Mid-Term Review of Capacity-Building for South African

Government of the Republic of South Africa FAO

Mid-Term Review of Capacity-building for South African Professionals in the Field of Agriculture and Food Security (with initial emphasis on International Development Cooperation)

(GCP/RAF/412/SAF)

Final Report of the Evaluation Mission

August 2010 Preface

This report presents the views of the Mid-Term Review Team on the performance and achievements of the project Capacity-building for South African Professionals in the Field of Agriculture and Food Security (with initial emphasis on International Development Cooperation/GCP/RAF/412/SAF).

The mid-term review was initiated with a view to providing the Government of the Republic of South Africa and FAO with an independent and objective assessment of the performance of the project. The review took place in South Africa from 5 to 28 May 2010; project locations and stakeholders in three provinces (Eastern Cape, KwaZulu Natal and Mpumalanga) were visited.

The report’s Executive Summary represents the mission's main views regarding the project, followed by more in-depth statements in the Conclusions and Recommendations/Way Forward; the main body of the report gives additional information on the project and highlights particular features. The annexes provide information on the MTR background (such as itinerary and list of people met), data on some administrative/operational aspects of the project, and further reviews of some project outputs.

The review used the following methods: document analysis; group and individual meetings with beneficiaries, stakeholders and key informants; brainstorming sessions with stakeholders. The field visits were useful to give the mission a first-hand impression of the general situation in the pilot sites and of project beneficiaries’ as well as of stakeholders’ views regarding the projects; the short duration of the field visits did not allow for an in-depth assessment of the beneficiaries’ situation, nor of their institutional environment.

The MTR Team is most appreciative of the support provided by the Project Coordinator and her staff, the FAO Representative and her staff, and the government officials and key informants met in Pretoria and the provinces. All people interviewed provided information and discussed issues in a frank and constructive manner. Last, but not least, thanks are due to the pilot site beneficiaries who always provided the team with a warm welcome.

The MTR Team

Bernd Bultemeier Flor E Healy Templeton Vuyani Yoba

ii List of Acronyms

APO - Associate Professional Officer CASP - Comprehensive Agricultural Support Program CPA - Community Property Association CSO - Civil Society Organization DAFF - Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries DETES - Department of Training and Extension Services DIRCo - Department of International Relations & Cooperation DoA - Department of Agriculture (renamed DAFF) ERP - Extension Recovery Plan FAO HQ - Food Agriculture Organization Headquarters FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization (of the UN) FAOR - Food and Agriculture Organization Representative FHU - Fort Hare University, Eastern Cape GAP - Good Agriculture Practices GDP - Gross Domestic Product GoSA - Government of South Africa HH - Household(s) IDC - International Development Cooperation KZN - Kwa-Zulu Natal Logframe - Logical Framework LRAD - Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development LTU - Lead Technical Unit MoA - Ministry of Agriculture MPL - Mpumalanga MTR - Mid-Term Report NGO - Non-Governmental Organization NT - National Treasury ODA - Official Development Assistance OED - Evaluation Office (FAO) PLAS - Pro-active Land Acquisition Strategy PSC - Project Steering Committee PSC/PSG - Project Steering Committee/Project Steering Group RSA - Republic of South Africa SADC - Southern African Development Community SMART - Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Timely (Indicators) SWOT - Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats TCE - Special Emergency Programmes Service (FAO) TOR - Terms Of Reference UoB - University of Birmingham, UK WARD - Women in Agriculture and Rural Development YPO - Young Professional Officer

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ...... II LIST OF ACRONYMS ...... III TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... IV EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 1 Project Objectives and Design ...... 1 Achievements and Results...... 2 WAY FORWARD ...... 3 Project re-validation ...... 3 Suspension of non-essential activities...... 4 Improved project management and governance...... 4 CONCLUSIONS...... 5 Project Relevance...... 5 Project Design ...... 5 Identification of Project Beneficiaries...... 5 Institutional Arrangements (Provisions for Management and Governance)...... 5 Project Approach ...... 6 Project Implementation ...... 6 Technical and Operational Backstopping ...... 7 Project Management...... 7 Government Support and Oversight...... 7 Actual and Potential Results ...... 8 Component One (Aid Management Capacity-Development) ...... 8 Component Two (Small- Holder Farmer Development) ...... 9 Specific topics and issues...... 10 Sustainability of project interventions ...... 10 Cost-effectiveness ...... 10 Gender equity in project implementation and results ...... 10 Major factors affecting the project results ...... 10 Way Forward (Extended Version) ...... 11 Short Term (next 6 months) ...... 11 Medium Term (2011 and beyond) ...... 13 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ...... 14 2. PROJECT RELEVANCE AND JUSTIFICATION ...... 14 3. PROJECT DESIGN – OBJECTIVES AND OUTPUTS...... 15 3.1 Objectives and Outputs...... 15 3.2 Identification of Project Beneficiaries...... 16 3.3 Institutional Arrangements (Provisions for Management and Governance) ...... 16 3.4 Proposed Project Approach ...... 17 4. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ...... 17 Budget Utilization...... 17 Implementation Efficiency ...... 20 3.3 Implementation status...... 21 4. SUPPORT BY GOVERNMENT, TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL BACKSTOPPING, PROJECT MANAGEMENT...... 21 4.1 Technical and operational backstopping ...... 21 4.2 Project management...... 22 4.3 Government support and oversight ...... 22 5. ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL RESULTS ...... 23 5.1 Component One (Aid Management Capacity Development) ...... 23 5.2 Component Two (Small-holder Farmer Development) ...... 26 ANNEX 1: MISSION TOR ...... 29 ANNEX 2: LIST OF PEOPLE MET - ITINERARY...... 33 ANNEX 3: LIST OF PROJECT STAFF ...... 36 ANNEX 4: LIST OF MAJOR EXPENDITURE ITEMS UNDER CONTRACTS ...... 37 ANNEX 5: PROJECT FACT TABLES...... 38 ANNEX 6: LIST OF EQUIPMENT ...... 40

iv ANNEX 7: MISSION OBSERVATIONS ON PROJECT SITES VISITED ...... 42 ANNEX 8: EXTENDED TIMELINE ...... 47 ANNEX 10: REVIEW OF CONSULTANT REPORTS...... 55 ANNEX 11 DOCUMENTS CONSULTED ...... 64

v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

By the early 2000s, the Government of the Republic of South Africa (GoSA) had become a donor for Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) projects in Southern Africa. These projects were emergency and rehabilitation-related to deal with food supply crises but also to prevent spread of transboundary diseases of livestock. In recognition of its growing role as fund provider for International Development Cooperation (IDC), and in order to ensure cost-effective delivery of aid resources, South Africa recognized the need to build up a cadre of its own experienced operators, and requested FAO assistance in building the required capacity.

Furthermore, as government programmes for extending support to small-scale emerging farmers from formerly disadvantaged communities had experienced constraints due to land reform beneficiaries’ lack of (mostly) commercial farming management skills and limited government staff capacities in planning and implementing support for smallholder farmers, FAO and RSA agreed to include a component for small farmer development in the planned assistance.

The project thus addressed two priority aspects of GoSA’s agricultural activities: extending IDC particularly to countries within Southern Africa, and support to smallholder farmers.

A project idea was developed in consultations between DoA and FAO in late 2006, a general project agreement was signed in March 2007, followed by the approval of the project document for GCP/RAF/412/SAF in July 2007. The project was planned (i.e. early 2007 to April 2007) for a duration of 5 years (i.e. April 2007 to April 2012), with a budget of US$ 10 million.

Project Objectives and Design

The project’s initial focus was to be on capacity-building for managing GoSA’s IDC (“aid”) programme (later called Component I), complemented by a parallel capacity-building programme for supporting formerly disadvantaged farmers (later called Component II). The Expected End-of-Project Situation (after five years) was described in the project document as follows:

1. Capacity (built) for aid management (Immediate Objective 1, 2)  Donor Government staff of different levels is trained and able to implement aid cooperation projects more effectively. An in-country training programme1, linked to national institutes, is established and functioning to continue training additional government staff.

2. Capacity (built) for promoting effective emerging farmer development – preparatory assessment and piloting (Immediate Objective 3)  A prioritized set of activities and implementation plan is drawn for capacity-building at national and provincial levels for effective service delivery in support of South Africa’s formerly disadvantaged and now emerging farmers.

3. Capacity (built) for promoting effective emerging farmer development - implementation (Immediate Objective 4)  Capacity-building programme is implemented for integrated support to emerging farmers

1 Immediate Objective 2 actually called for “a longer-term capacity-building programme for DoA development cooperation and Aid management in the agricultural sector, institutionalised within an accredited institution”.

1 The project document did not quantify the perceived “lack of a strong and effective support capacity for (future) management of South African international development cooperation”; neither did it include analyses of the perceived ‘weaknesses in service delivery systems supporting formerly disadvantaged small-scale farmers’.

The implementation approach for Component I was to ‘facilitate the rapid deployment of DoA officers to gain exposure as to how RSA’s contribution in support of agricultural emergency/rehabilitation activities in the region is being implemented and managed, and, using the experience gained, to lay the groundwork for a long term DoA capacity-building programme’. (The first project task was to organize a “confirmatory assessment” of capacity needs.)

Achievements and Results

By May 2010 (the time of the MTR), the project lags substantially behind on all implementation targets.

Under Component I, only 18% of the targets concerning study tours, fellowships and attachments have been reached (98 person/weeks out of targeted 534 p/w implemented by May 2010 2 ) – very few applications from professionals in DoA and other government institutions were received; and of the few who applied, most did not meet the requirements3.

Regarding other planned activities under Component I, the institutional needs assessment and aid architecture review were completed only by October 2008, instead of October 2007 and March 2008, respectively. They also did not significantly contribute to moving the project ahead.

Concerning Component II, while the review of experiences of establishing emerging farmers in South Africa got started relatively quickly (January 2008; findings were presented in July 2008), the final report (after editing by FAO) got published only in early 20104. The planned first output5 (baseline study in pilot sites to be initiated by October 2007) has not yet started; discussions regarding the selection of pilot sites were initiated in 2007, but agreements with provinces (KZN, MPL) were only reached in 20096.

