Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-

Atsushi Uno

The term hetvabhasa has traditionally been understood as fallacius probans or of , and forms a liveliest topic in the ancient logical treatises of Indian philosophical systems. Above all, Buddhist logicians paid close attention exclusively to this problem, whose minute, hair-splitting and sometimes far-fetched discussions of it made appear more and more tedious and unintelligible. Even when the topic 'in question is restricted to the Nyaya school alone, its origin was not dated merely from the Nyayasutra, but was brought about by the influence of the Vaisesika as well as Buddhist logic. The conception of hetvabhasa has undergone a considerable change, in its con- notation and denotation, even since the -Nyayasutra, and it might be really a laborius task to trace its development faithfully. Taking into account such situation, the writer wants here to start a discussion within the limit of Siddhantamuktavalz by Visvanatha Nyayapaflcanana (17th cent.); a logical treatise belonging to the Nyaya-Vaisesika syncretic system in which the classification of hetvabhasa fixed its form to such an extent as to be succeeded almost intact to the Navya-nyaya. They are five kinds of hetvabhasa viz. savyabhicara (anaikantika), asiddha, viruddha, satpratipaksita and badhita. As for the traditional interpretations of hetvabhasa, wha_ is to be noted first of all is that the so-called fallacy or defect (dosa) itself is not taken into account at all. The fallacy in question lies in an apparent probans or reason of inference and makes it invalid or fallacious, the fact of which is explicitly shown by the form of past participle or by the prefix 'sa-' used in fallacious . Take for instance savyabhicara or vyabhicarin, its idea is derived from vyabhicara, as is paraphrased by 'saha 'oyabhicarena' -1035- (29) Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nysya (A. Uno) in the Nyayabhasya (I. 2. 4), and it might be rather too rash to conclude that, the ancient logicians of the Nyaya school utterly neglected fallacy (dosa) as constrasted with fallacious probans. The term hetv-abhasa has two derivations and thus two different conno- tations. The first is paraphrased as hetuvad abhasate' (that which appears as a probans), or 'hetor abhasah sadrsah' (that which resembles a probans) ; this correrponds to fallacious probans' (dusta-hetu) or what was understood as such in the traditional Indian logic. The second is paraphrased as hetoh hetau va abhasah' (fallacy belonging to or abiding in a probans) and cor- responds to fallacy' (hetu-dosa), or in other words, error or fallacy which underlies the apparent probans and makes it invalid probans'. The writer's present concern is centred about the latter ones). The term fallacy' (dosa) here does not mean a defect in itself, but it is what is an impediment or obstructor to an inference, in conformity to correct and right perception. Visvanatha defines the fallacy' as follows: When the about something as its object thwarts an inferential knowledge (anumiti), that very something is called hetv-abhasa or (hetu-J dosa'2). The correspondence between fallacious probans' (dusta-hetu) and its defect' (hetu-dosa) can be illustrated as follows: savyabhicara - vyabhicara, viruddha-virodha, satpratipaksita-satpratipaksa, assiddha - asiddhi, badhita - badha, each consequent denoting the fallacy of its antecendent. However, the dif- ference of designation between the correlative terms is not always observed

