PHUNC VI

A Timeline of Exploration

1960s USSR Space Race

Letter from the Crisis Director

Dear Delegates,

My name is Ben Akhtar, and I will be serving as your crisis director for the USSR Space Race at PHUNC VI. I am a sophomore at Penn State and I am pursuing a major in Aerospace Engineering with a minor in Computer Science. If you have any questions about Penn State, rockets, or how to be a nerd, I am your guy. I love to hang out with my wonderful friends, work on rockets, and play video games in my free time. Lately, I have been playing too much Rocket League. I also enjoy hiking and spending time baking sweets. I especially love to make cakes and brownies.

I have been involved in Model United Nations since the freshman year of high school and attended PHUNC as a delegate once. I joined PSIADA last year and now serve as the Technology Chair on the Executive Board. I have had the pleasure of serving as a co-chair at PHUNC V and a chair at PUNC XI.

I am looking forward to crisis directing this year and cannot wait till PHUNC gets started. I am very excited to meet all of my delegates and believe that this will be a great PHUNC. I cannot wait to see how you respond to any challenges presented to you in committee. If you have any questions or concerns, feel free to reach out to me! I am also extremely happy to have Kayla, my chair, by my side all the way. She is so experienced and such a wonderful person that I know if I have any problems, Kayla will be there to help. I cannot wait to see you at PHUNC!

Sincerely,

Ben Akhtar [email protected]

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Letter from the Chair

Hello! My name is Kayla Wendt and I am your committee chair. I am from Lansdale, Pennsylvania, and I am honored and excited for the opportunity to chair for a PHUNC committee again! I am a senior here at Penn State, and I am currently pursuing my bachelor’s degree in International Relations and History, with minors in Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies. I am also in a five year program, meaning that I am also working towards my masters in International Affairs at the Penn State School of International Affairs. I have been in the Penn State International Affairs and Debate Association for the past three years, and I have enjoyed serving this organization in many capacities over the years, including serving as the current Secretary General for our collegiate conference, PUNC XII, in the spring. Joining PSIADA played a large part in helping me decide what exactly I wanted to do with my life and I hope your experience here at PHUNC will help to guide you in your future endeavors the same way Model UN has helped me. As your chair, I have a few expectations of you as delegates. I expect all delegates to have a working knowledge of parliamentary procedure. That being said, you do not have to be an expert; I don't consider myself an expert either. This is a learning conference after all, and I am here to help you become a better delegate. I also expect delegates to be able to correctly draft a directive. I encourage everyone to commit to the personality and behavior of the person he or she is portraying. Being well informed on the background and duties of your position will not only help you as a delegate but also the committee as a whole. I also stress the importance of maintaining decorum; to help with this I encourage you to pass notes. Most importantly, I want you to HAVE FUN!

Sincerely, Kayla Wendt

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Background

History of Cold War and How It Began:

The Cold War has ties rooted all the way back in World War 1. After the Bolshevik Revolution, there came a civil war within the Soviet Union. The Whites, the non-communists, were supported by the United States and Britain, among other nations. This set the tone early as these formed icy relations between the West and the Soviet Union. After the Soviets won the civil war, the West refused to officially recognize the Soviet Union. It was not until Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected President that the United States finally recognized the Soviet Union. The West in Europe and the United States, even after recognizing the Soviet Union, never fully trusted them and continually sided with the Nazis over them in the years leading up to World War II. This led to high tensions between the two sides. After the Nazis declared war on both the Soviet Union and the United States, there was no other way around it but to work together. Even when allied, these two nations hardly got along. Joseph Stalin got more and more frustrated as his allies continually pushed back their invasion date of D-Day. Roosevelt was unhappy that Stalin refused to help with Japan. As the war wore on in 1944 and into 1945, it became clear the Soviets had no intention of freeing the Eastern European states they had taken from the Nazis. This caused, as Winston Churchill so elegantly put it, an iron curtain to descend over Europe after the war. The Americans did not appreciate the building of the Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe, while the Soviets believed this was the only way to prevent another invasion of their homeland. Events slowly began to unfold that escalated tensions more and more, including the Chinese Civil War and the Berlin Airlift. Eventually, in 1950, the Korean War broke out. The first major proxy war of the Cold War had begun, and the Americans and the rest of the West scrambled to fend off the North Korean invasion. Eventually, after three years of bloody warfare between the communists and the West, an armistice would be agreed upon. Although the Korean War may have ended, it was just a precursor to what was to come as tensions continued to rise with the construction of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The Lead Up to the Space Race:

