 9 Fixed-wing Combat Aircraft 0 0 MR/MPA 0 0 ASW/Combat Helicopter 0 24 Other Helicopters - -

(Figures in parenthesis show additional equipment known to be in long-term storage. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

Israel Versus Egypt in 2000 Land Weapons

7,000 6,400 Israel Egypt

6,000

5,000 4,187 3,800 3,855 4,000

3,000

2,000 1630 1378

1,000

0 Tanks AFVs, APCs, OAFVs Arty

Air Forces

700 589 600

Israel Egypt 500 459 405 400 310 300

200 154 111 100 43 25 19 0 0 10 14 10 0

Trends in Egyptian-Israeli Military Spending: 1984-1997 (In Constant $97 Millions)

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

0 Israel 85 86 87 88 89 90 Egypt 91 92 93 94 95

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

Egypt 4289 3981 3980 3208 1953 1687 1767 1840 1904 1881 2653 Israel 10650 9554 8421 7740 7693 8237 6233 8320 7812 8376 8734

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Washington, GPO, , Table I, various editions.

Trends in Egyptian-Israeli Arms Import Deliveries: 1983-1997 ($97 Constant Millions)

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

0 Israel 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 Egypt 92 93 94 95 96 97

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Egypt 4420 4160 4380 3600 2160 1840 2070 2150 2230 2190 2180 2170 2180 Israel 10910 9850 8400 8280 8060 8620 7040 8730 8880 8330 9440 9490 9340

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US US State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, GPO, Washington, various editions, Table II.

New Egyptian- Israeli Arms Orders and Deliveries by Supplier Country: 1996-1999 ($Current Millions)

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 Israel-Agreements Israeli-Deliveries . Egypt-Agreements Egypt-Deliveries

US 4200 3500 5800 3200 Major West Europe 100 700 100 100 Other Europe 200 Russia 400 400 China 400 Other 200 300

0 = less than $50 million or nil, and all data rounded to the nearest $100 million.

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS, from Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Developing Nations, Congressional Research Service, various editions.

Force Trends in Egypt – Part One

Category/Weapon 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Manpower

Total Active 322,500 367,000 445,000 450,000 450,000 450,000 (Conscript) - - (250,000) (252,000) (320,000) (320,000) Total Reserve - - 380,000 623,000 254,000 254,000 Total - - 825,000 1,073,000 704,000 704,000

Paramilitary 120,000 49,000 139,000 374,000 230,000 230,000

Land Forces

Active Manpower 275,000 245,000 320,000 320,000 320,000 320,000 (Conscripts) - - (250,000) (180,000) (250,000+) (250,000+) Reserve Manpower 500,000 350,000 323,000 500,000 150,000 150,000 Total Reserve & Active Manpower 775,000 595,000 643,000 820,000 470,000 470,000

Main Battle Tanks 1,945 1,600 2,159 3,190 3,500 3,855 (Fixed & in Storage) - - - - - AIFVs/Armored Cars/Lt. Tanks 130 580 747 770 1,080 982 (220) APCs/Recce/Scouts/ 2,500 2,550 2,550 2,745 3,834 3,205(1,075) WWII Half-Tracks 0 0 0 0 0 0 ATGM Launchers - 1,000 - 3,340 2,785 2,350

SP Artillery 200 200 200 185 200 251 Towed Artillery 1,300 1,500 1,500 1,120 971 971 MRLs 420 300 300 300 296 156 Mortars - - - - - 2,400 SSM Launchers 18+ 54 - 13 21 24

AA Guns (Army + ADC) 2,500 2,500+ 2,500+ 1,070+ 1,677+ 1,074 Lt. SAM Launchers - - - 1,226+ 2,046 2,146

Force Trends in Egypt – Part Two

Category/Weapon 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Air & Air Defense Forces Active Air Force Manpower 30,000 27,000 25,000 80,000 30,000 30,000 Air Defense Command (75,000)* 75,000 80,000 30,000 80,000 80,000 Total Reserve Manpower 20,000 - 42,000 109,000 90,000 90,000

Aircraft Total Fighter/FGA/Recce 608** 363(305) 427 475 564 583 Bomber 30 23 13 0 0 0 Fighter - 45 164 272 339 337 FGA/Fighter 200 92 103 0 0 0 FGA 205-253 201 73 139 135 1335 Recce - - 34 20 20 20 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 0 0 0 5 5 5 Electronic Warfare (EW) 0 2 2 10 10 10 Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) 0 0 0 2 2 2 Combat Capable Trainer/OCU 153 50 38 48 70 85 Tanker 0 0 0 0 0 0 Transport 70 65 37 25 32 32

Helicopters Attack/Armed 0 0 48 74 103 129 ASW/SAR 0 0 5 0 14 0 Transport & Other 138 168 108 118 115 158 Total 138 168 161 192 232 287

SAM Forces Batteries - - - - - 38+ Heavy Launchers 635 635 727 808 702 628 Medium Launchers - 20 16 50 36 36-54

Naval Forces Active Manpower 17,500 20,000 20,000 20,000 16,000 20,000 Reserve Manpower 15,000 - 15,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 Total Manpower 32,500 - 35,000 34,000 30,000 34,000

Submarines 12 10(1) 14 10 4 4 Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes 8 8 10 5 7 11 Missile - 5 7 4 6 9 Other - 3 3 1 1 2 Missile Patrol 13 22 30 21 25 24 Coastal/Inshore Patrol 42 38 32 18 18 15 Mine 12 14 15 9 7 14 Amphibious Ships - 3 3 3 3 3 Landing Craft/Light Support 14 17 13 - 11 9 Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft 0 0 0 0 0 0 MR/MPA 0 0 0 0 0 0 ASW/Combat Helicopter 6 (5) (17) (14) 24 Other Helicopters ------

* Included in the army total. ** Includes 108 fighters in the Air Defense Command Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

Egyptian Major Military Equipment in 1998

Land Forces

Tanks 3855

AIFVs 982

APCs 3205

SP Arty 251

Towed Arty 971

MRLs 156

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500

Air Forces

Total Combat Aircraft 583

Attack Helicopters 129

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Naval Forces

Submarines 4

Major Surface - Missile 9

Major Surface - Other 2

Missile Patrol 24

Other Patrol 15

Mine Warfare 14.00

Amphibious Ships 3

Landing Craft 16

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance.

Egyptian Arms Agreements and Deliveries By Major Supplier: 1987-1998 ($Current Millions)

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 Agreements Agreements: Agreements: Deliveries: Deliveries: Deliveries: : 87-90 91-94 95-98 87-90 91-94 95-98

All Others 0 0 0 200 0 100 Other Europe 100 400 0 200 300 200 Major West Europe 0 200 100 400 0 200 China 0 0 0 100 0 0 Russia 500 300 400 500 100 500 US 5900 3600 4500 2300 4500 4000

Total 6,500 4,800 4,900 3,700 4,800 5,900

The Broader Arab-Israeli Balance: Part One

Category/Weapon Israel Syria Jordan Egypt Lebanon

Defense Budget (In 1999, $Current Billions) $6.7 $2.9 $0.488 $2.2 $0.56

Arms Imports: 1995-1998 ($M) New Orders 2,900 300 700 5,000 200 Deliveries 2,800 300 300 5,000 100

Mobilization Base Men Ages 13-17 276,000 1,007,000 269,000 3,560,000 210,000 Men Ages 18-22 269,000 970,000 242,000 3,364,000 196,000

Main Battle Tanks 3,800 3,450 1,204 3,855 304 (Fixed & Storage) 0 (1,200) - - -

AIFVs/Armored Cars/Lt. Tanks 400 3,305 54 982(220) 67 APCs/Recce/Scouts 5,900 1,500 1,400 3,205(1,075) 1,281 WWII Half-Tracks 500(3,500) 0 0 0 0

ATGM Launchers 1,225 3,390+ 640 2,350 250

SP Artillery 1,010 450 406 251 0 Towed Artillery 420 1,480 115 971 151 MRLs 200+ 480 0 156 23 Mortars 7,740 4,500+ 800 2,400 280+

SSM Launchers 48 62 0 24 0

AA Guns 850 2,060 368 1,074 220 Lt. SAM Launchers 1,298 4,055 965+ 2,146 -

The Broader Arab-Israeli Balance: Part Two

Category/Weapon Israel Syria Jordan Egypt Lebanon

Israel Versus Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon

Operational Land Weapons

14000 Israel Total Arab

11839 12000

10000 8,600

8000 6400

6000 4483 3800 4000

1630 2000

0 Tanks AFVs, APCs, OAFVs Arty

Operational Combat Aircraft

1400 1268

1200

1000 Israel Total Arab

800 688

600 459 405 400 337

201 217 200 133 34 43 0 0 25 10 31 19 0 Total Fighters AWX/FGA FGA Recce AEW/EW Combat Armed Trainers Helicopter

Algerian, Iranian, Iraqi, and Libyan Forces in 2000: Part One

Category/Weapon Algeria Libya Iran Iraq

Manpower Total Active 122,000 65,000 545,600 429,000 (Conscript) 75,000 40,000 290,000 - Total Regular - 65,000 420,600 429,000 Revolutionary Guard and Other 0 ? 125,000 0 Total Reserve 150,000 40,000 350,000 650,000 Total Active and Reserve 272,000 105,000 895,600 1,079,000 Paramilitary 146,200 ? 40,000 55,400

Land Forces Active Manpower 105,000 35,000 450,000 375,000 (Revolutionary Guards) - - (100,000) - (Conscripts) 75,000 25,000 Reserve Manpower - - 350,000 450,000 Total Manpower - - 800,000 825,000

Main Battle Tanks 951 985(1,040) 1,345 2,200 AIFVs/Armored Cars/Lt. Tanks 1,000 1,630* 555 1,600 APCs/Recce/Scouts/Half-Tracks 680+ 990* 550 1,800 ATGM Launchers - 3,000* 420+ 480+

SP Artillery 185 450* 290 150 Towed Artillery 416 720* 2,170 1,800 MRLs 126 700* 764+ 150 Mortars 330+ - 6,500 2,000+ SSM Launchers - 120 46 24? AA Guns 895 600+* 1,700 5,500 Lt. SAM Launchers 1,000+ 2,500+* 700 1,100

* Extensive, but unknown amounts inoperable or in storage.

Algerian, Iranian, Iraqi, and Libyan Forces in 2000: Part Two

Category/Weapon Algeria Libya Iran Iraq

Air & Air Defense Forces Active Manpower 10,000 22,000 50,000 52,000 (Air Defense Only) NA ? (25,000) (17,000) Reserve Manpower - - -- - (Air Defense Only) NA ? - - Aircraft Total Fighter/FGA/Recce 181 420 304 353 Bomber 0 6 0 6? Fighter 110 212 114 180 FGA/Fighter 50 194 140 130 Recce 10 11 15 8 Airborne Early Warning (AEW/EW) 0 0 0 0 Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) 15 0 5 0 Combat Capable Trainer 8 21 25 155 Tanker 0 0 4 2 Transport 27 78 60 34 Helicopters Attack/Armed/ASW 65 52 (100) (120) Other 63 98 512 380 Total 138 150 612 500 SAM Forces Batteries 9 39 Heavy Launchers 43 236 155 340 Medium Launchers - ? 52 200 AA guns - ? - 6,000

Naval Forces Active Manpower 7,000 8,000 40,600 2,000 Regular Navy 8,000 20,600 2,000 Naval Guards - 20,000 0 Marines - 2,600 - Reserve Manpower - - - Total Manpower - - 2,000 Submarines 2 2(2) 5 0 Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes 8 5 5 0 Missile 3 5 3 0 Other 5 0 2 1 Missile Patrol 11 21 20 1 Coastal/Inshore Patrol 5 8 42 5 Mine 11 8 7 4 Amphibious Ships 3 5 9 0 Landing Craft/Light Support 3 10 9 - ASW/Combat Helicopter 0 32 9 (6)

Note: Figures in parenthesis are additional equipment in storage. Total equipment holdings for the Iranian land forces include 470 tanks, 620 other armored vehicles, 360 artillery weapons, 40 rocket launchers, and 140 anti-aircraft weapons with the land units of the Revolutionary Guards. Iranian & Iraqi attack helicopters are in the army. Only about 60% of the US supplied fixed wing combat aircraft in Iran are operational and 80% of the Chinese supplied aircraft. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from data provided by US experts, and the IISS, Military Balance

The “Perceptual Balance”: Military Demographics of the Greater Middle East

Country Total Population Males Reaching Males Between the Ages of Males Between 15 and 49 Military Age 13 and 17 18 and 22 23 and 32 Total Medically Fit Each Year

Iran 72,644,000 767,000 4,438,000 3,694,000 5,582,000 17,203,000 10,217,000 Iraq 23,846,000 260,000 1,457,000 1,237,000 1,828,000 5,460,000 3,058,000

Bahrain 636,000 4,346 32,000 25,000 40,000 221,000 121,000 Kuwait 2,200,000 20,900 117,000 98,000 146,000 718,000 425,000 Oman 2,213,000 - 126,000 101,000 149,000 753,000 420,000 Qatar 681,000 6,125 25,000 20,000 35,000 301,000 158,000 Saudi Arabia 18,000,000 197,000 1,304,000 1,088,000 1,615,000 5,697,000 3,172,000 UAE 2,650,000 19,266 86,000 82,000 142,000 1,072,300 584,000

Algeria 29,600,000 360,000 1,923,000 1,740,000 2,780,000 8,238,000 5,047,000 Libya 6,203,000 62,000 362,000 301,000 458,000 1,327,000 816,000 Morocco 29,829,000 320,000 1,720,000 1,555,000 2,589,000 7,736,000 4,889,000 Tunisia 9,811,000 100,000 519,000 487,000 842,000 2,602,000 1,487,000 Chad 7,712,000 70,464 383,000 316,000 497,000 1,689,000 876,000 Mauritania 2,538,000 - 140,000 117,000 184,000 572,000 278,000

Djibouti 733,000 - 40,000 33,000 53,000 105,000 62,000 Eritrea 3,994,000 - 238,000 199,000 303,000 - - Ethiopia 57,000,000 655,000 3,706,000 2,993,000 4,513,000 13,520,000 7,053,000 Somalia 6,300,000 - 587,000 477,000 687,000 1,730,000 963,000 Sudan 32,194,000 379,000 1,888,000 1,596,000 2,399,000 7,942,000 4,890,000 Turkey 65,161,000 659,000 3,267,000 3,257,000 5,953,000 18,169,000 11,024,000 Yemen 18,000,000 212,000 939,000 772,000 1,259,000 3,776,000 2,119,000

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman, CIA World Factbook, 1999 and IISS, Military Balance, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000.

