September 11, 2001 W E Remember

WINTER 2001 - Volume 48, Number 4

September 11, 2001 We Remember WINTER 2001 - Volume 48, Number 4

Aeroplanes of Lebedev’s Factory Viktor Kulikov 4 In the Devil’s Shadow: Don Nichols and U.S. Air Force Special Air Missions Michael E. Haas 18 The AMST Program’s Lasting Legacy Betty Raab Kennedy 28 Taking Clodfelter One Step Further: Mass, Surprise, Concentration, and the Failure of Operation Rolling Thunder Stephen W. Wilson 40 Slanguage: Part V, Letters S-Z Brian S. Gunderson 48

Departments: From the Editor 3 Book Reviews 54 Books Received 62 Coming Up 64 History Mystery 68 Letters, News, Notices, and Reunions 69

COVER: An early model C–17 lifts off during testing of its STOL abilities. The Air Force Historical Foundation

Air Force Historical Foundation 1535 Command Drive – Suite A122 Andrews AFB, MD 20762-7002 (301) 981-2139 (301) 981-3574 Fax The Journal of the Air Force Historical Foundation Winter 2001 Volume 48 Number 4 Officers Contributing Members

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2 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 From the Editor

The horrific events of September 11, 2001, shook our nation as violently as did the attack on Pearl Harbor nearly sixty years ago. Just as we overcame that original day of infamy, so too shall we beat the challenge of the terrorist assault on the United States of America. Air power, which proved decisive throughout most of the twentieth century, will undoubtedly continue to influence events into the twenty-first. This journal will continue to encourage the study of air power history to serve the needs of our military, scholars, students, enthusiasts, and all people who love freedom. To continue our study, this issue starts with an article by a Russian air power enthu- siast, Viktor P. Kulikov, who recounts the history of Vladimir Lebedev’s World War I aircraft factory and its successes and failures. Many unique photographs illustrate the article. Michael Haas’s fascinating account of Don Nichols’s special operations exploits during the Korean War, “In the Devil’s Shadow,” is drawn from his book published by the Naval Institute Press. Air Mobility Command historian, Betty Kennedy, establishes the “lasting legacy” of the AMST—Advanced Medium Short-Takeoff and Landing Transport—the C–17 Globemaster III. It is relevant even today over Afghanistan. Stephen Wilson wrote, “Taking Clodfelter One Step Further,” while he was a U.S. Air Force Academy cadet. In this article, Lt. Wilson extends his mentor’s thesis by examining how the policy of gradualism led to the misuse of air power in the Vietnam War. Brig. Gen. Brian S. Gunderson, USAF (Ret.), this journal’s publisher and a World War II veteran, concludes his final installment of “Slanguage,” the Rosetta Stone of RAF-USAAF slang terms. Future generations will thank him for deciphering an entire body of arcane literature. Nine books are reviewed in this issue, covering a variety of subjects and written by experts in their field; these should pique everyone’s interest. Again, I invite your attention to the books received list. Book review editor, Michael Grumelli, is actively solicit- ing new reviewers. If you feel qualified to review one or more of the books listed—in this or prior issues, or have an appropriate book that was not listed—please contact Dr. Grumelli. See pages 62–63. The departments section includes the usual categories of “The History Mystery,” letters, news, notices, and reunions. If you would like to express your views or advise readers of some upcoming event, please write or e-mail the editors. See page 2. Gen. W. Y. Smith, USAF (Ret.), president of the Air Force Historical Foundation, was compelled to postpone the coalition air power in the Korean War symposium that was slated for October 17–18, 2001. We anticipate rescheduling it next spring. On behalf of the staff of Air Power History, I wish all of our readers happy holidays, health, and good fortune.

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AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 3 Aeroplanes ofL

4 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 ebedev’sFactory

Viktor Kulikov

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 5 (Overleaf) The three-seat uring World War I, Russian aviation was the French aero club. In June, Lebedev completed reconnaissance Lebed XVI posted good results in armed mainly with French aircraft, such as several successful demonstration flights at 1917 testing. The Le Rhone D those by Farman, Voisin, and Nieuport, that Gatchina airfield, frequently taking Russian offi- 80 hp engines were not were purchased abroad or built in Russia under cers aloft. As a result of those flights, many of the covered with bonnets. Vladimir Lebedev (third license. Some Russian designers, including Vasily officers later became military pilots. from the right) with Slesarev, Jakov Gakkel, and Vladimir Savel’yev Lebedev had brought with him a Farman-IV Russian and French officers near his aircraft. created original aircraft, but these were not devel- and, beginning in August, began to train students Engineer Mikhail Shkulnik oped beyond the experimental stage. A few at the All-Russian Aeronautic Club’s flying school is the first from the right. Russian designers managed to create successful on Gatchina airfield. Lebedev was soon appointed (Far right upper) A model aircraft that went into production for the Russian the head and chief pilot of the flying school. of Sommer aircraft by French designer and pilot army, notably Sikorsky’s Il’ya Muromets four- Besides performing as a flight instructor, he Roge Sommer was pur- engine bomber and Grigorovich’s M-5 and M-9 fly- became a test pilot, flying the first Russian-built chased by the Russian ing boats. Also in this category was the two-seat biplanes, the Rossiya-A and Rossiya-B, and setting Military Department to be built at the Russian-Baltic reconnaissance Lebed-XII, one of the few produc- an endurance record of fifteen minutes. That carriage works in Riga in tion airplanes of Russian design of the period. It autumn, he flight tested the Sommer biplane, built 1910. Vladimir Lebedev was produced in series at Vladimir Lebedev’s fac- at the Russian-Baltic Carriage Works. tested the aircraft in the spring of 1911. tory in Petrograd between 1916 and 1918, with Also in 1910, the Lebedev brothers, along with (Far right lower) Military more than 200 built during the war years and Captain Sergei Ul’yanin and a businessman biplane PTA No 1 was a after the revolution for the Red Army until 1920. named Lomach established Peterburgskoye tovar- modification of French Vladimir Alexandrovich Lebedev was born in ishchestvo aviatsii (the Petersburg Aviation Farman-IV. The idea of folding aircraft was real- St. Petersburg in 1879. While studying for a law Company (PTA). The newly organized company ized in this modification. degree from St. Petersburg Imperial University, he won an order from the army’s Central Engineering Lebedev successfully tested the aircraft in the was the Russian bicycle racing champion. In Department to build a folding or demountable air- spring of 1911. Rubber France in 1908, he observed the flight of a Wright craft. The contract specified that the disassembled flotation bags were brothers’ airplane. The following year, Vladimir airplane be capable of reassembly and put in fight- attached under the lower wing in case of water land- Lebedev and his brother, Aleksandr, a professor at ing trim within two hours. Completed on January ing. the Imperial Polytechnic Institute, built a glider 26, 1911, military biplane PTA No. 1 was a modi- that made a series of successful flights near St. Petersburg. Vladimir Lebedev became an active (Below) Vladimir Lebedev member of the All-Russian Aero Club and wrote standing (third from the for Vestnik vozdukhoplavanya (The Herald of left) near Bleriot XI aircraft. The Second aviation week, Aeronautics) magazine. In March 1910, these St. Petersburg, September activities gained him admission to the Henry 1910. Farman flying school in France. By April, Lebedev had earned his wings. He passed his examinations, qualifying for the rank of pilot-aviator, and soon returned to Russia. Awarded flying diploma No. 98, he became the third Russian to graduate from

fied Farman IV, distinguished from the French model by its reduced wing area and featured a gondola for an observer and the pilot. The airplane won a prize at the First International Aeronautic Exhibition in St. Petersburg in 1911. Lebedev’s flight tests at Kolomyazhsky airfield demonstrated that the new airplane was as fast as the

A Muscovite, Viktor P. Kulikov graduated from Urals University. For the past twenty years, he has been actively researching and writing the history of Russian aviation of the World War I period. A version of this article first appeared in Russian Aviation Research Group of Air Britain Bulletin, Vol. 39 No. 141, pp. 139ff. Mr. Kulikov’s article, Sikorsy’s Fighters, appeared in the Winter 2000 issue of this journal.

6 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 lighter Farman IV. The All-Russian Aero-Club Mikhailov. At the beginning of the war, Lebedev’s bought two copies of PTA No. 1 for pilot training. factory produced many more aircraft than did In 1912, without interrupting his flying activi- other Russian aircraft factories. In 1916, his fac- IN 1912, WITH- ties, Lebedev decided to devote himself to business. tory produced on average one airplane per day, and OUT INTER- He opened a workshop in St. Petersburg to repair in some months one and a half airplanes daily. RUPTING HIS and produce French Integral type propellers, parts Besides the Albatros, the factory also copied for Depredation aircraft, and trolleys to transport German airplanes built by Rumpler, Aviatik, and FLYING disassembled Nieuport IV airplanes. Although this LVG. Also constructed, but in smaller numbers, ACTIVITIES, workshop burned down in 1913, Lebedev had were the British Sopwith Tabloid and Sopwith 1- LEBEDEV bought insurance. Then, shortly after the work- 1/2-strutter. The copies were all named Lebed and DECIDED TO shop was restored, a second fire broke out and numbered sequentially. Thus, the Sopwith Tabloid DEVOTE again insurance compensated him. Some sus- was named Lebed VII. Lebedev’s factory also pected that this was how Lebedev accumulated his developed experimental airplanes. He enlisted cre- HIMSELF TO capital. In April 1914, Lebedev built several indus- ative people and provided them with favorable BUSINESS. trial facilities for his new aircraft factory— working conditions, but infrequently carried the Aktsionernoe obshchestvo vozdukhoplavaniay V. A. work through to completion because experimental Lebedeva (Lebedev’s joint stock aeronautic com- airplanes simply did not generate enough profit pany) in the Novaya Derevnya, near Komendant- soon enough. Nonetheless, several experimental sky airfield in St. Petersburg. Russian designs were built at Lebedev’s factory, including the Svyatogor by Vasiliy Slesarev, Le- A Growing Business Grand by Leonid Kolpakov, Morskoy Parasol by Georgy Fride, VM-4 by Aleksander Villish, and Lebedev’s factory began with only seven work- Lebed-XVII by Sergei Gurevich. LEBEDEV’S ers, but after obtaining many orders from the FACTORY Military Department, the factory’s work force grew Trophy and Licensed Aircraft of Lebedev’s BEGAN WITH to 1,500 employees and increased industrial capac- Factory ONLY SEVEN ity. Only six planes per month were produced in 1914. Two years later, the monthly average rose to Orders for military planes increased sharply WORKERS, thirty aircraft. The factory’s facilities included following the onset of World War I. The Central BUT…THE woodworking, drying, mechanical, fitting, welding, Military-Technical Department asked for 60 FACTORY’S carpentry, and assembly shops. The factory’s chief Morane Saulnier type G, 30 Morane Saulnier type WORK FORCE pilot was a French aviator named Januar. Lett L, and 72 Depredation aircraft. Later, the two-seat GREW TO Martin Fyodorovich Gospovskii, who had worked reconnaissance Voisin became the factory’s main 1,500 as an engine mechanic, later replaced Januar. product, with 153 copies of that aircraft produced Vitold Ivanovich Yarkovskii was the factory’s man- in 1916-1917. Lebedev also signed contracts for 40 EMPLOYEES ager and technical head. On the eve of the out- Nieuport 10 aircraft (only twelve were produced), break of World War I, Lebedev recruited Leopold 260 Sopwith 1-1/2-strutters (five were produced), Mikhailovich Shkulnik to be the factory’s primary and 80 Farman 30s (none were turned out). Many designer. Shkulnik, who had previously worked for of the orders could not be filled, however, because the German AGO Company, designed most of the of the factory’s limited capacity and a severe short- airplanes at Lebedev’s factory. Vasilii Ivanovich age of aircraft-engines. Rebikov headed the serial construction of foreign Lebedev’s factory also produced the so-called aircraft. Engineers Samuil Borisovich Gurevich, German “trophy” aircraft. Damaged enemy air- ORDERS FOR Leonid Dement’yevich, and Kolpakov-Miroshni- craft captured by Russian forces that could not be MILITARY chenko also worked in aircraft construction. repaired at the front were sent to the factory, Throughout 1914, aircraft production at the new where they underwent thorough exploitation to PLANES factory centered on the French Depredation two- learn the latest advances in German aviation tech- INCREASED seaters, powered by Gnome 80 hp. engines. Sixty- nology. Usually, these aircraft were copied exactly, SHARPLY three of these airplanes were produced. In July, the with only slight alternations. One of the first FOLLOWING factory began to manufacture the French Voisin German aircraft repaired at Lebedev’s factory was THE ONSET airplane, with the Salmson 130 hp engine. Albatros No. 76, powered by a four-cylinder Argus In the summer of 1915, Lebedev’s factory in engine. Repaired by Lebedev mid-1915, it was OF WORLD Petrograd (St. Petersburg was renamed in the handed over to the Gatchina military flying school. WAR I summer of 1914) acquired a captured German In December of that year several more trophy Albatros plane, powered by a Benz 150 hp engine. German aircraft were delivered to Lebedev’s fac- Acquisition of the Albatros initiated the practice of tory.Among them was the Rumpler No. 300 with a copying captured aircraft at Lebedev’s factory. Mercedes 112-hp engine and an LVG with a Slight changes were made to adapt different Mercedes 129-hp engine. After repairs, both air- engines to the copies. This line of business proved craft were sent to the front to the 8th Army Air profitable to Lebedev, as the government paid the Detachment in February 1916. same price—13,700 rubles—for any two-seat air- In 1916, about twenty German aircraft, mainly craft, whether repaired, captured, or newly-built. Albatros types, were repaired at Lebedev’s factory. Lebedev hired two new test pilots, Aleksei Those aircraft were equipped with engines Petrovich Goncharov and Vasilii Yakovlevich removed from other planes that had been shot

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 7 At Lebedev’s factory in 1915-1916, Georgy Fride modified the Morane Saulnier type L aircraft into a flying boat, designated the Morskoy Parasol (Sea Parasol). The wings, tail unit, and Gnome 80 hp engine were taken from a standard Morane Saulnier type L aircraft and installed in a boat-shaped hull with significant dead rise and equipped with additional hydrofoils. The aircraft was tested in the summer of 1916. The power of the hydrofoils caused the flying boat to rise from the water before the wings developed enough lift and the aircraft could be brought under control. Pilots did not want to risk the takeoff with hydrofoils. Without the hydrofoils, however, the flying boat could not take off from the water. Work soon stopped. At the end of 1916, the VM-4 seaplane was designed by Aleksandr Villish and built at Lebedev’s factory. It was a flying boat with a truss tail and pusher propeller, powered by a 110 hp Le The LM-1 at tests on the down. After alternation, repair, and test flights the Neva River in May 1916. It Rhone engine. The wing cell was equipped with a was powered by an eight- aircraft were designated “Albatros of Lebedev’s fac- device for changing the angle of climb during the cylinder 150 hp Sunbeam tory” with a corresponding number and sent to flight; but it appeared to be unnecessary as the air- engine. The main floats front, providing welcome reinforcements to the had rubber-block shock craft successfully flew with fixed wings. After suc- absorbers at the rear pick 18th, 33d, 34th, and Grenadier Corps Air Detach- cessful tests in Baku, the aircraft was turned over to up points. ments; and the 8th and 12th Army Air Detach- the Navy pilot school, but was not mass produced. ments. The use of outdated German planes was Besides seaplanes, in 1915 Lebedev’s factory necessitated by an acute shortage of airplanes for turned out two copies of a float version of the Russian army frontline aviation during the war. Depredation and copies of Maurice Farman M. F. 11 on floats for Navy aircraft schools. The French Seaplanes of Lebedev’s Factory flying boat FBA, renamed Lebedev Morskoi-2 (LM- 2) was built under license at Lebedev’s factory in The Lebed-Morskoi-I (LM-I) float seaplane was 1914-1916. A two-seat reconnaissance aircraft designed first with a 220-hp Renault engine, then with a 100 hp Gnome-Monosoupape engine, it a 150-hp Sunbeam engine was installed. It was could fly at up to 105 km/hr. three-bay biplane, two-seat reconnaissance that had three floats. Its useful load was 365 kg, with a Other Russian-designed Aircraft takeoff weight of 1,455 kg. After testing in the spring of 1916, the seaplane was delivered to the In March 1916, testing began of the giant Air Detachment of the Emperor Peter the Great. Svyatogor bomber, designed by Vasily Slesarev. Another seaplane produced at Lebedev’s factory The Svaytogor, one of the largest of Russian air- was a floatplane copied from the German Albatros craft built before 1917, was 21 meters long, with a No. 269. The latter made a forced landing on 36-meter wingspan. Specifications called for the September 28, 1915, south of Mitava not far from aircraft to take off with a 6.5-ton load, and fly for Babit Lake and was then delivered to Lebedev’s 30 hours at a speed of more than 100 km/hr, with factory. It was planned to equip it with a Hispano a ceiling of 2,500 meters. The aircraft featured The gigantic Svyatogor Suiza 200 hp engine. The Military Department aircraft by Vasily Slesarev large, 6-meter diameter propellers, set in motion was built at Lebedev’s fac- ordered 175 of the aircraft, but Lebedev was able with a belt drive by two Renault 220 hp engines tory in 1916. to produce only two. mounted in the fuselage. In early November 1916, while taxiing at Komendantskyi airfield, a wheel of the aircraft rolled into a drainage ditch, damag- ing the aircraft. The designer failed to solve the problem of inefficient transmission from engines to propellers and the Svyatogor did not get airborne. Slesarev changed the belt drive into a rope transmission. However, breakdowns continued and the power plant displayed new shortcomings. The airplane remained unfinished for three years after the Bolshevik revolution. The two-seat reconnaissance K-1, designed by Leonid Kolpakov, with an Austro-Daimler 100 hp engine, was built at the Lebedev factory in the summer of 1916. The aircraft featured a variable structure. During flight, the pilot could alter angle

8 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 of attack of the wing cell within limits of 7 degrees. Tsirgiladze damaged one of the last Lebed VII air- This device was designed to obtain greater lift, craft, works number (WN) 52, while landing at the AIRCRAFT while taking off and greater speed during flight by Gatchina flying school on February 5, 1917. PRODUCED selecting a smaller, constant angle of attack. A later attempt was made to improve the AT During the first flight the aircraft took off steeply Lebed VII by installing a two-bay wing cell with LEBEDEV’S then lost speed and fell. Pilot M. Gospovsky ailerons at the upper wing and an undercarriage escaped with slight injuries. The aircraft was without anti-nose-over runners. The modified air- FACTORY IN never rebuilt and work on the project stopped. craft, designated Lebed VIII, failed to produce the 1914-1918 increased load-carrying capacity expected and WERE DESIG- The Early Lebed Aircraft only two copies were built. NATED On July 5, 1915, due to the malfunction of its “LEBED” AND All experimental and serial aircraft produced Mercedes 120 hp engine, a German LVG B II made at the Lebedev’s factory in 1914-1918 were desig- a forced landing near the village of Stara Buda. NUMBERED nated “Lebed” and numbered from I to XXIV. The undamaged aircraft was turned over to the FROM I TO Information about the first six types is lacking, but 27th Corps Air Detachment. While on a night XXIV it is assumed that they were copies of foreign air- flight from the nearby Kovna fortress, however, the craft. The Lebed VII, produced at the beginning of plane was slightly damaged and sent to Lebedev’s December 1914, was a copy of the Sopwith Tabloid, factory. Repaired in early 1916, it was subse- a single-bay biplane powered by an 80-hp Gnome quently sold to the Military Department under the rotary engine. The 21st Corps Air Detachment designation Lebed IX. received two Lebed VIIs. The plane attracted the In 1915 work began on the Lebed X aircraft. An attention of the Grand Duke Aleksandr Mikhai- original design, its scheme and structure envi- THE PLANE lovich—Patron of the Imperial Russian Air Ser- sioned for multipurpose use. The fuselage, under- vice—who inquired about the Lebed-VII as a fight- carriage, and tail were the same for two variants. ATTRACTED ing machine and also how soon it could be pro- However, two different wing cell arrangements THE duced in quantity. Military pilots reported that the could be attached to the fuselage. The small wing ATTENTION Lebed VII was capable of attaining the same speed set yielded as a single bay sesquiplane that could OF THE as Morane Saulnier G, had better pilot visibility, be used as a fighter. Its 16-sq. meter upper wing GRAND DUKE and was easier to land. On the negative side, the had ailerons, while the smaller, 13-sq. meter lower ALEKSANDR single-seater was less desirable for military pur- wing had none. A second variant, with large wings poses. That estimation probably determined why was produced as a standard double-bay biplane. MIKHAI- the plane did not enter serial production and the Its two wings had the same wing span and almost LOVICH— remaining copies were transferred to the Gatchina the same area—upper wing 20 sq. meters, lower PATRON OF flying school. The last ones remained at that flying wing 19.4 sq. meters. Two of the aircraft, WN 100 THE IMPERIAL school until the middle of 1916. The two aircraft and 101, with different wing-cells, were built at the RUSSIAN AIR assigned to the 21st Corps remained until May end of 1915 and tested by Lebedev himself the fol- 1915. Lieutenant Vernitsky made more than thirty lowing spring. Both performed poorly. The short- SERVICE combat reconnaissance flights in them for the wing version was underpowered. The long wing Sixth Army Corps. The longest flight, on April 2, variant, intended for reconnaissance, was a single- lasted 2 hours 30 minutes. seater, with little load-carrying capacity. Lebed X (Below left) Lebed VII in In the spring of 1915, one Lebed VII flown by did not enter serial production and in July 1917, Gatchina flying school, Lieutenant Semenov was assigned to the Gro- WN 101 was transferred to the Gatchina flying winter 1915-1916. dnensky fortress air detachment. Another Lebed school. (Below right) Lebed X VII went to the Seventh Fighter Air Detachment The Monocoque No. 11 (Lebed XI) was not an fighter with a one-strut wing cell. Vladimir Lebedev in December 1916 for training, but crashed with exact copy of the French Depredation Racer. is in the cockpit. Ensign Janchenko at the controls. Lieutenant Russian designers tried to convert the racer into a

single-seat fighter, with a Gnome-Monosoupape 100-hp engine and a synchronized gun. Its design speed of 180 km/hr and armament made the aircraft a good prospect for Russian military aviation,

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 9 XII WN 325 powered by a Salmson 130-hp engine, that was later replaced with a slightly more powerful 140 hp engine. Lieutenant Sleptsov, from the Grenadier Corps Air Detachment was the test pilot. On December 29, he telegraphed to the head of aircraft and aeronautics in the Army in the Field, Grand Duke Aleksander Mikhailovich: “Lebed-XII with Salmson engine is the best of all the exist[ing] airplane[s]...urgent order for fighting tests is necessary.” During the tests the plane attained a speed of 120 km/hr, rose to a height of 2,000 meters in 22 minutes, while carrying a 350-kg. load. However, the tests also revealed some defects and Sleptsov recommended that the exhaust pipes be modified to divert exhaust gases that streamed into the (Above) Monocoque No. 11 except that it experienced numerous deficiencies. cockpit; that the wind screen in the pilot’s cockpit (Depredation Racer) was a Aircraft WN 401, constructed during the first be enlarged; the resistance at the control wheel be beautiful plane, but it did not become a combat air- quarter of 1916, flew fairly well, but its machine craft. gun had not been installed and the Military

(Far right) Lebed XII (WN Department refused to buy it. In June 1917, 457) with a Salmson 150-hp Lebedev managed to sell his Monocoque to the engine. Testing started in Gatchina flying school. The plane was equipped July 1916 at Komendan- tskyi airfield, where the air- with a Gnome Monosoupape 100 hp engine and an craft achieved speeds up Integral type N 8470 propeller. It was also equip- to 133 km/hr. The wind- ped with a spare set of wings and a set of skis for shield and machine gun mounting at the observer’s winter flights. cockpit are removed, and The designation Lebed XI was also assigned to the wheels are covered with axle caps. The fuse- a typical two-seat reconnaissance biplane with dif- lage was covered with a ferent versions of wings and engines. In fact, dif- colorless oil varnish and ferent versions of trophy Albatros were produced had yellowish painting. The wings and tail were cov- under this name from 1915 until 1916. Six vari- lowered; and that armor be provided for the pilot ered with three coats of eties of wings (two and three-bay biplanes) had and observer. varnish and painted beige. wing spans from 13 to 14.5 meters and wing areas The tests were interrupted by bad weather. from 39 to 43.6 sq. meters. Lebed XI aircraft were The experimental airplane continued the tests on equipped with a variety of captured Mercedes, a railway platform first at Kiev and then at Benz, and Maybach engines. Later versions of the Odessa. A Lebed XII was delivered to the A. A. plane had Salmson 150 hp engines. The Lebed XIs Anatra aircraft factory in Odessa on February 11, were distinguishable by their propellers’ spinners 1916. Flight testing was completed four days later, and engines, which had collector rings to eliminate but after landing and while taxiing, the aircraft exhaust gases passing above the center section of overturned. It would have taken two weeks to One of the many versions the wing. In all, ten Lebed XI aircraft were built. repair, but Lebedev was afraid of competition and of the Lebed XI aircraft at Komendantskyi airfield in demanded that the aircraft be returned to the summer of 1915. These The Lebed XII Petrograd. Two months later, Grand Duke types of radiators were Aleksandr Mikhailovich inquired about the status usually used for Salmson engines cooling Voisine Work on the Lebed XII aircraft started in mid- of the experimental airplane. He learned that aircraft. 1915. Flight testing began in December with Lebed instead of repairing the plane, a new one was built. Differing from its predecessor, the new Lebed XII’s testing was planned for June. On February 23, during the flight testing of the first Lebed XII, the Grand Duke had placed an urgent order for 400 airplanes. But negotiations between the head of Russian aircraft, Central Military Technical Department and Military Department were prolonged and a contract was not signed until April 19, and the number of planes requested dropped to 225, without engines or propellers. The same contract envisaged delivery of 245 sets of spare parts and ten dummy Lebed XII airplanes. The total cost was 5,153,500 rubles. Testing of the modified Lebed-XII started in July 1916. On the 31st Lieutenant Barbas flew one of the experimental aircraft (WN 457) from Petrograd to the front. It took him three and a half hours to reach Pskov. The engine performed well

10 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 Lebed XII (WN 442) with a Salmson 140 hp engine at Komendantskyi airfield during test flights July- August, 1916. Notice the wheels, Integral type propeller, and water radiator.

Engineer Kolpakov demon- strates versatility of machine gun mounting of his system.

and there were no complaints about the aircraft. In Pskov Barbas obtained a new map, fueled up, adjusted the engine and flew on to Dvinsk, where he landed after a two-hour, twenty-minute flight. His general impression about the airplane was good, but he noted that “the [aircraft] during the flight pulled downwards and it was necessary to [hold it level with the] control handle.” On September 13, Lebedev asked for a post- ponement due to technical difficulties. The problem was that the experimental airplane had been designed for the Salmson 130-hp engine, while the production model was equipped with 140 hp and 150 hp versions. Because the latter engines were heavier, they altered the airplane’s center of gravity. In addition, the attachments for the radiators and engines reqired modification. At the end of September, however, the modified planes resumed flight testing. On September 27, factory pilot Mikhailov took off in aircraft WN 444, with a 150- hp engine, carrying a 350-kg load to test horizon- tal speed. On the same day another aircraft (WN 497), with a 140 hp engine and a new exhaust system underwent testing. At the beginning of October, taking advantage of good weather, factory and military pilots carried out almost all the tests of the Lebed XII. It achieved a speed of 133 km/hr and the aircraft climbed to 3,000 meters, with a 350-kg load in 56 minutes. However, it also had excess weight, a small useful load, and insufficient ceiling. Factory pilots Mikhailov and Goncharov and military pilots Captains Zhokhov, Modrakh, Jablonsky, and Lieutenants Kalashnikov, Korvin-Krukovsky, and Lerkhe participated in the work of the test commission. In their October 10 report, they acknowl-

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 11 attached to a four-longeron framework with brass wood screws, nails, and joiner’s glue. The fuselage had great rigidity and durability, was simple and cheap to produce, but carried some excess weight in comparison with wire-braced fuselages with canvas covering. The wings’ profile was thin and concave, pinewood box spars were connected by struts that, together with a wire anchor, formed a closed biplane-box. The upper wing angle setting was positive, while the lower wing was negative. Later, it was discovered that the plane had diffi- culty in climbing out of a dive, the cause of several crashes. The tail unit was flat, its welded frame made out of steel pipes with a cloth covering. The standard undercarriage featured V-shaped struts formed from steel tubes of elliptical section. Two wheels 760 by 100-mm set on steel axes had steel rims and spokes and sometimes were covered with aluminum axle caps. The pilot’s seat, at the front, was placed over the fuel-tank, the observer’s cockpit was framed with a wooden ring, which served (Above) General view of edged the Lebed XII fit for reconnaissance in the as the base for the machine gun mounting. The machine gun mounting of engineer Shkulnik’s system nearest rear units, reported its maximum permis- training version of the aircraft was distinguishable on the Lebed XII. sible loading to be not more than 300 kg, and rec- by the student’s seat being located in the front and (Below) Standard produc- ommended sending the aircraft to frontline corps instructor’s behind it. tion aeroplane Lebed XII and air detachments to replace Voisin airplanes. A 140 or 150 hp Salmson engine was mounted with a Salmson 150-hp engine and Colt machine gun, The Lebedev XII featured a four-sided plywood on a rigid steel engine bed and covered with an produced at Lebedev’s fac- fuselage without internal bracing. The fuselage aluminum cowling. Only the valve heads remained tory in the summer of 1917. walls were made of 3-mm plywood; its sheets open to promote cooling. According to Lebedev’s assertion “owing to the bonnet [the] engine con- stantly worked at [a] good temperature, carbure- tors got warm air and stayed in [a] warm room.” The plane’s powerplant, together with cabin construction, tubular steel engine bed and undercarriage formed a closed rigid system. The firm attachment of the engine reduced vibration to a minimum. The fuel (270 liters) and oil tanks (26 liters) were made of red copper or brass and were self-sealing. The radiators were a tubular type, made of 240 brass tubes, arranged in ten sections (24 pieces in each), and were placed at the outside of the fuselage sides. The radiators caused considerable frontal resistance. The control handle operated the ailerons and elevator, pedals worked the rudder. The new airplane met contract specifications, and Lebedev soon placed it into serial production. At that time some structural defects were elimi- nated and slight improvements introduced. The Lebed XII was turned over to the army equipped only with machine gun mountings, but without machine guns or ammunition boxes. The Air Fleet Department, however, insisted that the machine guns be installed. In mid-October 1916, some additional changes were introduced as a result of testing to improve stability. First, the angle of attack of the upper wing was increased by 1 degree and 10 angular minutes and moved 35 mm forward. Second, to eliminate exhaust gases from the cockpit, vent pipes from the crankcase were installed and additional air holes were drilled in the cowling and fuselage. Serial production of the Lebed XII began in November 1916, but only 28 airplanes were turned

12 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 The results of a collision of a Voisin and Lebed XII aircraft at Gatchina flying school airfield, winter 1917- 1918.

