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IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) IDP Movements 5 - 11 June 2017

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IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) IDP Movements 5 - 11 June 2017 IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) IDP Movements 5 - 11 June 2017 OVERALL FINDINGS: 5 - 11 June • 159 out of 1,183 ISMI-covered communities in Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Hama, Homs and Idleb SYRIA governorates experienced inward or outward movement of IDPs: • 9,552 IDP departures (! (!(! (! !!(! (!(!(! (!(!(!(!(! ! (! (! (!(! (!(! (! (!(! (! (! (! ! (! (! • 9,487 IDP arrivals (! (! (! (! ( (! (!(! ! (! (!! (! (!(!(! ( (! (! (! (!(! (! A L - H A S A K E H (!(! (!(!(! (! ! • Ongoing confl ict in northern Hama governorate (!(! (! (! (! (! (! ((! (!(!(! (! (! (! (! A L E P P O (! resulted in the outward displacement of 1,169 A R - R(!!A Q Q A (!! (! (! (! (! ! (! (! ( (! (! (! (!(! (! individuals from Oqeirbat sub-district to ISMI-covered (! (!(! (! (! !I(!D L E B ! (! ( (! ( ! (! ! communities in Aleppo governorate. (! (! (! (! (! (! (!!(! (!(! (! (!( (!(! (!(! (! ( ! (! (! (! (! ( (!(! (! (! (! (! (! (! • An escalation of confl ict in and around Ar-Raqqa (! (!(! (! ( H A M A D E I R - E Z - Z(!O(! R sub-district led to the internal displacement of 3,881 (!(! (! (! (! (!(!(!!(! IDPs across Ar-Raqqa governorate, including 980 (!((! (! IDPs to Al-Thawrah sub-district. H O M S (! (! (! (! IDP Arrivals (! IDP Departures (! Both ISMI coverage Table 1: Recorded IDP arrivals to ISMI-covered communities, by governorate, 5-11 June 2017 IDP ARRIVALS Last week Week before Reported Reported Reported Communities with largest IDP arrivals Most common origins1 of IDP arrivals Change arrivals to last arrivals arrivals (# IDPs) (# IDPs) (#IDPs) week (# IDPs) (# IDPs) Tal Aghbar - Tal Aleppo 6,051 Al Bab (684) Oqeirbat (1,169) Ar-Raqqa (951) 3,978 17,285 Elagher (872) Ein Issa and Ma- Ar-Raqqa 1,472 Jurneyyeh (245) Ar-Raqqa (1,079) Debsi Faraj (114) 3,007 5,129 buja (each 314) Bab Alsalameh Idleb 1,112 Dana (154) Selwa (143) Idleb (268) 2,638 7,010 (240) Hama 501 Kafr Zeita (48) Eastern Bari (46) Halfaya (83) Hama (79) 590 320 GOVERNORATE Deir-ez-Zor 318 Al Mayadin (91) Abu Kamal (55) Deir-ez-Zor (49) Kasra (24) 453 751 Homs 33 Ar-Rastan (14) Shabaaniyeh (7) Wa’er (26) Grandad (7) 50 307 Table 2: Recorded IDP departures from ISMI-covered communities, by governorate, 5-11 June 2017 IDP DEPARTURES Last week Week before Reported Reported Reported Communities with largest IDP Most common destinations2 of IDP Change departures to last departures departures departures (# IDPs) departures (# IDPs) (# IDPs) week (# IDPs) (# IDPs) Ar-Raqqa 3,881 Ar-Raqqa (1,050) Mahmudli (998) Al-Thawrah (980) Bader (456) 4,438 2,941 Aleppo 3,770 Menbij (1,060) Azaz (350) Dayr Hafi r (245) Al-Thawrah (237) 3,243 3,101 Kafr Nabutha and Idleb 1,310 Qah (399) Dana (268) Ma’arrat An Nu’man Atma (154) 1,826 3,297 (each 171) Breiha and Khash- Deir-ez-Zor 407 Shate (60) Furat (102) Mabruka (81) 97 207 am (each 60) GOVERNORATE Rasm Elamun Hasu Elablawi Hama 170 Oqeirbat (75) Jruh (60) 54 285 (100) (40) Homs 14 Abu Homama (8) Saan Elosud (6) Homs (8) NA 54 43 1 Location of origin refers to the most recent location from which IDPs have departed. 2 The ISMI weekly displacement summary tracks only displacements which occur inside Syria. 