Presidential Politicization and Centralization Across the Modern-Traditional Divide Author(S): Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan Reviewed Work(S): Source: Polity, Vol

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Presidential Politicization and Centralization across the Modern-Traditional Divide Author(s): Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan Reviewed work(s): Source: Polity, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Apr., 2004), pp. 477-504 Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3235387 . Accessed: 20/12/2011 10:36

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http://www.jstor.org Polity * Volume XXXVI,Number 3 * April 2004

Presidential Politicization and Centralization Across the Modern-Traditional Divide*

Daniel Galvin Yale University

Colleen Shogan George Mason University

Conventional wisdom describes the "modernpresidency" as an institutionwith more political authority and autonomy than its "traditional"nineteenth-century predecessor. A central claim is that since the rise of the modern executive establishment, presidents have had an incentive to "politicize"and "centralize"their authority within the executive branch. Examining three lesser-known pre-modern presidents, we argue that the tendency for presidents to politicize and centralize is neither distinctly modern nor particularlyextraordinary. Rather, it is a fundamental presidential impulse that finds its roots in the ambiguous form of executive power in America.

Daniel Galvin is a Ph.D. candidate at Yale University.His dissertation exam- ines American presidents as party builders. His research interests include the American presidency, American political development, and political parties. His email address is: [email protected].

Colleen J. Shogan is an assistant professor of Government and Politics at George Mason University.She has forthcoming articles in Studies in American Polit- ical Development and White House Studies, and is currentlyfinishing a book man- uscript examining the moral and religious dimensions of presidential rhetoric. Her email address is: [email protected].

Introduction

The concept of the "modernpresidency" is the anchoringparadigm of presidential studies today. In Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt first described the attributesof the modern presidency,and FredGreenstein later codified the

* The authorswish to thankStephen Skowronek for his commentsand suggestions,and also David Mayhew,Sidney Milkis, and Matthew Glassman for their comments on earlierdrafts of thisarticle. This mate- rialis basedupon work supported under a NationalScience Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. 478 PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

term.1The modernpresidency construct has been useful in clarifyingour understandingof importantdevelopmental changes to the presidency,including the proliferationof bureaucraticand administrativestructures within the executive branchover the last seventyyears,2 the rise in public expectationsfor presidential agenda-settingand legislativeactivism,3 the heightened awareness of the relationshipbetween the presidencyand public opinion,4and the new powers derivedfrom the president'sincreased involvement in internationalaffairs.5 But the notion that the presidencyhas undergonea fundamental"metamorphosis," "transformation,"or "quantumchange" during the modern period has encouraged a bifurcatedframe of analysis, in which modern and pre-modernpresidents stand on opposite sides of a historicaldivide.6 Analyzingthe under-studiednineteenth-century presidencies of JohnTyler, James Polk,and RutherfordB. Hayes,we arguethat many of the characteristicsof the presidencythat are claimed to be distinctivelymodern are, in fact,transhistorical. Specifi- cally,the propensityfor presidents to politicizeand centralize7-to increase their political authoritythrough administrativecontrol-is not only a twentieth-century phenomenontied to the existenceof the modernexecutive establishment, but is an enduringpart of the president'sinstitutional incentive structure. Indeed, the originsof this propensitycan be foundin the ambivalenceof executivepower in the Constitu- tion.8The Founders defined executive power ambiguously, and left presidents to claim authorityand derive powers that were not specificallygranted to themin the Constitu-

1. RichardNeustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Wiley, 1960); Fred Greenstein, "Change and Con- tinuityin the ModernPresidency," in TheNew AmericanPolitical System, ed. AnthonyKing (Washington, DC:American Enterprise Institute, 1978); Fred Greenstein, Larry Berman, and AlvinFelzenberg, Evolution of the ModernPresidency: A Bibliographic Survey (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1977). 2. JohnP. Burke, The Institutional Presidency (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); JohnHart, The Presidential Branch (Chatham: Chatham House, 1995); Hugh Heclo, "The Executive Office of the President,"in ModernPresidents and the Presidency,ed. MarkLandy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1985);James Pfiffner, The Modern Presidency (New York: St. Martin'sPress, 1993). 3. GeorgeC. EdwardsIII, At the Margins:Presidential Leadership of Congress(New Haven:Yale Uni- versityPress, 1989); Paul Light, The President's Agenda (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); MarkA. Peterson,Legislating Together (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Stephen J. Wayne, TheLegislative Presidency (New York: Harper and Row,1978). 4. GeorgeC. EdwardsIII, The PublicPresidency: The Pursuitof PopularSupport (New York:St. Martin'sPress, 1983);Samuel Kernell, Going Public (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1997); TheodoreLowi, The Personal President (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetori- cal Presidency(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 5. LouisFisher, Presidential War Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,1995); Lowi, The Per- sonal President;Richard Rose, The Postmodern President (Chatham: Chatham House, 1988); Arthur M. Schlesinger,Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973). 6. Greenstein,"Change and Continuity in theModern Presidency"; Greenstein, Evolution of theModern Presidency:A BibliographicSurvey. Terri Bimes and StephenSkowronek, "Woodrow Wilson's Critique of PopularLeadership: Reassessing the Modern-TraditionalDivide in PresidentialHistory," Polity 29 (1996). 7. TerryMoe, "ThePoliticized Presidency," in The New Directionin AmericanPolitics, ed. John E. Chubband PaulE. Peterson(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985). 8. HarveyC. Mansfield,Jr., Taming the Prince(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 479

tion. The presidentialquest for autonomyand institutionalauthority is a perennial strugglethat crosses the boundariesof the temporalmodern-traditional divide. Althoughmost scholarsacknowledge that a few pre-modernpresidents, such as George Washington,Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, TheodoreRoosevelt, and WoodrowWilson claimed unprecedentedauthority for theiractions and expandedthe understandingof executivepower in America,they are treatedas exceptionsto the rule.Instead, the predominantparadigms are that modernpower "cannot be acquiredor employedon the same termsas those bene- fiting"pre-modern presidents9 and thatthe adventof the modernpresidency in the 1930swas accompaniedby a qualitativechange in the interests,motives, and behav- iorsof incumbentpresidents.'0 In contrast, we arguethat there are fundamental sim- ilaritiesin the way presidentshave acquired power and authoritythroughout Ameri- can history.In our case studies,we demonstratethat the tendencyfor presidentsto claimauthority and seek out reliableresources for the exerciseof power is neither distinctlymodern nor particularly extraordinary. Rather, it is a commontendency that findsits rootsin the peculiar,ambiguous form of executivepower in America.

ExecutivePower in the U.S. Constitution

Theidea of the executiveas a non-monarchicalagent of changeoriginates in the politicalthought of Machiavelli.In ThePrince, Machiavelli argued that the powerof the prince is not bound by law and the institutionsof governance,and is not restrictedby the liberalChristian virtues admonishing cruelty. The princeacts as he chooses and exertshis powerat will. However,he mustjustify his actionsby claim- ing to representsomething greater than himself-the people, the laws, or the sta- bilityof the state. His authorityto act with prerogative,while not democratic,still reliesupon his need forlegitimacy, or at leastthe appearanceof legitimacy.As such, the princemust take active steps to earnhis authority.His executive power must be soughtout andcultivated before it can be exercisedeffectively. According to Harvey Mansfield,the Founders'great accomplishment was to "tame"Machiavelli's prince and "republicanize"Locke's executive by institutionalizingthe executivepower in a democraticsystem of government."Yet not all the characteristicsof Machiavelli's princewere lost in the tamingprocess; the essential"ambivalence" of executive power providesthe motiveforce behind the Americanpresidency. American presidents, like all executivesdescendant from Machiavelli'sprince, have had to earn theirpolitical authority and institutionalautonomy.

9. Neustadt,Presidential Power. 10. Greenstein,"Change and Continuity in the ModernPresidency"; Moe, "The Politicized Presidency"; Neustadt,Presidential Power. 11. Mansfield,Taming the Prince. 480 PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

The Constitutionstates in ArticleII that "the executive power shall be vestedin a President,"but nowhereis the executivepower explicitly defined. The ambiguityof executivepower stands in sharpcontrast to the specificityof the legislativepowers enumeratedin ArticleI-"All legislativepowers herein granted shall be vestedin a Congress"(emphasis added). These constitutional"silences" regarding executive powergrant presidents the right-indeed,they compel presidents-to defineexecu- tivepower according to circumstance,to seek authorityaccording to necessity,and to claim legitimacyfor politicalactions where there is no doctrinalwarrant.'2 Althoughthe debateover why the Foundersinstitutionalized the ambiguityof executivepower is an interestingone, the importantpoint here is thatthe presidency, unlikethe Congress,must work to achievethe authorityit is not explicitlygranted. The presidentcannot merely declare his authorityand makeit so: as Machiavelli observed,executive power must be negotiated,justified, and achieved.As political actorsoperating within a politicalsystem inhabitedby other institutionsvying for powerand authority, presidents must ensure their institutional rights, per se, in rela- tion to otherinstitutions of governance.They must carve out specificrealms of gov- ernancein which theiractions will be consideredlegitimate and authoritative.Like Machiavelli'sprince, they yearn for autonomy; but unlikethe prince,their authority must be derivedfrom the democraticpolitical system in which they operate.By activelyconfronting existing institutional arrangements, redefining political under- standings,and seizing upon anynumber of availableresources, presidents throughout historyhave actively crafted their personal, political, and institutionalauthority.

