Very Preliminary Draft – Not for Quotation Liberal Democrats in a Condemnation: Strategy, Identity and Survival Alex Marsh

Very preliminary draft – Not for quotation

Liberal Democrats in a ConDemNation: strategy, identity and survival

Alex Marsh School for Policy Studies University of Bristol 8 Priory Road Bristol BS8 1TZ [email protected]

Paper to the Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Sheffield, 30th March-1st April 2015

Abstract

Liberal Democrats entered government in May 2010 in full knowledge that coalition is not kind to the junior partner. That is the case in countries where multi-party government is not unfamiliar: the political cost in the UK was always likely to be greater. The risks were magnified by entering government at a time when making, or supporting, unpopular decisions was almost inevitable.

This paper focuses upon the way in which the Liberal Democrats have managed their role in Coalition with the Conservatives, how this has played out with the electorate, and how the party moves on from the 2010-2015 Coalition.

The party adopted a two stage strategy: ownership followed by differentiation. This was always going to carry significant risks in a low trust environment. Difficulties in reading the party’s role in coalition were further compounded by lack of clarity over the identity of the Liberal Democrat political project, represented in popular discourse by the battle between Orange Bookers and social liberal wing of the party.

Issues of strategy and unstable identity intersect in the preparations for the 2015 General Election, which will be conducted in the febrile atmosphere associated with rising right wing populism. The political environment is, arguably, increasingly hostile to many core liberal concerns. While prominent liberal politicians might assert we have arrived in a Liberal Age, the reception for a distinctively liberal agenda would appear to be characterised by growing sceptical. The future of the party as an independent political force is by no means assured.

Very preliminary draft – Not for quotation

1. Introduction

Liberal Democrats entered government in May 2010 in full knowledge that entering - and exiting - coalition is not necessarily kind to junior partners. The history of the British Liberal party and experience elsewhere provides some salutary lessons. In countries where multi-party government is relatively familiar the junior partner can find itself bearing the brunt of voters’ dissatisfaction with coalition performance. The political cost in the UK was always likely to be greater. There is no modern experience of Westminster coalition to draw on, and the advent of coalition throws into question one of the great strengths claimed for our electoral system – that it delivers decisive results. The risks to the Liberal Democrats were magnified by entering government in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. The rhetoric of austerity had been embraced by both major political parties, albeit more fervently by the Conservatives: it was almost inevitable that the Liberal Democrats would be making, or supporting, unpopular decisions.

Issues of strategy and unstable identity intersect in the preparations for the 2015 General Election, which will be conducted in the febrile atmosphere associated with rising right wing populism. The political environment is, arguably, increasingly hostile to many core Liberal Democrat concerns. While prominent liberal politicians might assert we have arrived in a Liberal Age (Browne, 2014), the reception for a distinctively liberal agenda would appear to be characterised by growing sceptical. The future of the party as an independent political force is by no means assured.

2. Strategy

Junior partners contemplating going in to coalition face some profound strategic choices. The most fundamental question is arguably the stance to adopt on the question of unity versus distinctiveness. The second key question is the strategy towards portfolio allocation – whether to go for breadth or depth in office holding. Clearly, the two questions are interrelated: going for depth in office holding – so that particular policy areas are clearly ‘owned’ by the junior partner -

Very preliminary draft – Not for quotation makes it easier to demonstrate distinctiveness and influence when compared to the alternative strategy of seeking involvement across a range of policy areas.

A number of authors have analysed in detail the formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, the strategy adopted by the Liberal Democrats, and the implications of coalition for the machinery of government (eg. Lee and Beech, 2011; Matthews. 2011). David Cameron’s apparent repositioning of the Conservatives towards the political centre ground during the latter 2000s, coupled with the Liberal Democrats being nudged by their leadership away from the centre-left (Jones, 2011) had increased the plausibility of a sustainable coalition between the two parties. There was a narrowing of the political distance between the parties, as indicated by their manifesto commitments (Debus, 2011): indeed there was a notable degree of policy overlap. While major barriers to forming coalition had to be overcome – in particular reconciling the parties’ positions on voting reform - arriving at a coalition agreement was perhaps less painful than expected. This was a period in which David Cameron was championing “liberal conservatism” and the coalition was going to place “freedom, fairness and responsibility” at the heart of its agenda. The parties appeared to share an ideological commitment to enhancing freedom, while the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives placed relatively greater emphasis upon fairness and responsibility respectively. The resulting coalition agreement represented a genuine combination of policy proposals shared by the parties, proposals distinctive to the Conservative manifesto, proposals distinctive to the Liberal Democrat manifesto, and proposals that had featured in neither manifesto (Matthews, 2011). In terms of portfolio allocation the Liberal Democrats appeared to be more strongly represented in the Government than might have been predicted on the basis of strict proportionality (eg. Debus, 2011). Cameron was making his “big, open and comprehensive offer” to the Liberal Democrats.

