JUNE 2015. Vol 8. Issue 6

Contents The Islamic State Raises Its

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Islamic State Raises Its Black Flag Over The Caucasus Black Flag Over The Caucasus By Derek Henry Flood By Derek Henry Flood

REPORTS 5 A View from the CT Foxhole: An Interview with Michael Steinbach, Assistant Director, FBI By Brian Dodwell

8 The Smoldering Thai Insurgency By Zachary Abuza

11 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Opens a Door to the Islamic State By Damon A. Mehl

15 Evolving Approaches in Algerian Security Cooperation By Kal Ben Khalid

People inspect the damage after a December 4, 2014 attack by insurgents in , . ELENA FITKULINA / GETTY IMAGES 21 Haunted by their Past: Kurds and the Islamic State By Hoshang Waziri and Lydia Wilson n the early hours of December 4, the region’s capital and the death of 2014, a group of militants staged state security forces demonstrated 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts I a brazen attack in the heart of conclusively that this long-running Grozny, the Chechen capital. They conflict has not been resolved, despite stormed a government media building the message implied in the policies of and a significant part of the edifice was , Russian President engulfed in flames. Clashes lasted for ’s hand-picked leader in some 12 hours before the authorities Chechnya. He has gone to great lengths regained complete control of the area.1 to suppress religious and political The December incident belied the hard- violence and has greatly reduced About the CTC Sentinel won image that Chechnya had largely terrorism and insurgent activity in the The Combating Terrorism Center is an been pacified. The Grozny attack made area under his direct control. His tactics independent educational and research headlines in part because Chechnya though have also led to the diffusion institution based in the Department of Social had largely dropped out of the news of radicalism into the neighboring Sciences at the United States Military Academy, because the number of attacks within republics of , Ingushetia, West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses the republic had declined even as the and Kabardino-Balkaria in particular the Center’s global network of scholars and violence seeped into other areas to the which have made of up the core of the practitioners to understand and confront east and west. , known locally as contemporary threats posed by terrorism and Imarat Kavkaz. other forms of political violence. The timing and location of the attack was significant for several reasons. The December attack took place the same Targeting a government building in day Putin was to give his State of the The views expressed in this report are those of Nation address to Russian parliament the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, and also occurred a week before the the Department of the Army, or any other agency 1 Musa Sadulayev and Vladimir Isachenkov, “Islamic December 11 anniversary of the start of of the U.S. Government. militants attack Chechen capital; 20 dead,” Associated the first Russo-Chechen war that began Press, December 4, 2014. JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

in 1994.2 The attack did little though to former Russian President , Doku Umarov in 2013. Each blow to force a reassessment of the insurgency can be considered the nadir of post- the rebel leadership has demonstrably in the Caucasus. A more glamorous Soviet Russian power,6 particularly led to increased radicalization among battle in the Levant continues to attract the Accord. General the militants. Early nationalist leaders fighters away from and at the and then Chechen such as Dudaev and Maskhadov were same time is weakening the indigenous rebel President willing to negotiate. Negotiations with fight for autonomy, which is slowly signed that deal in August 1996 to end today’s underground insurgent leaders adopting additional radical Islamist the first Russo-Chechen war, but it would be unthinkable. It is arguable characteristics. also resulted in Chechnya becoming de that Russia’s attempts to retain one facto independent and referring to itself tiny secessionist republic, with all the With the emergence of the Islamic as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.7 mass casualties that have ensued, have State in Syria and Iraq, there has been Much of Putin’s, and by extension instead accelerated the radicalization an ongoing tug-of-war among the Kadyrov’s, policy is based on rectifying of Islamists throughout the region. jihadi fighters in the North Caucasus the military and diplomatic blunders of The further fighters were pushed into about whether to remain autonomous, the early post-Soviet period. the mountains as the security cordon affiliate themselves with al-Qa`ida’s tightened in the North Caucasus, the core leadership, or follow the Islamic There is one consistent thread more ideologically oriented they became State. By June 21, 2015, it appears that throughout the Russian Federation’s as their isolation deepened. Now the the Islamic State had won the day. fight for control of the North Caucasus (FSB) and An audio recording was posted to that began in late 1994, and that is the military must contend with a declared YouTube stating that the mujahideen successive elimination of rebel leaders. Islamic State wilayah on their soil. of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and The killing of Emir Aliskhab Kebekov Kabardino-Balkaria have sided with in Buinaksk district, Dagestan on The Radicalization of Grievances Islamic State’s leader Abu Bakr al- April 19, 20158 is the latest in a series The Caucasus was at the edge of historical Baghdadi.3 Baghdadi’s spokesman Abu of assassinations that accompanied Islamic expansion. Two schools of Sunni Mohammed al-Adnani subsequently the conflict’s steady evolution from , Shafi’i and Hanafi, were common released an audio recording on June a Chechen-centric ethno-nationalist in the region.9 Comparatively moderate 23 proclaiming the Islamic State’s insurgency to the present radical jihadi by today’s standards, two principle Sufi acceptance of bay`a of North Caucasian war that affects a cluster of forlorn orders, the Naqshabandiyya and the militant leaders.4 The Caucasus countries stretching from the Caspian Qadiriyya,10 took hold during a period Emirate has now been subsumed into to Black Sea. In 2014, Kebekov, a overlapping the Tsarist colonization the Islamic State’s sphere as a province qadi (sharia judge), had reluctantly and Caucasian wars of the mid-19th that would be known as Vilayat Kavkaz succeeded the late Doku Umarov as century. Though salafism in the North or Wilayat Qawqaz in Arabic. The emir of the Caucasian Emirate. While Caucasus, and Dagestan in particular, Islamic State’s chosen leader in the Moscow may trumpet his death as predates the Soviet collapse,11 it is now North Caucasus is Rustam Aselderov yet another decisive step in the now visibly resurgent, aided by broader (aka Abu Mukhammad Kadarsky),5 the decades-long counterinsurgency, trends in global Islam and the increased former emir of the Caucasus Emirate’s there is no indication that yet another technological connectivity of what was Vilayat Dagestan sector and notably leadership decapitation will bring the once a remote backwater of the umma also a non-Chechen. He could be in anti-Russian resistance to its knees. (Islamic community). conflict with Magomed Suleymanov, the yet-to-be confirmed leader of the rump Despite a long-running series of targeted There are other problems emerging Caucaus Emirate, leaving the future of killings, Russian authorities and their with Russian policy. Putin chose to the Caucasus Emirate in question. proxies in southern Muslim-majority strengthen the state security apparatus republics have remained unable to and elevate mid-level strongmen, most Leadership Decapitation as Strategy extinguish the smoldering discontent. notably Ramzan Kadyrov. This is Putin ascended to power largely based Russians or their agents have killed potentially problematic for Moscow. on his resolve to end the war in Chechnya Dzokhar Dudaev in 1996, Zelimkhan Kadyrov, in particular, has become by any means at the disposal of the Yaderbiyev in 1997, Aslan Maskhadov so emboldened that he views his local Russian state. The management of the in Tolstoy-Yurt in 2005, Abdul-Halim administration as being beyond Russian Chechen conflict under his predecessor, Sadulayev in Argun in 2006, and

2 Thomas de Waal, “20 Years On, Chechnya Still Trau- 6 Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power 9 Walter Richmond, The Northwest Caucasus: Past, Pres- matized by War,” The Moscow Times, December 10, 2014. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 142-144. ent, Future, (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 161. 3 Maria Antonova, “Russia’s Caucasus Islamists ‘pledge 7 Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border 10 Anna Zelkina, In Quest for God and Freedom: The Sufi allegiance’ to IS,” Agence France Presse, June 24, 2015. Between Geopolitics and Globalization, (Washington DC, Response to the Russian Advance in the North Caucasus, 4 “Russia’s Caucasus Islamists ‘Pledge Allegiance’ To Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), (New York: New York University Press, 2000), p. 229. IS,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 24, 2015. pp. 61, 171. 11 Roland Dannreuther and Luke March, Russia and Is- 5 “Islamic State moves in on al-Qaeda turf,” BBC Moni- 8 “Russia says Islamist rebel leader Kebekov ‘neutral- lam: State, Society and Radicalism, (New York: Routledge, toring, June 25, 2015. ised,’” Agence France Presse, April 20, 2015. 2010), p.138. 2 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

federal constrictions.12 Much of Putin’s sources, Suleymanov’s appointment emirate to pledge bay`a to the Islamic strategy to contain in the would seem to indicate that the North State’s al-Baghdadi.16 Zaylanabidov was North Caucasus depended on power Caucasus insurgency has shifted shape subsequently killed as he tried to pass being delegated to Kadyrov. Arguably, again. Avar control of insurgency is through a police checkpoint on June 6, those efforts have failed. not unheard of. In the 30-year struggle 2015.17 In the wake of Zaylanabidov’s to subdue Muslims in the same region death and the Caucasus Emirate’s As it spread through the region, the during the 19th century, the rebellion’s expressed allegiance, Islamic State insurgency has become more radical and two legendary leaders, Qazi Muhammed leaders likely perceive that they are in more a part of the militant transnational and Imam Shamil, were both Avars. direct conflict with Russia. Russia has Islamist movement. The push for territory to secure while Islamic State Chechen independence had originally Control of the insurgency by non- has an expansionist to feed. been more anti-authoritarian in nature Chechen Avars also highlights the move and was fed by the anger stirred up by in its center of gravity to Dagestan, Fundamental Divisions the Stalinist-like deportations of 1994. where radical Islamist thought is on The Caucasus Emirate remained under Now, the young fighters in the Caucasus the rise and violence is rife. Once the increasing strain since Umarov’s death. are more likely to pursue global jihad to nationalist independence movement The Islamic State’s jihad in Syria and its current locus in Syria and Iraq. Part was irrevocably re-framed in Islamist Iraq has secured jihadi ideological of this trend is simply logistical and part tenets by Doku Umarov in October preeminence in those countries and has is ideological. Once in Turkey, which 2007, the course of the insurgency has pulled in recruits and resources that is a fairly straightforward process for continued to metastasize far beyond might otherwise have gone to the fight Georgians and Azerbaijanis, the porous the Chechen republic. Goals have also in the North Caucasus. Syrian border presents relatively few changed. Rather than mere obstacles. In Syria or Iraq, jihadis from the Russian Federation as early The Caucasus Emirate de facto involved are presented with the opportunity Chechen nationalists had envisioned, itself in Syria by letting the most well to contest the so-called near enemy, the primary aim has become the known foreign fighter faction, Jaish that is, the forces of the Assad regime, implementation of sharia. al-Mujahireen wal-Ansar, anoint itself Kurdish militias, Iraqi federal forces, as the emirate’s official representative Iranian-sponsored Shia militias, and As the situation in the Caucasus in the Syrian conflict. Until recently, anyone else who stands in the way of devolved from all-out war to a low- Jaish al-Mujahireen wal-Ansar was led controlling the Umayyad caliphate intensity conflict, global attention by Salakhuddin Shishani, a Georgian capital of Damascus or the Abbassid ebbed. Fatigue set in among ordinary national like Umar al-Shishani. The caliphate capital of Baghdad. Chechens themselves, even as the newly two rival “Chechen” leaders in Syria are proclaimed emirate was divided into actually Kists—a distinct cultural group One near-term positive for the Russian the six principle vilayats (provinces) of descended from 19th Century Chechen authorities is that the battle for control Dagestan, Nokhchiycho (Chechnya), and Ingush migrants—from the Pankisi against the near enemy in the Russian Ghalghaycho (Ingushetia)14 United Gorge in northeastern Georgia’s Federation’s southwestern tier has Vilayat of Kabardia, Balkaria, and Kakheti region. Salakhuddin Shishani far less appeal with the decline of Karachai, Nogai Steppe, and Cherkessia. was born Faisula Margoshvili in Duisi, Sufi-inflected . But the Pankisi’s principle town, less than five insurgency has not simply evaporated. Kebekov’s tenure as emir was marked kilometers from the village of Birkiani by growing fissures in the Caucasus where his bitter rival Umar Shishani The Post-Chechen Caucasus Emirate Emirate. Though on the surface such was raised. Salakhuddin Shishani is Aliskhab Kebekov’s ascent to the internal schisms may appear to be the a veteran of the 2nd Russo-Chechen top leadership role in the evolving result of the “strong horse-weak horse” war,18 which may be why he has kept insurgency waged by the Caucasus dynamic among radical jihadis, they are his movement in Syria aligned with the Emirate was notable because he was also symptomatic of inept leadership, Caucasus Emirate’s leadership. not a battle-hardened Chechen, but ego-driven disputes among leaders at an ethnic Avar from Dagestan. The the jamaat15 level, and financial struggles, The vast international media attention selection of another Avar, Magomed even as the jihad is not uniformly focused on the Levant has made it Suleymanov (aka Abu Usman Gimry), to popular. difficult for jihadi leaders in the North replace Kebekov (according to Heydar Caucasus to recruit and retain the Jemal, the chairman of the Islamic The cracks began to show in November fighters needed to sustain their ongoing Committee of Russia13) would be even 2014, when the leader of Aukhov jamaat, more notable. If confirmed by insurgent Suleiman Zaylanabidov, broke with the 16 “In Dagestan, one of the emirs of the Aukhov militants sworn to the leader of the ‘Islamic State,’” 12 “Russian Interior Ministry Slams Kadyrov’s ‘Shoot- 14 The Ghalghaycho (Ingushetia) appears to include the Caucasian Knot, November 27, 2014. To-Kill’ Remark,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Republic of North Ossetia-Alania which is a majority 17 “Russia says militant adhering to ISIS killed in April 23, 2015. Orthodox Christian enclave in the otherwise Muslim- Dagestan,” Associated Press, June 6, 2015. 13 “Jamal: New Leader ‘Caucasus Emirate’ is Magomed majority North Caucasus. 18 Author emails with former Middle East analyst at Suleimanov,” Caucasian Knot, May 28, 2015. 15 Jaamats are a subdivision of Vilayats. Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, June 7, 2015. 3 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