InstitutionalIncentives of the AmericanPresidency

Evenwhen constitutionalizedand republicanized in the formwe recognizeas the Americanpresidency, the ambiguityof executivepower creates an incentivefor presidentsto be dynamicand forcefulagents of changeas theyinteract with otherpolit- icalinstitutions. As politicalactors, presidents are fundamentallyconcerned with the politicsof governing,and they seek to achievetheir political purposes through polit- icalmeans. Among other goals, presidents seek reelection,the perceptionof leader- shipsuccess, historical greatness, and a strengthenedparty by assertingtheir authorityand by tryingto controlpolitical developments on theirown terms. Moeadvances an understandingof the president'sinstitutional incentives that is quitesimilar to ours:presidents attempt to achievetheir goals by appearingstrong and by workingto expandtheir institutional autonomy.'3 He notes:"autonomy is an integralpart of theirinstitutional incentive structure, part of what it means to be a

12. See also RichardM. Pious, The American Presidency (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1979). 13. Moe,"The Politicized Presidency"; Terry Moe, "Presidents, Institutions, and Theory," in Research- ing the Presidency,ed. GeorgeC. EdwardsIII, John H. Kessel,and BertA. Rockman(Pittsburgh: University of PittsburghPress, 1993). Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 481

good president."14To achieve this autonomy,presidents take "aggressiveaction withintheir own sphereof authorityto shiftthe structure of politicsfor themselves and everyoneelse."l5 They engage with the institutionalsystem strategically and forcefully, hopingto achievetheir political objectives and enhancetheir independent authority. Moerecognizes that presidents are motivatedby a "questfor control" and autonomy.But like many presidency scholars, he mistakenlyclaims that this questbegan with the growthof the bureaucracyand the dramaticrise in expectationsfor presidential leadershipthat followed from FranklinRoosevelt's activist presidency. Modernpresidents, Moe says, respond to these unreasonableexpectations by trying to shape the structureof the politicalbureaucracy to be more responsiveto their personalcontrol. They aggressively build administrative and regulatoryinstitutions that are more tractable,pose challenges to the structureof the congressional bureaucracy,and act unilaterallywhenever possible. By "centralizing"the policy- makingprocess in the WhiteHouse and "politicizing"the institutionalsystem, pres- identsgain more personalautonomy and institutionalauthority.16 It is our contentionthat the institutionalincentives that lead presidentsto cen- tralizeand politicizeresult not merelyfrom their pivotalrole in determiningthe structureof the modernbureaucracy, but more fundamentallyfrom the ambiguity of executivepower and the elusivenessof authoritythat is inherentin the office itself. Moe makes a strong case that aggressiveadministrative and bureaucratic managementis the most prominentmanifestation of this incentivein the modern period.But because the structuralpolitics of the modernperiod drive his definition of institutionalincentives, Moe's analysis misses the creativeways in which presidentshave pursued authority over time. We contendthat the president'smotivation to politicizeand centralizeis not a modernphenomenon, but a reactionto a pervasiveinstitutional incentive. In the followingcase studies,we examine how Tyler,Polk, and Hayeseach soughtto seize upon the ambiguityof presidentialpower to politicizehis administrationand centralizehis authority.John Tyler battled against overzealous Whigs in Congressto securehis institutionalindependence and advancehis signaturepolicy, the annexationof Texas.Through his unprecedentedassertion of controlover the budgetaryprocess, James Polkcreated new avenuesof bureaucraticauthority for the presidencyand providedhis administrationwith the necessary means to accomplishhis ambitiousJacksonian agenda. By displacingentrenched interests and eliminatingpolitical patronage, Rutherford B. Hayesplaced the presidencyat

14. Moe,"Presidents, Institutions, and Theory," 364-65. 15. Moe,"Presidents, Institutions, and Theory," 367. 16. Moe,"The Politicized Presidency"; Terry Moe, "The Politics of BureaucraticStructure," in Canthe GovernmentGovern?, ed. JohnE. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989);Moe, "Presidents, Institutions, and Theory"; Terry Moe, and William Howell, "The Presidential Power of UnilateralAction," Journal of Law, Economicsand Organization15, (1999);Terry Moe, and William Howell,"Unilateral Action and PresidentialPower: A Theory,"Presidential Studies Quarterly 29 (1999). 482 PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

the centerof his party'sorganization. The followingthree case studiesdemonstrate thateven lesser-notednineteenth-century presidents had the incentiveto seek political authoritynot explicitlygranted to them by the Constitutionand turnit toward theirown politicalpurposes.'7

I. Politicizing and Centralizing Administrative Capacity: The Presidency of John Tyler

Thepresidency of JohnTyler does not standout in historyas particularlyremark- able. Norshould it: by most measures,Tyler had modest policyambitions, he did not leadthe nationthrough any wars or majoreconomic crises, and his personality was not especiallynoteworthy. He establishedthe importantprecedent of vice pres- identialsuccession, but did not leavea significantpolitical legacy after he left office in 1845.Yet because his presidencydid not makemuch of a markon Americanpol- itics,it is all the more illustrativeof the presidentialincentive to establishindepend- ence and politicalauthority by playingupon the ambiguitiesof executivepower in the Constitution.Like modern presidents, Tyler sought to pursuehis policyobjectives-the annexationof Texas and moderateeconomic policies that respected states'rights-by politicizingand centralizinghis administration. Tylerdid not come to powerwith an abundanceof independentpersonal or political authority,and as the firstVice Presidentto succeed a deceasedpresident, Tyler couldclaim no electoralmandate. Tyler's accession to the presidencywas hotlycon- tested,and his legitimacywas challengedfrom all sides. Throughout his term,Tyler's policyobjectives failed to generatea popularconsensus, and both the Democratic partyand the Whigparty found that organizing in oppositionto Tylerwas morefruit- ful than lookingto him for leadership.From the start,Tyler had to seize upon the ambiguitiesof executivepower to createhis own sphereof authority.

SecuringFormal Authority

Withthe electionof WilliamHenry Harrison to the presidencyin 1840,the Whig partyhoped to reversethe courseof presidentialaggrandizement set by AndrewJack-

17. A briefnote on ourmethodology: this research is partof a largerongoing project critiquing the per- vasive"modern/traditional" divide in presidentialscholarship by investigatingthe executiveleadership of nineteenth-centurypresidents. Clearly, these three case studiesare not exhaustive;yet theyare still inform- ative.To gain the mostexplanatory power from our limited number of cases,we followKing, Keohane, and Verbaby emphasizingthe largernumber of observationsof presidentialactions contained within each of the threecases. Forexample, within the examinationof Tyler,our thesis is substantiatedby numerous observations,including Tyler's strategic use of the presidentialoath, his wrestingof controlover Harrison's cabinet,his creationof a politicized"kitchen cabinet," his use of the veto, his strategicuse of the appoint- ment power,and his effortsto builda new partyfor political leverage. See GaryKing, Robert 0. Keohane, and SidneyVerba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in QualitativeResearch (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1994). Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 483

son and returncongressional supremacy to the federalgoverment. In his inaugural address,Harrison promised to putinto practice the Whig's restrictive understanding of executivepower. Overjoyed congressional Whigs expected their program to be fully implementedwithout significant interference from the executivebranch. But Harri- son's untimelydeath a monthlater left to his successorthe responsibilityof livingup to the Whigcreed. John Tyler, however, had been nominatedas the Whigparty's vice presidentialcandidate for political reasons, not forhis dedication to theWhig party program.He had providedvaluable support to keyWhig party leaders in the recentpast, and was a states'rights southerner who broughtsectional balance to the partycoali- tion.Tyler was a Democratuntil the mid-1830s,and only left the partyto demonstrate his oppositionto Jackson's"war" on the nationalbank. In placinghim on the ticket, the Whig partyhad "askedhim no questionsabout his views and requiredhim to makeno pledges."'8Tyler was an independentpolitician who stood,unlike most of his contemporaries,above party politics; his election as a WhigVice President did not alter his commitmentto patricianideals of independentstatesmanship. Harrison'sdeath promptedan urgentconstitutional debate over how to fillthe vacuumof powerhe left behind.Should Tyler become the president?Or should he remainVice President,acting as president?Like many other passages in the Con- stitution,the instructionsregarding succession leave considerableroom for inter- pretation.It reads: "in the case of the removalof the Presidentfrom office, or of his death,resignation, or inabilityto dischargethe powersand dutiesof the said office, the same shalldevolve on the Vice President."Precisely what "thesame" means is unclear:is it the "saidoffice," or "thepowers and duties?" Tyler's detractors, including Harrison'scabinet, declared that "Mr.Tyler must, while performingthe func- tions of President,bear the title of Vice-President,acting President"and several majornewspapers concurred that Tyler should assume the powersand duties of the presidencybut not the officeitself.19 In trueMachiavellian fashion, once Tylerreached Washington, D.C., he immedi- atelytook the presidentialoath of office.He swore to "faithfullyexecute the Office of the Presidentof the UnitedStates" and "preserve,protect, and defendthe Con- stitution."This action profoundly affected his status,providing him with the formal authorityof the office,not justof the president'sduties. Although former president JohnQuincy Adams regarded Tyler's assumption of the presidencyas a "directvio- lationof both the grammarand contextof the Constitution,"most of Tyler'scritics reluctantlyacknowledged that his swearingto execute the office of Presidentwas tantamountto being himselfthe President.20

18. RobertSeager, And Tyler Too: A Biographyof John& Julia Gardiner Tyler (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963),135. 19. RobertJ. Morgan,Whig Embattled: The Presidencyunder John Tyler(Lincoln: University of NebraskaPress, 1954), 7-11. 20. CharlesFrancis Adams, ed., Memoirsof John QuincyAdams (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1874), 463-64. 484 PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

Tyleralso decidedto deliveran inauguraladdress, which he considered"a brief expositionof the principleswhich will governme in the generalcourse of my administration."21Using the firstperson rhetorically was a directclaim of his autonomyas president,and it didnot go unnoticedin the pressor in the Houseof Representatives, wherea motionwas madeto forcethe titleupon Tyler of "Vice-President,now exer- cisingthe dutiesof President"(the motionfailed). Had Tyler hesitated for another day,week, or monthto asserthis authorityas President,it is reasonableto assume thathis congressionaldetractors would haveseized the opportunityto subordinate the presidencyand its powersto the will of the Whigmajority in Congress.With the questionof his legitimacyas presidentaddressed for the moment,if only by his de factoassumption of the titleand office, Tyler began his questto exertcontrol over his administrationand to directpolitical developments on his own terms.

