DRUDGERY, DRAMA AND WAR

CAMP SHERIDAN AND

CAMP ROBINSON

______

A Thesis

Presented

to the Faculty of

California State University Dominguez Hills

______

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

in

Humanities

______

by

Kenneth Sowden

Spring 2019

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many thanks to Dr. Matthew Luckett for his guidance and encouragement during this project and for affording me the privilege of exploring a topic about which I had very

little prior knowledge, but which nevertheless proved to be very illuminating.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... iii

ABSTRACT ...... iv

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

2. BACKGROUND ...... 3

3. SPOTTED TAIL AGENCY AND CAMP SHERIDAN ...... 8

4. RED CLOUD AGENCY AND CAMP ROBINSON ...... 27

5. THE GREAT SIOUX WAR ...... 41

6. AFTERMATH ...... 46

7. CONCLUSION ...... 49

WORKS CITED ...... 51

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to interconnect and enhance the narrative related to

Camp Sheridan and Camp Robinson during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Original endorsement journals and post returns from these two camps are utilized, as well as existing literature about each and about the history of the Plains Sioux. These sources provide an intimate glimpse into the daily routines, often marked by drudgery and danger, required to maintain military camps whose purpose was to protect the Indian agencies with which they were associated. More importantly, elements of the broader history of the United States government’s determination to expand westward during the latter half of the nineteenth century are discussed. Historical background and context for the formation of Indian agencies are provided, in addition to discussions related to the necessity and purpose of their associated military camps, the growing tension between

Indians and Whites and the onset and aftermath of the Great Sioux War.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

During the second half of the nineteenth century the United States government increased its reach and influence on the American continent through the acquisition of territories long inhabited by various Indian tribes. The concept of Manifest Destiny provided the philosophical impetus and optimism for a robust expansion that characterized this period of American history. Predictably, these efforts brought the government and its agents in direct conflict with those Native American tribes that had dwelt and hunted on the coveted land for centuries prior.

The US government established Indian agencies during the decades of the nineteenth century in order to mitigate this conflict and to attempt to facilitate the cultural assimilation of the tribes. Spotted Tail Indian Agency, named after Brulé Sioux chief

Spotted Tail, was established subsequent to the enactment of the Fort Laramie Treaty of

1868. So too was Red Cloud Agency, named after Oglala Chief Red Cloud. The purpose of both agencies was to oversee the distribution of goods to tribe members as stipulated by the treaty. The US Army formed Camps Sheridan and Robinson to protect Spotted

Tail Agency and Red Cloud Agency, respectively. Deteriorating relations between some of the Sioux and the Indian agents prompted, albeit reluctantly, the decision to station active military personnel in the vicinity of each agency beginning in the 1870s. Camp

Sheridan, established in 1874, was dismantled in 1881. Camp Robinson, later to become

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Fort Robinson, existed for decades afterward until the Army officially decommissioned it in the middle of the twentieth century.

A careful examination of journals kept by the commanding officers at both camps during those years reveal settings characterized by bureaucratic missteps and human foibles. They also candidly portray the growing tensions between the Lakota Sioux and the Whites that would ultimately result in the Great Sioux War. Finally, they hint at the ongoing logistical challenges associated with building and maintaining the Indian agencies and their proximate military camps together with the human drama inherent in such efforts. I will analyze the endorsement books from Camp Sheridan and the post returns from Camp Robinson beginning in the summer of 1874 and ending with Camp

Sheridan’s dismantling in the Spring of 1881. In so doing, I will add detail to the narrative related to the rugged conditions of military life in the American frontier during the volatile years following the Civil War and will demonstrate the parallel nature of the experiences of those stationed at both camps.

Thomas Buecker’s article in the Periodical Journal of America’s Military Past entitled, “History of Camp Sheridan, Nebraska” will serve as a reference. I will utilize additional texts in presenting much of the historical context of the paper. In particular, I will refer to Jeffrey Ostler’s The Lakotas and the Black Hills, George Hyde’s Spotted

Tail’s Folk and Robert M. Utley’s Frontier Regulars. Finally, Thomas Buecker’s comprehensive text Fort Robinson and the American West provide the vast majority of information about Camp Robinson and Red Cloud Agency.

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CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

Beginning in about 1765 the Lakota Sioux actively inhabited the Black Hills, a mountain range about 125 miles long and 65 miles wide straddling South Dakota and

Wyoming. Conflict with other tribes such as the Arikaras, Mandans, Crows, Pawnees and the Shoshones was present during much of their residency. The source of these conflicts was related to resources, and coalitions of tribes sought to control lands rich in grazing and game while forming and maintaining lucrative trading networks (Ostler 17).

During the first four decades of the nineteenth century, Americans showed scant interest in populating and developing the immense land acquired from France in 1803.

Subsequent expeditions into the territory had characterized the region as barren and inhospitable, a “Great American Desert,” that was unsuitable for habitation and agriculture. Prior to 1840, the resident Lakota Sioux had lived in the area with little notice and regard for white incursions. Beginning in 1840 white settlers seeking quality farmland in Oregon, together with Mormons migrating toward Utah and miners looking to strike it rich in the California gold fields, began to infiltrate the Lakota sphere of influence (Ostler 28-9). In the years following, there were different opinions among the

Lakotas about how to deal with the threat. Some leaders favored compromise and negotiation in order to stave off what they believed would be inevitable bloodshed, while others took a more militant and hardline view (Ostler 29). Those who entertained a more moderate approach were of the opinion that fighting the US military would be an exercise

4 in futility that would result in severe suffering. For Chief Spotted Tail, war with the whites would be madness (Hyde 186). Moderates were convinced that treaty negotiation and selective adoption of American customs provided the most effective means of survival (Ostler 32).

Violence and tension increased nevertheless. As more white settlers materialized on the frontier, resident Lakotas began demanding food, clothing and other items in exchange for passage and, occasionally, killed the livestock and stole the horses belonging to the settlers. Such behavior elicited an indignant response from most emigrants, one of whom complained, “The country we were traveling over belonged to the United States, and these red men had no right to stop us!” (Ostler 39).

The US Army established Fort Laramie in 1849 as a means to protect Americans on their westward travels. This would represent the first permanent US government fixture on Lakota lands (Ostler 38). In the summer of 1851 a gathering of several tribal leaders, together with agents representing the US government, took place at Fort

Laramie. While fraught with tension and the threat of violence from the extreme Lakota elements, a treaty was ultimately signed. While it allowed for the safe passage of overlanders through Lakota territory while providing compensation to the tribes, it paved the way for future conflict by allowing the United States to establish roads within that territory (Ostler 41). The ultimate result was a reduction in the population of buffalo and environmental damage.

The Sand Creek Massacre in November of 1864 (during which troops commanded by Colonel John M. Chivington slaughtered at least 150 Cheyenne Indians in

5 an unprovoked attack and mutilated their bodies) and the Fetterman Massacre in

December of 1866 (in which 81 soldiers were decoyed and killed by an assortment of

Lakotas, Cheyennes, and Arapahos) reflect the intensity of the military operations waged by the American military against the Indians. A new agreement, known as the Fort

Laramie Treaty, was introduced by the Indian Peace Commission in response to the ongoing and escalating carnage. Ratified by both sides in November of 1868, it stipulated that Indian agencies would distribute treaty payments, food, clothing, weapons and other supplies to their respective tribe members. Indian agents also inaugurated schools for the purpose of educating young Indians and offering agricultural training. It was hoped that this approach would acclimate the Indians toward a more productive and stationary means of subsistence and away from the life of a nomadic hunter (Buecker, Fort

Robinson 1). The US government’s principal objective at the time of the Fort Laramie

Treaty of 1868 was to congregate the Lakotas into a controlled setting under the authority of the Indian Bureau. The Treaty established the parameters of the Great Sioux

Reservation, which essentially included what is presently South Dakota west of the

Missouri River, and the promise of free rations lured the Indians to the agencies (Utley

237). Prior to the treaty’s enactment, a group of Quaker leaders proposed to President

Grant a plan, later known officially as the “Peace Policy,” that they believed would remedy the Indian problem. Grant’s administration had no definitive solution of its own.

The Quakers’ plan was based on the idea that concentrating tribes on reservations would result in them being civilized, educated and trained in agricultural techniques (Buecker,

Fort Robinson 2).

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By the early 1870s the Lakota Sioux, the Arapaho and the Northern Cheyenne primarily occupied Northwestern Nebraska. These three tribes were regarded by some as the most warlike in the American West, and there was concern that they would actively resist the encroachment of whites into their territory. The fact that Plains Indian tribes fought among themselves more often than they did with the whites mitigated the concern about organized resistance against the US government (Buecker, Fort Robinson xvi).