1) Cf. Nyayakosa, 3rd ed., pp. 1074,1079. 1.(d usto hetoh) - hetu-laksanabhavad ahetur hetu-samanyad hetuvad abhasamanah (Nyayabhasya I. 2. 4.)/ atra hetuvad abhasate iti vyutpattya hety-abhasa-padasya dusta-hetah ity arthah (Gadadhari II.)/ yad va hetor abhasah sadrsah (Nyayabindutika III.) 2.(hetor dosah) - yasya hi jnanam anumiti-pratibandhakafii sah (Tattvacintamani II., badha p. 116)/ atra hetoh hetau va abhasah iti vyutpattya hetv-abhasa-padasya hetu-dosah ity arthah/ hetvabhasatvam canumiti-karani-bhatabhava-pratiyogi (anumiti-)yathartha-jnana-visayatva / anumiti-pratibandhaki- bhuta-yathartha-jnana-visayatvam iti samuditarthah (Tarkadipika II). 2) Siddhantamuktavali (abbr. SM) with the commentary Kiranavali by Krsna- vallabharya Bhattacarya, Benares 1940., 71, pp. 254-5. tal-laksanarn to yad- visayakatvena jnanasyanumiti-virodhitvam tattvam. -1034- Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno) (30) strictly; the term satpratipaksa, for instance, is sometimes used in both senses, or viruddha as fallacious probans is expressed by the term virodha and so forth. Terms as such are with reason brought into ambiguous use, especially when different connotations for each hetvabhasa intended by the ancient and modern logicians of the Nyaya school are taken together into one and the same argumentation. As for the above-mentioned definition of fallacy', the term as its object' (yad-visayaktvena) must denote the fact which refers to the truth; that is, the additional qualification (pariskara) for the definition is-pertaining to the object which is objectively qualified' (yadrsa-visista-visayakatva). Such the case, the fallacy' must refer to the truth, and not the falsity ()3). Thus in the Navya-nyaya, hetvabhasa is taken as fallacy (dosa), while in the Pracina-nyaya it is understood as dusta (=dosavat-) hetu, or the locus of fallacy. However, the fallacy of inconstancy (vyabhicara) is considered as the probans qualified by the occurence in the locus of the absence of the pro- bandum' (sadhya-bhavavad-vrttitva-visista-hetu), and the fallacy of incon- gruity (badha) as the substantive qualified (possessed) by the absence of the probandum' (sddhyabhavavat (=visista)-paksa), both referring to the qualified (visista) themselves instead of the qualifiers. Such being the case, since the fallacy of inconstancy (vyabhicara), for instance, like the fire existent in the locus of the absence of smoke e.g. heated iron-ball' etc. refers to the probans itself, against the afore-said definition of fallacy', how can the fallacies as such abide in their loci viz. fallacious probans ? The Navina-naiyayikas or neo-logicians contend that fallacies abide in their loci by any relation whatsoever. Commentaries explain to this effect as follows : In the case of inconstancy (vyabhicara), it exists in its fallacious probans

3) SM § 71, p. 257. yad-visayakatvaih ca yadrsa-visista-visayakatvam, tena badha-bhramasyanumiti-virodhitve 'pi na ksatih/ Anumanacintamani (Calcutta 1872) p. 83. tatranumiti-karani-bhutabhava-pratiyogi-yathartha-jnana-visaya- tvam yad-visayatvena linga-jnanasyanumiti-pratibandhakatvam jnayamanaii sad-anumiti-pratibandhakam yat tattvam va hetvabhasatvam...... -1033- (31) Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno) by identity relation (tadatmya-sarabandha). And in the case of incongruity (badha) etc., it exists in its fallacious propans by the relation of sva (= vahny--hrada iti dosah)-visayaka-jnana-visayatva, that is, the re- lation of objecthood of the knowledge, the object of which is the very fallacy'. Here the fallacy of badha (= sva) is the fact that the pond has the absence of fire (vahny-abhavavad-hrada), and the knowledge having that fallacy as its object (tad-visayaka-jnana) is collective cognition (samu- halambana) referring to plural objects viz. a pond having the absence of fire' and smoke'. And the fallacious probans or smoke' has the fallacy, which is the content of the knowledge. However, it should be understood as a rule that any fallacy exists in its locus by the relation of having the determinant of reasonhood (hetutavacchedaka) in question which is the object of the knowledge about the fallacy' (sva-visayaka-jnana-visaya-prakrta- hetutavacchedakatva-sarabandha). It means, in other words, that fallacy is related to the fallacious probans as its locus through a knowledge as me- diator, both being the objects of one and the same knowledge (eka-jnana- visayatva-saraband ha)4). Moreover, the thwarting of inferential knowledge with reference to the said definition, is the obstruction of either the inferential knowledge or its cause. Such is the second additional qualification (pariskara). The cause here implies consideration' (paramarsa) which is substantially consisted of 1) -jnana or the knowledge of invariable concomitance of probans (hetu) with probandum (sadhya) and 2) paksa-dharmata-jnana or that of probans being present in a substantive (paksa). The fallacy of vyabhicarin (= sa-vyabhicara), however, does not thwart the inferential knowledge directly, but obstructs its cause viz. vyapti-jnana. So the above definition

