the issue into ambitious action. This policy policy This into ambitious action. issue the of awareness turning to partners EU and its of the commitment the and demonstrates change, of climate effects and destabilising risks the address will for action’.event The time the and security: peace ‘Climate, event high-level the host will Mogherini Federica 2018, High Representative/Vice-President June 22 On adecade. for over agenda the on been has which –atopic and security change climate on steps decisive EU takes action. for swift need and the change of climate implications security the emphasise which Diplomacy’, Climate on Conclusions ‘Council the adopted 2018 ministers EU foreign February 26 On Introduction 1 st06125-en18.pdf http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32953/ Council European Commission [EC]. (2018). (2018). [EC]. Commission European dedicated funding programmes are crucial. are funding programmes dedicated and more issue this address to approach explicit amore insecurity, climate-related to vulnerable highly EU are the to close countries several As adaptation. climate and development migration, security, of fields in the objectives policy EU foreign other strengthen also would which programmes, ongoing into nexus this include to opportunity ample is There nexus. climate-security of the account due take to adjusted be could instruments financial and related policies EU missions, of how examples policies. effective into translated rarely has this but risks, security climate-related in mitigating an interest EU shown has the adecade over For can do can in Iraq and Mali: What the EU risks security Climate-related JUNE 2018 Conclusions on Conclusions Climate Diplomacy. 1 With the Conclusions, the the Conclusions, the With (accessed April 2018). such risks. might reduce that and instruments policies EU on impact little had very it Consequently, for action. acall than risk asecurity as of change climate acknowledgement ageneric more was this adecade about for and Germany. UK But of the instigation internal after 2008, time in first for the risk recognised climate change as a security EU formally the UN, and the US the Following security climate on The road to 2018: EU leadership risks. could help reduce climate-related security and instruments policies action EU external –and how and Mali –Iraq priority of political cases in two relevance its agenda, political EU’s the on arrived nexus climate-security the of how overview asuccinct gives brief Iraq and Mali provide provide and Mali Iraq

Louise van Schaik, Stefano Sarris, Tobias von Lossow & Anca-Elena Ursu Policy Brief Clingendael Policy Brief

In 2008 a joint report by EU High notable outcomes were achieved.7 Sweden Representative Solana and the European and the Netherlands are also pressing Commission acknowledged climate change for an institutional home for the climate- as a ‘threat multiplier which exacerbates security nexus at the UN – in the form existing trends, tensions, and instability’.2 of an institutionalised cooperation, with Climate security was also mentioned in incoming members in the UNSC, Belgium the Review on the Implementation of the and Germany expecting to take over the lead European Security Strategy.3 One year later on this agenda in addition to France, the UK, a progress report underlined the EU’s intent Canada, the Maldives, Ethiopia and others. to harness a climate-security multilateral leadership role and to strengthen the The high-level event in June 2018 could EU’s capacity to work on the issue.4 Since be the starting point for the EU taking 2011, climate security has become part of EU leadership on climate security, a policy climate diplomacy, which bolstered foreign field long dominated by the US. To fill this policy aspects of climate change after the vacant position, the challenge now is how failed Copenhagen Climate Summit of 2009. the EU can adjust its policies to actually The 2016 EU Global Strategy on Foreign reduce security risks emanating from climate and Security Policy repeatedly refers to change. The cases of Iraq and Mali can move the security implications of climate change this agenda forward, as both countries are and calls for addressing them via the EU’s in vulnerable phases of conflict and early external action policies.5 post-conflict recovery. They are situated in regions that are highly exposed to climate In the meantime some EU member states change impacts. Integrating the security became more active in supporting and dimension of climate change into EU external advancing climate security developments in action should be prioritised, as that could other fora such as the UN Security Council make a difference and contribute to regional (UNSC).6 With the 2017 UNSC Lake Chad stabilisation processes. Resolution, the 2018 Presidential Statement on West Africa and the Sahel, and the resolution on Somalia in which climate was Climate security in Iraq: the EU’s recognised as contributing to insecurity, (potential) contribution