The “Perceptual Balance”: Military Forces of the Greater Middle East

Country Total Active Total Active Tanks OAFVs Artillery Combat Armed Manning Army Manning Aircraft Helicopters

Iran 513,000 450,000 1,440 1,065 2,948 295 100 Iraq 382,500 350,000 2,900 4,400 1,980 353 120

Bahrain 10,700 8,500 106 281 58 24 10 Kuwait 16,600 10,000 220 329 40 76 16 Oman 43,500 25,000 117(24) 103 109 40 0 Qatar 11,800 8,500 44 397 44 18 18 Saudi Arabia 105,500 70,000 1,307 4,285 520 432 12 UAE 54,500 59,000 232 927 289 99 49

Algeria 124,000 107,000 890 1,680 727 181 63 Libya 65,000 35,000 985 2,620 1870 420 65 Morocco 196,300 175,000 524 1,344 396 89 24 Tunisia 35,000 27,000 84 382 117 44 7

Chad 30,350 25,000 60 63+ 5 4 0 Mauritania 15,650 15,000 35 105 75 7 0

Djibouti 9,600 8,000 0 31 6 0 0 Eritrea 182,100 180,000 - - - 19 0 Ethiopia 352,500 350,000 500 200 300 71 24 Somalia 12,900 12,900 - - - - - Sudan 94,700 90,000 230 608 856 51 9 Turkey 639,000 525,000 4,205 2,515 4,453 440 0 Yemen 39,500 37,000 1,125 1,140 727 69 8

Libya’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction

Delivery Systems · Has developed a liquid-fueled missile with a range of 200 kilometers. No evidence of deployment. · Al-Fatih solid-fueled missile with 300-450 mile range reported to have been under development with aid of German technical experts, but no signs of successful development. · FROG-7 rocket launchers with 40 kilometer range. · Deployed 80 Scud B launchers with 190 mile range in 1976, but could not successfully operate system. Many of the launchers and missiles sold to Iran. · Fired Scud missiles against the Italian island of Lampadusa in 1987. · Purchased SS-N-2C and SSC-3 cruise missiles. Little operational capability. · Pursued other missile development programs with little success. There are unconfirmed reports of some Libyan interest in the Iranian Shahab 3 program. · Tu-22 bombers with minimal operational capability. · Su-24 long range strike fighters. These are operational and have with limited refueling capability using C-130s. · operational Mirage 5D/DE and 10 Mirage 5DD fighter ground attack aircraft. · Mirage F-1AD fighter ground attack aircraft. · MiG-23BM Flogger F and 14 MiG-23U fighter ground attack. · Su-20 and Su-22 Fitter E, J. F fighter ground attack aircraft. · Tube artillery and multiple rocket launchers. · The CIA estimated in January 1999 that, Libya continued to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, and technology during the first half of 1998. Outside assistance is critical to keeping its fledgling ballistic missile development programs from becoming moribund. Nevertheless, the UN embargo has restricted the flow of ballistic missile goods and technology reaching Libya. · Libya was caught smuggling Scud components from Hontex in Southern China which are being shipped from Taiwan via BA to Malta in November 1999. The parts include elements for the rocket propulsion system. The shipment is in 32 crates discussed as automobile parts. 1 · The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000 that Libya continued to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources. Outside assistance is critical to keeping its ballistic missile development programs from becoming moribund. · The CIA reported in August 2000 that Libya has continued its efforts to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources. One example is the attempt last year to ship Scud-related parts as "auto parts" from a firm in Taiwan to Libya which were intercepted in the UK. Outside assistance is critical to its ballistic missile development programs, but Libya’s current capability remains limited to its aging Scud B missiles. We expect that the suspension of UN sanctions last year will allow Libya to expand its procurement effort. · In the past, Libya has sought to obtain major weapon systems, spare parts, and other support for its military forces from traditional sources in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern Europe, as well as from Iran. During the reporting period, Libya actively assessed both acquisition and repair/upgrade options not previously available, and ACW supplier countries openly offered to negotiate arms deals.

Chemical Weapons · Claims will not sign the CWC as long as other states have nuclear weapons. · May have used mustard gas delivered in bombs by AN-26 aircraft in final phases of war against Chad in September, 1987. · Pilot plant near Tripoli has been producing small amounts of chemical weapons since early 1980s. · Are probably two other small research/batch production facilities. · Main nerve and mustard gas production facilities in an industrial park at chemical weapons plant at Rabta. This plant can produce both the poison gas and the bombs, shells, and warheads to contain it. Are probably two other research facilities. · Rabta Plant seems to have started test runs in mid-1988. It is a 30 building facility defended by SAM batteries and special troops. Has sheltered underground areas. · Libya has acquired large stocks of feedstocks for mustard gas like thiodiglycol, and precursors for nerve gas, and extensive amounts have been sent to Rabta. · At least 100 metric tons of blister and nerve agents have been produced at Rabta since the late 1980s, but production rate has been very low and plant is either not successful or is not being utilized because of fear of attack. · The plant would have a capacity of 100 metric tons per year if operated at full capacity. · Fabricated fire at Rabta in 1990 to try to disguise the function of plant and fact was operating. · German courts have convicted a German national in October 1996, for selling Libya a computer designed for use in chemical weapons programs and helping Libya to import equipment to clean the waste emissions from poison gas production from India using an Irish dummy corporation. · Additional major chemical weapons plant in construction in extensive underground site near Tarhunah, a mountainous area 65 kilometers southeast of Tripoli, but few recent signs of activity. · Tarhunah has been designed to minimize its vulnerability to air attack and has twin tunnels 200-450 feet long, protected by 100 feet of sandstone above the tunnels and a lining of reinforce concrete. This is far beyond the penetration capabilities of the US GBU-27B and GBU-28 penetration bombs. The GBU-28 can penetrate a maximum of 25-30 meters of earth or 6 meters of concrete. · Libya rejected the proposal of President Mubarak that it open the Tarhuna facility to third country inspection to prove it was not a chemical weapons facility in April 1996. · Reports of construction of another sheltered major facility near Sabha, 460 miles south of Tripoli. · Reports of Chinese, North Korean, German, Swiss, and other European technical support and advisors. · Reports of shipments of chemical weapons to Syria and Iran do not seem valid. · Very low quality weapons designs with poor fusing and lethality. · The CIA estimated in January 1999 that Libya remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and other key CW-related equipment. UN sanctions continued to severely limit that support during the first half of 1998. Still, Tripoli has not given up its goal of establishing its own offensive CW capability and continues to pursue an independent production capability for the weapons. · The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000 Libya remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and other key CW-related equipment. UN sanctions continued to severely limit that support during the first half of 1999. Still, Tripoli has not given up its goal of establishing its own offensive CW capability and continues to pursue an indigenous production capability for the weapons. This activity is part of a long-running program of ballistic missile cooperation between these two countries.

· The CIA reported in August 2000 that Libya remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and other key CW-related equipment. Following the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, it wasted no time in re- establishing contacts with sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals abroad, primarily in Western Europe. Clearly, Tripoli has not given up its goal of establishing its own offensive CW capability and continues to pursue an indigenous production capability for the weapons. · It also reported that Western countries were important as sources for WMD-related goods and materials as in past years — where entities in Western European countries in particular remain significant suppliers for their WMD programs. Increasingly rigorous and effective export controls and cooperation among supplier countries have led the other foreign WMD programs to look elsewhere for many controlled dual-use goods. Machine tools, spare parts for dual-use equipment, and widely available materials, scientific equipment, and specialty metals were the most common items sought Biological Weapons · Libya acceded to the BWC in 1982. · George Tenet, the Director of the CIA, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 20, and identified Libya as a key country seeking biological weapons. · No evidence of production capability. Nuclear Weapons · The Idris regime signed the the United Nations (UN) Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty in 1969. Libya ratified it in 1975. In 1980 an agreement was reached with the International Atomic Energy Agency placing all of Libya's nuclear installations under international inspection. · Has sought to create a development and production capability, but no evidence of any real progress or success. · In the mid- and late 1970s, Qadhafi repeatedly proclaimed his determination to acquire nuclear weapons, primarily because of Israel. · Rumors unsuccessfully attempted to buy nuclear weapons from China in the 1970s. · Cooperation with Pakistan began in 1977 Libya appeared to be providing financial assistance and, later, deliveries of uranium "yellow cake" originating in Niger. In an interview with an Indian newspaper in March 1986, however, Qadhafi declared that Libya would never help Pakistan acquire an atomic bomb. He said: "We consider nuclear weapons production a great mistake against humanity." · Qadhafi again called for Libyan production of nuclear weapons on April 29, 1990. · Facilities are limited: · Has explored for uranium, but no active mines or uranium mills. · 10 megawatt, Soviet-supplied nuclear research reactor at Tajura near Tripoli, was acquired from the USSR in 1979. The FAS reports it is staffed by 750 Libyan specialists and technicians. Many students were sent abroad; a group of 200 was studying in the US until early 1983 when the US prohibited training Libyans in nuclear science. Now Operates under IAEA safeguards. · Had plan to build at 440 megawatt, Soviet-supplied reactor near the Gulf of Sidra in the 1970s, but canceled project. · Libya negotiated with the Belgian firm of Belgonucleaire to take over the engineering contract and supply much of the needed equipment. After the United States objected, fearing use of the equipment in weapons development, Belgium decided in 1984 to refuse the US$1 billion contract. Shortly thereafter, Moscow's commitment to construct an 880-megawatt power station to be located in the Surt region was reaffirmed. It was to cost over US$4 billion, with repayment to stretch over 15 to 18 years. · Continues to train nuclear scientists and technicians abroad.

· The CIA reported in August 2000 that Libya continues to develop its nascent and still rudimentary nuclear research and development program but still requires significant foreign assistance to advance to a nuclear weapons option. In the latter half of 1999, Tripoli and Moscow resumed discussions on cooperation at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center and on a potential power reactor deal. Should this civil-sector work come to fruition, Libya could gain opportunities to conduct weapons related R&D.