In terms of activities of direct relevance to intended beneficiaries, by May 2010 the project had:

 Organized three one-week study tours for 10 government officials and four participants from farmer organizations;

2 It can be argued that with the exception of the two APOs and perhaps the YPO, none of the study tours and fellowships organized by the project had a specific focus on IDC. 3 A complicating factor in this regard was that DoA could not guarantee contract continuation after return from a longer-term assignment. Also, the DoA’s Sector Service programme in 2007/8 did not mention the need to develop officials’ skills in managing international aid or IDC. In addition, South African assistance to the region channelled through FAO (which was to absorb many attachments) ended in July 2008. 4 A preliminary report was circulated after the presentation. 5 Output 3.1: Report of a baseline study of selected sites that also includes institutional and needs assessment at DoA, provincial and farmer organizational levels during Project Year 1 and 2. An understanding regarding the baseline survey (which is a misnomer, as it has more analysis- and action-oriented elements) had been reached with a consulting firm, but FAO administrative regulations require a revised tendering procedure. 6 Service Level Agreements to formalize these agreements still have to be signed.

2  placed three individuals on attachments (2 APOs7, 1 YPO);  arranged two one-day workshops and one mini-workshop;  commissioned a series of training courses on project management for over 100 extension officers in various provinces8; and  commissioned a marketing course for six farmer beneficiaries from the intended pilot sites.

By April 2010 only US$ 1,378,274 had been spent, while the delivery schedule envisaged an expenditure of US$ 6,000,000 (ie 23% of the three-year target, or 14% of the total budget). In view of this massive under-delivery, it is surprising that the project has not had a budget revision.

Assuming the original budget allocation remains valid, for the remaining two years of project operations more than US$ 8,000,000 would remain to be spent by the project. In effect, 80%+ of project funding remains to be expended in under 2 years (whereas, US$10m was anticipated to be expended over 5 years), and this will require significantly improved project/financial management if absorptive capacity, value-for-money and beneficiary impact is to be successfully achieved.

The slow progress made in project implementation was hardly acknowledged by project management, project back-stoppers 9 and project governance bodies 10 : project progress reports did not mention any serious problems until March 2010, the PSC did not meet between October 2008 and April 2010, and the Project Task Force at FAO HQ did not meet formally after July 200711.

Way Forward

The project’s very low implementation rate requires drastic and swift action. The original needs assessments foreseen for both project components have either not happened yet (Component II), or have not been comprehensive enough (Component I) to provide the project with clear guidance. The MTR therefore proposes the following steps:

Project re-validation

 Given the low demand for the project’s services and the unconvincing 2008 needs assessment, the original project premise for Component I may not have been valid. The needs assessments (especially for aid management) therefore need to be re- commissioned with much clearer TOR and much closer technical scrutiny. These should be finalized between October 2010 (aid architecture, pilot site baseline survey) and November 2010 (DAFF needs assessment).

 The re-commissioned needs assessments will also serve the function to re-confirm the relevance of the project (ie the existence of an effective demand for the project’s services and outputs), and will probably lead to a re-design of the project12.

7 The APO in FAO SFE is not a civil servant. 8 Not expressly foreseen in the project document or workplans; in any case, should have been preceded by needs assessment. 9 The lack of critical – and constructive – comments regarding some of the project outputs (consultant’s reports, but also on progress work plans and progress reports) suggests that the current Task Force set-up may not suit the project. 10 The project experienced an extraordinarily high drop-out rate of project champions: the originator of the project idea in DoA/DAFF only chaired one PSC meeting in 2007; her counterpart in FAO HQ transferred to FAO SFE in 2008; the FAOR SA separated from the Organization in November 2008; and also several FAO technical backstoppers separated or were assigned other duties. 11 Members of the Task Force briefed the incoming FAOR in September 2008; FAO HQ initiated a high-level mission to South Africa in December 2010. 12 In particular, the demand for project support related to aid management has been minimal. Also, the existing outward orientation towards study tours, etc as means to build capacity should be revisited and compared with options for in-country

3  After completion of the Capacity Needs Assessment, Aid Architecture Review for Component I, Baseline Survey for Component II, a clear project approach and implementation strategy with documented and actionable targets (ie a revised project document) must be developed.

 On the basis of the above, a renewed agreement should be sought with project partners (in particular DAFF and National Treasury for the remaining project period, with possibility of project extension. This should be finalized by December 2010 (subject to all other critical success factors being achieved within the timeframes stipulated by the MTR team).

Suspension of non-essential activities

 Until the steps outlined above have been achieved (and thus provided a sound basis for a capacity development programme), all international study tours and placements (other than those already underway) should be suspended. Also in-country activities with major budget implications (such as series of training sessions not based on a capacity development plan) should be put on hold.

Improved project management and governance

 Project Management should be significantly strengthened by appointing an external senior professional with strong technical expertise and management skills (before end- 2010); this would give the National Project Coordinator the opportunity to concentrate on the necessary liaison work for the project. (New project appointments should be made on a short-term basis in order not to pre-empt any option – including the phasing-out of the project). Consideration should also be given to the appointment of a suitably qualified financial administrator to better administer programme/project financing, in particular, for this project, but also for upcoming projects in the pipeline.

 The existing institutional arrangements have not served the project well. The splitting of governance bodies into a higher-level Project Steering Committee and a Technical Committee is welcomed, but its functioning (composition, TOR, meeting frequency) should be under review throughout 2011. The composition of the Project Task Force in FAO HQ needs to be reviewed (in particular, after the termination of the GoSA/FAO projects in the region, TCE may no longer be relevant as a technical backstopping unit; for other types of capacity development, other FAO units with expertise in institutional development and management of land reform could be called upon), and its function has to be restored with urgency.

 Depending on the outcome of the aid architecture review/needs assessment, consideration should be given to the separation of Components I and II to improve focus and accountability. If aid management is confirmed as a major project focus, Component I should be allocated to International Relations Directorate and Component II should be allocated to Education, Training & Extension Services Directorate.

 FAO and GoSA should undertake a further assessment of project activities in early 2011 to ensure that progress has been made in key areas as outlined in this. An assessment of whether the project activities should continue should depend on this assessment.

training. If study tours are planned, the socio-economic, infrastructure and farming systems of earmarked countries have to examined and analysed for their relevance before undertaking study tours.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Project Relevance

The project addressed two relevant aspects of GoSA’s agricultural agenda: development cooperation, especially with other countries in Southern Africa had grown significantly, and support to smallholder farmers was (and is) a high-level political priority – the project was thus addressing important concerns.

However, one cornerstone of the project – GoSA aid programmes in the Southern Africa region channelled through FAO – fell away with the termination of these programmes in 2008.

Project Design

The project design envisaged the transformation of the original project idea into a full- fledged project strategy immediately after project launch13.

The project document itself lacked a clear assessment of the effective demand for capacity development with a focus on IDC (Component I), and also the capacity-building for small farmer development component (Component II) was not explicit on the challenges facing South African government staff in planning and implementing support for smallholder farmers. (These aspects were to be addressed through a “capacity-building needs assessment” and a “baseline study of selected sites”, respectively.)

Identification of Project Beneficiaries

Under Target Beneficiaries, the project document identified senior South African professionals in the Civil Service for Component I, and government staff at all levels from DOA and from provincial administrations for Component II as beneficiaries. The project document gave precise information on numbers and background of staff to be sent on study tours, attachments, etc, but it remained unclear which criteria had been used in the identification process.

Given the very low level of staff interest in the project’s capacity-building activities (including the APO positions); it seems that the beneficiary identification process suffered from some misconceptions.

Institutional Arrangements (Provisions for Management and Governance)

The project document promised a single entry point relationship with FAO headquarters, with the Agricultural Policy Support Service in the Organization’s TC Department as overall Lead Technical Unit, with “autonomous but closely interacting baby projects” to be established in the Agricultural Policy Support Service (TCAS) and in the Emergency and Rehabilitation Division (TCE). On the other hand, the project document also defined the project as a “free-standing FAO/Governments Cooperative Programme (GCP) (i.e. Trust Fund) project” with a regional designation – which led to the FAO Sub-Regional

13 The project document acknowledged its provisional character, and stipulated that “upon launch of the project, a first task will therefore be confirmatory assessment of capacity needs”. However, this re-validation and further refinement of the project idea happened only approximately one year after the project launch, and then in an incomplete fashion. The main reason for the initial delay seems to be an insistence by GoSA on national consultants; but even the eventually selected international aid architecture consultant did not produce very useful results. (See review in annex.)

5 Representative in Harare becoming the main Budget Holder, and not the FAO Representative in Pretoria.14

Coordination was to be ensured by a national professional officer (National Project Coordinator), and a capacity building adviser (to be recruited from RSA15) to provide overall technical guidance. The Steering Committee established for the project differed from the proposed arrangement16: participants came mostly from DoA/DAFF and FAO South Africa, with occasional attendance by DIRCO and Treasury.

After the first project year, the Steering Committee met only infrequently, and individual membership frequently changed. This lack of continuity has affected the oversight and guidance function.

Project Approach

The project document outlined for Component I a two-phased approach: after the needs assessment, to gain experience through the rapid deployment of DOA officers for the development of a long term capacity building programme for RSA’s National Department of Agriculture”.

The provisions for Component II envisaged a needs assessment (“baseline survey”), followed by the design for a capacity-building programme for small producer development and culminating in the full formulation of capacity building activities (“specifications for an in- country training programme, linked to national and provincial institutes ... for continuing training of additional government and farmer-organization staff/leaders”).

As no meaningful needs assessments have taken place, the original premise of the project (that there was a need to build up a cadre of experienced operators in aid management/IDC) has remained untested. The project has thus effectively remained in the inception phase: the proposed steps: needs assessment17 > exposure/piloting > development of capacity building programmes, have not been implemented.

