DOCSLIB.ORG

Uploading. Defaults and the Ends of Junk

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Uploading. Defaults and the Ends of Junk Kultura i Historia nr 39/2021(1) ISSN 1642-9826 DOI: 10.20375/0000-000E-5CC2-0 the context of exteriorization, which is THE FANTASY considered as constitutive of interiority. Keywords: Homo Nexus, Mind- Uploading, Data Behaviorism, OF MIND- Psychoinformatics, Post-Humanism, UPLOADING. Alienability Abstrakt: Z perspektywy behawiorystów, postulat uploadowania DEFAULTS „umysłów” jest już realizowany na masową, hiper-przemysłową skalę AND THE dzięki inteligentnego przetwarzania dużego i różnorodnego zbioru danych. Następuje nawiązania do argumentu, że ENDS OF „umysł” nie jest bytem, który istnieje wewnątrzczaszkowo. Raczej jest on JUNK. pojmowany jako proces indywiduacji, Adrian Mróz który przebiega w różnych trybach i w różnych ilościach. Przeanalizowane Abstract: From a behaviorist są niektóre z występujących w kulturze perspective, the desire to upload popularnej narracji o wczytywaniu “minds” is already being realized on a umysłu do komputerów i o technice: mass, hyper-industrial scale thanks to Transcendencja (2014, reż. Wally the convergence of cognitive computing Pfister) oraz Pianola Kurta Vonneguta. and Big Data. The accusation is that the Poruszane zagadnienia uwzględniają “mind” is not an entity that exists fenomenologiczne pojęcie originary intracranially. Instead, it is conceived as default Bernarda Stieglera oraz junk a process of individuation, which occurs Thierry’ego Bardiniego. Kilka wątków in different modes and numbers. Some związanych zostało z pomyłkami, narratives of mind-uploading and przypadkami, a także z dyskusją technics in popular culture are Nicolasa Agara na temat końca explored: Transcendence (2014, dir. człowieka i teorią Multiple Drafts Wally Pfister) and Player Piano by Kurt Daniela Dennetta w kontekście Vonnegut. The discussed issues eksterioryzacji, która traktowana jest consider Bernard Stiegler’s jako konstytutywna dla wnętrza. Słowa phenomenological notion of originary klucze: Homo Nexus, mind-uploading, default and Thierry Bardini’s analysis of behawioryzm danych, junk. Several questions are raised psychoinformatyka, post-humanizm, regarding miscalculations, accidents, in obcość. addition to Nicolas Agar’s discussion on the end of humanity, and Daniel Dennett’s Multiple Drafts theory within 142 I claim that the question of mind-uploading is posed incorrectly. Suppose we accept the methodological behaviorist paradigm and, in addition, consider the “mind” as Derek Melser proposes, i.e., the covert tokening of the overt tokening of concerted activity (2004, p. 56), together with the context of Big Data. In that case, we could claim that we are already uploading minds to data networks. For most users, this is a process that is underway without a proper understanding of the situation, so without genuine consent. Contemporary industrial mind uploading is being developed today by complex new data behaviorism (Rouvroy, 2013) powered by psychoinformatics (Montag, Duke, and Markowetz, 2016; Gupta et al., 2018). User profiles are models of the patterns of observable gestures and actions measured, recorded, stored, and processed. Such systematic network behaviorism creates digital doppelgangers that are a sort of copy of users’ minds for the sake of predictability and the reduction of risk, the singular, through hyper-synchronization. What is worrisome is the priority of increasing the speed of commercial access to brains within such an industrial context (Stiegler, 2014, 2015). Moreover, an essential part of our identity is nonidentical, such as how information and noise are relevant to each other, where what I cannot understand is constitutive of knowledge itself. For example, I can never know the time of my death, which is the most fundamental Heideggarian nonknowledge for Dasein. Technology, junk, chaos, mistakes, and story-telling profoundly involve and bind the relationships of individuation amongst the singular, dual, and plural collective selves and non-selves and their proper milieux for making sense, including the aesthetic and sensible environment of the noetic and sensorial. Through exosomatic organogenesis (Stiegler, 2017) or exteriorization, the other constitutes the selfsame—inalienability characteristically involves alienability. To phrase it in a catchier way: we human beings are always more our