Tyler'sPoliticization and Centralization

One of the most obviousplaces for a presidentto exerthis authorityas political leaderis in his own administration:presidents often seek to shape administrative arrangementsin the executivebranch and influencethe politicalorientation of gov- erninginstitutions within their reach. Terry Moe argues that presidents are drivento interactwith the surroundinginstitutional environment by the "underlyingdegree of congruence"between theirincentives and resourcesand the "existingstructures makingup the institutionalpresidency.... Ifpresidents are dissatisfied with the institutionalarrangements they inherit,then theywill initiatechanges to the extentthat theyhave the resourcesto do so."22Moe's theory of politicizationand centralization, of course,refers to the "patternedbehaviors" that exist within the modernexecutive establishment,including the federal bureaucracy,the numerous White House offices,the Officeof Managementand Budget,and the ExecutiveOffice of the Presi- dent.23The executivebranch in 1841, however,lacked significant administrative capacityor bureaucraticmachinery: Tyler's administration consisted of littlemore than a personalsecretary and a cabinet.Yet Tyler sought to controlthe executive branchin muchthe same way as modernpresidents do. Whatthe presidentalways wants,Moe tells us, "isan institutionalsystem responsive to his needs as a political leader."24Much of Tyler'sactivity in the presidencycan be seen, in this light,as part of an ongoingeffort to shapethe institutionalenvironment to his politicaladvantage. In Tyler'stime, the most prominentand politicallysignificant establishment in the executivebranch was the cabinet.The cabinetwas traditionallycomposed of

21. JamesD. Richardson,A Compilationof the Messagesand Papersof the Presidents,1789-1902, vol. 5 (Washington,DC: Bureau of NationalLiterature and Art, 1903), 36-39. 22. Moe,"The Politicized Presidency," 237-38. 23. Moe,"The Politicized Presidency," 237. 24. Moe,"The Politicized Presidency," 239. Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 485

prominent,independent-minded members of the president'sparty, distinguished statesmenin theirown right,who would not only overseedepartments within the executivebranch, but as in DanielWebster's case (Tyler'sSecretary of State),would have near-completeauthority over their policy areas. Presidents relied on theirsec- retariesfor information,advice, and politicalcapital. Who was placedon the cabinet indicatedwhich states, regions, political ideologies, and partyand congressional leadersheld sway in the president'sadministration; cabinet secretaries were political tools justas they were politicalresources. Proceedings from cabinet meetings had symbolicvalue and sometimesbecame veritablepolitical events-what was saidbetween presidents and secretaries could become the subjectof politicalnews. How the presidentmanaged his cabinet,therefore, was an essentialcomponent of executiveleadership in the nineteenthcentury: it impactedhis abilityto implement his policyobjectives, build politicalcoalitions, advance his reelectionhopes, and directthe politicalagenda. Uponentering the WhiteHouse in April1841, Tyler was sensitiveto the national upheavalsurrounding Harrison's death. In an effortto save the nationfrom further strife,Tyler chose not to dismissHarrison's cabinet and appoint new secretaries.His planwas to smoothover his rockytransition by showingrespect for the Whiglead- ership.This decision was intendednot only to ingratiateTyler with his party,but it was also a strategicmove designedto preservethe Whigs'delicate factional balance of anti-Democraticnortherners and southernerswith nationalisticeconomic policypreferences. Unfortunately for Tyler, Harrison's secretaries were knownlieu- tenantsof SenatorHenry Clay, and so his failureto change administrationsmade the new presidentappear subordinate to the strongcongressional Whig leadership. At the firstcabinet meetingon April6, DanielWebster explained to Tylerthat PresidentHarrison had made all policydecisions by a majorityvote in the cabinet, and the presidentreceived only one vote. The cabinet,as well as the partyleader- ship, expectedand encouragedTyler to follow Harrisonand cede authorityto his secretaries.Although this traditionof cabinet decision-makingdated back to ThomasJefferson, it becamea highlycontentious issue during the administrationof AndrewJackson. Jackson not only refusedto vote with his cabinet,he refusedto meet with it for the firsttwo years of his presidencyand insteadreferred to a "kitchencabinet" of informalfriends and advisors.Although Tyler had made his careeropposing the executiveaggrandizement of AndrewJackson, he now found himselffaced with a crucialdecision: should he, likeJackson, assert his autonomy and authorityover his cabinet,or handcontrol over his administrationto the Whig leadershipin a demonstrationof his partyfaithfulness? The latterproposition was untenable.Not only would a rule-by-committeesystem compromise his personal and institutionalautonomy, but his politicalobjectives would be subordinatedto the policyagenda and politicalambitions of HenryClay. Tyler seized thisopportunity to defendhis autonomy,declaring to his cabinet:"I am the President,and I shall be held responsiblefor my administration.I shall be pleased to availmyself of your 486 PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

counsel and advice.But I can neverconsent to being dictatedto as to what I shall or shallnot do.... Whenyou thinkotherwise, your resignations will be accepted."25 Tyler'sassertion that he and he alone possessed the executivepower demon- stratesthe vitalityand enduranceof the Founders'ideals and hopes for the institutions they created.By allowingthe executivepower to remainambiguous in the Constitution,the Founderseffectively empowered presidents to interprettheir role as theychoose. In thisway, the executivecould be both strongand weak, according to necessity.26But this flexibilityand adaptabilityrequires independence and unityin the executive.By institutionalizingtheir ambivalence over executive power in ambiguouslanguage, the Foundersprovided the presidencywith an incentiveto resistencroachment upon its unitaryform. In Federalist70, Publiuscontended that unityis an essentialcomponent of energyin the office,but it can be destroyedby "vestingit ostensiblyin one man, subject,in whole or in part,to the controland cooperationof others,in the capacityof counsellorsto him."The Founders rejected rule-by-committeeas a viableform of executivepower, and Tyler's decision demon- stratedthat the president'sincentive to be autonomouswas indeed a significant motivatingforce, a testamentto the Founders'foresight. Yetincreasing the authorityof the cabinetat the expense of the presidentwas a pivotalpart of the Whig planto restorelegislative dominance over the federalgovernment,and an essentialcomponent of HenryClay's political strategy. At the outsetof Harrison'sterm, Henry Clay had engineeredthe selectionof his supporters to a majorityof cabinetposts, and had rejectedan offerto serveas Secretaryof Statein orderto remainin the Senate.As the leaderof the Senateand the controlling influenceover the cabinet,Clay planned to bringabout legislativesupremacy. Tyler'sdecision to thwartClay's plan and asserthis independencefrom his cabinet was, accordingto Tyler'sbiographers, a painfuland difficultdecision. In addition to pittingTyler against his own party,his decision defied contemporarynorms. FromWashington to Van Buren, cabinet members had providedconsiderable input on policy mattersand constitutionalquestions, and often outlastedpresi- dents in office;even the issue of whetherthe presidenthad the power removehis secretarieswithout the consent of the Senatewas not resolveduntil the repealof the Tenureof OfficeAct in 1886.What was worse, Tyler'sclaim of autonomywas reminiscentof AndrewJackson, the only presidentto have assertedcomplete authorityover his cabinet.Surely the NationalIntelligencer's stinging repudiation of Tyler'saction as a "Jacksonianpretension to executiveinfallibility," a statement echoed throughoutthe politicalpresses, must have been a bitterpill for the anti- JacksonianTyler to swallow.27

25. J. G. Wilson,The Presidents of the UnitedStates, Vol. II (New York:D. Appletonand Company, 1894),p. 73n,John Tyler Jr. quoted by JohnFisk. 26. Mansfield,Taming the Prince. 27. TheNational Intelligencer, August 14, 1841. Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 487