Egypt’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction

Delivery Systems · Began three major design programs based on the V-2 missile in the 1950s, with help from German scientists. Test two missiles by 1965: A 350 kilometer range al-Zafir and a 600 kilometer range Al Kahir. A 1,500 kilometer range Ar-Ra’id was designed nut never tested. These missiles were liquid fueled aging designs and development ceased around 1967. · Cooperated with Iraq in paying for development and production of "Badar 2000" missile with a 750-1,000 kilometer range. This missile is reported to be a version of the Argentine Condor II or Vector missile. Ranges were reported from 820-980 kilometers, with the possible use of an FAE warhead. · Began collaborating with Argentina in 1984 on the Badr-2000 (which paralleled the Argentine Condor II). The Badr/Condor was to be a two-stage, solid-fuel, inertially guided ballistic missile. It was expected to deliver a 700 kg payload over 1,000 km, accurate to within 100 meters. · Egyptian officers were arrested for trying to smuggle carbon materials for a missile out of the US. in June 1988. The Egyptian defense minister, Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, was implicated in the scandal, and left office in April 1989. · US efforts then seem to have blocked the development effort. Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly testified to the House Foreign Affairs Middle East Subcommittee In late September 1989, that Egypt had terminated its cooperation with Iraq on the Condor I. · Has Scud B TELs and missiles with approximately 100 missiles with 300 kilometers range. · Reports has developed plant to produce an improved version of the Scud B, and possibly Scud C, with North Korean cooperation. · Range is believed to be 500 kilometers. · North Korean transfers include equipment for building Scud body, special gyroscope measuring equipment and pulse- code modulation equipment for missile assembly and testing. · Reports in June 1996 that has made major missile purchase from North Korea, and will soon be able to assemble such missiles in Egypt. Seven shipments from North Korea reported in March and April. · Another liquid-fueled missile under development known as 'Project T' has an estimated range of 450 kilometers. It is believe to be an extended-range Scuds designed with North Korean assistance. · Media reports that US satellites detected shipments of Scud C missile parts to Egypt in February-May, 1996 -- including rocket motors and guidance devices -- do not seem correct. The Scud C has a range of roughly 480 kilometers. · The CIA reported in June 1997, that Egypt had acquired Scud B parts from Russia and North Korea during 1996. According to press reports in June 1990, China signed a protocol with Egypt to help modernize the Sakr missile factory, "enabling it to produce a newer version of Soviet antiaircraft missiles, the surface-to-surface Scud-B and Silkworm and the Egyptian Sakr rockets." The CIA reported in January 1999 that Egypt continues its effort to develop and produce the Scud B and Scud C and to develop the two-stage Vector short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Cairo also is interested in developing a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). During the first half of 1998, Egypt continued to obtain ballistic missile components and associated equipment from North Korea. This activity is part of a long-running program of ballistic missile cooperation between these two countries.

Three Egyptian companies are sanctioned by the State Department in March 1999 for transferring US-based technology to North Korea that is on the MTCR forbidden transfer list: Arab-British Dynamics, Helwan Machinery and Equipment Company, and Kader Factory for Development Industries. Some US and Israel experts believe that North Korea has used technology obtained from Egypt in the Tapeo Dong missile. The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000 and August 2000 that Egypt continues its effort to develop and produce ballistic missiles with the assistance of North Korea. This activity is part of a long-running program of ballistic missile cooperation between these two countries. There are other potential delivery systems. · US suspects Egypt is developing a liquid-fueled missile called the Vector with an estimated range of 600-1200 kilometers. · FROG 7 rocket launch units with 40 kilometers range. · Cooperation with Iraq and North Korea in developing the Saqr 80 missile This rocket is 6.5 meters long and 210 mm in diameter, and weighs 660 kilograms. It has a maximum range of 50 miles (80 kilometers) and a 440 pound (200 kilogram) warhead. Longer range versions may be available. · AS-15, SS-N-2, and CSS-N-1 cruise missiles. · F-4E fighter ground attack aircraft. · Mirage 5E2 fighter ground attack. · Mirage 2000EM fighters. · F-16A and 80 F-16C fighters · Multiple rocket launcher weapons. · Tube artillery Chemical Weapons · History of involvement with chemical weapons: · Produced and used mustard gas in Yemeni civil war in 1960s, but agents may have been stocks British abandoned in Egypt after World War II. Effort was tightly controlled by Nasser and was unknown to many Egyptian military serving in Yemen. · Completed research and designs for production of nerve and cyanide gas before 1963. · During the Yemen War of 1963 through 1967, Egypt e used mustard bombs in support of South Yemen against royalist troops in North Yemen, and that phosgene and mustard aerial bombs killed at least 1,400 people, and During the Yemeni civil war. Reports that used an organophosphate nerve agent against Yemeni Royalist forces do not seem to be correct · Israel and Egypt began to actively prepare for at least defensive chemical warfare before 1967. According to reports by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the fear that the Egyptian army was equipped with chemical weapons reportedly led to the preparation in Israel of thousands of graves that were designated for victims of gas attacks. · Egypt deployed extensive chemical defense equipment in preparation for the October 1973 War. Some reports indicate it had chemical weapons in the rear, and that Egypt supplied Syria with chemical weapons. · Post-Camp David status is uncertain:

· The Defense Intelligence Agency study "Offensive Chemical Warfare Programs in the Middle East" in 1990 that Egypt was continuing to conduct research related to chemical agents.. · The London Times reported in Spetember 1993 that Egypt had purchased chemical weapons precursors from India, including about 90 tons of trimethyl phosphate, which is used in the production of mustard gas. · Former Egyptian Minister of War, General Abdel Ranny Gamassay stated in 1975, that, "if Israel should decide to use a nuclear weapon in the battlefield, we shall use the weapons of mass destruction that are at our disposal." · Seems to have several production facilities for mustard and nerve gas. May have limited stocks of bombs, rockets, and shells. · Unconfirmed reports of recent efforts to acquire feed stocks for nerve gas. Some efforts to obtain feed stocks from Canada. May now be building feed stock plants in Egypt. · Industrial infrastructure present for rapid production of cyanide gas. · The most positive claim that Egypt retains significant chemical weapons capability comes from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). “It is almost certain that the Egyptian chemical weapon stockpile continues to include mustard gas and phosgene, as were used in the 1960s in Yemen, and it is reported that the Egyptians also produce VX nerve gas. These agents are probably available for delivery in munitions such as mines, artillery shells, salvo bombs, rockets, air-to- surface bombs and missile warheads. It has been suggested, with some plausibility, that chemical agent warheads have been developed for the Condor missile project, which was abandoned, and for the Scud-C missile, which is operational. Biological Weapons · Research and technical base. · US exports feel there is no evidence of major organized activity leading to production, stockpiling, or deployment. · Israeli reports are different. One claims that Anwar al-Sadat said in 1970 that Egypt has biological weapons stored in refrigerators and could use them against Israel’s crowded population. It speculates that this declaration was apparently intended to warn Israel against a nuclear strike, and Israel did contemplate during the height of the October 1973 war. It reports that Egypt's biological warfare efforts mighty include work on plague, botulism toxin, encephalitis virus, anthrax, Rift Valley fever, and mycotoxicosis.2 · The US State Department report on arms control compliance states that Egypt has signed but has not ratified the BWC. The United States believes that Egypt had developed BW agents by 1972. There is no evidence to indicate that Egypt has eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct BW continues to exist. Nuclear Weapons · History of nuclear efforts under President Nasser beginning in mid 1950s: · 1954. Egypt acquired its first nuclear reactor from the Soviet Union in 1961. The two megawatt reactor was opened by Nasser at Inchass, in the Nile Delta. · Weapons program seems to have ended following defeat in 1967. Egypt lost many of its nuclear experts who had to travel abroad to seek work opportunities. Some emigrated to Canada and others joined the Iraqi nuclear program.

· Has since subscribed to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Since 1974, Egypt has proposed a Middle East nuclear-weapons free zone, calling all countries in the region without exception to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). · In April 1990, Egypt took the initiative to render the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference established a multinational mechanism to work on making the Middle East a nuclear weapon-free zone Egypt hosted in April 1996 the conference for signing the declaration on rendering Africa a nuclear-weapons free zone. · Current status makes any nuclear weapons effort seem unlikely: · Research and technical base: Work on nuclear power engineering, agriculture, medicine, biotechnology, and genetics continues. Bilateral agreements in the area of the peaceful use of atomic energy with Germany, the United States, Russia, India, China, and Argentina. Agreements with Great Britain and India to provide assistance in training national cadres for scientific research and work on the country's atomic enterprises. · Has negotiated a number of programs for nuclear power, and has some important capabilities: · In the mid-1970s, the US promised to provide Egypt with eight nuclear power plants and the necessary cooperation agreements were signed. In the late 1970s, the US unilaterally revised the bilateral agreements and introduced new conditions that were unacceptable to the Egyptian government. · Before his assassination in 1981, President Anwar Sadat announced plans to build two nuclear power stations along the Mediterranean coast. · In early 1992, a deal was made for Argentina to deliver one more reactor with a capacity of 22 megawatts to Egypt. · The contract signed in 1991 for the delivery to Egypt of a Russian MGD-20 cyclotron accelerator remains in force. · Since 1990 Egypt has been a member of the Arab Power Engineering Organization uniting 11 countries. A number of Egyptian scientific projects are being carried out under the aegis of the IAEA. · Has four explored uranium deposits and planning has gone on for industrial production, including extraction and enrichment of uranium for use as fuel for power plants. · President Mubarak did say in October 1998, that Egypt could acquire nuclear weapons to match Israel’s capability if this proves necessary,3 “If the time comes when we need nuclear weapons, we will not hesitate. I say ‘if’ we have to because this is the last thing we think about. We do not think of joining the nuclear club.” This speech was more an effort to push Israel towards disarmament talks, however, than any kind of threat. · Mubarak also said that Israel, “enhances its military expenditure and develops its missile systems that are used for military purposes. It knows very well that this will not benefit it or spare it from harm. Its efforts to use the help of foreign countries will plunge the region ban into a new arms race which serves nobody’s interests.” Egypt has supported the indefinite extension of the NNPT, has long been officially committed to creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, and had advocated an agreement that would ban all weapons of mass destruction from the region · In June 2000, a radioactive cylinder stolen from Cairo’s Nuclear Research Center killed an Egyptian farmer and two of his children in Mit Halfa, some 40 kilometers away from the Center. A special Egyptian Army unit found the cylinder. The three died of radiation posioning.4

Israel’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction

Delivery Systems · Israel has done technical work on a TERCOM type smart warhead. It has examined cruise missile guidance developments using GPS navigation systems. This system may be linked to a submarine launch option. · As part of its first long-range missile force, Israel deployed up to 50 "Jericho I" (YA-1) missiles in shelters on mobile launchers with up to 400 miles range with a 2,200 pound payload, and with possible nuclear warhead storage nearby. These missiles were near copies of the two-stage, solid-fueled, French MD-620 missile. Some reports claim the first 14 were built in France. (Some reports give the range as 500 kilometers.) · There are convincing indications that Israel has deployed nuclear armed missiles on mobile launchers. Most outside sources call the first of these missiles the "Jericho I", but Israel has never publicly named its long-range missile systems. · These missiles were near-copies of the two-stage, solid-fueled, French MD-620 missile. Some reports claim the first 14 were built in France. · A number of sources indicate that Israel deployed up to 50 "Jericho I" (YA-1) missiles on mobile launchers in shelters in the hills southwest of Jerusalem, with up to 400 miles range with a 2,200 pound payload, and with possible nuclear warhead storage nearby. · The current deployment of the "Jericho I" force is unclear. Some sources say it has been phased out for the Jericho II missile.5 · Israel has since gone far beyond the Jericho I in developing long-range missile systems. It has developed and deployed the "Jericho II" (YA-2). · The "Jericho II" began development in the mid-1970s, and had its first tests in 1986.6 Israeli carried out a launch in mid-1986 over the Mediterranean that reached a range of 288 miles (460 kilometers). It a seems to have been tested in May 1987. A flight across the Mediterranean reached a range of some 510 miles (820 kilometers), landing south of Crete.7 Another test occurred on September 14, 1989. · Israel launched a missile across the Mediterranean that landed about 250 miles north of Benghazi, Libya. The missile flew over 800 miles, and US experts felt it had a maximum range of up to 900-940 miles (1,450 kilometers) -- which would allow the Jericho II to cover virtually all of the Arab world and even the Southern USSR8 · The most recent version of the missile seems to be a two-stage, solid-fueled missile with have a range of up to 900 miles (1,500 kilometers) with a 2,200 pound payload. · Commercial satellite imaging indicates the Jericho II missile may be 14 meters long and 1.5 meters wide. Its deployment configuration hints that it may have radar area guidance similar to the terminal guidance in the Pershing II and probably has deployed these systems. · Some Jericho IIs may have been brought to readiness for firing during the Gulf War. · Israel began work on an updated version of the Jericho 2 no later than 1995 in an effort to stretch its range to 2,000 km. At least part of this work may have begun earlier in cooperation with South Africa. · Israel is also seeking technology to improve its accuracy, particularly with gyroscopes for the inertial guidance system and associated systems software. · Israel is actively examining ways to lower the vulnerability of its ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. These include improved hardening, dispersal, use of air-launched weapons, and possible sea-basing.