4) Kiranavali op. cit., p. 259. vahny-abhavavad-hrada' iti badha-sthale sva- visayaka-jnana-visayatva-sarhbandhena, sva'h - vahny-abhavavad-hrada' iti dosah, tad-visayaka-jnanam vahny-abhavavad-hrado dhumas ca' iti samaha- lambanam tad-visayatvam dhume iti dosavattvam dhumasya. vastutas to - sarvatra sva-visayaka-jnana-visaya-prakrta-hetutavacchedakavattva-samban- dhena dosavattvam bodhyam/ -1032- Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno) (32) duly applies to vyabhica rin too5). Here the writer wants to confine the problem of hetvabhasa to the fallacy of satpratipaksa. This fallacy can be formulated by a pair of arguments as follows: 1) hrado vahniman, dhumat. (The pond has fire, because of smoke.) 2) hrado vahny-abhavavan, Mat. (The pond has the absence of fire, because of water.) The intermediate cause (vyapara) of inference is called paramarsa or ' consideration' which is consisted of twofold knowledge viz., vyapti-jnana and paksa-dharmata-jnana, both referring to the probans or reason. Thus, in the case of satpratipaksa, each consideration' is the direct cause of its own inference, and as such, functions as the obstructor (pratibandhaka) of 'its opposite or rival consideration' (pratiparamarsa), which again leads to the obstruction of its own inferential knowledge' (prakrtanumiti). Take for instance the above example of satpratipaksa, each inferential argument 1) or 2) produces its own paramarsa in the form of a knowledge as follows: 1) 'hrado vahni-vyapya (dhuma) van' (The notion that the pond has (smoke or) what is pervaded by fire.) 2) hrado vahny-abhava-vyapya (jala) van' (The notion that the pond has (water or) what is pervaded by the absence of fire.) The fallacy of satpratipaksa is usually defined by Substantive (paksa) possesses what is pervaded by the absence of probandum' (sadhyabhava- vyapyavan paksah). However, what thwarts directly the inferential knowledge (anumiti) of the opposite argument (pratipaksa) is not the fallacy of satprattpaksa, but the knowledge of the fallacy of satpratipaksa in the form of paramarsa (say, the notion of vahni-vyapya(dhuma)van hradah') which is the intermediate cause of inferential knowledge that The mountain has fire' (parvato vahniman). Thus, the second additional qualification as mentioned above duly applies to the case of satpratipaksaalso.