Despitethese disadvantages,any chance Tyler had to defendhis policyand political commitmentsturned on the degreeof authorityhe assertedover the cabinet. Tylerwas a "spokesmanof the tidewatertobacco planters"who had strongpoliti- cal commitments;he "representedpre-eminently the resentmentof the greatagrar- ians of the Southagainst Jackson's vigorous executive policies and especiallyhis denunciationof the SouthCarolina nullificationists."28 Although he sharedsome of the Whigs'nationalist views, Tyler did not alignpolitically with Clay.In the summer of 1841,Clay introduced a seriesof billsin Congressthat constituted the bulkof the Whig policy agenda. At the center of the agenda was a plan to re-charterthe nationalbank. Despite warnings from Tyler confidants that the presidentopposed the ideaof a nationalbank that infringed on states'rights, the Whig-dominated Con- gressproceeded to pass the billand send it to the presidentfor his signature. Tylerneeded counsel on whetherto veto the bill,and how to explainit, if he did. He perceivedhis existingcabinet members as disloyaland was unwillingto solicit theiradvice; yet he feareda ruptureof the Whigparty if he dismissedthe Harrison holdovers.Driven by an incongruitybetween his motivesand the politicalstructure surroundinghim, Tyler politicized his administrationand createdhis own versionof Jackson's"kitchen cabinet." His informalcabinet included old friends:five members of the Virginiacongressional delegation, newspaperman Duff Green,and Massachusettscongressman Caleb Cushing. Tyler eagerly solicited their advice and sharedwith them his most personaland politicalconcerns. Tyler's real cabinet, however,was left guessinghow the presidentplanned to govern.When the first bankbill was sent to Tylerfor his signature,Webster remarked that Tyler "keeps his own counselas to approvingor disapproving.Opinions differ very much as to what he will do."29 AfterTyler vetoed the bankbill, Clay publicly accused him of violatingcontempo- rarypolitical norms and assaultingthe doctrineof cabinetcontrol. Tyler should have followed"the judgment of the partywhich brought him intopower... and,if public famespeaks true, of thecabinet which the lamentedHarrison called around him, and which he voluntarilycontinued."30 Yet ceding the authorityof the presidencyto his cabinetwould not, Tyler believed, be in the nation'sbest interests.To compromise on the bankbill would have been to surrenderthe institutionalauthority of the presidencyto a legislaturedominated by his ideologicalopponents. Instead, Tyler vetoed the bill and directedhis effortstoward the politicizationof his institutionalenvironment.Since he would not receivefaithful, constructive political advice from his existing cabinetmembers, Tyler cut them out of his deliberationsand insteadrelied on adviserswho were responsiveto his politicaland policyobjectives. Encountering an institutionalenvironment that was at odds with (andactually hostile to) his political

28. WilfredE. Binkley,President and Congress(New York: Vintage Books, 1962), 112 29. Morgan,Whig Embattled: The Presidency under John Tyler,62. 488 PRESIDENTIALPOLTICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

purposes,Tyler drew upon his informalresources to carveout his own sphereof authority,restructuring influence in the executivebranch on his own terms. Inaddition to politicizingand centralizing the presidentialchannels of adviceand counsel,Tyler sought to remakethe executivebranch in his image.Using the power of appointmentto packthe executivebranch with friends and family who were loyal and responsiveto him and his politicalobjectives, Tyler seized upon this simple, readilyavailable resource and builtan administrationto his liking.As Moeexplains, the power of appointmentis "anchoredin a formalpresidential power that,in its implicationsfor politicaland bureaucraticcontrol, is perhapsmore importantthan any otherhe possesses."31This most basictool of politicizationproved to be highly effectivefor Tyler's purposes. As Tyler'ssole assistantin the WhiteHouse, the presi- dentappointed his son JohnTyler Jr.; Robert Tyler, the president'soldest son, served as a politicalliaison with conservativenorthern Democrats and worked at the Land Officein Washington;Tyler's second wife, JuliaGardiner, became one of Tyler's most trustedadvisors and consultants on the use of politicalpatronage; one nephew workedin the TreasuryDepartment, and anothernephew was appointedas a diplo- maticcourier; a brother-in-lawbecame second assistantpostmaster general, and anotherbrother-in-law became a U.S. CircuitCourt clerk; Tyler's daughter-in-law became the head social coordinatorat the WhiteHouse, and helpedTyler use his informalpowers to influenceothers; Abel Upshur,an old friendand southernstal- wartfrom Virginia, became head of the U.S.Navy, and Tyler'sson-in-law became a purserin the Navy;close friendHugh Legare became AttorneyGeneral and presi- dentialadvocate before the SupremeCourt; family friend Charles Wickliffe was appointedpostmaster general.32 Although the traditionof presidentialnepotism was, of course,well established,Tyler received biting criticism from his detractorsfor his blatantuse of the appointmentpower for politicalpurposes. He was laterbrought up on impeachmentcharges for, among other reasons,his "wickedand corrupt abuse of the powerof appointmentto and removalfrom office: first, in displacing those who were competentand faithfulin the dischargeof theirpublic duties, only becausethey were supposedto entertaina politicalpreference for another and, sec- ondly,in bestowingthem on creaturesof his own will."33 By politicizinghis institutionalenvironment, Tyler extractedmore political authorityfor his disadvantagedpresidency. Using whatever resources at his dis- posal, Tylerstrategically and purposefullypursued his politicalobjectives. A telling example of Tyler'spoliticization occurred when a second bill to reestablisha

30. CongressionalGlobe, 27th Congress, 1st session, Appendix, 364, quotedin Morgan,Whig Embat- tled:The Presidency under John Tyler,64-65. 31. Moe,"The Politicized Presidency," 245. 32. NormaLois Peterson, Presidencies of WilliamHenry Harrison & John Tyler (Lawrence: University Pressof Kansas,1989), 147-64. 33. SeeJournal of the Houseof Representativesof the UnitedStates, 1842-1843, January 10, 1843,pro- ceedingsintroduced by RepresentativeBotts. Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 489

nationalbank was passedby Congressand sent forTyler's signature. Tyler learned earlyon thatthe billwas intendedas partof a politicalploy to forcea second veto, which would isolatethe presidentfurther from the Whigs,compel his cabinetto resignin a mass showingof no-confidence,and ultimatelyforce him to step down from the presidency.The SenatePresident Samuel Southard, a Clayman, would then be elevatedto the presidency.Tyler vetoed the bill, but did not resign. He stated:"My resignation would amountto a declarationto the worldthat our system of governmenthad failed... thatthe provisionmade forthe deathof the President was... so defectiveas to mergeall executivepowers in the legislativebranch of the government."34Tyler was burnedin effigy,threatened with assassination,and for- mallyexpelled from the Whig party.And on September11, 1841,Tyler's cabinet resignedin a mass exodus.35In a swiftand decisivemove, Tylernominated a new cabinetand establishednew procedures.Indeed, there is evidencethat Tyler may have encouragedthe exodus of the Harrisoncabinet in orderto rebuildhis admin- istrationin his image-well in advance of the cabinet resignations,Tyler had selectedtheir replacements.36 Overthe next threeyears, Tyler carefully manipulated the circulationof fourteen men throughhis cabinet,crafting that body to reflecthis own policyambitions. His appointmentswere gearedtoward forging a new partisanlink between conservative Democratsfrom New Yorkand Pennsylvaniaand southernstates' rights Whigs who had left the Democraticparty during Jackson's presidency. Throughout his term,Tyler insisted that his cabinetmembers recognize their subordination to the president,act harmoniouslywith one another,and adhereto his opinionson all matters. His cabinet meetings were gatheringsof like-mindedpoliticians who thoughtcollectively about how to best implementTyler's political agenda. Once he had disposedof the Harrisonholdover cabinet, Tyler was trulya presidentwithout a party-he now hadthe freedomto concentrateon achievinghis personal politicalgoals. He began to builda thirdparty, carefully targeting his political appointmentsto bringtogether nationalists and states'rights advocates under his leadership.Hoping to attractmoderates from the Whigparty and northernconser-

34. See JohnTyler, Statement in Answerto the Reportof the HouseCommittee, in August,1842, Let- tersand Timesof the Tylers,Lyon G. Tyler, vol. II,100, quoted in Seager,And Tyler Too: A Biography of John &Julia Gardiner Tyler, 161. 35. Secretaryof StateDaniel Webster was the onlysecretary to remainin thecabinet. Webster and Tyler hadforged a mutualrespect for one another,and the distinguishedsecretary was in the midstof important diplomaticnegotiations with GreatBritain over the Maineboundary (which he ultimatelyresolved, signing the importantWebster-Ashburton Treaty); he was reviewingthe questionof Mexico'sclaims in California; and he was examiningthe boundaryproblems in Oregonas well.Webster did not feel thathe couldleave the StateDepartment at such a crucialtime. 36. See DuffGreen to Tyler,September 10, 1841in DuffGreen, The Duff Green Papers in the Southern HistoricalCollection of the Universityof NorthCarolina Library (Chapel Hill, NC: 1967); and letterfrom Gilmorein John Tyler Papers, ol. V,175; see OliverPerry Chitwood, John Tyler: Champion of the OldSouth (NewYork: Appleton-Century Company, 1939). 490 PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

vativesfrom the Democraticparty, Tyler introduced third-way policy alternatives such as the ExchequerPlan and the 1842Tariff Act. But the centerpieceof Tyler's third-partymovement was the annexationof Texasand the expansionof America's boundariesto the PacificOcean: goals thatwould not only bringtogether the various factionsof moderatesunder his leadership,but help him leavehis markon history. "Couldanything throw so brighta lustrearound us?" Tyler asked Webster, whom he solicitedto join in a third-partymovement.37 In January1843, Tyler offi- ciallyfounded the Democratic-RepublicanParty (referred to as the TylerParty), and was nominatedfor presidentby a smallgroup of friends. His thirdparty never got off the groundas an electoralforce, but it did provide politicalleverage on the Texasquestion. Tyler knew his partywould never generate a largeenough national movement to defeatone of the majorparties, but he hopedto buildan organizationwith enough support to swingthe balanceof poweron impor- tantpolicy issues. Thus, with secretnegotiations stalled in April1844, Tyler rallied a groupof supporters(comprised mainly of politicalappointees to theoffice of the post- masterand mailcontractors) to declareboldly their intention to reelectthe president and makethe annexationof Texasinto a majorcampaign issue-a move calculated to pressurethe Democraticparty to announcein favorof annexation.The tools of presidentialpatronage and politicalparty building were centralto the realizationof Tyler'splan to leavea historicallegacy. As Tylerbiographer Robert Seager writes,

