Judicial Discipline Decision Summaries May-June 2015

Judicial Discipline Decision Summaries

May-June 2015

Wilson, Order (Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct February 6, 2015) (http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/reports/2014/14-331.pdf) The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a judge for presiding over a criminal damage trial even though he was a leasing agent for the company that managed the property that had been damaged and had spoken with the resident of the property about the broken window. The judge presided over a criminal damage trial in which Pedro Espinoza was charged with breaking a window at a residence occupied by Cheryl Benson. After finding Espinoza guilty, the judge asked Benson the cost to repair the window. She responded, “I don’t know. You haven’t told me yet.” The judge then told her he would get that to her as he did have it. The judge admitted that he was a leasing agent for the company that managed the property in question and that he had had a prior conversation with Benson, who advised him when the window was broken. He claimed to have failed to make the connection until the testimony in court. The Commission noted that, even after he learned of his connection to the case, the judge failed to disqualify himself, vacate the proceedings and reset them before a judge pro- tem, instead, ordering the defendant to pay $120 in restitution to the property management company.

Guzman, Order (Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct March 26, 2015) (http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/reports/2014/14-398.pdf) The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct reprimanded a judge for delaying 3 rulings in the same DUI case past 60 days notwithstanding his periodic certification that he had no pending or undetermined cause for more than 60 days. 1 ruling was unreasonably delayed for over 3 months.

Irwin, Order (Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct March 26, 2015) (http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/reports/2014/14-400.pdf) The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct reprimanded a judge for ex parte communications that improperly inserted him into the appeal of a case. During an appeal in a post-conviction relief proceeding in a case in which the judge had imposed the underlying sentence, the Arizona Court of Appeals' ruling incorrectly referred to a previous attorney for the defendant as court-appointed counsel. During oral argument, the Arizona Supreme Court continued to refer to the previous attorney as court-appointed counsel, and the defendant’s current counsel (Emiley Danies, who had correctly referred to the attorney as pro bono counsel in her brief) did not correct the misunderstanding. The judge became aware of that failure.

In an ex parte e-mail, the judge contacted Jonathan Bass, one of the attorneys from the attorney general’s office who had appeared at the oral argument, advised him of the misstatement, and demanded his office take action to correct the mistake. When Bass advised the judge his office believed the misstatement to be immaterial and would not be filing anything concerning the misstatement, the judge sent another ex parte e-mail demanding to have a supervisor involved and chastising both sides over the misstatement. In another e-mail, the judge alleged that Danies intentionally misrepresented the facts to the Court, chastised the attorneys in the attorney general’s office for their handling of the case, and demanded to speak to Bass’s supervisor. The judge then had an ex parte communication with the supervisor. The next day, Bass notified Danies of the communications with the judge, and they jointly agreed to file a notice of clarification with the Arizona Supreme Court. Upon remand of the case to the trial level, the complainant sought and obtained the judge’s disqualification for cause due to the e-mails.

Watters, Order (Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct February 6, 2015) (file:///C:/Users/cgray/Desktop/.pdf) The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct reprimanded a judge for appearing in a photograph on his law firm’s web-site in a judicial robe and advertising himself on the web-site as an active part-time judge pro tem in the Arizona court system.

Bravo, Press release (Arizona Supreme Court June 26, 2015) (http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/137/Press_Releases/Bravo%20Press%20Release.pdf) Based on a stipulated resolution, the Arizona Supreme Court censured a justice of the peace for failing to disclose that he jointly owned property with a litigant in 2 protective order proceedings. In 2012, a litigant who had appeared in the judge’s court on 2 cases acquired a mining claim in his name and the judge’s name. Although he initially placed the judge’s name on the claim without the judge’s knowledge, he later disclosed this interest to the judge. In 2012 and 2013, this litigant appeared before the judge as a plaintiff in a separate protective order proceedings, but the judge did not disclose his relationship or joint property ownership with the litigant to the other party.

Letter of Reprimand (Keaton) (Arkansas Commission on Judicial Discipline and Disability May 15, 2015) (http://www.arkansas.gov/jddc/pdf/2015/keatonLetter.pdf) The Arkansas Commission on Judicial Discipline and Disability publicly reprimanded a judge for a 17-month delay in entering a decision in a divorce case following the final hearing despite 2 inquiries from one of the attorneys. This is the 4th time the judge has been publicly sanctioned for delay; he was admonished in 1998 for a 2-year delay in 1 case; reprimanded in 2008 for delays in several cases; and censured in 2012 for delays in several cases. After the 2012 censure, the judge had implemented a case management system that he self-

2 administered. He took the case file in the divorce case home in May 2012; while in his home office, the file was moved and “fell into an ‘out of sight out of mind’ category which caused him to forget to have it logged into his case management documentation in his court office.” Since the complaint about this delay has been filed, the judge’s docket has been re-structured, and he no longer is assigned domestic relations or probate cases. The Commission also ordered the judge to review his docket every quarter with his trial court assistant and maintain a written documentation of when the review occurred, to “maintain constant and continuous communication with” his administration judge about strategies for case management, and to maintain organization of his cases and avoid delayed rulings. The Commission will monitor the judge’s compliance with the conditions.

Public Admonishment of Fielder (California Commission on Judicial Performance May 14, 2015) (http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/public_admon/Fielder_Pub_Admon_05-14-15.pdf) The California Commission on Judicial Performance publicly admonished a judge for (1) being aggressive and heavy-handed when interacting with a member of court administration regarding the re-assignment of another judge’s courtroom clerk and (2) summoning an attorney to his chambers and suggesting that a declaration should not be filed due to his concerns about the court’s reputation and the other judge’s family. (1) On April 3, 2013, Judge Fielder and Judge Cory Woodward met with the deputy chief court executive officer for court operations regarding court administration’s decision to re- assign Judge Woodward’s courtroom clerk. During the meeting, Judge Fielder accused court administration of violating court protocol by moving a clerk from a judge’s courtroom and stated that court administration should not be “messing around” with judges’ courtrooms. He stated words to the effect that, before they would allow court administration to move courtroom clerks around, the judges “would get together and fire” the court executive officer. Judge Fielder also stated that Judge Woodward’s clerk “was getting the shaft,” that there was “no significant or valid reason” to move the clerk, that the complaint about her “should be something more significant,” and that, if the complaint was coming from another clerk, that clerk was the one who should be moved. Judge Fielder conceded “that, during the meeting, he improperly displayed considerable irritation toward the court administrator and engaged in a discussion that was too aggressive, too heavy-handed, and could have been intimidating to court administration.” He acknowledged that he was unnecessarily forceful in his statements, that his conduct was inappropriate, that the statement about firing the administrator’s supervisor was “out of line,” and that court administration is ultimately responsible for decisions about staffing. (2) On July 1, 2013, Michael Kilpatrick, filed a motion for a new trial after Judge Woodward ruled against his client. On July 5, Kilpatrick’s associate, Andrew Smith, presented to Judge Fielder an ex parte application for a temporary stay of enforcement of Judge Woodward’s order pending the hearing on the motion for a new trial, which Judge Fielder, as supervising judge, needed to approve before the clerk would file it and set it for hearing. The application included a statement of disqualification of Judge Woodward for cause, accompanied by a declaration signed by Kilpatrick that included references to recent “allegations of perhaps substantial inappropriate behavior and/or misconduct between Judge