The Liberal Democrat strategy towards forming the coalition was, firstly, to opt for breadth rather than depth in portfolio allocation and, secondly, to prioritize unity over distinctiveness. Given that the Liberal Democrats were seeking to overturn the popular perception that as the third party they lacked experience of government it is perhaps understandable that they opted to seek to demonstrate the ability to work productively in partnership with the Conservatives across a range of policy areas by placing junior ministers in several departments. Similarly, given the Liberal Democrats’ emphasis upon constitutional reform, it made sense for the Nick Clegg to take the role of Deputy Prime Minister. However, while the Liberal Democrats may have done relatively well numerically out of portfolio allocation they held only one of the core executive roles (DPM) and by spreading themselves relatively thinly across departments, typically working under a Conservative Secretary of State, they set themselves a significant challenge in demonstrating distinctiveness and effectiveness. Whether the alternative depth strategy was ever a serious proposition is a separate question: the major policy areas where the Liberal Democrats might have seen a possibility of demonstrate a distinctive agenda if they were allowed complete

Very preliminary draft – Not for quotation control – education, home affairs, work and pensions, perhaps – are policy areas the Conservatives were never likely to countenance stepping back from entirely.

We can get a hint of what might have been possible by looking at the activities of the Liberal Democrat-led departments: DECC and BIS. Here there are initiatives such as the Green Investment Bank that are genuinely innovative and bear a clear Liberal Democrat stamp. But, we might argue, these are relatively peripheral areas of concern for the Conservatives: whether the Liberal Democrats would be allowed to pursue a similarly distinctive strategy closer to the heart of government is a moot point. Equally, we can look at totemic policies such as the rise in tuition fees and see that Liberal Democrat-led departments were obliged to implement Conservative policy commitments at substantial political cost.

McEnhill (2015) has recently discussed the challenges that the breadth strategy presented to the Liberal Democrats in demonstrating distinctiveness in policy areas dominated by the Conservatives, focusing on the area of welfare reform. And, in contrast, where a Conservative- led department has implemented a headline Liberal Democrat policy – such as the pupil premium or raising income tax thresholds – the policy has not only been owned by the Conservatives but credited to the Conservatives by substantial sections of the public.

The fact that during the early phases of the coalition the Liberal Democrats prioritized unity over distinctiveness meant that the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition was able to address one criticism of multi-party government. The agreement of May 2010 did not deliver weak government as a result of perpetual horse-trading and compromise. Strong party discipline from the Liberal Democrats in particular meant that the government was able to pursue a radical agenda renegotiating the role of the state. It set in train structural changes in a whole range of policy areas – on welfare reform, the National Health Service, planning deregulation, social housing, and the defunding of local authority services - that have yet to fully work themselves through the system. This was possible in large part because for much of the Parliament the Liberal Democrats were willing to put aside dissent, in public at least, and support a wide range of Conservative projects.

As Atkins (2015) has pointed out, this unity relied upon deploying powerful narrative strategies that emphasized the parties’ shared values, the importance of placing ‘the national interest’ above party interest, and the need to put aside inter-party difference in order to battle with the deficit created by a “fiscally irresponsible” Labour party. In so doing it required the Liberal Democrats to abandon some well-established policy positions or suppress a concern for core ideological principles for the sake of coalition unity.

The Liberal Democrats’ early commitment to coalition unity led to them paying a substantial price. Voters and members who had supported the party because its policy platform was to the

Very preliminary draft – Not for quotation left of Labour abandoned the party. The negative electoral consequences of coalition quickly became apparent in substantial losses in local elections and lost deposits in by-elections.