insurgency. Islamic State ideologues into the Islamic State have seen their and federal state actors in the Russian have taken advantage of the Caucasus belief that they were participating Federation while the Islamic State has Emirate’s weakened status to stress in the sole, legitimate jihad justified been busy winning hearts and minds that their movement is ideologically while those fighting at home were seen in the Dagestan vilayat and making superior to that of local insurgent as guilty of a form of ethno-linguistic inroads into other vulnerable regions. leaders in the Caucasus. nationalism, even though that fight was The latest transformation in the the Caucasus Emirate’s raison d’être. Caucasus Emirate’s plight, highlighted As the security situation in Chechnya Even so, the continued allegiance of the by its inability to confirm a new emir continued to harden under Kadyrov and Jaish al-Mujahireen wal-Ansar to the indicates that a purely anti-Russian in late 2012 and into 2013 the conflict Caucasus Emirate21 dilutes the Islamic resistance may be a thing of the past. in northern Syria became increasingly State’s triumphal absolutism, which fragmented, the Caucasus Emirate seeks total submission rather than a The future of the insurgency in the struggled to stay relevant. One of web of alliances. North Caucasus remains highly Umarov’s key challenges in the latter uncertain. The rump Caucasus Emirate period of his leadership was to keep his The head of the Chechen-led Vilayat can now only lay claim to its Nogai insurgency’s agenda focused on local Nokhchicho, Aslan Byutukayev (aka Steppe and Cherkessia vilayats, which issues in the face of the popularity of Emir Khamzat) pledged fealty to were never key nodes in the insurgency. Syria as the preeminent destination Baghdadi in mid-June.22 Byutukayev is The current struggle for power and for foreign fighters. Umarov vacillated a pivotal militant figure in Chechnya influence is being disproportionately on endorsing North Caucasians joining and was singled out by Kadyrov as the influenced externally by actors on the the jihad in Syria until it became prime suspect in the December 2014 Syrian battlefield, several of whom in unavoidable. The Caucasus Emirate raid in Grozny.23 His defection was a fact originate from the South Caucasus. is in essence now kept alive mostly severe blow to the group that may have The movement of Caucasian jihadis on social networks and its fighters sparked its current situation, especially to Syria and Iraq suits Moscow’s only clash occasionally with security as he was once widely mentioned as a purposes in several distinct ways. forces, while the Islamic State controls natural successor to Umarov as the It bolsters Russia’s policy of arming territory and is intensifying its appeal leader of the Caucasus Emirate. the embattled regime of Bashar al- as it attempts to form a new state. Assad in Damascus.24 The far more For many years the Kremlin glamorized war there encourages The Islamic State, however, sought vociferously claimed to be fighting local-regional fighters to wage jihad to expand during 2014 and disputes “Wahabis” in the Caucasus, and seemed outside the Russian Federation or between the two movements escalated unable to distinguish between Chechen its so-called ‘near abroad,’25 and the into diametric opposition. The Caucasus nationalists and genuine Islamists. Putin government can claim that that Emirate was forced to acknowledge it Now with the faded Chechen nationalist it has been fighting international could not avoid some level of involvement movement kinetically irrelevant on the terrorism26 as it has professed for in the Syrian conflict, particularly in ground, the Islamized intra-militant many years in its southern republics, light of the new generation of younger struggle for the North Caucasus is rather than an indigenous insurgency commanders that had quickly risen intricately interlinked to the war in motivated by local grievances. Now that to prominence in the Levant, such as Syria and Iraq. Until now, the Islamic the jihad in the North Caucasus has Salakhuddin Shishani, the now deposed State paid scant attention to ideological unequivocally been subsumed into the emir of the Jabhat al-Nusra-aligned and theological schisms within the larger transnational jihad helmed by Jaish al-Mujahireen wal-Ansar, who wider Caucasus, there can be no the Islamic State, Moscow will likely be pledged bay`a to the Caucasus Emirate. denying Baghdadi has found significant forced to reappraise its current security Salakhuddin Shishani has since been utility in the skilled Chechen, Kist, calculus for the Russian Federation’s deposed for alleged transgressions that and other Caucasian fighters active in most violent region. would stoke fitna (intra-Muslim discord) Syria and Iraq. The Caucasus Emirate, by an internal sharia court according meanwhile, is barely hanging on in its to a Facebook account purportedly run home base. It is pressed hard by local by Jaish al-Mujahireen wal-Ansar but the movement still claims to fights on in Aleppo Governorate despite such claims Islamic “caliphate,” Reuters, June 30, 2014. intense discord.19 21 Liz Fuller, “North Caucasus Fighters in Syria Pledge Allegiance to Umarov’s Successor,” Radio Free Europe/ Since the caliphate was declared in June Radio Liberty, March 31, 2014. 24 Jonathan Saul. “Russia steps up military lifeline to 2014,20 Caucasians already assimilated 22 Chechnya: Oath to Emir Khamzat (Vilayat Syria’s Assad – sources,” Reuters, January 17, 2014. Nokhchicho) to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, June 13, 2015, 25 Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Chechens drawn south infochechen.com. The source audio recording purported to fight against Syria’s Assad,” BBC Arabic, November 19 See Russian-language Facebook posts from the ac- to be Byutukayev has since been removed by You Tube 20, 2013. count “Jma Sham” dated June 8, June 10, and June 24, administrators. 26 Fiona Hill, “Putin and Bush in Common Cause? Rus- 2015. 23 “Chechnya homes targeted after Grozny militant at- sia’s View of the Terrorist Threat After September 11,” 20 Sylvia Westfall, “After Iraq gains, Qaeda offshoot tack,” BBC News, December 10, 2014. Brookings Institution, Summer 2002. 4 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

A View from the CT Foxhole: detect and disrupt, we are really being the most fundamental evolutions for the asked to prevent the crime before FBI over the last decade plus. An Interview with Michael it happens. And we have learned Steinbach, Assistant throughout our history that, whether CTC: As our global military footprint Director, FBI we are talking about terrorism, drugs, is scaled back, however, what impacts or some other violations, you really does this have on your organization in By Brian Dodwell have to take the fight overseas. You terms of what it will be asked to take on cannot sit in Miami, for example, and in this evolving environment? Does the Assistant Director Michael B. Steinbach wait for the drugs and the dealers to FBI pull back as well, or will it be asked has led the FBI Counterterrorism Division come to Miami. You have to be forward to expand to fill that void, albeit in a since July 2014. He began his career in leaning and go to the point of origin. In different capacity? the FBI in 1995 after seven years as an the case of the drug example, that was aviator in the U.S. Navy. Over the course primarily Central and South America. It Steinbach: We are definitely not being of his 20-year career he has served as is the same model for counterterrorism. asked to pull back. If anything, it is a manager of FBI operations at Guantanamo We can’t sit in the homeland and wait greater presence overseas. So, in some Bay, deputy on-scene commander for FBI for the actors to plot and then come to cases, as DoD leaves a space, we may be operations in Afghanistan, legal attaché the US. We have to be overseas. So, our asked to step in and provide assistance in Israel, assistant section chief for the overseas position and role has greatly to indigenous forces, whether it is International Terrorism Operations expanded. intelligence or law enforcement, to help Section, Counterterrorism Division, and them build and develop their capacity. deputy director for Law Enforcement “When you look at our But just because we leave conflict zones Services at the CIA’s Counterterrorism does not mean there aren’t lots of places Center. Before taking his current post, mission set to detect and in the world where DoD operates in Mr. Steinbach served as special agent some form, and where the FBI can take in charge of the FBI’s Miami Division. disrupt, we are really being advantage of the military’s ability to reach into those locations from afar, and CTC: You have had some very asked to prevent the crime where the FBI will look to the military interesting counterterrorism as the action arm. assignments in the FBI over the past before it happens.” dozen years that include serving in CTC: Have we come far enough in Afghanistan alongside the military (and this evolution and development of our others) and being assigned to the CIA’s counterterrorism architecture? In what Counterterrorism Center. How have the The military has played a significant areas are further enhancements to our role and capabilities of the FBI in this role in our ability to do this. Since CT capabilities, policies, or authorities interagency fight evolved during this 9/11 there have been several different needed in order to get us where we need time period? conflict zones which are breeding to be? grounds for terrorists and plots, so Steinbach: The evolution over the last the FBI needs DoD in order to work Steinbach: I can look at the question couple decades for the FBI has certainly in those environments. Clearly as in two ways. First, when you look at been in the interagency arena, with an a law enforcement agency we don’t our capabilities and the technology- especially strong working relationship have the tools, necessarily, to work driven world we live in, it requires us being developed with the military. If independently in conflict zones, and so to continue to invest in technology to you go back before 9/11 and you look lashing up with DoD in such locations is stay abreast of the changing landscape, at the relationship we had with DoD a benefit for both of us. so that we can continue to leverage our [U.S. Department of Defense] and resources and do our job. Second, we you compare that to today, it would It is important to remember that the have done a good job over the last 20 look vastly different. It’s a much more world is quite small these days. Maybe years of developing a joint interagency thorough relationship, it’s a much more 30–50 years ago what happened in working environment with our Joint agile relationship, and it’s an even more a small corner of the globe didn’t Terrorism Task Force model. But as functional relationship. really have any impact on the U.S. I said before, the world is small, and homeland. However, in today’s world, we need to take that same model and CTC: From a capabilities perspectives with technology and other factors, apply it internationally. We have how do you feel that the FBI has what is found in the far corners of the great relationships with our Western evolved? The mission given to the FBI world may have a direct impact on and allies, but the way that we do business after 9/11 was “never again.” How do direct connection to the United States, is through diplomatic channels, and you feel the FBI’s capability to achieve and that is really why and how our diplomacy takes time. Terrorists don’t what is obviously an almost impossibly relationship with DoD became one of follow that road map or timeline. We high standard has developed? have to develop a more agile and quick way to deal with our international Steinbach: You are absolutely right. partners, in much the same way we When you look at our mission set to 5 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

now deal with our state and local law efforts? What metrics are most useful Levant] is certainly one of the most enforcement partners. to you in determining whether the important areas of focus for the FBI in FBI’s CT actions are having the desired the terrorism arena. CTC: You have publicly discussed your impact on the adversary and on our concerns about the growing gap between security more broadly? CTC: How does the Islamic State threat adversary use of technology and our differ from that posed by al-Qa`ida over own technology and laws—the “going Steinbach: I’ll keep it very simple. the past decade or so? dark” phenomenon1 as you have called Fortunately or unfortunately, the it. Is this a technological problem that only metric that counts is terrorist Steinbach: How al-Qa`ida and ISIL we have to solve, or a policy problem? incidents, and the baseline is zero. So have approached things is different. Al- Or both? if there are no terrorist attacks in the Qa`ida was a more organized structural United States, we succeed; if a terrorist model, and plotting [against the Steinbach: It is actually a three pronged succeeds in conducting an attack in the United States.] was more centralized problem. First, it is a legislative U.S. or against U.S. interests abroad, as compared to ISIL, which seems to problem. We need the laws to catch up we fail. And that’s really the bottom- have a more diffuse model. They have to technology. There are laws on the line metric. certainly used technology and modern books, so we are not asking for new or communications (in the form of social enhanced authorities. We are asking CTC: How would you evaluate and media) much more effectively than al- for existing authorities to be updated prioritize the various terrorist threats Qa`ida ever did. So there are a number and made relevant. There is a law called we face? Obviously much of the public of differences between al-Qa`ida 15 CALEA [Communications Assistance years ago and ISIL today, but I think you for Law Enforcement Act]. It applies “The only metric that could argue it’s perhaps an evolution of to telecommunications providers and it the same type of threat. requires them to provide technological counts is terrorist assistance when law enforcement has CTC: How has the nature of the domestic a court order permitting collection. incidents, and the baseline jihadist threat evolved in the past few Much of today’s communications, years? Many of these American jihadis however, are not through traditional is zero. So if there are no have shifted their support over from telecommunications providers. They al-Qa`ida to the Islamic State. How has are through Internet Service Providers terrorist attacks in the this changed the nature of the threat, or and social media and other companies your approach to combating it? that aren’t bound by CALEA. So, we United States, we succeed; need our legislature to take a look and Steinbach: I think it starts with ISIL’s update the laws and make them relevant if a terrorist succeeds...we propaganda. They are very effective to today’s environment. Second, it is a at marketing their brand, and one of public relations problem. We have to fail.” their propaganda streams is a Western- get past the [Edward] Snowden concern focused message that has influenced and inform the public again that we are many of these former al-Qa`ida- not asking for new, invasive authorities. following jihadists and brought them We are looking to act on a court order focus is on the Islamic State. Is this to their brand. The last couple years or legal authorities to collect what focus justified, or does it distract from has seen a fundamental shift in how the we should collect so we can prevent a other threats? message is pushed out. We previously crime or a terrorist incident. Third is had recognized the emergence of the the technology challenge. Many of the Steinbach: I think we need to separate internet as a paradigm shift because companies don’t have the technological what the American public and the the internet allowed for anonymity, capability to achieve these goals, so we media focuses on versus what we it allowed for someone in the United need to work with those companies to focus on. In many cases they aren’t the States to no longer have to travel to a develop technological solutions. So, it is same thing. The way we prioritize our foreign location to train, to radicalize; really a three-part problem. threats is though an intelligence-based you could now do all of that from the process. We examine threats from a comfort of your own home. CTC: One of the things the CT community national perspective and then a city- has struggled with is measuring specific perspective. We take a look I would argue in the past two or three effectiveness in this fight. How can we at what the intelligence is telling us, years another paradigm shift has taken develop measurable and useful metrics and identify what don’t we know and place and that is social media. Social to assess the effectiveness of our CT what we do know about a particular media is fundamentally different than threat. So we prioritize the threats the “traditional” internet, because we face based on what our collection even though the previous sites could be 1 Michael B. Steinbach, Assistant Director, Counterter- and our investigations tell us across anonymous, you still had to go to them, rorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, State- the landscape of the homeland and find the sites (some of them password- ment Before the House Homeland Security Committee, also worldwide. Having said all that, protected), and reach out, whereas June 3, 2015. ISIL [the Islamic State in Iraq and the jihadi users of social media, with its 6 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

horizontal distribution model, actually passively consuming the propaganda, You will find those types of cases in reach into the United States. And on which is their right, versus those every state in the country. smartphones with push notifications individuals consuming it and then it’s right there with someone 24/7, and taking it a step further and acting on CTC: What does success look like in the that is a fundamental difference. it or taking overt steps in support of CT fight? Is there such thing as victory, terrorism. That is the fundamental or is this just a long-running challenge Social media is used by younger challenge faced by the FBI—going that we’re going to have to manage and individuals, and the fighters overseas through all that noise out there and mitigate? have smartphones in hand, so the identifying the discrete signals. individual foreign fighters, young Steinbach: I think it’s a long-running individuals who are already over there, CTC: The foreign fighter problem challenge, and I think that you should are communicating directly with young appears to pose a particularly plan to expect there to be groups and interesting challenge to the law “The foreign fighter enforcement community given the “We have to be prepared scale of the problem and the lack of problem and the certainty regarding the intentions and for the long-haul. We level of threat these individuals pose. homegrown violent How would you evaluate this problem can diminish and reduce and assess the relative threat posed by extremist problem, though Americans who travel overseas (and the threat, but to think who may or may not return) versus very closely related, are those who stay home (either by choice the threat will go away or due to difficulties traveling) and two distinct problems. consider pursuing a violent path here? completely is probably not