Furthermore, government agents were ignorant of the power structures within and among the tribes, each of which was rife with factionalism and self-interest. This fact would prove to make future negotiations between the whites and the Indians extremely difficult as, contrary to the expectations of the former, tribal authority was not centralized.

For the reservation program to succeed, Red Cloud’s Oglalas and Spotted Tail’s

Brulés, specifically, needed to attach to an agency. The government’s initial plan was to have both agencies located along the Missouri River so that shipping supplies and moving personnel would be as easy as possible. However, neither Sioux chief wanted to locate there, preferring instead to live in a more familiar setting. Negotiations between the two chiefs and the government became protracted. Red Cloud and Spotted Tail were intransigent and obstructionist for almost five years, during which time they met with

President Grant and his lieutenants (Utley 239). To the dismay of the generals, the government capitulated to their demands. In late 1873, after several proposals, locations for the two agencies were fixed on the upper reaches of White River. Technically, these sites were located in Nebraska rather than the Great Sioux Reservation, and their distance

7 from both the Missouri and the Platte made supply and oversight too difficult to sustain

(Utley 239).

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CHAPTER 3

SPOTTED TAIL AGENCY AND CAMP SHERIDAN

The 1868 Treaty required that both agencies (Spotted Tail and Red Cloud) be situated on the Dakota reservation. It was later discovered, though, that both were actually in Nebraska. As a result, the US Army operated under the assumption that the agencies would eventually be moved north in compliance with the treaty. The question arose as to whether or not there should be one military post situated in between both or whether each agency should have their own post. Colonel John E. Smith believed that one large centrally located post along the Niobrara River would provide sufficient access to both, and would require less work and expense than two separate ones. However,

Spotted Tail Agency was likely to move farther north in order to comply with the Treaty.

In that case, the two agencies would be too far apart for one military post to provide security for both. Colonel Smith eventually conceded that two separate military camps, each in close proximity to its respective agency, would be necessary in order to secure lives and property (Buecker, Fort Robinson 23).

General Sheridan continued to pressure the Indian Bureau to determine permanent locations for the agencies. He wrote to General Sherman in Washington, “The Indians at these agencies cannot be governed except by the presence of troops, and some understanding should at once be had with the Indian Bureau, which will determine the permanent location of the agencies. There is no time to lose on this matter. May I

9 therefore ask you to push it to a solution?” (Buecker, Fort Robinson 23) Appropriations would be necessary for construction, but bureaucratic indecision persisted.

Spotted Tail’s agency, located in frontier Nebraska along White River, was largely peaceful. Beginning in the early 1870s, though, militant Indians from neighboring tribes began to harass and threaten the agent and the residents. Some Minneconjou warriors belligerently interfered with beef issuance by driving off the agency herders and taking what they wanted. After Spotted Tail agent E.A. Howard was almost shot by an

Indian warrior he hurriedly wrote to Colonel John E. Smith at Fort Laramie. “As I may be compelled to call upon you at short notice for military protection, I trust you will be prepared to aid me” (Buecker, Camp Sheridan 55).

For the duration of their existence, both Spotted Tail and Red Cloud agencies experienced tension between agency and non-agency Indians. The latter group, resentful of what they believed was a traitorous capitulation to the whites, engaged in violence against the agency establishment. Sitting Bull viewed agency Indians with derision and lambasted them when he stated, “Look at me—see if I am poor, or my people either…

You are fools to make yourselves slaves to a piece of fat bacon, or some hard-tack, and a little sugar and coffee” (Utley 239). The five years of challenges posed by recalcitrant

Indians on the various Missouri River agencies in the past were a harbinger of what would later occur at both agencies. As the winter of 1873-4 drew closer, thousands of

Indians from the north flooded to the agencies and wreaked havoc, and this included several killings. The loss of control prompted the agents to appeal to the Indian Bureau for military assistance in order to keep the peace. Other Missouri River agencies leading

10 up to this time had also dealt with a frustrating trend among agency and non-agency

Sioux, who would often leave their young and elderly at the agencies to be cared for while they participated in violent raids on Whites and Indians alike, only to return and draw rations from the agency (Utley 241).

Camp Sheridan itself was formed, along with Camp Robinson (later Fort

Robinson), in 1874 in northwestern Nebraska. Problems at the Brulé and Oglala Sioux agencies necessitated their creation. The resident Brulé were generally peaceful and cooperative with the agent. However, when other Lakota groups such as Sans Arcs and

Minneconjous arrived at the agency, trouble often arose as they demanded that they be given rations, issued threats against employees and flaunted the authority of the agent

(Buecker, Camp Sheridan 55). The creation of both camps represented precautionary measures on the part of the US Army to mitigate against the unraveling of a somewhat tenuous peace between the government and the Lakota. The only effective means of procuring and maintaining that peace was a military presence near the agencies of

Spotted Tail and Red Cloud. The Army was reluctant to deploy troops to assist the beleaguered agencies, though, due to both the inclement weather likely to be encountered on the Nebraska plains and because a military presence would likely be perceived as contrary to the informal peace policy instituted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In fact, the Army felt that the request for its assistance was overdue and that the Bureau had known about the agencies’ problems long before (Buecker, Camp Sheridan 56).

Nevertheless, the Army deployed infantry and cavalry personnel to Fort Laramie.

Colonel John E. Smith, who was stationed at Fort Laramie, was ordered by Division of

11 the Missouri commanding General Philip H. Sheridan to lead the personnel to the Spotted

Tail Brulé and Red Cloud Oglala agencies. The purpose of this expedition was to protect the agencies, employees and the public property of the Indian Bureau (Buecker, Camp

Sheridan 56). Furthermore, the Army regarded military intervention as absolutely essential to maintain order. Peace policy proponents largely opposed the idea. The stationing of troops at or near agencies, Sheridan believed, would prevent the arrival of hostile northern Indians and encourage agency Indians to draw their annuities and rations from their appropriate agencies (Buecker, Camp Sheridan 57).

On March 10, 1874, troops arrived at Spotted Tail agency, and the sight of them produced the intended effect on the Indians who had been fomenting trouble. They quickly dispersed, and the agency Indians at Spotted Tail seemed relieved to have the

Army present. Colonel Smith ordered most of the cavalry back to Fort Laramie due to the lack of sufficient forage for the horses, after which he ordered sixty days of supplies shipped to both agencies. This officially marked the beginning of a military presence at

Spotted Tail, and this produced the desired result of creating some measure of stability.

Smith reported, “There can be no question of the good effect of the presence of troops upon the Indians at these agencies. The Indians will bully when they can do so”

(Buecker, Camp Sheridan 57). Initially, the army personnel stationed at Red Cloud and

Spotted Tail were reluctant to assume law enforcement duties while being under the control of a civilian agent. Rather, they were present solely to protect lives and government property.

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At this time, the Spotted Tail agency was located on the south side of White

River, some three miles west of the mouth of Beaver Creek. The first military encampment was located just south of the agency on a bluff overlooking it. While fairly exposed, it had enough visibility to afford it the ability to defend the agency effectively.

The building of fortifications began in earnest, while trenches were dug along the rear of the camp to serve as rifle pits. The process became a regular routine. The grounds were monitored daily and trash removal was organized. Due to the distance between the Army camp and the Indian camp, there was little disturbance between the two. Water supplied came from the river twice per day and two cottonwood storehouses were constructed near the agency buildings. By April, the Indians had seemingly acclimated to the presence of troops (Buecker, Camp Sheridan 58).

The Indian Bureau allocated $30,000 to the Army for the purpose of constructing buildings at each agency, and so a decision on permanent locations had to be made. The original plans drawn up by the department quartermaster called for each agency to build twelve sets of officers’ quarters, four barracks, mess halls and a storehouse (Buecker,

Camp Sheridan 59). It soon became evident, though, that a more agreeable location for

Camp Sheridan and the agency was needed. The bluff on which the current camp was located was not suitable for long-term residence. Although close to White River the water was deemed unhealthy, and its lack of proximity to much-needed timber supplies would prove to be a hardship during the construction of buildings approved for the agency. In

April of 1874, Indian Bureau representatives broached the subject of moving the Brulé agency for the aforementioned reasons. The primary impetus for the government’s desire

13 to relocate was related to the ability to farm the land. Spotted Tail, though, had no interest in farming and looked askance at government officials who refused to recognize the more serious issues of preserving order at the agencies and preventing non-agency Sioux from initiating hostilities with Whites (Hyde 224).