Ifhe was a Presidentwithout a party,he was stillthe nation'sleading patronage dispenser.With the patronage,he believed,would come the party,and with the partywould come the vehicle for annexingTexas and salvagingthe historical reputationof his administration... so the bloodlettingwent forward,Tyler fre- quentlyand personallyconcerning himself with new personnelfor the most obscureoffices. Scarcely a sparrowfell fromthe federalfirmament without the President'sknowledge and encouragement.38

Tylerwas not reelected,but a resolutioncalling for the annexationof Texaspassed Congressand Tyler signed it threedays before he vacatedthe WhiteHouse. Through- out his presidency,Tyler used the strategiesof politicizationand centralization in pursuit of his politicalgoals, including reelection and a historicallegacy, as well as his policygoals, including the annexation of Texas.The "accidental president" seized upon any and all availableresources in the pursuitof his objectives.He playedupon the ambiguityof executivepower to securehis legitimacyand authorityas president;he strategicallymanufactured a breakwith the Whig partyto ensurehis politicalinde- pendenceand builda more responsivecabinet; and he used the powerof appoint-

37. JohnTyler to DanielWebster, Williamsburg, Oct. 11, 1841,in Seager,And Tyler Too: A Biography of John& Julia Gardiner Tyler, 171. 38. Seager,And Tyler Too: A Biographyof John& Julia Gardiner Tyler, 224-25. Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 491

mentto generatepersonal and political support and to expandhis sphere of influence overthe federalgovernment. The presidency of JohnTyler stands as a testamentto the powerfulinstitutional incentive that all presidents face: to takeall practicable measures to expandthe president'ssphere of authorityin pursuitof his politicalobjectives.

II. Controlling Federal Expenditures to Create Authority: The Presidency of James K. Polk

Presidentialscholars widely recognize James Polk'sexpansive use of executive poweras commander-in-chiefduring the MexicanWar. The credithe has received forhis aggressiveforeign policymaking has overshadowedhis distinctionas the first presidentto exercise bureaucraticcontrol over federal expenditures.However, these two impressiveexpansions of executivepower should be consideredjointly. In an effortto achievehis policypreferences, Polk politicized and centralizedthe nascentbudget process. Muchlike our currentpresident George W. Bush,Polk faced difficultdecisions regardingexpenditures and wartimespending. As a Jacksonian,Polk needed to followthrough on his promiseto cut the tariff.But a reductionin revenuegenerated by the tariffposed a policyconundrum for Polk. To finance the warwith Mexicoand retainhis tariffreduction, Polk needed to gain tightcontrol over federalexpenditures.Polk's politicization of the earlybudget process resulted directly from his pursuit of an ideologicalpolicy program. Polk'sinnovations in executivebranch procedures created new authorityfor the presidencywhere none had previouslyexisted, and allowedhim to exerciseinflu- ence withoutrevealing himself in a dramaticdisplay of "sensationalexecution."39 UnlikeTyler, Polk's legitimacy as presidentwas neverquestioned. Instead, Polk was an innovatorwho soughtnew ways of exercisingindependence and controlin the executivebranch in orderto pursuehis policyagenda. An examinationof his efforts to control expendituresdemonstrates how a "pre-modern"president politicized and centralizedeffectively.

Seizing Controlof Expenditures

Everyyear, the variousbureaus and officeswithin each departmentof the executive branchgenerated their annual estimates.Before sending theirbudget esti-

39. Accordingto Mansfield,Machiavelli's executive government "is not ordinarilyvisible" (140). The sometimes"invisible" nature of executivepower contributesto its ambiguity.While impressiveactions which"jolt men intorecalling" why theyneed government are important, the everydayactions of the prince arejust as importantfor the accumulationof power.In Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt substantiates thisobservation when he arguesthat presidents must try to exercisecontinuous leadership rather than lead- ershipat timesof extremecrisis (6-9). 492 PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

mates to the Secretaryof the Treasury,department heads reviewedindividual bureaurequests. In a finalstep, the Secretaryof the Treasurygathered all departmentalrequests and transmitteda compiledfiscal proposal to Congress.Therefore, priorto Polk'spresidency, Congress did not receivean "executivebudget" per say, but "collecteddepartmental estimates" that may or may not have been subjectto scrutiny.40As it stood, the Presidentdid not exerciseany power or controlin the process.In general,Congress and the Secretaryof the Treasuryshaped fiscal policy in the earlynineteenth century. Polk, however, realized that nothingprevented the president'sinterjection and thatby reviewingdepartmental reports, he could influence policy.41Immediately after taking office in 1845,he began exercisingcontrol overbureau requests and expenditures. In pursuitof his goal to controlthe departmentsin the executivebranch, Polk held two lengthycabinet meetings each week and insistedupon regularatten- dance.42At these meetings,all policies, includingexpenditures, were discussed. Polkused the cabinetas a coordinatingbody.43 He insistedupon budgetcuts across the boardand avoidedplaying favorites within his cabinet.In part,Polk's equanim- itystemmed from his desireto insure"equal and exactjustice" to everyinterest in the DemocraticParty.44 But more importantly,Polk's approach to administrative managementfacilitated bureaucratic compliance and fiscal restraint.If the Post- masterGeneral knew thatthe Secretaryof the Navyalso needed to cut his expenditures,it was likelyhe would complywith Polk'srecommendations. In short,Polk treatedhis cabinetnot only as a policymakingand advisoryinstitution, but also as an instrumentof administrativecontrol.45 Polk achieved control over the various executive departmentsthrough his painstakingattention to detail.46Whereas earlier presidents had allowed department headsto runtheir divisions with littlesupervision, Polk used the ambiguityof his executiveauthority to his advantage,pushing the scope of his powerto the fore as a way of protectinghis own politicalprogram. Specifically, Polk wanted control of agencyrequests to ensurethat funding for the MexicanWar would be available withoutdriving the countryinto debt.47 Polk proved that a Presidentcould run a war by controllingthe navaland militarybudget estimates.48 Polk seized upon the hazy uncertaintysurrounding the President'sbureaucratic powers and grabbedhold of

40. LeonardD. White, The Jacksonians:A Studyin AdministrativeHistory 1829-1861 (New York: MacMillanCompany, 1954), 78. 41. White,The Jacksonians: A Studyin AdministrativeHistory 1829-1861 75. 42. PaulH. Bergeron, The Presidency of JamesK Polk(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,1987), 36. 43. White,The Jacksonians: A Studyin AdministrativeHistory 1829-1861, 62. 44. StephenSkowronek, The PoliticsPresidents Make (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1997),160. 45. White,The Jacksonians: A Studyin AdministrativeHistory 1829-1861, 92-93. 46. White,The Jacksonians: A Studyin AdministrativeHistory 1829-1861, 69. 47. White,The Jacksonians: A Studyin AdministrativeHistory 1829-1861, 79. 48. White,The Jacksonians: A Studyin AdministrativeHistory 1829-1861, 51. Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 493

the pursestrings with innovativemethods and a vigilantattention to structuraldetail and policyoutcomes.

TighteningControl

Throughouthis four years in office, Polk'scontrol of agency requests grew strongerand morecomprehensive. For example, at a cabinetmeeting in 1845,Polk informedhis secretariesthat he wanted the annualestimates "to be made on the most economicalscale."49 He also asked the membersof the cabinetto develop their departmentalrequests immediately so that he would have ample time to review them. By 1846,the Secretaryof the WarDepartment submitted revisions directlyto Polk,not to the TreasuryDepartment or Congress.50In an effortto keep overall federalexpenditures at a minimum,Polk also supervisedthe financial requestsof non-militarydepartments, such as the PostOffice. As the MexicanWar continued,Polk's power over the agenciesbecame ironclad as he initiatedthe practice of interrogatingbureau chiefs directly about proposed expenditures. One particularincident encouraged Polk to asserttight executive fiscal control. InAugust of 1847,Polk learned that Congress planned to denyhis requestto callout 6,000 new volunteersfor the MexicanWar because of the unavailabilityof funds. Astonishedby the failed request,Polk investigatedthe budget insufficiencyand learned that a foolish transactionbetween the TreasuryDepartment and War Departmenthad occurred a few monthsearlier without his knowledge.In his diary, Polkadmitted that he was "greatlyvexed" by the "looseness"of the WarDepart- ment budget, and confessed that the whole incidentmade him "sick."Conse- quently,Polk resolved, "there should be a reformin this respect."5' Afterthis incident,Polk monitored each departmentand theirfinancial transac- tions.52Polk refused to reimbursefinancial expenditures that he had not personally approved,and used the ambiguousnature of his budgetarypowers to supporthis executivedecisions. After the MexicanWar ended, an Americangeneral submitted a list of expendituresamounting to over $200,000that he had incurredin Mexico, allegedlyin pursuitof a "secret"military mission. An enraged Polk called the account"remarkable" and informedthe Secretaryof Warthat as president,he had "noauthority to pay such an account."53The tightfiscal control Polk had exercised in the previousthree years clearly demonstrated that he did havethe powerto pay the general'saccount. But Polk did not wish to reimbursea wastrel,and he denied the requestwithout controversy.