1 IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) IDP Movements 5 - 11 June 2017 AR-RAQQA GOVERNORATE Continued confl ict across Ar-Raqqa governorate led to 3,881 IDPs leaving ISMI-covered Recorded IDP arrivals communities, the majority travelling to other parts of the governorate. The most commonly recorded • 1,472 IDPs destinations of IDP departures were Al-Thawrah (980) and Bader (456) communities, both within % of arrivals from other governorates the governorate. • 0% Overall, a total of 1,472 IDPs arriving to ISMI-covered communities in Ar-Raqqa governorate Most common shelter of newly arrived this week. All arrivals travelled to communities within the governorate, such as Mabuja (314) , Ein IDPs Issa (314) and Jurneyyeh (245) (Figure 2). Ein Issa (628), Jurneyyeh (343) and Maadan (200) • Individual tents (925 IDPs) sub-districts received the largest numbers of IDP arrivals (Figure 1), with a large number of IDP • Hosted accommodation (458 IDPs) arrivals travelling from Ar-Raqqa sub-district (1,268). Recorded IDP departures Figure 1: Ar-Raqqa sub-districts receiving the largest IDP arrivals (# IDPs) • 3,881 IDPs 628 % of departures to other governorates 343 200 • 13% 143 57 11 Most common reasons for IDPs leaving Ein Issa Jurneyyeh Maadan Sabka Tell Suluk Ar-Raqqa communities Abiad • Escalation of confl ict Map 1: Major displacement in Ar-Raqqa governorate Number of IDP arrivals ² ( 05/06/17 - 11/06/17 ) Figure 2: ISMI-covered communities receiving largest (! 11 - 50 (! 101 - 200 (! (! (! IDP arrivals (# IDPs) Mabuja (! (! 51 - 100 201 - 314 Mabuja 314 A L E P P O Major displacements (>140 IDPs) Ein Issa 314 Ein Issa (! Jurneyyeh 245 Mahmudli 200 !( Maadan 188 (! Mahmudli (! Ar-Raqqa Figure 3: Most common sub-districts of origin of " arrivals1 (# IDPs) (! Sabka Ar-Raqqa (! 1,268 Maadan Mansura 114 A R - R A Q Q A D E I R - E Z - Z O R Kms H A M A 0 20 40 60 IDLEB GOVERNORATE A total of 1,310 IDPs left ISMI-covered communities in Idleb governorate this week, almost half travelling to other communities in the governorate, most commonly to Kafr Nabutha (171), Ma’arrat Recorded IDP arrivals An Nu’man (171) and Atma (154). • 1,112 IDPs % of arrivals from other governorates Simultaneously, a total of 1,112 IDPs arrived to ISMI-covered communities in Idleb, with Dana (331), Kafr Nobol (148), Ariha (120), Heish (108) and Harim (108) sub-districts receiving the • 54% largest number of IDP arrivals (Figure 4). Around half of the new arrivals travelled to Idleb from other Most common shelter of newly arrived governorates, including A’zaz in Aleppo (240) and Muhradah in Hama (70) (Figure 6). IDPs Figure 4:Idleb sub-districts receiving the largest IDP arrivals (# IDPs) • Rented/owned housing (871 IDPs) 331 • Hosted accommodation (168 IDPs) Recorded IDP departures 148 120 108 108 98 90 69 • 1,310 IDPs 23 11 % of departures to other governorates Dana Kafr Ariha Heish Harim Ehsem Idleb Salqin Sanjar Darkosh Nobol • 57% Figure 5: Six ISMI-covered communities receiving Figure 6: Five most common sub-districts of origin Most common reasons for IDPs leaving 1 largest IDP arrivals (# IDPs) of arrivals (# IDPs) Idleb communities Dana 154 Idleb 268 • Reduced confl ict in area of origin Selwa 143 A'zaz 240 • Loss of income Orm Eljoz 120 Damascus 172 Kafr Oweid 114 Heish 108 Ma'arrat An Nu'man 149 Harim 108 Muhradah 70 1 Location of origin refers to the most recent location from which IDPs have departed. 