· There are also reports that Israel is developing a Jericho III missile, based on a booster it developed with South Africa in the 1980s. · The tests of a longer-range missile seem to have begun in the mid-1980s.9A major test of such a booster seems to have taken place on September 14, 1989, and resulted in extensive reporting on such cooperation in the press during October 25 and 26, 1989. · It is possible that that both the booster and any Israeli-South African cooperation may have focused on satellite launches.10 Since 1994, however, there have been are numerous reports among experts that Israel is seeking a missile with a range of at least 4,800 kilometers, and which could fully cover Iran and any other probable threat. · Jane’s estimates that the missile has a range of up to 5,000 kilometers and a 1,000 kilogram warhead. This estimate is based largely on a declassifed DIA estimate of the launch capability of the Shavit booster that Israel tested on September 19, 1988.11 · Reports of how Israel deploys its missiles differ. · Initial reports indicated that 30-50 Jericho I missiles were deployed on mobile launchers in shelters in the cases southwest of Tel Aviv. A source claimed in 1985, that Israel had 50 missiles deployed on mobile erector launchers in the Golan, on launchers on flat cars that could be wheeled out of sheltered cases in the Negev. (This latter report may confuse the rail transporter used to move missiles from a production facility near Be’er Yaakov to a base at Kefar Zeharya, about 15 kilometers south of Be’er Yaakov.) · More recent reports indicate that Jericho II missiles are located in 50 underground bunkers carved into the limestone hills near a base near Kefar Zeharya. The number that are on alert, command and control and targeting arrangements, and the method of giving them nuclear warheads has never been convincingly reported.12 · Jane’s Intelligence Review published satellite photos of what it said as a Jericho II missile base at Zachariah (God remembers with a vengeance) several miles southeast of Tel Aviv in September 1997.13 According to this report, the transport-erector-launcher (TEL) for the Jericho II measures about 16 meters long by 4 meters wide and 3 meters high. The actual missile is about 14 meter long and 1.5 meters wide. The TEL is supported by three support vehicles, including a guidance and power vehicle. The other two vehicles include communications vehicle and a firing control vehicle. This configuration is somewhat similar to that used in the US Pershing II IRBM system, although there are few physical similarities. · The photos in the article show numerous bunkers near the TEL and launch pad, and the article estimates a force of 50 missiles on the site. It also concludes that the lightly armored TEL would be vulnerable to a first strike, but that the missiles are held in limestone caves behind heavy blast-resistant doors. It estimates that a nuclear-armed M-9 or Scud C could destroy the launch capability of the site. 14 · The same article refers to nuclear weapons bunkers at the Tel Nof airbase, a few kilometers to the northwest. The author concludes that the large number of bunkers indicates that Israel may have substantially more nuclear bombers than is normally estimated – perhaps up to 400 weapons with a total yield of 50 megatons. 15 · F-15, F-16, F-4E, and Phantom 2000 fighter-bombers capable of long-range refueling and of carrying nuclear and chemical bombs. · The same article refers to nuclear weapons bunkers at the Tel Nof airbase, a few kilometers to the northwest. The author concludes that the large number of bunkers indicates that Israel may have substantially more nuclear bombers than is normally estimated – perhaps up to 400 weapons with a total yield of 50 megatons. · Israel bought some Lance missile launchers and 160 Lance missiles, with 130 kilometers range, from the US in the 1970s. The US removed them from active duty during 1991-1994. The status of the Israeli missiles is unknown. · There are reports of the development of a long-range, nuclear armed version of Popeye with GPS guidance and of studies of possible cruise missile designs that could be both surface-ship and submarine based. · Variant of the Popeye air-to-surface missile believed to have nuclear warhead.

· The MAR-290 rocket with 30 kilometers range is believed to be deployed · MAR-350 surface-to-surface missile with range of 56 miles and 735 lb. payload believed to have completed development or to be in early deployment. · Israel seeking super computers for Technion Institute (designing ballistic missile RVs), Hebrew University (may be engaged in hydrogen bomb research), and Israeli Military Industries (maker of "Jericho II" and Shavit booster). · Israel current review of its military doctrine seems to include a review of its missile basing options, and the study of possible hardening and dispersal systems. There are also reports that Israel will solve its survivability problems by deploying some form of nuclear-armed missile on its new submarines. · Some reports indicate that Israeli submarines may be capable of carrying nuclear-armed Popeye Turbo cruise missiles, to provide a second-strike capability that would ensure Israeli could deter a striking to take out its nuclear weapons with a surprise attack. The most detailed have appeared in Jane’s Defense Weekly, the London Sunday Times, and reporting by the The Federation of American Scientists (FAS): · The FAS reports that Israel may have secretly carried out its first test launches from two German-built Dolphin-class submarines of cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads in May 2000. The missiles are reported to have been launched from vessels off Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean and to have hit a target at a range of about 1,500 kilometers [about 930 statute miles]. Israel is reported to possess a 200kg nuclear warhead, containing 6kg of plutonium, that could be mounted on cruise missiles. · Israel has reportedly developed an air-launched cruise missile that could be operational by 2002, called the Popeye Turbo. · The Popeye Turbo is normally reported to have a range at between 200 km and 350 km, and to be a turbo-jet powered cruise missile that may incorporate avionics and other components developed for the Popeye family of missiles.. The Popeye Turbo missile is probably similar to if not identical with the Israeli submarine-launced cruise missile carried on the Dolphin-class submarines. The baseline Popeye missile with a range of 45 miles has a diameter of 21 inches, and is nearly 16 feet long. · The reported range of 1,500 km for the SLCM tested in May 2000 is several times greater than the previously reported range for the Popeye Turbo. However, open literature provides little information. There is no particular reason to doubt that Israel could develop a variant of the Popeye Turbo with a range of 1,500 km, simply by lengthening the fuel tank associated with a 300-350 km variant reported by US intelligence. The longer range reported in June 2000 would suit with Israeli targetting requirements. · The submarines have six 533-millimeter torpedo tubes suitable for the 21-inch torpedoes that are normally used on most submarines, including those of the United States. Some reports suggest that the submarines have a total of ten torpedo tubes -- six 533-millimeter and four 650-millimeter. The four larger 25.5 inch diameter torpedo tubes could be used to launch a long-range nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM). For comparison, the American MK-48 heavy torpedo is 21 inches in diameter, and 19 feet long, while the BGM-109 Tomahawk SLCM is 20.4 inches in diameter and 20.5 feet long [including the booster motor], and the Russian SS-N-21 SLCM is similar in configuration and dimensions to the American Tomahawk. · The FAS reports that Israeli is considering a system of rotation where two of the vessels would remain at sea: one in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, the other in the Mediterranean. A third would remain on standby Chemical Weapons · Israeli has signed the CWC, but not ratified it. · Reports of mustard and nerve gas production facility established in 1982 in the restricted area in the Sinai near Dimona seem incorrect. May have additional facilities. May have capacity to produce other gases. Probable stocks of bombs, rockets, and artillery. · Extensive laboratory research into gas warfare and defense.

· According to some reports, Israel revitalized its chemical warfare facilities south of Dimona in the mid-1980s, after Syria deployed chemical weapons and Iraq began to use these weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. · An El Al 747-200 cargo plane crashed in southern Amsterdam on October 4, 1992, killing 43 people in the apartment complex it hit. This led to extensive examination of the crash and the plane was found to be carrying 50 gallons on dimethyl methylphosphonate, a chemical used to make Sarin nerve gas. The chemical had been purchased from Solkatronic Chemicals in the US and was being shipped to the Israel Institute for Biological Research. It was part of an order of 480 pounds worth of the chemical. Two of the three other chemicals used in making Sarin were shipped on the same flight. Israel at first denied this and then claimed it was only being imported to test gas masks.16 · Israel may have the contingency capability to produce at least two types of chemical weapons and has certainly studied biological weapons as well as chemical ones. According to one interview with an Israeli source of unknown reliability, Israel has mustard gas, persistent and non-persistent nerve gas, and may have at least one additional agent. · Development of defensive systems includes Shalon Chemical Industries protection gear, Elbit Computer gas detectors, and Bezal R&D air crew protection system. · Extensive field exercises in chemical defense. · Gas masks stockpiled, and distributed to population with other civil defense instructions during Gulf War. · Warhead delivery capability for bombs, rockets, and missiles, but none now believed to be equipped with chemical agents. Biological Weapons · Israel has not signed the BWC. · Extensive research into weapons and defense. · Ready to quickly produce biological weapons, but no reports of active production effort. · Israel has at least one major research facility with sufficient security and capacity to produce both chemical and biological weapons.17 There are extensive reports that Israel has a biological weapons research facility at the Israel Institute for Biological Research at Nes Tona, about 12 miles south of Tel Aviv, and that this same facility also has worked on the development and testing of nerve gas. This facility has created enough public concern in Israel so that the mayor of Nes Tona has asked that it be moved away from populated areas. The facility is reported to have stockpiled Anthrax and to have provided toxins to Israeli intelligence for use in covert operations and assassinations like the attempt on a Hamas leader in Jordan in 1997.18 · The Israel Institute for Biological Research is located in a 14 acre compound. It has high walls and exceptional security, and is believed to have a staff of around 300, including 120 scientists. A former deputy head, Marcus Kingberg, served 16 years in prison for spying for the FSU. · US experts privately state that Israel is one of the nations included in US lists of nations with biological and chemical weapons. They believe that Israel has at least some stocks of weaponized nerve gas, although they may be stored in forms that require binary agents to be loaded into binary weapons. · They believe that Israel has fully developed bombs and warheads capable of effectively disseminating dry, storable biological agents in micropowder form and has agents considerable more advanced than anthrax. Opinion differs over whether such weapons are actively loaded and deployed. Unconfirmed reports by the British Sunday Times claimed that IAF F-16s are equipped for strikes using both these weapons and chemical weapons.19

Nuclear Weapons · Israel has signed the CTBT, but not the NPT. It has, however, supported a WMD free zone. Gideon Frank stated at the 43rd General Conference of the IAEA that he was reaffirming Israel’s commitment “in due course and in the proper context, to establishing the Middle East as a zone free of WMD and missiles.” · Israel has significant nuclear facilities: · Two significant reactor projects: the 5 megawatt HEU light-water IRR I reactor at Nahal Soreq; and the 40-150 megawatt heavy water, IRR-2 natural uranium reactor used for the production of fissile material at Dimona. Only the IRR-1 is under IAEA safeguards. · Dimona has conducted experiments in pilot scale laser and centrifuge enrichment, purifies UO2, converts UF6 and fabricates fuel for weapons purpose. · Uranium phosphate mining in Negev, near Beersheba, and yellow cake is produced at two plants in the Haifa area and one in southern Israel. · Pilot-scale heavy water plant operating at Rehovot. · Major weapons facilities include production of weapons grade Plutonium at Dimona, nuclear weapons design facility at Nahal Soreq (south of Tel Aviv), missile test facility at Palmikim, nuclear armed missile storage facility at Kefar Zekharya, nuclear weapons assembly facility at Yodefat, and tactical nuclear weapons storage facility at Eilabun in eastern Galilee. · Views differ over the history of the Israeli nuclear weapons effort. On outline of its history based on work by the Federation of American Scientists indiates that: · The project began in the late 1940s when HEMED GIMMEL a special unit of the IDF's Science Corps, began a two- year geological survey of the Negev desert in 1949 that include the search uranium reserves. No significant sources of uranium were found, but recoverable amounts were located in phosphate deposits. · The Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) was created in 1952. Its chairman, Ernst David Bergmann, had long advocated an Israeli bomb as the best way to ensure "that we shall never again be led as lambs to the slaughter." Bergmann was also head of the Ministry of Defense's Research and Infrastructure Division (known by its Hebrew acronym, EMET), which had taken over the HEMED research centers (HEMED GIMMEL among them, now renamed Machon 4) as part of a reorganization. · Under Bergmann, the line between the IAEC and EMET blurred to the point that Machon 4 functioned essentially as the chief laboratory for the IAEC. By 1953, Machon 4 had not only perfected a process for extracting the uranium found in the Negev, but had also developed a new method of producing heavy water, providing Israel with an indigenous capability to produce some of the most important nuclear materials. · In the fall of 1956, France agreed to provide Israel with an 18 MWt research reactor. The Suez Crisis then led the Soviet Union made a thinly veiled threat of a nuclear attack against Israel while the United States stood idly by. This convinced Israeli leaders that an independent nuclear capability was needed to prevent reliance on potentially unreliable allies, and the collapse of the Anglo-French attack led to a French williningess to provide weapons technology. French premier Guy Mollet is even quoted as saying privately that France "owed" the bomb to Israel. · France and Israel signed a revised agreement on 3 October 1957 for France to build what was said to bea 24 MWt reactor. In fact, the cooling systems and waste facilities were designed to handle three times that power) and a secret protocol to provide a chemical reprocessing plant. This complex was secretly constructed at Dimona, in the Negev desert under the leadership of Col. Manes Pratt of the IDF Ordinance Corps. The effort was not reported to the IAEA. · The United States became aware of Dimona's existence after U-2 overflights in 1958, but it was not identified as a nuclear site until two years later. Israel stated that Dimona was a textile plant, an agricultural station, and a metallurgical research facility, until December 1960.