Climate change has had various 2 S113/08, p. 2. consequences for Iraq, including prolonged 3 EC. (11 December 2008). Report on the heat waves, higher average temperatures and Implementation of the European Security Strategy. less precipitation. Among the most serious S407/08. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ are the country’s various water challenges, cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf for example dilapidated infrastructures, (accessed April 2018). potential tensions with the Kurdistan region 4 Council of the EU. (25 November 2009). Joint progress report and follow-up recommendations and the massive environmental degradation 8 on climate change and international security. of the marshes in the south. Water has http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ always been related to security and stability srv?l=EN&f=ST%2016645%202009%20INIT in Iraq. In the past, water has repeatedly (accessed April 2018). been instrumentalised for political purposes, 5 EEAS. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (EU Global Strategy]. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/ 7 Van Schaik, L., Sarris, S., Von Lossow, T. (2018). pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (accessed April 2018). Fighting an existential threat: small island states 6 United Nations [UN]. (9 May 2017). EU an bringing climate change to the UNSC. https:// ‘indispensable’ UN partner, working for rules-based www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org/sites/default/ international order, Security Council told. https:// files/2018-03/Schaik_Sarris_Lossow_PB_Fighting_ news.un.org/en/story/2017/05/556932-eu- an_existential_threat_fin.pdf (accessed May 2018). indispensable-un-partner-working-rules-based- 8 Von Lossow, T. (2018): More than infrastructures: international-order-security (accessed May 2018). Water challenges in Iraq.

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it played a role in jihadist recruitment9 for with the Global Coalition against Daesh and Islamic State (IS), and has been weaponised with NATO, which has been active in Iraq during the recent violent conflicts.10 The since 2015 through providing training and water crisis decreases food production,11 assistance.17 threatens the country’s electricity supplies and contributes to migration trends,12 all of The EU’s Instrument contributing to which are significant threats in the current Stability and Peace (IcSP) funds, with fragile post-conflict setting in Iraq. a budget of €7.5 million, smaller projects on security sector reform and human rights The EU’s policies on Iraq pay only sporadic in Iraq but does not cover climate change attention to the impact of climate change issues. Projects related to climate security and water on security and development. can seek funding through the long-term The EU Advisory Mission in support of IcSP component managed by EuropeAid Security Sector Reform (EUAM Iraq), with (DG Devco), but only one such project, which a budget of €14 million until October 2018,13 developed a climate-security risk analysis, assists in implementing the Iraqi National has been funded to date and it did not look Security Strategy and in addressing the at Iraq. outlined most urgent security threats.14,15 This document explicitly lists water scarcity The EU’s development assistance for Iraq and natural disasters, challenges that are amounted to around €185 million between interrelated with climate change.16 With 2014 and 2017 and primarily targeted its implementation support, the EU has a good governance, stabilisation, primary direct opportunity to engage in action on and secondary education, and sustainable climate security in Iraq, but it is not clear if energy. The latter contributes to mitigation this potential is yet harnessed. The EUAM of climate change impacts but does not Iraq mission works in close coordination reduce immediate risks stemming from those impacts, as these are caused by global emissions, of which Iraqi emissions are only a fraction. Following the announced defeat of 9 Schwartzstein, P. (2017). Climate Change Daesh in December 201718 the EU formulated and Water Woes Drove ISIS Recruiting in Iraq. and communicated an EU Strategy on Iraq.19 https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/11/ The strategy set out six key areas, one of climate-change-drought-drove-isis-terrorist- recruiting-iraq/ (accessed April 2018). which focuses on the initiation of a formal 10 Von Lossow, T. (2016). The Rebirth of Water as migration dialogue. Herein, the EU has a Weapon: IS in Syria and Iraq. https://doi.org/10.10 an opportunity to formally integrate and 80/03932729.2016.1213063. underline the impact of climate change on 11 IAUIRAQ. (2012). Climate Change in Iraq. Accessed migration. May 2018 at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb. int/files/resources/Climate%20change%20In%20 Iraq has received €107.5 million from the Iraq%20Fact%20sheet%20-%20English.pdf. EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to 12 Missirian, A., Schlenker, W. (2017). Asylum the Syrian Crisis.20 Established in 2014, Applications Respond to Temperature Fluctuations. http://science.sciencemag.org/ content/358/6370/1610.full (accessed May 2018). 13 EEAS. (2017). Common Security and Defence Policy 17 NATO. (2018). Relations with Iraq. https:// EUAM Iraq. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/ www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_88247.htm files/factsheet_euam_iraq.pdf. (accessed May 2018). 14 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_ 18 England, A. (2017). Iraq announces defeat of Isis. euam_iraq.pdf. https://www.ft.com/content/d6636416-dcf3-11e7- 15 EEAS. (2017). EU launches new security mission a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c (accessed May 2018). in Iraq. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/ 19 FAC. (22 January 2018). Council conclusions on headquarters-homepage/33992/eu-launches-new- Iraq. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32406/ security-mission-iraq_en (accessed May 2018) st05285en18.pdf (accessed May 2018). 16 Shareef, H. (21 March 2016). Briefing on the 20 EC DG-NEAR. (n.d.) EU Regional Trust Fund in Republic of Iraq’s National Security Strategy, p. 7. Response to the Syrian Crisis. https://ec.europa. http://stabilizationandtransition.org/pdfs/IST- eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/ 1459338696.pdf (accessed June 2018) countries/syria/madad_en (accessed May 2018).