FRONTLINE PILOTS’ OPINIONS OF THE AIRCRAFT out by the end of that year, including the ten ous to fly, and not fit for flying schools. Factory WERE THAT dummy planes. Deliveries to the front proceeded pilots A. Goncharov and V. Mikhailov, engineers L. slowly, despite of the acute shortages of airplanes Shkulnik and L. Kolpakov disagreed with the com- IT WAS in the air detachments. By January 1, 1917, only mission’s report, however. The two factory pilots DIFFICULT six planes were in the Army in the Field (all at the had logged 250 hours on the plane, both of them TO CONTROL Northern front in the XIIth Air Division) and one had tested 160 aircraft of that type, and they con- airplane was kept in the 4th Aircraft Park. In sidered it to be a good reconnaissance plane with 1917, 164 aircraft were built and turned over; in slight drawbacks. 1918, 24 airplanes were delivered. The Lebed XII Lebedev and his colleagues concluded that the served in the 1st, 5th, 10th, and 12th Air Divisions commission’s tests had been carried out by inexpe- in the following air detachments: 10th, 13th, 15th, rienced pilots and that its conclusions were sub- 23d, 25th, 29th, 33d, and 38th Corps and the 5th jective. To resolve the dispute another commission Army. consisting of representatives of frontline pilots, the The plane was used for reconnaissance over Gatchina flying school, the Air Forces Department, enemy rear units, photographing and bombing and Lebedev’s factory was established. In a report enemy positions, and artillery spotting. Frontline dated October 2, 1917, the new commission pilots’ opinions of the aircraft were that it was dif- declared the Lebed XII unfit, outdated not only ficult to control, and it could get into situations with low load-carrying capacity, but by its inade- TRYING TO where it could not be brought out of a dive. quate speed and found several structural draw- IMPROVE THE Another serious drawback was that exhaust gases backs in the engine’s fuel and cooling systems. The LEBED XII’S penetrated the cockpit, causing a risk of fire in the commission concluded that “further construction is PERFOR- air. On February 1, 1917, for example, Lebed XII not desirable” and serial production was pro- MANCE, (WN 483) of the 13th Corps Air Detachment foundly curtailed. Trying to improve the Lebed VLADIMIR burned because of an engine fire. The pilot made a XII’s performance, Vladimir Lebedev substituted forced landing and survived, but the aircraft did the Hispano-Suiza 140 hp engine for the Salmson. LEBEDEV not. On June 17, during a test flight a Lebed XII He also made several structural modifications, SUBSTITUTED (WN 540) belonging to the 5th Army Air such as directing the exhaust pipes upwards. One THE Detachment caught fire in the air. The pilot glided copy of the altered plane was built and designated HISPANO- down safely, but the aircraft burned down. Pilot the Lebed XII bis. SUIZA 140 HP Ensign Tikhomirov received slight burns, but the observer escaped unharmed. An explosion in the The Last Lebed Series ENGINE FOR carburetor started the fire. Crashes and fires of the THE Lebed XII, traced to structural defects, resulted in The next type, the Lebed XIII, was scheduled to SALMSON a temporary production stoppage. be produced in March 1916, but no information In June, a special investigative commission was exists on its construction. The Lebed XV biplane, organized under the chairmanship of Professor featured a tractor propeller and Renault 225 hp Georgy Botezat. Pilot Ensigns Bazilevich-Knjazh- engine, and Lebedev promised that it would kovsky from the 29th Corps Air Detachment and appear at the end of March 1916. But it also Lieutenant Levchenko of the 29th Corps Air remained only a project. Engineer and inventor Detachment participated on the commission. The Leonid Kolpakov created the Lebed-XIV Le Grand. commission concluded, after several test flights, Started in 1915, it was a three-bay biplane, with that was impossible to improve the aircraft, it was two 150 hp Salmson engines and tractor pro- not desirable to send it to front, and that the air- pellers, designed for a rated speed of 140 km/hr. craft might be used only in the flying schools. The Though its official name was the “large fighter,” it training version of the Lebed XII, with the 140 hp was more typical of a mid-size bomber. Three engine, had even worse performance, was danger- machine guns provided almost 360-degree protec-

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 13 Lebed XII aircraft from Saratov Hydro Air Detachment of the Red Army in the region of Narva, Northwest front. Civil war, winter 1918-1919.

BY THE MID- DLE OF 1917, LEBEDEV MANAGED TO RAISE PRO- DUCTIVITY TO 50 AIRCRAFT PER MONTH BY DIPPING INTO THE FACTORY’S CAPITAL RESERVES tion. In his telegram dated January 16, 1916, receive an order. Seven copies of the two-seat AND ACQUIR- Vladimir Lebedev reported to the Chief of Russian reconnaissance Lebed-XXI were built in the ING NEW aviation, Grand Duke Aleksandr Mikhailovich: “at autumn of 1917. The aircraft took 20 minutes to EQUIPMENT the end of February [we will] test [a] two-engined climb to 2,000 meters. On the whole, the plane’s fighter ‘Lebed XIV’ of 900 kg load carrying capac- flight performance of the aircraft was disappoint- ity.” However, by the second half of 1917, the plane ing and it was not placed into production. Some was not yet built. copies of the plane flew until 1921. The Lebed- In 1916, the three-seat, two-engined reconnais- XXIV remained an experimental project, as deliv- sance Lebed-XVI was built. A two-strutter biplane, ery of the 230 hp Fiat and 200 hp Hispano-Suiza it was equipped with two 80-hp Le Rhone engines, engines destined for the aircraft were stopped by with tractor propellers. The engines were mounted the Russia’s allies in the second half of 1917. on struts and covered with cowlings with fairing. The observer’s cockpit, with a machine gun was Major Expansion located at the front, behind the cockpit and the tail gunner’s cabin. Tests carried out at the beginning By the middle of 1917, Lebedev managed to of 1917 by A. Gorshkov. The results were encour- raise productivity to 50 aircraft per month by dip- aging, but no orders were placed and work on this ping into the factory’s capital reserves and acquir- aircraft soon stopped. ing new equipment. The factory also built skis, pro- More advanced than its predecessors, the pellers, and spare parts for its own aircraft, and for Lebed-XVII was a giant step forward. Designed by aircraft turned out by other companies. Lebedev Sergei Gurevich it was a single-bay, two-seat soon had no room in Petrograd to enlarge his fac- reconnaissance biplane equipped with a stream- tory. Consequently, his joint stock aeronautic com- lined cowling covering a 150-hp Salmson engine. pany built factory branches in Taganrog and Pen- The upper wing had a center-wing section; two za. The planned capacity of the Taganrog branch LEBEDEV tubular radiators were attached to shaped front was to be 40 aircraft a month by year’s end. An SOON HAD struts; the fuselage sides at the front were rounded assembly shop was constructed for two parallel to fit the engine’s contour. The airplane was distin- production lines, one for land aircraft, another for NO ROOM IN guished by good aerodynamics. In August 1917, it hydroplanes. Two buildings were attached to an PETROGRAD passed flight testing with satisfactory results but assembly shop. The Taganrog factory included a TO ENLARGE was never placed into serial production, although modern conveyer belt assembly line. Located near HIS FACTORY several copies of that aircraft type were built by to the Azov Sea, there was a potential for expan- the end of the year. sion, thanks to the presence of metallurgical and In January 1917, Lebedev prepared a plan for fuel bases, waterways, railway communications, a two-seater reconnaissance Lebed-XVIII based on and skilled workers. Unfortunately, the economy the German Albatros type, with a 230-hp Fiat was in shambles, transportation was paralyzed, engine. He proposed to the Military Department to and revolutionary chaos prevented implementa- build 300 copies of that aircraft but failed to tion of plans. Thanks to the efforts by workers and

14 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 Military Pilot Ensign Shishkovsky and Observer Poruchik Shreider from the 10th Corps Air Detachment have returned from a reconnaissance on a Lebed XII, March 1917.

THE NEW GOVERN- MENT CON- FISCATED LEBEDEV’S FACTORY AND OTHER PROPERTIES …AND …LEBEDEV WAS DECLARED engineers, however, productivity at the Taganrog ment confiscated Lebedev’s factory and other prop- branch reached 25 aircraft a month. erties—the airfield, test station, and workshops— “AN ENEMY Construction of a branch in Penza, planned to and the capitalist Lebedev was declared “an OF THE produce more than 20 aircraft a month was also enemy of the people.” PEOPLE” adversely affected by war and revolution. Thus, The Bolsheviks nationalized Lebedev’s facto- the main burden of fulfilling orders from the ries in Petrograd, Taganrog, Yaroslavl, and Penza. Military Department remained with the Petrograd Lebedev’s plant in Taganrog became aircraft fac- factory. Lebedev received orders for hundreds of tory No. 32 of Narodny Kommissariat FORCED TO aircraft from the Military and Navy Departments. Aviatsionnoi Promyshlennosti (NKAP) (the Peo- FLEE FOR HIS In the spring, he contracted with the Military ples’ Commissariat of Aviation). Lebedev’s Petro- Department for 200 Albatros airplanes, equipped grad factory was merged with the Aviation LIFE, with the 200-hp Hispano-Suiza engine. However, Department of the Russko-Baltic Carriage Works LEBEDEV the order fell through when Russia’s allies, and renamed state aircraft factory No. 3 ESCAPED TO England and France stopped delivering the Gosudarstvenny Aviatsionny Zavod (GAZ). Later SOUTHERN engines during the second half of 1917. Lebedev it was renamed Krasnyi Lyotchik (Red Pilot), then RUSSIA, also won an order from the Military Department aircraft factory No. 23. for 260 Sopwith 1-1/2 Strutter type aircraft, with a Forced to flee for his life, Lebedev escaped to WHERE HE Clerget 130 hp engine, but only five copies were southern Russia, where he remained throughout REMAINED built. The Penza aircraft factory, which specialized the civil war in 1918-1920. There he became a min- THROUGH- in producing propellers, received a contract from ister of trade and industry in the government of OUT THE the Military Air Fleet to deliver sixty training the White Russian General Denikin. Lebedev tried CIVIL WAR IN Albatros-VIIs. However, this order, too, was not to start aircraft production at a factory in 1918-1920 filled. Taganrog, but failed amid the chaos of the civil war. Following the defeat of the White Russian Epilogue forces, Lebedev fled to Serbia, where he worked for a time as a representative of French firms, selling In 1917, Vladimir Lebedev was elected presi- the Gnome and Le Rhone engines. In 1926, he dent of the All-Russian Aero-Club. And, despite his moved to Paris, where he continued to work in the preoccupation with industrial strife, Lebedev was aircraft industry. His contributions to the develop- also appointed to head the flying school, the ment of French aviation were recognized by the Komendantsky airfield, and the hydroplane sta- award of the Legion of Honor. He died in Paris on tion at Krestov Island in Petrograd. After the February 22, 1947. Bolshevik revolution in October, the new govern- Throughout its existence, Lebedev’s company

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 15 A crashed Lebed XII.

THE FACTORY CONTINUED BUILDING THE LEBED XII UNTIL THE END OF 1917, WHEN IT HAD BECOME HOPELESSLY produced some 700 aircraft of Russian and foreign bers and types of airplanes constructed at OBSOLETE design. His Russian engineers created about 20 Lebedev’s factory in Petrograd from 1914-1917 is Russian aircraft designs, notably the reconnais- tabulated to the left in Table 1. sance Lebed-XII. The Red Army also used the Lebed-XII during the Russian Civil War in 1918-1920. The planes Part of the problem concerned labor unrest. In were in the inventory of the 2d Petrograd Avia March, strikes broke out as workers made eco- Group, Tverskaya Avia Group, 1st Socialist Air (Below right) A Lebed XII of nomic demands, including an eight-hour day, Detachment, 3d Separate Navy Air Detachment, the 2d Petrograd Air Group of the Red Army, which was introduced at Lebedev’s factory in Belomorsky Hydro Air Detachment, 3d Latvian Petrograd, summer 1919. April. Also, sharp increases in the cost of materials Air Detachment, and others. Fewer Lebed XIIs The red star was painted affected airplane production. The factory contin- served in White Army air detachments. Thus, in over the three-colored cockade of Imperial ued building the Lebed XII until the end of 1917, the aviation of the Siberian Army of Admiral Kol- Russian aviation. when it had become hopelessly obsolete. The num- chak there were only two Lebed XIIs (WN 535 in the 6th Air Detachment, and WN 585 in the 5th Air Detachment). Copies of the Lebed XII remained in service for several years after the end of Airplane Production at Lebedev’s Factory, 1914-1917 Civil War. The last Lebed-XII were used in civil aviation, including the Baku section of the Year built Aircraft Type Number of Aircraft Obshchestvo druzei Vozdushnogo Flota (Society of Air Fleet Friends, ancestor of the Soviet Aeroflot 1914 Farman IV and Nieuport IV 34 Airlines). In May 1925 two of the aircraft (WN 703 1914-1915 Depredation 63 and 717) were still in service, flying propaganda ■ 1914-1917 Voisin LA and LAS 153 missions in Azerbaijan (North Caucasus). 1914 Farman XVI 20 1915 Farman XXIIbis 20 1914-1916 Lebed VII, VIII, IX, X, XI 15 1914-1916 flying boat FBA 34 1916-1917 Lebed XII 216 1916-1917 Lebed XIII, XV, XVI, XVIII, XXIV 10 1915-1917 Morane-Saulnier type L 30 1915-1916 Morane-Saulnier type G 20 1916 floatplane Lebed 3 1916-1917 Nieuport X 10 1917 Sopwith 1-1/2-strutter 5 1914-1917 French and English acft 10 1914-1917 Trophy aircraft 30

Total 673

16 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 Technical performance data of the major aircraft types produced at Lebedev’s factory

Lebed-VII Lebed-XII engine Gnome 80 hp engine Salmson 150 hp length of the aircraft 7.77 m length of the aircraft 7.963 m height of the aircraft 2.57 m height of aircraft 3.25 m wing span 6.10 m wing span wing area 22.3 sq. m (upper/lower wing) 13.15/12.0 m take off weight 481 kg wing area 42 sq.m maximum speed 130 km/h empty weight 840 kg practical ceiling 3000 m useful load 350 kg flight duration 2.5 h take off weight 1,212 kg wing loading 29 kg/sq.m Lebed X power loading 8.1 kg/hp engine Le Rhone 80 hp fuel tank capacity length of aircraft 7.06 m (lower/upper tank) 210/60 l wing span oil tank capacity 26 l fighter 10.5/8.75 m maximum speed reconnaissance 13.125 m near the surface 133 km/h wing area time to climb the fighter 29.0 sq.m height of 1000 m 8.5 min reconnaissance 39.4 sq.m 3000 m 56.0 min empty weight 415 kg practical ceiling 3500 m maximum speed take off and near the surface landing run 100 m fighter 135 km/h Lebed-XIV (Le Grand) Lebed XI (biplane A 1 type) engines two Salmson 150 hp engine Mercedes Benz 100 hp length of the aircraft 11.0 m length of the aircraft 8.0 m height of the aircraft 3.6 m height of the aircraft 3.25 m wing span wing span 13.0 m (upper/lower wing)24.0/16.0 m wing area 40.8 sq.m size of undercarriage empty weight 735 kg wheels 900 x 100 mm capacity of the lower/ rated speed 140 km/h upper fuel tank 240/20 l oil tank capacity 20 l Flying boat LM–2 (Lebed Morskoi-2) or FBA weight of the fuel + oil 160 kg engine Gnome- useful load 350 kg Monosoupape 100 hp take off weight 1,085 kg length of aircraft 8.0 m wing loading 26.7 kg/sq.m height of the aircraft 2.93 m power loading 7.3 kg/hp wing span 13.68 m load ratio 32 % wing area 33.5 sq. m maximum speed empty weight 535 kg near the surface 110 km/h weight of fuel & oil 120 + 30 = 150 kg practical ceiling 3,000 m useful load 305 kg take off weight 840 kg Lebed-XI (later series) wing loading 25 kg/sq. m engine Salmson 150 hp power loading 8.43 kg/hp length of the aircraft 8.0 m load ratio 36.4 % wing span 14.5 m maximum speed wing area 43 sq.m near the surface 105 km/h empty weight 820 kg landing speed 70 km/h weight of the fuel & oil 130 + 23 = 153 kg time to climb the useful load 350 kg height of 1,000 m 15 min take off weight 1,170 kg 2,000 m 40 min wing loading 26.3 kg/sq.m practical ceiling 2.500 m power loading 7.8 kg/hp flight duration 4 h load ratio 30%

Editor's note: A special debt of gratitude is due to three individuals for their invaluable critiques and comments in preparing this article for publication: Mr. Augustus Blume, of Charlottesville, Virginia; Dr. I. B. Holley, of Duke University; and Dr. Roger Miller, of the Air Force History Support Office.

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 17 In the Devils Shadow: Don Nichols and U.S. Air Force Special Air Missions

18 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001

Michael E. Haas

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 19 (Overleaf) By early 1951, f I were called upon to name the most amazing at MacArthur’s headquarters. This former motor- Nichol’s Special Activities and unusual man among all those with whom I pool sergeant was also the combat leader who per- Unit was providing Fifth Air I Force with “one-stop ser- was associated during my military service, I sonally conceived, organized, and led a daring heli- vice” for requirements would not hesitate for a second in picking out copter mission deep into enemy territory to strip ranging from sensitive intelligence collection to Donald Nichols as that individual.... I have often parts off a downed MiG–15 fighter, then the most airborne-ranger type referred to him as a one man war. highly sought after intelligence prize of the war.2 assaults on high priority targets. (USAF Photo) But Nichols’s world had a darker side as well, a Gen. Earle E. Partridge, side visited by Partridge and others time and Commander, Fifth Air Force, 1948 again when the urgent need for results became too important to question the methods used, when the Maj. Gen. Earle E. Partridge first met MSgt. need was too sensitive to put in writing. For this Donald Nichols in 1948, soon after the general brand of warfare Nichols coined a new term, some- arrived in Japan to assume command of the Fifth thing he called “Positive Intelligence.” WHAT… Air Force.1 And though Partridge received periodic Nichols himself admits that he created the NICHOLS HAD briefings from the Counter-Intelligence Corps term Positive Intelligence in prewar Korea, where ESTAB- sergeant during the subsequent two years leading he was already well on the way to establishing a LISHED ON up to the war, the general later admitted his powerful intelligence apparatus throughout the sparse knowledge of Nichols’s activities in Korea entire peninsula. In his autobiography How Many THE KOREAN during this prewar period. Little wonder, consider- Times Can I Die? Nichols writes, “By this time PENINSULA ing that Nichols’s world was found in the mean [1947-1948] our unit was really moving in ‘high, DURING THE streets and back alleys of prewar Seoul, a long way very high’ South Korean government circles. All PREWAR from the plush offices found at Fifth Air Force doors were open to us. In those days no one in this YEARS WAS headquarters in Tokyo. The war gave Partridge area knew or even thought about Positive cause to take a deeper look into Nichols’s operation Intelligence (PI).3 We invented it for this area and …THE in the summer of 1950, and he was astonished at taught others, as we saw fit, for our own benefit.”4 GENESIS what he found. “Our unit” was Sub-Detachment K, 607th FOR WHAT For what the gruff, burly Nichols had estab- Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC), stationed at WOULD lished on the Korean peninsula during the prewar Kimpo Airfield on the western outskirts of Seoul. BECOME THE years was not simply an intelligence organization, After reporting to the sub-detachment in June MOST but the genesis for what would become the most 1946, Nichols soon began making extensive and successful special operations unit of the war. It was effective use of Korean civilians to establish a SUCCESSFUL by any account a bizarre organization to be run by covert network throughout the length of the polit- SPECIAL the “wild blue yonder” air force. But then again, ically troubled peninsula. Moreover, as President OPERATIONS neither the newly arrived Central Intelligence Rhee’s trust in Nichols grew, the president took the UNIT OF THE Agency (CIA) nor the Far East Command’s (FEC) highly unusual step of placing selected South WAR army intelligence team could compete with the Korean coast guard and air force personnel under quality of sensitive information generated by the unquestioned command of the American ser- Nichols’s contacts, deep penetration agents estab- geant. But what really swept Positive Intelligence lished years earlier throughout Korea. By 1950, beyond the scope of previous U.S. counter- intelli- Nichols was a man with access twenty-four hours gence operations, was the historical coming toge- a day to both General Partridge and South Korean ther of “the man and the moment” as Nichols went president Syngman Rhee, not to mention a host of to war in the summer of 1950. He would emerge shadowy Asian characters whose names will never three years later a legend in South Korea’s most see print. powerful military and intelligence agency circles, Possessing only a sixth grade education but an enigma even to the American special operators NICHOLS fluent in the Korean language, Nichols was the who worked for him and to this day an unknown to spymaster whose warnings accurately predicted the American public. WAS THE within days the North Korean invasion of South Nichols’s sub-detachment had become a well- SPYMASTER Korea, only to watch his warnings fall on deaf ears oiled machine by 1950, its effectiveness stemming WHOSE WARNINGS ACCURATELY Michael E. Haas, a retired colonel in the U.S. Air Force, began his military career as a private in the PREDICTED U.S. Army infantry and subsequently served in airborne, ranger, special forces, and psychological operations units. He was an assault helicopter pilot and flight platoon commander in the Vietnam War, WITHIN DAYS completing 968 combat flying hours and earning the Distinguished Flying Cross and Bronze Star, THE NORTH among other medals. Following his transfer to the Air Force, Haas served in special operations and spe- KOREAN cial tactics units, commanded the Pararescue Squadron and completed Pentagon tours with the JCS INVASION OF and Air Staff. A graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a master’s degree in national secu- SOUTH rity affairs, Colonel Haas also wrote Apollo’s Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations KOREA during the Cold War. This article is excepted from In the Devil’s Shadow: UN Special Operations during the Korean War. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000, pp. 78-91, © by Michael E. Haas, reprinted by permis- sion.

20 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 A rare photo of “Mr.” Donald Nichols, a man with good reason to be camera shy. This OSI agent survived assassination attempts in 1948, 1950 and 1953, as well as enduring an attempt to kidnap his son, then living in Seoul. (Photo courtesy of the author.)

HIS AGENTS PERSUADED A NORTH KOREAN PILOT TO DEFECT WITH HIS SOVIET- BUILT IL–10 GROUND- largely from its deep penetration, political contacts Truman administration. Not so surprising, it was ATTACK throughout both South and North Korea. One Nichols’s terse report from Seoul on the morning FIGHTER… measure of this effectiveness was demonstrated of June 25, 1950, that gave MacArthur’s head- THE FIRST the month before the war started, when his agents quarters its first official notification of the North AIRCRAFT OF persuaded a North Korean pilot to defect with his Korean invasion.7 ITS KIND TO Soviet-built IL–10 ground-attack fighter. It was After catching up with the retreating Ameri- FALL INTO the first aircraft of its kind to fall into U.S. hands, can embassy staff south of Seoul, Nichols learned and extensive debriefs of the willing pilot proved of both his promotion to the rank of warrant officer U.S. HANDS extremely valuable to the air force’s Air Technical and his next assignment. Amid the confusion at Intelligence experts. The plane itself was promptly the American camp, he was recognized by U.S. dismantled for shipment back to the Zone of the ambassador John J. Muccio, who immediately Interior, as the continental U.S. was then known in asked him to maintain personal contact with the military parlance. South Korean military service chiefs. Nichols But before this rare intelligence prize could served in this role for the following month before be shipped back to the United States, Nichols’s being relieved for appointment as a special repre- NICHOLS team and all other Americans in Seoul were sentative to the director, Special Investigations, WAS SENT TO forced to flee for their lives when 100,000-plus Far East Air Forces, a move designed for no other SECURE “BY North Koreans poured over the thirty-eighth par- purpose but to free him for bigger things. And the ANY MEANS allel like a huge swarm of killer bees. Leaving “a bigger things came fast, as General Partridge was POSSIBLE” bloody wake of massacred civilians to mark their a man in a hurry that summer. rapidly advancing line,”5 the North Korean For his first task Nichols was sent to secure ONE OF THE People’s Army forced his team to abandon their “by any means possible” one of the Russian-built RUSSIAN- hard-earned IL–10 acquisition. Staying behind T–34 tanks with which the Russians had equipped BUILT T–34 on his own volition to destroy abandoned equip- the North Korean army. Despite its extensive sup- TANKS ment and aircraft at Kimpo Airfield, Nichols him- port to Russia during World War II, the United self barely escaped at the last minute by clinging States had somehow missed getting an example of to the side of a small boat crossing the Han River, this highly successful weapon for study. One result just south of Seoul. of this omission was the very disagreeable surprise The experience was a bitter glass of wine for experienced by Fifth Air Force pilots as they the man who had repeatedly warned FEC head- watched the rugged T–34 withstand their cannon quarters in Tokyo of the impending North Korean and rocket attacks on the vehicle. Following the attack. But his warnings had been sent in vain, general’s orders, Nichols promptly borrowed a for as the Fifth Air Force commander later tank retriever vehicle from a frontline army unit observed, “Nichols’s reports were suppressed and and secured, under enemy fire, an abandoned disregarded.”6 His last report actually predicted T–34. A grateful Partridge promptly awarded Ni- within seventy-two hours the “surprise” attack chols a Silver Star medal for valor, along with that subsequently stunned a totally unprepared another tasking.

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 21 Nichols’ men included scholars with advanced degrees and burly athletic types without higher education, but who could walk all night through enemy forests, ride horses, paddle canoes, parachute from low altitude, kill a man with a single karate blow, and speak three or four languages. (Photo courtesy of the author.)

NICHOLS INFILTRATED FORTY-EIGHT SOUTH KOREANS BY If the general’s first request seemed more suit- soming of every other chute on the plane spread PARACHUTE able for one of the army’s tank officers than an air out above me as I dropped.”9 force intelligence operative, Partridge’s second By this time Positive Intelligence had obvi- BEHIND request seemed more suitable for an infantry offi- ously evolved into a special strike force of some ENEMY LINES cer. The general’s problem concerned the Com- unknown hybrid. If Fifth Air Force headquarters ON THIRTEEN munist guerrillas harassing Fifth Air Force planes was not sure how “air force blue” it was, General DIFFERENT operating from Taegu Airfield, a vital resupply Partridge knew he liked it, and that he had the MISSIONS base in South Korea. Could Nichols do something final “vote” on the issue. Regardless of its unortho- about the guerrillas? Partridge asked. Nichols dox activities, the time had clearly come to give responded by personally leading twenty South Nichols’s force the organizational support it Korean soldiers into the hills around the airfield, needed to reach its full operational potential. This at night, to attack the guerrillas in close quarter’s support was initiated in March 1951 with a Fifth combat. Nichols’s surprise attack brought a sharp Air Force headquarters letter that provides a rare reduction in guerrilla activity around the impor- insight into that command’s wide-open approach tant airfield, and yet another request from to aggressive intelligence collection. The letter Partridge. In response to the general’s need for tasked Nichols’s newly activated Special Activities UPON LEARN- information Nichols infiltrated forty-eight South Unit Number 1 to: ING THAT Koreans by parachute behind enemy lines on thir- THEY HAD teen different missions, to supply the Fifth Air Provide intelligence operations of a positive nature REFUSED TO Force with its most complete target list to date of [emphasis added] designated to meet the JUMP, HE enemy installations. Later that year he also sent objectives of this command. parachutists behind enemy lines to rescue the sur- Perform operations (sabotage, demolition and/or DETERMINED viving aircrew from a downed B–29 bomber. guerrilla) necessary to accomplish destruction TO SET THE Nichols’s parachutists came from a crude of specific objectives. EXAMPLE BY jump school set up earlier by him for just such mis- Assist allied agencies responsible for providing DONNING A sions.8 As he later recalled with humor, little did he evasion and escape facilities to downed UN PARACHUTE know at the time that he himself would become airmen. one of its graduates. While observing training at Coordinate with other allied UN intelligence agen- HIMSELF AND the school one day he watched a transport loaded cies as required by existing directives.10 WARNING with Korean trainee’s land for no apparent reason. THE STU- Upon learning that they had refused to jump, he The Fifth Air Force was soon compelled to DENTS OF determined to set the example by donning a para- delete “guerrilla warfare” from this task list, in def- THE CONSE- chute himself and warning the students of the con- erence to the fierce outcries from army and CIA QUENCES IF sequences if they refused to follow him out of the organizations already conducting such operations. aircraft. After all, he told them, he too had never That administrative deletion appears to have been THEY been to jump school. As Nichols relates in his auto- offered only out of bureaucratic politeness, how- REFUSED TO biography, “I really didn’t at this time think that it ever, as the air force “blue suiters” had no intention FOLLOW HIM would be necessary for me to jump. However, after of surrendering any of their operational preroga- OUT OF THE we became airborne, I noticed all eyes were on me. tives. For by this time Nichols was providing the AIRCRAFT When we went over the Drop Zone, old man Fifth Air Force with “one stop service” for require- Nichols jumped. I was quite elated to see the blos- ments ranging from sensitive HUMINT (the mili-