Woodward and his staff,” resulting in “tremendous pressure” on Judge Woodward and his family. The declaration also contained a statement that Judge Woodward was to have been in the Metropolitan District hearing family matters for 2013 and 2014, but that “he has now been quietly swept aside and returned to the East Kern Branch.” After Judge Fielder reviewed the ex parte application and declaration, he called Smith into his chambers and told him, among other things, that Kilpatrick’s declaration about Judge Woodward and the court should be toned down before it was filed. Judge Fielder was concerned that “the flamboyant statements” “unnecessarily implicated our court administration in improper acts and cast aspersions on Judge Woodward’s family” and believed the statement that the court was “sweeping aside” Judge Woodward was inaccurate and that the references to Judge Woodward’s family were “mean-spirited and unnecessary.” To the Commission, Judge Fielder stated that he may have asked Smith if he thought Judge Woodward’s family “deserved this kind of treatment in a public document.” As a result of Judge Fielder’s statements, Smith concluded that the declaration needed to be modified before Judge Fielder would permit it to be filed. Smith modified the declaration and re-submitted it the same day. Judge Fielder acknowledged that Smith might have taken his statements as not allowing the documents to be filed unless the content was changed although he did not think he said to Smith that he would not allow the documents to be filed. The Commission stated:

The only issue before Judge Fielder was whether a request for stay of enforcement of judgment could be filed as an ex parte application. The merits of the request for stay of enforcement of judgment and the disqualification of Judge Woodward for cause were not before Judge Fielder for decision, as evidenced by his concession to the commission that when the revised papers were presented later that day, they were filed “without review or comment.”

The Commission concluded that the judge “abused his authority by summoning an attorney into his chambers and suggesting in any way that the declaration not be filed as presented due to his stated concerns about the court’s reputation and Judge Woodward’s family.” The Commission stated that the judge’s prior discipline was a factor in determining the level of discipline. In 1992, the judge had received an advisory letter for accepting guilty pleas from an in-custody defendant who had entered not guilty pleas the previous day, without inquiring whether some action had been taken regarding affording counsel for the defendant. In 1994, he received an advisory letter for treating a witness in an unduly harsh and intimidating manner. In 1997, he received a private admonishment for conduct that appeared to be coercive in connection with guilty and no contest pleas, failing to advise unrepresented defendants of their right to counsel at arraignment, and reading police reports without the consent of an unrepresented defendant.

Inquiry Concerning Garcia, Decision and order (California Commission on Judicial Performance May 18, 2015) (http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/censures/Garcia_5-18-15.pdf)

Based on a stipulation for discipline by consent and the judge’s irrevocable resignation effective May 15, 2015, the California Commission on Judicial Performance censured a former judge and barred him holding judicial office for failing to disclose on financial disclosure forms the $250,000 he had received from the dissolution of a joint venture in a county contract for indigent defense and failing to disclose or disqualify when attorneys who had an interest in the contract appeared before him. In 2007, Garcia had joint venture agreement with a law firm that created a general partnership limited to the county’s indigent defense contract. The agreement provided that Garcia was to receive 45.662% of the net profits annually under the indigent defense contract, payable monthly, and Morse & Pfeiff was to receive 54.33%. The joint venture was “Merced Defense Associates,” which became known as MDA. In early October 2007, Garcia’s judicial appointment was announced. On November 29, an agreement dissolving the joint venture was executed. A separate 1-page agreement provided that MDA would pay Garcia $250,000, in monthly payments of $4,516 starting in January 2008, and that the payments would cease if the county terminated or did not renew the indigent defense services contract. In January 2008, after taking the bench, the judge began receiving monthly payments of $4,516 pursuant to the dissolution agreement. The monthly payments continued through August 2012, until the judge had been paid $250,000. On the judge’s statements of economic interests for 2008 through 2012, executed under penalty of perjury, the judge failed to disclose the $250,000 in income he received pursuant to the terms of the dissolution agreement. After the judge was re-assigned from a civil department to a criminal department in 2009, Pfeiff and other MDA attorneys regularly appeared before him. He did not disclose to his presiding judges the terms of the dissolution agreement or that, pursuant to its terms, he was receiving monthly payments. He also failed to disqualify himself in matters in which Pfeiff or other MDA attorneys appeared, including numerous MDA cases, or to disclose his continuing financial relationship with Pfeiff and MDA.

Inquiry Concerning Krause (Florida Supreme Court June 4, 2015) (http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/summaries/briefs/14/14-1812/Filed_06-04- 2015_Opinion.pdf) Based on a stipulation and recommendation of the investigative panel of the Judicial Qualifications Commission, the Florida Supreme Court suspended a judge for 30 days without pay for using social media to seek the assistance of her friends to help her husband, at the time a judicial candidate, correct perceived misstatements by his opponent. In June 2014, approving a stipulation and the Commission’s findings and recommendation of discipline, the Court had publicly reprimanded the judge and fined her $25,000 for (1) accepting funds from her husband in excess of the $500 contribution limit imposed by campaign law; (2) purchasing a table at a Republican Party fund-raiser; and (3) in some of her early campaign materials, failing to include the qualifier “for” required for a non- incumbent candidate. Inquiry Concerning Krause, 141 So. 3d 1197 (2014) (http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2014/sc13-2263.pdf).