Project Implementation

The project commenced activities in vigorous mode in 2007, but soon faced challenges in terms of stakeholder buy-in, and suffered the loss of major project champions as well. (The Director of the Lead Technical Unit transferred away from FAO HQ, the then FAOR retired; also the main protagonist of the project idea in DoA/DAFF was no longer closely involved.) The project inception phase (confirmatory needs assessments) did not take place as planned.

The project’s actual implementation lags far behind the proposed schedule: needs assessments either have not been done yet (Component II), or have not produced relevant results (Component I). The number of GoSA staff covered has remained much below the expectations.

Almost without exception, most activities were behind schedule soon after project start. By April 2010 only US$ 1,378,274 had been spent, while the delivery schedule envisaged an expenditure of US$ 6,000,000 (ie 23% of the three-year target, or 14% of the total budget).

14 However, all project funds were moved to the baby level, with no budget remaining at SFS level. 15 This raises the question what added value FAO as an international organization could provide to the project, if the overall technical guidance has to come from a South African national. 16 The proposed composition included FAO’s Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa, a representative from WFP, and a representative from the RSA Deputy Chancellor’s office. 17 “Confirmatory needs assessments” were proposed in the project document.

6 Translated into person/weeks, only 98 person/weeks out of targeted 534 p/w for study tours etc were implemented by May 2010 – it turned out that not many professionals in DoA and other government institutions were interested in the offer, and of the few who applied, most did not meet the requirements18.

There have been long phases of relative inactivity; moreover, many activities were commissioned to external service providers and did not contribute to the aim of developing a long-term capacity building programme for RSA’s National Department of Agriculture (now DAFF).

Many delays seem to stem, at least partly, on protracted negotiations between FAO and government institutions regarding the hiring of expertise (the DoA needs assessment/aid architecture is a case in point), and the conclusion of formal collaboration agreements (Service Level Agreements regarding the pilot sites). There was an (at least initial) insistence on sourcing project consultants in-country: often this appeared to drive up costs, but not necessarily quality19.

Technical and Operational Backstopping

A Project Task Force20 was established at FAO HQ as per standard procedure in May 2007, but did not meet formally after the second meeting in July 200721. Budget responsibilities were entrusted to the FAO Sub-regional Representative in Harare, who in reality has played no role in the project.

Project Management

Project management was left mostly to the NPO; the envisaged capacity building adviser did not materialize.

Delays in project progress were acknowledged by project management only after a lengthy delay. And while the project followed good management practices, such as producing detailed work plans, they served no practical purpose: the subsequent progress reporting was not against the targets in the workplans.

Government Support and Oversight

Like project management and the FAO Project Task Force, also the Project Steering Committee (which was chaired by DoA/DAFF) did not monitor project progress closely. This may be because PSC meetings rarely had the same participants; representatives of

18 A complicating factor in this regard was that DoA could not guarantee contract continuation after return from a longer-term assignment. Also, the DoA’s Sector Service programme in 2007/8 did not mention the need to develop officials’ skills in managing international aid or IDC. In addition, South African assistance to the region channelled through FAO (which was to absorb many attachments) ended in July 2008. 19 On the other hand, also the international aid architecture consultancy did not yield convincing results. 20 FAO’s Emergency Division (TCE) was nominated a Lead Technical Unit for Component I. It is not clear why an operations- oriented unit was given a lead technical role, while others units in FAO dealing more specifically with institutional capacity building were not members of the Task Force. 21 Members of the Task Force briefed the incoming FAOR in September 2008; FAO HQ initiated a high-level mission to South Africa in December 2010. 22 Attempts to have a budget revision initiated have been made, but were not followed through.

7 DoA/DAFF and other GoSA institutions tended to change and needed to be briefed more on general aspects of the project than on specific aspects and issues.

The set-up of the Project Steering Committee therefore did not improve accountability; only very recently (December 2009) new working arrangements (a Working or Technical Committee) have been proposed.

Actual and Potential Results

Component One (Aid Management Capacity-Development)

The original objectives for the project, and especially those of Component I, continue to be relevant for GoSA; the question is whether they are still a major concern for DAFF. There is some uncertainty as to what specifically the intentions of GoSA are in terms of IDC, especially in relation to the agriculture sector and the future role of DAFF in IDC. Indications are that a South African ‘Aid Agency’ may be set up which will serve to provide much needed direction and co-ordination on IDC.

Arising from the consultations undertaken, the following key conclusions are reached, notably:

1. IDC may not have been as high on the DoA/DAFF agenda as it was perceived to be at the time of project formulation, and as a result was not correctly defined and anchored in DoA/DAFF at national/provincial levels. IDC was not always championed at high levels within DoA/DAFF to counter the natural tendency to focus on domestic policy at national/provincial levels (as in Component II). There was insufficient engagement and consultation with DIRCo and IDC therefore, lacked sufficient vision and ‘outward’ orientation and SADC regional focus within DoA/DAFF to be meaningful;

2. The ‘Emerging Aid Architecture’ Report and the ‘Capacity Needs Assessment’ Report were not comprehensive or sufficiently relevant to give impetus to planned project initiatives with international/SADC orientation, being especially weak in mapping agriculture sector aid flows and potential numbers of officials engaged in IDC in DoA/DAFF at national/provincial levels (refer Annex 9 for an assessment of these reports);

3. DoA/DAFF HR Unit was not involved in the Capacity Needs Assessment process to ensure that IDC was incorporated into career path planning at national and provincial levels. Placements and releases of key individuals was slow or non-existent and it is clear that insufficient recognition was given to the potential importance of international exposure to DoA/DAFF officials in improving individual/collective capacity and skills in DoA/DAFF;

4. DAFF/FAO processes and procedures were often cumbersome and resulted in delays and obstacles to performance of certain project activities, in particular, the release of key individuals for project steering committee and study tours, placements and conferences/seminars. It can also be argued, that since IDC-related assignments were not integrated with career path planning, many potential participants were slow in availing of the opportunity to ‘expand their horizons’, preferring instead to secure their positions within an established and ‘safe’ job environment. High turnover of personnel resulted in low attendance and/or inconsistent availability at PSC, while an emphasis on the person/personality rather than on the position to be filled affected PSC performance, and consequently, project oversight, accountability and performance levels.

8 Component Two (Small- Holder Farmer Development)

1. Progress with regard to small farmer development in pilot sites has been critically delayed; by end of Year 3, a prioritized set of activities and implementation plan for capacity building should have been ready, but only preliminary contacts with pilot sites have been established.

2. The selection of pilot sites was not done with a view to identifying successful examples of small farmer development with commercial potential23; the pilot sites visited by the team displayed their own sets of fundamental problems and challenges rather than indications of success. (Negotiations with government also took a very long time to come to tangible results; Service Level Agreements to formalize these agreements still have to be signed.)

3. There is also a need to clarify the focus of Component II. The project document did not mention working with farmers; the scope of the project was limited to staff in DOA/DAFF and provincial agricultural administrations, and ‘promising small-farmers organizations’. Yet, there seem to be expectations that the project will establish an outreach and direct support to farmer beneficiaries (as was done with the recent agricultural marketing training). This may be the correct way to accelerate development; but it will require a careful analysis of the farmers’ situation as well as of the project’s capacity to deliver in this regard.

4. The project has not yet established a functional outreach to the pilot sites; provincial project coordinators and support staff have not yet been officially appointed, and the necessary information about the conditions at the pilot sites (to be generated by the baseline survey) is not yet available.

5. Working with the pilots sites alone will not generate sufficient evidence for lessons for programmes that can be replicated and upscaled; unless information is included on other successful initiatives in RSA, the lessons derived will remain too narrow and possibly biased.

6. The project has already started with providing training on project management to extension officers in province; however, this was done without a prior training needs assessment.

7. There appears to be a fragmentation and disconnect among smallholder farmer support services at the field level as well as at higher administrative levels; the project will need to address this structural deficiency in dealing with is institutional partners in the region. (This should perhaps form part of a wider recommendation to DAFF concerning its approach to small farmer development.)

8. The project has documented issues with regard to land reform in South Africa; for example, that beneficiaries often lacked the required skills set to become successful commercial operators, that too many beneficiaries became beneficiaries only to fulfil formal requirements (eg, for grant or loan purposes), that flexibility was needed when deciding on farm size (sub-division of large holdings may be appropriate, but also keeping together complementary assets), and that government services and funding mechanisms must be adequately coordinated to maximize gain. (The latter point in particular will need to be addressed: agencies working in isolation will achieve sub-

23 Apart from being good practice (to use successful development examples for he project document specified that, apart from staff in DOA/DAFF and provincial agricultural administrations, Component II would also cover promising small-farmers organizations.

9 optimal results for small farmer development. The impending “baseline survey” should be used to analyse this aspect.)

Specific topics and issues

Sustainability of project interventions

Regarding positive lasting effects, the project has been credited with providing inspiration to some officials during study tours, and it can be assumed that some of the training courses run by the project will have contributed to better skills among the participating DAFF officers.

The capacity building concept of the project has not yet been formulated, let alone tried24. There is a need to validate or abandon the original project premise for Component I (that there exists an effective demand for capacity building in IDC in DoA/DAFF); the idea of improving support services to smallholder farmers remains relevant, but indications are that DAFF (and thus also the project) will need to work in collaboration with other service providers.

Cost-effectiveness

With its current record, the cost-effectiveness of the project is low: in view of the limited activities implemented, the fixed administrative overheads absorb a much larger portion of the expenditure than originally envisaged.

Gender equity in project implementation and results

The project did not display a specific concern for gender issues; neither gender nor women were mentioned in the project document. In terms of project staffing, the majority of project staff is female; in terms of people that have benefited from project activities so far, a breakdown by sex is not always available, but female participants seem to have been included in every activity.

Major factors affecting the project results

With the benefit of hindsight, the following reasons can be singled out as having had a negative influence on the project performance:

 A project document based too much on untested hypotheses;  loss of major project champions;  lack of stakeholder buy-in;  protracted negotiations over the sourcing of expertise and concluding formal agreements; and  deficient project governance and oversight.