22 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 tary acronym for human intelligence collection), to night through enemy forests, ride horses, paddle airborne-Ranger-type assaults against high-prior- canoes, parachute from low altitudes, and kill a ity targets. On April 17, 1951, Nichols earned man with a single karate blow and able to speak America’s second highest medal for valor by per- three or four foreign languages.”16 sonally leading a dangerous mission against an To align Special Activities Unit Number 1 intelligence target so secret that the citation to his with the U.S. Air Force’s established intelligence Distinguished Service Cross would describe it only structure, the unit was re-designated the 6004th as “information of inestimable value.”11 Air Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS) the Indeed it was: the wreckage of a Soviet-built month following its activation. The squadron was MiG–15, the most advanced Communist fighter activated on Headquarters, Far East Air Forces NICHOLS entered in the war and a major threat to all UN orders, in what appears to have been an effort to MOUNTED aircraft flying over North Korea. To defeat this ensure top-level control of an extremely sensitive, ANOTHER, threat the U.S. Air Force badly needed technical intelligence/special operations asset. Although the information on the MiG, but despite the high pri- organization of the 6004th would continue to MUCH MORE ority assigned this task, no example of the fighter evolve throughout the war, its core structure was COMPLEX had yet fallen into Allied hands. Although the comprised of the following three detachments: AND ULTI- wreckage was too far—some one hundred miles— MATELY behind enemy lines to retrieve, technical intelli- Det One: Collect Air Technical Intelligence and MORE SUC- gence experts could still glean considerable infor- conduct Prisoner of War interrogations. mation by studying its most important parts. To Det Two: Collect and disseminate Air Intelligence CESSFUL this end, Nichols and five Korean specialists “pro- information. Due to the unusual nature of this OPERATION ceeded behind enemy lines in an unarmed heli- work and other circumstances, both the pri- TO RETRIEVE copter...despite fragmentation hits scored on the mary and secondary missions have been clas- THE WRECK- engine and intense anti-aircraft and automatic sified Top Secret by the Commanding General, AGE OF A weapons fire[,]...landed in an area only a few miles Fifth Air Force. DOWNED from a major enemy supply depot[,]... pho- Det Three: Plan, coordinate, and support Evasion tographed the materiel, recorded all inscriptions and Escape activities for the recovery of UN MIG–15 and technical data, and supervised dismantlement airmen downed in enemy territory...and to of vital parts [for loading] aboard the helicopter. assist in the organization and specialized Although suffering serious damage to the rotor training of personnel necessary to accomplish blade, the crippled aircraft flew 80 miles over the the basic mission.17 Yellow Sea to make an emergency landing on a friendly island.”12 The “friendly island” was Cho- Characteristic of the times, not more than a do, just off North Korea’s western coast. Itself few weeks had passed before the Fifth Air Force located some 100 miles behind enemy lines, the tasked Detachment 1 with a mission that under- island was one of Nichols’s primary operating scored its commitment to retain its operational NICHOLS bases in enemy territory and in fact his point of prerogatives, regardless of any joint-service sensi- SENT FIF- departure for the final flight into the MiG–15 tivities. TEEN SOUTH crash site.13 On June 1, 1951, Nichols sent fifteen South KOREAN AIR The following July Nichols mounted another, Korean air force saboteurs on a parachute infiltra- FORCE SABO- much more complex and ultimately more success- tion mission to blow up two railroad bridges. TEURS ON A ful operation to retrieve the wreckage of a downed Enemy uniforms, equipment, weapons, and identi- MiG–15 lying in the coastal mud flats northwest of fication papers were carried by the teams should PARACHUTE Pyongyang. So high was the priority accorded the they need to bluff their way past enemy chal- INFILTRATION capture of a MiG fighter, that the UN supported lenges. But despite Nichols’s attention to detail MISSION TO Nichols with a combined U.S.-British-South and planning, both missions failed as all the sabo- BLOW UP Korean fleet directed by Rear Adm. A. K. Scott- teurs were captured by the Chinese, a rare total TWO Moncrieff of the British Royal Navy.14 loss for Nichols.18 Moving beyond this setback Det To carry Nichols’s specialists to the site and 1’s mission soon reverted to the more traditional RAILROAD retrieve the aircraft, the U.S. Navy provided a technical intelligence and POW interrogation BRIDGES landing ship, utility, the LSU-960, that had been roles. It was during this transition that Nichols modified for the mission with the installation of a moved over to assume command of Det 2, later crane capable of pulling parts of the aircraft out of acknowledged as the most aggressive U.S. Air the mud.15 American and British aircraft were also Force intelligence unit of the war. brought in to provide air cover over the retrieval Unlike Det 1’s mission, which could usually be site. It was another demonstration of Nichols’s accomplished within established military intelli- exceptional organizational abilities and his talent gence channels, Det 2’s Positive Intelligence mis- for finding the best people for his purposes. Maj. sion took it far beyond any channels familiar to the George T. Gregory, one of Nichols’s executive offi- U.S. Air Force. In particular, the detachment’s Top cers during this period, describes the diverse kinds Secret activities led to its description by one post- of people the enterprising Nichols brought to his war study as “the first covert collection agency of a operation: “His [Nichols] men included scholars tactical nature in the history of the U.S. Air with advanced degrees, and burly athletic types Force.”19 Activated in Seoul on July 25, 1951, the without higher education, but who could walk all detachment began its operations with seven offi-

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 23 cers (Nichols commanding) and twenty-six air- thirty-eighth parallel again, they began releasing men.20 As noted earlier, the latitude of its mission more frontline forces for internal security duty in was extremely generous in an operational sense. areas where the agents had previously operated In a wide-ranging mission summary, Nichols was successfully. authorized to: As Nichols’s agents soon learned to their bitter cost, routine missions became tough and the tough MOST OF direct intelligence operations behind enemy lines ones became one-way missions. The agents were with special emphasis on...positive intelli- THESE not the only ones to suffer from this new and gence[,]...coordinate with allied intelligence agen- MISSIONS deadly reality. In his haunting memoirs, Nichols cies[,]...gather positive intelligence on the effective- COULD BE describes the price tag for knowingly sending men ness of (allied) air operations...vital points of the to their death, about lonely, dark nights in which ACCOM- enemy’s transportation system...revetment hide out he confesses: PLISHED areas[,]...plan and direct such special operations as ONLY BY… may be required to support...the Fifth Air Force and I hate to call myself a man. I had to be the one to REQUIRING Far East Air Forces Intelligence missions.21 give the actual orders when I knew someone was going to be killed. Maybe some of my bosses could THE OPERA- Most of these missions could be accomplished have told me how to go about filling some of those only by “eyes on target,” a reconnaissance tactic TIVE TO PER- requirements; however, I doubt it. They wanted lit- requiring the operative to personally observe the SONALLY tle to do with them. They wanted the answers, and target at close range—obviously at great risk to OBSERVE in some cases didn’t want to be told how I got them. the observer’s life. What the summary did not They knew it meant lives; sometimes many. THE TARGET specify was exactly whose eyes were to take such AT CLOSE great risks, how they were to conduct surveillance It’s easy to give an order such as ‘I want a MiG–15’ in the target area, and most important to the RANGE or ‘I want some enemy officers, a few enemy tanks owner of these eyes on target, how to stay alive in to experiment with, some of their tank 85mm tank the process. The answer to the “whose eyes” ques- ammo,’ etc. However, filling these requirements is tion could be found in the personnel manning sta- another problem, which requires lives.29 tistics for this most unusual U.S. Air Force detachment. By January 1952 only 5.7 percent of the With 900 Koreans in the field conducting MOST OF detachment’s 665 personnel were American, offi- Positive Intelligence not found elsewhere in the THESE cers representing a minuscule 1.2 percent of the U.S. Air Force, it was imperative that the detach- FORMER total.22 But Det 2 had to deal with one overwhelm- ment set up its own training program for its ing operational reality that no number of unique operations. Unfortunately, the pace of field PARTISANS Americans could remedy. Flatly stated, no operations and the deaths of some of its most expe- WERE FAR Caucasians could hope to survive in the detach- rienced agents delayed this program until the sec- MORE INTER- ment’s target areas, and official air force records ond half of 1952. Once operating, however, the ESTED IN leave little doubt as to why this was so. training center comprised three schools run by FIGHTING According to one 6004th AISS unit history both American and Korean instructors. The cur- report, “The main difference between its (Det Two) riculums included: THAN INTEL- mission and that of Det One, is that Detachment LIGENCE Number 2 generally works north of the bomb Interrogation: Agent-trainees were taught the GATHERING line.”23 By July 1952 twenty-three of Nichols’s sub- fundamentals and techniques for interrogat- detachments were “sending a steady stream of ing both prisoners of war and Koreans they radio reports back to Nichols’s headquarters from would encounter in the target area while oper- behind enemy lines.”24 By year’s end this number ating behind enemy lines. grew to thirty-two sub-detachments as Nichols Agent: Trainees learned techniques for accurate sent still more eyes into North Korea.25 To support intelligence gathering on enemy airfields, air- this growing effort (and replace casualties) the craft, and radar. Small arms training and detachment grew to a strength of 900 Koreans, 178 guerrilla warfare skills were also included and of whom came from the South Korean air force. 26 physical fitness was emphasized. Most of the remaining Koreans were recruited Paratroop: As parachute infiltration was a pri- from the ranks of the UN partisan forces,27 who mary means of entering enemy territory, a brought with their proven valor in combat some- jump school was organized to teach the DET 2 WAS thing else not as useful for intelligence work.28 For basics.30 CLEARLY as their American supervisors soon learned, most GROWING of these former partisans were far more interested Both in size and importance to FEC’s joint-ser- BEYOND in fighting than intelligence gathering, an advice intelligence community, Det 2 was clearly WHAT ANY- mirable quality anywhere else but in Det 2. Strin- growing beyond what anyone could have antici- ONE COULD gent supervision by their Korean sub-detachment pated early in the war. This growth had not gone commanders proved necessary to keep the prob- unnoticed by the army and CIA. In 1952 both HAVE ANTICI- lem under control. One problem definitely not began to suggest which organization should con- PATED EARLY under control, however, was the rising death toll of trol the detachment’s growing operations. To fend IN THE WAR these agents in the field. As the Chinese and North off such bureaucratic predators Far East Air Koreans began to comprehend the political reality Forces headquarters retained a tight grip on the that UN forces would not attack north of the detachment, while the Fifth Air Force continued to

24 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 A most unusual Air Force intelligence collection vehicle, this indigenous Korean junk acquired by Nichols sits at low tide awaiting its next mission. This vessel was part of Nichol’s “private” fleet that ranged in size from such vessels to a U.S. Navy landing ship tank (LST). (USAF Photo)

DET 2’S SECONDARY MISSION CALLED FOR IT TO SUPPORT SELECTED UNCONVEN- TIONAL provide general administrative and logistical sup- and Nichols’s agents were frequent users of Fifth port for the unit. Actual mission coordination was Air Force assets dedicated to supporting military WARFARE usually conducted through the Combined Com- (and CIA) operations behind enemy lines. But for MISSIONS mand Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK), all the different air force units flying his teams the Far East Command’s clearing house for all north of the bomb line, there remained throughout unconventional warfare operations in North Korea the war virtually only one way back to safety for after December 1951. CCRAK also provided these agents—-the slow and dangerous journey on Nichols’s agents with mission-specific equipment foot. The one viable exception to this long-range, INFILTRATION drawn from its warehouses by special arrange- air infiltration was Operation Salamander—agent ments established through the Fifth Air Force.31 insertion by sea. BY This latter arrangement further confirmed Det 2’s The Korean peninsula offers thousands of PARACHUTE secondary mission, which called for it to support miles of remote, rugged coastline for those seeking WOULD CON- selected unconventional warfare missions beyond discreet entry onto the mainland. And the road TINUE TO BE the scope of Fifth Air Force requirements.32 and rail traffic running through the flat coastal THE …ONLY The air force had no objection to the detach- areas adjacent to the coastline make ideal targets ment’s common sense cooperation with CCRAK, for both partisans and agents. But although parti- PRACTICAL but it objected strongly when the army-dominated san raiders could make good use of the fast, armed MEANS OF organization promptly set out to secure opera- gunboats provided by the U.S. Air Force’s crash LONG-RANGE tional control of this valuable air force asset. As boat crews, stealth and deception remained the PENETRA- important as these bureaucratic struggles were at keys to mission success—not to mention sur- TION INTO the top levels, they remained of little interest to vival—for Nichols’s agents. And to that end the NORTH the agents in the field who remained focused on always-creative Nichols found the money to more important (to them at least) issues. And fore- acquire local, shallow-water craft identical to those KOREA most among these issues was the life-or-death used by Korean fisherman. problem of getting to and from the target area By the close of 1952, Det 2’s fleet had grown to without being detected; a problem that continued “thirty vessels of all descriptions and sizes” to sup- to grow as the Communists further consolidated port its combat and resupply missions throughout their territory. For Nichols and his sub-detach- the partisan-held islands.33 Nichols also main- ment commanders it was a continual game of try- tained access to much larger vessels to support his ing to outfox the Communists, who of course were island activities, including for the biggest loads playing the same game against their agents. one of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious assault ships. Infiltration by parachute would continue to be This support was critical because as it turned out the primary, if not the only, practical means of there was a lot of activity on these islands. Located long-range penetration into North Korea’s moun- only a few miles from the shoreline, forested and tainous interior. The early-war experiences had far too many in number for the Communists to proven the effectiveness of radio-parachute teams, control at any one time, the islands provided

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 25 exceptional launching platforms for unconven- Chinese probably read the story too, for shortly tional warfare operations against the mainland. thereafter a large raiding party stormed the island, And the islands offered still something else of par- killing all partisans present.37 ticular interest to Fifth Air Force leaders and their Schinz’s misadventures in 1952 confirmed how PILOTS FLY- combat aircrews. little progress had been made in the escape and ING OVER United Nations pilots flying over North Korea evasion program since a very frustrated Fifth Air knew that a bailout from their crippled aircraft Force had designated Det 3 (6004th AISS) as its NORTH over the peninsula’s rugged interior meant almost focal point for such operations a full year earlier. In KOREA KNEW certain capture and torture. To stand any chance of fact, Det 3’s activation was born of a still earlier air THAT A rescue their best, if not only, hope was to get at force frustration with the CIA’s failure to establish BAILOUT… least as far as the offshore islands, where partisan a clandestine program in enemy territory. General OVER THE forces (including Nichols’s teams) operated. The Partridge’s dissatisfaction in this regard is made PENINSULA’S air force designated these islands as “safe havens,” clear in a Fifth Air Force paper, “Evasion & Escape a place for the pilots to head if bailing out over Historical Synopsis,” summarizing the situation RUGGED enemy territory appeared unavoidable. But if the during the first four months of the war.38 Upon ask- INTERIOR safe haven concept sounded plausible and made ing his staff when an effective escape and evasion MEANT for good pilot morale, in practice it rarely justified network could be established to assist airmen evad- ALMOST CER- the pilots’ hopes. Despite air force reports crediting ing through enemy territory, the unhappy com- TAIN CAP- partisans or friendly Koreans with helping pilots mander was told, “All clandestine activities in con- evade capture after being downed in enemy terri- nection with Evasion and Escape are delegated to TURE AND tory, further investigation makes clear that luck, an agency not under the operational control of the TORTURE not an effective escape and evasion program, Air Force, and that repeated assurances of sub- account for many of these rescues.34 One well-pub- stantial covert operations within the near future licized rescue in particular underscores the lack of had been received from this agency...but as yet no communications that crippled the escape and eva- agents had been placed in the field.”39 sion program throughout the war. By this stage of the war, the clandestine es- SCHINZ’S On May 1, 1952, U.S. Air Force Col. Albert W. cape and evasion mission had already been insti- RESCUE WAS Schinz, an F–86 fighter pilot and deputy comman- tutionalized within the CIA’s jurisdiction, and PURELY A der, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, parachuted Fifth Air Force efforts to reclaim the mission met MATTER OF from his battle-damaged plane into the sea near stiff resistance from the agency. Although a joint LUCK…THE one the small islands off North Korea’s western military-CIA meeting held later that year added coast. Before bailing out, he contacted Air Rescue manpower to the program the agency maintained PARTISANS with his position and was told to hang on for the its bureaucratic primacy for the mission. Despite WERE night to await pickup the following day. Making it everyone seemed to want the mission, none of the ACTUALLY safely to a nearby island and knowing that the “players in the game” could find the resources OUT LOOKING Fifth Air Force knew his general location, he needed to give it the day-to-day priority devoted to FOR awaited pickup—for the next thirty-seven days. In higher profile, unconventional warfare missions. ANOTHER his paper, “Special Operations in Korea,” Col. Rod Overall, the covert escape and evasion program in Paschall, director of the U.S. Army’s Military North Korea continued to represent the low point PILOT Institute, graphically describes what happened of military and CIA operations in North Korea, next: “Thirty-seven days later, near starvation and that continued to grow steadily in other areas. And thoroughly disgusted with the US escape and eva- like the other organizations, the 6004th AISS con- sion system, Schinz crawled into his hut for tinued to grow too. another lonely night of waiting, only to be rudely In proposing yet another expansion for the awakened at two a.m. as he found himself staring 6004th in September 1953, one air force report ONE AIR into a flashlight and a gun barrel. To his further describes Nichols’s unit simply, but accurately, as FORCE astonishment, he heard “Whoopee! American “the primary collection agency of FEAF.”40 Noting REPORT colonel!” spoken in English by [CCRAK] partisans the unit’s liaison as an organizational equal with DESCRIBES who were deployed in the area.”35 the Documents Research Section (the CIA liaison NICHOLS’S Although relieved to be picked up at last, with FEC), the report assessed the squadron’s Schinz’s relief turned to anger upon learning that bureaucratic position relative to other military UNIT SIMPLY, the partisans in these air force-designated safe intelligence organizations within FEC: “While an BUT ACCU- havens were not issued receivers that could pick up exact parallel...cannot be drawn, it may be noted RATELY, AS distress calls from the survival radios issued to the that in Korea we now have a detachment opera- “THE PRI- pilots. In fact, Schinz’s rescue was purely a matter tion [Det 2] on an equal basis with a CIA operation MARY COL- of luck. The partisans were actually out looking for of regimental strength and a Navy operation equi- LECTION another pilot they believed had bailed out over the valent of a Group.”41 Considering the senior rank area days earlier.Although Schinz was safe, his res- of officers normally commanding regimental or AGENCY OF cue would bring tragedy to the partisans who found group-size operations, the air force’s decision to FEAF” him. During Schinz’s subsequent debriefing at the allow the relatively low-ranking Nichols (by now a Pentagon he named the island on which he was res- major) to retain command of its most important cued by the partisans. Headquarters, U.S. Air Force intelligence asset was indeed remarkable. released the story to Life magazine, which pub- Although anecdotal sources have their obvious lished the saga in its July 28, 1952 issue.36 The limitations, they do provide rare, personal sket-

26 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 ches of enigmatic figures such as Nichols. Seldom a dominant personality exerts on the relatively known to wear military rank and rarely a com- small organization. Nichols clearly saw the poten- plete uniform of any type, the commander tial not only for Det 2, but also for what could be appeared to instill confidence in everyone ranging achieved by integrating his efforts with those of from field agents to the most senior commanders CCRAK, the CIA, and other Fifth Air Force special NICHOLS for whom he worked. Sgt. Ray Dawson of the U.S. operations units. Or was it they who benefited by ALONE Air Force, serving with CCRAK in 1952, recalls integrating their efforts with his? Nichols alone NEVER the night he went to Nichols’s compound in down- never rotated out of the combat zone during the ROTATED town Seoul to discuss operations with him: war. He provided the continuity and leadership for the successful efforts of many organizations. OUT OF THE The first thing I noticed was the presence of a large Special operations and Positive Intelligence may COMBAT number of Air Force security police outside Nichols’ have been too integrated to separate, but the com- ZONE DURING building; usually it was just Korean military bined potential was exploited to the fullest by one THE WAR police. As I entered Nichols’ room it was so dark it of the most unique warriors the United States has took a minute for my eyes to adjust to the light ever brought to the battlefield. coming from one small oil lamp of some sort. When Nichols retired from the U.S. Air Force in they did adjust I saw the reason for the Air Force 1962, his health failing from a number of diseases security police outside.... I was looking at General to which he was exposed in Burma, China, and Partridge and General Doolittle! They, along with Korea. He died on June 2, 1992, at the age of sixty- Nichols, were all sitting cross-legged on the floor, nine, in the Veterans Affairs hospital in Tusca- talking to [a casually dressed] Nichols.42 loosa, Alabama. In 1995, he was inducted into the Air Commando Hall of Fame, soon after a One of the most enduring aspects of special researcher first declassified and published reports operations units, for better or worse, is the impact of his wartime exploits. ■

NOTES

1. The Fifth Air Force reported to Headquarters, Far Activation, Special Activities Unit No. One, July 20, East Air Forces, the senior air force component in 1951. General Headquarters, Far East Command. 21. History of 6004th AISS, 1 July 1952-31 December 2. For this mission Nichols received the Distinguished Ser- 1952 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: U.S. Air Force vice Cross, America’s second highest decoration for valor. Historical Research Agency), pp. 37-40. 3. “Negative Intelligence” was the practice of denying the 22. Ibid.p.79. enemy from acquiring intelligence on U.S. forces, that is, 23. History, 6004th AISS, May-June 1951, p. 28. the Counter-Intelligence Corps’ primary mission. 24. Ibid,p.40. 4. Donald Nichols, How Many Times Can I Die? 25. Ibid. (Brooksville, Fla.: Brooksville Printing, 1981), p. 117. 26. Schuetta, “Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower,” p. 99. 5. Ibid., p. 126. 27. Virtually all the UN partisans were North Koreans who 6. Ibid., p. 5. had chosen to flee south from the advancing Communists 7. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in rather than live under their control. For the most sensitive Korea, 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force intelligence missions CCRAK and Det 2 found the educated, History, 1953, rev. ed.), p. 6. Christian Koreans to be the most reliable agents. 8. This was not part of the Pusan jump school estab- 28. Schuetta, “Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower,” p. 100. lished by FEC’s Liaison Group. 29. Nichols, How Many Times Can I Die? pp. 132-33. 9. Nichols, How Many Times Can I Die?, p. 130. 30. History, 6004th AISS, 1 July-31 December 1952, p. 42. 10. Hqs, Fifth Air Force, Office of Deputy for Intelligence, 31. Ibid.,p.45. to Special Activities Unit Number One, March 5, 1951, 32. Ibid., p. 89. subject: “Special Activities Unit Number One (Operating 33. Maj. Forrest L. Marion, “Air Force Special Operations Instructions),” in U.S. Army Forces, “UN Partisan Korean War Chronology,” p. 17. Hurlburt Field, Fla.: Air Forces,” January 1954, p. 192. Force Special Operations Command History Office, 1998. 11. Hqs, Far East Command General Order No. 159, 34. Schuetta, “Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower,” pp.151-53. June 22, 1951. 35. Col. Rod Paschall, “Special Operations in Korea,” 12. Ibid. Conflict, Vol. 155, No.2 (November 1987), p. 167. 13. Allison E. March and Donald C. McElfresh, 36. Schuetta, “Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower,” p. 186. Submarine or Phantom Target? A Search for the 37. Memo, Col. George Budway, USAF (Ret.) (former Truth.(Silver Spring, Md.: Edisto Press, 19980, pp. 24-25. chief, Air Operations, CCRAK) to R. H. Dawson, subject: 14. Ibid., p. 26. “CCRAK: Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities—- 15. Ibid. Korea,” June 1987, p. 9. 16. Nichols, How Many Times Can I Die? p. 148. 38. Rpt of Hqs, Fifth Air Force, “Evasion & Escape 17. History, 6004th AISS, May-June 1952, p. 31. Maxwell Historical Synopsis,” date obscured on original docu- AFB, Ala.: U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency. ment, 3. Author’s collection. 18. Diane Putney, “Air Force HUMINT 40th Anniver- 39. Ibid. sary,” U.S. Air Force Special Activities Center (AFSAC) 40. Director of Intelligence, Fifth Air Force, September booklet (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Nd), p. 5. 12, 1953, subject: “Reorganization of the 6004th Air 19. Lt. Col. Lawrence V. Schuetta, “Guerrilla Warfare Intelligence Service Squadron.” and Airpower in Korea, 1950-1953,” Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 41. Ibid. USAF Aerospace Studies Institute, p. 77. 42. Sgt. Ray Dawson, telephone interview with author, 20. Hqs, Far East Air Forces General Order No. 336, July 3, 1995.

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 27 The AMST Program’s Lasting Legacy

28 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 Betty Raab Kennedy

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 29 (Overleaf) A C–17 takes off lthough canceled in 1979, the Advanced future requirements.3 Had the Air Force persisted, in Bosnia, January 1996. Medium Short-Takeoff-and-Landing Tran- the 1957 DOD directive on service roles and mis- A sport (AMST) has an enduring legacy—the sions, and the 1966 McConnell-Johnson C–17 Globemaster III, the nation’s premier mili- Agreement on fixed and rotary wing aircraft tary transport plane of the twenty-first century. employment would have settled the mission dis- Initially, the AMST was slated to replace the pute in the Army’s favor.4 Congressman Price and Vietnam-worn C–130 tactical airlifter. However, subcommittee members were receptive to TAC’s politics, inflation, and national security priorities request for developing a turbofan STOL aircraft redirected the program. There were many similar- with greater payload and capabilities than the tur- ities between the two programs: they shared the boprop C–130. Originally, the basis for the request same acquisition philosophy, funding difficulties, came from a USAF Tactical Airlift Center review and adverse politics. But more importantly, the of tactical airlift operations in Vietnam, that AMST gave the C–17 its tactical and small austere acknowledged the obsolescence of the light trans- airfield capabilities. Its YC–14 and YC–15 proto- ports—the C–7 and C–123—and advocated replac- types served as starting points for designing the ing the aging C–130s, essentially the A and B mod- THE new airlifter. Lastly, the AMST provided the impe- els worn down by wartime use. That Gen. William ADVANCED tus for a radical change in airlift doctrine, as lim- W. Momyer, formerly the deputy commander for MEDIUM ited resources, pressing mobility requirements, air operations and Seventh Air Force commander SHORT- and technological advances eventually drove lead- in Vietnam, was the commanding general of TAC TAKEOFF- ers to reject the rigid separation of tactical and at the time was not lost upon the subcommittee, as strategic airlift so long maintained. The merging of it completed its major review of military airlift. AND- these two missions resulted in the C–17 gaining After all, Momyer had gained approval to form the LANDING its dual role. For these reasons, the AMST is sig- 834th Air Division, to ensure the efficient manage- TRANSPORT nificant. ment and control of airlift within Vietnam.5 No one HAS AN was more qualified than Momyer to advise on ENDURING AMST Origins: Congressman Price’s Support future tactical airlift requirements. General Momyer had participated in the tacti- LEGACY— Among the findings of the Air Force’s Project cal airlift modernization briefing to Gen. John D. THE C–17 Forecast study of 1963-1964, were recommenda- Ryan and Robert C. Seamans, Jr., the Chief of Staff tions to develop a CX-Heavy Logistics Support and Secretary of the Air Force, respectively, and Aircraft, that became the C–5, and a vertical- had opposed the VSTOL LIT course, promoting a short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft (VSTOL) to fill new STOL aircraft to replace the C–130. Based the gap between the capabilities of C–130s and upon his wartime experiences, Momyer told Ryan helicopters. However, the technology needed for a and Secretary Seamans that the Army would con- VSTOL aircraft had not matured. In their January tinue supplying the front lines via heavy heli- 1970 congressional testimony before the House copters under its air mobile concept. As a result, Armed Services’ Subcommittee on Military Airlift, intratheater airlift would operate into airfields far- Tactical Air Command (TAC) officers acknowl- ther in the rear; a STOL with takeoff and landing edged as much to the chairman, Melvin Price (D- performances of between 1,500 and 2,000 feet IL), a staunch supporter of airlift requirements.1 would suffice.6 In the 1970s with larger and heav- Additionally, TAC was willing “to take a realistic ier self-propelled firepower, the Army needed the view and admit that the C–130 and its replace- AMST to transport the 8-inch and 155mm self-pro- ment should be operated more rearward to avoid pelled howitzers, Vulcan air defense gun, and TAC heavy enemy fire, and that aircraft of lesser cost Chaparral guided missile system. The Army noted must handle the far-forward requirement.” 2 A that the AMST would transport 23 items, which OPPOSED more forward role for the Air Force’s tactical airlift, the C–130 could not. Nor was the C–130 highly DEVELOPING however, was unlikely given the Army’s sizeable regarded as a STOL capable aircraft.7 THE LIGHT inventory of frontline helicopters. Thus, TAC The introduction of the strategic C–5A also had INTRATHE- opposed developing the light intratheater trans- an influence, driving a need for a more efficient ATER port (LIT) to replace the C–7s and C–123s, even theater distribution system. A new AMST intra- though Air Staff analysis supported a LIT, STOL, theater airlifter would ensure a rapid redistribu- TRANSPORT and conventional aircraft solution as best meeting (LIT) TO tion of supplies and equipment brought in by the REPLACE THE C–7S Betty Raab Kennedy is a staff historian at Headquarters, Air Mobility Command. Her published articles AND C–123S include “A Revolution in Air Transport: Acquiring the C–141 Starlifter,” Airpower Journal (Fall 1991) and “Historical Realities of C–17 Program Pose Challenge for Future Acquisitions,” Program Manager (November-December 1999). She has also authored An Illustrated History of Scott Air Force Base, 1917- 1987 and contributed to Anything, Anywhere, Anytime: An Illustrated History of the Military Airlift Command, 1941-1991. She served with the U.S. Army Security Agency in Berlin and was an instructor at the Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Massachusetts. In 1982, she earned an MA in European History from Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville. She is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute and completed the Air Command and Staff College course. Ms. Kennedy is currently writing a history of the C–17 Globemaster III acquisition.

30 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 huge cargo-hauling C–5. The average payload of accommodate the Army’s outsize cargo. Such cargo the AMST would be 14 tons while the C–130 could is primarily represented in their mechanized forces carry 10 tons and required a longer runway (3,500 and should be brought into battle by surface feet). Additionally, with its wide body and STOL means. The new STOL should be optimized for the capabilities, a new tactical airlifter would be able other tactical features described in order to operate to transport to the forward area 90 percent of an in and out of those relatively forward bases with a Army brigade’s combat essential vehicles. The minimum of exposure. The size of the aircraft C–130 could haul only 55 percent of the vehicles becomes a major consideration because of vulnera- THE FINAL needed.8 bility, cramped space on the airfield and limited REPORT REC- The subcommittee report further noted that cargo unloading areas. All of these things plagued OMMENDED while the Military Airlift Command (MAC) had us in Vietnam even with C–130s when we got into a emphasized modernizing its strategic airlift capa- major operation.13 THE AIR bility by replacing the C–97s and C–124s with the FORCE more efficient C–141 and C–5 jet aircraft, “an By May 1970, TAC had finalized a required PROCURE AN approved program to modernize the Tactical Airlift operational capability (ROC, 52-69) statement for OFF-THE- Force appears to be nonexistent.”9 In his testimony, a medium STOL transport. The command sought SHELF STOL General Ryan had provided little on modernization a rapid self-deployment capability and an employ- TO ADDRESS plans, although there had been extensive discus- ment capability that took a 14-ton load (tracked sions prior to the hearings. TAC had even written a and towed equipment) into an austere14 airfield. THE draft required operational capability (ROC) state- Among the essential requirements were inflight IMMEDIATE ment for a medium STOL transport, with the vice refueling, a 2,600-nautical mile unrefueled range REPLACE- chief of staff of the Air Force requesting comments with a 19-ton payload, a long-range cruising speed MENT OF from the overseas commanders.10 Ryan may have of at least .75 Mach above 20,000 feet, and the abil- THE C–7 reasoned as follows. First, he realized that modern- ity to operate with a 14-ton (28,000 pound) load izing tactical airlift would take funding away from from a 2,000-foot-long by 60-foot-wide runway dur- AND C–123 other Air Force programs. He indicated this was the ing the midpoint of a mission. The aircraft would situation in a March 1970 message. Secondly, while have a cargo handling system compatible with the the LIT program was favored, it would face strong 463L pallet, ground loading height of 50-57 inches, opposition from the DOD, as the LIT competed and front on/offloading with rear onloading. It with the Army’s helicopters. The more service- would be capable of airdrop operations. At this acceptable STOL solution, however, meant the Air juncture, the AMST could not carry the outsized15 Force would concede part of the mission to the M-60A, the Army’s main battle tank. Later, the Army in the near term and would eventually have AMST specifications would serve as the baseline to accommodate the Army’s desire to coordinate its for developing the requirement documents for the helicopter supply operations with the C–141 and much larger C–17. C–5 at the large, safe air bases. Additionally, the C–5’s airlift capacity would be taken up transport- Prototype Source Selection ing helicopters to the overseas combat theaters.11 BY MAY 1970, In the end, Price’s subcommittee allayed all con- The acquisition philosophy of the AMST pro- TAC HAD cerns. The final report recommended the Air Force gram rested upon building demonstration air- procure an off-the-shelf STOL to address the planes or prototypes before the government would FINALIZED A immediate replacement of the C–7 and C–123 (the decide to proceed. David Packard, of Hewlett- REQUIRED Army’s interest), continue the VSTOL as a Packard, championed the concept while serving as OPERA- research and development program (favored by the deputy secretary of defense. Packard was well TIONAL the Air Staff), and develop the STOL (TAC’s aware of the cost overruns of the C–5A acquisition CAPABILITY request), with greater payload and operational program, which had discredited the total package …STATE- capability than the existing C–130. Developing the procurement concept. Under the prototype philos- STOL should receive the “highest priority” in the ophy, all of the engineering development and all of MENT FOR A Air Force’s fiscal year 1972 budget, the report the technical uncertainties would be resolved MEDIUM stated.12 The Air Force dutifully complied. ahead of a major production effort. This concept STOL was commonly known as fly-before-you-buy.16 The TRANSPORT Essential Requirements AMST along with the Light Weight Fighter (later the F-16 and F-18) were the first programs Aware of the pending discussions on consolidat- selected by the Office of the Secretary of Defense ing airlift as well as the need to coordinate Air for prototyping. The contract issued, as well as the Force airlift efforts, Momyer shared his views on a management approach for the C–17, reflected new tactical transport with Gen. Jack J. Catton, Packard’s influence. the Air Force’s strategic airlift commander: Lt. Gen. James T. Stewart, commander of the Aeronautical Systems Division, released the The follow-on STOL to the C–130 should have bet- AMST requests for proposals at the end of January ter performance in terms of takeoff and landing, 1972. Each contractor was to provide a technology high speed, ability to operate in and out of more demonstrator. The Air Force would evaluate the rudimentary airstrips and a larger cargo compart- design, technology, and military usefulness of the ment. I do not think this aircraft should be able to offers. There was no commitment for further devel-

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 31 Boeing’s YC–14 takes off from Boeing Field in Seattle, Washington in August, 1976, on its maiden flight. (Photo courtesy of Boeing Company, and supplied by the author.)