According to news reports, a couple months later, while her husband was running for judicial office, the judge urged the people following her on a Facebook page to "flood" his opponent’s Facebook page with posts “that having ethics and integrity means TELLING THE TRUTH!” The judge’s post claimed her husband’s opponent was “misrepresenting. ... to try and make Mitch look unethical and without integrity.” The judge accepted full responsibility for the conduct, admitted that it should not have occurred, and apologized. She explained that her social media posting followed multiple private but ignored attempts to correct what she and her husband perceived as misstatements about her previous Commission matter. The judge told the panel that those attempts included seeking counsel from her chief judge, twice sending the same letter to the candidate asking her to refrain from misrepresenting the record (and never receiving acknowledgement or a response), and enlisting the help of an emissary to speak with her husband’s opponent; all of these attempts proved fruitless. The judge further explained that she intended her post to be a private message to her friends, but she removed the message within hours after realizing it reach beyond her circle of friends. The post was further disseminated only through the actions of those supporting her husband’s opponent.

Inquiry Concerning Griffin (Florida Supreme Court June 18, 2015) (http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/summaries/briefs/15/15-865/Filed_06-18- 2015_Opinion.pdf) Accepting a stipulation and approving the findings and recommendation of the Judicial Qualifications Commission, the Florida Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge for, at the inception of her judicial campaign, failing to follow Florida law when she opened her campaign account and lent money to her campaign prior to filing the necessary qualification paperwork with the qualifying officer.

Inquiry Concerning Watson (Florida Supreme Court June 18, 2015) (http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/summaries/briefs/13/13-1333/Filed_06-18- 2015_Opinion.pdf) Agreeing with the recommendation of the Judicial Qualifications Commission, the Florida Supreme Court removed a judge for her deceptive conduct as an attorney toward her clients and co-counsel in the settlement of multi-party litigation. “Despite Judge Watson’s protestations to the contrary,” the Court emphasized that the Commission and it have jurisdiction over misconduct committed by an attorney who subsequently becomes a judge “no matter how remote,” noting 2 prior cases. At some point prior to 2002, Watson’s law office and 2 other firms entered into a joint business plan to represent 441 healthcare providers in numerous lawsuits involving personal injury protection (“PIP”) claims against Progressive Insurance Company for systematically underpaying health care providers. The “PIP attorneys” also retained the services of Larry Stewart and 2 other attorneys to initiate a bad faith case against Progressive on behalf of 40 of their clients. It was contemplated that bad faith claims would ultimately be asserted on behalf of all the 441 clients of the PIP attorneys once those claims became perfected. The PIP

6 attorneys and bad faith attorneys reached an agreement concerning how the work would be handled and the fees would be split. The clients were to receive 60% of the recovery and the attorneys’ fees would amount to 40%. The bad faith attorneys were to receive 60% of the attorneys’ fees. The bad faith attorneys participated in extensive discovery in which they obtained an order compelling Progressive to produce internal documents. The PIP attorneys encouraged the bad faith attorneys to pursue their claims by joining in the bad faith claims or by settling the PIP claims while preserving the bad faith claims. Due to pressure by the bad faith attorneys, Progressive commenced settlement negotiations with both sets of attorneys. On numerous occasions, the PIP attorneys referred settlement negotiations of the bad faith claims to the bad faith attorneys and gave full authority to the bad faith attorneys to negotiate a global settlement of all of the bad faith claims, including the ones filed through the PIP attorneys. On January 21, 2004, the bad faith attorneys met with Progressive and demanded $20 million to settle all of the bad faith claims and reported this to the PIP attorneys. Progressive counter-offered with a $3.5 million settlement of all the bad faith claims, but the bad faith attorneys did not accept the offer, and no settlement was reached. The bad faith attorneys continued to pressure Progressive to produce more documents. On May 14, without notifying the bad faith attorneys, the PIP attorneys accepted an aggregate settlement offer from Progressive in an undifferentiated amount of $14.5 million to settle the PIP claims as well as all bad faith claims, perfected or potential. After the settlement was accepted, Progressive and the PIP attorneys drafted a memorandum of understanding that made clear that the settlement applied to all PIP claims and bad faith claims regardless whether they were perfected. The memorandum of understanding did not allocate any recovery to the bad faith claims and required the release of those claims. The bad faith attorneys objected, and the PIP attorneys amended the memorandum of understanding to award $1.75 million to the bad faith claims. The PIP attorneys then notified their clients, via letter, of the settlement but did not disclose the conflicts of interests, provide closing statements, or advise the clients of the material facts necessary to make an informed decision about their cases or execution of the releases. The PIP attorneys received funds from Progressive, which were placed in their respective trust fund accounts. Watson’s firm received $3,075,000, from which $361,470.30 was paid to clients. The clients still did not receive closing statements. The bad faith attorneys notified the PIP attorneys that, in accordance with The Florida Bar rules governing claims of disputed property, all of the attorneys’ fees should be held in a separate escrow account, but the PIP attorneys did not hold the funds in a separate account. The bad faith attorneys subsequently sued the PIP attorneys for fraudulent inducement and in quantum meruit for the work they performed. In April 2008, after a bench trial, a judge found that the actions taken by the PIP attorneys, including the settlement of the bad faith claims without notifying the bad faith attorneys or notifying the clients with bad faith claims that their claims would be released and they would be receiving little to no compensation for those claims, violated several rules of professional conduct. The trial court also found that the PIP attorneys exaggerated the number of hours they spent working on the PIP and bad faith claims. Ultimately, the trial court awarded the bad faith attorneys additional attorneys’ fees

7 due to unjust enrichment received by the PIP attorneys and for the cost of the work performed by the bad faith attorneys during the 2-year span. The judge sent a copy of his order to The Florida Bar. The Florida Bar began grievance proceedings against the PIP attorneys. Watson requested that the prosecution be deferred until after she finished appealing. The 4th District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment on February 29, 2012, and the Bar proceeded with its investigation. In October 2012, the grievance committee found probable cause. In November 2012, Watson was elected; she assumed office in January 2013. The Florida Bar forwarded its file to the Commission, and Larry Stewart filed a formal complaint. The Commission found:

Watson and the others hired Larry Stewart, who warned them in advance that the PIP claims and bad faith claims were adverse, requiring careful handling throughout settlement negotiations, with full client transparency. When Progressive dangled a pot of money, ethical restraints were swept aside. Watson and the PIP lawyers (at Progressive’s insistence) excluded the only attorney sufficiently experienced and knowledgeable to see them through settlement negotiations, and reached a quick (and ethically flawed) settlement agreement.