Only in the last year of the Parliament has the party made any real effort to differentiate from the Conservatives. Whether that was the plan from the outset or a response to the fact that the Liberal Democrats seemed to be absorbing the vast majority of the political fallout from the implementation of the Coalition’s austerity-dominated agenda is not entirely clear.

This two stage strategy of fully owning the coalition agenda – of hugging the Conservatives close - and then seeking to differentiate was always going to carry significant, and rather obvious, risks in an environment where trust in politicians is low. As the junior partner, supporting policies that you would in other circumstances oppose comes with coalition territory. Explaining that you are doing so under sufferance would at least make it clear what was happening. But keeping your disagreements private while showing a unified front with the Conservatives in public, and doing so with seeming enthusiasm, means all distinctiveness is rendered invisible. Viewed from the outside “unity in the national interest” and “a coup by Orange Book liberals/Cleggite faction of yellow Tories” can look rather similar, if the party is unable or unwilling to provide a convincing narrative to accompany its actions. Liberal Democrat support collapsed as a consequence.

And once the junior partner moved to differentiate it opened itself up to accusations of hypocrisy. The party starts disagreeing with policies that it only a few weeks previously it had enthusiastically voted in to law. Sceptical voters might reasonably ask: does that mean you weren’t telling us the truth back then? After the initial damage caused by reneging the key tuition fees pledge, trust is potentially further undermined. The credibility of all future public pronouncements is likely to be questioned.

3. Identity

The difficulties in reading the party’s role in coalition were further compounded by lack of clarity over the identity of the Liberal Democrat political project, represented in popular discourse by the battle between Orange Bookers and social liberal wing of the party (referring to Marshall and Laws, 2004, and, for example, Brack et al, 2007).

It would be wrong to see the arrival of Nick Clegg as party leader as representing the dawning of an entirely new era in policy or ideological term for the Liberal Democrats. Some of the currents in policy thinking that have emerged to prominence were arguably already developing under Charles Kennedy. Equally it is wrong to think that “Orange Bookers” – or social liberals for that matter – cleave to a coherent and tightly specified philosophy. In fact, the contributions to the Orange Book itself take a range of different positions on questions such as the desirability or otherwise of state action and intervention. What is typically referred to as “Orange Book”

Very preliminary draft – Not for quotation liberalism – that is, the promotion of economic liberalism alongside – or, critics might argue, above – personal, political and social liberalism is most clearly articulated by the contribution from David Laws (2004). It is largely a belief in the benefits of market mechanisms, driven by non-state actors, in delivering desirable social outcomes. It would perhaps be appropriate to focus more closely on some of the work of the think tank CentreForum or the ginger group Liberal Reform in taking forward this agenda than to keep referring to the Orange Book.

The idea that the Liberal Democrat policy agenda has been taken over by the Orange Bookers – that there has been a Clegg Coup – tends to be treated as relatively uncontroversial in the literature. Certainly many of the contributors to the Orange Book now occupy senior, frontline positions in the party. The assertion of a coup is perhaps more controversial in internal party debate. But that is explicable. On the one hand, a core tenet of liberalism is tolerance and therefore self-professed liberals tend to be treated as such, even where the content of that liberalism starts to look very like libertarianism. On the other hand, if one were seeking to effect a coup then a useful discursive strategy would be to deny that that is what is happening: that differing policy positions represent no more than differences of emphasis. While the party leadership has tried to defuse these debates by seeking unity behind slogans that argue the party is neither left nor right but liberal, this does not bring much greater clarity regarding what the party stands for in a context where most of the debate is framed in one dimension.

Less controversial is the argument that the Liberal Democrats have gone through a process of professionalization (Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011). The party has a federal structure and formally policy making sits with biannual Federal Conferences. However, over time the professionalization process has meant that the party has moved from a largely bottom-up process towards a more top-down process where the party leadership and the parliamentary party are able to shape policy agendas in ways seen as beneficial, using the Federal Conferences primarily to ratify such positions and commitments:

The reality is that increasingly spokespeople are adopting [this] … approach to their parliamentary portfolios, leaving the conference as more of a ‘washing up’ exercise that brings parliamentarians’ statements and written policy together (Senior party official cited in Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011, p486)

This structural issue has increased salience under the coalition government. While it can plausibly be argued that the Liberal Democrats were the party best prepared for the coalition negotiations of May 2010, they were less well-prepared for the rigours of policy making in government. Biannual Federal Conferences were obviously not going to be sufficiently nimble. It was inevitable that in government the party was going to have to respond to emerging issues about which it had no settled policy. But it took a while to develop mechanisms that allowed the

Very preliminary draft – Not for quotation party to input into decisions so they were not based primarily on views within the leader’s inner circle.

