Satpratipaksa As a Fallacy in the Navya-Nyaya Atsushi
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Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya Atsushi Uno The term hetvabhasa has traditionally been understood as fallacius probans or reason of inference, and forms a liveliest topic in the ancient logical treatises of Indian philosophical systems. Above all, Buddhist logicians paid close attention exclusively to this problem, whose minute, hair-splitting and sometimes far-fetched discussions of it made Indian logic appear more and more tedious and unintelligible. Even when the topic 'in question is restricted to the Nyaya school alone, its origin was not dated merely from the Nyayasutra, but was brought about by the influence of the Vaisesika as well as Buddhist logic. The conception of hetvabhasa has undergone a considerable change, in its con- notation and denotation, even since the -Nyayasutra, and it might be really a laborius task to trace its development faithfully. Taking into account such situation, the writer wants here to start a discussion within the limit of Siddhantamuktavalz by Visvanatha Nyayapaflcanana (17th cent.); a logical treatise belonging to the Nyaya-Vaisesika syncretic system in which the classification of hetvabhasa fixed its form to such an extent as to be succeeded almost intact to the Navya-nyaya. They are five kinds of hetvabhasa viz. savyabhicara (anaikantika), asiddha, viruddha, satpratipaksita and badhita. As for the traditional interpretations of hetvabhasa, wha_ is to be noted first of all is that the so-called fallacy or defect (dosa) itself is not taken into account at all. The fallacy in question lies in an apparent probans or reason of inference and makes it invalid or fallacious, the fact of which is explicitly shown by the form of past participle or by the prefix 'sa-' used in fallacious reasons. Take for instance savyabhicara or vyabhicarin, its idea is derived from vyabhicara, as is paraphrased by 'saha 'oyabhicarena' -1035- (29) Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nysya (A. Uno) in the Nyayabhasya (I. 2. 4), and it might be rather too rash to conclude that, the ancient logicians of the Nyaya school utterly neglected fallacy (dosa) as constrasted with fallacious probans. The term hetv-abhasa has two derivations and thus two different conno- tations. The first is paraphrased as hetuvad abhasate' (that which appears as a probans), or 'hetor abhasah sadrsah' (that which resembles a probans) ; this correrponds to fallacious probans' (dusta-hetu) or what was understood as such in the traditional Indian logic. The second is paraphrased as hetoh hetau va abhasah' (fallacy belonging to or abiding in a probans) and cor- responds to fallacy' (hetu-dosa), or in other words, error or fallacy which underlies the apparent probans and makes it invalid probans'. The writer's present concern is centred about the latter ones). The term fallacy' (dosa) here does not mean a defect in itself, but it is what is an impediment or obstructor to an inference, in conformity to correct and right perception. Visvanatha defines the fallacy' as follows: When the knowledge about something as its object thwarts an inferential knowledge (anumiti), that very something is called hetv-abhasa or (hetu-J dosa'2). The correspondence between fallacious probans' (dusta-hetu) and its defect' (hetu-dosa) can be illustrated as follows: savyabhicara - vyabhicara, viruddha-virodha, satpratipaksita-satpratipaksa, assiddha - asiddhi, badhita - badha, each consequent denoting the fallacy of its antecendent. However, the dif- ference of designation between the correlative terms is not always observed 1) Cf. Nyayakosa, 3rd ed., pp. 1074,1079. 1.(d usto hetoh) - hetu-laksanabhavad ahetur hetu-samanyad hetuvad abhasamanah (Nyayabhasya I. 2. 4.)/ atra hetuvad abhasate iti vyutpattya hety-abhasa-padasya dusta-hetah ity arthah (Gadadhari II.)/ yad va hetor abhasah sadrsah (Nyayabindutika III.) 2.(hetor dosah) - yasya hi jnanam anumiti-pratibandhakafii sah (Tattvacintamani II., badha p. 116)/ atra hetoh hetau va abhasah iti vyutpattya hetv-abhasa-padasya hetu-dosah ity arthah/ hetvabhasatvam canumiti-karani-bhatabhava-pratiyogi (anumiti-pratibandhaka)yathartha-jnana-visayatva / anumiti-pratibandhaki- bhuta-yathartha-jnana-visayatvam iti samuditarthah (Tarkadipika II). 