5) SM 71, p. 260. anumiti-virodhitvam ca anumiti-tat-karananyatara-virodhi- tvam, tena vyabhicarini navyaptih/ -1031- (33) Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno) The specific features of satpratipaksa can be clarified by comparison with. virodha or viruddha which bears a strong resemblance to the former as fallacy or fallacious probans respectively. The fallacy of virodha thwarts an inferential knowledge directly by providing vyapti-jnana that the - parent probans is pervaded by the absence of probandum. It serves to establish the absence of the probandum as only one reason or probans, while in the case of satpratipaksa each probans logically exercises the function to prove the presence of its own probandum in the same argument. The viruddha as fallacious probans is one which is the counterpositive of the absence which- pervades probandum' (sadhya-vyapakibhutabhava-prati- yogin), or in other words, The absence of that probans pervades probandum'. In short, though the probans viruddha actually establishes the absence of probandum, it is put forward erroneously as what is intended to establish the presence of the probandum, while the probans satpratipaksita actually establishes inferential knowledge of its own argument, and is put forward as such. Thus in betraying such a special incapacity, viruddha (or virodha) differs from satpratipaksita (or satpratipaksa)6). The Navya-nyaya accepts the fallacy of satpratipaksa as eternal (nitya), while the Pracina-nyaya takes it as non-eternal (anitya). The distinction as such is derived from the following reasons. In the case of the Pracina-nyaya, an argument The mountain has fire because of smoke', which is actually true, can be obstructed even by the pa rsa or the notion of fallacy based on another mistaken argument The mountain has the absence of fire, because of its being made of rock' (parvato vahny-abhavavan, pasanama- yatvat) etc. Thus the probans fire' can be obstructed (dusta) by either right or erroneous notion of the fallacy, viz. by the `consideration' or pa ra- mnarsa produced by the second argument?). Now returning to the subject matter, "When there takes place a know-

6) SM 71, pp. 264-5. viruddhas to sadhya-vyapakibhutabhava-pratiyogi, ayam sadhyabhava-graha-samagritvena pratibandhakah/ satpratipakse to pratihetuh sadhyabhava-sadhakah, atra to eka eva hetur iti visesah/ 7) Cf. Kiranavali, op. cit., pp. 257-8. -1030- Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno) (34) ledge of substantive having what is pervaded by probandum' (sadhya - vyapyavatta jnana), which is not known to be false, the content of another knowledge of the substantive having what is pervaded by the absence of the probandum' (sadhyabhava-vyapyavattdpasthiti), which is not known to be false, is the fallacy of satpratipaksa". In this case, the obstruction of each inferential knowledge results from that of its own consideration' (prakrta-paramarsa), which is again produced by that of 'the opposite con- sideration' (pratiparamarsa)8). To illustrate the above, it can be formulated as follows anumiti paramarsa (s has P) E--(S has P-vyapya)------E (S has r P)------(S has -P-vyapya> ------The sign of the arrow ---p' or ------>'here indicates the direction which obstructions follow; in the order of pratiparamarsa prakrta-paramarsa prakrtanumiti. In connection with this topic, it is quite inevitable to mention a unique opinion contended by the author of Ratnakosa9>, which, is a Navya-nyaya work prior to Gangesa. This logical work is of opinion that, alike a doubt derived from perception (pratyaksatmaka-sarhsaya), there must take place an inferential knowledge in the form of a doubt (sa k. ayatmakanumiti). This opinion was quoted and finally refuted by Gangesa in his -