The Soviet and United States space programs existed for many years before World War II. However, after the war, a space race began to heat up. The idea of improving on German designs was attractive, and both nations hoped to outdo each other in space. This was just another part of the cold war as it extended to space. After the war, both nations attempted to recruit German rocket scientists, as they would help further their own space programs since many scientists were far above any person the US or

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USSR currently employed. Unfortunately for the USSR, they did not pick up as prestigious German rocket scientists as the Americans, which left them at a slight disadvantage. This was because, as quoted by Mitchell R. Sharpe, “We despise the French, we are mortally afraid of the Soviets, we do not believe the British can afford us. So that leaves the Americans.” Even though the Soviets made various offers of rations, luxurious housing, and being able to stay in Germany, something even the Americans did not offer, few took the offer, which helped give the Americans access to some of the absolute best rocket scientists in the world at the time. Unlike in the United States, German rocket scientists in the USSR were allowed little involvement in the actual development of rockets. Their main job was to write papers. This was to help the Russian rocket scientists understand the more advanced concepts the Germans knew. This occurred for a number of years, and the Soviets eventually surpassed the Germans in knowledge. This left only Russians working within the Soviet space agency, cutting down on the chance of treason or a knowledge leak within the agency. The Germans suggested many times for the USSR to develop rockets or missiles that were far advanced than what the Soviets had accomplished at the time. These efforts were futile, however, as many Soviet scientists advocated against allowing the Germans to create their own rockets. This ended in the Germans never seeing their designs put into practice and themselves pushed to the shadows. It took the Russians 12 years after the end of World War II to finally launch an intercontinental ballistic missile. It is likely they learned much of the research from their German counterparts, since they had created the V-2 during the war. Even though it took over a decade, the Soviets still beat the Americans to this accomplishment and it was one of the early events that began adding tension to the situation. It was an important event as a lot of the early Soviet scientists working on replicating the V-2 rocket went on to play important roles in the Soviet space agency. Perhaps more important, however, is what this accomplishment represented in the bigger picture. Khrushchev would go on to support the intercontinental ballistic missile program with more funding than the space program, leaving the space program to lag behind the Americans program later in the 60s. Beginning in the 1950s, the Soviet Union began to attempt to launch animals into

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space. Earlier, the Soviets had launched animals in some of their replicated V-2 rockets and succeeded, so they thought this would be a good way to gain experience. Unfortunately, these launches were unsuccessful. These were important events even though they may not seem so. These were the first events that set the idea that man could launch themselves off the planet Earth and into space. The Soviets were the first to launch a satellite into space with Sputnik I on October 4, 1957. This was a huge boost for Soviet morale and propaganda, as they were off to a fast start. Less than a month later, the Soviets created Sputnik II and this time the satellite had a dog inside of it, making it the first time an animal had been launched into space. This marked the beginning of the space race as the Americans began to realize they could not allow the Soviets to show scientific dominance in space. Unfortunately, the dog would not survive, as the first animal to launch into space and survive would come later. Meanwhile, it would not be until January 31, 1958, that the Americans would finally launch a satellite in space, putting them behind the Soviets. However, the year 1958 was the year of the Americans as they put multiple satellites in space, including the first solar-powered and first communication satellite. The following years would see a back and forth between the Soviets and the Americans, but one of the biggest accomplishments was the Soviets being the first to launch a man into space in 1959.