This issue of top-down versus bottom-up goes to the heart of the Liberal Democrats’ identity. On the one hand, the Liberal Democrats’ internal Bones Commission on party structure noted:

Leaders define and deliver political strategy, appoint the best teams to support delivery and are the focus of the party nationally to communicate and ‘sell’ our vision of a liberal democrat Britain. They need professional support and to be given the freedom to act; but they too should continue to face scrutiny (Bones Commission, cited in Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011, 471).

That is, the leader is not there to represent the collective views of the membership but to define political strategy and articulate a vision of liberal democracy in a way that will resonate with the electorate.

On the other hand, activists emphasize that the Liberal Democrats being a federal party is a strength and carries authenticity. The party is different from the Conservatives and the Labour party because the members make policy: it is a key part of the party’s self-identity and self- understanding.

Coalition has placed the leadership into conflict with the activist base on a number of occasions. The parliamentary party has supported a number of policy measures into law only for Federal Conference to pass motions either condemning those policies or calling for them to be modified. Several motions critical of welfare reform, cuts to legal aid and advice services, and the bedroom tax would fall into this category. The party leadership is then in the dilemma of supporting a policy in government that conflicts with official party policy. Here again the leadership has tended to favour unity over overt conflict with their coalition partners. This is felt particularly sharply around the edges of the coalition agreement: policy areas which do not feature in the coalition agreement, where Conservative policy proposals conflict with some principle deeply held by Liberal Democrat activists, and yet the party leadership supports the proposals into law. Civil liberties have provided a number of flash points.

One of the most intricate examples of the way these tensions play out is the case of the bedroom tax. The Liberal Democrats supported the policy into law as part of the welfare reform agenda, in the face of criticism. Federal Conference passed a two motions calling for the policy to be substantially modified and for mechanisms to mitigate the worst negative impacts to be put in place. The first of these motions put the leadership’s position of support for the policy in its then current form at odds with party policy. However, it did allow leverage to be exerted to secure some increased protections via Discretionary Housing Payments. Nick Clegg also stated that support for the policy would be reviewed when the results of the official interim evaluation

Very preliminary draft – Not for quotation became available. When these results were finally released – having been available within government for several months – Nick Clegg publicly withdrew the party’s support for the policy in its current form because it was felt to be perpetrating unacceptable unfairness and hardship. In doing so he did little more than bring his public position in line with what was already official party policy. This looked like solidly evidence-based policy, except that almost all the problems identified in the interim evaluation had been identified by expert commentators even before the policy was implemented. The evaluation provided very little new information. But it provided cover for a realignment of policy position in a period where differentiation was becoming a more pressing concern.

There are also lessons here about how and where power is most effectively exercised by the junior partner. For example, McEnhill (2015) argues that it was Simon Hughes as deputy party leader, outside the Government, who was able to push for concessions on the implementation of the bedroom tax rather than Steve Webb as DWP minister. We might reflect on how much leverage Hughes was subsequently been able to exercise over Chris Grayling’s agenda – which many Liberal Democrats roundly condemn for being fundamentally illiberal - once he joined the government as an MoJ minister.

One of the biggest challenges for the Liberal Democrats in coalition has been the realization that the foundation upon which it was built – a convergence in policy position between the Liberal Democrats and David Cameron’s “liberal conservatism” or “compassionate conservatism” – was shaky. It turned out that the Conservatives’ modernisation was only skin deep. It also became apparent that while the coalition agreement may well have played to Liberal Democrat priorities when it came to delivering on that agreement the Conservatives were going to approach it through the lens of their own party interest. One trigger for the fraying of coalition relations was the way the Conservatives campaigned to ensure that the move to the Alternative Vote was rejected. It was a campaign that was conducted in precisely the opposite of the non-partisan and non-personal spirit that had been hoped for.