The Commission also found that “Watson never told her PIP clients that Progressive paid funds to settle the bad faith claims, and they weren’t allowed to participate in that recovery, despite the fact they were required to release these claims” but unilaterally decided that those clients had no interest in the bad faith case and that they had no duty to pay or include unknown people who may or may not someday have a claim. In addition, the Commission concluded that Watson “entered into an undisclosed side deal with [the clients who initially filed bad faith claims], contrary to the interests of the other bad faith claimants” and failed to disclose material information to her clients, including the conflicts of interest and the methodology of allocating funds between the PIP and bad faith claims that substantially decreased the funds available for distribution to the clients and allowed the PIP attorneys to take $10,960,000 in fees in addition to their portion of the initial bad faith claimants’ attorneys’ fees. Based on these findings and conclusions, the Commission determined that the judge “sold out her clients, her co-counsel, and ultimately herself.” The Court found that Commission’s findings and conclusions were supported by clear and convincing evidence, stating that the judge’s arguments were “not a reasonable inference from this record” or “belied by her e-mail correspondence.” The Court noted a previous case in which it had found that a pattern of deceit and deception “casts serious doubt on [a judge’s] ability to be perceived as truthful by those who may appear before her in her courtroom” and “diminishes the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judicial system.” It concluded that her “conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office,” her “actions while a practicing attorney, and her demeanor during these proceedings ‘cast[ ] serious doubts’ on her ‘ability to be perceived as truthful by those who may appear before her in her courtroom.’”

In re Popovich, Findings, conclusions, and order (Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission June 18, 2015) (http://courts.ky.gov/commissionscommittees/JCC/Documents/Public_Information/FindingsFa ctsPopovich.pdf) The Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission suspended a judge for 15 days without pay for holding a hearing in a case to resolve issues concerning the internal operation of the county’s attorney’s office at which he demeaned and denigrated his election opponent, a chief assistant criminal court prosecutor. Cameron Blau was the chief assistant criminal court prosecutor. He rarely appeared in court but provided considerable legal research for the in-court attorneys in criminal cases. Sometime prior to July 2014, Blau announced his candidacy for the judge’s seat. After Blau’s announcement, the judge called the county attorney, Steven Franzen, and asked if the county attorney’s office had a problem with him and whether Franzen was going to take part in Blau’s campaign. Franzen informed the judge he did not have a problem with the judge, he was not going to take part in Blau’s campaign, and he had not known in advance that Blau was going to run against the judge. The judge told Franzen he did not want Blau in his courtroom. Franzen told the judge he had already informed Blau he was not to appear in the judge’s court. Blau had no problem with that directive. The Commission noted, “to be clear, Franzen who made a very credible witness said Blau was not to appear in the Judge Popovich’s courtroom, but Blau was not restrained from assisting other assistant county attorneys who were appearing in the Judge Popovich’s courtroom.” The Commission found, “clearly, Judge Popovich was upset that Blau was seeking the judicial position occupied by Judge Popovich . . . .” Nick Summe was representing Jessica Schatzman in a DUI case before the judge. John Fortner, a part-time prosecutor for the county attorney, was assigned to represent the Commonwealth. Summe felt the police stop was unconstitutional and called Blau to ask him to recommend that the case be dismissed. However, Blau rebuffed Summe’s attempt and instead sent Summe an e-mail, with the subject line “Supreme Court case screwing you,” that said, “Look at this and tell me what you think!” and included a recent U.S. Supreme Court case. “Unfortunately,” the Commission stated, Blau did not inform Fortner of his conversation and e- mail with Summe. Summe was already aware of this case, but believed he could distinguish it and filed a motion to suppress. There was a hearing on the motion on July 10, 2014. The judge was inclined to agree with Summe but gave Fortner’s office until July 24 to file a brief. A status conference was set for August 5. After the record was turned off at the hearing, Summe commented to Fortner to the effect that the defense “had this one in the bag.” The Commission found that the comment was “taunting” and “cajoling.” The judge did not hear the exchange. Summe started to leave the courtroom. Fortner “still fuming” went to the judge at the bench and reported “with some indignation” and “with considerable displeasure” that Summe had just told him concerning Blau helping with the case. The judge expressed his surprise. After the July 20 hearing, Fortner “took the initiative” and told Blau that he needed to be kept informed when there were conversations with defense counsel about his cases. Blau apologized to Fortner for not doing so. Some days later at a church picnic, an attorney who appears regularly before the judge told the judge that he overheard Summe tell Fortner that Blau had helped him write the brief.

(No other witness confirmed that version of the comment.) He expressed concerns that the county attorney’s office may be favoring some defense attorneys. The judge replied that he was “looking into it.” On July 23, the county attorney’s office filed its response to the motion to suppress. Summe declined to file a reply brief. At his disciplinary hearing, the judge testified that Summe’s failure to file a reply brief was further support for his suspicions that Blau was assisting the defense. The parties thought the “status hearing” on August 5 would be on the merits of the motion to suppress. Instead, the hearing was about Summe’s comments to Fortner; the merits of the case were barely mentioned. The judge did not ask any questions, and no one was invited to ask questions or produce witnesses concerning Summe’s comments. The judge began by commenting to Summe, “I know the comments were made because they were made in front of other attorneys.” Summe tried to explain that Blau had sent him a case that was favorable to the prosecution and unfavorable to the defense. The judge did not ask to see the e-mail. The judge opined that the Summe statements to Fortner placed the court in an extremely awkward position because it seemed Blau was helping the defense and that Blau had undercut the other assistants in the past. During the August 5 hearing, the judge referred to Blau as the “alleged Chief Assistant” at least 5 times. The Commission found that the judge “was using the term in a demeaning way.” The judge also referred to 2 cases successfully prosecuted in his court but later appealed in which that “particular person” (referring to Blau) decided not to file any briefs, and “those people went free.” The judge said he thought at the time it was just neglect but now he was not so sure that Blau was not “taking it upon himself to decide to go against you guys because he didn’t like it, I don’t know.” The Commission concluded referring to the other cases “was simply another way to denigrate Blau because of Judge Popovich’s displeasure with the Blau candidacy.” The Commission found that the August 5 hearing did not have the appearance of an investigation or an inquiry concerning Blau’s alleged assistance of Summe. Instead, it concluded, the judge “who appeared to be reading from a prepared script, used the hearing to embarrass Summe in front of his client and vilify Blau.” In an order following the hearing, the judge stated, “the whole matter is troubling. Can one even imagine an associate assisting prosecutor in a case where another member of the same firm is representing the defendant. Unthinkable.” The order also required the “actual” county attorney to tell him what authority Blau had over other assistants and whether the county attorney wished to proceed with the prosecution of Schatzman. In a letter, the county attorney informed the judge “that the County Attorney’s office certainly wants to proceed with its prosecution as outlined very eloquently in its brief opposition to the defendant’s motion.” The county attorney also told the judge that the internal operation of his office was not an issue in the Schatzman case. In a reply letter, which was not copied, to Summe, the judge, the Commission found, “seemingly chagrined that Franzen did not say what he wanted him to say. So, the judge said it for Franzen. He concluded that, ‘it is obvious from your letter that each prosecutor has the authority in criminal cases assigned to them and not Mr. Blau. I also assume that you have informed Mr. Blau not to assist with the defense in any cases your prosecutors are pursuing.’”