FROM INCEP- TION, NOT UNLIKE THE C–17 PROGRAM, SECURING FUNDING AND SUPPORT REMAINED A opment of the prototypes. Refraining from design- itary sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia existed. For ing the aircraft by issuing specifications, the Air the first two years, the program received $6 mil- PROBLEM Force, instead, provided goals, such as a STOL lion (FY 1972) and $25 million (FY 1973), but then payload of 14 tons, airdropping 80 paratroopers, in December 1973, the House Appropriations and a landing gear capable of a California Bearing Committee decreased the authorization for fiscal Ratio (CBR)17 of 6—soil consistency of a golf course year 1974 from $65 to $25 million. Chaired by LOSING OUT fairway. Imbued with Packard’s philosophy, the Air George H. Mahon (D-TX), the committee, was not Force sought the most for its money.18 In similar convinced the AMST was necessary and stated IN THE AMST fashion, the Air Force provided guidance and mis- that a modified C–130 could serve the long-term COMPETITION sion performance goals for the C–17 but refrained tactical airlift requirements.20 Politics factored in AND WITH NO from designing the aircraft. as well. Losing out in the AMST competition and C–130S IN AMST proposals came from Boeing, McDonnell with no C–130s in the Air Force’s budget, THE AIR Douglas, Fairchild, and Bell as well as a joint offer Lockheed had sought congressional support.21 from Lockheed Martin-North American Rockwell. Lockheed’s Aeronautics Company was located at FORCE’S The Air Force completed source selection evalua- Fort Worth, Texas. BUDGET, tions by the beginning of July. On November 10, This congressional action thoroughly disrupted LOCKHEED 1972, after receiving OSD approval, Secretary of the AMST program and raised legal concerns. The HAD SOUGHT the Air Force Seamans authorized awarding the Air Force debated whether to proceed with two CONGRES- Boeing Company and the McDonnell Douglas contractors but knew that it could not terminate SIONAL Corporation contracts, each to build two AMST one without jeopardizing the prototyping effort prototypes. The Air Force planned for a first flight and facing criticism for its program management. SUPPORT… thirty-five months after contract award. Initially, There were also cost considerations. After much [WHICH] the contracts provided Boeing and McDonnell discussion, Air Force Secretary John L. McLucas THOR- Douglas $96.2 million and $86.1 million, respec- decided to continue with the two contractors. A OUGHLY tively. The contractors were to keep their designs restructuring of the program in March 1974, DISRUPTED to a unit cost goal of $5 million (FY 1972 dollars). reduced the funding request for fiscal year 1975, If all went well, the Air Force planned to receive its stretched out the program, and raised prototype THE AMST first AMSTs in 1980.19 development costs from $182.3 to $229.1 million.22 PROGRAM There was also pressure to make the AMST a AND RAISED Obstacles civil-military airplane. Senate Armed Services LEGAL Committee member Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX) had CONCERNS From inception, not unlike the C–17 program, impressed upon William P. Clements, Jr., the securing funding and support remained a problem. Deputy Secretary of Defense, that the AMST also Both Boeing and McDonnell Douglas invested needed to be commercially marketable, or Bentsen their own money in the program, believing com- would withhold his support. So prompted, on June mercial airlines and foreign countries would pur- 22, 1973, Clements wrote a memorandum to chase the aircraft as well. Prospects of foreign mil- McLucas. Although the Air Force had, in its con-

32 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 The McDonnell-Douglas YC–15 takes off during testing.(Photo courtesy of the author.)

MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND DESIRED THAT THE AMST TRANS- PORT A MEANINGFUL PAYLOAD TO THE THE- ATER WITH- OUT RELYING ON LIMITED AIR gressional testimony, talked of the AMST’s com- as well as the longer range desired by the Military REFUELING mercial application, Clements wanted to ensure it Airlift Command, that took over the program the RESOURCES and requested that Boeing and McDonnell end of 1974, as a result of the consolidation of tac- Douglas be so informed.23 tical and strategic airlift management. The Clements’ memo further disclosed service poli- Military Airlift Command desired that the AMST tics when he also directed McLucas to seek con- transport a meaningful payload to the theater currences from the Army and the Navy on the without relying on limited air refueling resources. AMST’s configuration, especially the size of the As a result, the two prototype contractors evalu- cargo compartment. The Army’s AMST project offi- ated pylon tanks, longer wings, and more powerful cer at the Air Staff had tried several times to engines to meet the basic 2,600-nautical-mile, 19- DURING ITS reduce the cross-section of the AMST to that of the ton deployment mission. Originally, the prototype YEAR-LONG C–130’s and C–141’s and to reduce the landing/ contracts had primarily asked the contractors to FLIGHT TEST- takeoff goals and flotation capability. Simply, the investigate and demonstrate STOL technology ING, THE Army desired to protect its heavy-lift helicopter and did not specifically request a deployment pay- YC–15 MADE (HLH) from the AMST.24 A year earlier, General load.26 Momyer had drawn the same conclusion. “It is AMST flight testing, comprised of a combined 292 FLIGHTS, obvious what is going on—freeze Air Force out of developmental test and evaluation and a limited AMASSING the theater airlift and handle with a direct inter- initial operational test and evaluation, ended in 553.4 HOURS face between the heavy lift helicopter and the C–5. August 1977, when Boeing completed its testing. The M [Medium] STOL is a real threat to the McDonnell had finished its program a year earlier. future of the heavy lift helicopter hence the chal- During flight testing, the prototypes exceeded lenge on any grounds.”25 their performance specification goals. McDonnell Douglas’ YC–15 test program concentrated on con- Flight Test Program firming flight characteristics, performance of the externally blown flap, and STOL operations. As The first prototype, McDonnell Douglas’ YC–15, designed, the YC–15 demonstrated its ability to flew on August 26, 1975; Boeing’s YC–14 did so on land on a 2,100-foot runway with no special August 9, 1976. McDonnell was able to field its requirements. The YC–15 flew cross-country, prototype sooner, as it had taken a “cut and paste” underwent ground loading of Army equipment, approach. For example, the landing gear came performed aerial refueling proximity tests, and from the C–141. Along with a more conventional laid the groundwork for heavy equipment air- look, McDonnell had also selected less advanced drops. Testing also included airflow measurements technology. Boeing, on the other hand, took its of the cargo ramp and the troop door. During its YC–14 through seven separate design refine- year-long flight testing, the YC–15 made 292 ments. Boeing’s decision to refine its design flights, amassing 553.4 hours. Additionally in resulted in a longer wing configuration, which 1977, McDonnell Douglas tested a new wing to gave the YC–14 a medium-range STOL capability increase the range of the YC–15 and a high by-

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 33 The C–17 takes off leaving a cloud of dust. (Photo courtesy of the author.)

THE C–17 SHOWED OFF ITS YC–14 AND YC–15 HERITAGE BY LANDING IN LESS THAN 2,000 FEET ON AN pass turbofan engine capable of 22,000 pounds of had already begun to overtake and then reshape UNIMPROVED thrust, an increase of 4,000 pounds per engine. the program. RUNWAY IN Boeing’s two jet engines provided 50,000 pounds of thrust each.27 Strategic Airlift Emerges THE MOJAVE Beginning its test program a year later, Boeing DESERT adapted more to evolving requirements. Testing Within a year of the prototype source selection Boeing’s YC–14 included: load testing howitzers award, the Israeli-Arab Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the AN-1G attack helicopter, heavy equipment disclosed a need for the United States to possess a airdrops up to 20,000 pounds, STOL landings that viable response capability for the Middle East. For exceeded the requirements, a maximum gross its part, MAC, using its C–5 and C–141 aircraft, takeoff weight of 213,000 pounds, the ground load- rushed supplies, ammunition, and equipment to ing of the Army’s M-60A main battle tank (109,000 Israel. Hampered by the vast distances (on aver- pounds), semi-prepared soft-field runways with a age 6,450 miles one way), unavailability of en combat offload of a 10,000 pound pallet, and aerial route facilities, and lack of an air refueling capa- THE ISRAELI- refuelings. The YC–14 with a gross weight of bility, the crisis pressed U.S. strategic airlift ARAB YOM 160,000 pounds achieved a STOL stopping dis- resources despite their good showing against KIPPUR WAR tance of just over 800 feet using thrust reversers at Soviet airlift aircraft. OF 1973 reverse idle. With the same weight using only the In the aftermath, a series of studies in the mid- DISCLOSED A thrust reversers, the aircraft realized a stopping 1970s documented a need for more strategic airlift. NEED FOR distance of 1,500 feet. In addition, the YC–14 per- Although there were initiatives to increase the formed STOL approaches with a glide slope of strategic airlift capability, war plans still disclosed THE UNITED nearly six degrees with little or no flare used prior a shortage in strategic airlift.31 Given the docu- STATES TO to landing. The YC–14’s landing configuration mented need for more strategic airlift coupled with POSSESS A enabled sink rates of between five and eleven feet the recent events in the Middle East and Congress’ VIABLE per second.28 During the 1995 reliability, main- and OSD’s growing viewpoint that a C–130 might RESPONSE tainability, and availability evaluation, the C–17 do just as well for less money, it was not surprising showed off its YC–14 and YC–15 heritage by land- that MAC, when it published in December 1975 a CAPABILITY ing in less than 2,000 feet on an unimproved run- revised required operational capability (MAC ROC FOR THE way in the Mojave Desert.29 9-75) for the AMST, broadened the mission of tac- MIDDLE EAST At the conclusion of the AMST test program in tical airlift: “The AMST will augment the strategic 1977, the commander of the Air Force Test and airlift forces during the initial stages of an inter- Evaluation Command, Maj. Gen. Howard W. Leaf, national crisis.”32 Further, expressed his satisfaction with both the YC–15 and YC–14 prototypes. The Air Force Systems The speed of the augmenting AMST is compatible Command (AFSC) initiated the source selection with the block speeds of the strategic transport air- process in September 1977, intending to award the craft, while the AMST’s range and cargo-carrying production contract in April 1978.30 But events capability allow it to carry increased payloads over

34 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 AMST “Morphing” Into C-17

Tactical STOL Strategic Strategic Longer Wing Tank Carrying Add Cease AMST Augmentation Derivative AMST Strategic Possible Capability

Self-Deployment Direct Outsize Load Design Points Start C-X Insertion (Army Tank) 74,000lbs/2,600nm Dual Role 90,000lbs/2,000nm Strategic Primary 120,000lbs/1,300nm Outsize

TAC ROC MAC ROC ASD Study AMST Army Study PMD/AMST SECDEF Brown May 70 Dec 75 Apr 76 Configuration Aug 77 Configuration Oct 79 Steering Group Steering Group Apr 77 May 79

Israeli Airlift Fall of S. Vietnam Zaire Assistance Iran/Afghanistan 1973 1975 1977-78 1979

C–130E critical legs. The AMST will also be air- added to the military appropriations bill.37 As to refuelable which increases its range, payload, and the Army’s lagging support, Carlton was told the “WE AND THE the number of missions flown during the period of Air Force had pushed hard in the 1970s for the ARMY BET- time it is utilized in a strategic role. The best use of Army’s support of a new light intratheater trans- TER DEFEND the AMST in augmenting strategic airlift is when port and, after having secured the Army’s support, THE AMST full advantage is taken of the AMST’s wide-bodied dropped the LIT in favor of the AMST. The C–5 REQUIRE- characteristic in conjunction with the cargo-carry- program had also created some unfavorable MENT ing capabilities of the strategic airlift forces.33 impressions. Additionally, the Army’s heavy lift helicopter and the AMST had similar, hence com- BETTER Moreover, both MAC ROC 9-75 and the subse- peting, intratheater roles.38 THAN WE quent employment concept document for the In March, Carlton sent Air Force Chief of Staff HAVE OR AMST stated tactical airlift would airland supplies Gen. David C. Jones letters to pass on to key Army THIS [C–130] as well as airland/airdrop combat units over commanders. Of concern was the Army’s input to IS WHAT WE “extended distances,” specifically to or between the decision coordinating paper for the Defense theaters of operations. MAC ROC 9-75 also spoke System Acquisition Review Council Milestone II WILL GET!” of providing “direct insertion,” the seeds of the decision scheduled for September 1977. The deci- C–17’s direct delivery capability.34 A USAF head- sion before the council was whether to begin full- quarters (Studies and Analysis) study had con- scale development of the AMST or cancel the pro- cluded that tactical C–130E/H and AMST aircraft gram. The Army, however, was undertaking a could augment the strategic airlift force until hos- review of its tactical airlift requirements, and until tilities broke out during a NATO contingency. the results were published, senior Army leaders Using tactical assets in the strategic role reduced provided no support.39 The best Carlton could do the procurement of that amount of strategic air- was a statement from Vice Chief of Staff of the lift.35 Military officials were keen on improving Army Gen. Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., who told the deployment closure times. House Armed Services Committee in May that the A MIXTURE Army “very badly needed the capability.”40 OF AMSTS Erosion and Competition And there was erosion. In November 1975, the Research and Development Subcommittee of the AND C–130S Politics also persisted. In January 1976, Gen. House Armed Services Committee had conducted WERE Paul K. Carlton, the MAC commander, penned to hearings on the state of military airlift. The sub- REGARDED his deputy chief of staff for operations: “We and the committee’s report, released in April 1976, AS THE Army better defend the AMST Requirement better revealed the AMST was no longer the sole replace- “BEST than we have or this [C–130] is what we will get! ment for the C–130. Chairman Price had compro- BARGAIN” Comment.”36 Brig. Gen. Charles C. Irions’ staff mised. “Lockheed provided an analysis of C–130 replied that the Air Staff and the command con- and AMST fuel comparisons. The analysis shows tinued to challenge Lockheed’s attempts to offer a that for a typical 400 nautical-mile-radius, tactical modified C–130 to OSD and Congress. Of airlift mission use of the C–130 provides fuel sav- Lockheed’s military transport line, only the C–130 ings of about 250 million gallons a year and, at 42 was still in production, and then mostly for foreign cents per gallon, cost savings of over $100 million.” sales. The Air Force had not included the C–130 in Now a mixture of AMSTs and C–130s were its budget requests after 1973, and Lockheed had regarded as the “best bargain.”41 In light of the secured its production line by getting C–130s Arab oil embargo against the U.S. and other

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 35 nations for supporting Israel and the United porated. MAC did not favor growing the AMST to States’ dependence on foreign oil, Lockheed had a carry more of the Army’s outsize equipment powerful argument. Thus, the stage was set: “unless it can be assured that these changes will Lockheed would repeatedly challenge McDonnell neither degrade AMST STOL capability nor jeop- THE Douglas and then Boeing over the C–17 as well. ardize the program’s completion.”47 COMMAND Retrospectively, it was simply a matter of “busi- MAC remained keen on maximizing the AMST ALSO ness is business and companies are in business to and pushed its strategic airlift augmentation con- make money.”42 cept. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas had already NEEDED While Lockheed’s end run at the AMST could redirected their efforts to this end, testing and con- FUNDING be faulted for the erosion, the AMST competed ducting paper studies. In early April 1977, the FOR against other aircraft modernization and modifi- command’s vice commander, Lt. Gen. John F. STRETCHING cation programs and had to accommodate evolv- Gonge, informed Lt. Gen. Alton Slay, the DCS/ AND ADDING ing national security requirements. The Israeli R&D, that “to avoid degrading the acknowledged airlift, during the Yom Kippur War, had high- strategic shortfall, the AMST must be able to AN AIR REFU- lighted a need for air refueling capabilities and transport a meaningful self-support payload to the ELING for more strategic airlift to transport outsize theater of operations, even though it would have to CAPABILITY loads of tanks and helicopters rapidly. MAC island hop.”48 This justified revising the minimum TO THE sought funding for an advanced tanker cargo air- essential mission requirements stipulated in the C–141, FIXING craft (ATCA), what became the KC–10. The com- 1970 ROC. The command would not accept less. THE C–5’S mand also needed funding for stretching and Moreover, emerging Army concepts called for adding an air refueling capability to the C–141, larger equipment, faster deployments, and more WINGS, AND fixing the C–5’s wings, and procuring a C–XX43 mobility within the theater. A compromised AMST PROCURING strategic airlift replacement aircraft (civil-mili- program, offering a less than operationally capable A C–XX tary partnership). On the latter, Carlton was aircraft, should not be presented as an option, STRATEGIC especially proud of his several-year effort, believ- General Gonge advised.49 Thus, it was not surpris- AIRLIFT ing the C–XX would nearly triple the nation’s air- ing two weeks later when the AMST Configuration lift capability. Industry, however, embraced the Steering Group, that included representatives REPLACE- C–XX in a lukewarm fashion.44 Carlton and his from the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps and MENT successor, Gen. William G. Moore, also devoted was chaired by General Slay, decided on a longer AIRCRAFT much energy to an enhancement program for the wing to increase range and on the capability to Civil Reserve Air Fleet, thereby gaining addi- transport the Army’s main battle tank.50 tional oversize cargo capacity. Congressional sup- In August 1977, the Army finally released its port had to be “worked.” P. K. Carlton laid out his eighteen-month study of tactical airlift require- need in the House to Congressmen Mel Price and ments. The main conclusion was already known. A in the Senate to Sam Nunn (D-GA), member of tank-carrying AMST offered the Army the “most the influential Senate Armed Services flexible and efficient tactical airlift system.”51 Committee and champion of Lockheed’s inter- While the study found the C–130H/IV satisfactory ests.45 Thus, the inherited AMST was one of many for moving bulk supplies and light units, it “lacked programs advocated by MAC. sufficient box size to transport the Army’s primary A TANK- combat vehicles, i.e., main battle tank (MBT) CARRYING An Outsize AMST mechanized infantry combat vehicle, self-propelled artillery, division air defense gun (DIVAD Gun), AMST In March 1976, the Air Staff queried AFSC and and numerous combat service support (CSS) vehi- OFFERED MAC about using an AMST derivative as a pri- cles.”52 In the 1950s, when the C–130 was de- THE ARMY mary strategic, outsize cargo aircraft. signed, the Army had more infantry than mecha- THE “MOST nized or armored divisions. Over twenty years FLEXIBLE Could non-STOL derivatives of one or both of the later, the situation was reversed, and the C–130H AMST prototype designs be developed to meet the could only transport between 35 and 55 percent of AND following intertheater airlift missions? (1) Trans- a mechanized or armored division’s combat vehi- EFFICIENT port without refueling any single type of equip- cles. The C–5 provided the Army limited capability, TACTICAL ment presently carried by the C–5 over the current as it lacked airdrop and STOL capabilities, pos- AIRLIFT unrefueled C–5 range at maximum payload. (2) sessed a small fleet size, and was primary a strate- SYSTEM” Transport on a routine basis an M-60 tank weigh- gic airlifter. Assistant Secretary of the Army for ing 111,000 lbs over the following unrefueled Research, Development and Acquisition, Percy A. ranges: (A) 4,000 NM, (B) 3,000 NM, (C) 2,000 Pierre, recommended, in November 1977, that the NM.46 Air Force proceed with the full-scale development of an outsize capable AMST.53 The Army soon As a result, the Aeronautical Systems Division found, however, that it had thrown its full support studied the matter and concluded that a strategic to a program on its way out. derivative of the current AMST prototypes was not viable, due to insufficient cargo box size and range Carter Cancels performance. A strategic derivative of a redesigned AMST was feasible, provided a larger cargo box, A change in Presidents left the AMST unsup- new wings, and more powerful engines were incor- ported. Inclined to reduce defense expenditures,

36 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 President Jimmy Carter withdrew funding for the enhanced strategic capability made the AMST costly AMST program in the fiscal year 1978 bud- more attractive.61 In effect, the Army and Air get; it halted source selection and placed the pro- Force were taking their case before Congress, as gram on hold. Support from key members of Defense Secretary Brown had already told Congress, however, provided $5 million for source Congress in February 1978 that the Carter selection in the fiscal year 1979 DOD Appro- Administration had decided to cancel further priation Bill, to which Carter consented. But a development of the AMST and would seek a more year later the program was no more. Unit costs cost-effective program.62 had doubled from the original $5 million and were BEFORE THE expected to double again due to continuing infla- Dual Role tion.54 As directed, AFSC halted source selection in DECEMBER January 1978, and cancelled the program on De- As the final months unfolded, it was obvious 1979 CAN- cember 10, 1979.55 Besides the affordability issue that the AMST had to be more and more a strate- CELLATION, of a $9 billion program, Defense Secretary Harold gic airlifter with just some tactical capabilities. A PROPO- Brown rationalized that in a European conflict, shift in airlift doctrine was underway. While there NENTS rail and road transportation systems would com- was a sincere attempt to define the kind of airlifter pete favorably with the speed and responsiveness needed for wartime requirements, politics and sub- CONTINUED offered by a STOL tactical airlift system. He also jective views influenced the process as well. In TO WORK judged the current Air Force and Navy tactical air- March 1979, Headquarters USAF issued a pro- FOR THE lift resources along with the available short-range gram management directive on the “Advanced AMST… civil aircraft as sufficient for a global war. Thus, Medium STOL Transport (AMST) Transition [WHEN] THE there was no immediate need to purchase addi- Program.” This directive tasked AFSC and MAC to C–17 tional tactical aircraft.56 come up with range and payload combinations to Before the December 1979 cancellation, propo- add the strategic airlift capability desired by DOD PROGRAM nents continued to work for the AMST. Against officials. The joint service AMST Configuration EMERGED this background, the C–17 program emerged. The Steering Group met to work the issue. Taking into Army’s senior leaders were especially vocal in consideration Army brigade and division move- championing the AMST. They realized the only ment and closure time requirements, minimum other aircraft available for outsize equipment was strategic design points were established: the abil- the C–5, and it could not operate into forward ity to airlift 74,000 pounds of cargo for 2,600 nau- small austere airfields. Moreover, it was already tical miles, 90,000 pounds for 2,000 miles, or heavily tasked in deployment plans. Army Chief of 120,000 pounds for 1,300 miles. The 82d Airborne Staff Gen. Bernard W. Rogers told the Senate commander received assurances that airdrop oper- Armed Services Committee that the C–130 could ations would remain unaffected. The Marine Corps not carry the XM-1 tank, proposed infantry equip- reiterated its interests in a tanker/cargo version of ment, and other self-propelled vehicles. The a strategically enhanced AMST.63 “AMST is needed and the STOL capability in par- In the spring of 1979, the Air Staff released a ticular is needed to get the equipment where we study, that advocated a “swing“ concept for the need it.” Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., the AMST.64 While the MAC staff believed the AMST IN THE Commander in Chief of United States Army in was capable of swinging between tactical and SPRING OF Europe, was equally direct before the House strategic airlift roles, they objected to the study’s Armed Services Committee.58 force structure and flying hour reductions and con- 1979, THE AIR As to the Air Force’s efforts, General Moore, the tinued to favor the strategic augmentation role. STAFF MAC commander, in his quarterly report to One staffer disclosed the real concern: “The ‘swing’ RELEASED A Defense Secretary Brown, politely disagreed with concept proposes an aircraft that will ‘do all,’ and STUDY, THAT President Carter’s decision to cancel the AMST. raises a question about the need for future airlift ADVOCATED The previous quarter, Moore’s statement that the modernization. The C–5 wing modification and AMST was the replacement for the C–130 had C–141 stretch program may be affected, but most A “SWING“ elicited this reply from Brown: “What about new certainly the C–XX program will be threatened by CONCEPT C–130H instead?”59 ‘strategic’ AMSTs.”65 FOR THE In March 1979, Air Force leaders, appearing Clearly, support was building within the upper AMST before the House Budget Committee, expressed levels of the OSD staff for a new aircraft. After a concern over the ability to support forces or rapidly September briefing, Deborah P. Christie, OSD redeploy them within a theater. Air Force Director of Mobility Forces Division, previously an Secretary John C. Stetson and Chief of Staff opponent of the AMST, found the new strategic General Lew Allen stated it was “essential to iden- capabilities attractive.66 Gen. Robert E. Huyser, tify and produce a new wide-body tactical airlift the new MAC Commander-in-Chief, sensed the aircraft to replace the C–130 and to keep pace with moment. To General Slay, now AFSC commander, Army requirements.”60 he expressed: In September, as the situation deteriorated, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Edward C. Meyer threw I have followed your exchange of letters with the in his personal endorsement of the AMST. Meyer Chief on the AMST. I have had discussions with remained adamant about retaining the tactical Dave Jones and Hans Mark and believe the time is focus of the AMST, although he acknowledged an right to move on this program. The desire seems to

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 37 McDonnell Douglas—if what they are putting out is correct, we can have such an aircraft without starting back at ground zero. They say they have what they need from the YC–14 and 15. I believe state-of-the-art technology has us at a point where we shouldn’t define such an aircraft as tactical or strategic—we just discuss it as an airlifter capable of dual role.67

By the end of October 1979, the matter was over. Defense Secretary Brown had decided to improve the strategic airlift capability. He had met with the Air Force’s General Allen and advised him to cease associated activities on the AMST program and proceed with the C–X program, emphasizing strategic airlift as the primary mission, an outsize cargo capability, and a fiscal year 1987 initial operational date.68 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan two months later and events in Iran confirmed the course. The United States required a more rapid global response capability.Thus, over a four-year period, the shortfall in strategic mobility reinforced by world events altered the whole basis for justifying the AMST program. From these efforts to recast the AMST for a dual strategic–tactical role with an outsize cargo capacity the C–17 Globemaster III benefited. The C–17 owes much to the AMST. The C–17 underwent years be to have an aircraft with STOL capability and C–17 operations during Bosnia, Yugoslavia, and of operational testing and many changes before that will enhance the strategic lift end. I have gone now Afghanistan, validate the worth of a dual-role entering the inventory. over data from both companies—Boeing and airlifter. ■

NOTES

1. Headquarters, Military Air Transport Service, later mittee on Military Airlift, Military Airlift, 91st Cong., 2d Military Airlift Command (MAC), at Scott AFB, was sess, 1970, 9230. located in Congressman Price’s district. Hngs, House, 10. Hngs, House, Military Airlift: Hearings before the Military Airlift: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Subcommittee on Military Airlift of the Committee on Military Airlift of the Committee on Armed Services, Armed Services, 91st Cong., 2d sess, 1970, 6745, 6746; 91st Cong., 2d sess, 1970, 6392. Msg., CSAF to PACAF and USAFE, “TAC Proposal For 2. Ibid. Modernization of Tactical Airlift Forces, Draft TAC ROC 3. Ltr, Brig. Gen. George W. McLaughlin to Gen. 52-69 For Medium STOL Transport (MST),” 24/2045Z William W. Momyer, “Report of LIT Meeting with Vice Jan. 1970. Chief of Staff,” Nov. 29, 1969; Ltr, Gen. William W. 11. Ltr., Brig Gen. George W. McLaughlin to Gen. Momyer to Gen. Jack J. Catton, [Air Staff CDP on William W. Momyer, “Report of LIT Meeting with Vice V/STOL LIT], Dec. 12, 1969. Chief of Staff,” Nov. 29, 1969; Msg., CSAF to TAC/DR, 4. DOD Directive, 5160.22, Clarification of Roles and “Modernization of Tactical Airlift Forces,” 05/1329Z May Missions of the Departments of the Army and the Air 1970. Force Regarding the Use of Aircraft, Mar. 18, 1957; 12. Rpt. (No. 91-59), House Armed Services Subcom- Agreement, Gen. John P. McConnell and Gen. Harold K. mittee on Military Airlift, Military Airlift, 91st Cong., 2d Johnson, Agreement Between Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, sess, 1970, 9231. and Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force, Apr. 6, 1966. 13. Ltr., Gen. William W. Momyer to Gen. Jack J. 5. Rpt., (No. 91-59), House Armed Services Subcom- Catton, [Air Staff CDP on V/STOL LIT], Dec. 12, 1969. mittee on Military Airlift, Military Airlift, 91st Cong., 2d 14. Then defined as semi-prepared surface. sess, 1970, 9230, 9231; Ray L. Bowers, Tactical Airlift 15. Outsized cargo was defined as exceeding the capa- (USAF Office of Air Force History, Washington, DC, bilities of the C–141, but fitting on a C–5. 1983), pp 190, 191. 16. Hngs., House, Hearings Before A Subcommittee On 6. Ltr., Gen. William W. Momyer to Gen. Jack J. Appropriations, 92d Cong., 1st sess, 1971, 3-8, 14-20. Catton, [Air Staff CDP on V/STOL LIT], Dec. 12, 1969. 17. The California Bearing Ratio was the system used 7. Point Paper w/atch, HQ MAC/XPQA, “Advanced to classify landing surfaces for aircraft. Silt and clay sur- Medium STOL Transport (AMST),” Oct. 5, 1976. faces rated as low as 3-5 while graded gravel and gravel 8. Document, HQ TAC, Required Operational sand mixes could range as high as 60-80. Capability For Medium STOL Transport (TAC ROC No. 18. George M. Watson, The Advanced Medium Short- 52-69), May 1970, p 1, 2; Fact Sheet, Lt Col Vincent Take-Off-And-Landing Transport (AMST) and the Hughes, AF/RDQA, “AMST,” Feb. 3, 1976. Implications of the Minimum Engineering Development 9. Rpt. (No. 91-59), House Armed Services Subcom- (MED) Program, Air Force Systems Command Office of