2) Siddhantamuktavali (abbr. SM) with the commentary Kiranavali by Krsna- vallabharya Bhattacarya, Benares 1940., 71, pp. 254-5. tal-laksanarn to yad- visayakatvena jnanasyanumiti-virodhitvam tattvam. -1034- Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno) (30) strictly; the term satpratipaksa, for instance, is sometimes used in both senses, or viruddha as fallacious probans is expressed by the term virodha and so forth. Terms as such are with reason brought into ambiguous use, especially when different connotations for each hetvabhasa intended by the ancient and modern logicians of the Nyaya school are taken together into one and the same argumentation. As for the above-mentioned definition of fallacy', the term as its object' (yad-visayaktvena) must denote the fact which refers to the truth; that is, the additional qualification (pariskara) for the definition is-pertaining to the object which is objectively qualified' (yadrsa-visista-visayakatva). Such being the case, the fallacy' must refer to the truth, and not the falsity (bhrama)3). Thus in the Navya-nyaya, hetvabhasa is taken as fallacy (dosa), while in the Pracina-nyaya it is understood as dusta (=dosavat-) hetu, or the locus of fallacy. However, the fallacy of inconstancy (vyabhicara) is considered as the probans qualified by the occurence in the locus of the absence of the pro- bandum' (sadhya-bhavavad-vrttitva-visista-hetu), and the fallacy of incon- gruity (badha) as the substantive qualified (possessed) by the absence of the probandum' (sddhyabhavavat (=visista)-paksa), both referring to the qualified (visista) themselves instead of the qualifiers. Such being the case, since the fallacy of inconstancy (vyabhicara), for instance, like the fire existent in the locus of the absence of smoke e.g. heated iron-ball' etc. refers to the probans itself, against the afore-said definition of fallacy', how can the fallacies as such abide in their loci viz. fallacious probans ? The Navina-naiyayikas or neo-logicians contend that fallacies abide in their loci by any relation whatsoever. Commentaries explain to this effect as follows : In the case of inconstancy (vyabhicara), it exists in its fallacious probans 3) SM § 71, p. 257. yad-visayakatvaih ca yadrsa-visista-visayakatvam, tena badha-bhramasyanumiti-virodhitve 'pi na ksatih/ Anumanacintamani (Calcutta 1872) p. 83. tatranumiti-karani-bhutabhava-pratiyogi-yathartha-jnana-visaya- tvam yad-visayatvena linga-jnanasyanumiti-pratibandhakatvam jnayamanaii sad-anumiti-pratibandhakam yat tattvam va hetvabhasatvam...... -1033- (31) Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno) by identity relation (tadatmya-sarabandha). And in the case of incongruity (badha) etc., it exists in its fallacious propans by the relation of sva (= vahny-abhava-hrada iti dosah)-visayaka-jnana-visayatva, that is, the re- lation of objecthood of the knowledge, the object of which is the very fallacy'. Here the fallacy of badha (= sva) is the fact that the pond has the absence of fire (vahny-abhavavad-hrada), and the knowledge having that fallacy as its object (tad-visayaka-jnana) is collective cognition (samu- halambana) referring to plural objects viz. a pond having the absence of fire' and smoke'. And the fallacious probans or smoke' has the fallacy, which is the content of the knowledge. However, it should be understood as a rule that any fallacy exists in its locus by the relation of having the determinant of reasonhood (hetutavacchedaka) in question which is the object of the knowledge about the fallacy' (sva-visayaka-jnana-visaya-prakrta- hetutavacchedakatva-sarabandha). It means, in other words, that fallacy is related to the fallacious probans as its locus through a knowledge as me- diator, both being the objects of one and the same knowledge (eka-jnana- visayatva-saraband ha)4). Moreover, the thwarting of inferential knowledge with reference to the said definition, is the obstruction of either the inferential knowledge or its cause. Such is the second additional qualification (pariskara). The cause here implies consideration' (paramarsa) which is substantially consisted of 1) vyapti-jnana or the knowledge of invariable concomitance of probans (hetu) with probandum (sadhya) and 2) paksa-dharmata-jnana or that of probans being present in a substantive (paksa). The fallacy of vyabhicarin (= sa-vyabhicara), however, does not thwart the inferential knowledge directly, but obstructs its cause viz. vyapti-jnana. So the above definition 4) Kiranavali op. cit., p. 259. vahny-abhavavad-hrada' iti badha-sthale sva- visayaka-jnana-visayatva-sarhbandhena, sva'h - vahny-abhavavad-hrada' iti dosah, tad-visayaka-jnanam vahny-abhavavad-hrado dhumas ca' iti samaha- lambanam tad-visayatvam dhume iti dosavattvam dhumasya. vastutas to - sarvatra sva-visayaka-jnana-visaya-prakrta-hetutavacchedakavattva-samban- dhena dosavattvam bodhyam/ -1032- Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno) (32) duly applies to vyabhica rin too5). Here the writer wants to confine the problem of hetvabhasa to the fallacy of satpratipaksa. This fallacy can be formulated by a pair of arguments as follows: 1) hrado vahniman, dhumat. (The pond has fire, because of smoke.) 2) hrado vahny-abhavavan, Mat. (The pond has the absence of fire, because of water.) The intermediate cause (vyapara) of inference is called