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The Battle to Interpret Arlington House, 1921–1937,” by Michael B
Welcome to a free reading from Washington History: Magazine of the Historical Society of Washington, D.C. As we chose this week’s reading, news stories continued to swirl about commemorative statues, plaques, street names, and institutional names that amplify white supremacy in America and in DC. We note, as the Historical Society fulfills its mission of offering thoughtful, researched context for today’s issues, that a key influence on the history of commemoration has come to the surface: the quiet, ladylike (in the anachronistic sense) role of promoters of the southern “Lost Cause” school of Civil War interpretation. Historian Michael Chornesky details how federal officials fended off southern supremacists (posing as preservationists) on how to interpret Arlington House, home of George Washington’s adopted family and eventually of Confederate commander Robert E. Lee. “Confederate Island upon the Union’s ‘Most Hallowed Ground’: The Battle to Interpret Arlington House, 1921–1937,” by Michael B. Chornesky. “Confederate Island” first appeared in Washington History 27-1 (spring 2015), © Historical Society of Washington, D.C. Access via JSTOR* to the entire run of Washington History and its predecessor, Records of the Columbia Historical Society, is a benefit of membership in the Historical Society of Washington, D.C. at the Membership Plus level. Copies of this and many other back issues of Washington History magazine are available for browsing and purchase online through the DC History Center Store: https://dchistory.z2systems.com/np/clients/dchistory/giftstore.jsp ABOUT THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF WASHINGTON, D.C. The Historical Society of Washington, D.C., is a non-profit, 501(c)(3), community-supported educational and research organization that collects, interprets, and shares the history of our nation's capital in order to promote a sense of identity, place and pride in our city and preserve its heritage for future generations. -
Brochure Design by Communication Design, Inc., Richmond, VA 877-584-8395 Cheatham Co
To Riggins Hill CLARKSVILLE MURFREESBORO and Fort Defiance Scroll flask and .36 caliber Navy Colt bullet mold N found at Camp Trousdale . S P R site in Sumner County. IN G Stones River S T Courtesy Pat Meguiar . 41 National Battlefield The Cannon Ball House 96 and Cemetery in Blountville still 41 Oaklands shows shell damage to Mansion KNOXVILLE ST. the exterior clapboard LEGE Recapture of 441 COL 231 Evergreen in the rear of the house. Clarksville Cemetery Clarksville 275 40 in the Civil War Rutherford To Ramsey Surrender of ST. County Knoxville National Cemetery House MMERCE Clarksville CO 41 96 Courthouse Old Gray Cemetery Plantation Customs House Whitfield, Museum Bradley & Co. Knoxville Mabry-Hazen Court House House 231 40 “Drawing Artillery Across the Mountains,” East Tennessee Saltville 24 Fort History Center Harper’s Weekly, Nov. 21, 1863 (Multiple Sites) Bleak House Sanders Museum 70 60 68 Crew repairing railroad Chilhowie Fort Dickerson 68 track near Murfreesboro 231 after Battle of Stones River, 1863 – Courtesy 421 81 Library of Congress 129 High Ground 441 Abingdon Park “Battle of Shiloh” – Courtesy Library of Congress 58 41 79 23 58 Gen. George H. Thomas Cumberland 421 Courtesy Library of Congress Gap NHP 58 Tennessee Capitol, Nashville, 1864 Cordell Hull Bristol Courtesy Library of Congress Adams Birthplace (East Hill Cemetery) 51 (Ft. Redmond) Cold Spring School Kingsport Riggins Port Royal Duval-Groves House State Park Mountain Hill State Park City 127 (Lincoln and the 33 Blountville 79 Red Boiling Springs Affair at Travisville 431 65 Portland Indian Mountain Cumberland Gap) 70 11W (See Inset) Clarksville 76 (Palace Park) Clay Co. -
United Confederate Veterans Association Records
UNITED CONFEDERATE VETERANS ASSOCIATION RECORDS (Mss. 1357) Inventory Compiled by Luana Henderson 1996 Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley Collections Special Collections, Hill Memorial Library Louisiana State University Libraries Baton Rouge, Louisiana Revised 2009 UNITED CONFEDERATE VETERANS ASSOCIATION RECORDS Mss. 1357 1861-1944 Special Collections, LSU Libraries CONTENTS OF INVENTORY SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 3 BIOGRAPHICAL/HISTORICAL NOTE ...................................................................................... 4 SCOPE AND CONTENT NOTE ................................................................................................... 6 LIST OF SUBGROUPS AND SERIES ......................................................................................... 7 SUBGROUPS AND SERIES DESCRIPTIONS ............................................................................ 8 INDEX TERMS ............................................................................................................................ 13 CONTAINER LIST ...................................................................................................................... 15 APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................... 22 APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................................. -