8) SM 71, pp. 265-6. satpratipaksah sadhyabhava-vyapyavan paksah/ agrhita- pramanyaka-sadhya-vyapyavattopasthiti-kalina grhitapramanyaka-tad-abhava- vyapyavattopasthiti-visayas tathety anye/ atra ca parasparabhava-vyapyavatta- jnanat parasparanumiti-pratibandhah phalam/ 9) Though various passages of this treatise were frequently cited in many later Navya-nyaya works, the author of it had long been unascertained. Prof. Di- neshchandra, however, asserted recently that he must be Tarana Misra (1300 A. D.) slightly before Manikantha, Gangesa etc., on the strength of manuscripts quoting his name. The work exerted a great influence on the later Navya-naiyayikas to such an extent that many gave some sections exclusively to Ratnakosa. Such sections are of fallacy (dosa) in question, generic attribute (jati), debate (vada) etc. Cf. Dineshchandra Bhattacharya: History of Navya- nyaya in Mithila, Dalbhanga 1958, pp. 76-9, 87, 141, 150. -1029- (35) Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno) cintamani. Ratnakosa contends as follows : a) In spite of the knowledge that the substantive, say-the ground, has what is pervaded by the absence of a pot, a knowledge takes place in the form The ground has a pot', when there is a conjunction of the eye and the pot. b) And as in spite of paramarsa or the knowledge that a conch has conchhood which is pervaded by the absence of yellow-conchhood, there necessarily takes place a knowledge that the conch is yellow, if there is some defect such as the excess of bile or jaundice. So in spite of the knowledge of what are pervaded by the two alternatives (say, fire', and the absence of fire'), a doubt arises in the form of a perception of the two alternatives. Similarly in satpratipaksa too, there might duly arise such an inferential knowledge in the form of a doubt such as Has the pond fire or not ? However, when the knowledge of what is pervaded by one of the two alternatives (eka-koti-vyapya-darsana) is of greater strength owing to some auxiliary causes, the knowledge of the second alternative (dvitiya-koti-bhana) is thwarted, and hence no doubt takes place. Whether the knowledge of one alternative has equal strength as or greater strength than that of the other, depends on the effect of cause. That is, it can be postulated that when alternative A is true, paramarsa consisted of A (that is, the knowledge of substantive having what is per- vaded by A) is stronger; and when both alternatives A and B are equally true, both the paramarsa made up of A and B are of equal strength. Thus, the ground on which the fallacy of satpratipaksa serves for a vitiator (dusakata-bija), rests on producing a doubt (samsaya-janaka) and not on obstructing an inferential knowledge (anumiti-pratibandhaka). To explain the above contention explicitly, the two kinds of illustration deserve the purpose of establishing that perception' is strong enough to obstruct another kind of knowledge or not to be obstructed by another kind of knowledge, whether the perception as such may be ordinary perception (laukika) or perception due to specific defect (sopadhika-bhrama=dosa- visesa-janya-jnana). The first example viz. the perception of a pot aims at proving that a real perception cannot be thwarted by a wrong knowledge, -1028- Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno) (36) and it tries to prove that the fallacy (dosa) cannot always thwart an infer- ential knowledge. The second example viz. the perception due to specific defect is intended to show that a wrong knowledge cannot be obstructed by a real perception, and it proceeds one step further to prove that the fallacy of satpratipaksa establishes an inferential knowledge in the form of a doubt. According to Ratnakosa, ordinary doubt derived from perception can be formulated by a pair of paramarsa as follows : 1) purusatva-vyapya-karddiman ayam 2) purusatvdbhava-vyapya-kotaradiman ayam or 1) sthanutva-vyapya-kotaradiman ayam 2) sthanutvdbhava-vyapya-karadiman ayam Here due to the equal strength of the perceptions of two alternatives which have been produced by totality of causes for perception' (pratyaksa-samagri), a perception arises in the form of a doubt like Is it a man or not ?' Similarly, in the case of satpratipaksa too, there might duly take place an inferential knowledge in the form of a doubt like Has the pond fire or not?' as follows: 1) parvato vahni-vyapya [-dhuma) van 2) vahny-abhava-vyapya (-jala) van From such twofold paramars'a which is dependent on the totality of causes for inference' (anumana-samagri), a doubt in the form Has the mountain fire or not ?' (parvato vahniman na va) should be produced, due to the equal strength of the two viz. ubhaya-koti-vyapyavatta-jnanalo). In reply to this, neo-logicians or the Navina-naiyayikas beginning with Garigesa contend as follows: Since when there is the knowledge of sub-