The Soviet Space Program:

One of the big differences between the American program and the Soviet program was internal competition. The American program offered different subsystems under NASA. However, their general goal was the same. This was not the case for the Soviet program. The Soviet program also had different subsystems, but they often competed with each other as to which direction the program would take. This left the program in the early to mid 60s fighting internally as to what the main goal of the program should be. Although the Soviets continued to keep up for a few more years, this is likely one reason why the Americans eventually surpassed the starting lead the Soviets had and reached the moon first. Another one of the big issues with the Soviet space program was the propaganda that was to be promoted by the program. As the Cold War went on, the intelligence agencies of both sides went to great lengths to steal any bit of information they could about the other nation in some capacity. Because one of the main thought-processes at the time for Socialism was to propagandize anything noteworthy, it left the space agency in a bit of a conundrum. The agency had a lot of information they needed to keep secret and the less information that leaked out, the better. At the same time, they were supposed to champion their successful missions and display how far the Soviets had come and would go. When the Soviets used more propaganda, it allowed the Americans to gather more

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information and possibly find which programs they may be looking to extract data from. If they did not use much propaganda, it lowered the morale of the citizens, and this could have numerous impacts on society, including the output produced and general happiness to name a few. This conundrum was one that the Soviets would need to delicately balance in order to work effectively. The Soviets’ solution was to keep the program shrouded in secrecy. It was to the people what the iron curtain was to Western Europe—it was a space curtain. Almost nothing that occurred was revealed to the people until after it happened. This allowed the Soviets to effectively control public opinion by not reporting failures. As far as the public was concerned, the Soviets never failed a single space mission. Meanwhile, this allowed the Soviets not to reveal too much information and made it extremely difficult to steal information. Perhaps the most important date in the space race occurred almost five years after it began, and it was not the launching of a satellite or a man into the atmosphere; this was a political act. On September 12, 1962, John F. Kennedy gave a speech at Rice University that changed both the space race and the entire Cold War. It was a monumental event as Kennedy claimed the United States would put a man on the moon by the end of the decade. It was a challenge to the Soviet Union for years after until the United States put a man on the moon. Before this announcement occurred, the Soviets had been working on a rocket called the N-1. It had not started actual development and just the design had been proposed to the Soviet government for funding by Korolev. It was considered very large and perhaps unnecessary by the government. When Korolev brought the rocket before Khrushchev, he was asked how much it would cost. In response, Korolev claimed it did not matter. This produced a scathing remark by Khrushchev about how he has to worry about feeding people, providing necessary goods, and making sure the military is up to snuff. This would lead to a tense relationship between the Soviet leader and the space agency as they started out underfunded. In the end, the N-1 rocket was given a small amount of funding in 1961 to begin development. It was seen as a rival to the Saturn V; however, the Saturn V began with more funding, leaving the Soviets in a position to catch up in 1962 and 1963.

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Further hindering the Soviets developments were internal strifes in the early 60s. Korolev wanted to develop his N-1 rocket with Valentin Glushko as he was one of the premier scientists and most knowledgeable men when it came to rocket fuels within the Soviet space program. This marriage turned out to be a disaster. Korolev wanted to use a certain type of toxic fuel for his rocket, which was also used on the Titan series of rockets in the United State. However, Glushko believed it would harm the astronauts in the rocket and did not like the idea. Korolev and Glushko had already had past experiences that built resentment between the two. After much fighting back and forth on the design, Glushko flat out refused to work with Korolev. This led to inexperienced scientists being put on the project with little to no experience. Unlike the Americans, the Soviets continued to have different branches in their space program and often had trouble getting along with each other, leading to internal troubles and setbacks in designs and projects. If these shortfalls can be overcome, perhaps the Soviets will propel themselves to the moon.

Committee Structure

The way this committee will be run is in the form of a crisis committee. Delegates will all have portfolio powers to interact as their character with crisis, and they have the ability to pass directives with the help of other delegates. There are some differences between this committee and a normal crisis committee, however. Each session will be roughly about a year of time. At the beginning of each year, every delegate will receive an amount of money to spend at their discretion for that session. The committee itself will also receive money to spend on projects to help further the Soviets’ ability to get the moon as soon as possible. This budget will be determined by a number of factors, including how much money is spent the previous year and how much the committee pushes for more money. It is also important to note the government may set goals for the program to reach in certain amounts of time, even if the projects may deter the committee from achieving their goal of reaching the moon as quickly. Failure to accomplish these goals could reduce the budget. It is up to the delegates to decide which tradeoff to take.