2 IDP Situation Monitoring Initiative (ISMI) IDP Movements 5 - 11 June 2017 ALEPPO GOVERNORATE ISMI-covered communities in Aleppo received 6,051 IDPs between 5 and 11 June, a signifi cant Recorded IDP arrivals proportion travelling to the governorate from other parts of Syria, including Ar-Raqqa (1,396) sub- • 6,051 IDPs district and Oqeirbat (1,169) in Hama (Figure 9). The sub-districts of Ghandorah (1,277), Jarablus % of arrivals from other governorates (1,243), Menbij (1,069), A’zaz (1,068) and Al Bab (1,031) experienced the vast majority of IDP • 84% arrivals. Most common shelter of newly arrived A total of 3,770 IDPs were recorded leaving ISMI-covered Aleppo communities during this IDPs period, most commonly travelling to Dayr Hafi r (245) in the eastern Aleppo countryside and Al- • Individual tents (2,030 IDPs) Thawrah (237) in Ar-Raqqa governorate. Close to one third of all IDP departures left Menbij (1,060). • Camps (1,615 IDPs) Figure 7: Aleppo sub-districts receiving the largest IDP arrivals (# IDPs) Recorded IDP departures 1,277 1,243 • 3,770 IDPs 1,069 1,068 1,031 % of departures to other governorates • 20% 114 80 47 45 39 Most common reasons for IDPs leaving Ghandorah Jarablus Menbij A'zaz Al Bab Daret A'rima Jandairis Atareb Ma'btali Azza Aleppo communities Map 2: Major displacement in Aleppo governorate • Improved safety and security in area Jarablus of origin Ain Albayda (! ² (! (!! ! ( (! (! (!( (! Marma Elhajar (!(! (!(! Tal Aghbar Figure 8: Five ISMI-covered communities (!(! (! (! (! (! - Tal Elagher (! (! (! receiving largest IDP arrivals (# IDPs) (! (! (! (!! Menbij (!(! ( (!(! Ein Issa Tal Aghbar - Tal Elagher 872 (! (! (! (! " (! Al Bab Al Bab 684 " Shamiyeh (! (! Jarablus 542 (! (! Menbij 416 ! " Marma Elhajar 325 ( A L E P P O Ar-Raqqa I D L E B A R - R A Q Q A Figure 9: Most common sub-districts of origin of arrivals1 (# IDPs) Ar-Raqqa 1,396 Oqeirbat 1,169 Ein Issa 570 Number of IDP arrivals H A M A ( 05/06/17 - 11/06/17 ) Jeb Ej-Jarrah 285 (! 10 - 100 (! 251 - 500 (! (! Jebel Saman 216 Oqeirbat " 101 - 250 501 - 872 Major displacements (>200 IDPs) Kms Jeb Ej-Jarrah 0 20 40 60 " DEIR-EZ-ZOR GOVERNORATE A total of 407 IDPs left ISMI-covered communities in Deir-ez-Zor this week. The most common Recorded IDP arrivals destination communities being Furat (102) in Ar-Raqqa and Mabruka (81) in Al-Hasakeh. • 318 IDPs % of arrivals from other governorates Meanwhile, 318 IDPs arrived ISMI-covered communities in Deir-ez-Zor during the same period, • 71% with Al Mayadin (91), Abu Kamal (90) and Kisreh (29) sub-districts receiving the largest number of arrivals (Figure 10). More than half of new arrivals travelled from other governorates, including Most common shelter of newly arrived IDPs Ar-Raqqa sub-district (207) (Figure 12). Figure 10: Deir-ez-Zor sub-districts receiving the largest IDP arrivals (# IDPs) • Hosted (135 IDPs) 91 90 • Rented/owned housing (126 IDPs) Recorded IDP departures 29 25 24 24 20 • 407 IDPs 15 % of departures to other governorates Al Mayadin Abu Kisreh Basira Ashara Sur Hajin Susat Kamal • 89% Figure 11: ISMI-covered communities receiving Figure 12: Most common sub-districts of origin Most common reasons for IDPs leaving largest IDP arrivals (# IDPs) of arrivals1 (# IDPs) Deir-ez-Zor communities Al Mayadin 91 Ar-Raqqa 207 • Escalation of confl ict Abu Kamal 55 Deir-ez-Zor 49 • Safety and security situation in the Siyal 35 Kisreh 24 community compared with elsewhere Shate 29 Al Mayadin 20 Sokkar 25 Maadan 17 1 Location of origin refers to the most recent location from which IDPs have departed.
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