The Brulés were initially opposed to the move. Late in the summer of that year,

The Indian Bureau deployed another commission to try to find a more advantageous site, one that might prove more agreeable to the Indians. Given that a move was inevitable

(although the exact timing was yet to be determined) General Sheridan, though willing to allow troops to remain at the agency, was reluctant to authorize expenditures for new construction that would only be abandoned or dismantled upon the move. In late August, the decision was made to move the agency to Beaver Creek. Spotted Tail acquiesced and the move began in September. The army post was to be situated nearby on a “proper and comfortable site overlooking agency buildings” (Buecker, Camp Sheridan 59). On

September 9, the new post was officially named Camp Sheridan, after the general.

Construction of temporary buildings began almost immediately. Major E.R.

Townsend, 9th Infantry commander, wrote, “Since the buildings about to be constructed are only temporary, and not as contemplated when this application was made, it is not deemed advisable to employ skilled mechanics in their construction. The application is therefore withdrawn” (EBV1 4). Nevertheless, he formally requested two civilian hires— a sawyer and an engineer—on September 20. In July 1874, agency personnel believed that the relocation was probable. Correspondence from the chief quartermaster of the

Department of the Platte stated that hay and wood contracts had not been approved in

14 light of the impending move. Furthermore, he “directs that not more than a fortnight’s supply of hay and wood, in excess of immediate wants, be received” (EBV1 1).

The primary purpose of the military post was to protect the agency. The rather peaceful demeanor of the Brulés meant that the mission was accomplished merely by the presence of the troops, however. Troops stationed at the post never felt overtly threatened by the Indians. Nor were they apprehensive about sudden outbreaks of violence. Spotted

Tail was adept at keeping his people under control and exercised his authority judiciously in order to maintain peace at his agency. The post officers became rather fond of Spotted

Tail, who managed to ingratiate himself to those with whom he interacted. Additionally, officers got on well with Agent Howard, who considered his relationship with the military “of an amicable and satisfactory character” (Buecker, Camp Sheridan 63).

The challenges associated with supplying and maintaining the camp and the agency itself were formidable. Efforts to keep the facilities well-stocked and adequately staffed were often hampered by bureaucracy and weather and juggling the military obligations of the soldiers with the need for construction labor proved daunting at times.

On October 9, 1874, Captain M. Fitzgerald of the 9th Infantry wrote the commanding officer that the fatigue detail demands on his men resulted in too few of them to work on the construction of huts. The reply that he received was mildly unsympathetic.

The commanding officer is unable to perceive any injustice in the details made

from Company D. Each company, excepting Company F, has furnished its pro-

rata share, and that company was exempted from fatigue details, only, for good

15

reasons. The progression made in the erection of huts will now admit of a portion

of the details being made from that company. (EBV1 12)

At the same time, reflecting the grueling nature of the manual labor required to erect building at the camp, we read of Private John W. Munger’s request to be relieved from daily duty in the brickyard “on account of the work being too hard.” As 1st

Lieutenant W.W. Rogers noted,

Private Munger complained to me that he was required to do the hardest part of

the work in the brickyard, and that after representing that fact to the corporal in

charge, he stated that other men working there refused to exchange with him, and

thus equalize the labor, but requiring him to continue at the hardest work. I know

nothing of the matter, personally, further than Private Munger’s statement to me.

Private Munger is a steady man to work.

A terse reply followed: “The commanding officer cannot relieve men on account of the work being hard, though steps will be taken to equalize it” (EBV1 12,13).

In a note from the Camp Sheridan endorsement journal in December 1874 requesting that men belonging to the 3rd Cavalry, Company E, be relieved of extra duty attending stables, the harshness of the Nebraska winters becomes evident in what must have been a very unpleasant task. Under order from Major Townsend the request was denied with the response, “Under ordinary circumstances they would be excused,” but that doing so would cause “manifest injury to the Service” (EBV1 32). Evidently, labor was in short supply for many of the essential, albeit unsavory, jobs. Even skilled personnel were in continual demand. In September of 1876, assistant surgeon M. Wood

16 requested a sixty-day leave of absence. The response from the post commander highlights the challenges present in staffing important positions in a remote and rugged camp. “The application for sixty days leave of absence by assistant surgeon M. Wood cannot be entertained now as there is no available medical officer to supply his place, nor is it known when it can be as there are not enough medical officers in the department to meet the present demands for their services” (EBV3 24).

The Nebraska winters were difficult, both for the soldiers and for the Indians. For the former, the below-freezing temperatures were hard to endure, especially during guard duty. The post medical officer was asked to report on the necessity of ear flaps for those stationed outdoors (EBV1 76). The agency issued blankets to the Indians, among other things, in order to cope with the cold. Yet these were often in short supply at Spotted Tail

Agency. In the winter of 1877, for example, Indians complained that those at Red Cloud were receiving more blankets than they were.

The rations guaranteed by the 1868 Treaty were low in quantity and in quality.

Bleak conditions were present at both Spotted Tail and Red Cloud agencies, the responsibility for which may have been due to cost-cutting by the Indian Bureau and by

Congress. The contractors, who provided food to the parties, were compelled to deliver substandard fare due to the low prices that the government was willing to pay. The

Indians often were issued rations unsuitable to sell to whites (Hyde 227). 1st Lieutenant

Rogers, stationed at Camp Sheridan, wrote of the problem: “The evident neglect on the part of the contractor to furnish fresh beef during the present favorable weather and failure, so far, to provide subsistence for the cattle which will be required for issue during

17 the coming winter, seem to require that some measures be taken to compel compliance with the terms of the contract” (EBV2 68). There were also rumors that the contractors were deliberately furnishing the lowest quality of beef not out of necessity, but in a deliberate act of fraud in order to maximize their profit. Indian families were often seen begging for food outside of both Camp Robinson and Camp Sheridan (Hyde 227).

A letter written to Major Townsend in January of 1875 indicates that several of the Indians were extremely dissatisfied with the manner in which their beef rations were issued. E.A. Howard wrote that the Indian Department was seeking to change the method of beef issuance to the Indians, but that they would likely not submit to such a change.

Upon inquiring whether or not the garrison had sufficient capability to require the Indians to capitulate, Townsend replied:

While I believe the force at this post would be sufficient to compel submission to

the order contemplated in the within communication, yet as there are many

Northern Indians temporarily sojourning with the Brulés who would be only too

glad to create trouble and as they will leave for the north at an early day in the

Spring, it seems to be that the wisest course would be delay until they have

departed and no Indians remain except those who properly belong to this Agency.

I believe little or no trouble would result in making the change in their case,

particularly if they should become gradually accustomed to the idea by having it

discussed for some little time before it goes into actual operation. By the time of

the return of the Northern Indians the new system would be in full force and

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would not likely be disturbed. I would therefore recommend a suspension of

action until sometime during the summer. (EBV1 50)

Evidently, Townsend was keenly aware of the divide between those Indians who had willingly attached themselves to the agency and those who, apart from collecting rations, remained outside of its sphere of influence. The stability of the agency was tenuous at best. This was expected in light of the Indians’ meager apportionment, and Townsend clearly chose the more prudent path in order to preserve the peace.

Problems often arose when dealing with independent beef suppliers at both camps. One contractor, in particular, consistently furnished meat from old work oxen

(“very unwholesome as an article of food”). His contract was eventually cancelled, forcing the commissary to buy cattle on the open market for higher prices. Also, to stave off a potential scurvy outbreak, the post commander at Camp Robinson ordered large amounts of potatoes and onions (Buecker, Camp Sheridan 68).

Horse theft and desertion proved problematic at Camp Sheridan. Horses and mules were an integral part of frontier life. For the army, they were an indispensable tool for making war and transporting people and goods. For the civilian, they made plowing and farming possible. For the Indian, they were a symbol of status and wealth in addition to the aforementioned uses. The loss of a public horse was lamentable to the extent that it was routinely mentioned in camp post returns alongside the deaths of soldiers. On the return dated June 30, 1878, the following was recorded in the Record of Events at Camp

Robinson: “On the 3rd, one public horse pertaining to Company C 3rd Cavalry and for which 2nd Lieutenant H. H. French 3rd Cavalry is responsible died from inflammation of

19 the lungs when on herd” (FRPR). On the return dated September 30, 1878: “On the 25th, one horse pertaining to Company C 3rd Cavalry and for which 1st Lieutenant James H.