· The CIA issued a report on December 8 1960 outlining Dimona's implications for nuclear proliferation, United States inspectors visited Dimona several times during the 1960s, but they were unable to obtain an accurate picture of Israeli activities because of Israeli control over the timing and agenda of the visit, and deceptions like a false control room panels and the bricking over of elevators and hallways to secret areas of the facility.. · A new Israeli intelligence agency, the Office of Special Tasks, was created to provide security for the nuclear weapons project which, at its height, employed 1,500 Israeli scientists, many with doctorates, and included a community of French workers and their families consisting of over 2,500 people. In addition, France bought heavy water from Norway on the condition that it not be transferred to a third country, and the French Air Force secretly flew as much as four tons to Israel. · President de Gaulle altered Franco-Israeli cooperation even before the 1967 war. In May 1960, France began to pressure Israel to make the project public and to submit to international inspections of the site, and threatened to withhold the reactor fuel. The FAS reports that de Gaulle met with Ben-Gurion and offered to sell Israel fighter aircraft in exchange for stopping work on the reprocessing plant. Israel the worked out a compromise. France would supply the uranium and components already placed on order and would not insist on international inspections. In return, Israel would assure France that they had no intention of making atomic weapons, would not reprocess any plutonium, and would reveal the existence of the reactor, which would be completed without French assistance. In reality, nothing changed - French contractors finished work on the reactor and reprocessing plant, uranium fuel was delivered and the reactor went critical in 1963-64. · In addition to the enriched uranium from the Pennsylvania facility, 200 tons of uranium ore that disappeared from a ship in the Mediterranean in 1968 probably were also diverted to Israel. · There is a long history of uncertain estimates the numbers and kinds of weapons Israel posseses: · The CIA station in Tel Aviv estimated in the mid-1960s that the Israeli nuclear weapons program was an established fact, but US analyses of Israel's nuclear program then suffered from reliance on the assumptions - that Israel would need US assistance to successfully build a bomb, and that Israel would let its nuclear capability be publicly known. · Some type of non-nuclear test, perhaps a zero yield or implosion test, occurred on 2 November 1966 [possibly at Al- Naqab in the Negev]. · The CIA reported in early 1968 that Israel had successfully produced four nuclear weapons. The FAS says, however, that this estimate was based on an informal conversation between Carl Duckett, head of the CIA's Office of Science and Technology, and Edward Teller, father of the hydrogen bomb. Teller said that, based on conversations with friends in the Israeli scientific and defense establishment, he had concluded that Israel was capable of building the bomb, and that the CIA should not wait for an Israeli test to make a final assessment because that test would never be carried out. The figure of four devices was based on the assumption that 100 kg of enriched uranium - enough for four crude weapons - missing from a facility at Apollo, Pennsylvania, but much of the missing material was eventually recovered from the floors and ventilation ducts of the plant when it was decommissioned in the 1980s). · In 1974, the CIA estimated that Israel had between ten and twenty nuclear weapons. The FAS reports that this estimate was based on the assumption that Israel could have separated enough plutonium for at least six bombs since 1970, in addition to those made with the allegedly stolen uranium. The upper bound was derived from CIA speculation regarding the number of possible Israeli targets, and not from any specific intelligence. Because this target list was presumed to be relatively static, this remained the official American estimate until the early 1980s. · Some feel a suspected nuclear explosion in the southern Indian Ocean in 1979 was a joint South African-Israeli test. · Director of CIA indicated in May 1989, that Israel might be seeking to construct a thermonuclear weapon. · Jane’s Intelligence Review published an article in September 1997 which refers to nuclear weapons bunkers at the Jericho 2 missile base at Zachariah (God remembers with a vengeance) several miles southeast of Tel Aviv and at Tel Nof airbase, a few kilometers to the northwest. The author concludes that the large number of bunkers indicates that Israel may have substantially more nuclear bombers than is normally estimated – perhaps up to 400 weapons with a total yield of 50 megatons. 20

· Estimates of Israel’s numbers and types of weapons differ sharply. · Stockpile of at least 60-80 plutonium weapons. · May have well over 100 nuclear weapons assemblies, with some weapons with yields over 100 Kilotons. · US experts belief Israel has highly advanced implosion weapons. Known to have produced Lithium-6, allowing production of both tritium and lithium deuteride at Dimona. Facility no longer believed to be operating. · Some weapons may be ER variants or have variable yields. · Stockpile of up to 200-300 weapons is possible. · The FAS estimate is as follows: “The actual size and composition of Israel's nuclear stockpile is uncertain, and is the subject of various estimates and reports. It is widely reported that Israel had two bombs in 1967, and that Prime Minister Eshkol ordered them armed in Israel's first nuclear alert during the Six-Day War. It is also reported that, fearing defeat in the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis assembled 13 twenty-kiloton atomic bombs. Israel could potentially have produced around 20 nuclear warheads in the period 1970-1980, and from 100 to 200 warheads by the mid-1990s. In 1986 descriptions and photographs were published in the London Sunday Times of a purported underground bomb factory. The photographs were taken by Mordechai Vanunu, a dismissed Israeli nuclear technician. His information led experts to conclude that Israel had a stockpile of 100 to 200 nuclear devices. As of the late 1990s Israel's nuclear arsenal was thought to consist of from 75-130 weapons, based on plutonium production estimates. The stockpile would certainly include warheads for mobile Jericho-1 and Jericho-2 missiles, as well as bombs for Israeli aircraft, and may include other tactical nuclear weapons of various types.

· The FAS estimates that the upper and lower limits on Israel's stockpile may be limited by considering several variables. The current thermal power of the Dimona reactor is variously reported at between 100 MWt and 200 MWt. The reactor may have operated an average of between 250 and 300 days annually, and produced approximately 0.9 to 1.0 grams of plutonium for each thermal megawatt day. This would suggest an annual production rate of plutonium of between 20 and 60 kilograms, compared to the 40 kilograms annually reported by Vanunu. Israel may use between 4 and 5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon [5 kilograms is a conservative estimate, and Vanunu reported that Israeli weapons used 4 kg]. Given this range of uncertainty, as of 2000 the Israeli stockpile almost certainly consists of at least 125 weapons and probably no more than about 425 weapons. · Israel’s position on nuclear weapons may be changing: · Several reports indicate that Israel’s strategic review during 1997-1998 involved a review of Israeli nuclear strategy that included Prime Minster Netanyahu’s Office, the Ministry of Defense, and Foreign Ministry. This effort seems to have decided that Israel should keep the nature of its weapons of mass destruction and missiles secret, strengthen its missile defenses, and reduce the vulnerability of its nuclear strike forces.21 · The Israeli paper Yedioth Ahronoth, was allowed to print excerpts from the classified positions of the trial of Mordecai Vanunu, a former technician at Dimona, in November 1999. · Israel held its first parliamentary debate on nuclear weapons on February 2 2000, at the request of Issam Mahoul, a member of the Knesset from the largely Arab Hadash party.22 Mahoul provided the first statistics and description of Israel’s nuclear program ever mentioned in the Knesset, although the government rejected the numbers and the debate rapidly turned into an Arab-Israeli shouting match.23 · Israel seems to be considering ways to reduce the vulnerability of its nuclear strike force, and to reduce the incentive for any strike on its delivery system. These seem to include new forms of dispersal, hardening some facilities, and the possible use of Israel’s new Dolphin submarines to deliver cruise missiles. · Israel still refuses to openly discuss its deterrent or the nuclear issue in various regional arms control talks, although it has increasingly supported arms control measures that do not force it to declare its nuclear capability.

· It has agreed to abide by the terms of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in January 1993, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in September 1996.24 · In May 1997, Israel also carefully leaked an interview given by Gideon Frank, the former head of the Atomic Energy Commission in the Prime Minister’s office. frank that said Israel could only give up its nuclear weapons when it reached a peace with Egypt, Syria, and other states similar to the one reached between Argentina and Brazil. Frank said that it would require a proven framework for mutual cooperation, particularly in the economic area, a “process of democratization” in the Arab world, and “a long, phased confidence-building process.”25 · Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy stated on May 11, 2000 that Israel could not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty because Iran and Iraq posed too great a threat to be ignored. “WE have not reached the stage where the friends of Israel can guarantee the future.” Missile Defenses · Israel has developed a comprehensive missile defense plan, including a 10-year funding plan. The Arrow missile defense program forms the core of this plan, but it involves layered defense, a possible boost-phase interceptor, new battle management systems and sensors, and close cooperation with the US. It also involves consideration of extending the defense umbrella to cover Jordan, reducing the vulnerability of Israeli missile and nuclear forces, and possible cooperation with Turkey.26 · The resulting Homa (barrier) project now calls for both tactical and theater defenses to be overlayed in ways that combine Israeli systems with US reinforcements. Israel recognizes, however, that any program must be technology and threat driven and respond to new developments and events. It also recognizes that effective defense against long-range missiles involves terminal velocities that severely limit the effectiveness of the anti-tactical ballistic missiles it can afford to develop. As a result, Israel is faced with the challenge of either finding either some form of boost phase defense or an “upper tier” wide- area threat defense with a high intercept capability even against missiles closing from ranges in excess of 1,000 kilometers. (Missile launch ranges from Iraq, Libya and Syria are under 1,000 kilometers and have closing velocities suited to lower tier theater missile defenses and which still give tactical ballistic missile defenses some effectiveness in point defense over a reasonably wide range of deployment locations. Iran must generally launch from ranges in excess of 1,000 kilometers, and the closing speeds of more modern and longer-range missiles like the Shahab are faster and present much more serious intercept problems.) · The Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) or Nautilus · The Tactical High Energy Laser or THEL program was originally a $100 million program, with the US paying $70 million and Israel paying $30 million. At present it is primarily a defense against unguided rockets, rather than guided missiles. It is far from clear that it will work, since current versions need to hold a rocket in flight for nearly 15 seconds, and the average flight time of an 80-240 mm rocket is generally less than 30 seconds. They are also dependent on a clear line of sight, so haze and smoke present major problems.27 · Nevertheless, tests at White Sands in February 1996 proved that a laser could track a missile for the required time, and that a deuterium fluoride laser beam could destroy a missile in flight. The concept is still being pushed forward, largely in an effort to provide defenses against Hizbollah rocket attacks on northern Israel. Rockets can also be used to launch large numbers of biological and chemical weapons, however, and THEL provides a tactical layer of defense.28 · The THEL program ran into trouble in 1999 when a series of technical difficulties encountered during initial tests and chemical leaks caused by faulty valves delayed the project by up to a year.29 The delays resulted in cost overruns totaling $30-50 million over the $130.8 million ceiling. The cost overruns jeopardized the future of the project as the contractor and the US government argued over who was responsible for the extra cost.30 THEL was saved when the Israeli Ministry of Defense and the US Army agreed to each pay a quarter of the overruns while the contractor is still responsible for the other half.31 · The THEL deuterium fllouride laser has since been successful in tests against incoming Kathusha rockets, and the demonstrator may be dismantled and shipped to Israel for operational testing. The creation and deployment of an

operational test bed is unlikely to be complete before early 2001, however, and the cost-effectiveness of the program remains uncertain.32 · The Patriot and PAC-3 · Israel currently deploys three Patriot batteries using systems and missiles whose anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) defenses have been upgraded since the Gulf War. They now have software that allows them to distinguish between the missile booster and warhead far more accurately, and they have a much greater kill probability against an oncoming warhead. Each battery has three missile launch vehicles. It is receiving new equipment with a value estimated at $73 million, which was approved by the US Department of Defense in June 1998. This equipment includes three AN/MPQ-53 radar sets, three AN/MSQ-104 engagement control stations, three M-983 tractors, nine M931A2 trucks and other equipment. It is also developing its own ATBM defenses. · The Patriot is an air defense system with moderate capabilities in a largely point defense mode as a tactical ballistic missile defense system. It also provides considerable defense against cruise missiles, adding a key layer to Israeli defenses, and is being steadily improved to widen its coverage against Scud-type threats. Its speed and range are limited, however, and cannot be particularly effective against IRBM-type threats like the Shahab-3 which have closing velocities that limited the Patriot’s defense area coverage to a much narrower radius near the missile launcher. · The Patriot’s capability will be further enhanced by the PAC-3 upgrade. The PAC 3 upgrade expands the area from which Patriot can intercept a missile, reduces the risk of “leakage” against ballistic missiles, introduces a superior direct hit to kill system, and improves defense against cruise missiles. The system has had major development problems and cost overruns, but did have a successful hit-to-kill intercept in March 1999. 33 The US Department of Defense licensed the new Patriot technology for export in November 1999.34 · The Arrow · The Arrow missile is an anti-tactical ballistic missile defense with limited area coverage that is tailored to Israel’s needs and limited geographic area. The Arrow-2 is supposed to intercept incoming missile warheads at ranges, which have been variously reported as being from 10-40 kilometers or 33,000-131,000 feet. The missile is a two-stage, hypersonic, solid-fuel missile with a fragmentation warhead. Each Arrow-2 battery has four missile launchers with six missile tubes each, and will normally be equipped with at least 50 missiles. The system uses a Green Pine search and track radar, a Citron Tree fire control center, a Hazelnut Tree launch control center, and the Arrow 2 launcher. Its manning requires about 100 personnel. · Plans call for three batteries, although only two are fully funded. Israeli calculates that two batteries can defend “most populated areas in Israel.” The official program cost is often said to be around $1.6 billion, although some Israelis feel the true total system-related cost will be in excess of $3 billion.35 · The program is constantly evolving to respond to changes in technology, the development and test program, and changes in the threat. As of March 1999, it was a three-phase program with the following features: · Phase I: Validate Defense Concept and Demonstrate Pre-prototype Missile · Fixed price contract: $158 million · The US pays 80%; Israel pays 20%. · Completed in December 1982. · Phase II: Demonstrate Lethality, develop and demonstrate tactical interceptor and launcher. · Fixed price contract: $330 million. · The US pays 72%; Israel pays 28%. · Began in July 1991. · Successfully completed.