Crisis:

Crisis will act as all entities not represented in the committee. For example, crisis will represent foreign powers not represented in the committee, the domestic populations of each nation, and the economic forces of the nations. You will communicate with crisis primarily through notes, but you may request that an attaché enter and meet with a crisis staffer who will represent the person you would like to meet. When communicating with crisis, use detailed yet simple notes. An example of a note to move troops would look like this:

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Front Inside

Please move 1,000 To: Crisis soldiers from From: Name of your Philadelphia to position Pittsburgh.

Crisis will respond to your request. If they deny it, Your troops encountered X you’ll be told “you don’t have enough supplies to move number of enemy soldiers. these soldiers” or whatever other reason it is that you You lost 600 soldiers in cannot do so. Perhaps your soldiers, on their way to the battle. You now have Pittsburgh, encounter an enemy force in State College. In 400 soldiers camped in that case, you will receive a note that looks like the one to the left. Here it is important to remember that your troops State College. They are never made it to Pittsburgh, they are trapped. They require unable to continue to reinforcements to move on to Pittsburgh. Crisis will Pittsburgh provide periodic individual updates on your financial and military situations as well as newsworthy alerts. While these notes are simple, they also include all the information Crisis will need. Crisis cannot move soldiers unless it knows where they are coming from and where they are going. This same process works for all things you do be they economic, humanitarian, political, etc. Value detail and quality over quantity. Your effectiveness in Crisis is determined by your ability to use it to your advantage and play to your own strengths.

Topics of Debate

1. One of the biggest topics should be the budget. This includes how to increase the budget and use the current budget. This means delegates should be discussing how to use the money and which projects to fund for the current year. Delegates should also discuss what long-term projects and facilities may be necessary to reach the moon. 2. Delegates should also be prepared to discuss any internal problems that arise within the organization and try to remedy them to the best of their ability. This includes the split of the space agency or a competitive environment between subsets in the space agency that cause rifts. 3. Finally, the delegates should be prepared to figure out how to directly compete with the United States. Any way that hinders the United States should be considered to further increase the time the Soviet Union has to reach the moon.

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Learning Objectives

1. What was so important about the Space Race? What impact did it have beyond the Cold War? Within the Cold War? What impacts are still felt today in the world of science and politics? 2. What helped lead to the failure of the USSR space agency? What were some of the reasons it had greater success at first? What could have been done to help it reach the moon? 3. What are the greatest successes of the USSR space agency? In what ways was the space agency ahead of NASA? Why did both of them lose a lot influence, money, and power after the moon landings during the Apollo mission?

Delegate Positions

Georgy Babakin: Babkin is a Soviet scientist and engineer. He gets involved in the Soviet space program later, and he implements more testing of dynamics and motors. This helps the scientists to make sure that there are fewer failures of missions and rocketry in general, which allows missions such as Luna 4 to succeed. Beginning in 1965, he leads the Lavochkin Design Bureau, which is a major player in designing and building the rockets. He would push for safety and tests to make sure that problems that might plague the program are rooted out.

Gai Il'ich Severin: He is the main developer of life support systems and space suits for the Soviet space program. He is also in charge of the first Soviet spacewalk, where he has to design the airlock. He is a brilliant designer and is in charge of many of the designs in regards to human manned spacecraft. He would push for more manned missions to space and likely would push for a manned mission to the moon.

Roald Zinnurovich Sagdeev: He is a genius Soviet scientist and Russian physicist. He is a former director of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and later in his career advises Gorbachev regarding science. He is the principal advisor in many probes to Venus and often directs any science experiments that will be conducted within a space atmosphere. He also later on works on the joint Apollo programs with the United States. He would be less focused on the engineering side of things and want to push for more science experiments and traveling to different places besides the moon to gather data.