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the fund supports Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Climate security in Mali: the EU’s Lebanon, Turkey and the Western Balkans (potential) contribution in addressing the long-term economic, social and educational needs of refugees and internally displaced persons. These In Mali, climate change affects the security funds have also been used for irrigation situation through its impact on natural infrastructure rehabilitation – a sensible resources,25 accelerating stress on water climate adaptation response in the region.21 and land and hampering agricultural On the assumption that these projects productivity.26 Access to water, competition contributed to reducing tensions and were over land, and migration also play a role.27 sufficient in scale and scope to address Furthermore, a link has been established the huge water challenges and reduced with recruitment by radical armed groups,28 food production, they can be considered as migration and conflict risk. Of particular climate change adaption interventions that concern are disputes between nomadic also contribute to European migration and herders and settled famers who are security objectives. competing for grazing lands in the north and the centre, for instance in the Ségou and Moreover, Iraq received nearly €370 Mopti regions.29 Against this background, million of humanitarian aid from the EU the UNSC acknowledged that climate change between 2014 and 2017.22 The EU-Iraq can lead to adverse effects on stability in country factsheet does not specifically the Sahel and West Africa region.30 mention climate change, but lists basic humanitarian assistance for climate- The 2016 EU Strategy for Security and related factors, such as water and food Development in the Sahel (Sahel Strategy) availability.23 EU humanitarian assistance reports that security and development are focuses on supporting those most affected inextricably linked in the Sahel, with climate by conflict – by supplying basic needs change as one of the primary challenges for livelihood, including water and food.24 affecting the region.31 In this sense, the Through its disaster risk reduction (DRR) programme, the EU has an opportunity to improve preparedness for water scarcity and natural disasters affecting Iraq. 25 Mitra, S. (2017). Mali’s Fertile Grounds for Conflict: Climate Change and Resource Stress. PSI Policy The policies and instruments for Iraq indicate Brief. 26 Kalkavan, B. (2017). Climate Change, Inequality and that climate change impacts on water and Conflict.PSI Policy Brief. food security, and by extension the stability 27 Ursu, A. (2018). Finding justice amidst insecurity: of the country in general, do not yet feature Policy initiatives to strengthen customary justice prominently. But in some cases, there is systems and mitigate conflicts in Central Mali. room for directly strengthening climate PSI Policy Brief. security, particularly in the form of adaptation 28 Walch, C. (2017). Fertile Ground? Climate Change measures; others areas may provide climate- and Jihadism in Mali. http://www.thebrokeronline. security actions indirectly through the eu/Blogs/Sahel-Watch-a-living-analysis-of-the- policy fields of water, food, development or conflict-in-Mali/Fertile-Ground-Climate-Change- migration among others. and-Jihadism-in-Mali (accessed April 2018). 29 Ursu, A.E. (2018). Under the gun: embattled traditional authorities in Central Mali. Conflict Research Unit. Clingendael Institute. 21 EEAS. (2018). EU-Iraq Relations: EU Response to 30 UN. (30 January 2018). UNSC Presidential Iraq Crisis. Statement Expresses Serious Concern over Security 22 EEAS. (2018). EU-Iraq Relations: EU Response to Situation in West Africa, Sahel. https://www. Iraq Crisis. un.org/press/en/2018/sc13189.doc.htm (accessed 23 EC DG-ECHO. (2018). Humanitarian Aid in Iraq. April 2018). https://ec.europa.eu/echo/printpdf/where/middle- 31 EEAS. (2016). Strategy for Security and east/iraq_en (accessed May 2018). Development in the Sahel. https://eeas.europa. 24 EC DG-ECHO. (2018). Humanitarian Aid in Iraq. eu/sites/eeas/files/strategy_for_security_and_ https://ec.europa.eu/echo/printpdf/where/middle- development_in_the_sahel_en_0.pdf (accessed east/iraq_en (accessed May 2018). May 2018).

