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VU Research Portal Arguing From Cognitive Science of Religion Van Eyghen, H.M.R. 2018 document version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication in VU Research Portal citation for published version (APA) Van Eyghen, H. M. R. (2018). Arguing From Cognitive Science of Religion: Cognitive Science of Religion and its Epistemic Implications. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. E-mail address: [email protected] Download date: 30. Sep. 2021 Arguing From Cognitive Science of Religion. Cognitive Science of Religion and its Epistemic Implications Hans Van Eyghen This thesis was reviewed by: Lieven De Cock VU Amsterdam Amsterdam, Nederland Helen de Cruz Oxford Brookes University Oxford, United Kingdom Michiel van Elk Universiteit van Amsterdam Amsterdam, Nederland Joke van Saane VU Amsterdam Amsterdam, Nederland Robert McCauley Emory University Atlanta, GA, United States of America ISBN: 978-94-6295-929-3 ©2018, No part of this thesis may be copied or reproduced in any form or by any means without explicit permission from the author. Cover by Job de Lange Printed by proefschrift maken A digital version of this thesis is available at www.ub.vu.nl This thesis is the result of research performed as a member of the Abraham Kuyper Center at the department of Philosophy at VU Amsterdam. VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT Arguing From Cognitive Science of Religion Cognitive Science of Religion and its Epistemic Implications ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor of Philosophy aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, op gezag van de rector magnificus prof.dr. V. Subramaniam, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie van de Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen op vrijdag 15 juni 2018 om 11.45 uur in de aula van de universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105 door Hans Maurice Roger Albert Van Eyghen geboren te Gent, België promotoren: prof.dr. G. van den Brink prof.dr. R. van Woudenberg copromotor: dr. H.D. Peels Table of Contents Acknowledgments 5 Introduction: Arguing from Cognitive Science of 7 Religion 0.1 Why Cognitive Science of Religion 8 0.2 State of the art 9 0.3 The dissertation 15 0.4 Methodology 16 0.5 What’s new 17 Chapter 1: What are religious and supernatural 19 beliefs? 1.1 Introduction 19 1.2 What are religious beliefs? 19 1.3 What are supernatural beliefs? 21 1.4 A plurality of supernatural beliefs 23 1.4.1 Supernatural belief 1: Supernatural beings interact 23 intentionally with people. 1.4.2 Supernatural belief 2: Supernatural beings aid in 31 practical affairs. 1.4.3 Supernatural belief 3: Supernatural beings have 34 special powers. 1.4.4 Supernatural belief 4: Supernatural beings have a 37 moral concern. 1.4.5 Supernatural belief 5: Supernatural beings are 42 compassionate. 1.5 Conclusion 45 Chapter 2: Cognitive theories of religious belief 47 2.1 Introduction 47 2.2 Evolutionary theories of religious belief 47 2.2.1 Preliminary 1: Adaptation or by‐product? 49 2.2.2 Preliminary 2: Adaptationist fallacy? 51 2.2.3 Preliminary 3: Individual or group selection 52 1 2.2.4 Evolutionary theory 1: The Broad Supernatural 53 Punishment Theory (BSPT) 2.2.5 Evolutionary Theory 2: The Big Gods Theory (BGT) 59 2.2.6 Evolutionary Theory 3: The Costly Signaling Theory 63 (CST) 2.2.7 Evolutionary Theory 4: The Religion and Health 66 Theory (RHT) 2.2.8 Evolutionary Theory 5: The Attraction of Religion 70 Theory (ART) 2.3 Cognitive mechanism explanations 72 2.3.1 Preliminary 1: Cognitive mechanism theories 73 2.3.2 Preliminary 2: Universal cognitive mechanisms? 77 2.3.3 Preliminary 3: Cognitive mechanisms versus 79 evolutionary mechanisms 2.3.4 Cognitive Theory 1: The Preparatory Account 79 Theory (PAT) 2.3.5 Cognitive Theory 2: The Hyperactive Agency 85 Detection Device Theory (HADDT) 2.3.6 Cognitive Theory 3: The Moral Dyad Theory (MDT) 89 2.3.7 Cognitive Theory 4: The Existential Theory of Mind 91 Theory (EToMT) 2.3.8 Cognitive Theory 5: The Attachment Theory (AT) 93 2.3.9 Cognitive Theory 6: The Cognitive Optimum Theory 97 (COT) 2.4 One more theory : The Identity Fusion Theory (IFT) 98 2.5 Conclusion 101 Chapter 3: Are CSR and religious belief 103 incompatible? 3.1 Introduction 103 3.2 What is the incompatibility argument? 103 3.3 The argument stated 105 3.4 Criticizing the argument(s) 111 3.5 Specific responses 111 3.6 General responses 119 3.7 Conclusion 122 2 Chapter 4: Is supernatural belief unreliably 123 formed? 