Nikolai Alekseevich Pilyugin: He is a designer of Soviet control systems and boosters of Soviet rockets. He is also in charge of the navigation systems. He is an outstanding engineer that leads the development of all launch vehicles and the control systems for interplanetary bodies. He is a key figure for helping the Soviet space program advance as far as it does during the space race. He would likely head navigational objectives for reaching the moon.

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Viktor Petrovich Makeev: He is one of Korolev's, the head of the Soviet space agency, close associates and assistants. He is very involved in missile programs as well and eventually will work with ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines, so he will likely push for more militarization within the space program.

Sergei Pavlovich Korolev: Korolev is widely regarded as a founder of the Soviet space program. Involved in pre-World War II studies of rocketry in the USSR, Korolev, like many of his colleagues, went through Stalin's prisons and later participates in the search for rocket technology in occupied Germany. His incredible energy, intelligence, belief in the prospects of rocket technology, managerial abilities, and almost mythical skills in decision-making make him the head of the first Soviet rocket development center, known as RKK Energia. He deserves the most credit for turning rocket weapons into an instrument of space exploration and making the Soviet Union the world's first space-faring nation. He is head of the program for most of the time during the space race. He likely has the most political power but also lacks the ability to influence engineering choices as much, which can hurt or help the Soviets.

Boris Evseevich Chertok: He is the right-hand man of Korolev and is responsible for much of the communication via radio in Soviet spacecraft and satellites. He also helps work on the control systems for many of the spacecrafts. He is one of the best engineers within the Soviet space program and took on more engineering tasks, unlike Korolev. He has a large amount of power in terms of design work and communication systems but does not have as much political power.

Vladimir Pavlovich Barmin: He is a great engineer and one of the pioneers of the Soviet space program. He helps work on the launch infrastructure of modern Russian rocketry and is the key figure in this area, which allows Russia to keep up with the US in space for a while. He will likely work with other engineers to develop an engine that works well enough to get the USSR to the moon.

Alexei Mikhailovich Isaev: He is a Russian rocket engineer that is a key developer of the engines within Russian rockets. He designed a number of course-correction rockets that help work on many Soviet planetary probes and some that will be used in lunar landing missions. He will likely push for more focus on rocket engines and learning more from the Germans, as the Soviets’ main issue was with getting well-working rockets.

Viktor Ivanovich Kuznetsov: He is a key engineer on the rocket engine for the Soviet moon rockets. These designs will end up being successful but will end up being a little too late. By the time the system will work out all of its bugs, the program is canceled, even though the rocket is one of the most efficient in history. He will likely push for moon missions sooner on and perhaps sacrifice some of his efficient rockets for a passable one to help accelerate their program.

Mikhail Klavdievich Tikhonravov: He has had a long history with Korolev dating back to the

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30s. He works at a university and helps recruit future space and rocketry students. More importantly, he works on probes to Mars and missions among the asteroid belt. He believes these might help gain materials and resources that could be used in the future. He also works on rocket engines a good bit and specifically works on flight control. He is likely to focus on missions outside of the moon, or gathering resources from space and pushing for new and young bright minds coming in and taking over some of the positions.

Yuri Gagarin: He is the first person to go into space. He becomes an international celebrity and begins to tour. He also begins to get involved in some of the politics in the Soviet Union and becomes a heavy drinker. He participates in later missions; however, he gets more involved in the training side of things. He will have tremendous sway with the public, but does not have as much real power within the organization.

Yuri Pavlovich Semenov: A younger member of the space agency, as he was born in 1935, he quickly rises ranks within Korolev’s organization and helps work on key projects such as the Soyuz later in the space race. He also works on the orbital space stations. Although young, he has tremendous leadership qualities and a knack for politics that few within the organization have.

Vasili Pavlovich Mishin: He is Korolev’s right-hand man and plays a vital role in the development of the R-7 rocket, which is the rocket that launched the first Soviet satellite into space. He also is a leader on the N-1 moon rocket, which is the rocket supposedly going to the send the Soviets to the moon. He is going to struggle, however, as he faces a lot of difficult projects and lacks the charisma and funds to manage them at times. If he can overcome these issues, he may be able to keep the N-1 rocket from going bust.