accidents than our choice (Marquard, 1994, p. 132). It is a matter of engaging and playing with frequent and 143 deliberately unforeseeable accidents, or the defaults of making decisions in the form of behavioral choice architecture, or else their alienization qua routine (Ariely, 2009). Such phenomena would ensue an exteriorization and grammatization of will itself, as controlled losses of control – like the famous Jarocin Festival in communist Poland, which supposedly functioned like a safety valve (Karendał, 2014, p. 51). Today, such a safety-valve in the times of data behaviorism demands the exteriorization of what Kant calls the faculties of judgment, their automatization and predictability, which also brings the threat of the proletarianization of will, which the climate crisis of the Anthropocene, i.e., Capitalocene or Entropocene, exemplifies (Stiegler, 2018; Internation Collective, 2020). In this sense, mind-uploading is an intensification of the loss of all kinds of knowledge, hyper- proletarianization, since it presupposes the loss of the unpredictable, given that the automated cognizant mind is subordinated to out-of-body control, a performative project based on misleading assumptions about identity (Mróz, 2019a). However, it is essential to note that automatization is a condition of autonomy, or dis-automatization, not its loss. Before we learn to identify ourselves, we need to adhere to an identifying being, locate it. The only way this is possible is by anticipating it, projecting it. As a perception, this is a kind of hallucination. In other words, the self does not exist, but as Bernard Stiegler would say, it consists; it is a Husserlian eidos, and it is always inadequate, at least up to the moment of death. Stiegler argues that we cannot measure or see what we do not already expect (2011). Keeping this in mind, we can follow Dominic Pettman in Human Error, who asks and replies: “where is the human? […] wherever there is a constitutive technology of self-recognition. Whether that technology is a camera, a gun, a broken-in horse, a wife, or the U.S. Constitution itself matter less than the capacity to register, record, and transmit this recognition” (Pettman, 2011, p. 52). We may add language, DNA or “junk DNA” (Bardini, 2011, p. 7) to this list with which we individuate the self in different numbers (singular, dual, plural), and 144 modes (biologically, post-biologically, and institutionally) which in Pettman’s argumentation would be another part of the Anthropological Machine. For Giorgio Agamben, the primary motor in this autogenetic, narcissistic narrative of humanity is the “anthropological machine”: an abstract apparatus comprising of all those potent symbols, figures, and trope of belonging and exclusion. […] it sorts the humans from the nonhuman, subhuman, inhuman,post-human, and so on. For Agamben, the crucial component of the machine is the way its optics have been rigged (in both senses) to encourage self-reflection and nurture a sense of exceptionalism and superiority by virtue of one’s proper humanness. (Pettman, 2011, p. 8) The Anthropological Machine intensifies diffraction through which the selves pass in their co-constitution, a vanity mirror for the human species where the spectacle to behold would be our dispersed and alien minds. It is a circumstance of alien semantics, i.e., a hyper-virus. (Bardini, 2011, p. 179). At the same time, Nicholas Agar affirms that “[…] there is no consensus on what it means to be human” (2010, p. 19). We cannot distinctly locate ourselves in mode and number, just only reduced to ontological minds embodied in flesh. Furthermore, we may accent that humanity has no exclusive access to technologies or feelings since they are observed in the animal world. In addition, the work Vampyrotheuthis Infernalis is a hybrid mirror, where we see that humans, like squid, live as functions of their objects (Flusser and Bec, 2012, p. 63; Winnicott, 2016). According to Pettman, a cybernetic triangle of human, animal, and machine (2011, p. 5) articulates that we are sites, the traces we leave behind, or what Stiegler describes in terms of tertiary retentions. Mind- uploading, transhumanist story-telling attempts to personify the Anthropological Machine by excluding location, the biological, incorporating only the post-biological, abstract, and incidentally, the bureaucratic, i.e., algorithmic. However: 145 The body is sight and site, we