The Commission sent a notice to the judge on October 27 that a complaint had been filed against him based on the August 5 hearing. On November 13, the judge dismissed the Schatzman case based on the motion to suppress. The Commission concluded:

This was much ado about little, a tempest in a teapot. When Judge Popovich, on the record in a public hearing, attacked his political opponent there was far greater potential for damage to the integrity and independence of the court system than what was happening in the Count Attorney’s Office. Judge Popovich should not have interjected himself in the inner workings of the County Attorney’s Office. If he sincerely felt the need to do so, a proper hearing should have been held with proper notice to the parties affected. Such inquiry, if any, should not have been comingled with the Schatzman case.

The August 5, 2014 event was not a proper hearing or even an “investigation” of the Summe comments. Rather, it was an opportunity for Judge Popovich to excoriate his personal and political enemy, Blau, who had no chance to defend himself. If Judge Popovich was concerned there was unethical conduct on the part of Summe or anyone in the County Attorney’s Office, he was obliged . . . to report any such unprofessional conduct immediately to the proper investigation and disciplinary authorities.

The Commission noted that the judge had been privately admonished in 1993 for campaign conduct and publicly reprimanded in 2011 for (1) failing to use procedures that adequately assured that defendants understood their procedural rights and (2) addressing some parties and counsel in undignified and demeaning language. The Commission noted that it could not recall any testimony in which the judge admitted by any mistakes or wrongdoing, adding “to the contrary, he aggressively defended his conduct to the very end. It is troubling that the Respondent cannot see how his actions were improper and reflect poorly on the judiciary and court system of the Commonwealth.”

Commission on Judicial Performance v. Thompson (Mississippi Supreme Court May 5, 2015) (https://courts.ms.gov/Images/Opinions/CO103216.pdf) Agreeing with the recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Performance, the Mississippi Supreme Court removed a judge from office and fined him $3,500 for (1) failing to follow the law in drug court; (2) attending a meeting between a suspended bail bondsman and the sheriff; and (3) depriving a drug court participant of her right to counsel of her choosing by threatening to hold her retained counsel in contempt if she did not sit down. The Court also imposed costs of $7,693.38. (1)(a) The judge served as the sole judge for the Lee County Justice Court Drug Court. A statute provides that a justice court may require a defendant to remain in a drug court program subject to good behavior for a period not to exceed 2 years. Participants in the Lee County Justice Court Drug Court were routinely kept in the program for more than 2 years, and the judge was aware of how long each participant had been in the program.

(b) Participants in the drug court program were arrested and jailed for “contempt of orders of the drug court.” For example, T.L., who was held in the program for 3 years and 4 months, was jailed on at least 4 separate occasions (which totaled more than 6 months in jail) for violations or failures to comply with drug court orders that were deemed contempt of court, and S.S. was jailed several times, once for 24 days, for unspecified violations or failures “to comply with drug court” deemed contempt of court. In some instances, bench warrants were issued for a participant’s failure to appear at a monthly meeting. The Commission had previously cautioned the judge regarding improperly using contempt powers against drug-court participants. The Court stated that the judge’s “apparent defense in the hearing was that, because it was drug court in which incarceration was a ‘sanction,’ he did not have to use contempt-of-court procedures because ‘drug court is different from regular court.’” (c) Participants were jailed for drug court “violations” even though they were in the program for offenses that were not punishable with jail time or were not felony offenses. For example, the judge had T.L. jailed at the end of his 3 years in the drug court program for 6 months on the underlying charge of first-offense simple possession of marijuana, a charge that, by statute, carries no jail time and an additional 6 months for “contempt of court, failure to complete drug court.” The county prosecuting attorney expressed to the judge his concern that participants in the drug court program for whom the underlying offenses were not punishable by jail time were being jailed for not being compliant with “whatever requirements [the judge] or the counselors were putting on them.” (d) Without adequate due process hearings, participants were routinely jailed for violations that were discussed at “staffing meetings” just prior to monthly drug court sessions at which the participants were not present although a volunteer public defender was. The participants did not receive written notice of specific violations prior to or during hearings, and no affidavits or sworn evidence were presented in a hearing. Arresting documents charged “drug court violation” or “contempt of court failure to comply with drug court.” (e) The judge accepted and enrolled participants from other court systems that did not have drug courts even after receiving an opinion from the attorney general that the “Lee County drug court may not accept referrals from municipal courts that do not have a drug court” because the statute provided that “participation in the services of an alcohol and drug intervention component shall be open only to the individuals over whom the court has jurisdiction, except that the court may agree to provide the services for individuals referred from another drug court.” The judge had requested the opinion after the county prosecuting attorney had discussed with him a similar attorney general’s opinion issued to a different city. The Court noted that “testimony established that the judge was aware of, but chose to disregard, the Attorney General’s opinion because he disagreed with its conclusion and the opinion was not binding law.” Agreeing with the Commission that the judge’s “lack of understanding and appreciation for the basic legal principles of contempt of court and due-process safeguards cannot be overlooked,” the Court noted that the judge had “received information from numerous sources regarding the impropriety of his actions, yet he continued without regard to a proper understanding of the law” and concluded that his “conduct in jailing drug-court participants for inordinate periods of time for ‘contempt’ of court for ‘failure to comply with drug court orders’