38 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 History (Andrews AFB, Md., nd), pp. 5, 6, 11; Hngs., [Quarterly Activity Report], May 3, 1976. Memo., Dick Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Nemeth to Col. Duane H. Cassidy, [Dixon Ltr. to Army Year 1977: Hearings before a Subcommittee on the Four-Stars], May 14, 1976. Committee of Appropriations, Part 5, 94th Cong., 2d 40. Point Paper w/atch, HQ MAC/XPQA, “Advanced sess, 1976, 411. Medium STOL Transport (AMST),” Jul. 14, 1978. 19. Watson, pp. 8-10, 12, 14; Article, Vincent C. Hughes, 41. Rpt. (No. 94-40), House Armed Services “The Airlift Enigma and a Plan for the Future,” Armed Subcommittee on Military Airlift, The Posture of Forces Journal International, Oct. 1982, p. 25. Military Airlift, 94th Cong., 2d sess, Apr. 1976, pp. 7, 8. 20. Hngs., Senate, Department of Defense Appro- 42. Intvw, Col. Walter S. Evans, USAF (Ret.), with priations for Fiscal Year 1977: Hearings before a Betty R. Kennedy, Sep. 24, 1998. Subcommittee on the Committee of Appropriations, Part 43. The C–XX became known as the advanced civil- 5, 94th Cong., 2d sess, 1976, pp. 407-409; Watson, pp. 17, military aircraft (ACMA) and should not be confused 21. with the C–X/C–17. 21. Article, Vincent C. Hughes, “The Airlift Enigma and 44. Ltr., Gen. Paul K. Carlton to Gen. David C. Jones A Plan for the Future,” Armed Forces Journal [C–XX], Jan. 10, 1977; White Paper, NDTA Military International, Oct. 1982, p. 26. Airlift Committee, “Summary Analysis,” ca Apr. 1977. 22. Point Paper, HQ TAC/DRLL, “Advanced Medium 45. Ltr., Gen, Paul K. Carlton to Gen. David C. Jones, STOL Transport (AMST),” May 8, 1974. [Nunn Support], Jan. 24, 1977. 23. Watson, pp. 17, 19, 21. 46. Msg., CSAF/RD to AFSC/SD, “Use of AMST 24. Ibid., pp. 17, 19. Derivative in a Strategic Airlift Primary Mission Role,” 25. Ltr., Gen. William W. Momyer to Brig. Gen. Eugene 09/0014Z Mar 1976. W. Gauch, Jr., [SEA and AMST], Jul. 31, 1972. 47. Background Paper, HQ MAC/XPSS, “AMST 26. MAC ROC, “Advanced Medium STOL Transport,” Derivative for Strategic Airlift,” Jul. 22, 1976. Dec. 5, 1975, pp. 1, 2; Background Paper, HQ. MAC/ 48. Ltr. w/atch, Lt Gen. John F. Gonge to HQ USAF/RD, XPQA, “C–14 Briefing,” Mar. 22, 1976; Ltr. w/atch, Lt “AMST Operational Capabilities,” Apr. 4, 1977. Gen. John F. Gonge to HQ USAF/RD, “AMST 49. Ibid. Operational Capabilities,” Apr. 4, 1977. 50. Background Paper, HQ MAC/XPQA, “Advanced 27. Watson, pp. 32, 57, 62, 64, 66, 69. Medium STOL Transport (AMST),” Jul. 5, 1977. 28. Ibid., pp. 69, 71, 75, 78; Background Paper, HQ. 51. Study, USA Combined Arms Center, Advanced MAC/XPQA, “C–14 Briefing,” Mar. 22, 1976; Background Medium STOL (AMST) Study, Aug. 1977. Paper, HQ. MAC/XPSS, “AMST Derivative for Strategic 52. Ibid. Airlift,” Jul. 22, 1976. 53. Point Paper w/atch, HQ MAC/XPQA, “Advanced 29. Article, Tony Bartelme, “Against the Wind: The Medium STOL Transport (AMST),” Jul. 14, 1978; Ltr., Story of the C–17, ‘High Cost, Bungled Past Threaten Gen. William G. Moore, Jr., to Harold Brown, [Responses Plane’s Future,’” Part 1, Post and Courier (Charleston, to Questions], Nov. 2, 1977. S.C.), Aug. 20, 1995. 54. Hist, MAC, FY 1978, pp. 216-18; Point Paper, HQ 30. Watson, pp. 78, 81; Ltr., Gen. William G. Moore, Jr., MAC/XPQA, “Advanced Medium STOL Transport to Gen. David C. Jones, [Quarterly Activity Report], Jul. (AMST),” May 17, 1977. 26, 1977. 55. Msg., AFSC/SD to USAF/RDQ, “AMST Source 31. Besides the congressional hearings, see Study, HQ Selection,” 06/1330Z Jan. 1978; Program Management USAF (Studies and Analysis), Tactical Airlift in a Directive R-Q 6131 (3), USAF/RD, “Program Manage- Strategic Airlift Augmentation Role (SABER AUG- ment Directive for Cancellation to the Advanced MENT), Apr. 1975; Study, OSD, A Report to Congress on Medium STOL Transport (AMST) Transition Program,” U.S. Conventional Reinforcements for NATO, Jun. 1976; Dec. 10, 1979. Study, Logistics Management Institute, Vol I: The 56. Rpt., Harold Brown, “FY 1980 Budget, FY 1981 National Strategic Airlift Dilemma, Vol 2: The National Authorization Request and FY 1980-1984 Defense Strategic Airlift Dilemma: An Approach to Solution Programs,” Jan. 25, 1979. (commonly known as the Estes Study), Apr. 1976; Study, 57. Point Paper w/atch, HQ MAC/XPQA, “Advanced JCS Memorandum 30-77, A Report on Strategic Mobility Medium STOL Transport (AMST),” Jul. 14, 1978. Requirements and Programs (known as the JCS 58. Ibid. Mobility Study), Feb. 1977; Study, Rand Corporation, 59. Ltr., w/atch, Gen. William G. Moore, Jr., to Harold Strategic Mobility Alternatives for the 1980s, Mar. 1977; Brown, [October-December 1977 Quarterly Report], Jan. Issue Paper, OSD (Program Analysis & Evaluation), 5, 1978; Memo., w/atchs, RAdm. M. Staser Holcomb to Strategic Airlift and Air Refueling, Jul. 1977. Gen. William G. Moore, “CINCMAC Quarterly Report of 32. MAC ROC, “Advanced Medium STOL Transport,” 3 October 1977,” Oct. 17, 1977. Dec. 5, 1975, p. 3. 60. Statement, John C. Stetson and Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., 33. Ibid. “Report to the 96th Congress,” Mar. 1979. 34. Ibid., p. ii; Plan, HQ MAC/XPQA, Employment 61. Memo., Gen. Edward C. Meyer to Chief of Staff of Concept for the Advanced Medium STOL Transport, the Air Force, “Advanced Medium STOL Transport Jun. 1975 (revised Nov. 1976), pp. 3, 12, 21. (AMST),” Sep. 5, 1979. 35. Study, HQ USAF, Tactical Airlift Aircraft in a 62. Rpt., Harold Brown, “Annual Report Fiscal Year Strategic Airlift Augmentation Role (SABER AUG- 1979,” Feb. 2, 1978. MENT), Apr.1975, p. iv. 63. Ltr. w/atch, AF/RD, “Minutes–AMST Configuration 36. Staff Summary Sheet w/atch, HQ MAC/DOQA, Steering Group (CSG),” Jul. 24, 1979. “Requirement for the AMST,” Jan. 30, 1976. 64. Study, AF/RDQ, Airlift Modernization: A Different 37. Ibid., Article, Vincent C. Hughes, “The Airlift Approach, Apr. 1979. Enigma and A Plan for the Future,” Armed Forces 65. Staff Summary w/atch, HQ MAC/XPQA, “Airlift Journal International, Oct. 1982, pp. 25, 26. Modernization–A Different Approach,” May 25, 1979. 38. Staff Summary Sheet w/atch, HQ MAC/DOQA, 66. Staff Summary w/atch, HQ MAC/XPQ, “Selling the “Requirement for the AMST,” Jan. 30, 1976; Article, AMST,” Sep. 14, 1979. Vincent C. Hughes, “The Airlift Enigma and A Plan for 67. Msg., CINCMAC/CC to AFSC/CC, [Strategic the Future,” Armed Forces Journal International, Oct. STOL], 22/2100Z Oct. 1979. 1982, pp. 25, 26. 68. Paper, Col. Robert A. Cole, U.S. Army War College, 39. Ltr., Gen. Paul K. Carlton to Gen. David C. Jones “The C–17: In Perspective,” Mar. 23, 1987.

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 39 Taking Clodfelter One Step Further: Mass, Surprise, Concentration, and the Failure of Operation Rolling Thunder

40 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 Stephen W. Wilson

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 41 (Overleaf) A gaggle of ore than a century before American actually was. “The Vietnam disaster dimmed F–105s drop their bombs over North Vietnam. (All involvement in Vietnam, the Prussian those concepts,” wrote Stanley Karnow in the epi- photos courtesy of the M military theorist Karl von Clausewitz logue to Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War, Special Collections at the penned his famous axiom: “war is nothing but the “leaving Americans baffled and ambivalent about U.S. Air Force Academy ”1 ”4 Library.) continuation of policy with other means. Success their international role. Many have deliberated in war relies on the national leadership’s ability to over the “what ifs” of strict political restraints employ its military forces as a political instru- and their effect on Rolling Thunder. True under- ment, given the circumstances of the conflict at standing of the failure, however, comes from hand. In the years since the United States with- examining the gradual application of air power GRADUAL drew from Vietnam, historians and strategists and its inability to achieve political goals in a APPLICATION alike have attempted to gain some meaning from Clausewitzian framework. OF AIR the defeat. Operation Rolling Thunder—consid- When Rolling Thunder began in 1965, the U.S. ered by many to be the greatest failed air cam- had been involved in Vietnam for over ten years. POWER IN paign in history—has received much of this atten- This involvement stretched from aiding the ROLLING tion for its gradual approach to air power. French in their effort to maintain Indochina as a THUNDER One of the most notable studies on this topic is colony, to military advisors, and Special Forces VIOLATED Mark Clodfelter’s The Limits of Air Power: The cadre sent to bolster the South Vietnamese. The MANY OF THE American Bombings of North Vietnam.2 This book conflict heated up when, in August 1964, North PRINCIPLES takes an in depth look at why America failed to use Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked a U.S. Navy air power successfully in Vietnam and concludes vessel in the Gulf of Tonkin.5 The Gulf of Tonkin OF AERIAL that it was not just political restraints or a military Incident gave President Lyndon Johnson the con- WARFARE that misapplied air power doctrine, but the limits of gressional support he needed to commit combat air power as a political instrument that cost the forces to Vietnam. The following winter, Viet Cong FAILURE IN U.S. the war. Insightful as it is, Clodfelter’s analysis attacks at Pleiku and Qui Nohn resulting in the THE SKIES must be expanded–there was another important deaths of a number of Americans led to retaliatory contributor to the failure. The existing military the- air strikes against the North. Those raids, dubbed OVER NORTH ory of gradualism, advanced by Gen. Maxwell Operation Flaming Dart, led to a sustained, strate- VIETNAM Taylor, USA, held that an enemy’s actions could be gic air campaign against North Vietnam. WAS A controlled by the gradual application of force. The President Johnson expected Rolling Thunder RESULT OF gradual application of air power in Rolling Thunder to “signal that the United States planned to hold THE violated many of the principles of aerial warfare the North Vietnamese responsible for Vietcong DECISIONS learned over time. Failure in the skies over North activities in South Vietnam.”6 He felt that, “doing Vietnam was a result of the decisions made by civil- nothing was more dangerous than doing some- MADE BY ian and military leaders, not the limits of air power. thing.”7 The Johnson Administration hoped that CIVILIAN AND From a Clausewitzian perspective, gradualism was showing Hanoi U.S. willingness to take the war to MILITARY unsuccessful because it denied air power its inher- the North, the Communists would hesitate before LEADERS, ent advantages of flexibility, surprise, and concen- giving further aid to the Viet Cong insurgency in NOT THE tration of forces across time. the South. The Johnson Administration also hoped The ghosts left over from the Vietnam War that the strikes would show the Saigon govern- LIMITS OF have haunted our military and shaped its educa- ment that the U.S. was committed to the defense of AIR POWER tional and training philosophies. A need within South Vietnam. In return, Saigon would overhaul the Air Force to vindicate itself engrossed leaders its corrupt government and commit itself to win- for twenty years until success in the 1991 Persian ning the war. Johnson later wrote, Gulf War seemingly, “kicked the Vietnam syn- THE GHOSTS drome” once and for all.3 Even the media and I saw our bombs as my political resources for nego- American society at large have developed an tiating a peace. On the one hand, our planes and LEFT OVER acute fear of getting involved in “another our bombs could be used as carrots for the South, FROM THE Vietnam.” The first military defeat suffered by strengthening the morale of the South Vietnamese VIETNAM the U.S. left Americans with a bruised national and pushing them to clean up their corrupt house WAR HAVE image and shook the idea that America could by demonstrating the depth of our commitment to HAUNTED exert its will in any corner of the globe. In the the war. On the other hand, our bombs could be middle of the “American Century,” Americans used as sticks against the North, pressuring North OUR 8 MILITARY were left wondering what their place in the world Vietnam to stop its aggression against the South. AND SHAPED ITS EDUCA- The author,Stephen W.Wilson, is a second lieutenant in the United States Air Force and recent grad- TIONAL AND uate of the U.S. Air Force Academy, where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree in history. He is currently assigned to the 34th Operations Group, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado and waiting to TRAINING begin Undergraduate Pilot Training in January 2002 at Columbus AFB, Mississippi. Lieutenant PHILOSO- Wilson is a native of Columbia, South Carolina. PHIES Dr. Mark Clodfelter read this paper and offered historical clarifications on several points. Col. Mark Wells counseled me on the content and organization of my paper, proofread it, and gave advice on how to make it more unique.

42 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 War, is essential. This landmark book is considered one of the preeminent Western works on military operations and strategy because it looks beyond the quantifiable aspects of war to focus on the art and individual genius of the endeavor. Clausewitz breaks down warfare to its most basic level, “a duel on a larger scale.”13 He claims that war is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”14 Clausewitz explains that the means to the end in war is combat, and the key to combat is strategy. On War outlines several principles that are essential to successful strategy. In The Limits of Air Power, Mark Clodfelter uses a Clausewitzian framework to assess the effectiveness of the air campaigns against North Vietnam. He writes:

In the final analysis the supreme test of bombing’s efficacy is its contribution to a nation’s war aims. Clausewitz’s definition of war...provides the only true measure for evaluating air power’s effectiveness. My goal is to provide such a Clausewitzian appraisal of the air war against North Vietnam.15

This goal is accomplished by identifying the political goals set forth by the civil and military leadership, and then evaluating how well the three air campaigns of the war—Rolling Thunder, Line- backer I, and Linebacker II—achieved their goals, given the restraints placed on them by the politi- cians, commanders, the environment, and the enemy. A full Clausewitzian appraisal of Rolling Thunder must be taken one step further by considering ideas that Clausewitz advances such as surprise, flexibility, and concentration of forces across time. President Johnson felt that He used this “carrot and stick” analogy as ratio- These ideas can be used to illustrate the bombing North Vietnam would be successful nale for expanding the war. defects of gradualism in warfare, especially when because it would encour- The President ordered the sustained bombing an air campaign is employed. The element of sur- age South Vietnam by of North Vietnam on February 13, 1965.9 Despite prise can be achieved easily by air forces because showing American commitment to their cause while dissention in both the State and Defense Depart- of their speed and range, as well as their flexibility at the same time pressur- ments, USAF and VNAF fighter-bombers flew the and versatility.16 Because of these characteristics, ing North Vietnam to cease their aggression against first Rolling Thunder air strikes on March 2. The air planners can dictate when and where an attack the South. American forces attacked an ammunition depot at will occur, giving the enemy minimal advance Xom Bay and the Vietnamese struck the Quang warning. Clausewitz considered surprise, “the Khe naval base.10 As presidential historian Doris means to gain superiority,” over the enemy.17 He APPRAISAL Kearns Goodwin explains, Johnson decided to be- also wrote that, “surprise lies at the root of all OF ROLLING gin bombing the North because he believed that he operations without exception.”18 These advantages THUNDER could not afford to lose the war and that Americans are largely nullified when the enemy knows in MUST BE could solve any problem. Additionally, Rolling advance when and where an attack is to take Thunder prevented him from being regarded as place. During Rolling Thunder the gradual ap- TAKEN ONE powerless. It promised to end the war and allow proach denied the element surprise by attacking STEP him to go on with his plans for the Great Society.11 targets in a progressive manner. The gradual FURTHER BY At first, the intention was that Rolling Thun- approach dictated that initial air strikes were lim- CONSIDER- der would last only a few months. The original plan ited to certain targets in certain areas. The target ING IDEAS submitted by the Air Force projected a twenty- list would expand if the North Vietnamese did not THAT eight-day campaign. Shortly thereafter, the Joint bend to the will of the U.S. It did not take long for Chiefs of Staff (JCS) extended the plan to three the North Vietnamese to realize this. Once they CLAUSEWITZ months.12 Although seen as weak by many generals did, they could concentrate their air defenses in ADVANCES and statesmen, no one could foresee that the North the areas they knew would be attacked, and use Vietnamese would withstand such an intense “off limits” areas as safe havens for military bombing campaign for over two-and-a-half years. forces.19 For an evaluation of the strategy behind Flexibility has long been defined as the key to Rolling Thunder, Clausewitz’s definitive work, On air power. Current Air Force doctrine defines it as

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 43 Tonkin. They were responsible for costal regions, Route Packages 2, 3, 4, and 6B.23 Route Packages 5 and 6A, in the northwestern area of North Vietnam, were given to Seventh Air Force Headquarters in Saigon that utilized aircraft based out of South Vietnam as well as Thailand. Finally, Route Package 1—located just north of the DMZ—was under Gen. William Westmoreland at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.24 A difficult objective coupled with the gradual approach led to a piecemeal pattern of air strikes that lacked any decisive effects on North Vietnam. According to Clausewitz, “the simultane- ous use of all means intended for a given action appears as an elementary law of war.”25 Ap- parently, this idea was lost on U.S. military leaders. While he did not consider this lower level of the air campaign strategy, Clodfelter’s explanation of the American failure to achieve national objectives through Rolling Thunder is fitting. In a Designed as a light fighter- bomber, the F-100 Super the ability to, “exploit mass and maneuver simul- review of The Limits of Air Power in the Army War Sabre was employed along taneously.”20 Flexibility aids greatly in bringing College publication, Parameters, Elliot Cohen with USN and VNAF aircraft the mass of forces against the enemy’s decisive praises Clodfelter for his, “courage to study the during the initial air strikes against the North, dubbed point. Gradualism in Rolling Thunder precluded war and reject, politely but firmly, the stab-in-the- Operation Flaming Dart. flexibility by implementing a regimented targeting back theory that one occasionally hears from even The Super Sabres attacked ”26 an ammunition depot at plan that allowed no room for alteration or impro- today from serving officers. In another review in Xom Bay, and would see visation. President Johnson and his civilian advi- the Journal of American History, Michael Sherry more action as Rolling sors tightly controlled the target selection process. of Northwestern University lauds “Clodfelter’s his- Thunder took shape. Decisions on what to bomb—and what not to torical interpretation and strategic advice are so bomb—were made at the infamous Tuesday carefully reasoned and dispassionately offered Morning Luncheons. President Johnson, Secretary that his book commands attention.”27 To under- of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of stand why Clodfelter is successful at applying GRADUALISM State Dean Rusk, National Security advisor Clausewitz to Rolling Thunder, it is important to IN ROLLING McGeorge Bundy, and Press Secretary Bill Moyers understand Rolling Thunder itself, why it was ini- THUNDER attended these exclusive meetings.21 Not until tiated, how it was executed, what its results were, October 1967 was a member of the military as well as Clausewitzian theory. PRECLUDED included in this process.22 Ironically, this lack of Both the Johnson administration and the JCS FLEXIBILITY flexibility did not pervade the Air Force. In were liable for having launched a campaign that BY IMPLE- response to Vietnam, the Air Force established was doomed from the start. Failing to keep in mind MENTING A new missions and modified old ones. Among these the lessons of the Korean War, they looked instead REGIMENTED were the Misty FACs and B–52s used to provide to the lessons of strategic bombardment from close air support for ground troops, as well as new World War II. The bombings of Germany and TARGETING combat search and rescue tactics involving heli- Japan became a template from which later air PLAN THAT borne pararescue forces supported by propeller- campaigns would be designed. Air campaign plan- ALLOWED NO driven A–1 “Sandys” and SARCAP forces. ners, using the industrial web theory from the ROOM FOR Unfortunately, this atmosphere of ingenuity was days of the Air Corps Tactical School, developed ALTERATION neither seen nor allowed in the bombing of the Rolling Thunder to target the “vital centers” of North. North Vietnam hoping that they could crush the Finally, Rolling Thunder was unable to con- enemy’s war making capacity and induce them to centrate forces across time. This failure resulted in abandon the Southern insurgency.28 PRESIDENT an inevitable violation of economy of force; frag- President Johnson hindered Rolling Thunder JOHNSON mented command and numerous bombing halts in a way unlike that of previous strategic air cam- HINDERED precluded efficient use of available assets. Forces paigns. Thus, the Johnson Administration estab- flying in Rolling Thunder missions were strung lished negative objectives to avoid escalating the ROLLING out temporally and geographically. North Vietnam conflict to a point where the Soviets or the Chinese THUNDER IN was divided in to six route packages for scheduling might intervene.29 Not only did this fear demon- A WAY air strikes. The route package system made con- strate the administration’s failure to understand UNLIKE THAT centration of the forces impossible by parceling the conflict in broader terms, but it was also these OF PREVIOUS them out to different commanders—not only in dif- negative objectives that frustrated the airmen who STRATEGIC ferent services but locations as well—who did not were flying into harm’s way. The negative objec- coordinate air strikes among themselves. Navy tives led to the restricted areas near the Chinese AIR CAM- and Marine missions fell under the command of border and around Hanoi and Haiphong, as well as PAIGNS the 7th Fleet at Yankee Station in the Gulf of rules of engagement that banned any attacks on

44 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 a tactical goal—interdiction. Rolling Thunder, with its restrictions and bombing halts served only to strengthen the North’s will to defeat the U.S.33 Hanoi was not suing for peace, as both military and civilian planners had expected. Only a month into the Rolling Thunder campaign, doubts began to surface among the President’s civilian advisors. An air campaign alone could not achieve the stated national objective set forth by NSAM 288, of “a stable and independent noncommunist government,”34 in South Vietnam. During the years of Rolling Thunder, from 1965 to 1968, the Vietnam War leaned more toward an insurgency, and less toward a conventional conflict for which the U.S. had prepared. Destroying the industrial base of a preindustrial nation would have done little to stop the Southern insurgency. The industrial base was not a center of gravity in the Clausewitzian sense, as U.S. leaders believed. The true North Viet- namese center of gravity—its allies, the Soviet

(Above) McDonnell Doug- las F-4 Phantoms had the dual responsibility of escorting strike packages as well as bombing targets in the North themselves, and were used extensively by the Air Force, Navy, and Marines. (Right) Although conceived to carry tactical nuclear weapons on super- sonic strikes against Soviet targets, the F–105 Thunderchief became the workhorse of Rolling Thunder. Its unglamorous appearance did not prevent the venerable "Thud" from hauling the bulk of the bombs dropped on North Vietnam.

bridges on the Chinese border, ships entering or Union and Communist China—was not considered leaving Haiphong Harbor, aircraft on the ground, until President Richard Nixon’s trip to China and IN and idle air defense sites.30 the beginning of détente with the Soviets. In hindsight, it is hardly surprising that the HINDSIGHT, Additionally, the Southern insurgency did not North could and, indeed would, endure a bombing IT IS HARDLY require many outside supplies, much less an campaign that lasted for almost four years. The SURPRISING industrial base to sustain Viet Cong operations. To U.S. strategic goal to persuade Hanoi to bend to its their credit, the American civilian leadership real- THAT THE will, by making the war too costly to them, proved ized and attempted to redirect Rolling Thunder. NORTH fruitless, despite (or perhaps because of) bombing National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy con- COULD… halts and negotiations. Clausewitz addresses this vinced President Johnson to sign NSAM 328 on strategy as an alternative to directly attacking an ENDURE A April 6, 1965.35 enemy’s forces or territory. Clausewitz states that, BOMBING This directive altered the objective of Rolling “making the war more costly to [the enemy],” is Thunder into an interdiction campaign aimed pri- CAMPAIGN achieved by forcing him to waste forces in combat marily at North Vietnamese lines of communica- THAT or by occupying his territory.31 Rolling Thunder did tion.36 Instead of singularly winning the war by LASTED FOR not seek to occupy territory and it did not force breaking the North’s will to fight, Rolling Thunder Hanoi to waste its forces. In fact, the Politburo was ALMOST would now hinder Hanoi’s ability to aid the insur- able to use the American bombings as justification FOUR YEARS gency in the South. Rolling Thunder missions to ask for more support from the Soviets and the increasingly targeted truck convoys, rolling stock, Chinese.32 The original goal of forcing Hanoi to the roads, rail, bridges, marshalling yards, supply negotiating table using an air campaign of gradual depots, and POL reserves to curb the North’s abil- response was quickly perceived as unachievable ity to export war-making materials to the South. and it soon became apparent that the U.S. pursued

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 45 Later during the Rolling Thunder Campaign, interdiction overtook strate- gicpersuasion as the primary U.S. goal. Targets increasingly became LOCs and soft targets such as rolling stock, truck convoys, and POL reserves which did not necessarily require heavy bombardment.

THE AIR FORCE SIMPLY COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY INTERDICT NORTH This action showed the civilian and military lead- Despite frequently stating that the Communist VIETNAM’S ership’s belief that coercion of the Politburo in were conducting guerrilla warfare, [civil and mili- SUPPLY Hanoi through gradualism would not work, and tary leaders] assumed that destruction of resources ROUTES TO that North Vietnam’s center of gravity was not its necessary for conventional conflict would weaken industrial base, but rather its physical link to the enemy’s capability and will to fight unconven- THE SOUTH South. tionally.... The absence of limited war experience in These attempts would prove to be as fruitless an unconventional environment, combined with as those that preceded them. In a RAND study smug self-assurance, led to a misplaced faith in evaluating the economic and political effectiveness Rolling Thunder. Instead of facilitating victory, the of the first year and a half of Rolling Thunder, Oleg air power convictions of civilian and military chiefs Hoeffding concluded: served as blinders obscuring the true image of the Vietnam War.38 It is our impression that so long as the present con- straints on objectives and operations remain as It is important when pointing out the failures AMERICAN strong as recent Administration statements indi- of U.S. leadership–which were many–during the cate, it becomes increasingly doubtful that the Vietnam War, that one does not use the failures to LEADERS advantages of continuation or intensification of the wholly question the validity of air power. As proven INCOR- attacks outweigh the potential net gains from, or at by the Combined Bomber Offensive in Europe dur- RECTLY least, drastic and demonstrative de-escalation.37 ing World War II, the Linebacker Campaigns later ASSUMED during the Vietnam War, and Operation Instant THAT AN The Air Force simply could not effectively interdict Thunder during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, air North Vietnam’s supply routes to the South. power can be an effective tool in achieving political ENEMY In Clausewitzian terms, Rolling Thunder objectives with military forces. FIGHTING BY failed because it was not an effective political On War outlines several aspects of strategy UNCONVEN- instrument—it did not achieve its stated goal of that are crucial to victory. The failed American TIONAL compelling the North Vietnamese to do our will. A attempt to use air power against North Vietnam MEANS strategic air campaign that targeted North Viet- can be linked to three of these. Surprise was com- COULD BE nam’s industrial base, such as it was, could not promised after aircraft repeatedly stuck the same sway their determination to fight, nor could it targets in the same areas, allowing the Commu- DEFEATED interdict supply lines designed to support an in- nists to concentrate air defenses and protect WITH A CON- surgency.These targets were not centers of gravity important assets. Flexibility was neglected due to VENTIONAL for North Vietnam, and thus their destruction strict target plans that allowed no altercations. MILITARY could not break the enemy. Furthermore, the con- Concentration of forces across time was lost to the RESPONSE duct of Rolling Thunder aided the failure with its fractured nature of the organization of forces. All of lack of massive application of force, surprise to the these characteristics are vital to strategy, and enemy, and concentration of forces. especially to air power because of its unique char- American leaders incorrectly assumed that an acteristics of speed and range. enemy fighting by unconventional means could be There is more to the failure of Rolling Thunder defeated with a conventional military response. By than just hard-to-obtain or negative objectives. A placing negative objectives alongside unattainable closer look at Clausewitz exposes the importance positive ones, President Johnson worsened the sit- of strategy to military victory. Before using the air uation. Mark Clodfelter explains: war against North Vietnam as a case to discredit air power or political interference in warfare, it is

46 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 Key civil and military architects of the Rolling Thunder campaign— Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (left), General Maxwell D. Taylor (second from left), and American Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge(second from right)—believed that North Vietnam could not withstand modern strategic bombing, a force that helped defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan 20 years earlier.

ROLLING THUNDER VIOLATED ALMOST ALL PRINCIPLES ASSOCIATED WITH AERIAL OPERATIONS THAT THE AIR FORCE HAD LEARNED important to note that Rolling Thunder violated bombing in achieving political objectives–fail to THROUGH- almost all principles associated with aerial opera- make the distinction between the actual applica- OUT THE tions that the Air Force had learned throughout tion of air power and its potential, given that it is TWENTIETH the twentieth century. Those who criticize air used in a manner that is consistent with the CENTURY power–specifically the usefulness of strategic lessons learned over time. ■

NOTES

1. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. 17. Clausewitz, On War, p. 198. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: 18. Ibid. Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 69. 19. Clodfelter, Limits, pp. 119 and 131. 2. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The 20. Air Force Basic Doctrine,p.23. American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: The 21. Clodfelter, Limits,p.85. Free Press, 1989). 22. Ibid. 3. George Bush, quoted in Stanley Karnow’s Epilogue 23. Ibid, p. 129. to Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War, by Harry G. Sum- 24. Ibid. mers (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1995), p. 210. 25. Clausewitz, On War, p. 205. 4. Stanley Karnow, Epilogue to Historical Atlas of the 26. Elliot A. Cohen, review of The Limits of Air Power: Vietnam War, p. 210. The American Bombing of North Vietnam, by Mark 5. Summers, Atlas,p.94. Clodfelter, Parameters (Jun. 1990): 114. 6. Quoted in Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Setup: What the Air 27. Michael S. Sherry, review of The Limits of Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam,by University Press, 1991), p. 103. Mark Clodfelter, The Journal of American History (Sep. 7. Quoted in Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the 1990): 739. American Dream (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 28. Clodfelter, Limits,p.73. 1976), p. 263. 29. Ibid, pp. 141-42. 8. Quoted in Kearns, Johnson, p. 264. 30. Ibid, p. 142. 9. Clodfelter, Limits,p.59. 31. Clausewitz, On War,p.93. 10. Ibid., p. 63. 32. Clodfelter, Limits, p. 135. 11. Kearns, Johnson, p. 263. 33. Tilford, Crosswinds,p.76. 12. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Crosswinds: The Air Force’s 34. Quoted in Clodfelter, Limits, p. 74. Setup in Vietnam (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M 35. Clodfelter, Limits,p.66. University Press, 1993), p. 69. 36. Ibid. 13. Clausewitz, On War,p.75. 37. Oleg Hoeffding, Bombing North Vietnam: An 14. Ibid. Appraisal of Economic and Political Effects, RAND 15. Mark Clodfelter, Limits,p.xi. Memorandum 5213-1-ISA (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND 16. Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Corporation, 1966), p. 32. Doctrine, Sep. 1997, p. 20. 38. Clodfelter, Limits, p. 118.