know as representation, even when we fix our gaze on the three-dimensional breathing body of the self or the other, in that we “consider” the data recorded by the retina via language, whether spoken or silent, and language is, perforce, representation (and not reality). (Leppert, 1995, p. xx) Whatever the case may be, the mind most certainly is a case of mistaken identity. Humans attribute a great deal of effort in trying to understand the concept of consciousness, even as a hallucination as Daniel Dennett attempts to address via heterophenomenology, in which the processes and counter-processes of consciousness are misrepresented, perhaps, by cognitivism, i.e., as reduced to something finite, computational (Stiegler, no date). Nonetheless, in terms of the Heideggerian Sein zum Tode, or the fear of death, proponents
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Neural Lace" Company
    5 Neuroscience Experts Weigh in on Elon Musk's Mysterious "Neural Lace" Company By Eliza Strickland (/author/strickland-eliza) Posted 12 Apr 2017 | 21:15 GMT Elon Musk has a reputation as the world’s greatest doer. He can propose crazy ambitious technological projects—like reusable rockets for Mars exploration and hyperloop tunnels for transcontinental rapid transit—and people just assume he’ll pull it off. So his latest venture, a new company called Neuralink that will reportedly build brain implants both for medical use and to give healthy people superpowers, has gotten the public excited about a coming era of consumer­friendly neurotech. Even neuroscientists who work in the field, who know full well how difficult it is to build working brain gear that passes muster with medical regulators, feel a sense of potential. “Elon Musk is a person who’s going to take risks and inject a lot of money, so it will be exciting to see what he gets up to,” says Thomas Oxley, a neural engineer who has been developing a medical brain implant since 2010 (he hopes to start its first clinical trial in 2018). Neuralink is still mysterious. An article in The Wall Street Journal (https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon­musk­launches­ neuralink­to­connect­brains­with­computers­1490642652) announced the company’s formation and first hires, while also spouting vague verbiage about “cranial computers” that would Image: iStockphoto serve as “a layer of artificial intelligence inside the brain.” So IEEE Spectrum asked the experts about what’s feasible in this field, and what Musk might be planning.
    [Show full text]
  • Mind-Crafting: Anticipatory Critique of Transhumanist Mind-Uploading in German High Modernist Novels Nathan Jensen Bates a Disse
    Mind-Crafting: Anticipatory Critique of Transhumanist Mind-Uploading in German High Modernist Novels Nathan Jensen Bates A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2018 Reading Committee: Richard Block, Chair Sabine Wilke Ellwood Wiggins Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Germanics ©Copyright 2018 Nathan Jensen Bates University of Washington Abstract Mind-Crafting: Anticipatory Critique of Transhumanist Mind-Uploading in German High Modernist Novels Nathan Jensen Bates Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Professor Richard Block Germanics This dissertation explores the question of how German modernist novels anticipate and critique the transhumanist theory of mind-uploading in an attempt to avert binary thinking. German modernist novels simulate the mind and expose the indistinct limits of that simulation. Simulation is understood in this study as defined by Jean Baudrillard in Simulacra and Simulation. The novels discussed in this work include Thomas Mann’s Der Zauberberg; Hermann Broch’s Die Schlafwandler; Alfred Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz: Die Geschichte von Franz Biberkopf; and, in the conclusion, Irmgard Keun’s Das Kunstseidene Mädchen is offered as a field of future inquiry. These primary sources disclose at least three aspects of the mind that are resistant to discrete articulation; that is, the uploading or extraction of the mind into a foreign context. A fourth is proposed, but only provisionally, in the conclusion of this work. The aspects resistant to uploading are defined and discussed as situatedness, plurality, and adaptability to ambiguity. Each of these aspects relates to one of the three steps of mind- uploading summarized in Nick Bostrom’s treatment of the subject.