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strategy sets multi-annual objectives for the Most of the projects focus on migration, EU in the region, although these focus on rural (agriculture) employment opportunities, crunch issues such as conflict resolution, and countering radicalisation; there is little rule of law and combating radicalisation recognition of areas particularly vulnerable without relating them to resource scarcity, to climate impacts or of the need to take such as water or land, aggravated by climate account of the increasing scarcity of natural change. resources, notably food and water, due to climate change. The Sahel Strategy is harmonised with the main talking points between the EU The EU has two Common Security and and the G5 Sahel. At the first high- Defence Policy missions in Mali, the civilian level meeting in 2015, convened by High and military EU Training Mission in Mali Representative/Vice-President Mogherini, (EUTM), in operation since 2013, and climate change was on the agenda alongside the EU Capacity Building Mission in security, crime, migration and humanitarian Mali (EUCAP), set up in 2015. Currently, concerns.32 This meeting resulted in the these missions do not take account of the EU Regional Action Plan for the Sahel climate-security nexus in their operations. (RAP), the implementation framework of They cooperate closely with the UN the Sahel Strategy. The RAP falls under Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization the responsibility of the EU Special Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), but this mission Representative for the Sahel (EUSR), remains limited to the realm of traditional Angel Losada. One of Losada’s key tasks security and does not incorporate analysis is to continue raising awareness of the of climate change impacts into its activities. challenges around the Lake Chad Basin The established G5 Sahel seems to be the in relation to the consequences of climate most proactive security actor in this sense. change in the region, which are increasingly Geared towards stabilisation of the region it visible.33 Through its context analysis, the explicitly mentions the urgency of addressing RAP underscores the need to address and mitigating ‘food and nutrition security, underlying climate-related vulnerability and water resources management, pastoralism to build resilience to future climatic and and climate change’.35 conflict-related shocks through interventions covering, in particular, social protection, food According to the EU’s National Indicative security, nutrition and livelihoods.34 The RAP Programme (NIP) for Mali,36 €615 million is highlights an understanding that climate allocated for the period 2014-2020 out of the shocks can undermine stabilisation and the European Development Fund (EDF).37 The provision of security. Nevertheless, in the NIP funds are allocated under five categories: implementation of the RAP, the climate- state reform and consolidation of rule of security nexus has not been prominent. law; rural development and food security; education; transportation and infrastructure;