The homegrown violent Steinbach: I don’t want to diminish very realistic.” the threat of foreign fighters, but extremist is of greater sometimes the media confuses the two categories. The foreign fighter problem entities that use the terrorist model to concern.” and the homegrown violent extremist attempt to achieve their objectives. For problem, though very closely related, that reason we have to be prepared for are two distinct problems. Compared the long-haul. We can diminish and individuals in Western countries, to Europe, the United States does not reduce the threat, but to think the threat including the United States. So instead have the same foreign fighter problem. will go away completely is probably not of that older ideologue trying to sell Our numbers are much smaller for a very realistic. something to the younger generation, variety of reasons. And those numbers you’ve got someone of similar age, are also relatively small compared to of similar background—a 20-year- the universe of FBI subjects in the old talking to a 20-year-old—so they homeland that are supportive of ISIL. can communicate in the language of a 20-year-old. This communication The foreign fighter problem does, model being used by terrorist groups, however, still pose several distinct and ISIL in particular, is probably the challenges. Once that person travels most significant change we have seen in overseas he or she develops skills and the last couple years. And that provides techniques, and if that person comes both opportunities and challenges. back to the United States they have an enhanced skill set with which to conduct CTC: So as you work to combat that, an attack. They could also go over there how do you make determinations in and be recruited by leadership who terms of your interjection into that recognize the foreign-born passport and process? Given the number of people the ability to have access to the United who are consuming this material, how States or Western European countries. do you allocate your finite resources to Third, the foreign fighters over there engage or intervene in those types of can be enlisted as recruiters for their conversations? former peers in the West.

Steinbach: You just hit on the But when you compare those two fundamental challenge the FBI is faced buckets, the homegrown violent with. With social media, this material extremist is absolutely of greater is out there in large volumes, so how concern for the FBI on a strategic scale. do you distinguish between people just 7 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

The Smoldering Thai grievances, and not a transnational promises to end the insurgency by 2016 threat. also have created a sense that the junta Insurgency was willing to give the security forces By Zachary Abuza Background more scope to control the insurgency.3 The insurgency in southern has thailand’s southern insurgency been intractable since violence erupted The junta was so buoyed by the decline continues to smolder in the three mostly in 2004. Four elected governments and in violence that it announced that Muslim provinces along the border with two military-installed regimes have starting in April it would withdraw five . However, mid-way through come no closer to resolving the conflict of its ten army battalions from the Deep the 12th year of this struggle, recent and it remains the single most lethal South, replacing them with paramilitary incidents suggest growing restlessness conflict in Southeast Asia, with nearly rangers, Ministry of Interior troops, on the part of the Muslim Malay rebels 6,400 dead and 11,000 wounded. and village defense volunteers.4 That after a historically unprecedented lull in Violence peaked in mid-2007, when decision may have been premature. the violence since August 2014. On June nearly three people a day were being Poorly trained rangers and Ministry of 3, four soldiers died in two separate killed. The insurgents overplayed Interior troops are ill equipped to take attacks, including an ambush. Some two their hand, however, and the RTA was on kinetic operations. weeks earlier, insurgents set off a wave goaded into action. Today, more than of nearly 20 bombs that injured 22. A 60,000 security forces are deployed in Rebels Return month earlier, in mid-May, a car bomb the south, an area roughly the size of Casualties, which hit a low of 24 exploded in an underground parking Connecticut. Violence declined in 2008, in December 2014, have stormed lot of an upscale mall on the resort but stabilized between 2009 and 2014, back. March, April, and May showed island of Samui, in the first out-of-area averaging 86 casualties per month.1 consecutive increases in violence operation by insurgents since December Violence dipped again following the with casualties jumping from just 27 2013; luckily only seven were wounded. May 2014 coup, though not by the 60 in February to 80 in May, well above percent the junta claims.2 Without a the average since 2009. January and The violence may pale in comparison to doubt, the operating environment for February saw 12 shootings combined; the major sectarian conflicts dominating insurgents is more difficult thanks to the three months following averaged the global stage at the moment, but a very robust system of check points, 20. IED attacks also moved higher than Thailand’s insurgency does not appear closed circuit television (CCTV), and long-term averages. In May, 33 IEDs to be burning out and there is little better armed and equipped troops. exploded while another 17 were defused hope of any resolution in the near term. Between June 2014 and May 2015, the before they detonated, for a total of 50 Neither is it without human tragedy, average number of casualties fell to bombs; the average since January 2009 with the body count now estimated to 51 per month. The average number of is 13.5. have hit 6,400. Peace talks have been people killed has fallen from 31 per abandoned since the Royal Thai Army month in 2009 to 17 since the coup. The May attacks may also mark a shift (RTA) threw out the government of in tactics. Thirty-four of the 50 total Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra The reduction in violence has been a IEDs were in Yala City, the southern in the May 22, 2014 coup, despite source of pride and accomplishment administrative capital. The remaining lip service from junta leader Prime for the junta that has been grasping at 16 bombs were placed along rural roads, Minister Praysth Chan-ocha about the any accomplishment to legitimize its which until this round of attacks had future of such efforts. rule. Insurgents interviewed by the represented the insurgents’ tactic of author in October 2014 and February choice. This is both because the security Fears that the insurgency may be swept 2015 acknowledged the changing forces, who were at greatest risk in such up in the wave of extremism sweeping environment. They cited as causes both attacks, are widely seen as legitimate through the Islamic world remain fierce flooding in December 2014 and targets, and because the urban areas overblown, however. The roots of the January 2015, but also that arrests were in the south are so heavily defended violence in Southern Thailand are taking a toll on the movement. They also with checkpoints and monitored with ethno-political in nature rather than reported a palpable fear of the security near ubiquitous CCTVs5 that launching primarily sectarian. Despite the arrests forces, which even under democratic attacks in cities is much riskier. The of over 100 Malaysians for supporting leadership had operated with near additional difficulties posed by staging the Islamic State, and the estimated 600 total impunity in the south under the attacks in built-up areas, as well as the Southeast Asians who have traveled 2005 Emergency Decree. Government potential for collateral damage among to Syria and Iraq to join the fight, there is no evidence of any support or recruitment in southern Thailand. 1 This and other data comes from an open source data- 3 Amy Sawitta Lefavre, “Thailand promises peace ‘with- base of attacks in Thailand’s Deep South that the author in a year’ in insurgency-hit south,” Reuters, November This article examines the roots of the has maintained since 2004. The numbers are conserva- 3, 2014, and personal interviews with insurgents, Pat- conflict, before explaining the recent tive; not every incident is reported in the press and there tani, Yala, and Narathiwat, February 2015. flare up of violence. It concludes by is little follow up; many wounded later die. 4 “South soldier swaps to start next month,” Bangkok arguing that Thailand’s insurgency will 2 “Violent incidents and casualties drop in Deep South,” Post, March 16, 2015. remain a localized conflict over political Thai PBS, April 23, 2014. 5 Author’s travels in southern Thailand during 2015. 8 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

the Muslim community, indicates that attack for a February 3 extra-judicial negotiate with several calls for talks to the insurgents may have additional goals killing of a suspected insurgent who had resume failing to result in any advances. beyond discrediting the government. recently been acquitted.7 On October For example, the team that approached 12, insurgents set alight six schools in Malaysia for assistance in bringing the When insurgents do stage major retaliation for the torture of three of insurgents to the table is headed by Gen. bombings in cities, it has usually also their members who had recently been Aksara Kerdphol, a confidante of Gen. been intended to communicate messages arrested.8 Additionally, on November Prayut and anathema to at least one about the campaign and to win further 1, 2014, gunmen opened fire on a group of the rebel groups.12 More seriously, support. For example, on February 20, of Buddhists drinking in ’s the junta’s draft constitution further 2015, insurgents detonated a car bomb in Thepa district, killing three civilians centralizes power in the Thai political Narathiwat. The target and timing were and wounding seven others, including structure, making any concession on very specific: a dozen bars and karaoke a girl. Insurgents left leaflets saying autonomy or even devolution of powers parlors in a Buddhist neighborhood. that it was a “mistake.” The language impossible,13 let alone the release appeared to consciously echo that used “When insurgents do stage by the RTA after an October 23 incident “These types of retaliatory in which Marines in Narathiwat’s Bacho major bombings in cities, district shot a car carrying a Muslim strikes are unlikely to force family of four, killing a 10-year-old it has usually also been girl.9 the current government intended to communicate These types of retaliatory strikes are back to the table, and that unlikely to force the current government messages about the back to the table, and that has created has created significant significant frustration among the campaign and to win rebels. Starting in February 2013, the frustration among the insurgents had entered into peace further support.” talks with the democratically-elected rebels.” government of Yingluck Shinawatra. The rebels appeared to be negotiating in good faith, though at times they seemed The bomb exploded in the middle of amateurish, for example, by making of insurgent suspects and political the day when bar traffic was minimal, post-facto demands.10 Three rounds prisoners. Few concessions are being rather than at night when the casualties of talks were held before they broke considered by the Thai government. would have been far higher. While down. The prevailing narrative is that 17 people were wounded and more the talks were postponed because of the The insurgents meanwhile are trying than 40 building were damaged, the political crisis that unfolded in Bangkok to show that they can still attack at insurgents clearly intended to minimize during the fall of 2013, and which will. Recent targeting suggests that the loss of life and signal their military culminated in the May 2014 coup d’etat. the insurgents are trying to force the capabilities. In reality, the talks had stalled long military government back to the table. before because of Thai army opposition In March and April, security forces A Focused Strategy to any concessions that the government made up 26 and 27 percent of the total The attack on Narathiwat, though, might make and increased targeting of casualties respectively, but that jumped was atypical and for the most part, the insurgents by security forces.11 to 54 percent in May. At the same time, the militants instead concentrate on the rebels are increasing their attacks retaliatory attacks with a far more Stalemate in the heavily defended cities. The focused use of violence than in the past. The situation appears to be stalemated. targeting of security forces continued One insurgent interviewed for this In the year since the coup, the junta in early June, with four soldiers article said, “The higher ups suggested has seemed insincere about its desire to gunned down in an ambush, and eight that we preserve our energy; save it wounded by a car bomb as their truck for retaliation for Thai violations of passed by.14 The insurgents have also ground rules....But when we hit, we 7 “Monk, 3 civilians slain in Pattani,” Bangkok Post, stepped up actions that get Bangkok’s hit hard.”6 For example, on February February 13, 2014. attention. For example, on March 14, 13, 2014, a Buddhist monk and three 8 “Six schools torched in Pattani,” Bangkok Post, October civilians (including a 12 year old boy) 12, 2014. were shot dead and a policeman and five 9 “Three men killed in apparent revenge shooting,” 12 “Aksara to be new chief of South talks,” Bangkok Post, other civilians wounded in a drive-by Bangkok Post, November 2, 2014. October 25, 2015. shooting in Mae Lan district of Pattani 10 “NSC rebuts BRN demands,” The Nation, April 29, 13 Saksith Saiyasombut, “Thailand’s next post-coup province. It was thought to be a revenge 2013. constitution: The dictatorship of the ‘good people’?” 11 “Prayuth calls BRN terms unacceptable,”Bangkok constitutionnet.org, May 29, 2015. Post, August 20, 2013, and “Paradorn downplays truce 14 “Savage Yala attack kills 4 soldiers,” Bangkok Post, 6 Personal interview, Yala City, February 9, 2015. violence,” Bangkok Post, July 26, 2013. June 3, 2015. 9 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