    [Show full text]
  • Copyrighted Material
    Index affordances 241–2 apps 11, 27–33, 244–5 afterlife 194, 227, 261 Ariely, Dan 28 Agar, Nicholas 15, 162, 313 Aristotle 154, 255 Age of Spiritual Machines, The 47, 54 Arkin, Ronald 64 AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) Armstrong, Stuart 12, 311 61–86, 98–9, 245, 266–7, Arp, Hans/Jean 240–2, 246 298, 311 artificial realities, see virtual reality AGI Nanny 84, 311 Asimov, Isaac 45, 268, 274 aging 61, 207, 222, 225, 259, 315 avatars 73, 76, 201, 244–5, 248–9 AI (artificial intelligence) 3, 9, 12, 22, 30, 35–6, 38–44, 46–58, 72, 91, Banks, Iain M. 235 95, 99, 102, 114–15, 119, 146–7, Barabási, Albert-László 311 150, 153, 157, 198, 284, 305, Barrat, James 22 311, 315 Berger, T.W. 92 non-determinism problem 95–7 Bernal,J.D.264–5 predictions of 46–58, 311 biological naturalism 124–5, 128, 312 altruism 8 biological theories of consciousness 14, Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud 40–1 104–5, 121–6, 194, 312 Andreadis, Athena 223 Blackford, Russell 16–21, 318 androids 44, 131, 194, 197, 235, 244, Blade Runner 21 265, 268–70, 272–5, 315 Block, Ned 117, 265 animal experimentationCOPYRIGHTED 24, 279–81, Blue Brain MATERIAL Project 2, 180, 194, 196 286–8, 292 Bodington, James 16, 316 animal rights 281–2, 285–8, 316 body, attitudes to 4–5, 222–9, 314–15 Anissimov, Michael 12, 311 “Body by Design” 244, 246 Intelligence Unbound: The Future of Uploaded and Machine Minds, First Edition. Edited by Russell Blackford and Damien Broderick.
    [Show full text]
  • William Gibson's Neuromancer and Its Relevanceto Culture And
    “KALAM” International Journal of Faculty of Arts and Culture, South Eastern University of Sri Lanka William Gibson’s Neuromancer and Its Relevanceto Culture and Technology Noeline Shirome .G South Eastern University of Sri Lanka Abstract We live in a time where technology is in a rapid growth. These advancements have made various changes in the cultural sphere. Computers have drastically started to influence the lifestyle of people through various systems of information technology. Thus, within a fragment of time anyone can access to any sort of resources on the planet. This advancement is in way shrinking the division of mind and machine as most people depend vastly on the outside sources of intelligence through technological devices. The concept of mind uploading, trans-humans, cyber space, virtual reality, and etc. have interested the cyberpunk writers and influenced them to project these ideas in their literary texts. Thus the present paper explores the relationship between William Gibson’s cyberpunk science fiction Neuromancer and its relevance to culture and technology. It first focuses on the novel Neuromancer, and then goes onto its cultural and technological relevance with present time, and discusses the close connection between reality and cyberpunk literature. Key words Cyberpunk, cyber space, mind uploading, mindclones, mindfile, William Gibson Introduction in the novel named Henry Dorsett Case is a The link between computer technology and hacker who eventually gets into the digitalised literature play an important role in society, as system and logs into the Matrix where the literary texts reflects the contemporary copy of his consciousness exists forever. The situation. In this context, cyberpunk science similar idea of this mind uploading is now an fictions play an important role in exploring emerging concept in the twenty-first century.