Cold Harbor Syndrome: Balanced, Compelling Study' Examines Grant's Overland Miscalculations
Civil War Book Review Summer 2000 Article 8 Cold Harbor Syndrome: Balanced, Compelling Study' Examines Grant's Overland Miscalculations Gary W. Gallagher Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr Recommended Citation Gallagher, Gary W. (2000) "Cold Harbor Syndrome: Balanced, Compelling Study' Examines Grant's Overland Miscalculations," Civil War Book Review: Vol. 2 : Iss. 3 . Available at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol2/iss3/8 Gallagher: Cold Harbor Syndrome: Balanced, Compelling Study' Examines Grant' Review COLD HARBOR SYNDROME 'Balanced, compelling study' examines Grant's Overland miscalculations Gallagher, Gary W. Summer 2000 Furgurson, Ernest B. Not War But Murder: Cold Harbor, 1864. Alfred A. Knopf, 2000-06-01. $27.50 ISBN 679455175 Ulysses S. Grant's offensive against Robert E. Lee's entrenched Army of Northern Virginia at Cold Harbor on June 3, 1864, summons powerful images. Northern assaults that day stand alongside Ambrose E. Burnside's attacks at Fredericksburg and John Bell Hood's at Franklin as examples of seemingly pointless slaughter of brave but doomed soldiers. Even casual students of the conflict know that Grant admitted as much in his memoirs when he confessed that he "always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made." Despite the well-known drama and gruesome butcher's bill on June 3, historians have devoted relatively little attention to Cold Harbor. It served as the last major battle of the Overland campaign, greatly influenced morale behind the lines in the North, and set the stage for Grant's brilliant crossing of the James River - all attributes that invite scrutiny. -
The Shadow of Napoleon Upon Lee at Gettysburg
Papers of the 2017 Gettysburg National Military Park Seminar The Shadow of Napoleon upon Lee at Gettysburg Charles Teague Every general commanding an army hopes to win the next battle. Some will dream that they might accomplish a decisive victory, and in this Robert E. Lee was no different. By the late spring of 1863 he already had notable successes in battlefield trials. But now, over two years into a devastating war, he was looking to destroy the military force that would again oppose him, thereby assuring an end to the war to the benefit of the Confederate States of America. In the late spring of 1863 he embarked upon an audacious plan that necessitated a huge vulnerability: uncovering the capital city of Richmond. His speculation, which proved prescient, was that the Union army that lay between the two capitals would be directed to pursue and block him as he advanced north Robert E. Lee, 1865 (LOC) of the Potomac River. He would thereby draw it out of entrenched defensive positions held along the Rappahannock River and into the open, stretched out by marching. He expected that force to risk a battle against his Army of Northern Virginia, one that could bring a Federal defeat such that the cities of Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington might succumb, morale in the North to continue the war would plummet, and the South could achieve its true independence. One of Lee’s major generals would later explain that Lee told him in the march to battle of his goal to destroy the Union army. -
Lee's Army During the Overland Campaign: a Numerical Study
Civil War Book Review Fall 2013 Article 22 Lee's Army During the Overland Campaign: A Numerical Study Ed Frank Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr Recommended Citation Frank, Ed (2013) "Lee's Army During the Overland Campaign: A Numerical Study," Civil War Book Review: Vol. 15 : Iss. 4 . DOI: 10.31390/cwbr.15.4.22 Available at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol15/iss4/22 Frank: Lee's Army During the Overland Campaign: A Numerical Study Review Frank, Ed Fall 2013 Young, Alfred C. Lee’s Army during the Overland Campaign: A Numerical Study. Louisiana State University Press, $29.95 ISBN 978-0-8071-5172-3 Understanding is more important than certainty, but certainty is nice when you can get it. This is an important book on a rather narrow topic. Decades in the researching, it presents a new and likely definitive picture of what the Army of Northern Virginia (plus attached forces in theater) endured between the opening of the Wilderness battles in early May 1864 and the final phases of Cold Harbor a month later. By prodigious research in published and unpublished records, including newspaper casualty listings that were unknown to most earlier scholars, Alfred Young gives us the clearest picture yet of the cost of those operations to the Confederacy’s finest army under its best army commander. In large measure, this book is a gloss on the works of Gordon C. Rhea, who provides the foreword, and whose works about the campaign dating from the early 1990s to the early 2000s are the source of all the maps and many of the textual footnotes in this book. -
The Other Side of the Monument: Memory, Preservation, and the Battles of Franklin and Nashville