12 without adequate due-process hearings and keeping them jailed for periods well in excess of the time due the underlying crime was knowing and deliberate.’” (2) The sheriff testified that, while in the judge’s courtroom for a hearing, he had observed Christopher Hoyle sitting inside the courtroom bar near the bench in an area normally reserved for court personnel. When a defendant was fined or otherwise sentenced, Hoyle would approach the bench, the judge would hand him the file, and Hoyle would take the defendant and the file outside the courtroom. Hoyle is a bail bondsman and has a probation company for which he serves as a probation officer. Hoyle is not an employee of the Lee County Justice Court, but he testified he served as a “volunteer probation officer” in the judge’s court and the drug court. Hoyle testified that he “hung around justice court to help with the drug court” and that he routinely would sit in the judge’s court in “the probation area seats.” He is a friend and social companion of the judge. During 2013, after the sheriff suspended Hoyle from writing bonds following complaints regarding his business practices, Hoyle and the judge appeared at the sheriff’s office to inquire about the suspension. The sheriff testified that the judge spoke to him on Hoyle’s behalf in an attempt to have the suspension lifted. Although Hoyle testified that the judge had accompanied him only as a friend for moral support, the Commission found that Hoyle’s testimony that the judge did not speak during the meeting was disingenuous and not credible. The Commission found that, even if he did not speak to the sheriff, the judge’s presence at the meeting was an overt act to advance Hoyle’s private interests. However, the Commission did not find that, as alleged in the complaint, the judge had engaged in impropriety by allowing Hoyle to handle case files or speak to defendants. (3) On July 1, the judge signed an order placing K.F. in the drug court program. The order was also signed by K.F. and Janelle Lowery, as attorney for K.F. During her drug court participation, K.F. was arrested and incarcerated several times for alleged contempt of court for “failure to comply with drug court order.” She was twice incarcerated for a total of 22 days. Lowrey wrote letters to the drug court stating that she was representing K.F. When Lowrey inquired of the drug court personnel about a June 12, 2012, incarceration of K.F., Lowrey was informed she must place something in the file regarding her representation of K.F. A letter signed by K.F. authorizing drug court personnel to communicate with Lowrey regarding her case was submitted to the drug court on June 14. On June 15, K.F. was brought before the judge. When Lowrey approached the bench, the judge refused to allow Lowrey to speak on K.F.’s behalf. Lowrey testified that the judge threatened to hold her in contempt if she did not sit down. Instead of Lowery, the judge recognized a volunteer public defender, who had been recruited by the judge, to speak for K.F., even though the volunteer had not met with K.F. before the hearing. The Commission found that K.F. was denied her right to counsel of her choosing. In aggravation, the Court stated that, throughout the hearing, the judge “attempted to ‘pass the buck’ to others and claimed that it was another person’s responsibility to have explained to him what to do as judge in either justice court or drug court, and that he had done nothing wrong in failing to be knowledgeable of the law or procedures he was implementing.” The Court also considered the judge’s prior disciplinary history. In 2006, the Commission had privately admonished the judge after finding that he had engaged in ex parte communications with a litigant, attempted to mediate a dispute, and subsequently issued a criminal warrant in a

13 civil case. In 2008, the Commission had sent the judge a letter of caution for frequently calling a municipal judge and court personnel to inquire about the bonds and incarcerations of people he knew. In 2008, the Court had publicly reprimanded the judge for interjecting himself into a matter involving relatives and interfering with the issuance and execution of a warrant involving a family member in an attempt to prevent a warrant from being issued and served. Commission on Judicial Performance v. Thompson, 972 So. 2d 582 (Mississippi 2008). In 2010, the Commission had sent the judge a letter of caution for incarcerating 2 drug court participants upon observing them drinking alcohol at a restaurant. In 2012, the Court had suspended the judge for 30 days without pay, fined him $2,000, and publicly reprimanded him for interjecting himself into domestic matters when no case was pending before him; signing an order in a separate matter where there was no case pending; engaging in ex parte communications; interfering with another judges’ cases; and improperly dismissing traffic cases. Commission on Judicial Performance v. Thompson, 80 So. 3d 86 (Mississippi 2012). Agreeing that the judge “has not learned from those prior proceedings,” the Court stated that the current matter was “more egregious than the prior charges, thus warranting a greater sanction to restore confidence in the judiciary.”

Commission on Judicial Performance v. Littlejohn (Mississippi Supreme Court June 18, 2015) (https://courts.ms.gov/Images/Opinions/CO104865.pdf) The Mississippi Supreme Court suspended a chancellor for 30 days without pay, fined him $1,000, and ordered that he be publicly reprimanded for ignoring a supersedeas bond, holding a party in contempt, and ordering him incarcerated. The Court also taxed costs. The Court also ordered its clerk shall send copies of its opinion and mandate to the county chancery clerk, the county administrator, and the county board of supervisors. The Commission on Judicial Performance had recommended a $500 fine and a public reprimand. 1 justice dissented from the sanction and would have “defer[red] to the Commission’s careful evaluation of what sanctions are appropriate to impose on a longstanding public servant like Judge Littlejohn.” 2 justices dissented from the sanction, arguing that Article 6, Section 166 of the Mississippi Constitution precluded the Court from suspending a chancellor without pay. In March 2012, modifying an agreed order of filiation and support between Ronald Brooks and Janice Fields, the judge ordered Brooks to pay Janice $15,000 for an automobile for their child within 90 days and $1,750 in attorney fees within 60 days. Brooks posted a supersedeas bond, which the chancery clerk approved, and appealed. Because he had posted the supersedeas bond, Brooks did not pay the sums ordered while the appeal was pending. On August 7, Janice filed a contempt complaint against Brooks. The judge acknowledged that Brooks had posted a supersedeas bond but nevertheless held him in contempt for his failure to pay and ordered him incarcerated until he paid the entire amount of $16,750. Brooks filed an emergency appeal, and the Court vacated the judge’s contempt finding and ordered Brooks released. He had spent 3 days and 2 nights in jail. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a) provides that an appellant “shall be entitled to a stay of execution of a money judgment pending appeal if the appellant gives a supersedeas

14 bond . . . . The clerk of the trial court shall approve any such bond and the approval of the supersedeas bond by the clerk shall constitute a stay of the judgment.” The Court emphasized:

The language of this rule could not be more clear: when the clerk approves the bond, the trial court’s judgment is stayed. And more than sixty years ago, this Court held that a chancellor erred by holding a party in contempt for failure to pay alimony and medical expenses because the order granting those sums was appealed with a supercedeas bond posted. So Chancellor Littlejohn ignored not only the clear wording of the rule but also this Court’s application of it in a similar case. Therefore, his argument that he had jurisdiction to hold Brooks in contempt is specious, at best. . . .