24 The project document called for a “proposal development mission”, a “full formulation of the capacity building activities”, “specifications for an in-country training programme”, and the development of training modules. Only the last point has been achieved (through commissioned service providers).

10 Way Forward (Extended Version)

Short Term (next 6 months)

Project Management and Governance

1. Project Management should be strengthened by recruiting a senior project manager (still in 2010) with strong technical expertise and management skills, and revise the role of the current Project Coordinator to focus on assisting the Project Manager in liaising with Government and project operations (The designations in the project office should be changed to reflect the new set-up.)

2. The existing institutional arrangements have not served the project well. The splitting of governance bodies into a higher-level Project Steering Committee and a Technical Committee is welcomed, but its composition, TOR, meeting frequency should be reviewed in 2011.

3. The current designation of the project gives it a regional dimension. If it continues, it should clearly be identified as a South African based project and, accordingly, operated by FAO South Africa.

4. The role of TCE as LTU of Component I should be reviewed; the new capacity needs assessment should specifically address this aspect.

5. Depending on the outcome of the aid architecture review/needs assessment, consideration should be given to the separation of Components I and II to improve focus and accountability. If aid management is confirmed as a major project focus, Component I should be allocated to International Relations Directorate and Component II should be allocated to Education, Training & Extension Services Directorate.

6. As the project’s financial management has not been transparent, efficient and responsive (a budget revision is long overdue), consideration should also be given to the appointment of a suitably qualified financial administrator to better administer programme/project financing. This should be done in advance of embarking on a significantly scaled-up project roll-out over the next 2 years (and beyond, in the event of a project extension). This should be undertaken by 31st December 2010 at the latest.

7. On the basis of the above, a renewed agreement should be sought with project partners (in particular DAFF and National Treasury for the remaining project period, with possibility of project extension. This should be finalized by December 2010 (subject to all other critical success factors being achieved within the timeframes stipulated by the MTR team).

8. FAO and GoSA should undertake a further assessment of project activities in early 2011 to ensure that all critical success factors outlined in this report have been completed by 31st December 2010. A continuation of activities should depend on this outcome of this assessment - including value-for-money, ability to deliver key project milestones and whether sustainable impact can be achieved.

11 Component I: Aid Management Capacity-Development

1. Suspend with immediate effect all international study tours and placements (other than those already underway) until the following key activities have been completed:

 An updated ‘Emerging Aid Architecture and Capacity Needs assessment is produced, reflecting RSA’s current and future mandate and workload, as well as DAFF’s involvement in the SADC region for the agriculture sector, in the context of the wider international policy, in agreement with DIRCo. This should be produced by October/November 2010;

 An independent Capacity Needs Assessment is undertaken in DAFF, at national and provincial levels, reflecting the new DAFF requirements (and incorporating the updated Emerging Aid Architecture exercise), in consultation with DAFF HR Unit, which specifies current/future numbers, levels and activity requirements and addresses career path planning aspects. This should be produced by 30 November 2010;

 An independent external Viability Analysis/Plan is produced on the FHU-UoB Training Centre Initiative, reflecting DAFF’s IDC capacity needs requirements as confirmed (or otherwise) by the updated ‘Emerging Aid Architecture’ and ‘DAFF Capacity Needs Assessment’ exercises. If still found valid, the following activities should be addressed:

- Specific numbers of individuals to be trained, including levels and functions etc. over 3+ years; - Outline details of the intended Curriculum and Training Materials to be delivered, including relevance; - A signed Memorandum of Agreement between FHU-UoB is finalised/in place; - A definitive budget and funding requirement is agreed by National Treasury;

This should be produced by December 2010;

 An analysis of other relevant colleges and universities should be undertaken to ascertain what alternative capacity development options for capacity development are available to the project. This should be produced by December 2010;

 The budgetary allocation to Component I needs to be finalized/agreed with DAFF/National Treasury (for the remaining 2+ years, with possibility of project extension). This should be finalised by December 2010;

 A Memorandum of Understanding should be signed Between DAFF and FHU upon successful completion of the items above. This should be finalised by 31 December 2010.

Component II: Small-holder Farmer Development

1. The Base-line survey (which is really intended as a situation analysis) has to be commissioned immediately and be completed by 31 October 2010 at the latest. The baseline survey should include a skills assessment of support institution staff as well.

2. Before the baseline is finished and the basis for an implementation is ready, no further study tours, and attachments should be implemented.

12 3. The existing collaboration with the provincial Departments of Agriculture and the pilot sites should continue; detailed workplans and collaboration programmes should, however, await the outcome of the baseline survey.

4. The baseline survey will in all probability document a fragmentation of support services for smallholder farmers – the project approach may need to be adapted in order to be better able to deal with multiple stakeholders.

5. Within the context of this project, the Department of Rural Development & Land Reform should review current processes of purchasing land without assets; the consideration should be to purchase them as going concerns.

6. Likewise, the process of transferring nominal ownership through subdivision of large scale viable commercial units to benefit large numbers of beneficiaries with diverse interests, should be revisited.

7. The role and the contribution of private sector and commodity organizations have to be highlighted in order to beef up the impact of Extension Recovery Plan (ERP).

8. The budgetary allocation to Component II needs to be finalized/agreed with DAFF/National Treasury (for the remaining 2+ years, with possibility of project extension). This should be finalised by December 2010;

Medium Term (2011 and beyond)

Once it has been established and agreed the preconditions for a successful project still exist, the following actions should be taken:

9. After successful completion of the Capacity Needs Assessment, Aid Architecture Review for Component I, Baseline Survey for Component II and agreement with project partners on project continuation, a clear project implementation strategy with documented and actionable targets needs to be developed. In particular, the existing outward orientation towards study tours, etc as means to build capacity should be revisited and compared with options for in-country training. If study tours are planned, the socio-economic, infrastructure and farming systems of earmarked countries have to examined and analysed for their relevance before undertaking study tours.

13 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The project document argued that South Africa needed “... capacity not only to plan and target assistance but also to know enough about aid implementation to be able to properly guide it, whether implemented bilaterally or through other agents, including the United Nations. Furthermore, to maintain aid and ensure its delivery in a cost-effective manner, South Africa and its neighbours need to build up a cadre of their own experienced operators, exposed to field delivery in their own environment.”

Furthermore, government programmes for extending support to small-scale emerging farmers from formerly disadvantaged communities had experienced constraints. The project document listed as challenges “... insufficient agricultural tradition, among land reform beneficiaries, disadvantages in competing with much larger producers in the same markets, difficulties coping with the quality requirements, and for South African government staff the need to develop capacities in a whole new set of approaches for planning and implementation that were not necessary when support was targeting only the large-scale commercial farmers”. FAO and RSA therefore agreed to include a component for small farmer development in the planned assistance.

The project thus addressed two priority aspects of GoSA’s agricultural activities: extending IDC particularly to countries within Southern Africa, and support to smallholder farmers.

2. PROJECT RELEVANCE AND JUSTIFICATION

By 2006, while GoSA’s development cooperation especially within the Southern Africa region had grown significantly, there was a perceived lack of a strong and effective support capacity for future South African International Development Cooperation activities in the agricultural and food security operations in neighbouring countries.

Likewise, support to smallholder farmers was (and is) a high-level political priority – there were (and are) problems of limited government capacity to promote small farmers to increase productivity, operate commercially and generally become mainstreamed into competitive agriculture. The stated project intention was to get initially only involved in preparatory activities, pending government policy and strategic decisions on this matter. (These decisions were then to be developed and implemented during the second half of the project.)

14 3. PROJECT DESIGN – OBJECTIVES AND OUTPUTS

3.1 Objectives and Outputs

The project’s development objective was described as “the uplifting of the rural poor and their transformation into self-sustaining livelihoods”; the project’s initial focus was to be on capacity-building for managing GoSA’s IDC (“aid”) programme (later called Component I), complemented by a capacity-building programme for supporting formerly disadvantaged farmers (later called Component II). The Expected End-of-Project Situation (after five years) was described in the project document as follows:

4. Capacity (built) for aid management (Immediate Objective 1, 2)  Donor Government staff of different levels is trained and able to implement aid cooperation projects more effectively. An in-country training programme25, linked to national institutes, is established and functioning to continue training additional government staff.

5. Capacity (built) for promoting effective emerging farmer development – preparatory assessment and piloting (Immediate Objective 3)  A prioritized set of activities and implementation plan is drawn for capacity-building at national and provincial levels for effective service delivery in support of South Africa’s formerly disadvantaged and now emerging farmers.

6. Capacity (built) for promoting effective emerging farmer development - implementation (Immediate Objective 4)  Capacity-building programme is implemented for integrated support to emerging farmers

This scenario translated into the following Immediate Objectives:

Immediate Objective 1: The establishment of an initial cadre of DOA officers with increased knowledge and skills for more effective management of RSA Aid resources supporting agricultural rehabilitation

Immediate Objective 2: The design and implementation of a longer-term capacity building programme for DOA development cooperation and aid management in the agricultural sector

Immediate Objective 3: To critically assess needs and develop a prioritized proposal and implementation plan for capacity building at provincial and central levels for effective policies, strategies and service delivery in support of South Africa’s formerly disadvantaged and now emergent small-scale farmers; to make a preparatory start on implementation

Immediate Objective 4: Full-scale implementation of capacity building for support to emergent farmers (including at provincial and farmer-organization levels), based on outcomes of Immediate Objective 3

While the project document gave a broad description of the existing government capacity in aid management as well as smallholder support, it did not quantify the perceived “lack of a strong and effective support capacity for (future) management of South African international development cooperation”, nor did it include specific situation analyses of the perceived weaknesses in service delivery in support of South Africa’s formerly disadvantaged and now

25 Immediate Objective 2 actually called for “a longer-term capacity-building programme for DoA development cooperation and Aid management in the agricultural sector, institutionalised within an accredited institution”.

15 emergent small-scale farmers. (These aspects were to be addressed through a “capacity building needs assessment” and a “baseline study of selected sites”, respectively.)