Simpson 3rd Cavalry is responsible, having Glanders, was shot to prevent the spread of the disease” (FRPR). Finally, on the return dated August 31, 1880: “One serviceable horse, the property of the United States, for which Captain W.C. Forbuch, 5th Cavalry was responsible, died on the 30th from the effects of a rattlesnake sting, received while being herded on the 24th August 1880” (FRPR).

The crime of desertion was often the result of the isolation and grim routine endured by enlisted soldiers serving on the Plains. It was estimated that a full third of enlisted men serving between 1867 and 1891 deserted their posts at some point. Army recruiting methods were disorganized and inconsistent and resulted in “undesirable and totally unfit enlistees.” The low pay, poor food quality, disillusionment and drudgery of garrison life also compelled soldiers to abandon their duties (Buecker, Camp Sheridan

64). Punishments were meted out in accordance with the circumstances of the offense and could range from fines and incarceration to dishonorable discharge. An entry from

December 2, 1874, highlights one such incident. A Private Herrick from Company F 9th

Infantry was arrested and confined at Fort Laramie after being charged with desertion and horse theft while traveling with a detachment from the fort to Camp Sheridan. He was described as “unreliable” and it was recommended that he be dishonorably discharged

(EBV1 42). Captain Monohan of the 3rd Cavalry, and in command of Camp Sheridan in

October of 1878, delivered a scathing assessment of the issue of horse theft. After one

20 particular incident in which several mules were stolen and taken to Red Cloud Agency by thieves who could have been Indian or white, he wrote:

In connection with this subject I would desire to say that the country is at present

time literally swarmed with horse thieves, who are ready to depredate upon white

men or Indians as opportunity may offer. There is no civil officer to take

cognizance of offenses committed by this class, even if found in the act of

stealing, and the few honest citizens who are scattered through the country cannot

protect themselves. These horse thieves are particularly dangerous in the vicinity

of the Indian Reservation and may at any time cause serious trouble, and I would

respectfully suggest that vigorous means should be used by the proper authority to

rid the country of such a dangerous element. (EBV3 213,14)

It was not uncommon for white outlaws to appropriate mules and horses belonging to the

Indians and, in the absence of civilian law enforcement, it fell to the Army to recover them. In July of 1877, small groups of Indian scouts and soldiers were dispatched to locate and apprehend horse thieves. A civilian had several mules stolen at one point on the Sidney-Deadwood trail and a sergeant, together with six privates, were deployed to recover them. In most theft cases, the parties recovered the stock while the perpetrators were never apprehended.

Occasionally, the Army extended leniency for desertion. Private Ishmael

Lambert, stationed at Camp Sheridan, abandoned his post and fled to England. Following a twinge of conscience, Lambert returned, and his commanding officer recommended that he be returned to duty without trial. On January 23, 1875, it was noted,

21

I made the application that the within named Private Ishmael E. Lambert,

Company K 9th Infantry, who surrendered himself as a deserter from Company E,

late 27th, be restored to duty without trial believing that he had surrendered

himself as such Deserter from a conscientious desire to serve out his original

enlistment honestly and faithfully. He states, and I believe truly that he returned

from England for this purpose. (EBV1 54)

Endorsements from Camp Sheridan mention that overwork and lack of sleep were challenges confronting officers and those they commanded. Major Townsend, in late

December of 1874, wrote that the large number of men required to staff the hospital, subsistence, post headquarters, bakery and the quartermaster department resulted in those performing guard duty to have “barely two nights in bed, and should there be any further details from them, that will necessarily be reduced” (EBV1 45). Furthermore, beginning in late September of 1874, soldiers hurriedly built makeshift structures in order to make it through the winter. The shortage of available men contributed to the frantic pace of construction and the lack of building quality. On December 27, 1874, Major Townsend wrote:

Of all the buildings ordered to be put up for the permanent post, but one, the

Storehouse, has been built. The efforts of officers and men have been to get up

such structures as would quickest protect them from the winter, namely log cabins

covered with dirt. On the 22nd of September the first hut was commenced and

everything has been done since that date. The huts are of the most temporary

character and intended to be occupied only until the weather would admit more

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suitable quarters being erected. It was intended to occupy this winter in getting

out material by means of the Saw Mill to commence building at the first

practicable moment in the Spring, but a reduced force will necessitate an

immediate stoppage of the Saw Mill and discharge of the Sawyer. I would

respectfully ask definite instructions as to what further reduction if any I shall

make in the work now laid out. (EBV1 46)

In the years 1874 and 1875, it fell to troops stationed at Camp Sheridan to enforce the provisions of the 1868 Treaty that prohibited whites from entering the Black Hills. In

March of 1875, the Army was ordered to stave off illegal incursions into the area as long as the Sioux held title to the Black Hills. Accordingly, persons who were discovered trespassing were to be expelled, and Camp Sheridan troops were active in carrying out that directive until the fall of 1875. One particularly dramatic case illustrates the zeal with which this law was enforced. Captain Mills confronted a party of seventy-six miners east of what is present-day Gordon, Nebraska. The miners, originally from Sioux City, Iowa, had previously been confronted by a small contingent of soldiers from Fort Randall in

South Dakota. The soldiers were outnumbered by the miners, who completely disregarded the soldiers’ warnings. The soldiers sent an urgent message to Camp

Sheridan requesting that reinforcements be sent immediately. Mills responded by arriving with an entire company of cavalrymen and, more menacingly, a Gatling gun. Early in the morning on May 19, he surprised the miners and proceeded to destroy all of their wagons, weapons and equipment. He then sent the fugitives to Fort Randall. Mills was

23 criticized for his actions, which were branded as “arbitrary and unlawful,” but he was merely enforcing the law (Buecker, Camp Sheridan 64).

As of May 1875, most of the $15,000 originally appropriated for the construction of Camp Sheridan had been spent on lumber. Captain Anson Mills, commanding officer at that time, acknowledged that while they were prepared to harvest lumber by their own labor, he needed another $5,000 to complete the building of the Post. Additionally, he requested a brick maker as none was present in the command at that time (ESV1 92).

Prior to this request, Mills had issued a thinly veiled criticism directed toward Townsend, who had authorized the construction of temporary structures in anticipation of a hastily approaching winter. He wrote:

Major Townsend was perhaps right last fall in such a ruling in face of the winter,

but it should have been abandoned long ago, as it has no doubt worked to the

disadvantage of the Post, and the best interests of the Service, there being now,

eight months after its Establishment but one permanent building in the Post,

namely the Commissary Store house, while a good proportion of the material has

been expended, perhaps 1/3 of some articles such as nails, which are irretrievably

lost. (EBV1 85)

In order to maintain discipline and order, the army strictly regulated the sale and consumption of alcohol among its enlisted and officer personnel. It is reasonable to assume that the drudgery of daily life at Camp Sheridan together with the lack of diversion was responsible for a latent demand for alcoholic beverages. The sale of

“spirituous liquors in the Indian Country” was against the law in March 1875, prompting

24 the denial of the request to permit alcohol sales at the camp. However, in January 1876, then adjutant general Townsend informed the post trader, “that the secretary of war has received the order revoking his authority to sell liquor and he is authorized to sell liquor as in letter of June 4, 1875, provided they be sold in reasonable quantities and under such restrictions as the Post Commander may impose” (EBV2 89). Not unexpectedly, the sudden availability of alcohol was followed by an increase in the incidents of intoxication. Even officers were not immune. One Lieutenant Paul, in an endorsement written in late August of 1875, was observed in an alcohol-induced stupor the month before, once in his bed and another time on the floor of the billiard room. When Captain

Mills confronted the lieutenant with what was clearly a violation of army conduct, Paul admitted to being intoxicated. Mills decided not to arrest him in light of the fact that

Paul’s family had been suffering from illness. Nevertheless, the captain managed to extract a promise from the lieutenant (EBV 144).

He went immediately on sick report and the first time I saw him there after about

the 22nd or 23rd of July, he came to my quarters stating that he had committed

himself by being intoxicated on his last hour as officer of the day, that he had

come to apologize and beg of me not to take any notice of it and if I would do so

he would pledge me his word that he would never be found in that condition again

while in my company. I replied that I had noticed his condition and came near

taking action in the case but would now let it pass unless future developments

should compel me to act otherwise at the same time stating that this should be a

warning and if it occurred again I should certainly notice it. (EBV1 144)

25

As shall be discussed later in the case of Camp Robinson, Camp Sheridan’s relative isolation from urban settings resulted in a paucity of entertainment options.