10) SM § 71, pp. 266-7. atra ke-cit - yatha ghatdbhava-vyapyavatta-jnane pi ghata-caksuh-samyoge sati ghatavatta-jnanam jayate ; yatha ca sankhe saty api pitatvdbhava-vyapya-sankhatvavatta-jnane, sati pittddi-dose pitah sankha iti dhir jayate; evam koti-dvaya-vyapya-darsane pi koti-dvayasya pratyaksa- rapah samsayo bhavati ; tatha satpratipaksa-sthale samsaya-rupanumitir bha- vaty eva/ yatra caika-koti-vyapya-darsanam tatradhika-balataya dvitiya-koti- bhana-prati bandhan na sasayah/ phala-balena cad hi ka-samabala-bhavah kalpyata iti vadanti/ Kiranavali loc. cit. -1027- (37) Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno) stantive possessing what is pervaded by the opposite probandum X, there can arise neither extraordinary perceptual cognition (upanita-bhana-visesa) of X nor verbal comprehension (sabda-bodha) of X, the former knowledge (or the opposite paramarsa that the substantive possesses what is pervaded by the absence of the opposite probandum X) is considered to be an ob- structor (pratibandhaka) to all the knowledges which are produced neither by ordinary perceptual connection (laukika-pratyasatti) nor by perception due to specific defect. The gist of this refutation is intended to show that the second paramarsa X can be the obstructor to the first paramarsa Y, when and only when the latter paramarsa is produced by neither ordinary perceptual connection nor perception due to specific defect. Therefore these two kinds of perception are here mentioned as not capable of being ob- structed. Furthermore, when there takes place, with the help of ordinary perceptual cognition, the knowledge of a substantive (say, mountain) pos- sessing what is pervaded by the negation of fire with reference to the mountain, there arises an extraordinary perception (alaukika-p ratyaksa = upanita-bhana) with the help of the conjunction based on the common feature (sarnanya-laksana-sannikarsa)11) in the form All the mountains have what is pervaded by the absence of fire' (sarve pervata vahny-abhava-vyapya- vantah) and not in the form Mountains have fire' (parvata vahnimantah); henceforth an obstructor should be postulated individually to the extraor- dinary perception as such. Similarly when the paramarsa in the form ' vahny-abhava-vyapyavatta-jnana' which is not perceptual, there is not produced a perceptual cognition in the form The pond has fire' etc.; therefore the former cannot be the obstructor to the latter. Thus to the verbal cognition It has fire', the verbal paramarsa It has what is pervaded by the absence of fire' should be postulated as its obstructor individually. Such being the case, according to Ratnakosa, there have to be assumed

11) As for the extraordinary perception'(upanita-bhana), the commentary Kira- navali mentions, in this passage, only that due to samanya-laksana-sannikarsa. But it may also duly be applicable to that due to jnana-laksana-sannikarsa (conjunction based on previous knowledge). -1026- Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno) (38) innumerable obstructors in the form of 'tad-abhava-vyapyavatta' (the sub- stantive has what is pervaded by the absence of probandum)individually to particular extraordinary perceptions and verbal comprehensions in the form of 'tad-vatta'. In order to evade such combrousness (gaurava) in assuming innumerable obstructor-obstructed' relations (p ratibadhya-p rati- bandhaka-), the neo-logicians briefly stated as above for the sake of simplicity (laghava). Since thus assuming a single obstructor-obstructed relation, the inferential knowledge is included in what is to be obstructed, the paramarsa in the form having what is pervaded by the negation of mutual (opposite) probandum' (paraspara-tad-abhava-vyapyavatta-jnana) is always present. Then how can an inference take place ? Unlike the case of perception by ordinary conjunction, inference in the form of a doubt, that is supposed to take place in the case of satpratipaksa, is not attested by proof; where it so, the qualifying phrase other than an inference' ((samsayakara-Janumiti- bhinnatvena) would also be necessary to the definition of the obstructor. In the case of perception, there are two kinds of knowledge that the substantive has what is pervaded by both the alternatives produced by perception (prat- yaksa-paramarsa ; e. g. sthanutva-vyapya-kotarddiinan ayam' and purusatva- vyapya-karddiman ayam'), from the notion of both knowledges lacking validity. In the case of satpratipaksa, however, there takes place no inferential knowledge in the form of a doubt such as The pond has fire or not ?', since, unlike the case of perception, both the knowledges or tad-abhava- vyapyavatta-paramarsa serve as mutual obstructor to each other, whose invalidity being unascertained. Such is the refutation by the neo-logicians against Ratnakosa12).