49 JamesK. Polk, The Diary of JamesK Polk,vol. I-IV(Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co., 1910),vol. 1,48. 50. White,The Jacksonians: A Studyin AdministrativeHistory 1829-1861, 80. 51. Polk,The Diary of JamesK Polkvol. 111,135-36. 52. White,The Jacksonians: A Studyin AdministrativeHistory 1829-1861, 61. 53. Polk,The Diary of JamesK Polk,vol. IV,196. 494 PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

Duringhis presidency, Polk essentially became the "Directorof the Budget."54To achieve this control, Polk monitored the bureau chiefs, whom he believed inflated appropriations and practiced fiscal irresponsibility.Polk usually accomplished this task by requiringcabinet secretaries to read their reports aloud to him. Through this practice, Polk established a direct line of accountabilityfrom the departments to the president.55His scrutinyof the annual reports also enabled Polk to review the policy goals of each department. Furthermore,Polk recorded the positions and actions of all his cabinet members in his diary, believing that this notation created an addi- tional source of accountability.When all else failed, Polk interrogated the bureau chiefs directly.In September of 1847, the President asked Secretaryof War William Marcyto reduce his estimates. Marcyexplained to Polk that he could not control the requests of the bureau chiefs. Polk requested audiences with several of Marcy's subordinates and achieved the reduced budget he desired.56 In his last year as president,Polk continued to manage the bureau officers.A pro- ponent of Jacksonianideals and policies, Polkwas determinedto returnfederal expen- dituresto the low levels in existence before the MexicanWar. In a November 6, 1848 diaryentry, Polk recounted his effortto scale down the budget of the WarDepartment:

The Secretary of War submitted to me the estimates of appropriations for his Department for the next fiscal year, as prepared by the Heads of the several Bureau[s] in the War Department. On comparing them with the appropriations for similar objects for previous years, and before the Mexican war, they were found in some branches to exceed these appropriations.The Secretaryinformed that... he had much difficultywith his Bureau officers in having them reduced to what they now were. I directed furtherreductions of some of the items to be made, and directed some of the items to be struck out altogether.... The Bureau officers, whose duty it is to prepare the estimates, are always in favour of large appropriations.They are not responsible to the public but to the Executive, & must be watched and controlled in this respect.57

Notice that Polk classified the bureau officers not as public servants, but as presidential subordinates. According to the structure Polk imposed, the bureau officers

54. CharlesMcCoy, Polk and the Presidency(Austin, TX: University of TexasPress, 1960), 74. 55. Sometimesthe reportswere readin the presenceof the entirecabinet, and sometimes Polk asked the secretariesto readthem aloud in frontof him alone.For example, on November26, 1847,Polk wrote in his diary,"The Postmaster General called this morning and read to me the draftwhich he had prepared of his annualreport." In an earlierinstance, Polk recounted, "The Secretary of the Navyread to me the con- cludingpart of hisAnnual Report in the presenceof Mr.Ritchie, having read the precedingpart to me two or threenights ago." Polk, The Diary of JamesK. Polk, vol. III,231-2; vol. 1, 103. 56. Ina November11, 1847entry in his diary,Polk recounted a conversationhe hadwith Quartermas- ter GeneralJesup: "He submitted to me his estimates,and I foundthat he had reducedthem nearseven millionsbelow the sum he hadfirst proposed." Polk, The Diary of JamesK. Polk vol. III,219-20. 57. Polk,The Diary of JamesK Polk,vol. IV,180-81. Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 495

fell under the President'sdirect supervision.Although Moe contends that only twentieth-centurypresidents "anticipate, program, and engineer"the behaviorof theirbureaucratic subordinates in orderto exerttheir own influence,Polk's fiscal controlsuggests otherwise.58 Polk's innovations demonstrate that the tendencyfor presidentsto politicizeand centralizecannot be attributedonly to the existenceof a modernbureaucracy, but also to a persistentincentive that encourages presidents to carveout theirown spheresof activity. In sum, Polkwas largelysuccessful in controllingexpenditures. Near the end of his term,he repurchaseda half-milliondollars in governmentbonds, thus reducing the nationaldebt significantlybefore leaving office.59 It would be impossibletoday for presidentsto exercisethe same degreeof personalcontrol over the executive branchthat Polk enjoyed during his term.However, it is clearthat presidents in the pre-modernera manipulatedthe bureaucracyto enacttheir policy preferences. The president'srole in the formationof fiscalpolicy is undefinedin the Constitution,and Polkcapitalized upon thisimprecision. He interjectedthe presidencyinto an areaof domestic decision-makingthat the Treasurysecretary and the House Waysand Means committee had dominatedduring earlier administrations. Because Polk assumedcontrol of the budgetthrough the channelsof administrativesupervision, his monopolizationof the processwas accepted"without fanfare."60 He used the looselyknit bureaucratic structure to his advantageand then exertedhis independent influence,which ultimatelyresulted in the executionof the policieshe favored. Muchlike a "modern"president, Polk conceived of the presidencyas the driving forcein Americanpolitics, and forgedahead with an executivedetermination to dis- turb,control, and manipulatethe politicalsystem surrounding him.

III. Politicizing Civil Service Reform: The Presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes

One characteristicof "modern"presidential leadership is its increasinginde- pendencefrom party control. As Tulis,Kernell, and Milkishave shown, contempo- rarypresidents speak in theirown voices and relyless on partisanapparatuses to establishcredible leadership.61 The conventional wisdom is thatnineteenth-century partiescreated presidents,whereas "modern"presidents create theirown inde- pendentorganizations that perform the functionsof both campaigningand governance. This examinationof RutherfordB. Hayessuggests that the historicalrela- tionship between presidents and parties is more complicated. Even when

58. Moe,"The Politics of BureaucraticStructure," 284. 59 Polk,The Diary of JamesK Polk,vol. IV,195-96. 60. McCoy,Polk and the Presidency,223. 61. Kernell,Going Public; Sidney M. Milkis, The President and the Parties(New York: Oxford Univer- sityPress, 1993); Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency. 496 PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

presidentialpower reached a low pointin the late nineteenthcentury, Hayes found uniqueways to retainindependence from the imposinggrip of his party'sleader- ship.By politicizingcivil service reform, Hayes changed the directionof the Repub- lican Partyand broke the power of the conservativeStalwart faction. Thus, an importantconnection existed between Hayes'squest for bureaucraticcontrol and his effortsto promotethe policygoals of his party'smoderate reform wing.

The Electionof 1876

Situatedwithin an era of presidentialinfirmity, Rutherford B. Hayes was an unlikelycandidate to alterthe futuredirection of the GOP.Hayes is most widely knownfor his brokeredvictory over DemocratSamuel Tilden in the 1876election. With the presidentialvote of four states in doubt, Republicansand Democrats forgeda deal thatassured Hayes's victory and also endedmilitary occupation in the South.Both Democrats and Republicanswalked away with unscrupulousvictories resultingfrom the Compromiseof 1877. Hayesfound himselfin an unenviableleadership position. Besides assuming office afterthe damagingpresidency of AndrewJohnson and the scandal-ridden Grantadministration, Hayes's precarious election prevented him fromclaiming an electoralmandate. Furthermore, Hayes was forcedto deal with the conservative Stalwartwing of RepublicanParty, which opposed his nominationand program- maticreform efforts. Mostimportantly, Hayes sought to lead with authority,but foundthe structural capacitiesof the office lacking.Moe explains that presidentsdissatisfied with insti- tutionalstructures will pursue changes and reformto the extent their available resourcesallow them to do so.62To implementhis own policygoals and agenda, Hayesattempted to solve the problemof structuralincongruence. In pursuitof this goal, Hayesmanaged to imposehis reformistbeliefs upon the nascentbureaucratic structure,establish important precedents for the PendletonAct of 1883,reassert the executive'sappointment power by defeatinghis politicalopponents in the Senate, and reinvigoratethe presidencyfrom its nadirof influence.To bolster his leadership authority,Hayes responded to the pervasivepresidential incentive to initiatereforms and controlthe administrativeapparatus that surrounded him.63

The Politicizationof CivilService Reform

In his boldestactions as president,Hayes asserted executive power to imple- mentcivil service reform. Hayes did not hidethe factthat he aimedto overhaulthe bureaucracyand seize control from the Stalwartsin Congress;in his Inaugural

62. Moe,"The Politicized Presidency," 238. 63. Moe,"The Politicized Presidency," 269. Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 497

Address,he calledfor reform"that shall be thorough,radical, and complete."Such stronglanguage was no surprise;Hayes had used those exact words in his July8, 1876 partynomination acceptance letter to describethe civil service reformhe pledgedto implementif elected. Buteven beforeHayes confronted existing corruption, he neededto builda gov- erningstructure that would supporthis reformefforts. He selected a strong,independent-mindedcabinet and purposefullyexcluded individualsfrom the Grant administration.64Fully aware that his reform-mindedgoals would not garnerwide supportfrom many Republican senators whose powerrelied on the retentionof the patronagesystem, Hayes manipulated the structureof his administrationby assuming full controlover cabinetselection. The strategicformation of Hayes'scabinet was a necessaryprecursor to his controlof the bureaucracy.Selecting his cabinet sent a strongmessage of presidentialindependence to the anti-reformwing of the RepublicanParty, and also providedHayes with staunch allies in the executive branchwho would supporthis policy goals. Earlyin his term, Hayesrealized he needed to politicizeand centralizeto enacthis policyagenda. Forthe most part,Hayes picked his nomineeswithout consulting the leadersof his party.The most controversial nominee was Hayes'schoice forSecretary of State, WilliamEvarts. GOP leaders hotly contested the nominationof Evarts,who led the New Yorkreform faction of the partythat openly criticizedGrant's corruptions. Hayes also nominated Carl Schurz as Secretaryof the Interior.Schurz was "despised"by the Stalwartsbecause he had supportedHorace Greeley's candidacy for Presidentin 1872.65The Senate,which the Republicansstill controlled, threatened to reject Hayes'sselections for his cabinet. Hayesstood firmlybehind his choices, confidentthat publicopinion was on his side.66The newspapersreacted negativelytowards the Senate'srefusal to confirmthe nominees.Telegrams and let- tersflooded Congressional offices in supportof Hayes'sappointments.67 The Senate backeddown withina day of theirthreats. Only a shortmonth into his presidency, Hayesrejected executive subservience to the Stalwartsand challengedthe conservative,anti-reformist tendencies of his party. Inhis firstmove to overhaulthe civilservice, Hayes appointed John Jay, a known reformer,to lead a nonpartisancommission to investigatethe New YorkCustom- house. AlthoughHayes believed in the moralityof civilservice reform and wanted to eliminatecorruption, his motivationsfor scrutinizing the New YorkCustomhouse