Soldiers had to improvise their own amusements and diversions. Camp Sheridan possessed no regular post library or school. However, the post fund did pay for a number of subscriptions to newspapers and other periodicals. Thanksgiving, Christmas, and other major holidays were celebrated as festively as could be managed. All labor, except essential fatigue and guard duties, was suspended on those days. In light of possible hostilities that might erupt between soldiers and Indians, the former were prohibited from traveling beyond the limits of the post unless they were issued an authorized pass.

Soldiers were also not allowed into any house or tipi without the permission of the occupants. However, camp officers often entertained the Indian leadership. Spotted Tail,

Red Cloud and Young Man Afraid of His Horses were frequent dinner guests, with

Spotted Tail being a particular favorite at the officers’ headquarters (Buecker, Camp

Sheridan 65).

Hints of unrest among the Indians at Spotted Tail immediately prior to the beginning of the Sioux War are evident in endorsements sent during the summer of 1876.

On July 23, 1876, the post commander wrote, “While believing that there will be no trouble here with the Indians at this agency, two more companies should be sent to this post. The Indians are evidently much excited” (EBV3 1). Five days later, “Letter from

Secretary of War of July 28, 1876 to Secretary of Interior enclosing copy of General

Sheridan’s telegram of July 27th reporting all quiet at Red Cloud and much excitement at

Spotted Tail agency, that Indians cannot be kept quiet on corn and flour without beef.

26

Asks whether beef cannot be issued by Indian Department” (EBV3 11). In retrospect the general dissatisfaction with life at the agency, increasing restrictions on the sale of weapons and ammunition and the persistent shortage of rations contributed to mass departures from both Red Cloud and Spotted Tail agencies. In the Spring of 1876, large numbers of Oglalas and Cheyennes left Red Cloud Agency to join the northern camps led by Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull. At Spotted Tail Agency, most of the Brulés stayed, while several Minneconjous and Sans Arcs left (Buecker, Camp Sheridan 66).

27

CHAPTER 4

RED CLOUD AGENCY AND CAMP ROBINSON

Red Cloud, chief of the Oglalas, and Spotted Tail, witnessed the gradual erosion of their nomadic way of life during the post-Civil War years. The accelerating eradication of bison, once so plentiful on the Great Plains, meant that a life based on subsistence hunting was no longer tenable. Consequently, the Sioux became more dependent on

White material culture. The robust fur trade in and around Fort Laramie exposed them to guns, metal items and cloth, and they grew fond of these items (Buecker, Fort Robinson xvii). Fort Laramie, though, was an impractical location for an Indian agency due to the large number of Whites in the vicinity. Oglalas were reluctant to leave the area since, as

Red Cloud proclaimed, “The bones of Oglalas are there all around the fort.” Furthermore, they had been led to believe that they would be allowed to trade at Laramie (Buecker,

Fort Robinson 3). Soon after the arrival of Dr. Jared M. Daniels, who would serve as the

Indian agent for Red Cloud, the Army constructed buildings at the new site 30 miles below Fort Laramie on the North Platte River. The site was inadequate due to a shortage of firewood. Also, the Sioux were continuing “raids and depredations” against white targets.

Oglala obstructionism caused Daniels to resign. Dr. John Saville, an Episcopal appointee, assumed the duties of agent in August of 1873. However, notwithstanding his military and medical expertise, he lacked any credentials or experience which would have recommended him for the position. He wrote, “Inexperienced in this business myself, and

28 having no one familiar with the forms of business, and without papers, books, or instructions for guides, I was left in a sufficiently embarrassing position to undertake so complicated a business” (Buecker, Fort Robinson 4).

Red Cloud Agency was situated near the point at which Soldier Creek and White

River converged. Arranged in a compound measuring two hundred feet by four hundred feet were various offices, stables and other buildings necessary for the function of the agency and were located on a bluff above the river. The site was ideal due to its proximity to water, timber and bottomland on which the Indians could farm (Buecker,

Fort Robinson 4). Thousands of non-agency Lakotas came to Camp Robinson annually, particularly in the winter months, to obtain free rations. At Red Cloud Agency, Saville often found himself confronted with groups of Sans Arcs, Hunkpapas and Minniconjous exhibiting “vicious and insolent” behavior and demanding to be fed. In order to accommodate the outsiders and preserve the peace, he made sure to have adequate supplies on hand (Buecker, Fort Robinson 5).

Saville reported to Commissioner Smith and hinted that military assistance might be needed to keep the peace at the agency. In January 1874, Saville formally requested that the Army establish a post at the agency. General Philip H. Sheridan believed that both agencies should be moved to the Missouri River, since White River locations were not technically on the Sioux reservation as defined in the Treaty of 1868. Furthermore, moving military personnel to White River would be cumbersome during the winter months. He promised to consider sending troops in the Spring (Buecker, Fort Robinson

5).

29

The situation continued to worsen, with Northern Indians (Minneconjous) accelerating raids along the Platte Valley. They would often ride onto agency land and display aggressive and threatening behavior, and this was in part motivated by their disgust at the agency Indians’ capitulation to whites. The murders of teamster Edward

Gray while hauling freight from Fort Laramie, Frank Appleton (Saville’s nephew) while acting as agent in Saville’s absence, 1st Lieutenant Levi H. Johnson and Corporal John C.

Coleman while escorting wood supplies made the situation even more precarious. At Red

Cloud the Whites, fearing assassination, dared not venture out after dark (Buecker, Fort

Robinson 8). Saville took measures to ensure the security of the agency by moving all employees into the agency compound and issuing them weapons. He also made an effort to enlist the friendly Oglalas and Brulés against the hostile northern Indians. Pumpkin

Seed, an Oglala ally, oversaw a force of Indians as they guarded the agency around the clock (Buecker, Fort Robinson 9). Correspondence to Smith now reached a fevered pitch, and Saville requested that troop deployment be expedited. The deterioration of agency security and the earnest request for military assistance were fodder for the critics of the aforementioned Peace Policy, which they believed to be a naïve and overly- optimistic approach to Indian relations. Skeptics of the policy, mostly white Westerners, had never entertained the notion that the Indians could be “civilized” and open to adopting the White way of life. Indeed, the Sioux had repudiated all efforts to alter their traditional way of life. Sentiment among the critics tilted toward the idea of peace through strength and force (Buecker, Fort Robinson 9).

30

On February 12, General Sheridan advised General William T. Sherman that the need for military intervention at the agencies was no longer in question. There was the fear that a troop presence would instigate a broader Indian war against the US government. General Sheridan believed that the Sioux had been actively anticipating war for several years and had been stockpiling weapons and ammunition purchased from agency traders, and that this is what was behind their growing insolence and increasing demands on the government (Buecker, Fort Robinson 10).

On February 19, General Sheridan ordered troops to both Spotted Tail and Red

Cloud Agencies. The Brules at Spotted Tail were more amiable toward the whites than the Oglalas at Red Cloud. However, in spite of Spotted Tail’s efforts to maintain control, several Northern Indians openly talked of war and continued to agitate and stir up resentment among the young male Indians attached to the agency (Buecker, Fort

Robinson 11).

A cavalry column arrived at Red Cloud Agency on March 5. Infantry and a supply train arrived on March 8 after difficulty traversing sections of White River.

Colonel Smith met with Red Cloud and about a dozen headmen upon his arrival at the agency and informed them in rather blunt terms that he was there to maintain order among the Indians. Furthermore, he suggested that they should assist him in controlling the non-agency Northern Indians from causing trouble. With this enjoinder came a threat to attack Indian villages in the event that any Indians fired into the camp or stole any army property. He reminded them that he was there because the Indians had failed to follow previous directives and that more soldiers would come, if necessary. During the

31 conference, Red Cloud was sullen and quiet—resentful of Smith’s patronizing tone but aware that there was no recourse for the Indians (Buecker, Fort Robinson 14). A

Cheyenne newspaper reported, “This is plain language and easily understood by the treacherous savages. They know that General Smith means exactly what he says and that he will not hesitate to let loose his ‘boys in blue’ if the ‘boys in red’ give him the slightest provocation” (Buecker, Fort Robinson 15).

Notwithstanding this crass crow of victory, the sudden appearance of a formidable military unit was responsible for restoring order to both agencies. Upon seeing the intimidating arrival of troops, non-agency Northern Indians broke camp and fled back to the north. At Red Cloud Agency in particular, Indians who stayed behind were observed to be brooding and sulking due to the military presence. Those who harbored particular resentment did not hide it, and made a point of avoiding contact with the soldiers.