32 EEAS. (2017). The EU and the Sahel, factsheet. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/ 35 General Secretariat of the Council. (20 Apr, 2015). headquarters-homepage_en/4099/The%20 Council conclusions on the Sahel Regional Action European%20Union%20and%20the%20Sahel,%20 Plan 2015-2020), p. 7. http://www.consilium.europa. fact%20sheet (accessed May 2018). eu/media/21522/st07823-en15.pdf (accessed May, 33 Secretary-General of the European Commission. 2018). (3 January 2017). Annual Report on the Sahel 36 European Commission. (2015). National Indicative Regional Action Plan, p. 10. http://data.consilium. Programme (NIP) for Mali. https://ec.europa.eu/ europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5009-2017-INIT/en/ europeaid/sites/devco/files/pin-mali-fed11-2014_ pdf (accessed May 2018). fr.pdf. 34 General Secretariat of the Council. (20 April 2015). 37 EC DG-DEVCO. (2018). European Development Council conclusions on the Sahel Regional Action Fund (EDF). https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ Plan 2015-2020), p. 7. http://www.consilium.europa. funding/funding-instruments-programming/ eu/media/21522/st07823-en15.pdf (accessed May funding-instruments/european-development-fund_ 2018). en (accessed May 2018).

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and support for international organisations about a third is allocated to strengthening and civil society. Under rural development resilience, including food and environmental and food security, the NIP warns that the security.42 Other priorities are improved adverse effects of climate change, rising food governance and conflict prevention, greater prices and the security challenges create an economic and employment opportunities, alarming situation in Mali. and improved migration management.

The EU also supports inclusive national The EU has allocated nearly €200 million dialogues to define National Resilience of humanitarian aid to Mali since 2012 to Priorities for the Global Alliance for address immediate needs related to high Resilience (NRP-AGIR).38 The Alliance, infant mortality, severe malnutrition and the consisting of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and situation of Malian refugees in neighbouring Niger, with Mauritania and Senegal in the countries.43 Moreover the Instrument process of validation, aims to build resilience contributing to Stability and Peace to nutrition and food crises in West Africa (IcSP) funds a €5 million short-term crisis and the Sahel.39 The aim of the NRP-AGIR management project.44 As peace building Mali is to address the root causes of this is still in the early stages, Mali continues to food and nutrition insecurity driven by need ad hoc and short-term funding. ‘demographic pressure, climate change and exacerbated by the 2011-2012 political In summary, the Mali case illustrates that crisis’.40 The acknowledgement of climate there is ample opportunity to integrate change as an underlying factor in Mali’s the climate-security nexus ito policy NRP-AGIR is a strong signal that EU external interventions, and they are recognised action is addressing climate security. as important, particularly with regard to the food security situation in the country. In the area of migration policy, the EU Whereas development and migration established the EU Emergency Trust Fund policies have made a head start, peace for Africa (EUTF) in November 2015 during building and humanitarian efforts still the Valetta Summit. The EUTF addresses require a more explicit acknowledgement the root causes of instability, irregular of the link between climate security and migration and forced displacement, and regional stability. contributes to better migration management. It complements existing EU foreign policy instruments, such as PARSEC Mopti-Gao in Towards ‘the time for action’ on Mali, which aims to tackle the root causes EU climate security policy of irregular migration and the phenomenon of displaced people and to prevent irregular migration, smuggling and human trafficking.41 In this policy brief, we discussed the EU’s The EUTF currently has ten projects in Mali external action policies on Iraq and Mali with a budget of €186.57 million, of which and how they are already considering the climate-security nexus – or could do so. So far, the relationship between climate and security has been recognised, but more 38 Annual Report on the Sahel RAP, p. 12. http://data. could be done to adjust relevant policy consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5009-2017- INIT/en/pdf (accessed May 2018). 39 EC DG-ECHO (n.d.) AGIR (the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative). https://ec.europa.eu/echo/ what/humanitarian-aid/resilience/sahel-agir_en 42 EC. (n.d.). EUTF Mali. https://ec.europa.eu/ (accessed May 2018). trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/mali 40 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/ (accessed May 2018). mali_case_study.pdf. 43 EC DG-ECHO.(2018). Humanitarian aid in Mali. 41 EC. (2018). EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa https://ec.europa.eu/echo/printpdf/where/africa/ [EUTF]. https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/ mali_en (accessed May 2018). sites/euetfa/files/eu_emergency_trust_fund_for_ 44 EC. IcSP Map. https://icspmap.eu/ (accessed May africa_07-05-2018.pdf (accessed May 2018). 2018).