3.2 Identification of Project Beneficiaries

The project document gave only a brief explanation of the intended beneficiaries:

“In matters of aid implementation, initially only South African professionals in the Civil Service are targeted who have eventual potential to take the lead in Government’s development cooperation programme in agriculture and food security (including emergency/rehabilitation assistance). Eventually, Government could consider possible non- South African SADC nationals in key positions as national managers of aid programmes in agriculture and food security (...)

Under Immediate Objective 4, government staff at all levels that are to extend support to small farmers and their organizations will benefit from capacity building. Government staff will come from DOA and from provincial administrations.”

This indicates that while Component I was to involve mainly senior staff, Component II was to be open to all levels of staff. Due to limited interest by government staff, in the course of project implementation it turned that many of the study tours and also one of the APO positions were filled by candidates from outside the civil service.

3.3 Institutional Arrangements (Provisions for Management and Governance)

The project was described as a “free-standing FAO/Governments Cooperative Programme project. Very good coordination will be assured, with only one single entry point in FAO headquarters (...) the project will be treated as supportive of normative activities of FAO and will therefore have as overall Lead Technical Unit the capacity-building team of the Agricultural Policy Support Service in the TC Department. Autonomous but closely interacting baby projects will be established in the Agricultural Policy Support Service (TCAS) and in the Emergency and Rehabilitation Division (TCE).”

Coordination was to be ensured by a national professional officer (National Project Coordinator) based in the FAO Representation in Pretoria, and a capacity building adviser (to be recruited from RSA27) to provide overall technical guidance. The proposed Steering Committee 28 comprised the FAO Representative, a senior representative from DOA, a senior representative from Department of Foreign Affairs, a representative from FAO Sub- Regional Office for Southern Africa (Harare), the Regional Emergency Coordinator for Southern Africa, a representative from WFP, and a representative from the RSA Deputy Chancellors Committee29. In the course of project implementation, a different composition of the Steering Committee emerged: mostly with participants from DoA, and occasional

26 The largest budget component was Travel (US$ 1,573,550 for study tours, etc), followed by Contracts (US$ 1,430,000, mostly for development of training modules – US$ 1,250,000, but also for capacity-building needs assessment – US$50 000, Institutional Analysis – US$30 000, and a “Proposal Development Mission” – US$100 000). 27 This raises the question what added value FAO as an international organization could provide to the project, if the overall technical guidance has to come from a South African national. 28 A bracketed remark qualified that the composition of the PSC still was to be negotiated between DoA and FAO. Likewise, reference was made to a national institution to develop and provide the short courses/modules, and provide mentoring support – also this institution was still to be identified. 29 WFP also benefited from the RSA’s donation to alleviate the crisis in Southern Africa.

16 attendance by DIRCO and Treasury – but neither a representative from FAO’s Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa nor a representative from WFP or a representative from the RSA Deputy Chancellors ever attended.

There were a number of unclear statements in this section of the project document, or at least statements that had not been fully discussed and agreed upon among the project parties. In the course of project implementation, the capacity building advisor position was cancelled without replacement (thereby increasing the responsibility, but also workload of the NPO), the ‘national institution to develop and provide short training courses’ never materialized (UFH might become a candidate), and the final composition of the PSC differed markedly from the proposed set-up.

3.4 Proposed Project Approach

As the implementation approach for Component I was to ‘facilitate the rapid deployment of DoA officers to gain exposure as to how RSA’s contribution in support of agricultural emergency/rehabilitation activities in the region is being implemented and managed, and, using the experience gained, to lay the groundwork for a long term DoA capacity-building programme’, the project document proposed to accommodate project activities in the Emergency Coordination Units (ECU) in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, The United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which could provide supervision and provide sources of best practice. (The first project task was to organize a “confirmatory assessment” of capacity needs.)

Component II’s implementation likewise envisaged “a sound needs assessment and review of experiences, (and) considerable consultations and mutual reflections” to precede implementation. A “capacity-building programme for emerging farmer development” would then be designed based on best practices and models. The project document stated that ‘in the field of small-farmer development, FAO can draw upon a long history of exposure worldwide in small-farmer development, small-farmer organization, and support services to them. It also has run programmes of fellowships, study tours and formal training at all levels, apart from having well-established frameworks for having trainees of professionals attached to it for operational hands-on capacity-building’.

Given the absence of dedicated analyses at project formulation stage, the outputs and targets as stipulated in the project document were surprisingly detailed. Mostly, they referred to study tours and attachments (such as “Output 3.9: 5 relatively senior South African managers undergone six weeks study tours – in three segments – to successful programmes in commercially-oriented small-farmer programmes in Asia, Africa, Latin America and to small-farmer organizations for development in these regions plus in Europe - part of the time in FAO headquarters”): over 100 professionals were to be sent on fellowships, attachments and study tours by the project30.

4. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Budget Utilization

The project document contained a budget table with a detailed breakdown of expenditure items, reproduced below. (Some budget lines did not correspond to the text of the project document, such as, for example, the budget line for International Consultant Capacity-

30 The largest budget component was Travel (US$ 1,573,550 for study tours, etc), followed by Contracts (US$ 1,430,000, mostly for development of training modules – US$ 1,250,000, but also for capacity-building needs assessment – US$50 000, Institutional Analysis – US$30 000, and a “Proposal Development Mission” – US$100 000).

17 building: the project document described this position as “... capacity building advisor (...) recruited from RSA”)

Table: Planned Budget

Percentage 5011 Salaries Professionals Amount of Total National Programme Officer (coord/liaison) 225,000 2.28% 2 APOs (2 years each) (incl.12% PSC) 580,000 5.88% Subtotal (1) Salaries Professionals 805,000 8.16% 5013 Consultants/Support Staff 0.00% International Consultant capacity-building 90,000 0.91% Admin assistant 120,000 1.22% 4 Drivers 360,000 3.65% 25 Young Professionals (each six months) 390,000 3.95% 5 Young Professionals (each six months) 78,000 0.79% Subtotal (2) Consultants/Support Staff 1,038,000 10.52% 5014 Contracts 0.00% Rapid capacity-building needs assessment mission 50,000 0.51% Institutional analysis 30,000 0.30% Proposal development mission 100,000 1.01% Development of training modules 1,250,000 12.67% Subtotal (3) Contracts 1,430,000 14.50% 5021 Travel 0.00% 25 senior staff study tour (2x1 week) (DSA+tickets) country level 129,000 1.31% 5 senior staff study tour (3x2 week) (DSA+tickets) Asia, Africa, L. America 126,000 1.28% 25 mid level staff fellowship country level (each 3 months) 543,750 5.51% 10 mid level staff fellowship country level (2 months each) 145,000 1.47% 10 mid level staff study tour country level (1 month each) 64,000 0.65% 5 mid level staff study tour Asia, Europe, Africa (1 month each) 55,000 0.56% 10 junior staff study tour Asia, Europe, Africa (2 months each) 340,000 3.45% Biannual exchange workshops (DSA+tickets) 40 participants, 20 from outside 116,800 1.18% Travel budget Young Professionals 54,000 0.55% Subtotal (4) Travel 1,573,550 15.95% 5023 Training 0.00% In-country selected courses, language training 50,000 0.51% Subtotal (5) Training 50,000 0.51% 5024 Expendable Procurement 0.00% Training material (maps, books.) 7,500 0.08% Stationary, material 7,500 0.08% Subtotal (6) Expendable Procurement 15,000 0.15% 5025 Non-Expendable Procurement 0.00% Vehicles (2 minibus, 2 4x4) 120,000 1.22% Laptops 25,000 0.25% PCs (4), Printer (4) 13,600 0.14% Miscellaneous 28,000 0.28% Subtotal (7) Non-Expendable Procurement 186,600 1.89% 5027 Technical Support Services+AS 0.00% Terminal Report 5,000 0.05% Assessment report 5,000 0.05% Project Evaluation costs 50,000 0.51% FAO STS training programme (LTU) 24,000 0.24% FAO ATS visits 25,000 0.25% Backstopping HQ/RIACSO 20,000 0.20% Subtotal (8) Technical Support Services+AS 129,000 1.31% 5028 General Operating Expenses 0.00% Recruitment and home payments FAO Pretoria 30,000 0.30%

18 Steering Committee meetings 5,000 0.05% Insurance shipment 13,200 0.13% Miscellaneous 20,000 0.20% Subtotal (9) General Operating Expenses 68,200 0.69% Subtotals (1-9) 5,295,350 53.69% Capacity-building of emerging farmers, extension and other service providers at all levels 0.00% Subtotal 8,795,350 89.17% Project Support Costs (13%) of Sub total less APOs 5029 salary 1,067,996 10.83% Total Project Costs 9,863,346 100.00%

Although the planned budget soon became obsolete as project delivery (ie expenditure) was very low, above all due to the very limited uptake of the study tour/attachment offers, a budget revision was never performed. (There is correspondence documenting various attempts to initiate the process, but this not accomplished until the time of the evaluation.)

Travel (for attachments and study tours) was the highest planned compound expenditure (15.95%); the most expensive single activity planned was the development of training modules (12.67%), followed by Consultants/Support staff (10.52%) and Professional salaries (8.16%). Regarding the latter two categories, they lump together genuine project staff and APOs and Young Professionals: ie persons that stood to benefit from the project, rather than work for it.

The budget and expenditure information provided by FAO does not match the format of the original budget table; the following table is mainly useful to illustrate the expenditure situation (actuals & commitments) from project start until December 2009.