a bomb exploded as a squad of Border pause, and are now seeking to again arrests in Malaysia, but the concerns Patrol Police escorted Buddhist monks show the government that the only path are driven more by ignorance than to collect alms in Pattani’s Saiburi to ending the insurgency is through reality. Although the Salafi presence in district, wounding four police and two a negotiated political solution. While southern Thailand is growing, they are civilians.15 While no monks were killed Malaysia appears to have brokered the at odds with the Malay nationalists, and or wounded, it was the first such attack establishment of an umbrella grouping in many ways share many of the same since February 2014, and portends the of the various insurgent groups and prejudices toward them as demonstrated fear of greater sectarian conflict as factions in the historically fractious by the institutions of the Thai state. But Buddhists start to return to the south Majlis Amanah Rakyat Patani (MARA the rise of Salafism is having its own with the gradual decline in violence. Patani), they [Malaysia] have shown impact, making the traditional Sha’afis little will to negotiate with Thailand’s more conservative. Militants have also moved to immolate military government.18 the bodies of their victims, something A great concern to Thai security forces that causes particular distaste among Ethnicity, Not Religion, is the Key is that young university students the Buddhist community and which The revival of violence in Thailand’s are starting to be drawn to Islamic even the Islamic clergy have deemed predominantly Muslim Deep South has State propaganda. This seems to be “un-Islamic.” On May 6, insurgents spurred fears that radical extremists primarily driven by frustration that set fire to a middle-aged Buddhist will make their presence felt there as the Malay insurgents have nothing they have in other conflict zones such “Militants have also moved as Syria. That fear remains overblown. “Although the Salafi Other than a handful of training to immolate the bodies of manuals downloaded from the Internet, presence in southern there have been few proven links to their victims, something any international movement, including Thailand is growing, they Jemaah Islmaiyah or the Islamic State. that causes particular The roots of this fight are cultural are at odds with the Malay and sociological, and are very much distaste among the rooted in religion and language.19 The nationalists.” majority ethnic Malay Muslims who Buddhist community.” comprise roughly 85 percent of the 1.2 million inhabitants of Thailand’s southern provinces Yala, Pattani, akin to the Islamic State’s slick social Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla, see media campaign, rather than any true couple gunned down in Yala’s Bannang little space for them in the Thai nation ideological affinity, but as the conflict Sata district.16 On April 12, insurgents state. The conflict remains dominated drags on, many in the community believe torched the bodies of a couple they by conservative Sha’afi clerics, who that the militants have to increase the had killed in Sukhirin district of see themselves as the guardians of level and scope of violence to force the Narathiwat.17 Such desecrations have traditional Malay culture, and a government to peace talks. happened 54 times since January 2009, bulwark against Thai colonialism and but rarely since the end of that year. In cultural influence. Thai officials are Some insurgents seem to share this 2013, there were none, and six in 2014. frustrated that the 100-year project to perspective. The Koh Samui bombing Another gruesome tactic, beheading, assimilate the has failed, unlike is thought to be the work of Ubaidillah has not been used by the rebels since every other minority group. Many Thai Rommuhli. Rommuhli was responsible March 2014. officials refuse to even refer to them for the March 2012 bombing of the Lee as Malay, calling them instead “Thai Gardens Hotel in the commercial center Thai leaders seem convinced that with Muslims.” of Hat Yai that wounded more than the decline of violence following the coup, 500. The operation was not sanctioned they could enter into peace talks from a Despite concerns that the insurgents by the insurgent leadership. Indeed, position of strength, perhaps with only could reach out to transnational groups, one insurgent told me that most of nominal concessions. The insurgents such as the Islamic State, to date they the leadership had determined that have undermined the RTA’s claim that have remained inwardly focused. such attacks would only be authorized they have been defeated however. It is Thai authorities have expressed as a last resort, as they would be too evident that they were taking a tactical concern about the influence of the counter-productive. But more hard- Islamic State, including after recent line commanders may be insisting that similar types of operations are 15 “Pattani Bomb Targets Buddhist Monks, Injures 6,” necessary to take the insurgency to Khaosod English, March 14, 2015. 18 “Six separatist groups formed organization to hold the next level or force the Thai side to 16 “Motorists Shot Dead, Burned By Suspected Insur- peace dialogue,” Isra News, May 25, 2015. talks. Yet it is doubtful that hard-line gents in Yala,” Khaosod English, May 6, 2015. 19 Lindsay Murdoch, “The War in Southern Thailand is militants such as Rommuhli will be 17 “Eight Die in Two-Day Spate of Violence in Thai- Long-Running and Threatens to Spread,” Sydney Morn- able to win support because the risks land’s Deep South,” Benar News, April 13, 2015. ing Herald, June 6, 2015. are so much greater, and such tactics 10 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

would run counter to what to date has The Islamic Movement of pragmatic. The IMU logically justified been a very conservative and cautious Uzbekistan Opens a Door its support for the Islamic State,3 while insurgency. Also, the insurgency has not turning away from the Taliban, who limited resources and areas to operate to the Islamic State have a longstanding relationship with from, and it is fighting a large and well- By Damon A. Mehl the IMU. funded state security apparatus. Nonetheless, the statement is a Conclusion recent developments among Central significant marker. No other Central With violence largely contained to the Asian jihadi groups demonstrate a likely Asian jihadi groups had previously three southernmost provinces, and shift in support away from the Taliban pledged allegiance to the Islamic only one Westerner killed since 2004, toward the Islamic State. In mid- State,4 though there had been some the insurgency remains a low priority September 2014, the Islamic Movement earlier pledges from smaller groups in for both the military government of Uzbekistan’s (IMU) emir, Usman the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In in Bangkok and the international Ghazi, issued a statement announcing March 2014, a group of nine al-Qa`ida community, despite the violence that the IMU was now siding with the members from the region disassociated ongoing in the heart of Southeast Asia. Islamic State. themselves from al-Qa`ida and pledged Yet the Thai government has neither allegiance to the Islamic State.5 That the capabilities to defeat the insurgency The narrative of shifting support does was followed in late January 2015 with nor the political will to end it. The have its wrinkles, however. Ghazi the official creation of the Islamic State insurgents have limited resources did not outright declare allegiance, in Khorasan6 (ISK).7 The ISK included and are operating in a very hostile or bay`a, as many other jihadi groups some mid-rank leaders from the Afghan environment. As such, the violence in the Maghreb, the Middle East, and Taliban and the Tehrik-i-Taliban will likely remain subdued. To many Africa have done. Ghazi’s statement Pakistan (TTP) operating in Pakistan’s in the insurgency, this is an adequate of support was clearly diplomatic and Federally Administered Tribal and appropriate level needed to force is a pragmatic reflection of the IMU’s Areas (FATA), and Logar and Kunar concessions. Of course, frustrations political and tactical environment. provinces, Afghanistan.8 The role that are building among some insurgents given there is little expectation the More recently however, in early April government will give any ground 2015, a branch of the IMU did declare its 3 In his September 2014 statement, Usman Ghazi justi- despite new murmurs about peace talks unconditional allegiance to the Islamic fied the IMU’s statement of support for the Islamic State and there are signs that some rebels State. There is little evidence to indicate with multiple scriptures from the Koran. may change tactics, and start targeting whether this statement represents a 4 Among the Central Asian jihadist groups fighting in tourists on a more regular basis. There struggle for control of the IMU or just the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, only the IMU has are few internal checks on cells pursuing poor communication. Nonetheless, it pledged support for the Islamic State. The predomi- more aggressive tactics and despite the does underline the shifting alliances nantly Uzbek Islamic Jihad Union and the Tajik group inherent risks in such a strategy, some among jihadi groups in Central Asia Jamaat Ansarullah have remained silent on the issue. insurgents may believe they are worth it and highlights the need for continued There are three prominent Central Asian jihadist groups given that the smoldering low intensity observation given the operational fighting in Syria: the Imam Bukhari Battalion, Jannat struggle of the past decade has raised implications for the Islamic State of Oshiqlari AKA the Tavid va Jihod Battalion, and the awareness of Malay demands, but has increased support in Afghanistan and Central Asian/Dagestani Sabiri Jamaat. The first two not achieved them. Pakistan. groups fight with Jabhat al-Nusra and the latter is loyal to the Islamic State. The IMU also indicated they had Zachary Abuza, PhD specializes in politics Ghazi’s September 12, 2014 statement also fought in Syria in a June 2, 2014 statement available and security affairs in Southeast Asia. declared that, “on behalf of members at http://justpaste.it/messagefromIMU. Between 2010 and 2012 he was a Professor of our Islamic Movement, I herewith 5 Don Rassler, “Situating the Emergence of the Islamic of National Security Studies at the National announce to the world that we are State of Khorasan,” CTC Sentinel, 3:8, Combating Terror- War College. He is a currently an adjunct siding with the Islamic Caliphate ism Center at West Point. at the Army War College’s Security Studies [ed: The Islamic State].”1 Ghazi did 6 Khorasan is a historical geographical region dating to Institute. He has a forthcoming monograph not use terms such as bay`a2 or pledge pre-Islamic Sasanian dynasty during the 3rd Century of on the Thai insurgency due for publication of allegiance, but the statement was the Christian Era that covered northeastern Iran, south- by the National Defense University Press. intended to show its support for the ern Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan. The Islamic State’s Islamic State while not alienating its apparent definition is somewhat broader, stretching into patrons in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan as well. Usman Ghazi’s announcement was 7 “Die in Your Rage” by Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-‘Adani as-Shami was translated by Pieter Van Ostaeyen and can be found on his website 1 IMU statement dated September 12, 2014, “From the at https://pietervanostaeyen.files.Abu Muhammad Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to the Islamic State: al-‘Adani as-Shamiwordpress.com/2015/01/al-adnani- Word of Support and Advice,” posted to the IMU’s say-die-in-your-rage.pdf primary website www.jundurrahmon.com. 8 The Long War Journal provided an excellent graphic 2 Bay`a is an Islamic oath of allegiance. on ISK’s leadership available at http://www.longwar- 11 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

Central Asian jihadist groups like the the group.12 In exchange for the IMU’s hope that the Taliban and TTP would IMU will play in the ISK is uncertain. bay`a, the Afghan Taliban provided the eventually support the Islamic State.15 It is still unclear if the IMU is an ISK IMU with an area in which to train, member group and Islamic State leaders operate, and survive.13 It also seems clear that Ghazi must have in Iraq and Syria have not yet openly carefully calculated the risks inherent in responded to Ghazi’s support. The Taliban has more recently benefited such a statement and likely believed the from the relationship by having the IMU could withstand any subsequent The IMU Hedges Its Bets IMU fill leadership gaps among Uzbek pressure or criticism from the Taliban. The IMU’s decision to publicly support enclaves in northern Afghanistan. The IMU has not been reliant on the the Islamic State, while respecting Afghan Taliban’s provision of sanctuary the Taliban and Mullah Omar’s title “Ghazi must have or support recently, at least in the areas of ameerul mumineen,9 is pragmatic. The strongly controlled or influenced by the decision opens the door to the IMU’s carefully calculated the Taliban’s Quetta Shura.16 17 The IMU potential inclusion into the Islamic found shelter in South Waziristan with State, and could help reap a windfall risks inherent in such support from the TTP’s Mehsud faction of additional recruits, financing, and from at least 200918 until June 2014.19 resources, but it also attempts to a statement and likely IMU leaders likely assessed they would minimize any volatility with the Afghan be able to maintain their operating areas Taliban by holding back from outright believed the IMU could in northern Afghanistan20 following allegiance to the Islamic State. The IMU has operated in Afghanistan as guests of withstand any subsequent the Taliban since 1997.10 The two groups 15 Ibid. IMU statement dated September 12, 2014, “From have had a mutually beneficial working pressure or criticism from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to the Islamic relationship since then, which was State: Word of Support and Advice,” posted to the formalized by the IMU pledge of bay`a to the Taliban.” IMU’s primary website www.jundurrahmon.com: “We Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan hope that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the Taliban. The early relationship between Pakistan Taliban Movement will establish a brotherly the Taliban and the IMU is documented relationship with the Islamic State in the near future and in letters captured in Afghanistan, This has allowed the Taliban to expand cooperate in the sacred jihad against the kufr forces of which detail the Taliban accepting and its operating area into non-Pashtun the world, insh’Allah.” protecting IMU members crossing from areas.14 Despite the support expressed 16 Press reports and some IMU statements since June Central Asia,11 and providing shelter to for the Islamic State, Ghazi did not 2014 suggest the group fled South Waziristan, due to turn his back on the Taliban, and later Pakistan military operations. The IMU may have taken in the same statement he expressed his refuge in remote areas of Zabul and Faryab provinces journal.org/archives/2015/01/islamic_state_appoin.php. of Afghanistan. This will be discussed further in this 9 Ameerul Mumineen is an Islamic title meaning “Com- article. mander of the Faithful” or “Leader of the Faithful.” This 17 “Harmony Document SOCOM-2012-0000015-HT.” title has historically been reserved for the Caliph, the 12 “Harmony Document AFGP-2002-000489,” Com- Although Zabul may fall within the traditional area of leader of the Islamic Caliphate. Usman Ghazi’s associa- bating Terrorism Center, West Point. This document control and influence for the Quetta Shura, the province tion of the title with Mullah Omar in a statement of sup- is an internal IMU letter signed by Tohir Yuldashev has long been a refuge for foreign fighters including port for the Islamic State is problematic. The position of detailing the establishment of the IMU’s Bukhari from the IMU and al-Qa`ida. The IMU fled to Zabul “Commander of the Faithful” would technically be given Camp in Afghanistan due to the growth of the IMU in following their 2007 ouster from South Waziristan by to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as the leader of the Islamic Afghanistan because of the influx of members arriving militants loyal to Wana-based Commander Nazir, ac- State and self-declared leader of the “Caliphate.” from Central Asia. Yuldashev indicated the IMU needed cording to a report by Pakistani’s Dawn on 5 April 2007. 10 The IMU’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban is an independent camp because the Taliban provided Al-Qa`ida has also used Zabul as a refuge according to longstanding and documented multiple times in IMU shelter to the group when their numbers were small. As a declassified letter seized during the May 2011 Usama documents captured in Afghanistan by ISAF and in the IMU grew, the group rented houses from Taliban, Bin Laden raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan. IMU media and statements. In this instance, Usman and now required their own camp. 18 The first identifiable joint statement or media release Ghazi specified the IMU pledged bay`ah to Mullah 13 Footnotes 11 and 12 provide historical context to the by the IMU and TTP was a November 2009 video Omar in 1997 in his September 2014 statement of sup- Taliban and IMU relationship. More recent examples produced by the IMU’s Jundallah Media Production port for the Islamic State. of the Taliban’s use of IMU commanders to fill Taliban Studio titled ”Al-Ansar and Al-Mujahirun.” The video 11 “Harmony Document AFGP-2002-60112523,” leadership positions in Uzbek enclaves of northern was distributed by the IMU through their www.furqon. Combating Terrorism Center, West Point. This docu- Afghanistan are seen in ISAF press releases from 2008- com website. ment is a compilation of four personal accounts of IMU 2012 detailing ISAF operations targeting Taliban and 19 In June 2014, Pakistan’s military commenced members’ migration to Afghanistan from Central Asia. IMU commanders. Operation Zarb-e-Azb in Waziristan, which was the One specific account details a group of IMU members 14 Evidence of IMU leaders acting in leadership posi- IMU’s primary sanctuary. Multiple press reports and who crossed via the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border tions on behalf of the Taliban is noted in multiple ISAF a few statements from IMU elements indicate the IMU under fire from Turkmenistan border guards. The Tali- press releases from 2008-2012. See also Abubakar has recently operated in Zabul, Faryab, and Kunduz ban provided the IMU members protection and refused Siddique, “In Afghanistan, IMU-Taliban Alliance Chips provinces, Afghanistan. the border guard’s demands to return the IMU members Away At The Stone,” June 9, 2011, Radio Free Europe/ 20 In Afghanistan, the IMU has found refuge in the to their custody. Radio Liberty. northern Afghanistan provinces of Faryab, Badghis, 12 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