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 47 ROYAL AIR U.S. ARMY AIR FORCES FORCE TERM EQUIVALENT/ DEFINITION Slanguage SCHRÄGE MUSIK A JAZZ MUSIC CODENAME FOR UPWARD-FIRING CANNON ON GERMAN LUFTWAFFE FIGHTER Brian S. Gunderson INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT SCOFF EAT QUICKLY

Part V: Letters S-Z SCRAMBLE A FAST FORMATION TAKEOFF BY FIGHTER ROYAL AIR U.S. ARMY AIR FORCES AIRCRAFT FORCE TERM EQUIVALENT/ DEFINITION SCRAPER RUN OFF, RUN AWAY, LEAVE FORMATION SALLY A MEMBER OF THE SAL- VATION ARMY SCRAPER THE THIN RING IN AN RAF’S SQUADRON SALOON CAR A DELUXE SEDAN LEADER’S (MAJOR’S) AUTOMOBILE RANK BRAID BETWEEN TWO WIDER BANDS SAND BOYS RAF AIRMEN WHO SERVED IN UNITS IN SCRATCH CREW AN AIRCREW MADE UP NORTH AFRICAN DESERT OF PERSONNEL FROM SEVERAL CREWS AND/OR SANDRA A BRITISH SYSTEM SPARES USING SEARCHLIGHTS TO GUIDE DISABLED RAF SCREAMED EXECUTED A POWER AND USAAF AIRCRAFT DOWNHILL DIVE IN AN AIRCRAFT TO HOME AIRFIELD OR TO AN EMERGENCY SCREECHERS A PERSON WHO IS VERY AIRFIELD DRUNK

SATURATED WITHOUT PERSONALITY SCREW A PROPELLER ON AN AIRCRAFT ENGINE SCARECROW AN EXPLOSIVE CANISTER FILLED WITH SCRIMSHANK A PERSON WHO SHIRKS GUNK FIRED BY ASSIGNED DUTIES GERMANS INTO ROYAL AIR FORCE BOMBER SCRUB CANCEL A PLANNED COMMAND FORMATION MISSION DURING NIGHTTIME TO CREATE ILLUSION THAT SCUPPERED CANCELLED BOMBER AIRCRAFT HAD COLLIDED OR SECOND DICKIE A CO-PILOT OF AN EXPLODED, THEREBY AIRCREW SPOOKING NEW, INEXPERIENCED CREWS SECTOR CALLING GROUND CONTROL AND CAUSE THEM TO CALLING FIGHTERS DEVIATE FROM THEIR WITH INFORMATION- COURSE TO TARGET OR E.G. “SCRATCH CALLING ABORT THE MISSION MATCHSTICK (CODENAME FOR SCARECROW PATROLS BY ROYAL AIR SQUADRON) THERE IS PATROLS FORCE PILOTS IN DE TRADE (ENEMY HAVILAND (DH-82) AIRCRAFT) AT ANGELS UNARMED TIGER MOTH 15(15,000 FT ALTITUDE).” AIRCRAFT OVER WATER TO FRIGHTEN ANY SHAKEN FRIGID ASTONISHED, SCARED GERMAN SUBMARINES FLABBERGASTED ON THE SURFACE OF THE SEA/OCEAN SHAKEY DO A ROUGH, RISKY,SCARY CHARGING THEIR MISSION BATTERIES, THEREBY CAUSING THEM TO DIVE SHOT DOWN LOST AN ARGUMENT, UNDER THE SURFACE IN FLAMES REPRIMANDED PREMATURELY

48 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 ROYAL AIR U.S. ARMY AIR FORCES ROYAL AIR U.S. ARMY AIR FORCES FORCE TERM EQUIVALENT/ FORCE TERM EQUIVALENT/ DEFINITION DEFINITION

SIGNALS RADIO MESSAGE SOWING CUCUMBERS DROPPING AERIAL TRAFFIC MINES FROM RAF AIRCRAFT INTO SILENCER ON A CAR A MUFFLER GERMAN-OCCUPIED HARBORS SISTER A MILITARY NURSE/ USUALLY THE SENIOR SPAM MEDAL A SERVICE/CAMPAIGN NURSE ON A WARD MEDAL/RIBBON

SKEW-ELL AN RAF SQUADRON SPAM MISSION AN AERIAL-DELIVERED LEADER (EQUIVALENT FOOD DROP TO ALLIES TO A MAJOR) (E.G. FRENCH UNDERGROUND) SKIPPER AN AIRCRAFT COMMANDER, SENIOR SPANNER A WRENCH PILOT ON AN AIRCREW SPARKS A WIRELESS/RADIO SKY PILOT A MILITARY CHAPLAIN AIRCREW MEMBER OR GROUNDCREW SMACKER ONE POUND STERLING TECHNICIAN

SMALLS LADIES LINGERIE SPARROW START STARTED VERY EARLY

SMARMY FLATTERING SPAWNY LUCKY

SMASHING MARVELOUS, SUPER, SPIFFY SMART-LOOKING, WONDERFUL, WELL-DRESSED

SNAKE ABOUT PERFORM OPERATIONAL SPINNER AN AIRCRAFT AEROBATICS PROPELLER-BOSS

SNAPPERS AN ENEMY FIGHTER SPIT(S) WWII RAF SUPERMARINE AIRCRAFT SPITFIRE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT SNOGGING SLEEPING SPOOF FLARES FLARES DROPPED ON AN SNOWDROP A TERM USED TO ENEMY CITY NEAR DESCRIBE AN RAF PRIMARY TARGET POLICEMAN-REFERS TO DESIGNED TO DRAW WHITE COVER ON AWAY ENEMY FIGHTER THEIR PEAKED HATS AIRCRAFT FROM MAIN BOMBING STREAM SNUGGERY WIRELESS/RADIO OPERATORS POSITION SPOT, A HAVE A DRINK ABOARD THE AVRO LANCASTER BOMBER SPOT OF BOTHER A RISKY, DIFFICULT AIRCRAFT—CONSID- SITUATION ERED TO BE THE WARMEST POSITION SPOT ON RIGHT ON TARGET OR ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT TOTALLY CORRECT

SOAKING GLASS A GLASS OF GIN AND SPOTTED DICK AN ENGLISH DESSERT— OF WET TONIC PLAIN PLUM PUDDING WITH RAISINS OR SOD OFF GO AWAY, BEAT IT CURRANTS

SODDING TEMPER A BAD TEMPER SPROG CREWS INEXPERIENCED CREWS

SOGGY MUSHY, SLOW TO REACT, SPUD BASHING PEELING POTATOES AS AS WITH AIRCRAFT IN KITCHEN POLICE (KP) CONTROLS SPY WAS SPOT ON INTELLIGENCE OFFICE SOLID LUMP A LARGE FORMATION OF CORRECTLY PREDICTED OF BLITZ ENEMY AIRCRAFT WHERE ENEMY FLAK AND FIGHTERS WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED DURING THE MISSION

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 49 ROYAL AIR U.S. ARMY AIR FORCES ROYAL AIR U.S. ARMY AIR FORCES FORCE TERM EQUIVALENT/ FORCE TERM EQUIVALENT/ DEFINITION DEFINITION

SQUADDIE A BASIC RECRUIT, SWEENY A HAIRCUT TO MILITARY A PRIVATE STANDARDS (REFERS TO THE MUSICAL “SWEENY SQUARE BASHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE OR TODD”-THE DEMON TRAINING OFFICER OR BARBER). AN N.C.O. RECORD KEEPER SWEEP A GROUP OF RAF FIGHTERS ATTACKING SQUIRT A SHORT BURST OF ENEMY GROUND GUNFIRE FROM AN TARGETS AIRCRAFT SWINGING THE LEAD MALINGERING, BEING STALLS ORCHESTRA SEATS IN A LAZY THEATER OR MUSIC HALL SWIPES WEAK BEER

STANDING AN AIRCRAFT PARKING SWOT TO WORK HARD, TO HARDSTAND STUDY

STARBOARD RIGHT SIDE TAIL-END CHARLIE LAST IN LINE, LAST AIR- CRAFT IN A FORMATION STATION AN RAF AIRFIELD OR AIRBASE TAKE A FLIP TAKE A RIDE IN AN AIRCRAFT STATION MASTER A COMMANDING OFFICER OF AN RAF AIR TAKE A WACK AT MAKE AN ATTEMPT, TRY STATION TAKEOFF FULL TAKEOFF A BOMBER AIR- STEEPLE/STEEPLING THE EFFECT CAUSED WACK CRAFT FULLY LOADED WHEN SEVERAL ENEMY WITH BOMBS, AMMUNI- SEARCHLIGHTS LOCK- TION AND GASOLINE ON TO AN INCOMING BOMBER; CONING TALL BOY 12,000 POUND BOMB USED BY SPECIALLY STIFFENER A BORE CONFIGURED RAF AVRO LANCASTER BOMBERS STONE USED IN MEASURING AN INDIVIDUAL’S WEIGHT IN TALLY HO PILOT RADIO TRANSMIS- GREAT BRITAIN (ONE SION INDICATING THAT STONE EQUALS 14 ENEMY AIRCRAFT HAVE POUNDS) BEEN SIGHTED—-PRE- PARE TO ENGAGE/ STOOGING AROUND FLYING AIMLESSLY ATTACK AROUND, CIRCLING, WAITING TO LAND AN TANNER A BRITISH SILVER COIN AIRCRAFT (A SIXPENCE 12 1/2 CENTS) STOPPERS THE BRAKES TANNOY RAF AIRFIELD PUBLIC STRIPPING BEING DISCIPLINED, COMMUNICATIONS SYS- CHEWED OUT TEM LOUDSPEAKER SYS- TEM STUFFED CLOUD A CLOUD COVERING A HILL OR A MOUNTAIN TAPES NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER STRIPES/ SUSS TO RECONNOITER, TO CHEVRONS ON A UNI- CHECK OUT FORM

SWALLOW NICKNAME GIVEN TO TAPS AIRCRAFT CONTROLS GERMAN MESSER- SCHMITT JET FIGHTER TARMAC THE FLIGHT LINE, ME- 262 RUNWAYS ON AN RAF AIRFIELD SWATS UP STUDIES HARD PREPAR- ING FOR A TEST/EXAM

50 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 ROYAL AIR U.S. ARMY AIR FORCES ROYAL AIR U.S. ARMY AIR FORCES FORCE TERM EQUIVALENT/ FORCE TERM EQUIVALENT/ DEFINITION DEFINITION

TATE AND LYLE WARRANT OFFICER’S THRUPPENY/ A VERY SMALL BRITISH BADGE OF RANK THAT THREE PENNY BIT SILVER COIN (3 PENCE= RESEMBLES TRADE- 6 CENTS) MARK OF BRITISH COM- PANY’S FAMOUS GOLDEN TICK OFF A MILD DISCIPLINARY SYRUP ACTION, A CHEWING OUT TATTY UNTIDY, CHEAP, RAGGED TICKING OVER AN AIRCRAFT ENGINE TEAR OFF A STRIP SEVERELY REPRIMAND THAT IS IDLING OR DRESS-DOWN A SUB- ORDINATE TIDDLY INTOXICATED

THRASH A BEER PARTY TIDDY OGGY, A CORNISH PASTY TIDDIE OGGLE (BACON,ONIONS AND THROWS IN AN ENEMY FIGHTER POTATOES IN A PASTRY) THE TOWEL BEING SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKED BY AN RAF TIFFIN AFTERNOON TEA FIGHTER INDICATES DEFEAT BY INVERTING TIGGY WWII RAF DE HAVIL- HIS AIRCRAFT AND LAND TIGER MOTH A contemporary photo of BAILING OUT TRAINER AIRCRAFT the author, Brig. Gen. Brian S. Gunderson. TILL A CASH REGISTER

TIP AND RUN RAID A RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT

TIPPING TERM USED TO DESCRIBE AIRCRAFT SORTIES WHEREBY RAF FIGHTERS WOULD FLY ALONG SIDE GERMAN V-1 FLYING BOMBS, PLACE A WING TIP UNDER THE WING TIP OF THE V-1 AND FLIP IT OVER SO THAT IT WOULD CRASH HARMLESSLY IN AN OPEN AREA

TOAD-IN-THE-HOLE A LARGE YORKSHIRE PUDDING STUFFED WITH BANGERS (SAUSAGES) AND SERVED WITH ROASTED POTATOES

TOFF A DISTINGUISHED PERSON, UPPER CLASS PEOPLE

TOFFEE NOSE A SNOB

TONNE A METRIC TON OF 1000 KILOS

TORBEAU WWII RAF TORPEDO- CARRYING BRISTOL BEAUFIGHTER AIRCRAFT

TORCH A FLASHLIGHT

TOUCH BOTTOM CRASH

TRAPPER A FLIGHT EXAMINER, A FLYING INSTRUCTOR

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 51 TRADES ENLISTED PERSONNEL VIC A V-SHAPED FORMATION SPECIALTY CLASSIFICA- OF AIRCRAFT TIONS (E.G. MECHANIC, ELECTRICIAN, ETC.) WAAF A MEMBER OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE’S WOMENS TREACLE SYRUP, MOLASSES AUXILIARY AIR FORCE

TROLLEY- A HAND-PULLED WACK ATTEMPT, TRY ACCUMULATOR STARTER BATTERY FOR STARTING AIRCRAFT WACKED OUT TIRED OUT

TRUMPETER A BUGLER WACKING OVERDRAWN AT THE OVERDRAFTS BANK TRUNK CALL A LONG DISTANCE OR TOLL TELEPHONE CALL WAD A BUN, A PIECE OF CAKE OR A SANDWICH TRUNK ROAD A MAIN ROAD, A HIGHWAY WAFFLED AN AIRCRAFT ZIGZAG- GING IN FLIGHT TSE TSE’S NICKNAME FOR GROUND CREW PERSONNEL WHO WAG A WIRELESS/RADIO MAINTAINED RAF DE OPERATOR GUNNER HAVILLAND MOSQUITO ABOARD AN RAF AIRCRAFT BOMBER AIRCRAFT

T-TROLLEY AN AIRCRAFT TOW-BAR WALLAH A PERSON ON TWO SMALL WHEELS WALLOP A BEER, AN ALE OR TUBE LONDON’S UNDER- OTHER LIQUOR DRINK GROUND RAILWAY SYSTEM WASTAGE POOL A PERSON IN TRANSIT, AWAITING TWIGGED THE PUT EVERYTHING POSTING/ASSIGNMENT WHOLE THING TOGETHER WATCH TOWER/ AN AIRFIELD CONTROL TYRO A NEW, INEXPERIENCED OFFICE TOWER AIRMAN IN A UNIT WATER CLOSET A TOILET/A LAVATORY UMBRELLA MAN AN AIRCREW MEMBER WHO HAD BAILED OUT WEB FOOT A BRITISH FLEET AIR ARM AIRCREW MEMBER UNDERCART AN AIRCRAFT’S UNDER- CARRIAGE, MAIN LAND- WELLINGTONS, RUBBER BOOTS ING GEAR WELLIES

UPKEEP “BOUNCING BOMB” WHIFF BREATHE OXYGEN DESIGNED BY SCIENTIST-BOFFIN DR WHITE KNUCKLE IN A TIGHT OR TOUGH BARNES WALLIS TO BE STUFF SITUATION USED BY ROYAL AIR FORCE BOMBERS TO WICK, ON ONE’S GET ON SOMEONE’S BREACH THE MOHNE, NERVES/BACK/OR CASE EDER AND OTHER DAMS IN GERMANY WICKET, ON A STICKY IN A MESS

UXB AN UNEXPLODED BOMB WIGGING REPRIMANDING

VAPOUR TRAILS CONDENSATION TRAILS WILDE SAU CODE NAME FOR LUFT- (WILD BOAR) WAFFE TACTIC OF FREE- LANCE (ROAMING) BY VECTOR 90 INSTRUCTIONS FROM FIGHTERS, INFILTRAT- GROUND CONTROL TO ING A BOMBER STREAM AIRCRAFT TO STEER DUE EAST-O90 DEGREES WIMPY WWII RAF VICKERS WELLINGTON TWIN- VEGETABLES AERIAL MINES DROPPED ENGINED BOMBER NICK- FROM RAF AIRCRAFT NAMED AFTER POPEYE’S OVERWEIGHT FRIEND J. VERGE, SWERVED ON TO THE WELLINGTON WIMPY SWERVED ON TO SHOULDER OF A ROAD

52 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 WIND SCREEN A COCKPIT WINDSHIELD WONDERS AND AIR MINISTRY WORK’S BLUNDERS DIRECTORATE RESPON- WINDOW RADIO;/RADAR COUN- SIBLE FOR THE CON- TERMEASURES CHAFF STRUCTION OF RAF AIR- MADE OF METALLIC FIELDS STRIPS OF VARIOUS LENGTHS TO COVER DIF- WONKY ON THE BLINK, FERENT FREQUENCIES INOPERATIVE (E.G. COM- PASS, GEE, RADIO, WINDY APPREHENSIVE, SCARED; RADAR) ALSO MEANS TO TALK A LOT OF HOT AIR WOODEN WONDER WWII RAF DE HAVIL- LAND MOSQUITO WINGCO, WINCO AN RAF WING COMMAN- FIGHTER/BOMBER AIR- DER (EQUIVALENT TO A CRAFT LT. COLONEL) WOP A WIRELESS OPERATOR WING TIP TO DESCRIPTION OF LARGE ABOARD AN AIRCRAFT WING TIP MUSTACHES WORN BY MANY RAF FIGHTER WREN, WRNS A MEMBER OF THE PILOTS WOMEN’S ROYAL NAVAL SERVICE WIRELESS RADIO WRITE OFF AIRCRAFT DAMAGED WIZARD/WIZZARD/ EXCELLENT, WELL- BEYOND REPAIR WIZZO DONE, THE BEST, FIRST CLASS Y-RUN A CROSS-COUNTRY AIR TRAINING FLIGHT USING WOG/WOGETTE WIRELESS OPERATOR H2S RADAR ON GROUND RECEIVING RADIO MESSAGE TRAF- FIC FROM AIRCRAFT

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AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 53 Book Reviews

A Dying Breed: The True Story of a But as with any family’s scrapbook, the have analyzed what motivated the res- World War II Air Combat Crew’s Cou- story that this one tells is one-sided. cuers she so admires to behave differently rage, Camaraderie, Faith, and Spirit. People do not compile scrapbooks to from the mass of their countrymen, but By Neil B. Dillon. Grant’s Pass, Oregon: remember the bad times, but to preserve this would have required focusing on Hellgate Press, 2000. Pp. xi, 330. $15.95 the high points of their lives. In looking shades of gray that she apparently does ISBN: 1-55571-529-8. back at the records we keep of our own not see. Silent Heroes: Downed Airmen and lives, we do not find photos of shouting Instead, she gets caught up in her zeal the French Underground. By Sherri matches or tearful encounters—that is not to tell what she seems to think is an Greene Ottis. Lexington: The University what we wish to remember; and those untold—or at least, out-of-print—story, Press of Kentucky, 2001. Pp. 235. $24.00 shades of gray will not be found in this maintaining that “few competitive works ISBN: 0-8131-2186-8. book, either. For Dillon, there was no gray. are available to compete with this study Refuge from the Reich: American Air- These men wore the white hats in a battle [sic].” In her bibliography, she is quick to men and Switzerland During World between good and evil; that is how he sees criticize other books and to praise her own War II. By Stephen Tanner. Rockville Cen- them and how he unabashedly portrays (“the research done for this book is of much tre, N.Y.: Sarpedon, 2000. Pp. x, 262. $25.00 them. And of course, in the overall scope of wider scope”). This is at the least irritating ISBN: 1-885119-70-4. the war against Nazi Germany, he is right. and unbecoming—especially from an au- But he would have done these men a ser- thor who does not have the French lan- I would like to like these books more vice by portraying their flaws, fears, and guage skills to do her own primary than I do, especially the two that are clear- failures. As history, that would have been a research. ly a labor of love. Unfortunately, it is pre- better and more interesting book. Despite the book’s shortcomings, its cisely their partisanship that makes all of But the comment is idle. Dillon was individual stories deserve to be told. them less useful than they might be as neither willing nor able to write such a Although one might wish for a more skill- contributions to the history of World War book. That is not what he set out to do. ful and less self-absorbed author (an over- II. Dillon, Ottis, and Tanner all deal with These men have been his heroes since as a ly long epilogue focuses more on Ottis than the stories of American (and in Ottis’s case, very young boy he watched them go off to on her subjects), the book will still reward British) airmen shot down over continental war. He fulfilled his promise to T/Sgt. those interested in the experiences of aver- Europe, but the heroes of their books are Honeycutt by paying tribute to them with age men and women on the front lines of different. In Dillon’s case, the heroes are a scrapbook recording the great adventure World War II. the ten crew members of a B–17 Flying that ten young men shared together—as While Dillon and Ottis are perfectly Fortress; in Ottis’s, the men and women of they and he wish to remember it. frank about their personal affection for the French and Belgian underground who As history, Sherri Greene Ottis’s book and commitment to the subjects of their organized escape routes out of Nazi-occu- suffers from much the same problem. books, the motives behind Stephen Tan- pied Europe for downed Allied airmen; and Although of a much younger generation ner’s ode to Switzerland are far less clear. in Tanner’s case, the Swiss government. than Dillon, she, too, has found her heroes He has written a very curious book, a story The most honest of the three authors in the men (and, in her case, women) who he describes as “a fascinating panorama of is Dillon, who makes no secret of the fact fought in World War II on the Allied side. heroism from the personal to the national that his book is an homage to his late Her admiration for the personal courage of level,” in which “a small democracy was brother-in-law, TSgt. Sam Honeycutt, and members of the Belgian and French under- able to offer safety to individual fighting his nine fellow B–17 crewmen. Dillon’s ground is not misplaced, but it has led her, men of a larger one.” Well, yes; sort of. publisher, unfortunately, was less honest in like Dillon, to write an homage to people to For American air crews, internment in subtitling the book on its cover, “The whom she feels a strong personal connec- Switzerland was clearly preferable to Courage of the Mighty Eighth Air Force”; tion, rather than a history. Indeed, al- becoming a POW in Germany.The tortuous the book is not a history of the Eighth Air though she is less up front than Dillon ambiguity of Swiss neutrality did not con- Force, but the story of one B–17 crew, as about her relationship to these people, she cern them, but it should concern Tanner. the author’s subtitle makes clear. thanks her mother, Claudette, for her help He has a greater responsibility than Dillon This is not a critical discussion of air with hours of French translation, and it and Ottis, who are trying to convey their power in World War II. In some respects, it may be that Ottis, too, is telling a family sense of admiration for ordinary people. is a scrapbook. Dillon made a promise to his story. Tanner puts his hyperbole in the service of brother-in-law, who battled Parkinson’s dis- Ottis has compiled the personal sto- a nation with a wartime record that is far ease and died in 1992, to tell the story of his ries of numerous airmen and their res- more checkered than he is prepared to crew’s wartime experience. They trained cuers, and she recounts them fully, includ- admit. He persists in referring to the together, fought together, and were POWs ing “where are they now.” But her admira- United States and Switzerland as “sister together in Germany for the last year of the tion for these individuals gets in the way republics,” admiring the “courage [that] war. From the personal recollections of sur- and leads to sweeping generalizations. She was displayed by an entire nation...alone viving crew members, relatives of those has less than a nuanced view of the con- in the very center of the continent, who have died, and their published and un- flicting pressures on those living under unbowed and defiant.” Claiming that neu- published letters and reminiscences, Dillon German occupation, writing, for example, tral Switzerland was “a unique case in has compiled a record of their training, that “the feeling of compassion that arises Nazi-held Europe” (Sweden? Portugal? combat, and captivity. in most people confronted by someone lost Spain?), he also waxes lyrical on the con- Dillon recounts their experiences as a and alone, wounded, or frightened com- temporary Swiss: “handsome but not home scrapbook would record it, and as a pelled the people of France to help air- ostentatious in clothing or behavior; scrapbook, there is a good deal that is right men.” Both parts of this statement are scrupulously honest but always exacting in with this book. It contains many pho- open to question. Do “most people” feel transactions; hardworking but unaggres- tographs of the interior of a Flying compassion for total strangers? Those who sive.” What bill of goods is being sold here? Fortress, pictures of life at an air base in carried out Nazi occupation policies clearly This book is unpalatable in many Britain, excerpts from letters home and did not. And “the people of France” did not respects. Here is Tanner on Britain’s from official telegrams, and abundant help airmen. Some individuals helped; “finest hour”: “In retrospect, the Battle of quotes from crew members describing some looked away; some helped the Britain can be viewed not as a life-and- their experiences in the air and as POWs. German occupiers. Ottis could usefully death struggle for national survival, but as

54 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 simply the most visually spectacular of an emphasis is, rather, on the trials conducted trial court? In his outstanding analysis of historic string of colorful battles between by the IMTFE and the most important mil- the work of the International Military European states in which both sides were itary courts. (p. xii) Because he focuses Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, Bradley F. evenly matched.” Too bad that Tanner was almost exclusively on American military Smith wrote, “To assess the judgment in a not there to tell the young RAF pilots fly- courts and the U.S. trial program, he virtu- trial, we must first know who is doing the ing without rest for weeks on end that they ally ignores the efforts of other nations to judging, who is being judged, and what are were merely engaged in a visual spectacle. bring Japanese war criminals to justice. the charges and the system of law in use.” Not that they would have believed him. Unfortunately, Maga has neglected to [Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Unfortunately, today’s younger readers place his story in clear historical context. Nuremberg (New York: Basic Books, Inc., with little previous exposure to the history Beginning as early as 1941, the Allied pow- 1977), p. 3.] of World War II might. ers began to develop policies to hold Regrettably, Maga does not discuss Imbedded in Tanner’s political agen- accountable two types of Axis war crimi- any of these basic—but essential—ele- da, which is apparently the rehabilitation nals—the “major” offenders and the ments in a systematic or complete way. of the American image of Switzerland after “minor” offenders. The major offenders Who were the judges who sat on the what he euphemistically calls “the ‘gold’ were high-level civilian and military lead- IMTFE? Maga waits until page 43 to controversy of the late 1990s” are stories of ers, policymakers whose crimes had no reveal that eleven men sat on the court, individual air crews and their experience particular geographical location; the minor including presiding judge Sir William of Swiss internment. Like the personal sto- offenders were those, often lower-level, Webb of Australia. The reader must wait ries recounted by Dillon and Ottis, they civilian and military personnel who com- until page 60 to learn the names and deserve to be told. Had Tanner stayed fo- mitted crimes in a particular location, for nationalities of three of the other judges; cused on those tales of individual courage, example, in a prisoner of war or concentra- the final seven are not mentioned. Here, as he might have fallen victim to the hero tion camp. Eventually, both major and elsewhere, an appendix would have been worship that colors Dillon’s and Ottis’s minor Axis war criminals were tried. The helpful. writings, but it would have been a more minor trials constituted the vast majority Who were the defendants who faced noble flaw than the one to which he suc- of postwar proceedings and were conduct- the IMTFE? Twenty-eight “Class A” defen- cumbed. ed in a great number of locales, by a large dants were originally indicted; three of number of nations, in a variety of tri- these escaped judgment through death or From 1995-2001, Edwina Campbell was a bunals, national and international, mili- mental collapse. The remaining twenty- professor of grand strategy at the tary and civilian. Maga’s story belongs in five Class A defendants, sitting together in Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the wider context of the history of post- one dock—as Goring, et al., did at the IMT National Defense University. World War II war crimes trials. Nuremberg proceedings—received judg- Maga’s presentation of these trials, ment by the IMTFE tribunal. The IMTFE their controversies, and their legacies is proceedings constituted one trial—as did more impressionistic than systematic, and the IMT Nuremberg proceedings—in spite ◆◆◆◆◆◆ his book is at times marred by question- of Maga’s persistent use of the word “tri- able organization and footnoting, disrupt- als” to describe the work of the Tokyo ed lines of argument, awkward writing, court. Class A Japanese war criminals Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War and even factual errors. were the equivalent of “major” German Crimes Trials. By Tim Maga. Lexington: Examples of some of these problems war criminals and faced similar charges; The University Press of Kentucky, 2001. can be found in the author’s discussion of Class B and Class C Japanese war crimi- Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. the IMTFE case against former minister of nals were the equivalent of “minor” Ger- Pp. xiv, 181. $25.00 ISBN: 0-8131-2177-9. war and premier Gen. Hideki Tojo. Maga man war criminals and faced similar char- coherently and without interruption pre- ges, though there were slight differences Bradley University history professor sents the arguments of the defense (pp. 45- between the two classes. Maga mentions Tim Maga has chosen as his subject a 50, 51). But he then divides the arguments none of this, nor does he give a full defini- rather neglected aspect of the history of of the prosecution, thereby diluting them. tion even of Class A criminals or the post-World War II prosecutions of Axis war Maga begins with a seven-line paragraph charges that they faced in court. He does criminals. All of these war crimes trials are on prosecution arguments on the aggres- not mention the Class B or C criminal cat- of interest to specialists in and general sive war charge and atrocity allegations egories until page 128, and he does not readers of military and legal history. And against Tojo (p. 51). The seven paragraphs describe the types of individuals who fell because many of these trials involved that follow provide a rambling discourse on into those categories or the types of crimes against Allied airmen, they are of Tojo’s relationship with his eldest daugh- charges that they faced. particular interest to aviation history ter and concerns for his family, his respect Maga does reveal that the IMTFE scholars and enthusiasts. for Hirohito, his views on gardening and on found all twenty-five defendants guilty Dr. Maga’s too-short book offers small, the success of the new Japanese yen, his and sentenced Tojo to death (p. 53) and six- often fragmented snapshots of a large, statement of sympathy to the family of teen others to life imprisonment (p. 60). complex picture, and his study is both Hermann Goring, his criticisms of the But we must wait until pages 134-35 to broader and less exhaustive than its title aggressive war charge, and the Japanese learn about the specifics of some of the sen- would suggest. His focus is diffuse, and his atomic bomb project. Buried at the end of tences the IMTFE passed. An appendix chapters offer general discussions of a few the seventh paragraph are two sentences listing this information in a complete form of the early U.S. Army trials; the Inter- in which Maga finally returns to the pros- would have been helpful and might also national Military Tribunal for the Far East ecution argument that linked Tojo to “spe- have corrected the multiple errors that the (IMTFE) trial; some of the U.S. Navy trials; cific battlefield atrocity accounts...actions reader will encounter on those pages. the influence of the trials on postwar rela- so ghastly that the tribunal was physically Maga believes that the postwar prose- tions between Japan and the United disturbed by them.” (p. 52) cution of Japanese war criminals should be States; and recent efforts to establish an Maga’s “general thesis” is that there investigated as a topic sui generis, inde- international permanent war crimes court. were “good intentions behind the Tokyo tri- pendent of the trials of German war crimi- Maga aims not at providing “an ency- als” and that the trials did “good work”. (p. nals “in Nuremberg.” (p. x) Here, Maga clopedic account” of all of the trials; his ix) But how is one to judge the work of any presumably means the IMT trial at