· Phase III: Develop and integrate tactical system, conduct weapon system tests, and develop and implement interoperability. · Program cost estimated at: $616 million. · The US pays 48%; Israel pays 52%. · Began in March 1996. · System integration in progress. · Israel originally planned to deploy the Arrow in two sites near Tel Aviv and Haifa which could cover up to 85% of Israel’s population. It expanded this plan to include a third site in June 1998, with an additional $57 million allocated to this battery. Partly because of the increasing pace of the threat from Iran and Syria, Israel accelerated work on the Arrow. It then planned to deploy the system in mid-1998. However, a fire at a plant near Tel Aviv caused an estimated $30 million in damage and delayed the program. As a result, the first Arrow 2 missile battery was activated on November 29, 1998, and began training in December 1998. 36 In 1999 Israel urged the US to consider expanding the Arrow system into a regional defense by including additional batteries in Jordan and Turkey. With additional batteries, the Arrow would protect all of Turkey, Jordan, and Israel against attacks from a country such as Iran. However, it is unlikely that the US will agree to this and it is unclear that Jordan even wants the Arrow.37 · It is difficult to put the Arrow 2 into technical perspective. Like all systems this complex, it has had a troubled life in terms of its original technical design, management and system integration problems. It has had some successful tests, notably in an integrated weapon system test and fly out against a simulated target on September 14, 1998. It also destroyed an Israeli seal-launch TM-91 missile, which was simulating an Iraq Al Hussein missile, during its first comprehensive system test in November 1999. However, the Arrow has also had test failures and severe management and development problems. It had had only seven firing tests as of the end of 1999, and its current test program calls for less than one-fifth of the tests necessary to fully validate its reliability and effectiveness.38 · The development schedule that Israel has adopted is a high-risk program with limited testing that raises serious questions about the extent to which even successful follow-up tests will provide high reliable data on its operational probability of intercept, particularly under real-world conditions against different types of missiles and different types of “volleys.” It seems possible that it may prove highly effective against Scud type missiles. However, it clearly has only limited capability against newer systems like the Iranian Shihab series, which is already forcing Israel to develop a follow-on version of the Arrow 2. Occasional Israeli claims that Arrow can provide a reliable defense capability against the regional missile threat seem to be be designed to deter possible enemies from launching, rather than claims that even the Isrfael advocates of the Arrow feel are technically credible.39 · The Arrow 2’s growth capability to deal with missiles like the No Dong, Shahab 3, Taepo Dong-1, CSS-4, and Shahab-4 is also questionable. Under these conditions, the launch footprint – or defensive area -- the Arrow can cover with a high probability of intercept might well be so restricted in area that Israel would have to rely primarily on other layers of its missile defense system.40 · The Integrated Boost-Phase Intercept System and Moab · Israel is examining a number of options for an integrated boost-phase intercept system and gave such programs a high priority in its security talks with the US in 1999. Israel is closely studying the US airborne laser program, but its leading candidate for an Israeli system is the Moab. The Moab is a missile that can be carried on an F-15 or UAV, and that is designed to engage theater ballistic missiles at ranges of around 100 kilometers soon after launch. The Moabs would be a modified form of the Python 4 with a new booster to accelerate the missile to speeds of 1.5-2 kilometers per second. Maximum firing range is stated to be 80 kilometers from a firing altitude of 30,000 feet and up to 100 kilometers from 50,000 feet.41 · The Moab would initially be deployed on the IAF’s F-15Is, but would eventually use a high altitude UAV that would loiter at 60-66,000 feet. Israel is looking at possible use of its Hermes UAV or some form of the Teledyne Ryan Global Hawk UAV, which can loiter for 42 hours at 40,000 feet or beyond. Conceptual pictures of the UAV show some stealth characteristics. The UAVs would be flown in launch zone constellations, nominally of four UAVs. They

would be controlled by a mobile command center which would use a data link with a low data rate of less than 1 kilobit per second and which would control flight and operations. The system would be integrated into the overall IAF BM/C4I theater air defense network. 42 · Cost and technical feasibility present major problems. The system is being designed by Rafael, and two cost-driven design characteristics include the use of engagement speeds below the aeroheating threshold of the missile to avoid cooling the infrared seeker, dome cooling, and a protective cap. The missile also locks on at launch to avoid an expensive data link. This design places considerable stress on the ability to design a missile with the required performance and the associated search/track systems and command and control capabilities. Much also depends on the threat being suitably close to Israel or an Israeli area of operations, the ability of Israeli intelligence to predict a narrow launch area for enemy missiles and the probable time of launch, since Israel may not be able to react to previous missile launches without risking the successful penetration of a first round or volley of enemy missiles. · Warning and Command and Control · Israel receives spaced-based warning, tracking, and point of impact data from the US as part of an agreement signed in April 1996. It also receives warning data, and substantial information on Iranian, Iraqi, Libyan, and Syrian programs. Much of these same data are also, in fact, provided to Egypt, Jordan, and the Southern Gulf states. · Israel is, however, studying the possibility of creating its own space-based system and a space-based queuing system for intercept purposes. Such a system hardly seems cost-effective, given Israel’s financial constraints, but the Technion Space Research Institute in Haifa has carried out studies of such options.43 Israel began to acquire the capability to launch satellites with electro-optical sensors and digital down-links. The Shavit I launched Israel's satellite payload on September 19, 1989. It used a three stage booster system capable of launching a 4,000 pound payload over 1,200 miles or a 2,000 pound payload over 1,800 miles. It is doubtful that it had a payload capable of intelligence missions and seems to have been launched, in part, to offset the psychological impact of Iraq’s missile launches. · This seems to be equally true of the Ofeq 2 launched in April 1990, one day after Saddam Hussein threatened to destroy Israel with chemical weapons if it should attack Baghdad. Israel used its three-stage Shavit launch vehicle to launch the Ofeq-3 from a secret launch site at the Palmachim test range near the coast south of Tel Aviv on April 5, 1995. Israeli radio almost certainly exaggerated in claiming that that the satellite could transmit imagery “that allows identification of license numbers in downtown Baghdad.” In fact some reports indicate that only about 36 kilograms of its 225 kilogram weight was payload and the rest was structure. Nevertheless, the Ofeq 3 had a much larger payload than the Ofeq 2, and the IDF spokesman confirmed that the 495 pound satellite was in a low orbit that circled the earth every 90 minutes and covered Syria, Iran, and Iraq. It is scarcely coincidental that the Ofeq 3’s orbit takes it almost directly over the Golan and Damascus, about 90 miles north of Teheran and 240 miles north of Baghdad.44 · Since that time, other launches of Israel’s Ofeq and Amos series of satellites have demonstrated Israel’s technical capability to launch sophisticated satellites. The Ofeq 3 launch in April 1995 seems to have been of a more capable photo reconnaissance satellite, although it evidently did not include advanced all-weather coverage and real time data processing and transmission capability.45 but there have been important technical failures like the failure to launch the Ofeq 4 intelligence satellite on February 4, 1998.46 The Ofeq 4 was intended to be an all-weather photo reconnaissance satellite with real-time capability. It is unclear whether it was intended to replace the Ofeq 3 or work together with it. Changes in the orbit of the Ofeq 3 after the Ofeq 4 failed to reach orbit might suggest the latter.47 · The IDF has concluded that its own warning system would require three or four satellites flying in a low earth orbit to provide continuous coverage of the most likely 1000 by 1000 kilometer launch area.48 Israel’s current space budget is only about $50 million a year and an effective program would cost hundreds of millions of dollars and provide less coverage and information than the US system. As a result, Israel may choose to rely on US capabilities. However, Israel may soon have another option. West Indian Space Ltd., a joint venture between US and Israeli companies, is trying to become the first commercial provider of high-resolution satellite images. It plans to operate eight small satellites based on the Ofeq design. Israel is believed to be the company’s first customer.49

Advanced Intelligence Systems · The Shavit I launched Israel's satellite payload on September 19, 1989. It used a three stage booster system capable of launching a 4,000 pound payload over 1,200 miles or a 2,000 pound payload over 1,800 miles. It is doubtful that it had a payload capable of intelligence missions and seems to have been launched, in part, to offset the psychological impact of Iraq’s missile launches. · Ofeq 2 launched in April, 1990 -- one day after Saddam Hussein threatens to destroy Israel with chemical weapons if it should attack Baghdad. · Launched first intelligence satellite on April 5, 1995, covering Syria, Iran, and Iraq in orbit every 90 minutes. The Ofeq 3 satellite is a 495-pound system launched using the Shavit launch rocket, and is believed to carry an imagery system. Its orbit passes over or near Damascus, Tehran, and Baghdad. · Agreement signed with the US in April 1996 to provide Israel with missile early warning, launch point, vector, and point of impact data.

Syria’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction Delivery Systems · Four SSM brigades: 1 with FROG, 1 with Scud Bs, 1 with Scud Cs, and 1 with SS-21s. · Has 18 SS-21 launchers and at least 36 SS-21 missiles with 80-100 kilometers range. May be developing chemical warheads. · Some experts believe some Syrian surface-to-surface missiles armed with chemical weapons began to be stored in concrete shelters in the mountains near Damascus and in the Palmyra region no later than 1986, and that plans have long existed to deploy them forward in an emergency since that date · Up to 12 Scud B launchers and 200 Scud B missiles with 310 kilometers range. Believed to have chemical warheads. Scud B warhead weighs 985 kilograms. The inventory of Scud B missiles is believed to be approximately 200. · New long-range North Korean Scud Cs deployed · Two brigades of 18 launchers each are said to be deployed in a horseshoe shaped valley. This estimate of 36 launchers is based on the fact there are 36 tunnels into the hillside. The launchers must be for the Scud C since the older Scud Bs would not be within range of most of Israel. Up to 50 missiles are stored in bunkers to north as possible reloads. There is a maintenance building and barracks. · Estimates indicate that Syria has 24-36 Scud launchers for a total of 260-300 missiles of all types. The normal ratio of launchers to missiles is 10:1, but Syria is focusing on both survivability and the capability to launch a large preemptive strike. · The Scud Cs have ranges of up to 550-600 kilometers. They have a CEP of 1,000-2,600 meters. Nerve gas warheads using VX with cluster bomblets seem to have begun production in early 1997. Syria is believed to have 50-80 Scud C missiles. · A training site exists about 6 kilometer south of Hama, with an underground facility where TELs and missiles are stored. · Syria can now build both the entire Scud B and Scud C. It has sheltered and/or underground missile production/assembly facilities at Aleppo, Hama, and hear Damascus have been built with aid from Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean technicians. Possibly some Russian technical aid. · A missile test site exists 15 kilometers south of Homs where Syria has tested missile modifications and new chemical warheads. It has heavy perimeter defenses, a storage area and bunkers, heavily sheltered bunkers, and a missile storage area just west of the site. According to some reports, Syria has built two missile plants near Hama, about 110 miles north of Damascus, one is for solid fueled rockets and the other is for liquid fueled systems. North Korea may have provided the equipment for the liquid fuel plant, and Syria may now be able to produce the missile. · Reports of Chinese deliveries of missiles but little hard evidence: · Reports of PRC deliveries of missile components by China Precision Machinery Company, maker of the M-11, in July1996. The M-11 has a 186-mile (280 kilometer) range with a warhead of 1,100 pounds. · Some sources believe M-9 missile components, or M-9-like components delivered to Syria. Missile is reported to have a CEP as low as 300 meters. · Jane’s reported in March 1999 that Syria had created a production facility to build both the M-11 (CSS-7/DF-11) and M-9 missiles with ranges of 280 and 600-800 kilometers respectively. It reports that production of the booster stage of the M-11 began in 1996, and that missile production is expected to start “soon.” · Washington Times reported on July 23, 1996 that the CIA had discovered that Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center received a shipment of missile components from China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, China's premier firm selling missiles (particularly M-11s) abroad.