12) Cf. SM 71, pp. 268-9. tad-abhava-vyapyavatta-jnane sati tad-upanita-bhana- visesa-sabda-bodhader anudayal laukika-sannikarsajanya-dosa-visesajanya- jnana-matre tasya pratibandhakata laghavat, na tuipanita--visese sabda- bodhe ca prthak-pratibandhakata gauravat/ tathaca pratibandhaka-sattvat katham anumitih?/ na hi laukika-sannikarsa-sthale pratyaksam iva satprati- paksa-sthale samsayakaranumitih pramaniki, yendnumiti-bhinnatve napi visesa- niyam/ Kir loc. cit. -1025- (39) Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno)

In connection with the notion of hetvabhasa, it should be considered why the hetu-dosa has come to be scrutinized instead of dusta-hetu in the Navya- nyaya. If the five-fold classification of hetvabhasa is considered to be due to the specific features of each probans, one probans in an inference can bE applied to any of fallacious reasons. Take for instance an inference like ' Wind has smell because of oiliness' (vayur gandhavan, snehat), the probans ' oiliness' (sneha) can be found to fall under all the five heads of hetvabhasa; and it might be classed under as many heads as there are defects or fallacies involved in it. Thus, if the five-fold division of hetvabhasa has been applied to the fallacious probans (dusta-hetu) instead of fallacy (hetu-dosa), what is the criterion on which to distinguish each probans from other possible heads, or to form an independent class. Uddyotakara also mentions, in his Nyayava rttika, innumerable hetvabhasa or fallacious reasons, when one takes into consideration the diversities of time, of person and the thing to be proved. However, in a general way, when only the diversity due to the relation of probans to probandum be taken into account, he enumerates 176 possible kinds of probans, right or wrong ; and finally he remarks that the sum total of them comes to be 2032 or even more, through due distinction being drawn between the diversities attending the qualifying and qualified factors (visesana-visesya-bheda). With a view to solving the difficulty in restricting innumerable fallacious reasons to five kinds only, Uddyotakara

gives a strained explanation in saying All that the definitions (I. 2. 4.-I. 2. 9) do is to differentiate the fallacious probans from another, and they do not restrict the number to five ; the definitions do not indicate that the number of fallacious probans is five only'13).. In order to solve such difficulty, the neo-logicians adopted a better device in classifying all the fallacies (dosa) that are possible in a probans, and then denominating a probans as fallacious in many ways according to the fallacy possessed by the former. The obstructive fallacy as such do abide not merely in the probans (hetu), but also in substantive (paksa) or pro-

13) Cf. Nyayavarttikam, Chok. Skt. Ser., Benares 1915., I. 2. 3. pp. 163-4, 169. -1024- Satpratipaksa as a Fallacy in the Navya-nyaya (A. Uno) (40) bandum (sadhya) etc., the fact of which is explicitly shown in the fact that the Jaina and Buddhist logicians postulated fallacious probandum' (sadhya- bhasa) and fallacious substantive' (paksabhasa) etc. Thus the Na vya-nyaya holds that the restriction of hetvabhasa to five kinds only, depends not on the nature of fallacious reasons themselves, but on that of fallacy which obstructs inferential knowledge or its cause. Visvanatha gives an explanation to this effect as follows: When a particular probandum, substantive or reason (viz. probans) has innumerable defects or fallacies, each of these fallacies is considered as hety-abhasa or hetu-dosa'14>. To be explicit, accord- ing to five principal types in which fallacies (dosa) can thwart an inferential knowledge or its cause, the, fallacious probans is considered to be of five kinds.

14) SM 71, pp. 262-3. yadrsa-sadhya-paksa-hetau yavanto dosas tavad-anyanya- tvam tatra hetvabhasatvam/ pancatva-kathanam to tat-sambhava-sthaldbhi- prayena/

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