    [Show full text]
  • CYBORGIZATION and VIRTUAL WORLDS: Portals to Altered Reality
    Sample file CYBORGIZATION AND VIRTUAL WORLDS: A character’s body is the means by which she perceives Portals to Altered Reality and interacts with her environment. When a character ex- tends her body by grafting robotic components onto it – or Volume 02 in the replaces some of its key components with biosynthetic sub- Posthuman Cyberware Sourcebook series stitutes – it inevitably alters the way in which she experi- ences the world. Written and edited by: Matthew E. Gladden The nature of a character’s forays into virtual reality is just one part of her life that’s transformed by the process of Special thanks to cyborgization. After all, it’s easy to know when you enter All those who offered feedback regarding the research and ma- a virtual environment if the tools you’re using are a VR terials that eventually found their way into this volume, as well headset and haptic feedback gloves. If the virtual experi- as those whose work as game designers, gamers, scholars, and ence is too much for you, you can always just rip off the authors provided inspiration for this project, including: headset: the digital illusions instantly vanish, and you know that you’re back in the ‘real’ world. But what if the Magdalena Szczepocka Sven Dwulecki VR gear that you’re employing consists of cranial neural Bartosz Kłoda-Staniecko Mateusz Zimnoch implants that directly stimulate your brain to create artifi- Paweł Gąska Nicole Cunningham cial sensory experiences? Or what if you’re toting dual-pur- Krzysztof Maj Ted Snider pose artificial eyes and robotic prosthetic limbs that can ei- Ksenia Olkusz Ken Spencer ther supply you with authentic sense data from the external Michał Kłosiński Nathan Fouts environment or switch into iso mode, cut off all the sensa- tions from the real world, and pipe fabricated sense data into your brain? What signs could you look for to help you Copyright © 2017 Matthew E.
    [Show full text]
  • Brain Uploading-Related Group Mind Scenarios
    MIRI MACHINE INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Coalescing Minds: Brain Uploading-Related Group Mind Scenarios Kaj Sotala University of Helsinki, MIRI Research Associate Harri Valpola Aalto University Abstract We present a hypothetical process of mind coalescence, where artificial connections are created between two or more brains. This might simply allow for an improved formof communication. At the other extreme, it might merge the minds into one in a process that can be thought of as a reverse split-brain operation. We propose that one way mind coalescence might happen is via an exocortex, a prosthetic extension of the biological brain which integrates with the brain as seamlessly as parts of the biological brain in- tegrate with each other. An exocortex may also prove to be the easiest route for mind uploading, as a person’s personality gradually moves away from the aging biological brain and onto the exocortex. Memories might also be copied and shared even without minds being permanently merged. Over time, the borders of personal identity may become loose or even unnecessary. Sotala, Kaj, and Harri Valpola. 2012. “Coalescing Minds: Brain Uploading-Related Group Mind Scenarios.” International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (1): 293–312. doi:10.1142/S1793843012400173. This version contains minor changes. Kaj Sotala, Harri Valpola 1. Introduction Mind uploads, or “uploads” for short (also known as brain uploads, whole brain emu- lations, emulations or ems) are hypothetical human minds that have been moved into a digital format and run as software programs on computers. One recent roadmap chart- ing the technological requirements for creating uploads suggests that they may be fea- sible by mid-century (Sandberg and Bostrom 2008).
    [Show full text]
  • Everybody and Nobody: Visions of Individualism and Collectivity in the Age of AI
    International Journal of Communication 10(2016), Forum 5669–5683 1932–8036/2016FRM0002 Everybody and Nobody: Visions of Individualism and Collectivity in the Age of AI ARAM SINNREICH (provocateur) American University, USA JESSA LINGEL University of Pennsylvania, USA GIDEON LICHFIELD Quartz, USA ADAM RICHARD ROTTINGHAUS University of Tampa, USA LONNY J AVI BROOKS California State University, East Bay, USA In Homer’s The Odyssey (one of humanity’s earliest surviving works of speculative fiction), the story’s hero, Odysseus, pulls off one of literature’s great escapes. Trapped in a cave by the giant, man- eating cyclops Polyphemus, the wily Greek lulls the monster to sleep with divinely powerful wine, then pokes out his only eye with a flaming wooden stake. Right before Polyphemus passes out, Odysseus prepares an insult to go along with the injury: when the Cyclops asks his name, he responds by claiming it’s “Nobody.” Thus, when the blinded Polyphemus seeks help from his fellow monsters and retribution from his divine father, the sea god Poseidon, all the poor creature can tell them is that “Nobody’s killing me” and “Nobody made me suffer” (Fagles, 1996). The plan works, and Odysseus escapes with his remaining men to their ship, as the blind cyclops, relying on his ears instead of his eyes, heaves boulders in their direction. This is when the hero commits his greatest error: Despite his men’s entreaties, he begins to taunt the cyclops, reveling in his victory by revealing his true identity: Cyclops— if any man on the face of the earth should ask you who blinded you, shamed you so—say Odysseus, raider of cities, he gouged out your eye, Laertes’ son who makes his home in Ithaca! (Fagles, 1996, p.