their statement of support to the Islamic his September statement of support to declined29 since Pakistan’s military State and despite any potential backlash the Islamic State. implemented Operation Zarb-e-Azb in from the Afghan Taliban. North and South Waziristan agencies, “Our shaheed ameer, Muhammad Tohir which was the IMU’s primary sanctuary The IMU’s Views on the Caliphate Foruq,25 gave us good news in many of until June 2014. The IMU’s statement of support for his khutbas26 that the wind of the caliphate the Islamic State is less surprising was blowing and that we should not What the IMU Can Offer the Islamic State when viewed in historical context. miss the caravan. Upon realization of While the IMU might hope to secure In 1999, the IMU founder and former that dream all members of our jamaah27 increased recruiting from its pledge leader Tohir Yuldashev described his unanimously became joyous.” of support to the Islamic State, the thinking regarding the establishment benefits flow both ways. The IMU of an Islamic state to the Voice of the The IMU’s public support for the can also provide the Islamic State Islamic Republic of Iran.21 Yuldashev Islamic State’s caliphate is clear, but or their regional affiliate ISK with stated the IMU’s highest goal was to how and in what manner the IMU could increased operating areas in northern “see the Holy Koran as the Constitution or would support the Islamic State Afghanistan, or provide an added of Uzbekistan,” adding that Uzbekistan offensive capability against strategic was “absolutely ready” to establish an “The IMU can also provide targets in South or Central Asia. The Islamic state. Yuldashev also discussed IMU has been responsible for and his perception that NATO22 had focused the Islamic State or their significantly contributed to several efforts against Islam following the successful high-profile attacks in collapse of the Soviet Union, a narrative regional affiliate with Pakistan’s settled areas in support of that is similar to the language used by the TTP. These attacks have targeted Usman Ghazi in the IMU’s pledge of increased operating areas hardened strategic locations in support to the Islamic State.23 sensitive areas. One hallmark of these in northern Afghanistan, attacks has been the high casualty In August 2010, Yuldashev’s rate, with a majority of attackers dying replacement and the new emir of the or an added offensive during the operation. The IMU targeted IMU, Usmon Odil, maintained the the Jinnah International Airport in group’s long-term goal of establishing an capability against strategic Karachi in June 2014,30 the Bacha Khan Islamic state.24 Odil said the IMU would International Airport in Peshawar in continue to build a single caliphate, targets.” December 2012,31 and Pakistan’s naval broadening the IMU’s mission. In the base at Shahrah-e-Faisal in Karachi in IMU’s most recent statement to the May 2011.32 Islamic State, Odil’s replacement Usman Ghazi cited the IMU’s happiness with and its regional affiliate ISK remains The June 9, 2014 attack on Karachi’s the reestablishment of the caliphate in difficult to identify.28 The IMU has only Jinnah International Airport is an issued a few statements and provided example of the IMU’s operational no further insight into the group’s capability to strike strategic targets for Kunduz, Baghlan, and Takhar, according to ISAF press actions to justify or even solidify their media gain. The Islamic State should be releases from 2008-2012 and IMU attack claims from statement of support for the Islamic able to leverage the same capabilities. 2007-2014. The author collected multiple IMU state- State. The IMU’s media profile has ments and claims of attack from 1999–2015 from IMU statements available on their websites, social media, and 29 Ibid., IMU website other jihadist forums. 25 Bill Roggio, “Tahir Yuldashev Confirmed Killed In 30 IMU statement signed by Usman Ghazi titled “State- 21 “Uzbek Opposition Head on Establishing Islamic US Strike In South Waziristan,” October 4, 2009, The ment Regarding the Martyrdom Operation in Karachi” State,” Mashhad Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Long War Journal. Shaheed translates into English as posted to the Jamia Hafsa Urdu Forum (jhuf.net) in Persian, May 18, 1999. martyr. Muhammad Tohir Foruq is the IMU’s founder English on June 10, 2014. The attack killed 37 people 22 It is interesting that Yuldashev declared NATO as Tohir Yuldashev. and ten jihadis. a threat to Islam prior to NATO’s establishment of 26 A khutba is an Islamic preaching or sermon. 31 The IMU is believed to have supported the TTP’s De- the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 27 Jamaah or jamaat translates into English as group. cember 15, 2012 attack on the Bacha Khan International Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001 attacks. This 28 The IMU’s website and social media accounts were Airport in Peshawar, Pakistan. See, “TTP Using Uzbeks view likely strengthened the IMU’s resolve to fight in the primary outlet to distribute their statements and to Conduct Terrorist Attacks” The News, December Afghanistan. have nearly fallen silent since June 2014, likely a conse- 18, 2012. Ten militants allegedly first fired rockets at 23 Ibid, “Uzbek Opposition Head on Establishing quence of Pakistan’s military operations in Waziristan the airport followed by deployment of a Vehicle Borne Islamic State.” and the IMU’s departure from the area. The IMU’s Improvised Explosive Device. 24 In mid-August 2010, the IMU’s website carried Us- primary website, jundurrahman.com, went offline 32 “Who are the Uzbeks Launching Terror Strikes in mon Odil’s statement in Uzbek on the group’s website sometime in early 2015, and their primary Twitter feed Pakistan,” The News Online in English (Islamabad), furqon.com. In this statement, Usman Odil breaks the @KhorasanArmy tweeted details of their June 2014 May 22, 2011. According to the report, four Uzbeki IMU’s one-year long silence to officially announce the attack on the Karachi airport and has been silent since members of the IMU attacked the PNS Mehran at August 2009 death of Tohir Yuldashev and his new with the exception of a December 10, 2014 tweet which Shahrah-e-Faisal resulting in the destruction of two P3C position as the group’s emir. stated, “We are back insha Allah!” Orion surveillance aircraft and damage to a third. 13 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

The attack, which was supported by to draw support.39 Nonetheless, the June 2014. However, someone or some the TTP33 and carried out by ten IMU IMU could use the Islamic State’s group claiming to be an IMU affiliate attackers, was initiated at 11:15pm with prophesized return of the caliphate as openly pledged allegiance to the Islamic the attackers equipped with small arms a justification to ramp up their their State in a video that circulated on and grenades divided into two groups.34 capabilities in northern Afghanistan, Dari language Facebook accounts in The 15-hour assault resulted in 37 killed, where the IMU has a proven operational early February 2015.43 The video was including the attackers, and damage ability, and the potential to conduct likely produced and uploaded by the to several important aerial assets.35 At targeted strikes in Central Asia.40 Faryab-based faction that the jihadist the time, Usman Ghazi indicated the sympathizer indicated had split with attack was revenge for the death of Usman Ghazi. women and children in Mir Ali, North “Recent developments, Waziristan, after bombardment by In the video, a Faryab-based IMU Pakistan’s military on May 21, 2014.36 If however, indicate that member, Sadullah Urgenchi,44 named that was in fact the trigger, it displays the Islamic State’s leader Abu Bakr al- significant operational capability given there may be an ongoing Baghdadi as their new leader instead of there was only 19 days separating the the Taliban’s Mullah Omar.45 Urgenchi two incidents. power struggle within the stated that according to Sharia, IMU militants believed Mullah Omar could The IMU could also provide the Islamic IMU.” no longer be their leader because State with a platform to launch attacks he had not been seen publicly for 13 in Central Asia37 and potentially years.46 Urgenchi’s proclamation of establish another regional affiliate, allegiance to the Islamic State in the which could be called the Islamic State Evidence of an IMU Fracture? video is overshadowed by the brutal of Mawarannahr,38 though these are Recent developments, however, beheading of an Afghan National less likely options. The two biggest indicate that there may be an ongoing Army soldier who was kidnapped with challenges are the IMU’s patchy power struggle within the IMU, though approximately 30 other Hazara men presence in Central Asia and the lack there are alternate explanations. In in Zabul province, Afghanistan in late of a radicalized population from which January 2015, the author interviewed a February 2015.47 In the video, Urgenchi France-based jihadist sympathizer who claims that the kidnapping was in closely tracks Central Asian jihadist retaliation for the Afghan government’s 33 The TTP first claimed credit for the attack, a claim groups.41 The individual indicated that arrest of female IMU supporters and that was quickly overshadowed by the IMU’s own state- the IMU had fractured following the threatened additional beheadings if the ment. Following the attack, Pakistan implicated and April 29, 2012 death of then IMU emir females were not released. The video is issued arrest warrants for TTP Emir Maulawi Fazlullah Usman Odil.42 The split was rooted emblazoned with the seal for the IMU’s and other TTP leaders. See “#KarachiAirportAttack: in disagreement over Usman Ghazi’s media wing, Jundallah, which is found Arrest warrant of TTP chief Fazlullah, others issued,” emphasis on operations in Pakistan on all official IMU videos. December 21, 2014, gtms Pakistan. instead of Central Asia or Afghanistan. 34 “Karachi airport attack: How it happened,” June 10, The sympathizer stated the IMU had Urgenchi is likely a member of the 2014, Dawn.com split into two elements: Usman Ghazi’s IMU, though his name, or a version of 35 Mid-June 2014, according to photos the IMU circu- faction, which supported the TTP it (Asadullah Urganchiy), appears only lated and retweeted from other Twitter users on their and which had issued the September once in more than 20 years of media @Khorasanarmy account. Pakistani media was largely 2014 statement offering support to the quiet over the damage caused by the attack. Islamic State; and an Afghanistan- 36 Abu Ibrahim, “Pakistan Wars Just Began.” This IMU focused group headquartered in Faryab, 43 IMU Leader Pledges Allegiance to Islamic State in publication details Pakistan military operations in Mir Afghanistan. Beheading Video of Afghan Soldier. The video can be Ali and the IMU’s claim that their homes and families viewed via the author’s YouTube account at this link: had been targeted. The statement included links to The evidence of a split is thin, given the https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMtcerbfySU pictures on their websites. limited statements from the IMU since [Caution: The video contains graphic footage of a 37 Despite its name, the IMU does not maintain a foot- beheading] hold in Central Asia. Instead the group primarily oper- 44 Urgench is a city in Uzbekistan, which is the capital ates in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, supporting the 39 Reid Standish “Shadow Boxing with the Islamic State of Khorezm province, located on the banks of the River TTP in their jihad against the Government of Pakistan in Central Asia,” Foreign Policy, February 6, 2015. Amu, and situated approximately 450 kilometers north- and in northern Afghanistan. 40 The IMU has not maintained a continuous presence west of Bukhara and near the Turkmenistan border. 38 Also known as Transoxiana, or in Arabic as Bilad in Central Asia over the past decade, despite multiple 45 Speaking in native-level Dari fluency. ma-Wara’ al-Nahar (land beyond the [Oxus] river). This claims of arrests by Central Asian countries. The IMU 46 Ibid, “IMU Leader Pledges Allegiance to Islamic is the ancient name used for the portion of Central Asia has primarily documented their presence in their State in Beheading Video of Afghan Soldier.” corresponding approximately with modern-day Uzbeki- statements and media in Pakistan’s tribal areas and in 47 Mirwais Adeel, “Uzbek Militants in Afghanistan stan, Tajikistan, southern Kyrgyzstan, and southwest Afghanistan. Pledge Allegiance to ISIS in Beheading Video,” March Kazakhstan. The predominantly Uzbek Imam Bukhari 41 Author interview, January 2015. 31, 2015, Khaama Press. The English-language Hazara. Battalion in Syria also calls themselves Mawarannahr 42 Bill Roggio, “IMU announces death of emir, names net website also carried a report about the kidnapping Mujohidlari. new leader”,Long War Journal, August 4, 2012. on February 25, 2015. 14 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6 releases and statements from the IMU.48 possibility exists that it could expand its Evolving Approaches Urganchiy is listed as the author of a operations into Central Asia. The IMU book published in 2013 called “What’s could also provide the Islamic State in Algerian Security Happening in the Tribal Areas” via the with a significant force multiplier in the Cooperation Pakistan-based jihadist media outlet region, similar to the way the IMU has By Kal Ben Khalid Jamia Hafsa Urdu Forum.49 been able to support the TTP’s attacks in Pakistan. The recent reestablishment The absence of a notable or of IMU sanctuaries in northern for the better part of a quarter century, identifiable IMU leader in the video is Afghanistan, particularly in the Uzbek Algeria had generally focused its interesting. The claim of allegiance is enclaves of Faryab52 and Kunduz,53 security policy inward in an attempt a bold statement and in more normal could also lead to the establishment of to secure domestic stability. While circumstances would likely have been a sanctuary that would rival or replace the National Liberation Front (FLN)- reserved for Usman Ghazi. There is one Pakistan’s tribal areas. If the IMU is led government took a relatively high reference to a similar message coming able to do so, it could use the area to international profile in the 1960s and from Usman Ghazi as IMU leader. An launch operations into Central Asia 1970s, the state became more inwardly Uzbekistani law enforcement official that would further their own strategic focused as the economic problems of reported in October 2014 that Usman interests or those of the Islamic State. the 1980s took hold. This domestic Ghazi indeed pledged allegiance to al- focus intensified during Algeria’s bitter Baghdadi, amplifying his September Damon Mehl is a senior analyst with the civil war during the 1990s. As Algerian statement of support.50 51 75th Ranger Regiment and previously the leaders sought to consolidate their Joint Special Operations Command and rule after crushing the decade-long The video supports evidence from the the US Central Command. He has over five Islamist insurgency, counterterrorism jihadist sympathizer regarding a split years of combat experience since 2001, became a key piece of Algeria’s efforts within the IMU, but there are alternate primarily in Afghanistan. Over the past at reengaging with the outside world. explanations. Usman Ghazi’s silence ten years, Mr. Mehl’s professional research This was especially the case after the on the IMU’s support or allegiance to experience has focused on Islamist groups September 11, 2001 attacks on the the Islamic State since his September and security issues in Central and South United States, as Algeria presented statement may simply be due to Asia. itself as an authority on fighting Pakistani military operations and Islamist terrorism. subsequent relocation of the IMU’s The views expressed here are those of network to more hospitable areas of the author and do not reflect the official Algeria’s leaders moved to assert Afghanistan. Nonetheless, it is clear policy or position of the Department of the themselves as responsible global though that both Usman Ghazi and the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. partners and took an active role Faryab-based Sadullah Urgenchi have Government. in regional security cooperation, expressed support for the Islamic State. hosting and coordinating a number of regional counterterrorism cooperation Conclusion frameworks at the diplomatic and The IMU’s support for the Islamic military levels. Many of these State is an important development, arrangements failed, however, when notwithstanding the possibility of a tested by the upheavals of the Arab split within the group. It has a proven Spring in 2011 and the 2012 jihadist track record of conducting high-profile takeover of northern Mali, in part attacks against strategic targets in because of ongoing distrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the regional governments and a lack of capacity.