Table 3: Expenditure (Commitments & Actuals) until 12/2009

Budget Soft Hard Total Actuals Commitments Percentage of Available Commit Commit Commit and Actuals Expenditure Budget ments ments ments (Actuals & Commitments)

5011 Salaries Professional (Parent account) 145,000 0 100 100 144,900 5012 Salaries General Service (Parent account) 0 0 0 0 56,478 56,478 4.59% <56,478> 5013 Consultants (Parent account) 310,750 0 5,851 5,851 204,720 210,571 17.11% 100,179 5014 Contracts (Parent account) 440,000 0 136 136 75,617 75,754 6.15% 364,246 5020 Locally Contracted Labour (Parent account) 0 0 47,071 47,071 3.82% <47,071> 5021 Travel (Parent account) 481,171 0 <0> <0> 187,612 187,612 15.24% 293,559 5023 Training (Parent account) 240,000 0 290,470 290,470 23.60% <50,470> 5024 Expendable Procurement (Parent account) 3,000 0 2,374 2,374 0.19% 626

19 5025 Non Expendable Procurement (Parent account) 119,200 0 0 0 125,869 125,869 10.23% <6,669> 5027 Technical Support Services (Parent account) 30,000 0 7,974 7,974 0.65% 22,026 5028 General Operating Expenses (Parent account) 79,793 0 0 0 84,839 84,839 6.89% <5,046> 5029 Support Costs (Parent account) 221,509 0 140,059 140,059 11.38% 81,450 5050 Chargeback (Parent account) 0 0 1,800 1,800 0.15% <1,800> Total Expenses 2,070,423 0 5,987 5,987 1,224,984 1,230,970 100.00% 839,453

Project delivery towards the end of project year three (ie April 2010) was only slightly more than 20% of the expenditure target.

The expenditure pattern arising from the above table shows training as the major expenditure category (23.6%), followed by consultants (17.11% - this includes the salary of the NPO), and travel (15.24%). Due to lower expenditure overall, the proportion of staff salaries rose from roughly 7% in the original budget to certainly above 10%; the most dramatic rise is in non-expendable equipment31: from a planned expenditure of 1.89% to 10.23% in actual expenditure during the first three project years.

Implementation Efficiency

Table: Timeline Capacity-building Project (Major Milestones)32

Date Activity/Milestone Comment

FAO Mission – Formulation of Draft 12-19 February 2007 Proposal Donor Agreement Signature 30 March 2007 Designation of Budget Holder 25 April 2007 Sub-regional Representative designated BH on account of project’s presumed regional mandate – no active involvement 1st Project Task Force Meeting 7 May 2007 FAO HQ 1st Project Steering Committee 9 May 2007 2nd Project Steering Committee 3 July 2007 Only PSC chaired by Ms Titi (Dep D-G) Project Document Signed 16 July 2007 2nd (and last) Project Task Force 23 July 2007 Meeting Project Coordinator appointed August 2007 Yolanda Ntlakaza FAO Representative – end of November 2007 George Mburathi assignment Review of experiences of establishing January 2008 Contract assigned, approach emerging farmers in South Africa presented at mini-workshop Feb 2008; review WS in July 2008 Training on Project Mgt From March 2008 onwards 100 extension officers by University of KZN and private

31 Non-expendable items are items of equipment which may be expected to have a normal life of at least five years, and which costs at least US$ 1,500 per unit, and certain items considered to be of an attractive nature and having a value of at least US$ 500 per unit such as cameras and computers. 32 A more extended timeline, and more tables on activities and results can be found in the annexes.

20 service providers Study Tour Denmark 18-23 May New FAO Representative assigned September 2008 Ms Rosebud Kurwijila 5th PSC Meeting (last one until April 2 October 2008 2010) Study Tour Thailand 27 Sept – 5 Oct 2008 Workshop on Needs Assessment and 30 Oct 2008 Presentations by University of Aid Architecture Birmingham and University Fort Hare Study Tour France 19-25 Oct 2008 Pilot Sites selected Late 2009 Agreements with Prov Dept of Agric (KZN,MPL) not yet formalized APOs placed Oct 2009 One APO in FAO HQ, and one APO FAO SFE Ethiopia FAO High-level Mission Dec 2009 Re-vitalize PSC, establish Working Committee, Service Level Agreements with provinces PSC Meeting 21 April 2010 Marketing Course for Pilot Site May 2010 Six participants (project Beneficiaries beneficiaries from pilot sites)

3.3 Implementation status

After an extended start-up period, which took significantly longer than envisaged, the implementation of technical activities started in 2008.

By the end of Project Year 3 (April 2010), the project lags substantially behind all implementation targets. Especially the planned study tours, fellowships and attachments (the major budget items for the first three years of the project) are far behind schedule.

Translated into person/weeks, only 98 person/weeks out of targeted 534 p/w for study tours etc were implemented by May 2010 – it turned out that not many professionals in DoA and other government institutions were interested in the offer, and of the few who applied, most did not meet the requirements33.

Regarding other planned activities under Component I, the institutional needs assessment and aid architecture review were only completed by October 2008, instead of October 2007 and March 2008, respectively, and have not significantly contributed to moving the project ahead.

Concerning Component II, while the review of experiences of establishing emerging farmers in South Africa got started relatively quickly (January 2008; findings were presented in July 2008), the final report (after editing by FAO) got published only in early 2010. Discussions regarding the selection of pilot sites were initiated in the PSC meeting of July 2007; however, agreements with provinces (KZN,MPL) were only reached in 2009.

Service Level Agreements to formalize these agreements still have to be signed, and the baseline survey (which should have been initiated by October 2007) still has to be commissioned34.

4. SUPPORT BY GOVERNMENT, TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL BACKSTOPPING, PROJECT MANAGEMENT

4.1 Technical and operational backstopping

A Project Task Force was established at FAO HQ as per standard procedure in May 2007; participants were from the originally involved technical/operational units (TCA and TCE), and

33 A complicating factor in this regard was that DoA could not guarantee contract continuation after return from a longer-term assignment. Also, the DoA’s Sector Service programme in 2007/8 did not mention the need to develop officials’ skills in managing international aid or IDC. In addition, South African assistance to the region channelled through FAO (which was to absorb many attachments) ended in July 2008. 34 An understanding had been reached with a consulting firm, but new FAO administrative regulations require a revised tendering procedure.

21 one representative of the FAO unit dealing with land reform. (It is not clear how an operations-oriented unit like TCE could become a Lead Technical Unit – LTU – for Component I, when there are other units in FAO dealing with institutional capacity building.) However, the Task Force did not meet formally after the second meeting in July 200735

Budget responsibilities were officially entrusted to the FAO Sub-regional Representative in Harare (due to the perceived sub-regional character of the project); two so-called baby budgets were then created for a Budget Holder in TCE (LTU for Component I), and the FAO Representative in South Africa.

Both in terms of operational as well as technical backstopping, the arrangements chosen for the project have not worked well. In view of the very low expenditure, the project should have had a budget revision early on: to date, no budget revision has been effected36. In terms of technical backstopping, the drastic slowing-down of activities should have led to an intervention by the Task Force; instead, the Task Force itself fell dormant. Only very late (December 2009), a high-level mission was mobilized by FAO to address the implementation problems.

4.2 Project management

Contrary to the provisions of the project document, the project never had a “capacity building adviser” to provide overall technical guidance37. Project management was thus left mostly to the NPO.

The slow progress made in project implementation was acknowledged by project management, project backstoppers and project governance bodies alike only after a lengthy delay. And while the project followed good management practices, such as producing detailed work plans, they served no practical purpose: the subsequent progress reporting was not against the targets in the workplans. The project’s progress reports sounded like “business as usual” from April 2008 to September 2009, despite the evident problems.

A Monitoring and Evaluation System was supposed to be established by the project; a consultant was hired and produced a report with proposals for an M&E system – but no follow-up is visible.

4.3 Government support and oversight

Like project management and the FAO Project Task Force, also the Project Steering Committee (which was chaired by DoA/DAFF) did not monitor project progress closely. The PSC meting of 2 July 2008 merely recorded that “most of the activities in the first year were preparatory and some activities were delayed because they are dependent upon others”. The 2 October 2008 PSC meeting did not record any concerns – and the next PSC meeting was not convened until April 2010. This may be because PSC meetings rarely had the same participants; representatives of DoA/DAFF and other GoSA institutions tended to change and needed to be briefed more on general aspects of the project than on specific aspects and issues.

35 Members of the Task Force briefed the incoming FAOR in September 2008; FAO HQ initiated a high-level mission to South Africa in December 2010. 36 Attempts to have a budget revision initiated have been made, but were not followed through. 37 FAO engaged the services of an international consultant for several missions; but these were more related to workplanning and reporting.

22 5. Actual and Potential Results

The actual project results to date have been disappointing; if the current pace continues, there is prospect of the project achieving its stated objectives.

5.1 Component One (Aid Management Capacity Development) Component I had two main objectives, as follows: . Immediate Objective 1: A cadre of DoA officers will have increased knowledge and skills for more effective management of RSA international development cooperation programs supporting food security and agricultural rehabilitation; - Output 1.1: Capacity building needs assessment report within 6 months of project launch - Output 1.2: Every year 5 senior level managers completed 2 x 1 week placements at country level - Output 1.3: Every year 5 middle level managers/technical experts completed 3 month fellowship at country level and prepare and present mini-dissertations - Output 1.4: Every year 5 junior level staff attached as Young Professionals to on-going projects for 6 months and prepare and present mini-dissertations - Output 1.5: Every year quarterly seminar series on development cooperation conducted at DoA (open to all DoA staff, obligatory for capacity building programme participants) - Output 1.6: Every year, one month short course/module designed and implemented (combination of residential and distance learning) - Output 1.7: Two Associate Professional Officers successfully complete 2 years each in FAO HQ between Project Years 1 and 4 - Output 1.8: Monitoring and evaluation system for capacity building programme established and functioning within Project Year 1 (subsequently moved to Project co-Ordination & Management in the First Annual Workplan)

. Immediate Objective 2: A longer-term capacity building programme for DoA development cooperation and Aid management in the agricultural sector, institutionalised within an accredited institution; - Output 2.1: Report on institutional analysis of RSA official Aid architecture, mechanisms and flows prepared and approved by the PSC between Project Year 1 and 2 - Output 2.2: Institution contracted to design accredited course curriculum for Aid management in the agricultural sector to meet domestic and SADC member states needs within Project Year 2 - Output 2.3: Curriculum approved and new funding sourced for implementation between Project Year 4 and 5 identified.