Gleb Lozino-Lozinskiy: He is working on a secret space plan mission during the race which would essentially create a manned space plan. His efforts will lead to the failure or success of this project, which could have lasting military implications during the Cold War.

Mikhail Fedorovich Reshetnev: He is a leader in Soviet space communications systems. He becomes an integral part of the programs involving satellites, specifically communication and navigation satellites. His work extends to probes as well, but this is not his expertise. His goals likely include expanding communication satellites and developing better satellite missions to other planets.

Valentin Glushko: He is a Russian engineer working mainly on liquid fuel engines for rockets. He had a big fued with Korolev and Korolev that led to soured relations between the two. He will likely push for competing directly with Korolev to increase his personal fame and hurt Korolev’s reputation.

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Dmitri Ilyich Kozlov: He lost his left arm in the war with the Germans. He is a close associate of Korolev and was a key figure in developing early rockets and often in charge of designing them. He is going to have tremendous influence in terms of deciding which designs to pursue and which to not.

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Kovtunenko: He is a leader in the Lavochkin design bureau. He is integral in non-moon missions as he leads unmanned missions to Mars, Venus, and other smaller planetary bodies. This earns him immense prestige and helps develop the space program outside of the landing a man on the moon. His focus will be on continuing these missions and developing them.

Mstislav Keldysh: He is an active political member and has a large influence politically compared to many of his peers within the organization. Additionally, he is a renowned scientist and mathematician and does a lot of the theoretical calculations behind missions, including Gagarin’s and Sputniks'. He will likely be influential in deciding what is feasible.

Sources

Siddiqi, Asif A. Challenge to Apollo: the Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA History Div., Office of Policy and Plans, 2000.

Petersen, Carolyn Collins. “The Story of Soviet and Russian Space Exploration.” ThoughtCo, ThoughtCo, 17 Jan. 2018, www.thoughtco.com/soviet-space-program-history-4140631.

“The Soviet Space Program.” National Cold War Exhibition, National Cold War Exhibition, www.nationalcoldwarexhibition.org/schools-colleges/national-curriculum/space-race/soviet- space-program.aspx.

Dunbar, Brian. “United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War.” NASA, NASA, www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/coldWarCoOp.html.

Richelson, Jeffrey T. “U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM.” The National Security Archive, The National Security Archive, 4 Feb. 2015, nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB501/.

Howell, Elizabeth. “Sergei Korolev: Architect of Soviet Space Program.” Space.com, Space.com, 15 Oct. 2016, www.space.com/34396-korolev-biography.html. “Choosing Seven Pioneers.” Science Explorations | Scholastic.com, teacher.scholastic.com/space/friendship7/choosing_7_pioneers.htm.

Godwin, Matthew. “The Cold War and the Early Space Race.” History in Focus, History in Focus, 1 Mar. 2006, www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/cold/articles/godwin.html.

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“German Legacy in the Soviet Rocketry.” Russian Space Web, Russian Space Web, www.russianspaceweb.com/rockets_ussr_germany.html.

“German Rocket Scientists in Moscow.” Russian Space Web, Russian Space Web, www.russianspaceweb.com/a4_team_moscow.html.

Zak, Anatoly. “The Rest of the Rocket Scientists.” Air & Space Magazine, Air & Space Magazine, 1 Sept. 2003, www.airspacemag.com/space/the-rest-of-the-rocket-scientists- 4376617/?page=3.

Awards Criteria

Effectiveness in Crisis Effectiveness in Committee • Frequency of communication. • Initiative in proposing solutions. • Appropriate use of portfolio powers. • Quality of proposed solutions. • Impact of portfolio actions on crisis. • Contribution to directives. • Coherence and quality of communication. • Direction of committee.

Creativity Diplomacy • Originality of ideas. • Eloquence of speech. • Ability to adapt actions to evolving • Influence amongst other delegates. crises. • Leadership during moderated caucuses. • Ability to manipulate existing powers • Ability to negotiate and collaborate with beyond their initial capacity. fellow delegates. • Professionalism and consideration.

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