· Sheltered or underground missile production/assembly facilities at Aleppo and Hamas have been built with aid from Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean technicians. Possibly some Russian technical aid. · A missile test site exists 15 kilometers south of Homs where Syria has tested missile modifications and new chemical warheads. It has heavy perimeter defenses, a storage area and bunkers, heavily sheltered bunkers, and a missile storage area just west of the site. · Syria has shorter range systems: · Short range M-1B missiles (up to 60 miles range) seem to be in delivery from PRC. · SS-N-3, and SSC-1b cruise missiles. · May be converting some long range surface-to-air and naval cruise missiles to use chemical warheads. · Syria continues to seek more advanced long-range systems: · The CIA estimated in January 1999 that Syria continued work on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability. Foreign equipment and assistance have been and will continue to be essential for this effort. The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000 that Damascus continued work on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability with help from outside countries such as Iran. Foreign equipment and assistance to its liquid-propellant missile program, primarily from Russian entities, but also from firms in China and North Korea, also have been and will continue to be essential for Syria’s effort. Damascus also continued its efforts to assemble-probably with considerable North Korean assistance-liquid-fueled Scud C missiles. · The London Times and Haaretz report on May 29 and 30, 2000 that Syria has taken delivery of a new ballistic missile from North Korea which would enable it to hit any target in Israel from launchers deep inside Syrian territory. Haaretz newspaper reported that Damascus had recently equipped its forces with the Scud D, and that Libya and Egypt were also buying the new weapon. These article seem to refer, however, to the North Korea deliveries which had actually taken place some years earlier. · The CIA reported in August 2000 that Syria continued work on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability with help from outside countries. Foreign equipment and assistance to its liquid-propellant missile program, primarily from North Korean entities, but also from firms in Russia, also have been and will continue to be essential for Syria’s effort. Damascus also continued its efforts to assemble—probably with considerable North Korean assistance—liquid-fueled Scud C missiles. · The CIA reports in August 2000 that, · As to Syria’s embryonic nuclear research and development program, we will continue to monitor the potential for this program to expand. Moscow and Damascus agreed in 1999 to cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a wide area of disciplines. · Air assets include: · 20 Su-24 long range strike fighters. · 30-60 operational MiG-23BM Flogger F fighter ground attack aircraft. · 20 Su-20 fighter ground attack aircraft. · 60-70 Su-22 fighter ground attack aircraft. · Land force assets include: · 18 FROG-7 launchers and rockets. · Negotiations for PRC-made M-9 missile (185-375 mile range).

· Multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery. · Syria has improved its targeting capability in recent years by making extensive direct and indirect use of commercial satellite imagery, much of which now offers 3 meter levels of resolution and comes with coordinate data with near GPS- like levels of accuracy. One meter levels of resolution will become commercially available. Chemical Weapons · First acquired small amounts of chemical weapons from Egypt in 1973. The FAS reports that Syria acquired CW artillery shells as a "gift" from Egypt prior to the 1973 war. Syria then purchased defensive chemical warfare gear from the USSR and from Czechoslovakia. · Began production of non-persistent nerve gas in 1984. may have had chemical warheads for missiles as early as 1985. · The FAS reports that Syria used the expansion of its pharmaceuticals industry as a cover for purchases relating to its CW program. · Major German pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and machine-building companies helped Syria to establish its modest and well-dispersed production facilities, some with the support of official "Hermes" export credits from the German government. In addition to Schott Glasswerke, which continues to export licensed goods to Syrian chemicals plants, special mixing vats, high temperature furnaces, hot isostatic presses (HIP) and sophisticated machine-tools have been shipped with German export licenses to Syria's Scientific Research Council (CERS) by Ferrostaal, Carl Schenck, Leifeld, Weber GmbH, and other major German companies. It is not believed that these shipments were illegal under German law. · Firms in the French pharmaceuticals industry were active in Damascus in the 1980s. Many opened branch offices and built production facilities in Syria, to make French pharmaceuticals under license. French firms increased their share from 13.11% of Syria's pharmaceuticals imports in 1982 to 23% by 1986. France only began applying controls on production equipment that could go into a chemical weapons plant in early 1992. The FAS reports that a senior French foreign ministry official said in May 1992, "Only in the past six months has there been a universal will to impose this type of controls,". "Before then, CW production equipment was freely available." · The use of pharmaceuticals plants for poison gas production appears to have led to a series of accidents. In 1991, the Syrian Ministry of Health was compelled to close down five pharmaceuticals plants (three in Aleppo, one in Damascus, and one in Homs), following what were termed "complaints from citizens and doctors" that products "did not meet the required standards." · CIA Director William Webster testified to Congress in 1989 that foreign assistance was of "critical importance in allowing Syria to develop its chemical warfare capability, and that West European firms were instrumental in supplying the required precursor chemicals and equipment. Without the provision of these key elements, Damascus would not have been able to produce chemical weapons". · In 1991, Syria signed a cooperation agreement with Libya in that called for Syrian experts to train the Libyans in pharmaceuticals production. · Believed to have begun deploying VX in late 1996, early 1997. · CIA reported in June 1997 that Syria had acquired new chemical weapons technology from Russia and Eastern Europe in 1996. · Unconfirmed reports of sheltered Scud missiles with unitary Sarin or Tabun nerve gas warheads, now being replaced by cluster warheads with VX bomblets, deployed in caves and shelters near Damascus. · Tested Scuds in manner indicating possible chemical warheads in 1996. · Seems to have cluster warheads and bombs. · May have VX and Sarin in modified Soviet ZAB-incendiary bombs and PTAB-500 cluster bombs. · Acquired design for Soviet Scud warhead using VX in 1970s.

· General Anatoly Kuntsevich, Russian President Yeltsin's personal adviser on chemical disarmament and Russia's highest official authority on the subject, dismissed for suspicion of smuggling nerve gas precursors to Syria in early 1995. The FAS reports that General Kuntsevich admitted in an interview in 1998 with the New York Jewish weekly The Forward that shipments to Syria of small amounts of nerve gas components had indeed taken place. According to him, however, these shipments were only intended for "research purposes" and had been authorized by the Russian government under previously undisclosed terms of a treaty with Syria. The materials shipped to Syria were intended for the production of the Soviet/Russian version of the VX nerve agent - code-named Substance 33 or V-gas. Such a deal might have been made in the early '90s or late '80s during a visit to Syria by the then-commander of the Russian Chemical Corps, General Pikalov. · Major nerve gas, and possible other chemical agent production facilities north of Damascus. Two to three plants. · Syria is now believed capable of producing several hundred tons of CW agents per year. · Syria's principle suppliers of CBW production technology included large chemical brokerage houses in Holland, Switzerland, France, Austria and Germany, including many of the same companies that were supplying Iraq. At least one German company, Schott Glasswerke, has been subjected to an official inquiry, for its delivery of glass-lined reactor vessels, sarin precursors and production equipment to a suspected Syrian poison gas plant. And one French source suggests that the United States may have supplied Syria with precursors and CW production equipment prior to 1986, at a time when Syria was subjected to international sanctions for its attempt to plant a bomb on an El Al plane in London. · The FAS reports that four production sites have been positively identified, one located just north of Damascus, and the second near the industrial city of Homs. The third, in Hama, is believed to be producing VX agents in addition to sarin and tabun. Officials in Washington identified a fourth facility dedicated to the production of biological agents in Cerin, while Israeli intelligence is monitoring several additional "suspicious" sites. · Israeli Chief of Staff Ehud Baraq told an audience of leading industrialists in Tel Aviv on December 6, 1991 that Syria's chemical weapons capability was "larger than Iraq's." · Syria also runs a large urea and ammonia plant in Homs, and plans to build a $ 500 million super-phosphate complex in the desert near Palmyra. · Syria's CW plants tend to be relatively small, and as a result have been harder to detect.. · One facility is located near Homs and is located next to a major petrochemical plant. It reportedly produces several hundred tons of nerve gas a year. · Reports is building new major plant near Aleppo. · Reports that a facility co-located with the Center d’Etdues et de Recherche Scientifique (CERS) is developing a warhead with chemical bomblets for the Scud C. · An industrial complex known as the Scientific Studies and Research Center is reported to have obtained expertise, technology and materials from Russian sources. · Many parts of the program are dispersed and compartmented. Missiles, rockets, bombs, and artillery shells are produced/modified and loaded in other facilities. Many may be modified to use VX bomblets. · Experts believe has stockpiled 500 to 1,000 metric tons of chemical agents. · FAS states thatr, “Syria's current CW stockpiles have been estimated at "several thousand aerial bombs, filled mostly with sarin," and between 50 to 100 ballistic missile warheads.” · Wide range of delivery systems: · Extensive testing of chemical warheads for Scud Bs. May have tested chemical warheads for Scud Cs. · Shells, bombs, and nerve gas warheads for multiple rocket launchers. · FROG warheads may be under development.

· Reports of SS-21 capability to deliver chemical weapons are not believed by US or Israeli experts. · Israeli sources believe Syria has binary weapons and cluster bomb technology suitable for delivering chemical weapons. · The CIA estimated in January 1999 that Syria continued to seek CW-related precursors from various sources during the reporting period. Damascus already has a stockpile of the nerve agent Sarin and may be trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. · The CIA stated that Chinese entities sought to supply Iran and Syria with CW-related chemicals during this reporting period. · The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000 that Syria sought CW-related precursors and expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and apparently is trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment It also reported that Russian entities were expanding missile-related assistance to Syria and India. · The CIA reports in August 2000 that Syria sought CW-related precursors and expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and apparently is trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment.

Biological Weapons · Signed, but not ratified the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Extensive research effort. · ACDA report in August 1996 indicated that, “it is highly probably that Syria is developing an offensive biological capability.” · The US State Department report on arms control compliance states that Syria has signed but has not ratified the BWC. The United States reaffirms its previous judgment that it is highly probable that Syria is developing an offensive BW capability. · Extensive research effort. · Reports of one underground facility and one near the coast. Several dual-use sites are of concern, including a pharmaceuticals plant in Aleppo that was left mysteriously "unfinished" in 1989 after the Syrian government had invested nearly $ 40 million in its construction. · Syria can tap the potential of more than a dozen government-run pharmaceuticals plants spread across the country, which could be converted rapidly to produce a wide variety of CBW agents. · Syria's principle suppliers of CBW production technology were large chemical brokerage houses in Holland, Switzerland, France, Austria and Germany, including many of the same companies that were supplying Iraq. · Probable production capability for anthrax and botulism, and possibly other agents. · Israeli sources claim Syria weaponized Botulin and Ricin toxin in early 1990s, and probably anthrax. · Limited indications may be developing or testing biological variations on ZAB-incendiary bombs and PTAB-500 cluster bombs and Scud warheads. · Major questions exist regarding Syria’s strike capabilities: · Older types of biological weapons using wet agents, and placed in older bomb and warhead designs with limited dissemination capability, can achieve only a small fraction of the potential effectiveness of biological weapons. Dry micropowders using advanced agents – such as the most lethal forms of Anthrax – can have the effectiveness of small

theater nuclear weapons. It is difficult to design adequate missile warheads to disseminate such agents, but this is not beyond Syrian capabilities – particularly since much of the technology needed to make effective cluster munitions and bomblets for VX gas can be adapted to the delivery of biological weapons.50 · The design of biological bombs and missile warheads with the lethality of small nuclear weapons may now be within Syrian capabilities, as is the design of UAV, helicopter, cruise missile, or aircraft-borne systems to deliver the agent slowly over a long line of flight and taking maximum advanced of wind and weather conditions. US and Soviet texts proved that this kind of “line source” delivery could achieve lethalities as high as 50-100 kiloton weapons by the late 1950s, and the technology is well within Syria’s grasp. So is the use of proxy or covert delivery. · The CIA estimated in January 1999 that Syria continued to seek CW-related precursors from various sources during the reporting period. Damascus already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and may be trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. · The FAS estimates that Syria is rapidly expanding kits biomedical industrial base: · Syria simplified the procedures for foreign investments in a May 1991 law, and companies are being set up to negotiate licensing and technology transfer agreements with foreign suppliers. · The largest project of this kind has been announced by Saeb Nahas, whose GAS group is partially owned by the Syrian state. GAS owns a 51% share in the newly-formed Ibn Zahr Pharmaceuticals Company, which claims to be negotiating to build "one of the largest pharmaceuticals plants in the Middle East" at a cost of $ 15 million. Discussions are currently under way with companies in Germany, Britain, and Holland to obtain production licenses and manufacturing technology, and with the European Community to obtain export financing. · The American medical supplier group, Baxter International, has contracted to build a factory to produce intravenous fluids for the Syrian military. Of concern in this case are the manufacturing processes, which could be applied to a broad-range of CBW activities, and the end-user, which is the Syrian army. Vigorous intervention by the Simon Wiesenthal Center with Baxter director, G. Marshall Abbey, caused the company to back off from this contract temporarily in 1991. However, it was subsequently reported that Baxter was attempting to complete the sale through the intermediary of an unknown supply house called Medport, located in Amhurts, Ohio. · Despite the attempts to attract private sector interest, the two largest pharmaceuticals conglomerates in Syria, Thameco and DIMAS, remain under rigid state control. Together they control a third company, Saydalaya, which serves as the foreign procurement board for all Syrian imports of chemicals and processed medicines · Thameco is controlled the Syrian Ministry of Industry and employs approximately 900 people at its principle production site in Damascus. A second plant, built in Aleppo at a cost of nearly $ 40 million by a consortium of French pharmaceuticals companies in the late 1980s, was reportedly "abandoned" in 1989 because of financial difficulties. However, suspicion remains that Syria may have simply switched suppliers, in order to better disguise conversion of the plant to the production of CW agents. · DIMAS (the General Establishment for Blood and of Medical Industries) is directly controlled by the Syrian Ministry of Defense, and is the only manufacturer of serum in Syria. DIMAS is run by General Hikmat Tahrani, and controls a large production plant in Damascus. · George Tenet, the Director of the CIA, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 20, and identified Syria as a key country seeking biological weapons.