Coalition politicians have spent five years emphasizing the “difficult decisions” they have had to make to cut the deficit. In 2010 the claims were that “fairness is at the heart of those decisions” and “those most in need are most protected”. As the threat from the populist right strengthened and geopolitical threats from ISIS emerged the Conservative party reverted to a more authoritarian and divisive stance. The way in which new “compassionate conservatism” manifested itself in implementation looked rather familiar. In welfare reform it has entailed a stigmatising rhetoric and increasingly harsh compulsion and sanctioning. The early coalition commitment to “freedom, fairness and responsibility” has played out rather differently in practice (Bell, 2015). As more evidence is gathered it becomes clearer that criticisms of policies such as welfare reform are well-founded. The argument that fairness is at the heart of policy becomes harder, if not impossible, to sustain.

Very preliminary draft – Not for quotation

The Preamble to the Liberal Democrat constitution states that: “We champion the freedom, dignity and well-being of individuals” and that “no one shall be enslaved by poverty, ignorance or conformity”. Many of the reforms that the Coalition has overseen – for example, changes to disability benefits, work capability assessments, the benefit sanctioning regime, the effective removal of rights to many types of legal redress - are policies that can be seen as challenging core principles. Had the Liberal Democrats been in opposition they would most likely have condemned these policies in the strongest possible terms.

As a consequence, while most party members continue to support the decision to enter coalition with the Conservatives, fewer are content with the way the coalition has gone about implementing its agenda.

4. Survival

Issues of strategy and unstable identity intersect in the preparations for the 2015 General Election, which will be conducted in the febrile atmosphere associated with rising right wing populism. The political environment is, arguably, increasingly hostile to many core Liberal Democrat concerns. The 2014 European Elections – which the Liberal Democrats approached from an unambiguously pro-European perspective – demonstrated the scale of the problem. Similarly, messages on migration, drug liberalisation, or prioritising freedom over the wishes of the security state would appear to run against the grain.

The Liberal Democrats can identify a long list of Coalition policies that have the Liberal Democrat stamp all over them. But most of the headline policies upon which the coalition government will be judged – on NHS reorganisation, welfare reform, immigration, security, and most notable on the economy – carry the Conservative hallmark. That is perhaps inevitable for the junior partner. It comes as no surprise. Indeed, writing presciently not long after the formation of the coalition Stuart (2011, p51) argues:

The Liberal Democrats became too fixated on the minutiae of what they had gained in terms of policy concessions from the Conservatives, particularly their long-term obsession with electoral reform. What they seemed unable to realize at the time was that their central concession to the Conservatives on the economy – agreeing to cut the deficit further and faster than Labour – trumped all their anorak manifesto commitments put together. Nor were they able to foresee that they would take nearly all of the blame and gain virtually none of the political credit for taking the tough decisions on spending within the Coalition.

While it may not be a surprise that the coalition agenda has a Conservative flavour, in many cases those policies not only conflict with principles that Liberal Democrats hold dear but are badly thought through and/or poorly implemented.

Very preliminary draft – Not for quotation

The challenge for the Liberal Democrats is to tell the story of coalition in ways that get beyond the accusation that they have been useful idiots propping up a radically illiberal Conservative government and highlight the Government’s positive, liberal achievements. In the public mind these are unlikely ever to outweigh the broader thrust of policy originating with the dominant partner. But that highlights the point that the UK electorate is yet to fully recognise and accept the nature and limitations of coalition government.

It is hard, in this context, to see beyond the party suffering badly at the polls in May 2015. The main question is how badly. It may well be that one of the Liberal Democrats most high profile failures in constitutional reform – the AV referendum – will mean that the party does not do quite as badly as it otherwise might.

The party’s challenge now and for the future is how to reconcile its actions in coalition with its fundamental principles and how to credibly rearticulate what the party stands for in a way that will be given a hearing by the electorate. At the same time, given that the likely outcome of the May 2015 general election is a hung parliament there is a question of how it should respond. If the Liberal Democrats were to participate in another coalition then how can they retain greater distinctiveness and a stronger sense of identity? A second coalition with the Conservatives that isn’t conducted on different terms could spell the end of the Liberal Democrats as an independent party, in a replay of the history of the Liberal party. Would a coalition with Labour mean that the party will be branded unprincipled and only interested in clinging on to power? Or does the party’s survival ultimately depend on it not participating in a second coalition and rebuilding its identity in opposition?

