Command Climate By Lt. Col. Joseph Doty and Maj. Joe Gelineau

The moral compass of the Army is the PL and the CO. I told every one of my PLs that they have to set that moral standard, that once you slip to the left, you can’t pull your guys back in. —Capt. Dan Kearney, New York Times Magazine, February 24, 2008

n this era of persistent conflict, with arms room inventory, a material readi- Ithe focus on counterinsurgency ness report, appropriate use of rules of (COIN) operations, a unit’s command engagement and escalation of force, climate is vital to our nation’s long- timely and accurate reporting of check- term success at all levels of war—tac- points, and so on). For example, com- tical, operational and strategic. manders (leaders) who give cursory at- Command climate is the culture of tention to the importance of accurate a unit. It is the way a unit “conducts (ethical) reporting, training to standard, business.” The leader of the organiza- discipline under fire and treatment of tion is solely responsible for the orga- noncombatants set a command climate nization’s command climate. Com- that is prone to failure (or worse). manders at all levels establish this What follows is a response from a climate by what they say and what former brigade commander in Afghan- they do. Character-based leadership istan to the question, “How much is the bedrock requirement for a suc- does/can command climate prevent cessful command climate. ethical lapses (atrocities) from occur- Commanders send clear messages to ring?” their units by the way they do simple things and the things they check (an Command climate has everything to do with it, but I would define it broadly to include discipline, leader- ship, training and understanding of the environment as well as values: courage, respect … there is no excuse for atrocities or indiscriminate kil- ling—it’s criminal behavior, and we are not criminals. We’ve lost 41 killed and 330-plus wounded without any lapses in discipline and are winning this COIN campaign. We investigate every civilian death [according to Army regulation] 15-6 and do the right thing, be it solatia, express remorse or apologize if we were wrong for any innocent civilians killed; we obviously do not apologize for enemy killed, and we always em- phasize how the enemy endangers the civilians by fighting among them. The unwillingness or decision not to do this is staggering. How can we ex- pect to keep the population with us if we do not live American values and respect indigenous cultural values? We were sent here to win the COIN, the center of gravity of which is the people. To do that, we live and model our American values and re-

22 ARMY I July 2008 spect Afghan values; in all we do, we How does a leader establish a com- voiced nonstop in the unit. seek to do no harm to the people and mand climate? Most importantly, a Arguably, in conventional forces (not always do the right thing. If you do command climate is set by what the special operations), command climate that, you retain the moral high leader says and does. Leaders must set is set at the battalion level. Although ground, without which we lose. the example. Period. Soldiers watch brigade-and-above commanders will their leaders and follow the examples establish a command climate, it is at istorically, there are examples of they set. Equally important, the leader the battalion level where the most pro- Hquestionable command climates must set the standard and enforce the found and effective influence occurs. resulting in behaviors that are not in standard. Walking by or ignoring any Battalion-level commanders are the tune with our professional military violations of a unit’s command climate lowest level commanders centrally se- ethic or a result of character-based is setting a new command climate. lected by the Department of the Army, leadership. An AR 15-6 investigation Commanders can set a climate that and they most closely “touch” and in- report, released by the Department of fosters open and honest communica- fluence soldiers’ attitudes and behav- the Army in 2000, concluded that the tion—both up and down the chain of iors. Counterinsurgency operations, command climate in Company A, 3rd command. This type of leader is an ap- which are often decentralized at com- Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry proachable leader who does not shoot pany- and platoon-level operations, Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, the messenger and fosters a climate of highlight the importance of battalion serving on a peacekeeping mission in trust in the organization. A comman- commanders establishing and enforc- Kosovo, resulted in a West Point lieu- der who “cuts out the knees” of peo- ing—by their presence (“leadership by tenant (torture) and a staff sergeant ple who bring him bad news will fos- walking around”)—a moral/ethical (rape and murder) being involved in ter a climate in which the unit will command climate. Company comman- criminal conduct. The unit’s battalion hide bad news or lie about it. ders and platoon leaders are at the exe- commander, also a West Point gradu- Leaders also set a command climate cution level of the battalion comman- ate, believed that his unit was only do- by articulating what the core values of der’s command climate (as alluded to ing what the situation required. Some the unit are. Core values are those non- in the introductory quotation by Capt. of this “required” behavior included negotiable tenets that permeate the Kearney). grabbing ethnic Albanian women’s unit and guide everything the unit Most importantly, if a battalion- breasts, drinking alcohol in violation does or fails to do and the manner in level commander does not set and en- of Army rules and roughing up ethnic which it does so. Core values are often force a command climate, subclimates Albanians. A unit’s motto is a reflec- articulated in a commander’s philoso- will be established by leaders in the tion of its command climate and a phy. For core values to be most effec- unit. Subordinate leaders within the window into the way the unit con- tive, they should be limited to three to unit with referent and expert power ducts its business—the company’s five. Why only three to five? Because (charisma) will establish subcultures motto was “shoot ’em in the face.” when a unit focuses on too much, it that may or may not be what the unit In 2003 and 2004 during Operation ends up focusing on nothing. Clarity commander desires. Iraqi Freedom, the 4th Infantry Divi- and simplicity are paramount when es- Setting a moral/ethical command sion’s Lt. Col. Allen West (firing a tablishing a command climate. For ex- climate must be an intentional process weapon adjacent to an Iraqi detainee’s ample, the following definition of dis- by commanders and is a requirement head) and Lt. Col. Nate Sassaman (his cipline could be a catchy yet effective to maintain the moral high ground in subordinates throwing Iraqi detainees battalion phrase that articulates a com- this era of persistent conflict. I into the Tigris River) were involved in mand climate: “Doing what should be questionable ethical behavior, which done, when it should be done; doing it LT. COL. JOSEPH DOTY teaches in the resulted in both being released from the best it can be done; and doing it Department of Physical Education and the Army. There can be no doubt their that way every time.” the Department of Behavioral Sciences units’ command climates factored into A unit’s core values, its command and Leadership at the U.S. Military what they did and why they did it. climate, should not be confused or re- Academy. He also serves as the deputy Soldiers in units are going to do ex- placed with the seven Army Values director in the Army’s Center of Excel- actly what their leaders allow and ex- (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, lence for the Professional Military Ethic. emplify. The most egregious case is the honor, integrity and personal courage), He previously commanded the 1st Bat- My Lai massacre during the Vietnam the Soldier’s Creed or the Warrior talion, 27th Field Artillery (MLRS), V War. Appropriate questions to reflect Ethos. These values, beliefs and creeds Corps Artillery, U.S. Army Europe. on in this case are: Can part of the are vitally important and are the MAJ. JOE GELINEAU teaches in the blame be placed on the fact that the lo- Army’s strategic themes and values. At Department of Physical Education at cals were all “gooks”? Had the enemy the unit level, however, it is more effec- the U.S. Military Academy. He previ- been so dehumanized that this (and tive to use the KISS (“Keep It Simple, ously served as team leader and assis- other) atrocities had to occur? What Stupid”) principle and emphasize tant operation officer in the 10th Special was the command climate in this unit? those three to five themes that will be Forces.

24 ARMY I July 2008