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 55 Nuremberg, though he does not say so. researched and easily read overview of four Fortunately, given all of these issues, Maga maintains that his book is about “the major Allied weapons of World War II—the the authors do provide a very readable and Tokyo trials”, and he makes note of British Submarine Spitfire and the Ame- informative account of the four “decisive” “Nuremberg...when it makes sense to do rican DC—3 (C—47 Dakota), Sherman weapons that they chose, that helped turn so.” (p. x) His point is well taken, but it is tank and the amphibious truck, DUKW, defeat to victory for the Allies during World precisely on the question of basic defini- known as the “Duck”. Given the book’s title, War II. All of these weapons were the prod- tions, jurisdictional parameters, types of a reader might expect to find a comprehen- uct of Allied technology, production, and defendants, rules of evidence, trial proce- sive review of most of the “decisive” ingenuity and, in their own way, greatly dure, and sentence review that a Nurem- weapons of the greatest and most cata- contributed to the ultimate Allied victory berg-Tokyo compare-contrast model might strophic conflict in human history, a con- over Nazi Germany. Although less numer- have been most helpful. Such an approach flict that saw the introduction of many new ous than the Hawker Hurricanes during would have been particularly effective in weapons. At the very least, it could have the Battle of Britain, the Submarine Spit- refuting the critics who believe that the tri- had a number of representative “decisive” fire came to exemplify the bravery of “those als of Japanese war criminals were racial- weapons from both Allied and Axis coun- few who gave so much for so many” during ly motivated. tries. Some readers might believe any book Britain’s “finest hour” against the German about “decisive weapons” would be, at Luftwaffe in the summer of 1940. The pre- Dr. Priscilla D. Jones, Air Force History worst, presumptive and, at the very least, war commercial Douglas DC—3 became Support Office selective—why were these four weapons the military C—47 that saw service in selected over “obvious” others. Additionally, every theater of operations and dropped ◆◆◆◆◆◆ the book does not look at any enemy thousands of paratroopers over occupied weapons, such as the German 88mm anti- France in the early morning hours of June aircraft artillery that also served as a very 6, 1944, paving the way for the greatest Battle Stations: Decisive Weapons of effective antitank weapon or the Japanese invasion force in history. The Sherman the Second World War. By Taylor Dow- “Zero” that dominated Far East skies dur- tank, although inferior in gun caliber and ning and Andrew Johnston. Barnsley, UK: ing the opening years of the war in that armor to its German counterparts, made Pen & Sword Limited, 2000. Photographs. theater. Finally, the book does not review up in numbers what it lacked in quality to Index. Pp. 223. £19.95. ISBN 0-85052-749- any weapons of the Soviet Union—for spearhead the Allied breakout from the X example, the Soviet T-47 tank, touted as Normandy beaches. Finally, the funny lit- the best all-around tank of the Second tle amphibious truck, known as the “Duck,” The authors of this book provide a well World War. well demonstrated its ability to deliver

56 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 supplies from offshore ships to inland In addition to the regular commentary Maps. Tables. Photographs. Notes. Glos- areas, a capability that the U.S. Army did about each weapon system, the book also sary. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiii, 416. not initially want. has other virtues. For example, the authors The authors cover each weapon in a provide additional highlights in side sto- Wayne Thompson is currently Chief of lengthy chapter that takes the reader from ries about various personalities and other Analysis at the Air Force History Support the weapon’s genesis to its employment in contemporary weapons without distracting Office. He served as an Army draftee dur- combat. For each weapon the authors start the reader from the main story. For exam- ing the War in Southeast Asia, and subse- with an in-depth background on the gene- ple, the reader gets a look at Air Marshal quent to earning his doctorate in history, sis of the weapon as an idea, continue Dowding and his German counterpart, Air joined the CHECKMATE staff on the Air through the weapon’s design and produc- Marshal Goering. In the chapter on the Staff in August 90. He also served as the tion phases, and then end with the use of Sherman tank, the authors give a “short” senior historical advisor on the Gulf War the weapon in a major campaign of World on the Detroit Arsenal. Also, the book is Airpower Survey. More recently, he has War II. A good portion of each chapter cen- filled with numerous photographs that studied air operations in the Balkans. ters around the battle or operation in illustrate the stories about each of the As implied in the title, this book deals which the weapon particularly made itself weapons. Overall, Battle Stations is a well with the use of air power against North known. For example, the center of the story written, easily read, and profusely illus- Vietnam. Little attention is paid to the sev- about the Submarine Spitfire is the Battle trated book whose only vice, at least to the eral other air wars being flown in South of Britain, and, for the C—47, it is the scholar, is the lack of documentation. Vietnam and Laos. It concentrates on the transport of the Allied paratroopers over Rolling Thunder, Linebacker, and Line- Normandy just after midnight June 6, Lt. Col. Robert B. Kane, USAF, Air War backer II operations. 1944. For the Sherman tank, the central College. The author skillfully develops the air battle was the Allied breakout from war over the north chronologically, while Normandy where the Sherman’s speed and simultaneously mixing in the develop- sheer numbers made it a significant oppo- ◆◆◆◆◆◆ ments on the home front. Not only are the nent to the better gunned and armored political aspects of the planning and deci- German panzers. Finally, the Duck proved sion making discussed, but also the devel- itself at Anzio and other beachheads when To Hanoi and Back: the USAF and opment of the antiwar movement and how supplies and equipment had to be moved North Vietnam, 1966-1973. By Wayne that affected the decisions made. quickly from offshore ships to men ashore Thompson. Washington, D.C.: Air Force Thompson also devotes quite a bit of and in the heat of battle. History and Museums Program, 2001. time describing the technical aspects of the

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 57 air war: ECM pods, the Wild Weasel mis- reporting to cover up unauthorized protec- tions than the “rah-rah” boosterism of sion, Operation Bolo, the attacks against tive reaction strikes into North Vietnam. Walter Boyne. the Thai Nguyen Iron Works, attacks The air war between Rolling Thunder and To Hanoi and Back has an extensive against the Dourmer Bridge and, finally, Linebacker was characterized by these bibliography, covering an impressive list of against the Phuc Yen MiG base. He dis- protective reaction strikes, under very sources of information on the subject. cusses Combat Skyspot and Site 85, restrictive rules of engagement. The con- However, I thought the number of maps EC–121 operations, and during Line- troversy centered on how to interpret those and photos was skimpy. Only three maps backer, Teaball. rules of engagement. Lavelle claimed that were provided, although the detailed one of He also develops topics that are not he had been encouraged by his bosses to the Hanoi area was not one that I had seen well covered in other sources, for example, conduct raids outside the rules of engage- before and I thought was quite useful. the June 2 incident where a flight of ment, and that the false reporting was a There were forty-eight photos in the two F–105s strafed the Soviet ship Turkestan;a result of misunderstanding and overzeal- photo sections. For a war so widely open to situation that was later compounded when ousness on the part of subordinates. the media, I think more photos could have Wing Commander Col. Jaskal Broughton Thompson provides a balanced been provided. I also found the index a bit destroyed gun camera film of the incident. account of the events portrayed in the hard to use. Thompson also fleshes out the book by book. For example, he discusses both sides These last points are minor criticisms. providing brief biographical information of the argument for how successful The book was well written, and provided a about the main figures involved, political Linebacker I was as an interdiction cam- very complete account of the air war and military, on both sides. For example, he paign. He also deals with such sensitive against North Vietnam in a single volume, provides details on the careers of political Air Force topics as training, tactics, per- covering the controversial topic from the advisor Walt Rostrow, Seventh Air Force sonnel assignment and rotation policies, military, technical, human, and political commander Gen. William Momyer, and and comparing Air Force versus Navy per- aspects. I recommend it to readers who North Vietnam’s Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap and formance. He also discusses the organiza- seek a deeper understanding of the events political leader Ho Chi Minh. tional morass that hampered efficient of the era. He also devotes an entire chapter to application of air power during the war. the Gen. John D. Lavelle incident. When While Thompson does not go as far in crit- commander of the Seventh Air Force early icizing Air Force operations as did Mark Colonel Stetson Siler, Director of Test in 1972, General Lavelle was relieved of Clodfelter, Marshall Michel, or Earl Til- Support, AFOTEC, Kirtland AFB, NM command by Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. ford, he goes much further in discussing John Ryan for employing a system of false the good and the bad of Air Force opera- ◆◆◆◆◆◆

58 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 Winter Journey through The Ninth: ments, the recce pilots had begun function- effectiveness during interviews at the 5th The Story of Tactical Air Power as ing as airborne controllers for close sup- and 90th Infantry Divisions, where he Illustrated by the Exploits of the port missions. observed air-ground operations with air Ninth Air Force in Europe. By Harry A. The highlight of Winter Journey is and ground liaison officers. Although Franck, with Charles O. Porter. Tucson, fighter-bomber operations, the Ninth’s cen- acclaim for the air-ground relationship was Ariz.: Prince of the Road Press, 2001. tral mission. Each Allied army in the order of the day, no one avoided dis- Tables. Diagrams. Illustrations. Photo- Northwest Europe was assigned its own cussing two of the most controversial graphs. Appendices. Glossary. Index. Pp. tactical air force. “Pete” Quesada’s IX issues in the campaign— friendly fire inci- xii, 304. $21.95 Paperback ISBN: 0- Tactical Air Force, for example, supported dents and bombing accuracy and assess- 9705948-0-1 [www.harryfranck.com] Hodge’s First Army, while “Opie” Weyland’s ment. Frank’s coverage of these sensitive, XIX Tactical Air Force spearheaded complex subjects is superb and correctly Winter Journey Through the Ninth is a Patton’s Third. Quesada was the innovator, dispels conventional wisdom that friendly long overdue addition to our record of the who first convinced General Bradley to fire casualties and pilot reporting accuracy U.S. Ninth Tactical Air Force in the Second place Army Air Forces radios in tanks so elicited little concern or attention from air World War. It finds its niche between offi- that supporting pilots and controllers in and ground officers. cial histories, like Condensed Analysis of the tanks could communicate and make Winter Journey notes the overall the Ninth Air Force in the European possible the celebrated armored column strong cooperative relationship between Theater of Operations, and accounts by cover tactic of the Normandy breakout and air and ground personnel, the importance individual participants, such as Bill dash across France. Franck’s interview of of centralized control of air resources by an Cogan’s World War II Fighter Bomber Quesada captures the air commander’s air commander, and the effectiveness of Pilot. A veteran of the Great War and charisma, outspokenness, and focus on tactical air power on ground operations. author of numerous travel books, Harry maintaining control of his air assets. These lessons often seemed forgotten in Franck was commissioned a 62-year old Weyland, who arrived in-theater after the acrimonious atmosphere of the post- major and charged, “to write for the man in Quesada, benefitted from established pro- war years, which witnessed the creation of the street the story of tactical air power as cedures, yet proved a resourceful air com- the independent Air Force and controver- illustrated by the exploits of the Ninth AF.” mander in his own right whose partner- sies over roles and missions. They had to He brought to his assignment the experi- ship with Patton set the standard for air- be relearned in the Korean conflict, where ence of a seasoned traveler and keen ground pairings and cooperation. Tactical Weyland, the Far Eastern Air Forces com- observer, as well as the storyteller’s art. air doctrine called for centralized air con- mander, faced enormous problems in coor- Franck’s comprehensive treatment of fly- trol, the concentrated use of air power, and dinating air-ground operations and cen- ing and living conditions, and his coverage tactical missions flown in the prescribed tralizing control of Air Force, Naval, and of both successes and “snafus” make this a order of air superiority, interdiction, and marine air. The Second World War’s central useful book for specialist and non-special- close air support. Both airmen demonstrat- lesson for tactical air power is that air ist alike. Along the way the reader is treat- ed the flexibility of tactical air power and superiority, sufficient resources, and cor- ed to a colorful travelogue of northwest showed that doctrine must serve only as rect doctrine will not produce a successful Europe and the author’s opinions on every- guide, not rigid formula. air-ground program without the coopera- thing from the weather to concentration Harry Franck directly confronted the tion and good will of air and ground com- camps and the plight of displaced persons. issue of doctrine and air-ground relation- manders and their staffs. Winter Journey Appointed the semi-official chronicler ships by raising the “seduction” charge, also affirms this basic requirement. of the Ninth, Major Franck had unlimited whereby a news reporter had accused the Had Franck’s manuscript been pub- access and he made a point of visiting every air arm of violating doctrine by acceding to lished shortly after the war, as originally type of Ninth unit, often twice, once in the army requests for close air support in lieu intended, it might have charted new winter of 1944-1945, then later that spring. of interdiction requirements. Weyland’s ground. But General Vandenberg and War He began his journey on the eve of the response was characteristic: “I run my out- Department censors had reservations, Battle of the Bulge with the first of six fit—he [Patton] runs his.” Patton became a which likely reflected concerns about the medium bomber groups. Here he estab- champion of air-ground cooperation and author’s strong criticism of American lished his practice of interviewing a wide could not compliment his air commander behavior in defeated Germany, rather than range of participants, from the top brass enough. “We get along famously, don’t we, revelations about tactical air power proce- and aircrews to the enlisted men who sup- Weyland?” And they did. Weyland made dures and problems. When the government ported the operations. Using lengthy quotes, every effort to fulfill Third Army requests, cleared the manuscript in March 1946, it he allows the men to speak for themselves but stood his ground and refused to attack refused to publish it, and Franck could not on the intricacies of box formation tactics, targets he considered unsuitable for fight- find an interested commercial publisher. Pathfinder operations, the unromantic life er-bombers or compromise his control of The manuscript gathered dust until of the bombardier, and the curse of “gross his air elements. On the other hand, the recently, when family members succeeded errors,” among other subjects, before achievement of air superiority made it pos- in publishing it without revision. Despite adding his own insightful comments sible for Weyland to focus more of his air the passage of time, Winter Journey Through framed by personal vignettes. power on close air support needs. Despite the Ninth retains its sense of immediacy. It Harry and his small team also visited Patton’s strong personality, the Third is an accurate, vivid tale of tactical air the engineers who built the Ninth’s Army commander never violated the pre- power in Northwest Europe. This is a story airstrips, the service teams who supplied rogatives of his air commander or the worth retelling, and one told by a superb them, and the air defense antiaircraft bat- mutual trust they had established early in storyteller. teries that defended them. He correctly the campaign. emphasized their vital supporting role that After interviewing the commanders, Dr. David Spires, Colorado Springs, ensured the Ninth’s vaunted mobility. He Franck continued his odyssey with visits to Colorado also spent time with two often overlooked two of the elite XIX TAC fighter bomber flying units, the P–61 “Black Widow” night groups, the 354th “Pioneers” and 362d ◆◆◆◆◆◆ fighter squadron and the 10th Reconnais- “Maulers.” There he received a primer on sance Group. While the intrepid Black interdiction and close air support flying Widows had too few aircraft to seriously and praise for the air-ground relationship. The Infinite Journey: Eyewitness forestall nighttime German supply move- Franck followed up his theme of air power Accounts of NASA and the Age of

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 59 Space. By William E. Burrows. New York: Astronautical Society’s prestigious Emme liberty, equality, and fraternitywere not Discovery Books, 2000. Photographs. Prize and was a finalist for the Pulitzer extended to the Vietnamese, who were, at Index. Pp. 240. $40.00 ISBN: 1-56331-924- Prize. His introduction to The Infinite best, second-class citizens in their own 1 Journey escorts the reader through the country. roots of space flight and establishment of In discussing the assassination of At first glance, one might categorize NASA. His narrative, at the beginning of Diem in 1963, Joes, assesses the leader’s The Infinite Journey by William Burrows each of the book’s ten sections, provides weakness and strengths. The author notes as simply another colorful, coffee table sufficient context for readers to under- that despite his faults, Diem came from an book. Prepared in collaboration with the stand and appreciate the significance of old, distinguished family and certainly pos- National Aeronautics and Space Admini- both the accompanying photographs and sessed an impressive resume as an ardent stration, this large-format volume contains first-hand recollections. The epilogue, a col- nationalist. Joes argues that those who approximately 200 eye-catching pho- laborative effort that includes remarks by succeeded Diem could not match his politi- tographs. The spectacular images invite Ray Bradbury,Arthur Clarke, the late Carl cal credentials nor his national and inter- casual observers to flip through the pages Sagan, Homer Hickam, and Daniel Goldin, national prestige. Acknowledging that without paying serious attention to adja- frames the past as prologue to America’s Vietnam needed military leadership fol- cent text. Viewing the product at this level, civil space activities in the 21st century. lowing Diem’s demise, the author argues one might dismiss it as intellectually shal- If anything is required to generate sup- that the talents of his eventual successor, low and, therefore, of little scholarly worth. port for new space adventures through Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, lay not in the lat- This would be a mistake. reflection on past achievements, this vol- ter’s skill on the battlefield, but rather as a The author, with editor Mary Kala- ume answers the call. It is a wonderful ret- skillful politician in an army uniform. maras’ assistance, has crafted a truly infor- rospective on what we have accomplished Another poignant issue for Joes was mative history that combines introductory during the past half-century and an inspi- that members of the highly educated text, first-hand recollections of various par- rational treatise on why we should do even ARVN (Army of the Republic Vietnam) offi- ticipants, and images to explain the signifi- more in the decades to come. cer corps, mostly from the middle class, cance of thirty human and robotic NASA were out of touch with and unsympathetic missions. Flight controllers, physicians, Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant, Deputy Director of to the country’s peasant majority, “among administrators, engineers, secretaries, and History, HQ Air Force Space Command whom and over whom the war was being public affairs officers, as well as the astro- fought.” The author addresses the results nauts themselves, supply thought-provok- of the 1968 Tet Offensive for both sides and ing, insightful reflections on key Mercury, ◆◆◆◆◆◆ he concluded that it was a victory for the Gemini, and Apollo flights. Others share United States and its allies. The memories of Skylab and the Apollo-Soyuz Communists’ anticipation that Tet would Test Project of the early 1970s. Of course, result in a massive popular uprising to the shuttle Columbia’s inaugural flight in The War for South Vietnam, 1954-1975. overthrow the puppet regime utterly 1981, the Challenger disaster of 1986, and By Anthony James Joes. Westport, Ct: failed, and the death of so many Viet Cong the shuttle program’s revitalization with Praeger, (revised edition), 2001. Notes. ultimately delivered much of the country- Discovery’s return to space in 1988 receive Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiv, 199. $18.95. side into the hands of the Saigon govern- due attention. Coverage of human space ISBN: 0-275-96806-5. ment. Some Viet Cong even charged that flight concludes with establishment of per- the Tet Offensive was a plot by Hanoi not manent outposts—shuttle missions to the Joes, a professor of political science only to destabilize and discredit the ARVN, Russian space station Mir, the prelude to and director of the international relations but also to engineer a massacre of the Viet construction of the International Space program at Saint Joseph’s University in Cong, “Killing two birds with one stone,” Station. Philadelphia, has written a useful over- thereby removing all obstacles to Hanoi’s Fully half of The Infinite Journey view of the war in Vietnam, from 1954- eventual takeover of the South. But it was deals with robotic space missions—some 1975. As with most overviews, it should not U.S. public opinion following Tet that even- looking outward, others earthward. These be considered the final word on any topic tually handed victory to the soundly highlight the exploration of Mars from the dealing with that war. While avoiding the defeated Communists. The U.S. public saw Mariner and Viking flights of the 1960s details and intricacies of battle planning that the promised end of the war was and 1970s to the spectacular Pathfinder and implementation, the author has pro- nowhere in sight and thus turned against and Global Surveyor adventures of the vided a highly readable survey of the polit- the conflict. This caused President Lyndon 1990s. Other selections include Pioneers ical events of the period. His work would Johnson’s decision not to seek reelection. 10 and 11, Voyager’s grand tour of the make an excellent college survey textbook The Democrats would subsequently lose outer solar system, the Hubble Space for a course on the history of the Vietnam the 1968 election to Richard Nixon, who Telescope’s and Cosmic Background War. promised to end U.S. participation in and Explorer’s study of the farthest reaches of Arranged chronologically, the text responsibility for the war through Viet- the universe, Magellan’s examination of begins with a discussion of French colonial namization. Venus, and Galileo’s exposure of Jupiter involvement in Indochina. The author Nixon’s pledge to Vietnamize the war and its moons. The remaining section notes that the root cause of the revolution came to fruition during the Easter Offen- focuses on how NASA’s development of against the French lay with disgruntled sive in 1972, when the North Vietnamese earth-orbiting satellites, especially for Vietnamese intellectuals who were thwart- army suffered some 100,000 casualties and communication and multi-spectral imag- ed in their efforts to achieve equal status smashed their conviction that the majority ing, have directly benefited humans. within the civil bureaucracy run by French of South Vietnamese wanted the North to Burrows brought a wealth of experi- officials. When Vietnamese did find work win. The ARVN had developed into a ence to the crafting of this piece. He previ- in the civil service or in private enterprise, proven fighting force that with U.S. ously authored several volumes on space they were often subordinates of less well replacement supplies and air support, history, from Deep Black: Space Espionage educated French citizens, and they especially B–52s, could indefinitely defend and National Security (1987) to This New received one-half to one-fifth of the salary the independence of the South. Ocean: A History of the First Space Age paid to Frenchmen in similar positions. But Nixon twisted Thieu’s arm to (1998), which won the American The principles of the French Revolution accept an unfair peace, pledging that the

60 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 United States would intervene with its expect, is mixed. David Horner, historian of not just our glorious operational history, mighty air force if the North openly violat- Australia’s role in World War II, paints but the less celebrated areas of logistics, ed the inequitable accords, and U.S. partic- MacArthur as “a brilliant political gener- technology, doctrine, and people. The con- ipation in the actual fighting came to an al,” whose influence on the political-mili- ference begins with the roundtable. end. However, with Watergate and Nixon’s tary sphere in Australia was enormous. Individual presentations then fall into six resignation, the promise of air interven- Stanley L. Falk, a noted historian of major categories: the road to indepen- tion, along with a continued pipeline of the war in the Pacific, and a former chief dence, roles and missions, combat support, supplies to the Thieu government, evapo- historian of the U.S. Air Force, argues that doctrine for strategic air attack, the Air rated. After a Northern attack into the cen- after 1943, when Japanese forces had been Force at war, and advances in technology. tral highlands at Ban Me Thuot in 1975, stopped in the Southwest Pacific theater, Interspersed are the four addresses. the South panicked, and its once re- the American commitment to this area At some symposia, attendees hear a few spectable Army uncontrollably dispersed should have been ended. After this point, papers that are real standouts—interest- among the retreating body of hysterical “the continued Southwest Pacific commit- ing, thought provoking, and dynamic— civilians—splintered, and disintegrated. ment was an unnecessary and profligate while others are fillers. There was not one So, the real defeat of the South lay in waste of resources, involving the needless dud among the papers here. The eighteen the departure of U.S. troops and supplies loss of thousands of lives, and in no signif- distinguished historians kept their topics and an invasion by the North’s convention- icant way affecting the outcome of the tight and to the point and had little over- al armies. The author notes that the ques- war.” He concludes, however, that interser- lap with other presentations. While it is tion of who was at fault for the defeat of vice rivalries and General MacArthur’s difficult to select favorites from superbly the South will be debated for generations influence and reputation “made inevitable” written, top-notch papers on fascinating to come. His book will provide an excellent continued military operations against the topics, my personal interest leads me to the basis to start any such future discussion. Japanese in the Southwest Pacific. four dealing with the road to an indepen- Other outstanding contributors are dent USAF. Flying in the face of Air Force Dr. George M. Watson, Jr.,Air Force History John Killigrew [“The Army and the Bonus lore, the reader will find little here on Billy Support Office, Bolling AFB, Washington, Incident”]; Ikuhiko Hata [“The Occupation Mitchell. While certainly the loudest and D.C. of Japan, 1945-1952”]; D. Clayton James most flamboyant of the early advocates of [“Command Crisis: MacArthur and the Ko- air power, Mitchell may have done as much ◆◆◆◆◆◆ rean War”]; and Russell Weigley [“Military harm as good. These papers clearly show Biography Without Military History”]. that Mason Patrick, Hap Arnold, Dwight Leary even includes an essay on “gender Eisenhower, Lauris Norstad, and George analysis,” by Laura Belmonte, that Marshall were the real architects of today’s MacArthur and the American Cen- attempts to probe MacArthur’s masculini- Air Force, often operating quietly—but tury: A Reader. By William M. Leary, Ed. ty. effectively—in the Washington bureaucra- Lincoln and London: University of Nebra- Overall, this volume succeeds as an cy. ska Press, 2001. Illustrations. Maps. Chro- introduction to MacArthur and the unend- Also found in the papers are concise nology. Bibliography. Pp. 522. $40.00. ing controversies surrounding his career. It histories of Air Force logistics, airlift, ISBN:0-803-22930-5 should stimulate interest and research by reconnaissance, and space operations, as a new generation of historians. As Leary well as new looks at World War II’s General Douglas MacArthur will emphasizes, although “MacArthur can be Combined Bomber Offensive, command never fade away. Commemorations of World criticized, he cannot be ignored.” and control, and the changes in the USAF War II and the Korean War have spurred a over the past several decades. Again, every new wave of interest in MacArthur’s career Herman S. Wolk, Air Force History Support paper is first-rate and well worth reading. and its controversial aspects. This “reader,” Office, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C. Eight distinguished former USAF leaders edited by Prof. William M. Leary, a histori- participated: Gen. Bryce Poe II (Air Force an of America’s military experience in Asia Logistics Command) moderated the round- and the Pacific, is intended as an introduc- table with Gen. Bernard Schriever (Air tion to MacArthur’s impact on the ◆◆◆◆◆◆ Force Systems Command), General Jacob “American Century.” Smart (EUCOM Deputy Commander), Lt. The volume easily falls into five parts: Gen. Devol Brett (Commander, Allied Air Growth to Maturity, World War II, Japan, Golden Legacy, Boundless Future: Forces Southern Europe), and Lt. Gen. Korea, and Assessments. Within each of Essays on the United States Air Force Thomas McInerney (Assistant Vice Chief these sections, Leary has selected a piece and the Rise of Aerospace Power By of Staff). Discussing the topic of “turning by MacArthur himself, along with views of Rebecca H. Cameron and Barbara Wittig, points,” their views were varied and per- scholars, some critical of MacArthur, oth- eds. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History haps surprising, but all were fascinating. ers favorable to the general, and still oth- and Museums Program, 2000. Notes. Former Secretary of the Air Force Eugene ers providing a more balanced perspective. Glossary. Index. Pp. 358. Zuckert, Gen. John Chain (Strategic Air Also included are insightful essays by offi- Command), Gen. Ronald Fogleman (Chief cials who served with MacArthur during This is the proceedings from a sympo- of Staff), and General Poe addressed sever- various points in his career. The strength sium, held in May 1997, that marked the al historical perspectives as well as the of this approach resides in the breadth of fiftieth anniversary of the United States future of aerospace power. viewpoint, the weakness in the inherent Air Force. If I could have only one book in Whether enlisted, officer, or civilian; uneven quality and style of the contribu- my library on who we in the Air Force are active duty, Air National Guard, or Air tions. and how we got here, Golden Legacy, Force Reserve; active or retired; this is a The World War II section is one of the Boundless Future would have to be it. book that is a must read for every member strongest, featuring Duncan Anderson, The symposium’s eighteen papers, of the USAF’s Total Force. David Horner, Stanley L. Falk, Stephen four speeches, and roundtable discussion Taaffe, D. Clayton James, Edward Drea, lay out a superb history of the USAF from Clark Reynolds, and Gerald Wheeler. The its earliest days in the U.S. Army Signal Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret), Docent, picture that emerges here, as one might Corps through modern times. They cover NASM’s Garber Facility

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 61 Books Received

Armstrong, R. E. and Terry P. Rizzuti. Vete- Gorn, Michael H. Expanding the Envelope: rans’ Benefits: A Guide to State Programs. Flight Research at NACA and NASA. Westport, Ct. and London: Greenwood Lexington: The University Press of Kentu- Press, 2001. Appendix. Index. Pp. xii, 329. cky, 2001. Photographs. Notes. Appendices. $59.95 ISBN: 0-313-31905-7 Glossary. Index. Pp. xii, 472. $35.00 ISBN: 0- 8131-2205-8 Bednarek, Janet R. Daly. America's Air- ports: Airfield Development, 1918–1947. Hammond, Grant T. The Mind of War: John College Station: Texas A&M University Boyd and American Security. Washington, press, 2001. Photographs. Notes. Bibliogra- D.C. and London: Smithsonian Institution phy. Index. Pp. viii, $39.95 ISBN: 1-58544- Press, 2001. Photographs. Notes. Index. Pp. 130-9 xiii, 234. $29.95 ISBN: 1-56098-941-6

Deaver, Michael V. Disarming Iraq: Johnson, Herbert A. Wingless Eagle: U.S. Monitoring Power and Resistance. Westport, Army Aviation through World War I. Chapel Ct. and London: Praeger, 2001. Tables. Hill and London: The University of North Illustrations. Notes. Glossary. Bibliography. Carolina Press, 2001. Maps. Tables. Photo- Index. Pp. viii, 151. $62.00 ISBN: 0-275- graphs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi, 97261-5 298. $34.95 ISBN: 0-8078-2687-8

Eisendrath, Craig, Melvin A. Goodman and Logsdon, John M., ed., Exploring the Gerald E. Marsh. The Phantom Defense: Unknown: Selected Documents in the America’s Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion. History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Westport, Ct. and London: Praeger, 2001. [Vol. V: Exploring the Cosmos]. Washington, Photographs. Notes. Appendices. Index. Pp. D.C.: NASA History Office, 2001. Notes. xix, 190. $24.95 ISBN: 0-275-97183-X Glossary. Index. Pp. xxviii, 792.