Nevertheless, as time passed, agency Indians grew used to their presence (Buecker, Fort

Robinson 16).

Initially, there was conflict between the agent and the military leadership regarding the roles of the military. For Colonel Smith, the army’s job was solely to protect property and prevent violence, not arrest Indians (Buecker, Fort Robinson 16).

The authority of the agent and the military was ill-defined, and Colonel Smith and Agent

Saville argued constantly about their respective roles. Saville, who had been duplicitous in the past with regard to his requests for military support—requesting it one moment and downplaying the need for it at another—was not anxious to lose control of his agency.

Additionally, Red Cloud, still smarting from the harsh comments of Colonel Smith,

32 complained to the Indian commissioners about his treatment of them. Per the commission members’ request, the Interior Department was asked to determine whether the authority of the agent or of the commanding officer was superior. Secretary Delano refused to take sides, and instead stated that each of the two were equal in authority, per President

Grant’s decision, and that the duties of each were distinct and independent. Furthermore, any disagreements between the two would need to be referred to Grant for settlement

(Buecker, Fort Robinson 18). The commission eventually concluded that a military presence was the only means of maintaining order. On March 29, 1874, the military camp at Red Cloud Agency was officially named “Camp Robinson” in honor of First

Lieutenant Levi Robinson, who had been killed in the line of duty.

Fort Laramie supplied both agency camps. Large quantities of military supplies were hauled by freighters from the Cheyenne quartermaster depot to Fort Laramie and then north to Red Cloud Agency. Per Colonel Smith’s recommendation, sixty days worth of supplies were to be on hand. However, because a permanent location for Spotted Tail

Agency was still in question, only a thirty-day supply was appropriate. The logistics and materials required to transport these supplies were daunting. More than 300 mules were utilized in the wagon trains, which required a considerable amount of forage to be on hand at Red Cloud. The forage alone consisted of eighty-seven tons of oats, forty-three tons of corn and two-hundred tons of hay. In addition, food, clothing, ordnance and many other supplies needed to be regularly shipped to each camp (Buecker, Fort Robinson 22).

The proximity of Camp Robinson to the agency presented a number of problems.

First, it exacerbated the friction between soldiers and Indians forced to interact regularly.

33

Second, the thousands of Indian horses over-grazed the nearby fields leaving little for the army horses. Finally, warm weather contributed to the rotting carcasses of the beef cattle that the Indians slaughtered upon receipt, thus creating an unbearable stench. For these reasons, the arguments for moving the camp gained traction (Buecker, Fort Robinson

24).

Colonel Smith and Captain MacArthur, after surveying the nearby landscape, chose a new site for Camp Robinson situated on the north side of White River about a mile and half above the agency. They located a level area next to where Soldier Creek emptied into the river. This proved to be a much better location for a few reasons. Army and Indian animals would no longer have to compete for grazing areas, water and timber were plentiful and close and, perhaps most importantly, the new site was far enough away from the agency Indians to mitigate conflicts, but close enough to allow for a rapid response if necessary (Buecker, Fort Robinson 24). The camp’s proximity to water was of the utmost importance. Camp Robinson’s location near White River, Soldier Creek and other natural springs proved beneficial. In an effort to maintain the cleanliness of this water supply, bathing and watering of post animals was prohibited in certain areas

(Buecker, Fort Robinson 68).

The move to the new site occurred on May 6. Tents were spaced more generously than at the previous camp. Sanitation was paramount but mosquitos were an issue, described by one visitor as “so thick only a part of them can find anchorage at a time”

(Buecker, Fort Robinson 24). Aware that many of the agency Indians harbored resentment toward the soldiers, Colonel Smith limited the number of military visits to the

34 agency. At one point, he ordered that enlisted men could not venture more than a mile away from camp unless they were on active duty. Any soldiers stepping foot in the agency needed written permission of company officers, together with the approval of the commanding officer. Only then, they needed to be in parties of at least three and fully armed (Buecker, Fort Robinson 25).

The layout of Camp Robinson began to take shape. As was typical of post designs at the time, the buildings were arranged around an open and flat area and were to measure 160 square yards. Officer barracks were to run along the north side with company barracks along the east and west. A guardhouse, cavalry barracks, a headquarters building, and a storehouse were built on the south side. Corrals and stables were added later (Buecker, Fort Robinson 32). As construction continued into the Fall of

1874, Lee asked Jordan for permission to retain the number of men who had been performing extra duty construction work. Forty-six had been on extra duty in addition to the twenty-six who had been authorized for regular duty. Lee’s request was motivated by a conviction that the favorable fall weather would not continue for much longer. Soldier laborers assisted the mason, quarried rock and hauled logs to the sawmill. It was recommended that men who had been working extra duty be reclassified as “daily duty” as a way to avoid paying them additional stipends (Buecker, Fort Robinson 35).

The isolation of Camp Robinson made it difficult to receive supplies, all of which were requisitioned through headquarters in Omaha. First shipped by train and then north to the camp by wagon, the amount of time required to deliver food, ordnance and building supplies varied depending on weather conditions. Lieutenant Auman requested

35 permission to order eleven months of supplies in advance, rather than the usual three months, in anticipation of a long winter. Lieutenant Jesse M. Lee, who would replace

Auman as quartermaster, submitted a similar request (Buecker, Fort Robinson 34). As the construction continued at a robust pace, the fact that manpower was often stretched thin was highlighted by Captain Jordan’s annoyance at a directive from district headquarters at Fort Laramie ordering him to deploy a company to improve the wagon road and crossings of White River. Jordan chafed at the order since that would necessarily delay the hauling of logs needed to maintain the vigorous pace of construction he felt was necessary (Buecker, Fort Robinson 40).

Gradually, Camp Robinson began to assume a sense of permanence as lumber, stone and hardware were stockpiled and building additions were completed. The first major phase of construction ended by the spring of 1875. Camp Robinson’s buildings were primitive by contemporary standards, yet they were superior to those at Spotted

Tail. A newspaper correspondent remarked that Camp Robinson’s “neatly constructed adobe brick quarters and log barracks give it an air of permanence and comfort that is not possessed by the primitive earth covered cantonments at Camp Sheridan” (Buecker, Fort

Robinson 42).

Diversion and entertainment were limited at Camp Robinson for the same reasons that they were at Camp Sheridan. For both officers and enlisted, the remoteness of the camps afforded little in the way of recreation. Socializing was naturally restricted to other soldiers and the daily grind was rigid and mundane. Even if both camps had not been in a perilous location surrounded by the constant threat of violence, there would have been

36 nothing to do outside of them. Nevertheless, there were occasional dances and holiday festivities that were well-attended. Soldiers also enjoyed visits to the post trader’s store, which provided clothing, guns, food, drink and various trinkets for sale at prices determined by the post council of administration. Post traders would often extend a reasonable amount of credit to officers and their wives. While regular enlisted soldiers were generally unable to interact with the Indians off-grounds, officers were able to routinely visit their camps and entertain their leaders (Buecker, Fort Robinson 69). There were also several sporting events hosted by the soldiers. Horse racing, in particular, was extremely popular, especially when there happened to be a significant number of cavalry troops stationed at the camps. Races varied in length and often had hundreds of people watching, including Indians, who particularly enjoyed the activity (Buecker, Fort

Robinson 70).

For most of 1875 some 350 officers and enlisted were stationed at Robinson with a majority of the latter being infantry. Although cavalry could pursue and scout more efficiently while on horseback, infantry were lower-maintenance and had long-range weaponry as opposed to the short-range cavalry weapons. The officers who staffed the garrison during the early years of Camp Robinson were very capable leaders. All of them had either graduated from West Point or were seasoned Civil War veterans with expertise in plains warfare. The proximity of hostile Northern Indians to Red Cloud Agency created an environment that historians have described, in retrospect, as a dangerous

“powder keg.” The close presence of soldiers to the agency undoubtedly served as a deterrent against hostile Indian activity, and they provided a certain gravitas to the

37 agent’s position and authority within the agency. The agents appreciated this. Never, during the White River years, did any of them request the removal of soldiers (Buecker,

Fort Robinson 43-4).

The initial duties of the soldiers stationed at Camp Robinson (and presumably at

Camp Sheridan) fell into two categories. Field service consisted of scouting and escort duty, pursuit of raiding bands and law enforcement assistance. The second was garrison duty. The majority of the field duties consisted of regular garrison duty, which was essential to maintain the military readiness of the post. Discipline was enforced and preserved by means of the rigid routine to which the soldiers were subjected (Buecker,

Fort Robinson 50).