64. KennethDavison, The Presidencyof RutherfordB. Hayes (Westport,CT: Greenwood Press, 1972),95. 65. Ari Hoogenboom,The Presidencyof RutherfordB. Hayes (Lawrence,KS: University Press of Kansas,1988), 52. 66. On March14, 1877,Hayes wrote in his diary,"After a few daysthe publicopinion of the Country was shown by the pressto be stronglywith me.... The expressionsof satisfactionfrom all partsof the countryare most gratifying"(81). 67. Davison,The Presidency of RutherfordB. Hayes, 164. 498 PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

were politicaland strategic.New YorkRepublican Senator Roscoe Conklinghad opposed Hayes'snomination to the presidencyin an effortto eliminatethe entire reformwing of the party.Drawing much of his supportfrom southern Republicans, Conklingalso failedto supportthe compromiseof 1876because it restoredhome ruleto the Southand jeopardizedthe powerof the carpetbaggerswithin the party. If a new RepublicanParty developed in the South,consisting mostly of OldWhigs, then the authorityof Conklingand his conservativewing would be severelydimin- ished.After the 1876election, Conkling continued to antagonizeHayes, openly call- ing him "Rutherfraud."68Using his executivecontrol of the bureaucracy,Hayes sought to punishConkling and the Stalwarts,who controlledthe New YorkCus- tomhousesince Grant'sadministration. Hayes's depoliticizationof the bureaucracywas a politicalmove in itself. Throughhis efforts,Hayes aimed to eliminatea "hostilefaction" of his partythat "failedto deliverthe vote in 1876."69Hayes used the executivearm of the bureaucracyas a mechanismto exertinfluence over those who threatenedhis presidential leadership.He sought to neutralizeConkling not because he was corrupt,but because he derivedhis power in the Senate from the New YorkCustomhouse patronageand the southernwing of the RepublicanParty. Hayesaimed to refashionhis partyto fithis own politicalagenda, and soughtto punishthose who threatenedhis leadershipproject and preventedhim fromclaiming additionalauthority. Indeed, Hayes viewed the controversyover civil service reformas a "war"between his supportersand the Conklingfaction.70 Much like a "modern"president, Hayes was concernedwith how the "bureaucracyas a whole" was organized.71 Thebattle over civil service was a contestrooted in the president'scapacity to controlthe futureof his party'sagenda. Hayes instituted reform for its own sake,but more importantly,his effortsreasserted the independentauthority of the executiveto direct policy.The larger battle for Hayes involved the reclamationof presidentialpower; he used the reformationof the bureaucracyas the vehiclefor his assertionof authority. In PartyGovernment, E. E. Schattschneideranalyzed the structuralincentives thatencourage the presidentto seek civilservice reform. Schattschneider observed that in the second half of the nineteenthcentury, congressmen consistently used patronageto benefitlocal partybosses, often damagingthe "publicreputation of the president"in the process.72The abolitionof the spoils in Americanpolitics requireda "fundamentalredistribution of power"that shifted authority from "local

68. AriHoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils(Urbana, IL: University of IllinoisPress, 1961), 156. 69. Hoogenboom,The Presidency of RutherfordB. Hayes,132. 70. Hoogenboom,Outlawing the Spoils,136. 71. Moe,"The Politics of BureaucraticStructure," 280. 72. E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist'sView of Democracyin America(Holt: Rinehartand Winston, 1960), 139. Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 499

machines"to a morecentralized leadership structure.73 Hayes's executive actions to reducethe influenceof local patronagecan be explainedby the president'sinstitu- tionalincentive to seek centralizationand independentcontrol over the futuredirection of his party.

Hayes's Reformof the CivilService

Afterreceiving Jay's highlycritical report concerning the New YorkCustom- house, the Presidentordered that federalcivil servants should not assume leadership or managementpositions in politicalorganizations or campaigns. Hayes wanted to remove ChesterArthur, the collectorof the customhouse,but did not want to damagethe Republicanorganization by actinghastily. He allowedArthur to keep his job as long as he cooperatedwith ongoing reformefforts. For the time being, Hayesbelieved it was in his best interestto pursuea moderatecourse of action.74But when customhouseNaval officer Alonzo Cornell disobeyed the Presi- dent's executiveorder and refusedto resignfrom his positionin the Republican Party,Hayes resolved to removeArthur and Cornelland eliminateSenator Con- kling'sinfluence. The selectionof the New Yorkcollector was more than just a bureaucraticappointment; it was commonlyunderstood that the individualin this positionserved as the politicalleader and managerof the state'sRepublican Party.75 Thus, Hayes'spractice of using bureaucraticappointments "systematically" as a "mechanismof presidentialcontrol" demonstrates that the presidentialtendency to politicizeand centralizeis not a distinctlymodern phenomenon.76 Inan October24, 1877,diary entry, Hayes pondered his strategyto wrestcontrol of the New Yorkcustomhouse from the Stalwartsin the Senate:

How to meet and overcomethis opposition is the question.I am clearthat I am right.I believethat a largemajority of the best peopleare in fullaccord with me. Now my purpose is to keep cool-to treat all adversariesconsiderably and respectfullyand kindlybut at the same time in a way to satisfythem of my sin- cerityand firmness.(100)77

Hayes'spersonal letters to friendsand politicalconfidantes throughout 1877 and 1878revealed that he intendedto utilizethe appointmentpower to gathersupport forhis administrationand its policies.78

73. Schattschneider,The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist'sView of Democracyin America,140. 74. Hoogenboom,The Presidency of RutherfordB. Hayes, 131. 75. Hoogenboom,The Presidency of RutherfordB. Hayes, 140. 76. Moe,"The Politicized Presidency," 254. 77. RutherfordB. Hayesand T. HarryWilliams, ed. Hayes:The Diary of a President(New York: David McKayCompany, Inc., 1964), 100. 78. Hoogenboom,The Presidency of RutherfordB. Hayes, 142. 500 PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

By convincingother membersof the Senatethat the President'sindependent course threatenedlegislative control of the bureaucracy,Conkling managed to kill Hayes'sappointments in late 1877. But Hayesdid not accept defeat easily.In a December6, 1877 diaryentry, Hayes charged that legislationshould be passed which would relieveCongress from all "responsibilityfor appointments."If Con- gress failedto pass such legislation,Hayes resolved to "adoptand publishrules" thatwould achievethe same effect.79Using the politicaltools availableto him, the Presidentplanned a counterattackin 1878.He issueda specialcivil service reform messageto Congressand collected evidence to supporthis claimthat the New York Customhousecheated the federalgovernment out of revenue by undervaluing goods and favoringlocal merchants.80When Congressadjourned in the summer months,Hayes put his planinto action. He suspendedArthur and Cornell,replacing them with his own recess appointments.With public opinion favoring his actions, Hayesprepared for an aggressivebattle with his opponentsin the Senateover the appointmentpower.8' Accordingto custom,senators would not vote forconfirmation of a nomination that was opposed by the senatorrepresenting the state in which the office was located.To gainconfirmation of his appointments,Hayes needed to discreditCon- kling.In a letterto the President,William Henry Smith advised Hayes to attackthe problemdirectly, arguing that the only "wayout now lies throughassaulting the abuses in the New YorkCustomhouse in earnest."82In Januaryof 1879, Hayes issued a reportto the Senate,urging them to accept his appointments.Using evidence his executivecommission gathered, Hayes emphasized that the conductof the New YorkCustomhouse had improvednoticeably since his replacement summerappointments had assumedoffice. Conkling responded by publiclyinsult- ing Hayes,a strategythat ultimatelycaused Conklingto lose credibilitywith many of his fellow senators.With the help of John Sherman,Secretary of the Treasury, Hayesassembled a coalitionof Republicansand Democratswho supportedhis replacementnominees. The southern Democrats in the president'scoalition did not supportreform for altruistic reasons. Rather, they sided with Hayesto keep the intra- partyfeud between the reformersand the Stalwartsgoing strong.83In Februaryof 1879,the Senatedecided that the Presidentcould choose his own subordinates,and

79. Hayes,ed., Hayes:The Diary of a President,106. 80. Hoogenboom,The Presidency of RutherfordB. Hayes, 136. 81. Hayesmight have recalled a January25, 1877letter written to himby Secretaryof the InteriorCarl Schurz.Writing about the Senate,Schurz stated, "A President who has publicopinion at his backneed fear no oppositionin thatbody" Carl Schurz and Frederic Bancroft, ed., Speeches, Correspondences, and Polit- ical Papersof CarlSchurz, vol. 3 (NewYork: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1913),371. 82. RutherfordB. Hayesand Charles Williams, ed., Diary and Lettersof RutherfordBirchard Hayes, vol. 3 (OhioState Archaeological Society, 1924), 455. 83. Hoogenboom,The Presidency of RutherfordB. Hayes, 143. Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 501

approvedHayes's customhouse appointments.84 Subsequently, through an executiveorder, Hayes extended the reformsachieved in the New YorkCustomhouse to otherports across the nation.85 When Hayesentered office, he aimed to diminishthe ironcladunion of office holders and party politics and end the kickbacks required of patronage appointees.86In pursuit of these policy objectives, Hayes sought to impose bureaucraticstructures that would advancehis own politicalinterests. He used bureaucraticcontrol to make the politicalsystem responsiveto his politicalpro- gramand partisanvision. When possible,Hayes issued unilateral executive orders to reformcivil service and relied upon his cabinet members to implementhis directivesin theirrespective departments. To curb the powerof his adversaryCon- kling,Hayes and his independent-mindedcabinet secretaries built a coalitionof Democratsand Republicansto supporthis nominees for the New YorkCustom- house. As an outsiderwho stood apartfrom the powerfulfactions within his party, Hayeswas in a favorableposition to bring about reformand renew the independentauthority of the presidency.At the end of his term, Hayeshad achieved all of his goals. KennethDavison contends that Hayes'spresidency marks a "lineof demarca- tion"that can be "drawnin the historyof the Americanpresidency."87 According to Davison,Hayes was the firstpresident of the "modern"era. Butinstead of placing the breakingpoint of "modernity"at the Hayespresidency, or any other date in time, it is perhapsmore instructiveto appreciatethe persistentinstitutional incentive of presidentsto politicizethe bureaucracyto enact theirpolitical agendas and promotetheir policy preferences.