4.1 Introduction 123 4.2 What is the argument? 123 4.3 Evolutionary unreliability arguments 126 4.3.1 Goodnick’s evolutionary unreliability argument 126 4.3.2 Wilkins and Griffiths’ evolutionary unreliability 129 argument 4.4 False god‐beliefs unreliability arguments 136 4.5 Incompatible god‐beliefs unreliability arguments 143 4.6 Off‐track unreliability arguments 146 4.7 Conclusion 149 Chapter 5: Is everything supernatural 151 superfluous for religious experiences? 5.1 Introduction 151 5.2 Preliminaries 151 5.3 Naturalistic explanations of religious experiences 158 5.4 Are the explanations naturalistic? 160 5.5 The argument 163 5.5.1 What is the argument? 163 5.5.2 The argument stated 164 5.5.3 Objections 167 5.6 Naturalistic explanations and the case for 169 naturalism 5.6.1 The argument stated 172 5.6.2 Objections 174 5.7 Conclusion 176 Chapter 6: Does CSR harm the evidential status 177 of supernatural beliefs? 6.1 Introduction 177 6.2 What is the argument ? 177 6.3 Preliminaries 178 3 6.4 Claim 1: P (N/ wosb) < P (S/ wosb) 185 6.5 Claim 2: P (N/ wosb + Mx) > P (N/wosb) 194 6.6 Are CSR‐mechanisms accurate? 198 6.6.1 Evolutionary Theory 1: The Broad Supernatural 200 Punishment Theory (BSPT) 6.6.2 Evolutionary Theory 2: The Big Gods Theory (BGT) 201 6.6.3 Evolutionary Theory 3: The Costly signaling Theory 202 (CST) 6.6.4 Evolutionary Theory 4: The Attraction of Religion 204 Theory (ART) 6.6.5 Evolutionary Theory 5: The Religion and Health 205 Theory (R&HT) 6.6.6 Cognitive Theory 1: The Preparatory Account 206 Theory (PAT) 6.6.7 Cognitive Theory 2: The Hyperactive Agency 207 Detection Device Theory (HADDT) 6.6.8 Cognitive Theory 3: The Moral Dyad Theory (MDT) 209 6.6.9 Cognitive Theory 4: The Existential Theory of Mind 210 Theory (EToMT) 6.6.10 Cognitive Theory 5: Attachment Theory (AT) 211 6.6.11 Cognitive Theory 6: The Cognitive Optimum Theory 213 (COT) 6.6.12 Combining mechanisms 213 6.7 Objections 217 6.7.1 An accurate mechanism is forthcoming 217 6.7.2 Partially explaining is enough 220 6.8 Conclusion 222 Conclusion 223 Epilogue: Cognitive Science of Religion and 227 scientism Bibliography 229 Summary 259 4 Acknowledgments Rafael’s masterwork The School of Athens portrays Plato as pointing up and Aristotle as pointing down. During my PhD-research I was taught to do both. Cognitive scientists taught me to look down in the human mind to how religious beliefs originate. Philosophers and theologians taught me to look up into the normative realm of religious epistemology. To bring both together I was fortunate enough to receive help from too many people to list. I want to express my thanks to a number of people in particular. First of all, I thank my supervisors Gijsbert van den Brink, René van Woudenberg and Rik Peels for their huge amounts of time and efforts invested in this thesis. They carefully read every chapter (including those that didn’t make the final cut) and provided very useful comments and criticisms. I was fortunate to have supervisors with different, mutually complementing backgrounds. Without them, this thesis could not have come about or would have been much worse. Second, I thank Robert McCauley, the (academic) staff of the Center for Mind, Brain and Culture at Emory University and various scholars of Cognitive Science of Religion I met over the years. Their input helped me make up for my lack of background in cognitive science. Special thanks go out to Robert McCauley for welcoming me at Emory University and helping me with my research. Third, I thank Valentin Arts, Lieke Asma, Thirza Band-Lagewaard, Wout Bisschop, Leon de Bruin, Jeroen de Ridder, Gerrit Glas, Tamarinde Haven, Naomi Kloosterboer, Kelvin McQueen, Scott Robbins and Emanuel Rutten for their sometimes firm, but always useful comments and criticisms on my work. While I did not always look forward to having my writings discussed during research meetings, the resulting comments and criticisms certainly improved this thesis. I also thank them and the rest of the (academic) staff at the department of philosophy for making the VU a wonderful environment to work. At risk of omitting some I thank Govert Buijs, Lieven de Cock, Henk de Regt, Loes Derksen Annemie Halsema, Edwin Koster, Christian Krijnen, David Ludwig, Marije Martijn, Reinier Munk, Philip Robichaud, Angela Roothaan, Judith van Ooijen, Jojanneke Vanderveen, Martin van Hees, Irma Verlaan, Jan Willem Wieland and Marije Zeldenrijk.