48 The author has compiled a comprehensive database Following the In Amenas attack in of media statements produced by the IMU and Central January 2013 (which resulted in the Asian jihadists dating back to the mid-1990s. deaths of more than 35 hostages and 29 49 Asadullah Urganchiy, “What’s Happening in the jihadists), Algeria’s strategic discourse Tribal Areas” IMU. 2012. This book is translated into and posture shifted more dramatically. English by Jamia Hafsa’s translation department and The gas plant crisis was a strategic details the life of the IMU and its members in Pakistan’s surprise that shocked and embarrassed tribal areas. the leaders of Algeria’s security 50 Thomas Ruttig, “ANSF Wrong-Footed: The Taleban 52 An increase in Uzbek, Tajik, Pakistani, and Cauca- institutions. The response was marked offensive in Kunduz,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, sian fighters has been reported in multiple press reports. by a new willingness to engage with May 3, 2015. See, Fazul Rahim, and Alexander Smith, “ISIS-Linked external partners, but this article will 51 Jane’s Country Risk Daily Reports, “IMU hopes Fighters Tighten Grip in Afghanistan, Outmatch Tali- argue that the underlying motivation alignment with Islamic State will improve its finances, ban Brutality” NBC News, May 1, 2015. has remained the current crop of increasing risks to government targets in Uzbekistan,” 53 Ibid, Thomas Ruttig, “ANSF Wrong-Footed: The leaders’ understanding of how to secure October 7, 2014. Taleban offensive in Kunduz.” the country’s long-standing national 15 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

interest regarding external threats, country’s internal security regimen outlets. These include official journals maintain Algeria’s regional dominance, and cultivating bilateral security such as the Chiefs of Staff’s El Djeich.7 They and secure domestic stability. arrangements with countries such as also include government-backed think Tunisia to stem the growth of cross tanks and research institutes, such as The Roots of Change border activity by extremist groups. the Institut Militaire de Documentation, Changes in Algeria’s security posture d’Evaluation et de Prospective (IMDEP) were prompted by a number of important Reorganizations and Rethinking and Institut National d’Études de strategic surprises since 2011. Cross- At a policy level, the Algerian Stratégie Globale (INESG). These border attacks by jihadist groups intelligence services were reorganized organizations have hosted conferences operating in Mali during 2012, such as in late 2013 and early 2014.2 Various and symposia that explore the evolving the Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb organs of the powerful Department Algerian perspectives on crisis (AQIM) splinter faction Movement of Intelligence and Security (DRS), diplomacy, military cooperation and for Unity and Jihad in West Africa the Algerian military intelligence assistance, humanitarian operations, (MUJWA), were among the most notable service, were moved to other sections strategic communications, command incidents highlighting the vulnerability of the military, and their leaders were and control doctrine, counterterrorism, of Algeria borders. Attacks included dismissed, retired, or appointed as border security, electronic warfare, and suicide bombings targeting barracks advisors to the Presidency. Certain surveillance technology.8 sub-organizations were abolished or “The 2013 In Amenas gas divided.3 Like many Arab intelligence “According to some services, Algeria’s intelligence plant hostage crisis was a community is highly compartmentalized reports, the result has been and politicized, and public narratives turning point and quickly around these reorganizations attributed that the military’s Chiefs of them to efforts to improve intelligence led to shifts in emphasis in coordination and assert the control Staff have gained greater of the Chief of Staff and Presidency Algerian security policy.” over the DRS, which is widely seen as influence.” a fiefdom.4 Widespread speculation also described these moves as part of a long power struggle between allies and security installations in southern of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Starting in 2014 at the direction of the Algeria, at Tamanrasset, but also as far those of General Mohamed “Tewfik” Chiefs of Staff, IMDEP began publishing north as Ouargla.1 Mediene, the DRS chief since its a biannual strategic studies journal creation in 1990.5 called Strategia, which is published in Algerian-led multilateral security Arabic, French, and English. From the frameworks such as the Tamanrasset- According to some reports, the result has start, the subjects highlighted a more based Comité d’Etat-major Opérationnel been that the military’s Chiefs of Staff outward focus for Algerian security Conjoint (CEMOC) were meant to have gained greater influence over the policy. Articles in the inaugural issue coordinate counterterrorism operations direction and focus of counterterrorism of spring 2014 included topics such between Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and counter-trafficking policy.6 as the adaptation of the national state and Niger as concerns about jihadist in the face of globalization and recent activities in the region escalated in the Policy Journals Track Shift international crises, the role of social late 2000s. But they proved ineffective The Algerian defense policy apparatus and were sidelined during the French has several intellectual and ideological intervention in northern Mali. Algeria’s 7 El Djeich is the official journal of the Algerian military’s approach also suffered setbacks from Chief of Staff, and has been a mouthpiece for military political instability in Libya, which 2 Steve Massa, “Is a Possible Power Struggle Looming in policy since the 1970s. It has alternated between having left Algerian and Tunisian institutions Algeria?” November 26, 2013, The Journal of Diplomacy been publicly available and having more limited circula- without viable security counterparts and International Relations, and Lamine Chikhi, “Alge- tion since the 1980s. in Tripoli as they tried to coordinate ria’s Bouteflika consolidates curbs on state intelligence 8 See for example: B. Djaouida, “Prospective sur border security efforts among the three agency,” Reuters, October 24, 2014. l’évolution des événements dans le monde arabe,” El countries. The 2013 In Amenas gas 3Riyadi Hamadi, “Vers une profonde restructuration du Djeich, January 2014, p. 50; H.G. Sihem, “La stratégie plant hostage crisis was a turning point DRS,” Tout Sur Algerie, September 29 2013. des acteurs européens et des USA en Méditerranée et and quickly led to shifts in emphasis 4 Lamine Chikhi, “Analysis: Algeria’s Bouteflika flexes dans la région du Sahel : concurrence ou complémen- in Algerian security policy. Algerian muscles before 2014 vote,” Reuters, October 1, 2013. tarité?” El Djeich, June 2013, p. 51; H.G. Sihem, “INESG. leaders focused on buttressing the 5Isabelle Mandraud, “Power struggle takes centre stage Crise, choix du modèle économique et integration ahead of Algerian presidential election,” The Guardian, régionale en Méditerranée : quels enjeux?” El Djeich, February 25, 2014. May 2011, p. 60; F. C. Amel, “Colloque national organisé 1 AFP, “Mali-based Islamist group claims Algerian at- 6 Florence Gaub, “Algeria’s Army on Jihadist Alert,” par l’IMDEP: Le Maghreb et les mutations régionales: tack,” Alarabiya, June 30, 2012, and “Al-Qaeda offshoot European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief 6, Quelle synergie face aux nouveaux défis ?”El Djeich, claims Algeria attack,” Al Jazeera, March 3, 2012. March 2015. February 2015, p. 50. 16 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

media in public safety, and evaluation of meanwhile lack credible border This also involved a new focus on direct the Algerian approach to security in the security, institutions or capabilities, military-to-military collaboration Sahel.9 Important areas of investigation and are in the throes of ethno-sectarian, with officials in Tunis. The internal in Algerian strategic studies and institutional, and ideological conflicts. organization of certain military regions military journals in recent years have also has been revised to concentrate on included innovations in Command and Climbing the Learning Curve counterterrorism or smuggling.14 Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and The perception of risk and Algeria’s own Reconnaissance (C2ISR), especially history of internal fragmentation have Tunisia: A Case Study as related to the country’s southern made the country’s leaders reluctant A focal point of this evolution has frontiers, drone technology and to engage in deep or expeditionary been Algeria’s increasing security remote sensing, and formulating military operations.12 There are echoes cooperation with Tunisia on Algerian responses to the emergence of too of the state’s approach to the bitter counterterrorism, border security, and humanitarian interventionism.10 civil war of the 1990s. As in its internal customs since 2013. For Algiers, Tunisia war, Algeria has struggled to cope with represents a buffer from instability in The shift was also seen in the subject crises since 2012. According to critics, Libya. Tunisia’s proximity to Algeria’s material at National Gendarmerie (NG) demographic center of gravity—the conferences. The NG is responsible “Algerian security northern coast and mountains—and its for border policing, customs, and proximity to Libya make the emergence rural law and order, and material at assistance appears of AQIM-linked militants there more symposia highlighted new strategies serious. The mountains and plains for the coordination of customs intended to both boost linking northwest Libya to Tunisia operations with bordering countries, and eastern Algeria present a complex especially Tunisia.11 This speaks to efforts to engage with its geography that poses problems for two trends: a reevaluation of elements military activity. The threat from Libya, of Algeria’s defense policy at a high neighbors and attract the symbolized by the spectacular and level and an effort to promote and humiliating attack at In Amenas, make socialize these analyses and policies sponsorship of Western the eastern frontier a new frontline among key audiences internally and for Algerian efforts to resist regional internationally. and other countries instability. In 2013, the Algerians deployed 12,000 troops to its border The Algerians see a region fraught anxious over instability.” with Tunisia.15 They also sent similar with risk and crisis. Algeria’s leaders numbers of soldiers and paramilitary regard Morocco as passively hostile, forces to the Libyan, Nigerien, and and Mauritania and Niger as reliable if Malian borders with the objective of fragile. Tunisia is regarded as a serious it projected power timidly. Algeria interdicting and deterring cross-border concern, however. That country’s learned lessons from its decade-long attacks by jihadist militants.16 security apparatus has suffered a struggle with an Islamist insurgency in number of setbacks in the last four the 1990s. This led to changes in how Algiers Helps Itself by Helping the Region years and has struggled to adapt to the it dealt with internal dissent, protests, Algerian security assistance appears challenges posed by an underground special operations, communications, intended to both boost efforts to jihadist militancy. Algeria fears that and other matters. Its policy shifts engage with its neighbors and attract a jihadist safe haven could develop in recent years indicate that military the sponsorship of Western and other along its mountainous frontier with security doctrine continues to evolve in the Tunisian provinces of Kasserine, a changing threat environment. In 2013, El Kef, and Jendouba. Mali and Libya Algeria started to close its borders or 24, 2014 and Lamine Chikhi, “Wary of disorder in Libya place them under military control and and Mali, Algerian army targets southern smuggling,” ramped up efforts against smuggling Reuters, May 11, 2015. 9 “Nouvelle revue spécialisée dans les études de défense and other illicit activities, in an effort to 14 There is also talk of adding an additional military et de prospective,” El Djeich, April 2014, p. 52. address mounting instability resulting region, increasing the number from six to seven. Ac- 10 Samia Djenaoui Goubi, “Les Technologies de from the disruption of Tunisian border cording to press reports, the government would split in l’Information et de la Communication: La clé du succès security and intelligence operations.13 two the 4th Military Region, which covers much of the opérationnelle,” El Djeich, October 2013, p. 44–47; “ESG. Algeria’s borders with Libya and Niger and which is Conférence sur le système C4ISR,” El Djeich, June 2011, headquartered at Ouargla.Gaidi Mohamed Faouzi, “Feu p. 60; “ESG. ‘Assurer la sécurité de l’Etat sur le plan 12 Alexis Arieff, “Algeria and the Crisis in Mali,” Institut vert pour une 7e Région militaire à Illizi,” El Watan, militaire en temps de crise,’ thème du Wargame,” El français des relations internationals (IFRI), July 2012 December 7, 2014. Djeich, June 2011, p. 60; “Séminaire sur le développe- and Laurence Aida Ammour, “Regional Security 15 “L’Algérie déploie 4.000 soldats à ses frontières ment des Tic à l’EST: Plus de sécurité et de haut debit,” Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria’s Pivotal avec la Libye et le Niger pour traquer des trafiquants El Djeich, June 2013, p. 46. Ambivalence,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Brief d’armes,” Xinhua, September 3, 2014. 11 B. Djaouida, “Conférences à l’Ecole supérieure de 8, February 2012. 16 “L’Algérie déploie 4.000 soldats à ses frontières Guerre: Contribution des Douanes à la sécurité natio- 13 George Bajalla, et al, “Algeria at a Crossroads: Bor- avec la Libye et le Niger pour traquer des trafiquants nale,” El Djeich, January 2014, p. 49. ders and Security in North Africa,” Muftah, September d’armes,” Xinhua, December 22, 2014. 17 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

countries anxious over instability in and Tunisians both regard low-level and other Tunisian provinces bordering Libya and elsewhere. The Tunisians smuggling as something that must be Algeria.23 have also received support from Western tolerated to some degree in order to militaries, with the United States for short circuit popular discontent, but The Changing Threat Environment example tripling its security assistance which can aid their enemies. As a result, A common regional perception of to Tunisia in 2015 and planning to the military attempts to limit the growth threat emerged during 2013 and 2014. give the country major non-Nato ally and operations of organized criminal Crises in Mali, Syria, and Libya have status.17 18 Yet true to form, Algeria groups, but will not root it out entirely. also changed Tunisian perspectives continues to closely guard its role in the After the 2011 revolution, Tunisia’s (even among moderate Islamists), region and remains wary of too much demoralized internal security services particularly as youth from Tunisia Western involvement. Algeria’s leaders melted away from the frontier and its flocked to participate in jihadist likely also see close collaboration with intelligence networks along the border movements in Syria, Mali, and Libya Tunisia as a way to avoid potential collapsed, contributing to an explosion with some returning with deadlier Western intervention in either Tunisia in illicit trade. The boom allowed new skills and deeper ties to regional terror or Libya, after widespread criticism of trabendistes (smugglers) to emerge, in groups. Political assassinations, suicide the light touch they used in the Mali both Tunisia and Algeria.20 bombings, and killings of soldiers