IV. Concluding Thoughts: Politicization, Centralization, and the Modern Presidency Construct

The politicizedpresidencies of JohnTyler, James Polk, and RutherfordB. Hayes demonstratethat the constitutionalambiguity of executivepower provided a similar incentivestructure to threenineteenth-century presidents. Although the presidentsin our case studiespursued their political objectives in differentways, the threadthat binds them togetheris theircommon impulseto push the envelopeof executive powerand theirmanipulation of structuralarrangements to pursuetheir policy program.As these cases demonstrate, the tendencyfor presidents to seekcontrol, authority,and autonomyis not onlya modem phenomenon,as typicallycharacterized.88

84. VenilaLovina Shores, "The Hayes-Conkling Controversy," Smith College Studies in History4, no. 4 (1919),264-65. 85. Hoogenboom,Outlawing the Spoils,173. 86. Shores,"The Hayes-Conkling Controversy," 276. 87. Davison,The Presidency of RutherfordB. Hayes,66. 88. Moe,"The Politicized Presidency,"; Moe, "Presidents, Institutions, and Theory." 502 PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

Evenin the absence of the modernexecutive establishment, we observethat presidentsacross time are motivatedby the ambiguityof executivepower to carve out a sphere of independentauthority and exercisecontrol over theiradministra- tions.Tyler, Polk, and Hayesare a mere samplingof pre-modernpresidents whose termswere characterizedby politicizationand centralization; we anticipatethat addi- tionalexaminations of presidentialleadership in differenthistorical eras and political contextswill yield even greaterexplanatory power. Studiesof other lesser-noted presidents,such as VanBuren, Buchanan, Grant, Benjamin Harrison, and Taft,for example,should be highlyinformative.89 Not all presidents,of course, have been equallyaggressive in theirquests for authority and autonomy.Some havestood out in Americanhistory as bold,assertive presidents, and othershave faded into obscu- rity.Yet all havefaced the same institutionalincentives provided by the Constitution, which set out the "geneticcode" of the presidency.90The pointwe wish to under- score is thatpresidential scholarship narrowly focused on the modernera tends to ignorefundamental, enduring aspects of the president'sincentive structure. Clearly,what we want to know about the presidencyshould guide how we studyit. Muchof the scholarshipon the modernpresidency does well to concentrateon the similaritiesamong modern presidents, particularly when the objectis to betterunderstand the president'srole as leaderof a globalpower since WorldWar II, or as policymakerand agenda-setterin the same period.91However, theory- drivenanalyses of the presidencywould benefit,we suggest,from sidestepping the modernpresidency construct. For example, Moe's theory of the presidencyskillfully identifiesthe logicof institutionaldevelopment as consistingof the interplayamong incentives,resources, and structures,but it ignoresthe most significantsource of presidentialincentives-the Constitution-and 130 years of emergentresources and evolvingstructures. Because it neglectsthe "pre-modern"era of presidential politics,Moe's analysis is not able to appreciatethe fullsignificance of the institutionalincentives embedded in the constitutionalpresidency. As our briefstudies of Tyler,Polk, and Hayesconfirm, the tendencyfor presidentsto politicizeand centralizeis as observablein the "pre-modern"era as it is in the "modern"era. The modernexecutive establishment does not createthe incentiveto politicizeand centralize:that incentive is foundin the Constitution.Why, then, shouldtheories of the presidencybe circumscribedby a historicalbreak point which is consideredby some-but not others92-to be the beginningof "modernity"in the presidency?

89. See PeriE. Arnold, "Effecting a Progressive Presidency: Roosevelt, Taft, and the Pursuitof Strategic Resources,"Studies in AmericanPolitical Development 17 (Spring2003): 61-81. 90. Tulis,The Rhetorical Presidency, 8. 91. Rose,The Postmodern President; Light, The President's Agenda; Peterson, Legislating Together. 92. Tulis,in TheRhetorical Presidency, claims that the modernpresidency began with the rhetorical shiftushered in by WoodrowWilson; Greenstein, in "Changeand Continuityin the ModernPresidency," advancesthe argumentthat Franklin Roosevelt was the firstmodern president; Milkis, in ThePresident and the Parties,argues that the modernpresidency began afterFranklin Roosevelt's presidency; and Moe,in Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 503

It is time to revisitthe utilityof the modernpresidency construct. While we can stillbenefit from a deeperappreciation of the changesin the presidencywhich have takenplace since FranklinRoosevelt, the notion of "modernity"in the presidency needs to be more clearlyarticulated: what do we mean when we talk about the modernpresidency? Are we referringto the administrativeand bureaucraticgrowth in the executivebranch since the 1930s?Or new foreignpolicy responsibilities? Or are we concernedwith fundamentalchanges in the way the presidencyrelates to other institutions,derives and exercises its power,and impactspolitical developments in the modern era? The significanceof "modernity"in the presidency dependson whetherwe view the presidencyas an institutionwith certainproperties, characteristics,and propensitiesthat impact presidents'motives, behaviors, and purposes;or whetherwe see the presidencyas a historicallycontingent political institutionthat has transformeditself periodicallyinto differentanimals, with each break-pointmarking the end of one era and the beginningof another,each incarnationlooking less and less like its previousself. Yet it is not methodologically sound to accept either characterizationof the presidencywithout testing our assumptions,defining our terms,and scrutinizing the temporalboundaries we have chosen to erect. We contendthat understanding the motivesand purposesof the presidencyand the people who hold the office-indeed, understandingleadership in America- requiresattention to those institutionalincentives, resources, and structureswhich persistacross time as well as those which are emergentor period-based.Examin- ing persistentinstitutional factors without considering emergent ones is as muchof a mistakeas it is to drawtemporal boundaries around the analysiswithout consid- eringcontinuities across periods. Tyler, Polk, and Hayesall facedthe same institu- tionalincentive, yet each operatedwithin very different political circumstances: the partysystem faced by Tylerwas clearlydifferent from that with which Hayeshad to contend;the warwith Mexicocreated a differentcontext for presidential leadership in Polk'sadministration than did the end of Reconstructionfor Hayes;none of the three presidentsfollowed the same path to the White House;each left different legacies. Yet the Constitutionprovided each presidentwith the same motive to expandhis politicalauthority and institutionalautonomy. In otherwords, we need to appreciateboth what has changedand what has stayedthe same. Inbetween the two picturesof change and continuity,we might discoverwhat drivesthe presidencyand with what effect.93We have not connectedall of the dots-our purpose

"ThePoliticized Presidency," claims that the moderninstitutionalized presidency truly began with the formationof the Bureauof the Budgetin 1921. 93. Fora similaraccount of thisresearch agenda, see JosephM. Bessette and Jeffrey Tulis, The Presi- dency in the ConstitutionalOrder (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981).Consider the fullersignificance of the presidencythat can come into view when multiplesources of incentives, resources,structures, and strategiesare examined alongside one another:see Tulis,The Rhetorical Presi- dency; Skowronek,The PoliticsPresidents Make; James W. Ceaser,Presidential Selection (Princeton: 504 PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION

here is to take accountof a single pervasiveinstitutional incentive and take a first step towardthe developmentof a historicallyinformed and theory-drivenresearch agendathat transcends the modern-traditionalframe of analysis.

PrincetonUniversity Press, 1979). Using historically informed accounts of presidentialpolitics, the presidencycan be understoodas an agentof changein politicaldevelopments over the fullscope of American history(see Pious,The American Presidency; Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make); the officecan be viewedas a politicalinstitution with certainproperties that are identifiableand comparable across political institutionsand regimetypes; and the behaviorof the personin officecan be informedby factorssuch as the particularconfigurations of institutionalarrangements and politicalinterests at a givenmoment in time (see ScottC. James, Presidents, Parties, and the State (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2000), the distributionof politicalauthority across the politicallandscape (see RichardFranklin Bensel, The Polit- ical Economyof AmericanIndustrialization, 1877-1900 (New York:Cambridge University Press, 2000)), and stagesof developmentin constitutionalinterpretation (see KeithE. Whittington, Constitutional Con- struction:Divided Powers and ConstitutionalMeaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); BruceAckerman, We the People (Cambridge,MA: Belknap Press of HarvardUniversity Press, 1991); and KennethMayer, With the Strokeof a Pen:Executive Orders and PresidentialPower (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 2001)).