By 1876, however, the army’s duties had morphed into those of law enforcement, particularly with regard to arresting whisky peddlers and evicting unwanted persons from agency grounds. The department judge advocate soon ruled that post commanders be notified, in writing, of probable cause before performing an arrest. Agents were required to state a complaint explicitly in order that the accused be properly informed of the charges. Soldiers were allowed to assist the agent but were prohibited from making frivolous arrests. The rights of the private citizen remained paramount (Buecker, Fort

Robinson 45). As was the case at Camp Sheridan, desertion and horse theft were continual problems. Camp Robinson soldiers were dispatched to pursue and apprehend deserters, and the ever-present threat from hostile Indians made armed escorts necessary during travel to and from the agencies. Even pacifistic commissioners acting as emissaries to the Oglalas and Brulés did not travel without protection (Buecker, Fort

38

Robinson 48). Finally, although the Black Hills were located within Indian territory, and white incursions into them was prohibited by the 1868 Treaty, small groups of miners occasionally made their way into the forbidden territory in search of gold. George Custer had led an exploratory expedition into the Black Hills in 1874 and rumors of gold discoveries quickly spread. The garrison at Camp Robinson was given the unsavory task of keeping illegal miners out of Indian territory. The country was, at the time, in the midst of an economic depression, and this prompted more miners to try their luck

(Buecker, Fort Robinson 46).

In spite of the number of field duties that soldiers at Camp Robinson and Camp

Sheridan were required to perform, garrison duty was by far the most time-consuming.

This type of duty was comprised of daily, often monotonous tasks essential in maintaining smooth post operations. Garrison duty promoted discipline and structure, which were essential in preserving order. At both camps, field musicians and buglers assembled at 5 AM. Reveille sounded at 5:10 AM sharp signaling the first of three daily roll calls. Barracks were put in order immediately following and breakfast was served at

6 AM. Guard mount occurred at 9 AM and the cavalry watered the horses at 10 AM.

Fatigue call occurred at 6:30 AM, and consisted of labor not specifically related to the use of arms. Various fatigue chores, together with specific instructions, were issued at company formations. Policing and cleaning the post, garbage disposal, hauling and distributing water by water wagon from the creek to barrels near buildings, tending to the camp gardens, stable detail and ice cutting (in winter) all needed to be performed on a regular basis. Those of special duty (as opposed to daily duty) served as cooks, hospital

39 attendants, company clerks and mechanics. As vital as these tasks were, fatigue work was a constant source of discontent among the soldiers at both camps, who undoubtedly felt exploited as cheap labor by the army. However, given the remoteness of the camps, they were the only suitable labor force from which to draw (Buecker, Fort Robinson 51).

One of the most demanding and important jobs was post quartermaster, who in

Camp Robinson’s and Camp Sheridan’s early days managed the supply trains that relentlessly hauled supplies to both. The quartermaster was responsible for all construction activities. To that end he requested all building materials, assigned tasks, managed the construction budget and account and prepared all official correspondence and reports. He also ordered and issued all supplies and equipment required by the garrison, supervised bids for hay and wood contracts and often served as the commissary officer in charge of the subsistence stores. Other positions were filled exclusively by officers. For example, the post ordnance officer oversaw the receipt and maintenance of weapons, ammunition and related equipment, and issued them as needed. An engineer officer performed the duties of a qualified engineer and was involved in construction and waste removal activities (Buecker, Fort Robinson 59).

Officers at Camp Robinson were rather opinionated regarding Indian Bureau policy, and their disagreements were predicated upon firsthand experience with the

Indians. They were convinced that imposing white civilization on Indians was utterly futile, and that Indians would not change their ways unless they wanted to. Therefore, control of agencies such as Red Cloud could only occur through military means

(Buecker, Fort Robinson 63). It is reasonable to assume that Camp Sheridan officers

40 shared similar views, and this highlights the divide that existed between those in the trenches and the ideologues in Washington. Luther Bradley, who served as post commander in 1877, was vehemently opposed to the “fight and feed” policy currently in effect. Regarding management at the Indian Bureau, he lamented:

I wish some man of brains with just a little sensibility could be in charge of the

Indians for a year or two with power to use the money appropriated by Congress

for the best good of the government and the Indian. Such a man might save

thousands of lives and millions of money, in preventing the outbreaks that occur

almost every year. And he might so very easily put the Indians in the way of

becoming self-supporting, and thereby saving the large appropriation of Congress

for their support (Buecker, Fort Robinson 63).

41

CHAPTER 5

THE GREAT SIOUX WAR

As the summer of 1875 approached, it became evident that keeping white miners out of the Black Hills was an impossible task. However earnest the US government had been in attempting to honor the provisions of the 1868 Treaty initially, the momentum created by hordes of gold seekers presented an insoluble problem. Chief Red Cloud, perhaps believing that a wide-scale military confrontation with the whites in order to defend their land would result in catastrophic losses for the Sioux, proposed a settlement with the Whites, namely that the Black Hills might be purchased instead (Buecker, Fort

Robinson 77). However, the lack of centralized authority within the larger Sioux community meant that non-Treaty Sioux would have to be won-over.

In the Summer of 1875 Edward Smith, commissioner of Indian Affairs, formed the Allison Commission in order to dialogue with the Sioux about a possible sale. The council meetings were fraught with animosity and the threat of violence. At one point

Little Big Man, a Northern Sioux warrior, threatened to shoot any white man that attempted to take his land. Several young Oglala Indians diffused the situation and prevented what would have likely been a violent and bloody incident. Following tense discussions for a few more days, the commission concluded that negotiations were futile.

It became evident that as long as northern non-treaty Indians were opposed to a sale, it would be impossible to achieve it (Buecker, Fort Robinson 78).

42

The Indian Bureau, reluctant to abandon the plan to purchase the Black Hills, sent a special investigator, Erwin C. Watkins, to evaluate the situation and make recommendations. His conclusion was less than promising, and provided the pretext for military action against the non-Treaty Indians. On November 9, Watkins reported that civilizing the Indians would be impossible as long as they were separated from their agencies, as they would be tempted by militant non-agency Indians to coalesce into a dangerous fighting force that would present a threat to the Army (Buecker, Fort Robinson

78). The “Peace Plan,” originally proposed to President Grant by well-meaning Quakers some years earlier, would have to be enforced at gunpoint.

In late November of 1875, Zachariah Chandler, Secretary of the Interior, directed

Commissioner Smith to inform all non-agency Indians that they needed to return to their agencies on or before January 31, 1876. Those who did not capitulate would be subject to the use of force. This deadline was arguably unfair for two reasons. First, the various tribes of Northern Indians were scattered over a large area and communication of this ultimatum would be difficult. Second, travel during the inclement winter weather would present an insurmountable challenge, especially for the very young and elderly. Smith delayed an extra week before instructing his agents to convey the message to the Sioux.

Did he do this in order to sabotage the relocation effort in order to provide a pretext for military action? Perhaps. In the meantime, General Sheridan instructed Generals Crook and Terry to begin preparations for an offensive. While some Indians did ultimately report to their agencies by the deadline, many of the non-agency Indians defiantly held out. In the months following, many of the Indians began to leave their agencies. Between

43

May 10 and early June of 1876, some two thousand Indians had left Red Cloud agency alone, leaving only about five hundred warriors. Depredations near the agency in the form of arson and raids increased dramatically (Buecker, Fort Robinson 79).

Thirteen days after it occurred, news of Custer’s defeat at Little Big Horn reached

Camp Robinson and Red Cloud Agency. Indians at both agencies became excited at the news, though less so at Spotted Tail due to the chief’s ability to keep his people under control. Red Cloud Agency then saw a dramatic exodus of non-agency Indians, with less than half of the population present in September of 1875 still present one year later. At

Spotted Tail, the population dropped from 8,000 to around 5,000. The Army assumed management of both Sioux agencies in July of 1876, with officers replacing the civilian agents (Buecker, Camp Sheridan 67).