    [Show full text]
  • Humanity's Capability of Transcendence Through Artificial
    California State University, Monterey Bay Digital Commons @ CSUMB Capstone Projects and Master's Theses Spring 5-2016 Humanity’s Capability of Transcendence through Artificial Intelligence Zena McCartney California State University, Monterey Bay Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/caps_thes Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation McCartney, Zena, "Humanity’s Capability of Transcendence through Artificial Intelligence" (2016). Capstone Projects and Master's Theses. 529. https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/caps_thes/529 This Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ CSUMB. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capstone Projects and Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ CSUMB. Unless otherwise indicated, this project was conducted as practicum not subject to IRB review but conducted in keeping with applicable regulatory guidance for training purposes. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Humanity’s Capability of Transcendence through Artificial Intelligence What does it mean to be a human in a technological society? Source: Cazy89. Artificial Intelligence. Cruz, Alejandro. Flickr Commons. WikiMedia Project. Web. 28 December 2008. Digital Image. Senior Capstone Practical and Professional Ethics Research Essay David Reichard Division of Humanities and Communication Spring 2016 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................................2
    [Show full text]
  • Science Fiction in a Reality Check» Evening?
    HOW CAN I PLAN A «SCIENCE FICTION IN A REALITY CHECK» EVENING? DO YOU WANT TO PLAN AN EVENING IN WHICH YOU PUT SCI- ENCE FICTION FANTASY TO THE TEST? HOW REALISTIC IS A PHASER, TELEPORTATION OR THE HOLODECK? YOU CAN FIND OUT MORE ABOUT HOW TO ORGANIZE SUCH AN EVENING HERE: Science fiction films often contain technologies that rely on visions stemming directly from real-life technology. Whether it is Jules Verne, Isaac Asimov or Georges Lucas — every one of them uses science as a source for their technologies of the future. That is how stories about nuclear submarines, swarm robots or prosthetic bodies come about. These films shed light on the boundaries of the ethically defensible and often show possible negative consequences of technologies — but they also excessively raise hope for what will be possible in the future. In this format, the goal is to talk about the reality of such visions and about what we as a society desire in terms of progress. The ’reality check’ format is particularly suitable for high school students. It gives researchers the opportunity to comment on these films and to discuss them with young people who have a whole lot of future ahead of them. 01 1. FIND A FILM AND A RESEARCHER! Find a film that addresses a topic that is particularly interesting for students. Ask yourself: Which technological question is behind the film? Does technology play a significant role in the selected film such that it would be worth having a discussi- on about it afterwards? Form a “what if ” questions that the film poses regarding technology.