So when Chancellor Littlejohn held Brooks in contempt for failing to pay a sum Brooks had appealed with a supercedeas bond, Chancellor Littlejohn disregarded the clear language of a rule of court and decades-old precedent. And in doing so he abused his power of contempt and illegally incarcerated Brooks.

The Court noted that the judge cited inapposite cases holding that a chancellor possesses continuing jurisdiction to modify child support any time there is a material change in circumstances. With respect to sanction, the Court noted that “much of his public service has been laudable” but that it had previously reprimanded because he had incarcerated an attorney who failed to recite the pledge of allegiance in the judge’s courtroom. The Court noted that it has repeatedly sanctioned judges for misusing the contempt power and that the Commission’s recommended sanctions was not commensurate with the sanctions imposed in those cases. The Court also noted that the judge had “created one of the most severe forms of harm he could: that is, he illegally incarcerated Brooks,” emphasizing that the judge failed to acknowledge any wrongdoing.

In the Matter of Leavitt, Stipulation and order (Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline May 8, 2015) (http://judicial.state.nv.us/Docs/2015/2015-05- 13_Stipulation_OrderforPublicReprimand_MichelleLeavitt.pdf) Based on a stipulation and agreement, the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline publicly reprimanded a judge for abusing her contempt power and failing to be honest with the Commission. The judge also agreed to take a minimum of 2 courses at the National Judicial College (one on “Ethics, Fairness, and Security in Your Courtroom and Community”) and to familiarize herself with the statutes and rules governing the contempt power. While presiding in a criminal case, the judge incarcerated the complainant on a charge of contempt and jailed her without ensuring that she had a timely opportunity to understand the charge against her, to seek release from jail or bail, or to be timely tried on the charge; failed to determine whether the alleged contempt was direct or indirect and to enter judgment (if direct contempt) or to ensure that an affidavit in support of the allegations was timely filed by the bailiff, court officer, or marshal (if indirect contempt); failed to issue a warrant of attachment or warrant of commitment as required by law; and failed to ensure the

15 complainant was brought before a magistrate on the contempt charge or any other charges within 72 hours as required by statute or within a timely manner in accordance with constitutional requirements. The judge also stated words or led the Commission to believe that there was sworn testimony to the facts of the complainant’s interaction with jurors outside the courtroom, that she fully advised the complainant of the factual basis leading to her incarceration, that counsel from the public defender’s office had been immediately appointed and advised that the complainant had been incarcerated and the reason for the incarceration; and that a complaint had been filed forthwith.

Public Admonition of Schildknecht and Order of Additional Education (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct May 11, 2015) (http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf/actions/FY2015- PUBSANC.pdf) The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a judge for (1) holding a “marathon” court session lasting until 4:00 a.m.; (2) describing the district attorney as a “New York Jew;” (3) expelling the district attorney from her courtroom; and (4) telling a prosecutor his beard made him look like a “Muslim.” The Commission also ordered the judge to obtain 4 hours of instruction with a mentor, in addition to her required judicial education, regarding the “Open Courts” doctrine and recognizing and eliminating explicit and implicit bias and/or prejudice. (1) On July 2, 2014, the judge began hearing probation revocation cases starting at 1:00 p.m.; the court session did not end until 4:00 a.m. on July 3. The judge did not provide any formal breaks in which litigants, attorneys, witnesses, or other court personnel could eat meals or use the restroom facilities. The defendant whose case was the final matter heard in the early morning of July 3rd appealed her conviction, arguing that “fair consideration could not have possibly been given at 4 a.m. after a 19 hour day.” In her written responses to the Commission’s inquiry, the judge acknowledged holding court from 1:00 p.m. on July 2nd until 4:00 a.m. on July 3rd without providing formal breaks, but explained that this “marathon” session was necessary to prevent jail over-crowding and that, in her opinion, there had been enough “downtime” for anyone to eat or use the restroom and return in time to conduct court business. (2) In July 2014, the judge referred to District Attorney Michael Munk as a “New York Jew” during a private conversation with Munk’s secretary in the judge’s office. On July 25, after jury selection in a criminal case, the judge met in chambers with Munk and a defense attorney to try to explain why she had referred to Munk as a “New York Jew.” In that conversation, the judge stated: “When I tell people why you [Munk] are different and have different thoughts, I explain because you are from New York and because you are Jewish.” In her written responses to the Commission’s inquiry, the judge admitted making these statements but explained she made them, not with bias or prejudice or to disparage Munk, but to attempt to explain that Munk’s “background is that from a culture of a New York Jew,” and that his approach and perspective “may be different from that of someone who has been reared in West Texas. To understand that leads to acceptance of the differences.” The judge added that, “I may be too blunt, but I am not biased or prejudiced against New Yorkers or Jews.”

(3) On the afternoon of July 15, 2014, when District Attorney Munk attempted to enter her courtroom, the judge instructed her bailiff to refuse entry to him with words to the effect of “Get him out of here” or “I don’t want to see his face.” In her written responses to the inquiry, the judge acknowledged that she made the statement and expressed regret for acting “in haste” but explained that she did not see any reason for Munk to be in her courtroom after “the business of the court had concluded” for that day. (4) On September 30, 2014, at the conclusion of a criminal docket in her courtroom, the judge criticized an assistant district attorney about his beard, stating, “You look like a Muslim, and I wouldn’t hire you with it,” or words to that effect. In her written response to the Commission’s inquiry, the judge could not recall whether she made the statement but commented that the situation “seemed faintly familiar.” The judge added that she would not have made such a comment while actively conducting court business, surmising that the conversation must have taken place during “down time.” The judge further explained that she did not know “that there is a specific look of a Muslim” and did not recall any particular look that is common to Muslims she had seen on television.