Overall, in terms of meeting the objectives above, it can be stated in unambiguous terms that performance and achievement under Component I is poor and insufficient over a 3-year period, attributable to a number of factors, as follows:

1. Lack of clarity on GoSA IDC priorities/modalities and RSA’s ‘Emerging Aid Architecture’

From the outset, there was insufficient clarity on GoSA’s objectives in terms of RSA’s longer- term intentions for IDC in Africa, and in SADC in particular, as regards the emerging aid architecture for general IDC across all sectors. This was further compounded by a lack of clarity and objectivity when specifically addressing IDC in the agriculture sector and the future involvement of DoA/DAFF in the international process. In practical terms, this aspect should have been led by DIRCo and DoA/DAFF should have ensured that DIRCo was more actively engaged in the PSC, with the implementation support of FAO.

23 Under Objective 2.1, the project commissioned the University of Birmingham, UK (Mr. Philip Amis) to undertake a study into RSA’s ‘Emerging Aid Architecture’, which was produced in May 2008, a full year after project commencement (see Annex 9 for a summary and analysis of the report38). UoB was chosen because of its established faculty concentrating on IDC. The report outlined in general terms the current situation in terms of IDC in the agriculture sector, but failed to explore the broader aspects relating to GoSA’s IDC priorities/objectives and did not explore the future trends and requirements for IDC generally, and in the agriculture sector specifically. No mapping exercise was undertaken in terms of IDC aid flows inwards/outwards and the potential for a RSA ‘Aid Agency’ was not addressed, including its implications on project activities under Component I. There was no linkage to, and/or recognition of, the priorities that would need to be addressed vis-à-vis the parallel capacity needs assessment exercise being undertaken by University of Fort Hare (which was being mentored by UoB on IDC matters generally). The ‘Emerging Aid Architecture’ Report did not outline Recommendations and ‘Next Steps’ and significantly, was not critically assessed by the FAO Backstopping Team for relevance and effectiveness.

At the mid-term point, the project is no wiser as to the vision for IDC and the current/future requirements by GoSA for improved capacity across all departments, including DAFF in particular, as regards IDC-related aid management. As a consequence, an updated and independent ‘Emerging Aid Architecture’ Report should be produced as expeditiously as possible to enable the project to determine whether agriculture sector IDC continues to be important to GoSA and to what extent the project should develop Component I to deliver capacity-development interventions to key DAFF staff at national and provincial levels, ensuring that DIRCo is more meaningfully engaged in going forward.

2. Lack of a comprehensive DAFF IDC Capacity Needs Assessment

The project commissioned Fort Hare University (Dr. Francois Lategan) to undertake a ‘DAFF IDC Capacity Needs Assessment’, which was produced in September 2008, 17 months after project commencement (see Annex 9 for a summary and analysis of the report). FHU was chosen because it was a ‘disadvantaged’ regional university based in the Eastern Cape and had a recognised faculty specialising in agriculture (though not in IDC). The IDC aspects were to be developed over time in partnership with University of Birmingham, UK under a partnership/twinning arrangement.

The Capacity Needs Assessment report outlined in general terms a basic summary of the current situation in DAFF as regards understanding of/general interactions with IDC, highlighting the directorates most likely to have some exposure to IDC. This overview was formulated after structured consultations with a limited number of key individuals within DAFF at national directorate level, with opinions of senior management serving as the basis for a basic capacity needs assessment. It is important to note that neither were discussions held with the key Directorate for Education, Training & Extension Services (due to non- availability) nor were discussions held with DAFF HR Directorate (as none was scheduled), both inputs being critically important to a comprehensive and relevant DAFF capacity needs assessment and career path planning. No discussions were held with DAFF staff at regional/provincial levels. No mapping exercise was undertaken to identify IDC aid flows inwards/outwards within DAFF and so this aspect was not quantified in terms of current/future workload and HR resource requirement.

In assessing the Capacity Needs Assessment Report, it is clear that its content is of a general and surface-level basis, based as it is on structured consultations with a limited number of directorate-level staff at national level only. The report singularly fails to outline numbers of individuals within DAFF currently/potentially engaged with IDC-related activities

38 The project and its backstoppers tried identify a national expert, and this failed.

24 at national, regional and provincial levels and therefore, it is impossible to determine the requirements for future IDC training and capacity-development within DAFF. Similarly, no significance was placed on the need for career path planning (to ensure that IDC and international placements were given a higher recognition and importance) and IDC-related training and capacity-development was not integrated with HR planning and deployment, at both national and provincial levels.

There was no linkage to, and/or recognition of, the priorities that would need to be addressed vis-à-vis the parallel ‘Emerging Aid Architecture’ exercise being undertaken by University of Birmingham (a key mentor to FHU on IDC matters generally). The ‘DAFF IDC Capacity Needs Assessment’ Report did not outline Recommendations and ‘Next Steps’ and significantly, was not critically assessed by the FAO Backstopping Team for relevance and effectiveness.

At the mid-term point, the project is no wiser as to the actual requirements for IDC training and capacity-development in DAFF, both nationally and regionally/provincially, as regards IDC-related aid management. As a consequence, an updated and independent ‘DAFF Capacity Needs Assessment’ Report should be produced as expeditiously as possible to enable the project to determine capacity development needs in DAFF, the extent to which IDC-related activity within DAFF remain important, as well as the extent of training and capacity development required at national and provincial levels to meet the needs as envisaged under a (potentially re-oriented) Component I.

3. Challenges to delivery of the IDC-specific Curriculum and to establishing a dedicated IDC Training College (FHU-UoB)

Under Objective 2.2, it was envisaged that following a comprehensive capacity needs assessment of DAFF IDC-specific requirements, a curriculum would be developed to ensure that IDC-specific skills and competencies were developed on a structured basis to meet DAFF IDC-specific current and future requirements. Fort Hare University, in conjunction with University of Birmingham, was chosen by the project to develop the curriculum and to deliver the IDC training and capacity-development programme. However, a Memorandum of Understanding was never signed between FAO-DAFF and FHU-UoB and this continues to be the case at the Mid-Term point of the project. To date, development of the curriculum and a plan to deliver training and capacity-development has not progressed beyond the initial and general ‘DAFF IDC Capacity Needs Assessment’ Report produced in September 2008 and there has been little evidence of proactive and/or innovative inputs from FHU/UoB in progressing matters forward from the basic concept stage.

In discussions with FHU, it is evident that the university has ambitious plans to establish an IDC Training College, targeting South African civil servants and focusing on agriculture sector aid management. FHU intends to broaden its horizons to target civil servants within SADC and elsewhere in Africa, building on its experience gained from training and capacity- development of South African civil servants. FHU may even broaden its focus further to include other sectors and cross-cutting issues affecting aid management, also targeting NGOs and others. While these plans are interesting, there is currently no validity to this ambition without (i) the signed MoU between FAO-DAFF and FHU-UoB being in place, and (ii) a factual and accurate insight into the numbers likely to require IDC-specific training and capacity development in the next 2+ years, drawn from national and provincial levels of DAFF, should the requirement continue to be relevant (in line with current GoSA IDC policy/strategy, which needs to be re-validated). In short, the viability and practicality of such a venture, supported by the project, needs to be re-examined in the context of the challenges faced so far in the project implementation phase.

25 At the mid-term point, the project does not have a conclusive insight into what the actual IDC-specific training and capacity-development requirements are, nor does it have evidence of a comprehensive and confidence-building Curriculum which has been designed/tailored to meet the specific requirements of DAFF IDC-related staff at national and provincial levels, for which training has yet to be delivered. All in all, progress in this regard is extremely poor and it is recommended to commence the process afresh, recognising the ‘institutional memory’ which exists with FHU-UoB.

4. Lack of an Integrated Capacity-Development and HR Training & Development Plan

Arising from the difficulties and challenges faced under points 1-3 above, it is not surprising therefore, that no DAFF IDC-specific Training & Capacity Development Plan exists. For one to meaningfully exist there would need to have been more comprehensive analyses of both the ‘Emerging Aid Architecture’ and the ‘DAFF IDC Capacity Needs Assessment’, as well as greater engagement with DAFF HR Directorate to address career path development and deployment of key DAFF personnel within South Africa and internationally (on placements, secondments and study tours/conferences etc.). The process would likely have been led by FAO, in conjunction with FHU-UoB, in order for it to have been a meaningful exercise.

As was evidenced from discussions with key stakeholders and participants, it quickly became evident that the awareness of IDC-related international placement opportunities was low and willingness to participate in international placements was weak. There are many possible reasons for this outcome which will require further analysis, but in general, it appears that since IDC was not perceived as ‘mainstream’ and was not ranked as a potentially rewarding career move, most DAFF staff were unwilling to take the risk, preferring instead to remain in ‘safe’ career-streamed positions of employment, with automatic promotion and benefits secured. This unwillingness to participate in international placement and the low value placed on international exposure are significant challenges for future project attention.

In the event that items 1-3 are successfully addressed in the coming 6 months under the ‘Project Turnaround Phase’, then it will be critically important that a ‘DAFF IDC-specific Training & Capacity Development Plan’ is produced, led by FAO in conjunction with FHU- UoB, with the direct involvement of DAFF HR Directorate (to address career path planning) as well as the other relevant directorates within DAFF.

5. Lack of focused and insightful IDC project management expertise

It can be argued, that problems 1-4 above are as a direct result of low-level understanding and insight of IDC requirements generally amongst all stakeholders, especially FAO as project implementer, who should have been taking the lead in ensuring progress and performance was achieved. Project management and project backstopping in this regard were insufficient to ensure that high standards were maintained in terms of key project objectives being delivered on time, being technically proficient and tailored to meet the specific requirements of DAFF and its relevant staff at national and provincial levels.

In terms of going forward, this aspect is being addressed under the ‘Project Management and Governance’ section of this report.

5.2 Component Two (Small-holder Farmer Development)

Progress with regard to small farmer development in pilot sites has been critically delayed; by end of Year 3, a prioritized set of activities and implementation plan for capacity building should have been ready, but only preliminary contacts with pilot sites have been established.