    [Show full text]
  • Motor Neuroprosthesis Implanted with Neurointerventional Surgery
    New devices and technologies J NeuroIntervent Surg: first published as 10.1136/neurintsurg-2020-016862 on 28 October 2020. Downloaded from CASE SERIES Motor neuroprosthesis implanted with neurointerventional surgery improves capacity for activities of daily living tasks in severe paralysis: first in- human experience Thomas J Oxley,1,2 Peter E Yoo,1,2 Gil S Rind,1,2 Stephen M Ronayne,1,2 C M Sarah Lee,3 Christin Bird,1 Victoria Hampshire,2 Rahul P Sharma,4 Andrew Morokoff,1,5 Daryl L Williams,6 Christopher MacIsaac,7 Mark E Howard,8 Lou Irving,9 Ivan Vrljic,10 Cameron Williams,10 Sam E John,1,11 Frank Weissenborn,1,12 Madeleine Dazenko,3 Anna H Balabanski,13 David Friedenberg,14 Anthony N Burkitt,11 Yan T Wong,15 Katharine J Drummond,1,5 Patricia Desmond,1,10 Douglas Weber,16 Timothy Denison,2,17 Leigh R Hochberg,18 Susan Mathers,3 Terence J O’Brien,1,13 Clive N May,12 J Mocco,19 David B Grayden,11 Bruce C V Campbell,20,21 Peter Mitchell,10 Nicholas L Opie1,2 ► Additional material is ABSTRACT control of digital devices in two participants with flaccid published online only. To view Background Implantable brain–computer interfaces upper limb paralysis. please visit the journal online (http:// dx. doi. org/ 10. 1136/ (BCIs), functioning as motor neuroprostheses, have the neurintsurg- 2020- 016862). potential to restore voluntary motor impulses to control digital devices and improve functional independence in For numbered affiliations see patients with severe paralysis due to brain, spinal cord, INTRODUCTION end of article.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY the Refinement of Control
    1 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY The Refinement of Control Strategies for Cortically-Controlled Functional Electrical Stimulation A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS For the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Field of Biomedical Engineering By Stephanie Naufel Naufel EVANSTON, ILLINOIS September 2017 2 Abstract Paralysis resulting from spinal cord injury (SCI) is devastating, dramatically reducing the independence of affected individuals. Currently, functional electrical stimulation (FES), controlled by a patient’s residual movements, is used clinically to restore a limited range of voluntary movement. However, if FES could be controlled using signals recorded from the brain, it might allow patients with high-level SCI to regain even more natural and sophisticated movements. Cortically-controlled FES has been successfully used in animal experiments and in preliminary human clinical trials, but it needs refinement before it can be fully translated to the clinic. Here I present three distinct studies, each of which addresses the improvement of a system control strategy. Taken together, my three studies offer insights that will improve the future implementation of cortically-controlled FES. In my first study, I evaluated the ability to use peripheral nerve stimulation to selectively activate muscles for FES. I demonstrated that the Flat Interface Nerve Electrode (FINE) can selectively stimulate a subset of wrist and hand muscles, and that this stimulation is stable over a period of 4 months. In future implementations of FES, nerve stimulation can therefore be used to selectively stimulate a subset of muscles without the need to implant these muscles individually. This method may be especially useful for muscles which are difficult to individually implant and stimulate intramuscularly without current spillover.
    [Show full text]
  • Is It Rational to Upload Ourselves Into Machines
    A peer-reviewed electronic journal published by the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies ISSN 1541-0099 22(1) – November 2011 Ray Kurzweil and Uploading: Just Say No! Nicholas Agar School of History Philosophy Political Science and International Relations Victoria University of Wellington [email protected] Journal of Evolution and Technology - Vol. 22 Issue 1 – November 2011 - pgs 23-36 Abstract There is a debate about the possibility of mind-uploading – a process that purportedly transfers human minds and therefore human identities into computers. This paper bypasses the debate about the metaphysics of mind-uploading to address the rationality of submitting yourself to it. I argue that an ineliminable risk that mind-uploading will fail makes it prudentially irrational for humans to undergo it. For Ray Kurzweil, artificial intelligence (AI) is not just about making artificial things intelligent; it’s also about making humans artificially super-intelligent. 1 In his version of our future we enhance our mental powers by means of increasingly powerful electronic neuroprostheses. The recognition that any function performed by neurons and synapses can be done better by electronic chips will lead to an ongoing conversion of biological brain into machine mind. We will upload . Once the transfer of our identities into machines is complete, we will be free to follow the trajectory of accelerating improvement currently tracked by wireless Internet routers and portable DVD players. We will quickly become millions and billions of times more intelligent than we currently are. This paper challenges Kurzweil’s predictions about the destiny of the human mind. I argue that it is unlikely ever to be rational for human beings to completely upload their minds onto computers – a fact that is almost certain to be understood by those presented with the option of doing so.
    [Show full text]