Nuclear Weapons · Syria is a party to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and Syria has called for an area free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. · Ongoing research effort. · No evidence of major progress in development effort.

· Has miniature 30 kilowatt neutron-source reactor, but unsuitable for weapons production. · Does, however, continue to seek larger reactors: · Announced nuclear reactor purchase plans including 10 megawatt research reactor and six power reactors in 1980s, but never implemented. · Research by the FAS cites several efforts: · In 1991, China reported to the IAEA the potential sale of a 30 KW research reactor to Syria. The IAEA blocked the sale and Syria subsequently reduced its nuclear activities. · In 1995 the United States pressured Argentina into abandoning a proposed sale of a reactor to Syria. · In 1997 Russian government reported to be interested in selling a nuclear reactor to Syria. · On 23 February 1998 Syria and Russia signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In July 1998 the two sides agreed on the time table for the realization of a 25-MW light-water nuclear research center project in Syria with the participation of Russia's Atomstroyeksport and Nikiet. · The Syrian fertilizers plant under construction at Homs [34° 40' N 36° 40' E] is owned and operated by the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria. The facility will engage in Uranium recovery from phosphates using the D2EHPA-TOPO process. · The CIA reports in August 2000 that, · As to Syria’s embryonic nuclear research and development program, we will continue to monitor the potential for this program to expand. Moscow and Damascus agreed in 1999 to cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a wide area of disciplines. Missile Defenses · Seeking Russian S-300or S-400 surface-to-air missile system with limited anti tactical ballistic missile capability.

1 Kyodo News Service; Associated Press, January 9, 2000, 2322, 2214; Reuters, January 10, 1999, 0115, 1221, January 11, 2000, 0452, 1103. 2 See Dany Shoham, “Evolution of Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt,” Ariel Center for Policy Research and “Egypt War Preparations Against IDF Viewed,” FBIS-NES-98-320 ; 11/17/98 [Tel Aviv Hatzofe in Hebrew 25 Sep 98] 3 Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 14, 1998. 4 Reuters, June 27, 2000. 5 Some reports give the range as 500 kilometers; Jane's Defense Weekly, March 10, 1999, p. 50-64. 6 Baltimore Sun, November 23, 1988; Washington Post, September 16, 1989. 7 Tass International, 1216 GMT, September 15, 1989; Washington Post, September 16, 1989; Jane's Defense Weekly, November 19, 1988, September 23, 1989, p. 549; Washington Times, July 22, 1987, p. D-4; International Defense Review, 7/1987, p. 857, and New York Times, July 22, 1987, p. A-6, July 29, 1987; Mideast Markets, November 23, 1987, p. 11; in Harold Hough, "Israel's Nuclear Infrastructure, Jane's Intelligence Weekly, November, 1994, pp. 505- 511. 8 BBC and ITV reporting efforts seem to give more credibility to the idea that Israel has some form of relatively short-range nuclear armed missile. Ranges of anywhere from 750-930 NM have been reported, with accuracy's of anywhere from 0.1 Km to radar correlator guidance packages capable of CEPs of 100 meters. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 46, Jan/Feb. 19980, p. 48; Washington Post, September 16, 1989, p. A-17, November 15, 1989, p. A-14; Economist, August 1, 1987, p. 41; Washington Times, July 22, 1987, p. D-4; July 24, 1987, p. A-9 and April 4, 1988, p. 17; International Defense Review, 7/1987, p. 857, and New York Times, July 29, 1987, p. A-10. 9 Tass International, 1216 GMT, September 15, 1989; Washington Post, September 16, 1989; Jane's Defense Weekly, November 19, 1988, September 23, 1989, p. 549; Washington Times, July 22, 1987, p. D-4; International Defense Review, 7/1987, p. 857, and New York Times, July 22, 1987, p. A-6, July 29, 1987; Mideast Markets, November 23, 1987, p. 11; in Harold Hough, "Israel's Nuclear Infrastructure, Jane's Intelligence Weekly, November, 1994, pp. 505- 511. 10 Washington Post, October 26, 1989, p. A-36; Boston Globe, October 30, 1989, p. 2; Newsweek, November 6, 1989, p. 52. 11 Jane’s Intelligence Review, September, 1997, pp. 407-410; Jane's Defense Weekly, March 10, 1999, p. 50-64; International Defence Review, Extra, 2/1997, p. 2. 12 It is also possible that Israel may have deployed nuclear warheads for its MGM-55C Lance missiles. Israel has 12 Lance transporter-erector-launchers, and at least 36 missiles. The Lance is a stored liquid fueled missile with inertial guidance and a range of 5-125 kilometers. It has a warhead weight of 251 kilograms, and a CEP of 375 meters. It was deployed in US forces with the W-70 nuclear warhead. International Defense Review, 7/1987, p. 857; Economist, May 4, 1968, pp. 67-68; New York Times, July 22, 1987, p. A-6; Washington Times, July 22, 1987, p. D-4; Defense and Foreign Affairs, June, 1985, p. 1; Aerospace Daily, May 1, 1985, p. 5 and May 17, 1985, p. 100; Aerospace Daily, May 1, 1985, May 7, 1985; Shuey, et al, Missile Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces, p. 56; CIA, "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, " DCI NIO 1945/74, September 4, 1974; NBC Nightly News, July 30, 1985; New York Times, April 1, 1986; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Washington, GPO, 1989, p. 18; Michael A. Ottenberg, "Israel and the Atom," American Sentinel, August 16, 1992, p. 1. 13 Harold Hough, “Could Israel’s Nuclear Assets Survive a First Strike?,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September, 1997, pp. 407-410. 14 Harold Hough, “Could Israel’s Nuclear Assets Survive a First Strike?,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September, 1997, pp. 407-410.

15 Harold Hough, “Could Israel’s Nuclear Assets Survive a First Strike?,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September, 1997, pp. 407-410. 16 Associated Press, October 5, 1998, 0316, October 8, 1998, 1350; Philadelphia Inquirer, November 1, 1998, p. A-7. 17 This information is unconfirmed, and based on only one source. Israel does, however, have excellent research facilities, laboratory production of poison gas is essential to test protection devices as is the production of biological weapons to test countermeasures and antidotes. 18 Philadelphia Inquirer, November 1, 1998, p. A-7; Associated Press, October 8, 1998, 1350. 19 Washington Times, October 7, 1998, p. A-14. 20 Harold Hough, “Could Israel’s Nuclear Assets Survive a First Strike?,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September, 1997, pp. 407-410. 21 Defense News, June 29, 1998, p. 3; New York Times, June 21, 1998, p. A-6. 22 January 21, 2000, 0645; 23 Associated Press, February 2, 2000, 0834. 24 Strategic Assessment, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 3, April, 1998. 25 Ha’aretz, May 22, 1997’ Reuters, May 23, 1997, 0821, Washington Times, May 24, 1997, p. A-8 26 Much of this analysis is based on interviews with US and Israeli officials. It includes data drawn from Jane’s Defense Weekly, April 29, 1998 p. 3, June 3, 1998, p. 3, October 21, 1998, p. 4 December 9, 1998, p. 18; Defense News, June 8, 1998, p. 8; July 6, 1998, p. 3; Wall Street Journal, September 28, 1998, p. A-23. 27 Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 10, 1996, p. 3 28 David Martin, “Ballistic Missile Defense Overview,” Washington, Ballistic Missile Defense Office, Department of Defense, March 3, 1999; Defense News, July 8, 1996, p. 4, July 6, 1998, p. 6. 29 Lennox, Duncan and David Eshel, “Israeli high-energy laser project may face more delays,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, April 7, 1999, p. 21. 30 Bender, Bryan, “Future of US-Israeli laser project in doubt,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 2, 1999, p. 6. 31 Bender, Bryan, “US and Israeli governments to bail out THEL,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 16, 1999, p. 6. 32 Jane’s International Defense Review, 2/2000, p. 4. 33 “US approves extra patriot sales to bolster Israeli defenses,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 24, 1998, p. 17, March 24, 1999, p. 3; Associated Press, December 10, 1998, 1704. 34 Jane’s Defense Weekly, November 17, 1999, p. 3. 35 Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 6, 1995, p. 15, March 19, 1997, p. 19, August 27, 1997, p. 4, November 12, 1997, p. 29, January 14, 1998, p. 4, July 8, 1998, p. 17, September 23, 1998, p. 3, December 2, 1998, p 22, December 9, 1998, p. 18; Defense News, May 20, 1996, p. 33, July 22, 1996, p. 6; Washington Times, March 9, 1996, p., A-1 Aviation Week, June 21, 1993, p. 39; Reuters, March 27, 1998, 1733, September 15, 1998, 0528, November 29, 1998, 1044; Associated Press, August 3, 1998, 1125; Washington Post, September 16, 1998, p. A-37. 36 Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 6, 1995, p. 15, March 11, 1998, June 24, 1998, p. 17, p. 18 December 2, 1998, p 22, December 9, 1998, p. 18; Aviation Week, June 21, 1993, p. 39; Reuters, November 29, 1998, 1044; Jane’s International Defense Review, 8/1999, p. 10. 37 Opall-Rome, Barbara, “Israel Promotes Regional Arrow,” Defense News, May 10, 1999, p. 3. 38 Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 14, 1998, February 4, 1998, p. 18, March 11, 1998, p. 18, November 10, 1999, p. 5; Reuters, February 26, 1998, 1409, November 1, 1999, 0914. 39 The program manager has referred to a 100% leak-proof system. Then Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordecai referred to it as, “an almost complete shield against the present and future threat,” on November 29, 1998. Reuters, November 29, 1998, 1044; Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 5, 2000, p. 15.

40 Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 10, 1999, pp. 71-73, January 5, 2000, p. 15; Angelo M Codevilla, “Missiles, Defense, and Israel,” Washington, IASP Papers in Strategy, No. 5, November 1997.

41 David Martin, “Ballistic Missile Defense Overview,” Washington, Ballistic Missile Defense Office, Department of Defense, March 3, 1999; Jane’s International Defense Review, 7/1996, p. 5, 9/1997, p. 9; Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 10, 1999, pp. 71-73; Defense News, March 29, 1999, pp. 1 & 28.. 42 David Martin, “Ballistic Missile Defense Overview,” Washington, Ballistic Missile Defense Office, Department of Defense, March 3, 1999; Jane’s International Defense Review, 7/1996, p. 5, 9/1997, p. 9; Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 10, 1999, pp. 71-73. 43 Defense News, June 8, 1998, p. 8; May 6, 1996, p. 24; Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 10, 1999, pp. 71-73. 44 Israel launched the Ofeq 1 prototype on September 19, 1988. It has a satellite mass of 156 kilograms. It sent up the Ofeq 2 on April 3, 1990, one day after Saddam Hussein threatened to destroy half of Israel with chemical weapons if Israel attacked Baghdad. The Ofeq satellite has a mass of 160 kilograms. Washington Post, April 6, 1995, p. 1; Jane’s Intelligence Review, Volume 7, Number 6, June, 1995, pp. 265-268; Washington Post, April 6, 1995, p. 1. 45 Jane’s Pointer, August 1998, p. 7. 46 Jane’s Defense Weekly, February 4 ,1996, p. 18; Jane’s Pointer, August 1998, p. 7. 47 Clarke, Philip, “Another Israeli satellite fails,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1998, p. 7; Jane’s Pointer, August 1998, p. 7. 48 Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 6 ,1996, p. 23. 49 “US-Israeli venture aims to capture high-res satellite image market,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 31, 1999, p. 17. 50 Jane’s Defense Weekly, September 3, 1997. P. 3