Furze, Anthony. Wilfrid Freeman: The Martel, William C., ed. The Technological Genius behind Allied Survival and Air Arsenal: Emerging Defense Capabilities. Supremacy, 1939 to 1945. Staplehurst, UK: Washington, D.C. and London: Smithsonian Spellmount, 2000. Maps. Photographs. Institution Press, 2001. Photographs. Notes. Notes. Appendices. Glossary. Bibliography. Glossary. Index. Pp. xix, 284. $29.95 ISBN: Index. Pp. 384. £25.00 ISBN: 0-9536969-4-4 1-56098-961-0

PROSPECTIVE REVIEWERS

Anyone who believes he or she is qualified to substantively assess one of the new books listed above is invited to apply for a gratis copy of the book. The prospective reviewer should contact:

Dr. Michael L. Grumelli ACSC/DES 225 Chennault Circle Maxwell AFB, AL 36112 Tel. (334) 953-3060 e-mail: [email protected]

62 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 SPECIAL OFFER: AMERICAN ASTRONAUTICAL SOCIETY (AAS) BOOKS ON THE HISTORY OF ROCKETRY AND ASTRONAUTICS AAS History Series (Write for a complete catalog): Volume 1, Two Hundred Years of Flight in America: A Bicentennial Survey, E.M. Emme, ed., 326p., 3rd printing, hard cover $25 $17.50; soft Morrison, Wilbur H. Birds from Hell: cover $25 $12.50. History of the B–29. Central Point, Ore.: Volume 2, Twenty-Five Years of the American Astronautical Society: Historical Reflections and Projections, 1954-1979, E.M. Emme, ed., Hellgate Press, 2001. Photographs. Biblio- 248p., hard cover $25 $12.50; soft cover $15 $7.50. graphy. Pp. x, 274. $34.95 ISBN: 1-55571- Volume 3, Between Sputnik and the Shuttle: New Perspectives on American Astronautics, 1957-1980, F.C. Durant III, ed., 350p., hard cover 550-8 $40 $20.00; soft cover $30 $15.00. Volume 4, The Endless Space Frontier: A History of the House Committee on Science & Astronautics, 1959-1978, by K. Hechler, Pelletière, Stephen. Iraq and the Inter- abridged and ed. by A.E. Eastman, 460p., hard cover $45 $22.50. Volume 5, Science Fiction and Space Futures, E.M. Emme, ed., 278p., national Oil System: Why America Went to hard cover $35 $17.50; soft cover $25 $12.50. Volume 6, First Steps Toward Space (1st and 2nd IAA History War in the Gulf. Westport, Ct. and London: Symposia), F.C. Durant III and G.S. James, eds., 318p., hard cover $45 Praeger, 2001. Map. Notes. Index. Pp. xi, $22.50; soft cover $35 $17.50. Volume 7, Parts I & 11, History of Rocketry & Astronautics (3rd-6th IAA 239. $69.95 ISBN: 0-275-94562-6 History Symposia), R.C. Hall, ed., Part I, 250p, Part II, 502p., sold as set, hard cover $100 $50.00; soft cover $80 $40.00. Volume 8, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (7th and 8th IAA Samuel, Wolfgang W. E. I Always Wanted to History Symposia), K.R. Lattu, ed., 368p., hard cover $50 $25.00; soft cover $35 $17.50. Fly: America's Cold War Airmen. Jackson: Volume 9, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (9th-11th IAA History University Press of Mississippi, 2001. Maps. Symposia), F.I. Ordway III, ed., 330p., hard cover $50 $25.00; soft cover $35 $17.50. Tables. Illustrations. Photographs. Glossary. Volume 10, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (12th-14th IAA History Symposia), A.I. Skoog, ed., 318p., hard cover $50 $25.00; soft cover $40 Bibliography. Index. Pp. xix, 363. $30.00 $20.00. ISBN: 1-57806-399-X Volume 11, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (15th and 16th IAA History Symposia), R.D. Launius, ed., 236p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover $40 $20.00. Thomas, Ward. The Ethics of Destruction: Volume 12, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (17th IAA History Symposium), J.L. Sloop, ed., 252p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover Norms and Force in International Relations. $40 $20.00. Volume 13, History of Liquid Rocket Engine Development in the United Ithaca, N.Y. and London: Cornell University States 1955-1980, S.E. Doyle, ed., 176p., hard cover $50 25.00; soft cover Press, 2001. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, $35 $17.50. Volume 14, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (18th and 19th IAA 222. $16.95 Paperback ISBN: 0-8014-8741-2 History Symposia), T.D. Crouch and A.M. Spencer, eds., 222p., hard cover $50 $25.00; soft cover $35 $17.50. Volume 15, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (20th and 21st IAA Trest, Warren and Donald Dodd. Wings of History Symposia), L.H. Cornett, Jr., ed., 452p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover $40 $20.00. Denial: The Alabama Air National Guard’s Volume 16, Out from Behind the Eight-Ball: A History of Project Echo, Covert Role at the Bay of Pigs. Montgomery, by D.C. Elder, 176p., hard cover $50 $25.00; soft cover $30 $15.00. Volume 17, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (22nd and 23rd IAA Ala.: South Books, 2001. Maps. Illustrations. History Symposia), J. Becklake, ed., 480p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover $40 $20.00. Photographs. Notes. Appendices. Biblio- Volume 18, Organizing the Use of Space: Historical Perspectives on a graphy. Index. Pp. 160. $17.95 Paperback Persistent Issue, R.D. Launius, ed., 232p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover $40 $20.00. ISBN: 1-58838-021-1 Volume 19, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (24th IAA History Symposium), J.D. Hunley, ed., 318p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover $40 $20.00. Watson, George M., Jr. Secretaries and Volume 20, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (25th IAA History Symposium), J.D. Hunley, ed., 344p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. $40 $20.00. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Volume 21, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (26th IAA History Symposium), Philippe Jung, ed., 368p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover Museums Program, 2001. Illustrations. $40 $20.00. Volume 22, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (27th IAA History Photographs. Appendices. Bibliography. Symposia), Philippe Jung, ed., 418p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover Index. Pp. 278. $46.00 ISBN: 0-16-050847-9. $40 $20.00. Special Price for Complete Set (Volumes 1-22): Hard Cover $475.00 GPO Stock No. 008-070-00771-1 plus $20.00 postage and handling (U.S.) Soft Cover $345.00 plus $20.00 postage and handling (U.S.). Postage and Handling Zenter, John J. The Art of War Leadership Please add $5.00 for the first book ordered and $l.00 for each additional and Aircrew Morale in Combat. [Cadre book ordered (U.S.), $8.00 for the first book ordered and $3.00 for each Paper No. 11] Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air additional books ordered (non-U.S.). Ordering Information: University Press, 2001. Tables. Illustrations. All orders from individuals must be prepaid by check or money order in Notes. Bibliography. Pp. xi, 110. Paperback. U.S. funds. Visa and Mastercard accepted. California residents should add sales tax. Website: http://research.maxwell.af.mil (See Order from Univelt, Inc., P.O. Box 28130, research papers, special collections) San Diego CA 92198 Phone: (760) 746-4005; Fax: (760) 746-3139

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 63 February 14-15

The Air Force Association will host its annual Air Warfare Symposium at the Wyndham Palace Hotel in Walt Disney World Village at Lake BuenaVista, Florida. Contact: Air Force Association. 1501 Lee Highway Arlington, VA 22209 Website: http://www.afa.org

Compiled by George Cully February 15-16 The 4th Annual Society for Military and Strategic Studies’ Student Conference is entitled “War & Security: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Inter- pretations, and Science & Technology: Missing Dimen- sions.” The Conference will be held at the University of 2002 Calgary, in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Contact: Jillian Dowding / Chris Bullock January 3-6 Centre for Military and Strategic Studies University of Calgary The American Historical Association will hold its 2500 University Drive NW annual meeting in San Francisco, California. This year’s Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4 theme will be “Frontiers.” Contact: Tel.: (403) 220-7091 Philippa Levine Fax 282-0594 Dept. of History e-mail: [email protected] University of Southern California Los Angeles CA 90089-0034 February 15-16 Tel.: (213) 740-1670, fax –6999 e-mail: [email protected] The Center for the Study of the Korean War will host its 3rd annual symposium on “War and Memory” at the January 24-25 Graceland University-Indepedence Campus in Indepen- dence, Missouri. Contact: The Department of History at New Mexico State Paul Edwards University and the New Mexico Farm & Ranch Center for the Study of the Korean War Heritage Museum are co-sponsoring a World War II home 1401 W. Truman Rd. front symposium entitled Labor in the Southwest, 1943-46: Independence, MO 64050-3434 A Symposium to be held in Las Cruces, N.M. Contact: Tel.: (816) 833-0524 Dr. Jon Hunner e-mail: [email protected] Department of History P.O. Box 30001, MSC 3H March 6-9 New Mexico State University Las Cruces, N.M. 88003-8001 The American Association for History and Compu- e-mail: [email protected] ting will hold its annual meeting at the Nashville Marriott Hotel, Nashville, Tennessee. This year’s theme will be February 13-17 “Reading Clio’s Compass: Assessing Where We Are with History and Instructional Technology.” Contact: The Southwest/Texas Popular Culture Association and Ken Dvorak, Secretary and Director of Publicity American Culture Association will host their annual AAHC Atomic Culture in the Nuclear Age at the Albuquerque Lansing Community College Hilton Hotel in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Contact: Lansing, Michigan, 40010 Scott C. Zeman, Assistant Professor of History Tel.: (517) 483-1280 Humanities Department e-mail: [email protected] New Mexico Tech 801 Leroy Place March 7-9 Socorro, New Mexico Tel.: (505) 835-5628, Fax x5544 The U.S. Military Academy will host a conference, e-mail: [email protected] “Making History: West Point at 200 Years,” in commemo- Website: http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/~swpca/ ration of its bicentennial. Contact: Capt Kevin Clark February 14-15 Dept. of History United States Military Academy The Department of History at the National University West Point NY 10996 of Singapore will present a conference entitled Sixty Years Tel.: (845) 938-5083 On – The Fall of Singapore Revisited. Contact: e-mail: [email protected] Dr Brian P. Farrell Dept. of History March 7-9 National University of Singapore Singapore 119260 The Citadel will host a Conference on American Women Tel.: 65-8743845, fax 65-7742528 and the Military in Charleston, South Carolina. Contact: e-mail: [email protected] Catherine Clinton Website: http://www.nus.edu.sg 17 Sheephill Road Riverside, CT 06878 Tel.: (203) 637-7507 e-mail: [email protected]

64 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 March 13-15 April 4-7

The Women in Aviation International 2002 Conference The Society for Military History will hold its 69th will be held at the Opryland Hotel in Nashville, Tennessee. annual meeting at the Monona Terrace in Madison, Contact: Wisconsin. This year’s theme is “War and Remembrance: Women in Aviation, International Constructing the Military Past and Future.” Contact: P.O. Box 11287 Jerry Cooper Daytona Beach, FL USA 32120-1287 Department of History Tel.: (386) 226-7996, Fax 226-7998 University of Missouri-St. Louis e-mail: [email protected] Tel.: (314) 516-5735 Website: http://www.wiai.org Website: http://www.smh-hq.org

March 14-16 April 11

The Society of Experimental Test Pilots will hold its The Society for History in the Federal Government 32nd San Diego Symposium at the Catamaran Resort in will hold its annual meeting at the Library of Congress, San Diego, California. Contact: Jefferson Building, Washington, DC. The program will be SETP “A Dynamic Relationship: The Federal Legislature, P. O. Box 986 Executive and Judiciary in Operation.” Contact: Lancaster CA 93584 Ray Smock, SHFG President Fax (805) 940-0398 6824 Nashville Road e-mail: [email protected] Lanham, MD 20706 Website: http://www.setp.org Tel.: (301) 552-3907, Fax x4907 e-mail: [email protected] March 14-17 Website: http://shfg.org/index.htm

The 20th Annual Mephistos Conference on Science April 11-12 and Technology History Studies will be held on the campus of Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia. Contact: The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronau- Mephistos 2002 tics will co-host the 1st AIAA/IAF Symposium on Future Re- Graduate Program in Science and Technology Studies usable Launch Vehicles in Huntsville, Alabama. Contact: Virginia Tech AIAA 131 Lane Hall 1801 Alexander Bell Dr, Ste 500 Blacksburg, VA 24061-0227 Reston VA 20191-4344 Tel.: (540) 231-6547, Fax x7013 Tel.: (703) 264-7500, (800) NEW AIAA, e-mail: [email protected] Fax 264-7551 Website: http://www.aiaa.org March 16-19 April 11-14 The National Air & Space Museum will host its 15th Annual Mutual Concerns of Air & Space Museums The Organization of American Historians and the Seminar in Washington, DC. Contact: National Council on Public History will co-host their Jane Pisano respective annual meetings at the Renaissance Washing- National Air & Space Museum - MRC 310 ton Hotel in Washington, D.C. The theme of their joint ses- Smithsonian Institution sions will be “Overlapping Diasporas: Encounters and Washington DC 20560-0310 Conversions.” Contact: Tel.: (202) 357-4473, Fax x4579 Convention Manager e-mail: [email protected] Organization of American Historians 112 North Bryan Avenue March 19-20 Bloomington IN 47408-4199 Tel.: (812) 855-7311, fax –0696 The American Astronautical Society will host its 40th E-Mail: [email protected] Annual Goddard Memorial Symposium at the Greenbelt Website: http://www.oah.org/meetings/index.html Marriott Hotel in Greenbelt, Maryland. Contact: The American Astronautical Society April 18-20 6352 Rolling Mill Place, Suite 102 Springfield VA 22152-2354 The 44th Annual Missouri Conference on History will Tel.: (703) 866-0020 convene at the Marriott Crowne Plaza Hotel in Kansas e-mail: [email protected] City, Missouri. The program will include a special session Website: http://www.astronautical.org on the Korean War. Contact: Tim Rives Time in April to be Determined National Archives-Central Plains Region 2312 E. Bannister Rd. A symposium on the Falklands War and its consequences Kansas City, MO 64131 entitled The Falklands/Malvinas Conference: Twenty Tel.: (816) 823-5031, fax 926-6982 Years On will be held in Portsmouth, England. Contact: e-mail: [email protected] Dr Lucy Noakes, faculty of Media, Arts and Society Southampton Institute East Park Terrace Southampton, Hampshire SO14 0RF United Kingdom e-mail: [email protected]

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 65 April 19-21 May 20-22

The Annual Meeting of the Business History Con- The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro- ference will be held at the Hagley Museum & Library in nautics will host its 1st Annual Conference and Workshop Wilmington, Delaware. This year’s theme will be on Unmanned Aerospace Vehicles, Systems, Technologies, “Corporate Governance.” Contact: and Operations in Portsmouth, Virginia. Contact: Roger Horowitz, Secretary-Treasurer AIAA Business History Conference 1801 Alexander Bell Dr, Ste 500 P.O. Box 3630 Reston VA 20191-4344 Wilmington DE 19807 Tel.: (703) 264-7500, (800) NEW AIAA, Tel.: (302) 658-2400, x244 Fax 264-7551 Website: http://www.aiaa.org e-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.hagley.org May 30

April 24 The Journal of Policy History will host a Conference on Policy History to be held in St. Louis, Missouri. Contact: The U.S. Naval Institute's 128th Annual Meeting and 12th Policy Conference Annapolis Seminar will be held in Alumni Hall at the U.S. Journal of Policy History Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Contact: Saint Louis University U.S. Naval Institute 3800 Lindell Blvd. P. O. Box 56907 291 Wood Rd St. Louis, MO 63156-0907 Annapolis MD 21402 e-mail: [email protected] Tel.: (410) 268-6110, Fax 269-7940 Website: http://www.slu.edu/departments/jph e-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.usni.org June 6-7

April 26-28 Siena College is sponsoring its 17th Annual Conference on the 60th Anniversary of World War II. The focus for The 11th Annual Seminar of the Great War Society will 2002 will be 1942. Contact: be held at the Sheraton Newton Hotel in Newton, Professor Thomas O. Kelly, II Massachusetts. This year's theme is "The Russian Department of History Revolution, 1917-1921." Contact:. Siena College Mike Hanlon 515 Loudon Road The Great War Society Loudonville, NY 12211-1462 Box 18585 Tel.: (518) 783-2512, FAX 786-5052 Stanford CA 94309 e-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.worldwar1.com/tgws Website: http://www.siena.edu/sri/wwii/

May 8-9 June 11-13

Topics for the Nat’l Naval Aviation Museum’s 2002 The American Helicopter Society will hold its annual Symposium will include “Naval Air War in Korea,” “Space convention and exhibition at the Montréal Convention Pioneers: The Mercury Astronauts,” “Naval Aviation: Center, Montréal, Quebec, Canada. This year’s theme is Issues and Answers,” and “Fighters!” Contact: “Vertical Flight Technology: Building Global Consensus.” National Museum Of Naval Aviation Contact: 1750 Radford Blvd. AHS International - The Vertical Flight Society N.A.S. Pensacola, FL 32508 217 N. Washington Street Tel.: (850) 452-3604 or (850) 452-3606, Fax x3296 Alexandria, VA 22314-2520 e-mail: [email protected] Tel.: (703) 684-6777, Fax 739-9279 Website: http://www.naval-air.org e-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.vtol.org/index.html May 11-15 July 9-11 The Army Aviation Association will hold its annual convention in Nashville, Tennessee. Contact: The Association For Unmanned Vehicle Systems AAAA National Office International will hold its annual symposium and exhi- 49 Richmondville Ave bition at the Disney Coronado Springs Resort in Orlando, Westport CT 06880 Florida. Contact: e-mail: [email protected] AUVSI Website: http://www.quad-a.org 3401 Columbia Pike Arlington VA 22204 May 16-19 Tel.: (703) 920-2720, Fax x2889 Website: http://www.auvsi.org The Historical Society will hold its third national meeting in Atlanta, Georgia. This year’s theme is “Historical July 10-14 Reconstructions.” Contact: The Historical Society The Council on America's Military Past will hold its Attn: 2002 Program Director annual meeting at the Wyndham Old San Juan Hotel in 656 Beacon Street, Mezzanine San Juan, Puerto Rico. Contact: Boston MA 02215-2020 CAMP P. O. Box 1151 Ft. Myer, VA 22211 Tel.: (703) 912-6124; (800) 398-4693, Fax x5666 e-mail: [email protected] or [email protected] Website: http://www.campjamp.org/

66 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 September 5-8 November 7-9

The 45th Annual Tailhook Convention and Symposium A Conference on Cities as Strategic Sites: Militar- will be held at the Nugget Hotel and Casino in Sparks ization, Anti-Globalism, and Warfare will be held in (Reno), Nevada. Contact: Manchester, England. Contact: The Tailhook Association Stephen Graham 9696 Business Park Ave. Professor of Urban Technology San Diego CA 92131 School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape Tel.: (858) 689-9223/(800) 322-4665 3rd Floor, Claremont Tower e-mail: [email protected] University of Newcastle upon Tyne Website: http://www.tailhook.org Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, U.K. e-mail: [email protected]> September 16-18 Tel. +44(0) 191 222 6808, Fax +44(0) 191 222 8811 Website: The Air Force Association will hold its annual National Convention & Aerospace Technology Exposition at the Marriott Wardman Park Hotel in Washington, D.C. Contact: Air Force Association. 1501 Lee Highway Arlington, VA 22209 Website: http://www.afa.org

October 2-5

The Society of Experimental Test Pilots will hold its 46th Annual Symposium and Banquet at the Westin Bonaventure Hotel & Suites in Los Angeles, California. Contact: SETP If you wish to have your event listed, contact: P. O. Box 986 Lancaster CA 93584 George W. Cully Fax (805) 940-0398 230 Sycamore Creek Drive e-mail: [email protected] Spingboro, OH 45066-1342 Website: http://www.setp.org (513) 748-4737 e-mail: [email protected]

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 67 History Mystery by Robert F. Dorr

The readers of Air Power History know their Coast Guard (as the HOS-1) and the Royal Air airplanes—and their helicopters, too. Once again, Force (as the Hoverfly Mk. II). The R-6 was replaced readers correctly identified last issue’s “What Is It?” by the R-5 (redesignated H-5 in 1948), which flying machine. But only about a dozen sent post- became a familiar sight in the Korean War. cards, compared with the usual forty-five to fifty. Our Fall 2001 mystery photo showed a Civil Aren’t readers interested in helicopters? Air Patrol member in the cockpit of Nash R-6A no. Well, okay,maybe there’s another reason for the 43-45399 at Bellows Field, Oahu, in 1948. The photo low turnout. How can we put this? We goofed. came from Lincoln Higa, historian for the 15th Air Although the photos are different, the aircraft used Base Wing at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii—but as our Fall 2001 History Mystery was an unin- the photographer’s name is not known. Can anyone tentional repeat, having previously appeared in the provide further details? Winter 1998 issue of this journal. Our follow-up illustration is a Coast Guard The Sikorsky R-6 helicopter was developed in photo of an HOS-1 model. 1944, and was powered by a 255-hp Lycoming O- Our “History Mystery” winner is Thomas 435 piston engine. Sikorsky and Nash Kelvinator Hitchcock of Washington, Utah. Thanks to all who built 193 for the Army Air Forces, the Navy and joined in our “name the plane” exercise.

Once again, we challenge our ever-astute readers. Send your pictures or slides for possible use as This See if you can identify this month’s “mystery” air- “History Mystery” puzzlers. We will return them. craft. But remember the rules, please. Issue’s 1. Submit your entry on a postcard. Mail the postcard to Robert F. Dorr, 3411 Valewood Drive, Mystery Oakton VA 22124. 2. Correctly identify the aircraft shown here. Plane Also include your address and telephone number, including area code. If you have access to e-mail, include your electronic screen name. 3. A winner will be chosen at random from the postcards with the correct answer.The winner will receive a recently-published aviation book as a prize. This feature needs your help. In that attic or basement, you have a photo of a rare or little- known aircraft. Does anyone have color slides?

68 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 Walter Boyne’s book, Aces in Command: had a larger fan (low-pressure compres- Letters Fighter Pilots as Combat Leaders.Dr. sor) to give it the extra thrust. It also had Sherwood wrote that “Fighter pilot an extra stub stage to match it to the com- excesses also hurt careers. Blesse’s wom- mon high-pressure compressor. With the Medals Are Earned! anizing sealed his fate quite early.” After larger fan, they needed a larger, low-pres- thirty years, “Boots” Blesse retired in sure turbine (one of five modules) to drive 1975, as a major general and Deputy it. I was amazed to see Air Power History Inspector General of the Air Force. I won- Finally, two observations regarding the [“Air Force Historian Wins Silver Star,” der what Sherwood thinks Blesse might first F-15B flight: (1) the two-seater was a page 38, Vol. 48, No. 2] use the term “wins” have accomplished were it not for his TF-15A for several years, as I’m sure the for a combat medal! Yikes. I do hope you “womanizing?” author knows. He probably used the later put something into your style manual and current “B” designation for those who about this to prevent future mistakes. John M. Fitzpatrick, McLean, Virginia. today would have no idea of what a “TF was, and (2) the reference to the “F-15B MSgt. David W. Menard, USAF (Ret.), flight in July,” which coming right after Huber Heights, Ohio The F-15 Eagle the PFRT date of February 1972, implies July 1972. The first TF flight took place in Editor’s reply: Of course you are correct Reading Jacob Neufeld’s excellent arti- July 1973. that combat medals are earned. In this cle on the F–15 development [Air Power case Bob Phillips earned the medal during History, Vol.48, No. 1] brought back a lot of Col. Scott Willey, USAF, (Ret.) the war, but it took him fifty years to win old memories and explained some of what recognition. happened long before I joined the [F–15] program on December 17, 1969, or things that I had forgotten about as the years News Which P–51? have passed. Since I was involved in the engine For your information, the North work, I am compelled to point out a couple American P–51 depicted [APH, Fall 2001, of technicalities. In the engine section, ref- Rex Barber Dies Vol. 48, No. 3, page 24] is an XP–51, one of erence is made to the TF-30. Turbine two taken from the British order at engines never use a dash in the designa- Rex T. Barber, a famous World War II Wright Field, Ohio, in the Spring of 1942. tion; it is TF30. I have been trying to tell airman, died on July 26, 2001, in Terre- As you know, VII Fighter Command people for thirty years that there is a lot of bonne, Oregon. He was eighty-four. Mustangs were P–51Ds. difference between an F-100 Super Sabre On April 18, 1943, piloting specially- aircraft and an F100 engine. equipped Lockheed P–38 Lightnings, six- Michael P. Jungers, North Las Vegas, Also, the author notes the common core teen U.S. Army Air Forces fliers took off on Nevada. engines, F100 and F401, “differed in the a 400-mile mission to intercept Japanese fan, afterburner, and compressor sec- Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto—the master- tions.” Actually, it was the fan, afterburn- mind of the December 7, 1941 attack on Another Angle er (or augmentor in its official designa- Pearl Harbor. Intercepted over the tion), and turbine sections. The common Solomon Islands, Yamamoto’s plane was I was somewhat amused by one of Dr. core was the compressor, combustor, and shot down and the admiral killed. Sherwood’s comments in his review of high-pressure turbine. The Navy’s F401 Historically, the shootdown was shared

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 69 between Thomas Lanphier and Rex tage Flying Museum, Ghost Squadron, the source of terrorist attacks on Ameri- Barber. In 1986 the American Fighter Heritage Air Force, and Commemorative cans, including the World Trade Center Aces Association embarked on a quest to Air Force. The winner will be announced bombing and the attempted assassination assign sole credit to Barber. However, the on December 7th and become effective on of former President George H. W. Bush. U.S. Air Force denied the claim and in New Years Day 2002. The Clinton Administration, wittingly or 1996 a federal appellate court upheld the Note: See the story in Air Power History, unwittingly, has chosen the path of self- Air Force’s ruling. Summer 2001, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 60-61 delusion: to not investigate the matter seriously. In this way, unpleasant policy options have not been articulated and dis- Look it Up! cussed. Yet, the failure of U.S. officials to Confederate Air Force Renamed address the question of state sponsorship In his review of Laurie Mylroie’s book, of terrorism will have significant conse- On October 5, 2001, members of the Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein’s quences. It encourages future terrorist Confederate Air Force (CAF) voted on a Unfinished War Against America,[Air attacks by eliminating the costs of retribu- new name for the organization. A year ago Power History, Summer 2001, Vol 48, No. tion from the calculations of leaders such members of the CAF voted by a margin of 2, pp. 52-54] Dr. Mark Mandeles wrote: as Saddam Hussein. four to one to change the name. More than 1,000 names were proposed. Of these, four This reviewer believes that Mylroie has names were chosen for the ballot: Heri- correctly pinpointed Saddam Hussein as Notices

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Canadian Society for the History and Philosophy of Science (CSHPS) is holding its annual conference at the University of Toronto, May 26-28, 2002. The program committee invites historians, philosophers, and other scholars of the social sciences and humanities to submit paper, panel or session proposals. The proposals and papers may be in English or French, and should have a title, a brief abstract of 150 to 250 words, and the complete information for correspondence. We strongly encourage e-mail submissions. Information about registra- tion and accommodations can be found at the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada website. Please note that the CSHPS meeting, which takes place as part of the Congress of the Social Sciences and Humanities, overlaps with the meeting dates of a number of other societies, including the Canadian Society for the History of Medicine (May 24-26), the Canadian Philosophical Association (May 25-28), the Canadian Society for the History and Philosophy of Mathematics (May 24-26), and the Canadian Historical Association (May 27-29). The CSHPS program committee welcomes suggestions for joint ses- sions with these and other societies. Program Website: http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/r20430/ schps_toronto_2002 Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science: http://www.ukings.ns.ca/cshps

70 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 Congress of the Social Sciences and Association, the Federal Aviation Admini- Humanities: stration, and the National Aeronautics http://www.hssfc.ca and Space Administration. The First Air Power History Flight Centennial Federal Advisory List of Referees, Board, which will support the Com- Centennial of Flight Commission mission, is composed of nineteen members Dec. 2000-Dec. 2001 and is chaired by Dr. Thomas D. Crouch of The U.S. Congress has chartered a the Smithsonian Institution’s NASM. Centennial of Flight Commission, charged The Commission encourages national David G. Allen with leading, coordinating, and publiciz- and international participation. It seeks ing public activities to celebrate the to publicize and encourage programs, pro- William H. Bartsch achievements of Wilbur and Orville jects, and events to involve, educate, Donald R. Baucom Wright and commemorating a century of enrich, and inspire the maximum number August Blume powered flight. Made up of senior govern- of people. One of its primary goals is to George Bradley ment officials, the Commission is chaired promote awareness of the centennial and by Gen. John R. Dailey, USMC (Ret.), of related centennial events. To assist in Rebecca Cameron director of the Smithsonian Institution’s achieving that goal, the Commission has George W. Cully National Air and Space Museum (NASM). created a public web page that includes Richard G. Davis Other members represent the First Flight activities related to the centennial of Ron Dick Centennial Foundation of North Carolina, flight celebration and the history of avia- the Inventing Flight: Dayton 2003 Com- tion. One can visit at: Robert F. Dorr mittee of Ohio, the Experimental Aircraft http://www.centennialofflight.gov Stanley Falk Paul C. Fritz Alan Gropman Brian S. Gunderson R. Cargill Hall Richard P. Hallion Grant T. Hammond Paddy Harbison Von Hardesty I. B. Holley Perry Jamieson William M. Leary Donald S. Lopez Mark Mandeles Thomas Manning Edward Marolda Roger G. Miller Daniel R. Mortensen Bernard C. Nalty Jeff Rudd David N. Spires Air Combat Legends Rick W. Sturdevant Wayne W. Thompson New book by aviation artist Earl H. Tilford, Jr. Philip A. True NICHOLAS TRUDGIAN George M. Watson Price: $55.00 + tax Kenneth P. Werrell (phone orders welcome) Herman S. Wolk William T. Y’Blood THE MILL STREET GALLERY James Young 125 Mill Street Tommy Young Occoquan, Virginia 22125 (703) 490-0782 • www.cliftonart.com

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 71 New volumes from the AIR FORCE History and Museums PROGRAM

Forthcoming Arrived Available from the Government Printing Office Phone: (202) 512-1800

Fax: (202) 512-2250

Web: www.gpo.gov

Guidelines for Contributors

We seek quality articles—based on sound scholarship, perceptive analysis, and/or firsthand experience—which are well-written and attractively illustrated. The primary criterion is that the manuscript contributes to knowledge. Articles submitted to Air Power History must be original contributions and not be under consideration by any other publication at the same time. If a manuscript is under consideration by another publication, the author should clearly indicate this at the time of submission. Each submission must include an abstract—a statement of the article’s theme, its historical context, major subsidiary issues, and research sources. Abstracts should not be longer than one page. Manuscripts should be submitted in triplicate, double-spaced throughout, and prepared according to the Chicago Manual of Style (University of Chicago Press). Because submissions are evaluated anonymously, the author’s name should appear only on the title page. Authors should provide on a separate page brief biographical details, to include institutional or professional affiliation and recent publications, for inclusion in the printed article. Pages, including those containing illustrations, diagrams or tables, should be numbered consecutively. Any figures and tables must be clearly produced ready for photographic reproduction. The source should be given below the table. Endnotes should be numbered consecutively through the article with a raised numeral corresponding to the list of notes placed at the end. If an article is typed on a computer, the disk should be in IBM-PC compatible format and should accompany the manuscript. Preferred disk size is a 3 1/2-inch floppy, but any disk size can be utilized. Disks should be labelled with the name of the author, title of the article, and the software used. WordPerfect, in any version number, is preferred. Other word processors that can be accommodated are WordStar, Microsoft Word, Word for Windows, and AmiPro. As a last resort, an ASCII text file can be used. There is no standard length for articles, but 4,500-5,500 words is a general guide. Manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be sent to Jacob Neufeld, Editor, c/o Air Power History, P.O. Box 10328, Rockville, MD 20849-0328, e-mail: [email protected].

72 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001