Captain William Jordan ordered Captain Gerald Russell’s company, which had been on road patrol, back to Camp Robertson. Jordan was concerned that the outcome of

Little Bighorn might embolden the agency Indians to engage in hostilities. The failure of the Indian bureau to deliver beef might also stoke discontent, as they were reduced to receiving only flour and corn (Buecker, Fort Robinson 82). In August of that same year

Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie, who commanded six companies of the 4th Cavalry, established his headquarters at Camp Robinson. By the end of the summer, it was the most crucial post in the Department of the Platte. It served as the headquarters for all operations against the Oglala Sioux and the Northern Cheyenne (Buecker, Fort Robinson

85). On September 6, George W. Manypenny arrived at Red Cloud agency in charge of a new Indian commission whose objective was to compel the Sioux to give up all claims to

44 non-reservation land and the Black Hills. Non-compliance with the ultimatum would result in subsistence appropriations being cut-off. All pretense of good will toward the

Sioux was now absent. The commissioners informed the assembled Indians of these draconian conditions and allowed them to disperse to discuss the matter. Many days later, after contentious argument and confusion, the Indian chiefs and two headmen from each of the agency bands begrudgingly signed the agreement (Buecker, Fort Robinson 88).

During the winter of 1876-77, Camp Robinson expanded. A new stable was erected, and a corral established next to it. The Army added a storehouse for ordnance, a granary and extensions to existing buildings. The addition of chicken coops, boardwalks and fences served to convey a sense of permanence. At the same time, military operations against the Indians continued in earnest. By February northern warriors and their families, beleaguered by months of war, slowly began to make their way back to the

Nebraska agencies where they were de-armed and de-horsed. On May 6, 1877, Crazy

Horse and more than 1,100 northern Indians surrendered peacefully at Camp Robinson.

By May 9, a total of 4,000 Indians had surrendered at both agencies. The Great Sioux war was effectively over (Buecker, Fort Robinson 89).

The last significant event related to the Sioux war was the death of Crazy Horse in

September of 1877. After surrendering at Camp Robinson, Crazy Horse remained encamped near Red Cloud Agency. There were persistent rumors that his surrender was not sincere and that he intended to break away and renew hostilities with the army. In a pre-emptive move designed to remove that possibility, the army decided to separate

Crazy Horse from his people by force. However, he fled to Spotted Tail Agency before

45 he could be arrested. Agent Lee discussed the issue with the Indian leaders at the agency and, in the end, Crazy Horse agreed to make the trip back to Camp Robinson. He was bayoneted by a guard while resisting confinement and died on September 5. A Fort

Robinson post return dated September 30, 1877, notes, “The Sioux chief Crazy Horse was wounded while attempting to escape from the post command tower on the 5th. Died about midnight same night” (FRPR). His body was brought back to Spotted Tail Agency and buried near Camp Sheridan on September 8 (Buecker, Camp Sheridan 69).

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CHAPTER 6

AFTERMATH

The Oglala and Brulé agencies were both relocated to the Dakota reservation in the Fall of 1877. The Brulés were escorted to the new location by one of two cavalry companies that were stationed at Camp Sheridan. As the Oglala column passed Spotted

Tail Agency, members of Crazy Horse’s family took his remains with them. The buildings and supplies at Spotted Tail were moved to the new site. Originally, Red

Cloud’s Oglalas had intended to relocate to a site on the Missouri River. However, they eventually settled on a location that was only twenty or so miles north of Camp Sheridan, which then became the closest military post. Camp Sheridan officers would continue to visit the agency on a regular basis in order to manage it (Buecker, Camp Sheridan 69).

Due to the relocation of Red Cloud Agency to Dakota, there seemed to be no compelling reason to continue to staff and maintain Camp Robinson. General George

Crook, in 1878, proposed the abandonment of Camp Robinson and that a garrison at

Camp Sheridan be kept. However, the former was better situated along the road to the

Black Hills and its troop accommodations were better suited than those at Camp

Sheridan. Crook eventually changed his mind and recommended the abandonment of

Camp Sheridan. Late in 1878, Camp Robinson officially became Fort Robinson, indicating that it was henceforth going to be a permanent fixture (Buecker, Camp

Sheridan 69).

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In 1880, in order to provide security for the new Brulé reservation, the Army began construction of Fort Niobrara. At that time, Fort Robinson was sufficiently large to accommodate a full garrison without the need to construct any more additions. This consideration provided the impetus for the closing of Camp Sheridan, which at that point was costly and unnecessary. The new Red Cloud Agency was named Pine Ridge Agency and its agent, Valentine T. McGillycuddy, argued against the proposed abandonment of

Camp Sheridan. He maintained that even with a minimal number of troops, the camp would continue to have “a good effect on such Indians here as might be tempted to be turbulent.” Nevertheless, General William T. Sherman, commanding general of the

Army, decided in favor of abandonment in November of 1880. However, it was decided that the garrison would remain stationed at the camp until May 1, 1881 (Buecker, Camp

Sheridan 70).

During the spring of 1881 all commissary, quartermaster and remaining supplies still at Camp Sheridan were shipped to Fort Robinson. Most of the remaining buildings were demolished and the lumber was salvaged to be sent to Robinson and Fort Niobrara.

Company E, Ninth Infantry and Company M, Fifth Cavalry, the last garrison at Camp

Sheridan, left for Fort Robinson on May 2, 1881. Three months later, on August 2, a public auction was held at the now-abandoned post. Lieutenant Charles H. Watts oversaw the auction. The commissary storehouse, the laundress quarters, all remaining lumber and about thirty-five tons of hay were all sold. All remaining items were removed afterward

(Buecker, Camp Sheridan 71).

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If one were to drive about 13 miles north of Hay Springs, Nebraska, along Road

473 and glance West, the forlorn landscape of grass, deciduous trees and low, rolling hills that greet the viewer are all that remain to mark the site of what was Camp Sheridan. The

Army abandoned Fort Robinson in 1947, but several of its original structures remain largely intact and are maintained by the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission.

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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

That the westward expansion of the nineteenth century was accompanied by violence and death seems unremarkable, in hindsight. The determination of the United

States government to appropriate as much real estate as possible, together with Indian resolve to resist displacement, made conflict inevitable. History, though, seldom offers strictly binary interpretations, and it would be disingenuous to judge the actions and motives of those so far removed from our own time through a progressive twenty-first- century lens. Malfeasance and violence occurred on both sides. The formation of Spotted

Tail and Red Cloud agencies represented perhaps the most reasonable compromise at the time for two parties with disparate worldviews and agendas. The United States was going to continue expanding west, regardless, and the agencies were an imperfect but good- faith effort to allow the Lakotas some measure of autonomy. The unwillingness of many of them to affiliate with an agency and the frequent acts of violence they committed against whites and army soldiers alike underscore the tragically dysfunctional and unsustainable nature of this effort, however. The Peace Policy, based on the notion that a seamless transition from the Lakota way of life to that of the whites was attainable, seems foolhardy in retrospect. The distribution of rations to Indian tribes by way of treaty did nothing more than create an unhealthy and demeaning level of dependence upon white culture that would ultimately strip the agency Lakota of their pride and identity.

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The broad historical narrative surrounding this drama on the Nebraska frontier is enhanced by analyzing the mundane details of the day-to-day happenings at Camps

Sheridan and Robinson. They reveal not only the parallel and concurrent experiences of those individuals stationed at each, but the struggles and challenges associated with the implementation of a US government policy that would prove to be a portent of the lamentable state of Native Americans in present-day America. Nevertheless, we may glimpse within those records sincere and occasionally misguided efforts to cope with the often unpleasant realities of Plains life in the late nineteenth century.

WORKS CITED

52

WORKS CITED

Buecker, Thomas M. “History of Camp Sheridan, Nebraska.” Periodic Journal of

America’s Military Past. Volume 22 (1995): Pages 55-73.

---. Fort Robinson and the American West—1874-1899. Oklahoma: University of

Oklahoma Press, 1999. Print.

Hyde, George E. Spotted Tail’s Folks—A History of the Brulé Sioux. Oklahoma:

University of Oklahoma Press, 1987. Print.

Ostler, Jeffrey. The Lakotas and the Black Hills—The Struggle for Sacred Ground. New

York: Penguin Group, 2010. Print.

U.S. Army. Camp Sheridan Endorsement Book. Volume 1. Aug 21, 1874–Sept 30, 1875.

National Archives, Washington D.C.

---. Camp Sheridan Endorsement Book. Volume 2. Oct 20, 1875–Feb 16, 1876. National

Archives, Washington D.C.

---. Camp Sheridan Endorsement Book. Volume 3. July 23, 1876–Dec 29, 1879. National

Archives, Washington D.C.

---. Camp Sheridan Endorsement Book. Volume 4. Jan 1, 1880–April 28, 1881. National

Archives, Washington D.C.

---. Fort Robinson Post Returns. June 30, 1874–Jan 3, 1885. History Nebraska, Lincoln,

Nebraska.

Utley, Robert M. Frontier Regulars—The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1890.

New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973. Print.