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MONUMENT: MEMORY, PRESERVATION, AND THE BATTLES OF FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE by JOE R. BAILEY B.S., Austin Peay State University, 2006 M.A., Austin Peay State University, 2008 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2015 Abstract The thriving areas of development around the cities of Franklin and Nashville in Tennessee bear little evidence of the large battles that took place there during November and December, 1864. Pointing to modern development to explain the failed preservation of those battlefields, however, radically oversimplifies how those battlefields became relatively obscure. Instead, the major factor contributing to the lack of preservation of the Franklin and Nashville battlefields was a fractured collective memory of the two events; there was no unified narrative of the battles. For an extended period after the war, there was little effort to remember the Tennessee Campaign. Local citizens and veterans of the battles simply wanted to forget the horrific battles that haunted their memories. Furthermore, the United States government was not interested in saving the battlefields at Franklin and Nashville. Federal authorities, including the War Department and Congress, had grown tired of funding battlefields as national parks and could not be convinced that the two battlefields were worthy of preservation. Moreover, Southerners and Northerners remembered Franklin and Nashville in different ways, and historians mainly stressed Eastern Theater battles, failing to assign much significance to Franklin and Nashville. Throughout the 20th century, infrastructure development encroached on the battlefields and they continued to fade from public memory. -
James Longstreet and the Retreat from Gettysburg
“Such a night is seldom experienced…” James Longstreet and the Retreat from Gettysburg Karlton Smith, Gettysburg NMP After the repulse of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s Assault on July 3, 1863, Gen. Robert E. Lee, commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, knew that the only option left for him at Gettysburg was to try to disengage from his lines and return with his army to Virginia. Longstreet, commander of the army’s First Corps and Lee’s chief lieutenant, would play a significant role in this retrograde movement. As a preliminary to the general withdrawal, Longstreet decided to pull his troops back from the forward positions gained during the fighting on July 2. Lt. Col. G. Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet’s adjutant general, delivered the necessary orders to Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, commanding one of Longstreet’s divisions. Sorrel offered to carry the order to Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law, commanding John B. Hood’s division, on McLaws’s right. McLaws raised objections to this order. He felt that his advanced position was important and “had been won after a deadly struggle; that the order was given no doubt because of [George] Pickett’s repulse, but as there was no pursuit there was no necessity of it.” Sorrel interrupted saying: “General, there is no discretion allowed, the order is for you to retire at once.” Gen. James Longstreet, C.S.A. (LOC) As McLaws’s forward line was withdrawing to Warfield and Seminary ridges, the Federal batteries on Little Round Top opened fire, “but by quickening the pace the aim was so disturbed that no damage was done.” McLaws’s line was followed by “clouds of skirmishers” from the Federal Army of the Potomac; however, after reinforcing his own skirmish line they were driven back from the Peach Orchard area. -
Battle of Gettysburg Day 1 Reading Comprehension Name: ______
Battle of Gettysburg Day 1 Reading Comprehension Name: _________________________ Read the passage and answer the questions. The Ridges of Gettysburg Anticipating a Confederate assault, Union Brigadier General John Buford and his soldiers would produce the first line of defense. Buford positioned his defenses along three ridges west of the town. Buford's goal was simply to delay the Confederate advance with his small cavalry unit until greater Union forces could assemble their defenses on the three storied ridges south of town known as Cemetery Ridge, Cemetery Hill, and Culp's Hill's. These ridges were crucial to control of Gettysburg. Whichever army could successfully occupy these heights would have superior position and would be difficult to dislodge. The Death of Major General Reynolds The first of the Confederate forces to engage at Gettysburg, under the Command of Major General Henry Heth, succeeded in advancing forward despite Buford's defenses. Soon, battles erupted in several locations, and Union forces would suffer severe casualties. Union Major General John Reynolds would be killed in battle while positioning his troops. Major General Abner Doubleday, the man eventually credited with inventing the formal game of baseball, would assume command. Fighting would intensify on a road known as the Chambersburg Pike, as Confederate forces continued to advance. Jubal Early's Successful Assault Meanwhile, Union defenses positioned north and northwest of town would soon be outflanked by Confederates under the command of Jubal Early and Robert Rodes. Despite suffering severe casualties, Early's soldiers would break through the line under the command of Union General Francis Barlow, attacking them from multiple sides and completely overwhelming them. -