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processes and policies.45 More specifically, – Stress more explicitly the climate-security the following actions could be considered: nexus in the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis and the EU – Fund climate-security risk analyses and Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – thereby projects through the IcSP in order to building on the 2016 EU Global Strategy. increase awareness of climate-related These instruments both acknowledge security risks. Such risk analyses and the challenges of migration and climate risk management strategies could also change in the Middle East and Africa become part of a Mediterranean-MENA and present a window of opportunity for taskforce on climate security. addressing climate change in a practical – Raise awareness of climate-security manner. as part of the RAP and include it – Integrate actionable climate security permanently on the agenda of meetings plans further into EU humanitarian between the EU and G5 Sahel. For this policies and operations. More specifically, region it is clear that climate change is the EU could target climate-security intertwined with other phenomena such objectives via its disaster risk reduction as migration, radicalisation and conflict. (DRR) programme. Currently 9 percent of – Invest in policy actions that contribute EU humanitarian aid funds go towards the to food security, improved water DRR programme, but with climate change management and better use of land impacts hitting increasingly hard, this is resources – to be carried out in a unlikely to be sufficient.46 conflict-sensitive manner and taking into – Pay more attention to climate impacts in account the climate-security dimension. military risk analyses and efforts geared For example, such actions should not towards peace building, especially in favour one group over another, should fragile contexts such as Iraq and Mali. pay attention to existing grievances and To date, EU missions do not seem to be should consider of future climate change. fully aware of how the climate-security – Expand the EU Strategy on Iraq with nexus is relevant for the country in which a focus on water scarcity and building they are based. resilience to prevent or reduce the possibility climate impacts hitting hard. This would be in line with the Iraq National Security Strategy. Related impacts aggravated by climate change, such as reduced food and electricity production, also need to be addressed up front.

45 See also Shiloh Fetzek and Louise van Schaik, 2018, Europe’s Responsibility to Prepare: Managing Climate Security Risks in a Changing World, the Center for Climate and Security, in partnership with the Planetary Security Initiative and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 46 https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/ ‘Clingendael’. risk-reduction_en.

7 About the Planetary Security Initiative

The Planetary Security Initiative aims to help increase awareness, to deepen knowledge, and to develop and promote policies and good practice guidance to help governments, the private sector and international institutions better secure peace and cooperation in times of climate change and global environmental challenges. The Initiative was launched by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015 and is currently operated by a consortium of leading think tanks headed by the Clingendael Institute.

Follow us on social media  @PlanSecu  The Planetary Security Initiative  The Planetary Security Initiative

E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org

About the authors

Dr Louise van Schaik is Head of Sustainability and Climate Change and Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute. She is also acting Head of the EU in the World Unit and visiting professor at the College of Europe in Bruges.

Stefano Sarris is former Intern at the Planetary Security Initiative, based at the Clingendael Institute.

Tobias von Lossow is Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute.

Anca-Elena Ursu is Research Assistant with Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit. A legal professional by training, she works at the intersection of customary justice, local governance and irregular migration from the Sahel.