“Yet true to form, Algeria Unsurprisingly, some of AQIM’s “AQIM’s surrogates took surrogates took advantage of the continues to closely guard security vacuum and boom in smuggling advantage of the security to move into western Tunisia from its role in the region and eastern Algeria. Applying a strategy vacuum...to move into honed in Algeria, AQIM surrogates remains wary of too much have so far targeted only military and western Tunisia from security targets, especially those that Western involvement.” originate outside of their main area of eastern Algeria.” operations. Groups such as the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, which reportedly has links to both AQIM and Ansar al- crisis, which ended with French military Sharia in Tunisia, are controlled by intervention. The Algerian military AQIM’s commanders in Algeria and and police in western and northern continues to stress in its messaging that draw Tunisian recruits and support.21 Tunisia by AQIM-linked militants the Algerian state remains committed This process heightened Algerian have increased support for wider to “the peaceful resolution of conflicts” concerns over the development of a new counterterrorism cooperation and a without foreign, especially Western, safe haven in western Tunisian that more assertive security service.24 intervention.19 could enable militant operations inside Algeria. The Tunisian government’s crackdown A Security Vacuum Encourages Cooperation on supposedly non-violent jihadist This regional security cooperation At the same time, the return of Tunisian groups like Ansar al-Shariah in Tunisia extends to other issues such as organized jihadists from Syria and Libya has since 2013 has driven the country’s crime and smuggling. The Algerians boosted the country’s threat profile. In youth-driven militant subculture the summer of 2014, the Tunisian Army further underground or into Libya suffered its largest number of casualties and spurred an increasingly violent 17 “U.S. pledges $60 million to aid Tunisian Army’s ever, when AQIM militants ambushed low-level insurgency in the area along war on terror,” World Tribune, September 2 2014. and and killed 15 soldiers and wounded 20 the country’s western border.25 Hard- Suzanne Malveaux, “President Obama pledges aid to more in a raid on checkpoints near Jebel line jihadists have divided themselves Tunisia,” CNN, May 22, 2015. Chaambi.22 Militants continue to target among camps loyal to AQIM and those 18 Danica Simans, “NPS Helps Northern Africa Im- Tunisian National Guards, police, and that back the Islamic State.26 Some prove Border Security through Series of Workshops,” soldiers in Kasserine, El Kef, Jendouba, Naval Post Graduate School, March 13, 2014. 19 H. G. Sihem, “L’Algerie et le règlement pacifique des 23 Bouazza Ben Bouazza, “Militants kill 4 Tunisian conflits: Constante immuable,”El Djeich, April 2015, pp. national guard troops,” Associated Press, February 18, 23–25. This article presents the principles of Algerian 2015. foreign policy and includes text of part of a speech by Al- 24 Stephano Torelli, “Tunisia’s Elusive Jihadist Net- gerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika commemorating 20 “Tunisia’s Borders: Jihadism and Contraband,” work,” Terrorism Monitor, 11:12, June 2013. Algeria’s Victory Day in its war for independence from International Crisis Group,” N°148, November 28, 2013. 25 “Tunisia’s Borders (II): Terrorism and Regional France, which highlights comments reiterating “the 21 Aaron Zelin, Andrew Lebovich, and Daveed Gartens- Polarisation,” International Crisis Group, N°41, October support and solidarity of Algeria with the brotherly and tein-Ross, “Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisia 21, 2014. neighborly people of Tunisia,” apparently a reference to Strategy,” CTC Sentinel, 6:6, 2013. 26 Aaron Zelin, “Between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda Algerian mediation in Tunisia’s political crisis last year 22 “Tunisian soldiers killed in attack near Algerian in Tunisia,” International Centre for the Study of Radi- and ongoing security cooperation. border,” BBC.com July 17, 2014. calisation (ISCAR), Insight, May 11, 2015. 18 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

AQIM units operating in Algeria and of Algiers’s engagement with Tunis and training from the Algerians as Tunisia have reportedly shifted their has focused on drawing attention to essential.34 Tunisia’s security services allegiance to the Islamic State following militant activity on their common are overextended, demoralized that group’s initial claims for incidents frontier, which Tunisian security forces (especially law enforcement), and ill- such as the kidnapping of a French have tended to see as a secondary threat prepared for the low-intensity violence mountaineer east of Algiers in 2014 compared to the southeastern border brought on by jihadist youth movements and its expansion in Libya.27 However, with Libya.30 and AQIM elements that have emerged the extent to which such units have since 2011. The Tunisians must adapt benefited in terms of capacity and “There are reports of the Algerians tactically and structurally to address recruitment remains unclear. providing training to Tunisia’s elite the threats posed by the jihadist groups troops, with Tunisian leaders seeking operating in their country. As part of out Algeria’s expertise in dealing “Algerian cooperation with jihadist groups. Both sides have “Many in the Tunisian exchanged multiple high-level defense with Tunisia has focused delegations in the last two years.31 In military and security 2013, the two governments established on targeting AQIM-linked a joint intelligence unit and in 2014 services see assistance they reached an agreement on border militants in Jebel Chaambi security coordination. Meanwhile, and training from the Algerian press reports hint that and cracking down on operational coordination may have led Algerians as essential. to Algerian military participation in smuggling networks.” joint operations inside Tunisia, despite Tunisia’s security services official denials.32 This cooperation is best symbolized by the Algerian- are overextended, Tunisian Joint Commission, whose Regional Efforts military component has been especially demoralized (especially Political crises and the deteriorating active in recent years.33 security environment in Tunisia law enforcement), and ill- prompted Algeria’s leaders to intervene Many in the Tunisian military and and boost security cooperation as much security services see assistance prepared.” as they could. They helped mediate between the Ennahdah government and its opponents in 2013. At the end 30 Tunisian security and political leaders have tended of 2012, the two countries signed a to view security threats as emanating toward the coast that process, Tunisian Army, Air Force, border security agreement, facilitating either from abroad or from the country’s desert south. and intelligence delegations have made joint patrols and operations. And in This has been due in part to expanding instability in repeated visits to Algiers recently.35 January 2013, Algerian, Tunisian, Libya and threats related to small arms proliferation Tunisian National Guard and special and Libyan representatives met at and illicit migration. At the same time, many security operations leaders have, for example, Ghadames in northwestern Libya to elites view threats to the country as threats to the studied the training and tactics of the coordinate border security, though country’s more developed coastal region, home to most Algerian Gendarmerie’s elite Rapid Libya’s contributions were hampered of Tunisia’s economically vital tourism industry. This Intervention Detachments, as well as by political crises and Tripoli’s weak has led to some neglect of security threats in parts of control of militias operating on its the interior west and in coastal urban areas seen as less frontiers.28 likely to produce or be targeted by terrorist threats. Recent incidents and attacks in Tunis, such as the Algerian cooperation with Tunisia Bardo National Museum attack in March and escalating has focused on targeting AQIM-linked insurgent activities in Kasserine, El Kef, Sidi Bouzid, bat Growing Terror Threat,” Al-Monitor, May 2, 2013 militants in Jebel Chaambi and cracking and Jendouba governorates has contributed to shifts in and “Algeria-Tunisia Joint Commission: Security and down on smuggling networks.29 Much this perspective. development high on agenda,” Algérie Presse Service, 31 “Tunisia, Algeria agree to step up co-operation in February 8, 2014. tourism, trade and security,” Agence Tunis Afrique 34 Youssef Cherif, “Tunisia’s Foreign Policy: A Delicate 27 Melanie Matarese, “Le ralliement d’Al Mourabitoune Presse, May 17, 2015. “Tunisian people grateful to Balance,” Atlantic Council, March 23, 2015 à l’EI pose des questions sur le sort de Belmokhtar,” El Algeria for its solidarity,” Algérie Presse Service, May 35 See for example: “Le président Bouteflika reçoit le Watan, May 15, 2015. M. Aziz, “Daech recrute dans les 9, 2014. chef du gouvernement tunisien,” El Djeich, December prisons algériennes,” El Watan, May 29, 2015 32 Mokrane Ait Ouarabi, Attentats terrorists en Tunisie: 2012, p. 6; “Audiences du chef d’état-major de l’ANP: 28 Ali Shuaib, “Libya, Algeria and Tunisia to step up l’engagement de l’armée algérienne,” August 4, 2014, El Le chef d’état-major des armées tunisiennes,” El Djeich, border security,” Reuters, January 12, 2013. Watan and “Une cellule de renseignement tuniso-algéri- December 2012, p. 7; “Délégations militaires étrangère 29 Mokrane Ait Ouarabi, Attentats terrorists en Tunisie: enne pour arrêter les terroristes de Châambi,” Mosaique s en Algérie: Tunisie,” El Djeich, August 2013, p. 9; l’engagement de l’armée algérienne,” El Watan, August FM, August 3, 2013. “Delegations militaires etrangeres en Algerie: Tunisie,” 4, 2014. 33 Kaci Racelma, “Tunisia, Algeria Join Efforts to Com- El Djeich, January 2015, p. 18. 19 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

Algerian criminology and forensics might come to dominate Tunisia, due to neighboring countries will narrow labs.36 its significantly larger size and reports gaps that lead to the kind of strategic that Algerian leaders have requested surprises that emerged from the There are problems, however, despite Tunisian authoritites notify them ahead upheavals of 2011 through 2013. It the push to cooperate. Algiers has of any defense-related agreements with also appears to believe that closer ties reportedly been the driving force for other countries.41 with countries like Tunisia will help the intensified relations, reportedly compensate for the lack of a coherent causing some anxiety in Tunis. There Press reports have mentioned concerns security sector in Libya. As the is also significant distrust. While long- among unnamed high level officers region becomes increasingly unstable, term relationships between Algerian in Tunisia42 that Algeria may exert Algeria’s leaders appear more prepared and the Tunisian intelligence services influence over armed groups operating to pursue their security targets and remained relatively intact after 2011, in Tunisia using the penetration and promote regime sustainability through some military collaboration suffered in manipulation tactics for which the collaboration with regional militaries the wake of the revolution, given that DRS is well known. Whatever the case, that share their goals. the Tunisian Army had to compensate Tunisia-Algeria military-to-military for the weakness of the Interior and intelligence cooperation appears Kal Ben Khalid is a Washington, D.C.- Ministry during those events.37 At the be a fact of life as a result of escalating based North Africa analyst and research same time, communication between the tension within Tunisia itself, the consultant. He is the author of the Algerian and Tunisian security forces northwest Africa-focused blog, The Moor has generally been hierarchical and “Some Algerian elites Next Door. The views expressed here are slow, despite efforts to formalize lower- his alone. level border security and customs feared that Tunisia’s collaboration. democratic transition Algerian institutions and leaders also distrusted Tunisia’s transitional might inspire Algerian government, led by the moderate Islamist party Ennahdah. Ennahdah’s groups to emulate their leadership was just as suspicious of their Algerian counterparts.38 These overthrow of a long- concerns were usually attributed to Ennahdah cadres’ view of Algeria as a standing regime.” meat grinder for Islamists, based on the treatment of Islamists by the Algerian military during the 1990s, experiences which were communicated to Ennahda fragmentation of Libya’s political and leaders in Europe at the time through a security institutions, and the largely well developed Islamist grapevine.39 unbridled expansion of the jihadist presence in Libya. At the same time, some Algerian elites feared that Tunisia’s democratic Conclusion transition might inspire Algerian groups These shifts in Algerian policy reflect to emulate their overthrow of a long- responses to strategic surprises and standing regime. Many press reports setbacks for Algerian and international and rumors since 2011 depicted Tunisia security policy over the last four years. as a kind of overflowing cauldron of The key response from the Algerian fanaticism, bearded, stone-throwing state has been an attempt to cope with youth, and general crisis.40 On the other an unraveling security environment hand, some in Tunisia fear that Algeria by beefing up its internal and border defense posture and bilateral security arrangements with key neighboring 36 “Délégations militaires étrangères en Algérie: Tu- countries, such as Tunisia. The ruling nisie,“ El Djeich, May 2015, p. 15. elite in Algiers hopes that enhanced 37 “Tunisia’s Borders: Jihadism and Contraband,” Inter- border security measures and deeper national Crisis Group,” N°148, November 28, 2013. military-to-military cooperation with 38 Youssef Cherif, “Tunisia’s Foreign Policy: A Delicate Balance,” Atlantic Council. March 23, 2015. 39 Ibid. “Tunisia’s Foreign Policy: A Delicate Balance.” 41 Youssef Cherif, “Tunisia’s Foreign Policy: A Delicate 40 Z. Aniss, “Des groupes extrémistes cèdent à la tenta- Balance,” Atlantic Council, March 23, 2015. tion de la violence: La menace djihadiste plane sur le 42 Tam Hussein, “Tunisia’s Militant Struggle,” The pays,” El Watan, February 6, 2013. Majalla, August 1, 2013. 20 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

Haunted by their Past: divisions and swelling the territorial first Kurdish independent Republic,4 ambitions of each side. was made the honorary president of the Kurds and the Islamic State party while Hamza Abdullah, one of the Hoshang Waziri and Lydia Wilson This article explores the apparent original party’s founders, was elected failure to overcome these historical as the secretary general. divisions, despite a common and after sweeping victories in Syria formidable enemy, and shows how In 1951, a young intellectual from the and Iraq in June and July 2014 that tensions are growing rather than city of Sulaimayiah, Ibrahim Ahmad, brought them ever closer to Baghdad, receding. The analysis underlines the succeeded in recruiting most of the the Islamic State suddenly changed sheer complexity facing policymakers. Iraqi Kurdish leftists and nationalists course in August, turning east toward Any move to help the Kurds in their into the KDP. In March 1951, the second Iraq’s Kurdish region. The Kurds were fight against the Islamic State must be party congress was held, and Barzani’s taken by surprise. In the resulting weighed against the danger of stoking wing lost to Ibrahim Ahmad who was scramble, the peshmergas retreated tensions through counterproductive elected Secretary General. In 1958, ahead of the snowballing, rapid Barzani returned from exile in the advance of the jihadists, leaving tens “The Islamic State’s Soviet Union. Soon after, he began to of thousands of Yazidis around Sinjar interfere in party affairs which led to and Christians in the Nineveh plains military success had also repeated conflicts with other members to flee or be captured.1 Islamic State of the politburo, especially with Ibrahim forces eventually swept through the reawakened those same Ahmad.5 Eventually, in April 1964, Makhmour and Gwer regions, reaching the political bureau stripped Barzani within 20 kilometers of the Kurdish divisions. The jihadists’ of his authority. In response Barzani capital, Erbil.2 successfully expelled Ibrahim Ahmad, assault has revived the and other key members from the party.6 Two things were clear at that point: The rivalry between these two men, the Kurds were not prepared to face rivalry between the two with Barzani representing rural, tribal such a serious military offensive, nor society, and Ahmad coming from an had they seen it coming. Apart from main Kurdish political urban background,7 is still present in some involvement in the 2003 U.S.-led the current political landscape. invasion, Iraqi Kurds had not used arms parties.” collectively and intensively since the The next important step came on June brutal civil war of the 1990s known in 1, 1975, when Jalal Talabani (current Kurdish memory as the brakujie (Brother leader of the PUK, and Ibrahim Ahmed’s Killings). What was less obvious was decisions. Additionally, the analysis son-in-law) announced with others— that the divisions that had driven the highlights the limitations of not including Iraq’s current President D. violence 20 years ago have also been considering the complexity of the Fouad Masoum, and current Change reawakened. The jihadists’ assault has Kurdish political environment. Using Movement leader Nawsherwan revived the rivalry between the two the term “the Kurds” in strategic Mustafa—the formation of the PUK. The main political parties, the Kurdish discussions on this issue is not helpful launch of the PUK was the beginning Democratic Party (KDP, led by the given the divisions there and the of a split in Iraqi Kurdistan that led to Kurdish President Masoud Barzani) possibility of worsening an already outright violence from the late 1970s and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan precarious situation. through the 1980s, and again in the (PUK, led by Jalal Talabani), and their 1990s. respective military wings. The renewed Background enmity is deepening internal Kurdish The tensions in Iraqi Kurdistan can be The brakujie of the 1990s started after the dated back to just after World War II. first Gulf War when the international In August 1946, one year after Kurdish community enforced a no-fly zone leader Qazi Muhammad established over the Kurdish region of Iraq. De the KDP in Iranian Kurdistan, the facto independence led quickly in Iraqi branch of the KDP was founded 1992 to the first elections in this in Baghdad by a group of intellectuals 1 Euronews, “Iraq: Fleeing Yazidis and Christians Face and officers.3 Mullah Mustafa Barzani Desperate Plight,” August 10, 2014. Isabel Coles and (the father of current Kurdish president 4 The Muhabad Republic Saif Sameer, “Islamic State Advances on Yezidis on Masoud Barzani), one of the top 5 For more detail see Martin van Bruinessen, “Major Iraq’s Sinjar Mountain,” Reuters, “Video shows scale generals involved in establishing the Kurdish Organisations of Iraq,” in Middle East Report, of Yazidi Suffering on Iraq’s Mount Sinjar,” Daily Tele- 16:141 (July/August, 1986), the Middle East Research graph, June 11, 2014. and Information Project. FORMAT 2 See, for example, an interview with Chief of Staff Fuad 3 For more on modern Kurdish history, see David 6 Gareth Stansfield,Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development Hussein, “Senior Kurdistan Official: IS Was at Erbil’s McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: IB and Emergent Democracy (London: Routledge, 2003), p. Gates; Turkey Did Not Help,” Rudaw, September 16, Taurus, 2004), and Michael Gunter, Historical Diction- 72. 2014. ary of the Kurds (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2004). 7 Ibid, McDowall. 21 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