Public Admonition of Johnson (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct May 14, 2015) (http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf/actions/FY2015-PUBSANC.pdf) The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct admonished a former judge for failing to provide public documents and information to citizens regarding cases in her court; failing to timely execute the business of the court; failing to hold jury or bench trials; failing to reduce her rulings to final, written, appealable judgments; failing to maintain proper records; and failing to conduct proper fiscal management. The judge had been placed on paid administrative leave by the city and later resigned in August 2014. In December 2013, a citizen went to the municipal court to inquire about the status of a citation for which the citizen was the alleged victim. After a verbal altercation, the judge refused to provide the citizen with any information about the case, erroneously relying on an opinion or ruling from the Texas Attorney General’s Office that did not apply to the request. In January 2014, the judge was observed by several witnesses engaging in a shouting match with a woman she had stopped outside city hall. According to the witnesses, it appeared that the judge was upset with the woman for criticizing the judge’s handling of the December 2013 incident. In February 2014, a local reporter went to the court to inquire into the status of a citation that had been filed for which the reporter was the alleged victim. The judge again denied access to the requested court records, again erroneously relying on an opinion from the Attorney General’s Office that did not apply to the request. In October 2014, an audit reported chronic and systemic problems with the judge’s court, including fiscal mismanagement, failure to hold pre-trial, bench, or jury trials, failure to process complaints, failure to render final written judgments, and a total absence of record- keeping and management.

Public Admonition of Mullin (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 30, 2015) (http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf/actions/FY2015-PUBSANC.pdf) The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct admonished a former judge for failing to treat certain attorneys with patience, dignity, and courtesy and repeatedly attempting to intervene and assert her “rights” in pending recusal proceedings. Bryant Wyatt filed a motion to recuse Judge Mullin. Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion was referred to another judge. At a hearing on the motion, Wyatt testified, “I have never been treated the way that I have been treated in County Court Number 5 by presiding judge…Judge Etta Mullin . . . I have never been talked to where I was told to back away from the bench in a threatening manner . . . . She tells [another judge] that basically I’m a liar.” During the hearing, an assistant criminal district attorney also testified that Judge Mullin could not be fair and impartial in the case due to her dislike of Wyatt. The assistant criminal district attorney representing the state at the hearing raised no objections to the motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge was ordered recused from the case. On learning that she had been recused, the judge filed a “Court’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of Recusal.” The judge who presided over the recusal hearing granted the motion. Pursuant to Wyatt’s request, the Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief, finding that “Judge Mullin’s motion for reconsideration was wholly improper and without authority.” The Court held:

[T]his process contemplates the resolution of the motion through the exercise of the independent judgment of the assigned judge absent any outside pressure. It would defeat the purpose of the “refer rule” to permit the challenged judge to insert herself in her official capacity as judge in order to exert pressure upon and influence the assigned judge’s judgment. It is not just inappropriate but blatantly improper for a challenged judge to take action designed to influence the outcome of the matter at issue. To hold otherwise would seriously compromise the independence of the assigned judge and undermine the integrity of the judicial recusal.

Although aware of the appellate decision, Judge Mullin testified before the Commission that her actions had been appropriate because she believed her due process rights had been violated when she was not provided with notice of the recusal hearing and, as a result, was prevented from presenting witness testimony at the hearing. The judge also testified that she had routinely provided the State with the names of potential witnesses who would testify on her behalf in recusal hearings. The Commission concluded that the judge’s “repeated attempts to intervene and assert her ‘rights’ in pending recusal proceedings constituted a willful and/or persistent failure to follow the law and demonstrated incompetence in performing the duties of the office,” noting the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure specify that the “judge whose recusal or disqualification is sought should not file a response to the motion” and in a case specifically involving Judge Mullin’s recusal, “the Fifth Court of Appeals found the language of the rule to be mandatory.” The Commission stated, “it did not appear from Judge Mullin’s testimony before the Commission that she understood or accepted that she could not insert herself or become involved in pending recusal motions.”

On Friday, April 11, 2014, James Bright arrived in the judge’s court attired in a dress shirt, suit jacket, tie, and Bermuda shorts to accommodate a clearly visible, large knee brace that he was forced to wear as the result of knee surgery. When Bright approached the bench to ask the judge if he could handle a plea for his client while wearing shorts, the judge denied his request, suggesting that Bright have someone else stand in for him. The following Monday, another attorney appeared on Bright’s behalf to handle the plea for his client. Bright also appeared, again wearing shorts, with one of his law partners to notify the judge that he had filed a motion to recuse. That motion was later denied. This incident received media attention. Bright also told the media that he actively avoided the judge’s courtroom, as did a large number of other attorneys, due to her poor judicial temperament. In her testimony before the Commission, the judge denied discriminating against Bright or treating him in a discourteous or undignified manner, explaining that she refused to allow Bright to appear before her while attired in shorts in an effort to enforce decorum in her courtroom. The judge also claimed that Bright returned to her courtroom that Monday for the sole purpose of creating a public spectacle for the media to report. Throughout the spring of 2014, several local, state-wide, and national media reports were published criticizing the judge, a candidate for re-election, for inefficient courtroom management skills and for discourteous, impatient, and undignified treatment of certain attorneys. In these reports, and later confirmed by the Commission, a local attorney who had been practicing law in Dallas for 32 years, called the judge the “most inefficient and inconsiderate judge that [he] can recall having.” Another attorney recounted to reporters and the Commission several criticisms of the judge’s discourteous treatment of lawyers, including an occasion when the judge made him wait approximately 5 hours in the courtroom and then got off the bench, left, and never came back. The judge generally denied these allegations, stating that it was difficult to respond without being informed of the specific times, dates, or cause numbers involved.

In re Johnson, Stipulation, agreement, and order (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct May 1, 2015) (http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/Case%20Material/2015/7711_Johnson_Stip.pdf) Based on a stipulation and agreement, the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct censured a former part-time judge for under-reporting income she received as a judge and thereby collecting unemployment benefits to which she was not entitled. On June 24, 2014, the Employment Security Department's Office of Special Investigations issued a "Determination Notice" concluding that the judge had, 20 times between March 9 and December 14, 2013, under-reported the income she earned as a judge and thereby collected unemployment benefits to which she was not entitled. The Department determined the judge knowingly withheld material facts to obtain benefits to which she was not entitled and was at fault in causing the overpayment, which is considered fraud pursuant to statute. That finding was affirmed by an administrative law judge on December 18, 2014. The judge agreed that, if the matter were to proceed to a hearing, the Commission could find based on the stipulated facts that she violated the code of judicial conduct. She did not admitted committing fraud, but acknowledged the finding of the Employment Security

Department. The judge agreed not to hold office in the future without first securing permission from the Commission.