Myths of Cold Harbor
Myths of Cold Harbor Bert Dunkerly, September 25, 2020 blueandgrayeducation.org Battle of Cold Harbor by Kurz & Allison| Library of Congress There are certain battles which have a lot of misconceptions attached to them. Perhaps one of the most myth-shrouded battles is the 1864 Cold Harbor engagement near Richmond. Part of the Overland Campaign, it was at the tail end of Grant’s grueling drive across central Virginia. Many readers likely know that one of the biggest myths of Cold Harbor is the estimate of 6,000 (or whatever high number you insert here) killed and wounded in just 30 minutes on June 3. Just not true. Writers like Gordon Rhea have compellingly dealt with that misconception, so I will focus on several others. First, to many of us Cold Harbor seems like a nameless, senseless battle, lacking maneuver and without key landmarks. Gettysburg has its Wheatfield, Peach Orchard, and High Water Mark. Antietam has the Cornfield and Sunken Road. Shiloh has the Hornet’s Nest and Bloody Pond. I could go on. What does Cold Harbor have? In fact, in the first few days, there was open field fighting and maneuver at Cold Harbor. And there were landmarks on the battlefield named by the soldiers: Bloody Run, the Allison Farm, the Crossroads, Fletcher’s Redoubt, and more. This battle simply has not been studied in the same detail as many others, thus the lack of familiarity with these landmarks. Fletcher's Redoubt | courtesy of the author Another misconception is that it was a lopsided Union defeat. It was, in the end. -
General AP Hill at Gettysburg
Papers of the 2017 Gettysburg National Park Seminar General A.P. Hill at Gettysburg: A Study of Character and Command Matt Atkinson If not A. P. Hill, then who? May 2, 1863, Orange Plank Road, Chancellorsville, Virginia – In the darkness of the Wilderness, victory or defeat hung in the balance. The redoubtable man himself, Stonewall Jackson, had ridden out in front of his most advanced infantry line to reconnoiter the Federal position and was now returning with his staff. Nervous North Carolinians started to fire at the noises of the approaching horses. Voices cry out from the darkness, “Cease firing, you are firing into your own men!” “Who gave that order?” a muffled voice in the distance is heard to say. “It’s a lie! Pour it into them, boys!” Like chain lightning, a sudden volley of musketry flashes through the woods and the aftermath reveals Jackson struck by three bullets.1 Caught in the tempest also is one of Jackson’s division commanders, A. P. Hill. The two men had feuded for months but all that was forgotten as Hill rode to see about his commander’s welfare. “I have been trying to make the men cease firing,” said Hill as he dismounted. “Is the wound painful?” “Very painful, my arm is broken,” replied Jackson. Hill delicately removed Jackson’s gauntlets and then unhooked his sabre and sword belt. Hill then sat down on the ground and cradled Jackson’s head in his lap as he and an aide cut through the commander’s clothing to examine the wounds. -
Historical Perspective on Meade's Actions Following the Battle Of
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON MEADE'S ACTIONS FOLLOWING THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG Terrence L. Salada and John D. Wedo Pursuit and destruction of a defeated army is an often unfulfilled wish of both generals and history. Accounts of battles sometimes offer a postscript similar to this: "But General (or Admiral) So-and-So did not pursue and destroy the enemy thereby losing an opportunity to end the war then and there." In many cases, the battles are tremendous victories, such as Borodino in the Napoleonic wars, Shiloh in the American Civil War (referred to hereafter as simply the Civil War), and Midway and El Alamein in World War II (WW2). This is particularly true for the Battle of Gettysburg in the Civil War and the Union commander, Major General George Meade. For almost no other battle is the criticism of no quick pursuit and destruction more injurious to the reputation of the victorious commander. This paper first presents a summary of the arguments pro and con for a pursuit after Gettysburg. It then presents the core of the paper, a meta-analysis of five decisive victories without pursuit and the conditions leading to those decisions. These battles span roughly 130 years, occur on land and sea, and include three wars. The objective is to present Meade's decision in a historical context both in situ (discussing only that battle) and in comparison with other such decisions. The goal is to ascertain whether historiography has been more critical of Meade than others. The hope is that examination 1 of the actions of other commanders of great victories will open the door for a different interpretation of Meade's actions.