It is clear that thoughts within the party are turning to who will succeed Nick Clegg, either if the party loses a lot of seats, Clegg himself loses his seat, or his head is the price for the formation of a coalition. A clear component of the manoeuvres that are being played out in public by potential successors is the future direction of the party. Tim Farron is seen as centre-left, looking towards Labour, and a favourite among many activists and members. He could be seen as taking the party back in the direction from whence it has come. The other potential leaders – Norman Lamb or Ed Davey – are much more likely to be seen as trusted with the stewardship of the worldview Nick Clegg has tried to promote. The outcome of the election in May will very likely have a profound effect the future trajectory of the party both in terms of where it locates itself ideologically and whether it has a long-term future.

If the electoral arithmetic is such that the party is in a position to opt for coalition the party needs to think carefully about how it makes sense of itself. There are unresolved issues about how party policy relates to coalition policy. Greater thought needs to be given to how the party at large can be helped to understand what is going on when the Parliamentary party not only doesn’t follow party policy but actively votes against it. There may well be reasons. It may well

Very preliminary draft – Not for quotation be tied up with strategy and the long game; with tactics and the realpolitik of coalition. But there needs to be a better way of communicating this. Otherwise, Federal Conferences increasingly become a charade. The alternative is to recognize that the bottom-up model is being supplanted for a top-down model that looks rather more like those used by the other parties. This may be judged the only way to ensure clarity of vision and message discipline. But it would precipitate an identity crisis in the party.

5. Conclusion

The Liberal Democrat’s experience of coalition government 2010-2015 has highlighted the potential costs of coalition for the junior partner. However, those costs must be interpreted in the lightly of the strategies adopted – breadth not depth, unity followed by differentiation. These were distinctive choices, for reasons that were plausible at the time. But they are clearly not the only choices. In light of the difficulties the Liberal Democrats are having demonstrating the difference they have made in coalition – restraining the worst impulses of the Conservatives may be a valuable service, but it isn’t an easy sell to the electorate – it is tempting to argue that the party made strategic mistakes. It is, however, hard to see whether the alternative approaches – depth, differentiation – would have played out any better either for the party or the country.

The choices that may face the party after the election in May 2015 are no more obvious. There are risks in all directions. Entering coalition again will mean continued influence over policy in the short term but a more problematic long term future. Returning to opposition might allow the party to recover some of its distinctive identity, but means that it foregoes the opportunity to influence policy in a period where a concern for fairness and liberty are going to be a key counterweight, whichever major party emerges as the biggest after the election.

The Liberal Democrats have undergone a crash course in coalition government since 2010. How – or indeed whether they get the opportunity to – put that knowledge to use after May 2015 remains to be seen.

6. References

Adkins, J. (2015) ‘Together in the national interest’: the rhetoric of unity and the formation of the Cameron-Clegg government, The Political Quarterly, online first.

Bell, E. (2015) Soft power and freedom under the coalition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Brack, D., Grayson, R. and Howarth, D. (eds) (2007) Reinventing the state: social liberalism for the 21st century, London: Politicos.

Browne, J. (2014) Race plan, London: Reform.

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Debus, M. (2011) Portfolio allocation and policy compromises: How and why the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats formed a coalition government, The Political Quarterly, vol 82, no 2, 293-304.

Evans, E. and Sanderson-Nash, E. (2011) From Sandals to suits: Professionalisation, coalition and the Liberal Democrats, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13, 459-473.

Jones, T. (2011) The revival of British liberalism: From Grimond to Clegg, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Laws, D. (2004) Reclaiming liberalism, in P. Marshall and D. Laws (eds).

Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds) (2011) The Cameron-Clegg government: Coalition politics in an age of austerity, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

McEnhill, L. (2015) Unity and distinctiveness in the UK coalition government: Lessons for junior partners, The Political Quarterly, online first.

Marshall, P. and Laws, D. (eds) (2004) The Orange Book: Reclaiming liberalism, London: Profile Books.

Matthews, F. (2011) Constitutional stretching: coalition governance and the Westminster model, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, vol 49, no 4, 486-509.

Stuart, M. (2011) The formation of the coalition, in S. Lee and M. Beech (eds)