newly hopeful region. But the results forces, who described the division. of Kirkuk, leaving it up to the residents were too close to call for either party, “The war front from Sinjar, on the Iraqi there whether they would remain under leading to a catastrophically sharp Syrian border, to Mala Abdullah, a the central Baghdad government or division not only in the political and village in Kirkuk, is under the command secede to the KRG. The referendum was administrative system but also within of the KDP; from Mala Abdullah to set for November 2007, but it has been the social fabric of Kurdish society Jalawla and Khanaqeen on the Iranian postponed several times, the victim of itself, producing a highly fragmented borders is under the command of the political convenience for both Erbil and society and leading inexorably towards PUK,” he said.11 This territorial division Baghdad. a bloody civil war that continued for based on political allegiances cuts the more than four years.8 One sign of the front into almost two equal parts, and In late June 2014, President Masoud renewed tensions has been the revival replicates the “50/50” mechanism used Barzani congratulated the people of of the term “50/50,” which originally to divide Kurdistan between the two Kirkuk, announcing from the city that appeared after the 1992 election and main political parties after the civil war. Article 140 was dead and that Kirkuk’s was later used to describe the rigid and status was defacto resolved without The lack of a single, unified central “There is still no unified command was illustrated along the “Even more ominous for front lines in the early stages of the army in Iraqi Kurdistan, campaign against the Islamic State Iraqi Kurds are the lack of by the sight of troops, offices, and despite the existence of a outposts displaying party flags instead consensus and the power of national Kurdish flags (no Iraqi flags Ministry of Peshmergas are seen in this region). Unilateral struggles over major issues claims of victory are common and in the Kurdistan Regional have led to increasing tensions, and such as independence, even outright military reversals. One Government (KRG).” example illustrates the chronic lack of relations with the central unity. A Kurdish fighter, a member of the presidential guard, reported that Iraqi government, and in August, a squabble over claims of scrupulously even power-sharing deal victory resulted in the PUK commander regional and international that helped resolve the brakujie.9 Kurds, ordering all his forces to leave Jalawla as the current disputes show very soon after helping to liberate the city. alliances.” clearly, have still not recovered from A day later, with the remaining KDP that divisive election. forces in disarray, Islamic State fighters retook Jalawla, taking the opportunity The War with the Islamic State to thoroughly booby trap the city. When a referendum.14 In response, Kirkuk One clear sign of the ongoing divisions is the peshmergas recaptured the town in Governor Najmaddin Karim publicly the state of the Kurdish military. There is November, there were many needless disagreed in a July 8 interview with the still no unified army in Iraqi Kurdistan, deaths from explosive devices.12 PUK newspaper Kurdistani Nwe, saying he despite the existence of a Ministry of still supported a referendum.15 Peshmergas in the Kurdistan Regional Article 140 and Claims for Independence Government (KRG) led by Mustafa Sayid The divisions do not stop with the The disputed territories are part of the Qadir, who is a member of the Change frontline. Even more ominous for Iraqi much larger issue of independence for Party, a party with no military wing. In Kurds are the lack of consensus and the Iraqi Kurdistan. Masoud Barzani has conversation,10 he reported that the over power struggles over major issues such been vocal on this issue, most recently 1,050-kilometer-long front between the as independence, relations with the in his May visit to Washington DC. Kurds and the Islamic State is divided central Iraqi government in Baghdad, (The U.S. administraton remains firmly into eight operations. The west side is and regional and international alliances. opposed to that outcome, responding mostly controlled by KDP peshmergas, Article 140 in the Iraqi constitution of to Barzani’s requests for support by while the east side is controlled by PUK 200513 is a key example of the tension. renewing its commitment to “a united, peshmergas. It promised a referendum on the issue federal, and democratic Iraq.”16) Some

At the frontline region of Makhmour, 45 kilometers southwest of Erbil, we spoke 11 Personal interview, anonymous Asaysh official, 14 “President Barzani: We’ll Make Kirkuk an Example to an official from the security (Asaysh) November 2014. of Religious and Ethnic Coexistence,” Rudaw, June 27, 12 Personal interview with Minister of Peshmergas 2014. Mustafa Sayid Qadir, November 2014, in which he 15 “Najmadeen Kareem: This new situation is a golden 8 Ibid, Stansfield. described booby-trapped refrigerator doors, soft drink opportunity but not free of risks,” Kurdistani Nwe, 9 Ibid, Stansfield. cans, and even Qur’ans. August 7, 2014. 10 Personal interview with Minister of Peshmergas 13 Iraq Constitution available at www.iraqinationality. 16 Guy Taylor, “Kurdish leader says his people will one Mustafa Sayid Qadir, November 2014. gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf. day declare independence,” Washington Times, May 6, 22 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

KDP members, however, claim that influence within the PUK, thanks in and widened the gulf between the two some PUK figures would oppose an part to its good relations with the Shi’a- parties at a critical juncture. independent Kurdish state if it were to dominated government in Baghdad be declared by a member of the Barzani and the infighting resulting from There are also increasingly strident family.17 the increasing absence of ailing PUK debates over the constitution ahead of leader, Jalal Talabani. In late 2013, the August election. President Masoud Regional Implications for example, Adel Mourad, one of the Barzani has been in power since July One of the main concerns regarding an PUK’s founding members, publicly 2005, and his original eight-year term independent Kurdistan relates to future favored Iran’s involvements over that had already been extended by two years regional involvement, specifically how of Turkey or Saudi Arabia in the affairs in 2013 via a parliamentary motion. the rivalry between Iran and Turkey of Kurdistan and Iraq.19 This extra time expires on August 19, would play out. Both countries have but there is still no clear indication significant Kurdish populations that The PKK: An Added Complication of how a power transition will occur. are also struggling for more rights. The final complication that must be The KRG could not face this at a worse Both nations have sought political and factored into the KRG’s uneasy web time given the fighting with the Islamic economic influence in Iraqi Kurdistan of tensions that has been exposed by State and the apparent divisions among dating back to the brakujie, with Turkey the Islamic State’s military successes Kurdish groups. is Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ “One of the main concerns Party (PKK). The PKK has been on “The final complication the international terrorism list since regarding an independent the 1980s, yet it has been one of the that must be factored into most effective forces countering the Kurdistan relates to future Islamic State. It was, for example, the KRG’s uneasy web responsible for the Islamic State’s regional involvement, defeat at Makhmour, and the opening of tensions that has been of a humanitarian escape corridor from specifically how the rivalry Mount Sinjar after the KRG’s forces had exposed by the Islamic withdrawn.20 President Barzani himself between Iran and Turkey visited PKK officials in Makhmour State’s military successes and thanked them, a move that risked would play out.” the KDP’s relationship with Turkey.21 is Turkey’s Kurdistan The PKK has also clashed with another group of armed Kurds, the KDP of Iran, Workers’ Party.” over control of territory, most recently continuing to support the KDP, while on May 24, 2015. Iran retains its links to the PUK. Future Tensions Chief of Staff Fuad Hussein recently The strong ties between the KDP and There are clear and recent signs that announced that the presidential Turkey have raised concerns among that these multiple tensions are causing election has been set for August 20,22 some PUK officials that Turkey problems. On April 5, 2015, for example, although the legal and constitutional would dominate a future independent security forces in Dohuk, which is setting for these elections are by Kurdistan. For example, KRG Prime dominated by the KDP, arrested the no means clear, and continue to be Minister Nechirvan Barzani in Time Yazidi leader Hayder Shasho, who is debated by the parties. Barzani may magazine in 2012, described Turkey as a member of the PUK central council have already exceeded his term as KRG “a door of hope.”18 On the other hand, and the commander of the “Shangal president, yet his KDP party claims that Iran appears to have been gaining [Sinjar] Protection Forces.” He was the current situation requires he stay in released a week later with no charges, power.23 Members of Parliament (MPs) but the episode angered PUK members from other parties submitted a bill to 2015. change the system of governance from a 17 See, for example, “Hemn Hawrami: PUK should not presidential to a parliamentary system, allow some people to remove their Party from the Kurd- but all 38 KDP members boycotted the ish consensus,” Awene, July 5, 2014. The Barzani family session at which the bill was discussed, currently occupy the positions of president (Masoud), 19 “PUK official supports Iran’s role in Kurdistan and provoking more tensions.24 KDP MPs prime minister (Nechirvan, Masoud’s nephew), head attacks US and Turkey,” Ekurd Daily, October 30, 2013. of security (Masrur, Masoud’s son), and various other 20 Dominique Soguel, “Terrorist or ally? A Kurdish military and political posts, and also owns large portions militia joins the fight against the Islamic State,”The 22 “Kurdistan Region sets Aug 20 date for Presidential of the infrastructure such as mobile phone networks Christian Science Monitor, August 22, 2014. Christoph Election,” Rudaw, June 13, 2015. (Sirwan, Masoud’s nephew). Reuter, “The Drama of Sinjar: Escaping the Islamic State 23 “KDP says Iraqi Kurdistan requires Massoud Barzani 18 Jay Newton-Small, “An Interview with Nechirvan in Iraq,” Der Speigel, August 18, 2014. to stay in office,”Ekurd Daily, June 10, 2015. Barzani: Will There Be an Independent Kurdistan?,” 21 “Masoud Barzani visits PKK Forces in Makhmour,” 24 “KDP boycotts Iraqi Kurdistan parliament session Time, December 21, 2012. Kurd Press, August 14, 2014. over presidency law,” Ekurd Daily, June 23, 2015. 23 JUNE 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 6

have warned of chaos if the session is factionalism that drove the brakujie CTC Sentinel Staff held.25 and, at worst, draw regional powers into another proxy war. The depth of feeling apparent in many Managing Editor personal interviews with peshmerga, Hoshang Waziri’s work has appeared John Watling police, and others indicates that in al-Hayat, Assafir, and other Arabic tensions could spill over into violence, publications, and openDemocracy in despite protestations from the subjects English. Editorial Board that they would not fight other Kurds.26 COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. The protestations fall flat though given Lydia Wilson is a research fellow at the Department Head the loyalty to political parties and Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Department of Social Sciences (West Point) leaders apparent in the interviews. Conflict at Harris Manchester College, Most Kurdish fighters seem likely to do University of Oxford. COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. anything their party leaders asked them. Deputy Department Head “I might not agree, but I would obey,” Department of Social Sciences (West Point) was a common refrain from Kurds of all parties when talking of their leaders.27 LTC Bryan Price, Ph.D. Director, CTC Their leaders, however, appear more willing to consider further deterioration Brian Dodwell, of the situation. President Barzani went Deputy Director, CTC so far as to predict unrest. Abandoning all pretence of a unified front, on April 16, 2015, he warned of renewed Kurdish conflict, saying “a new method of antagonizing the Kurdish nation has appeared, which is through media statements and articles aiming at initiating a civil war in our region, creating chaos and getting us back to CONTACT the era of two governments.” Combating Terrorism Center U.S. Military Academy Conclusion 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall The Kurds face significant risks and West Point, NY 10996 challenges even after the current threat Phone: (845) 938-8495 from the Islamic State is dealt with. Email: [email protected] Despite the efforts of the Minister of Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ Peshmergas to build mixed brigades, unification of the army has not * For Press Inquiries: (845) 938-8495 happened. This is not only affecting the fight against the Islamic State, but has ramifications for regional security in the future. The precarious situation also affects Western governments, SUPPORT which must consider how best to The Combating Terrorism Center would position themselves to pursue their like to express its gratitude to its financial interests after the Islamic State is supporters, for without their support and defeated, and who have many options shared vision of the Center products like the to pursue in countering its impact. CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you Without a nuanced understanding of are interested in learning more about how the existing conditions, good intentions to support the Combating Terrorism Center, could actually fuel another round of the please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1561. 25 “Hemn Hawrami and Jaffer Emniki threatened the Parliament with Blood,” Lvin Magazine, June 25, 2015. 26 Personal interviews with peshmerga along the frontline in Makhmour, Erbil, Suleimania, and Koya, The views expressed in this report are those of November 2014. the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 27 Personal interviews with peshmerga along the the Department of the Army, or any other agency frontline in Makhmour, Erbil, Suleimania, and Koya, November 2014. 24