26 The project commissioned one study (A review of experience of establishing emerging farmers in South Africa), the results of which were presented at a short (half-day) workshop in July 2008 – but the published report became available only in early 2010. (A preliminary report was circulated earlier.)

The study documented that beneficiaries often lacked the required skills set to become successful commercial operators, that too many beneficiaries became beneficiaries only to fulfil formal requirements (eg, for grant or loan purposes), that flexibility was needed when deciding on farm size (sub-division of large holdings may be appropriate, but also keeping together complementary assets), and that government services and funding mechanisms must be adequately coordinated to maximize gain.

Concerning the project activities at pilot sites: these were selected only by late 2009 in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga, but agreements with Provincial Departments of Agriculture were not yet formalized by the time of the review mission.

Several (eight) training courses for provincial officials sponsored by the project in 2008 and 2009 could be said to fall under Component II; however, they were not linked to the pilot sites, and were also not expressly foreseen in the project document. (Also the workplans and progress reports make no complete reference to these courses.) One Marketing Course for Pilot Site Beneficiaries took place in May 2010 for six participants (project beneficiaries from pilot sites) – the first time that the project tangibly benefited smallholder farmers. (But this was not even foreseen in the project document – the project document envisaged benefiting farmer organizations.)

The selection of pilot sites was not done with a view to identifying successful examples of small farmer development with commercial potential; the pilot sites visited by the team displayed their own sets of fundamental problems and challenges rather than indications of success.

While provincial Steering Committees exist, composed of key relevant stakeholders, it appears that the project has not yet established a functional outreach to the pilot sites. Provincial project coordinators and support staff have not yet been officially appointed, and although there exists a technical team comprise of extension officers mainly attached to pilot sites who liaise with the provincial steering committee, the working arrangements still need to be tested.

It appears that there is a lack of interdepartmental cooperation, which affects the streamlining of governmental programs; a “silo approach” is evident which betrays a severe lack of co-ordination by key stakeholders at farm level as well as at higher administrative levels; the project will need to address this structural deficiency in dealing with is institutional partners in the region. (This should perhaps form part of a wider recommendation to DAFF concerning its approach to small farmer development.)

The common practice of “renting a crowd” in order to have large enough numbers of beneficiaries to participate in the farm has proved damaging to efficient farm operations; likewise, the severe lack of technical skills required to improve production levels of various enterprises will be a major challenge to the project, and service providers in general.

A serious lack of managerial skills in the existing redistributed farms jeopardizes their success as commercial ventures; the common lack of working capital threatens the organic growth of the business. In addition, illiteracy and numeracy problems tend to retard the understanding the basic business principles and the business environment.

27 For the project to gather the necessary data for a later capacity development programme, a better understanding of the conditions at the pilot sites is necessary – this was to be generated by the baseline survey, which still needs to be commissioned. However, working with the pilots sites alone will not generate sufficient evidence for lessons for programmes that can be replicated and upscaled; unless information is included on other successful initiatives in RSA, the lessons derived will remain too narrow and possibly biased.

The project has already started with providing training on project management to extension officers in province; however, this was done without a prior training needs assessment. Possible future approaches that the project could explore are:

 to substitute generalist extension with specialist extension, because generalist extension has severe limitations in a business environment where refined expertise is of utmost importance. All extension personnel servicing commercial farms should undergo specialized commodity training of their choice to be most beneficial to business undertakings currently in place in those farms.

 To facilitate attachment of expert extensionists to farms not persons; the current practice of allocating extension personnel to commercial farms should be reviewed as a matter of urgency and changed to placement of a specialized extensionist to service differing scales of the same commodity within an agreed radius.

 To allow for complementary private sector extension with public sector; creating an environment where public sector extension has opportunity to interact with private sector extension.

28 Annex 1: Mission TOR

Terms of Reference for a joint FAO/DAFF Mid-term Review of Capacity-building for South African Professionals in the Field of Agriculture and Food Security (with initial emphasis on International Development Cooperation)

I. Background 1. In July 2007, the South African Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (DAFF) signed a cooperation agreement with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in the field of capacity-building. The Project GCP/RAF/412/SAF, funded by the Government of South Africa, has two major components: (i) create a capacity for aid management in the Department of Agriculture (DAFF), and (ii) strengthen the Department’s capacity to provide support to emerging farmers. Its duration is five years and it has a total budget of approximately US$10 million.

2. The development objective as stated in the Project Document is the uplifting of the rural poor of South Africa and in SADC countries at large and their transformation into self-sustaining livelihoods. For South Africa, one of the primary objectives of the Government of RSA is to support emerging farmers in such a way that they become active participants in the commercial farming sector of South Africa. For SADC countries, the objective is to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of South African contribution to regional integration in the benefit of agriculture-dependent communities.

3. The Project has two intermediate objectives for Component one: (i) A cadre of DAFF officers will have increased knowledge and skills for more effective management of RSA international development cooperation programs supporting food security and agricultural rehabilitation; and (ii) A longer-term capacity-building programme for DAFF development cooperation and Aid management in the agricultural sector, institutionalised within an accredited institution.

4. Similarly, Component two has two intermediate objectives: (i) A prioritized proposal and implementation plan for capacity-building at provincial and national levels for effective policies, strategies and service delivery in support of formerly disadvantaged and now emergent small-scale farmers; to make a preparatory start on implementation; (ii) Scaled up implementation of capacity- building for support to emerging farmers (including at provincial and farmer-organization levels), based on outcomes of Objective 3.

5. The current review follows the stipulation of the project document that about halfway through project implementation, a joint FAO/DAFF review of progress should be carried out.

II. Purpose of the Review 6. The purpose of this review exercise is to: a) Determine as systematically and objectively as possible the relevance, design, efficiency, achievements (outputs, potential outcomes and impact) and sustainability of the project; identify and propose areas for future improvement.

In particular, the review is intended to provide guidance to Project Management on its mode of operation, and suggest eventual adjustments in project design and implementation strategy to improve likelihood of achieving project results and objectives within the remaining time of the project duration.

III. Scope and Issues to be addressed by the Review 7. The review will assess the project/programme against the standard OECD/DAC review criteria, i.e. relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. In addition, the project/programme will also be assessed in terms of its performance on gender equality and social inclusion.

8. Within these criteria, the review will assess the following features of the project/programme, as appropriate.

29 a. Relevance and contribution of the project to national development priorities and needs, the FAO’s Strategic Framework, the National Medium Term Priority Framework and the Millennium Development Goals; b. Quality and realism of the project design, including: i. inks and causal relationships between inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impact (specific and development objectives) in the Logical Framework and Annual Work Plans; ii. relevance and appropriateness of indicators selected; iii. validity of assumptions and risks; iv. implementation approach and methodology; v. time frame and resources; vi. institutional set-up; vii. management arrangements; and viii. stakeholders and beneficiary identification. c. Project management and implementation, including:

i. effectiveness and efficiency of operations management, including designation of budget holder; ii. adequacy and relevance of strategic management; iii. efficiency and effectiveness of project coordination and steering bodies and mechanisms; iv. set-up, efficiency and effectiveness of monitoring and internal review and reporting processes; v. project exit strategy to sustain and build upon achievements made; vi. quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by FAO; and vii. implementation gaps and delays if any, their causes and consequences, between planned and implemented outputs and outcomes; and assessment of any remedial measures taken. d. Project financial resources and financial management, including: i. rate of delivery vis-à-vis budget allocations; ii. relevance and adequacy of budget allocations in the project document and subsequent Budget Revisions; e. Project outputs and results, including the analysis of a sample of outputs and outcomes. A complete list of outputs prepared by the project team will be included as annex to the review report. f. Gender and social equality, including: i. extent and quality of women’s and minority groups’ participation in project activities, their access to project resources and benefits, including capacity development; ii. analysis of how gender relations, gender equity and processes of social inclusion were and will be affected by the project in the area/sector of intervention; iii. contribution to women’s and minority groups’ visibility, participation in local development processes and empowerment; and iv. extent to which gender and social equity were pursued in project management. g. The prospects for sustaining and possibly upscaling the project's results by the beneficiaries and the host institutions after the termination of the project. The assessment of sustainability will include:

30 i. Institutional, technical, economic and social sustainability of proposed technologies/innovations/processes; ii. project contribution and/or impact on natural resources in terms of maintenance and/or regeneration of the natural resource base (environmental sustainability).

h. Any other issue that the review team may consider relevant and important. 9. Based on the above analysis the review will prepare a report, for submission to DAFF, FAO and other relevant stakeholders drawing specific conclusions and making proposals for any necessary further action by Government and/or FAO to ensure sustainable development, including any need for follow-up action;

10. The Review Team will finalize the report incorporating comments received from the Governent, FAO and other appropriate partner institutions.

IV. Methodology 11. The methodoly will include the following principles: a. the review will adopt a participatory approach and triangulation as a key method for validation of information and evidence. It will follow a consultative, iterative and transparent approach with internal and external stakeholders throughout the whole process;

b. a range of tools will be used, including: consultation of existing reports, semi-structured interviews with key informants and stakeholders and focus group discussions supported by check lists and/or protocols, direct observation during field visits, etc. Particular attention will be devoted to ensure that under-privileged groups will be consulted in adequate manner; and

c. the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) framework will be used as one analytical tool for assessment of the project.

V. Roles and Responsibilities 12. The FAO Representative (FAOR) in consultation with the Lead Technical Unit (LTU) of the project is responsible for initiating the mid term review process, recruiting the review team and supporting its work during the mission. The FAOR and the LTU are required to participate in meetings with the team, to make available information and documentation as necessary, and to comment on the final draft report.

13. The FAOR and the LTU are also responsible for leading and coordinating the preparation of the FAO Management Response to the review, in which it expresses its overall judgment of the review process and report and accepts, partially accepts or rejects each recommendation.

14. The government will be responsible for facilitating the work of the review team both at the central and provincial levels by making available the necessary documentation, providing access to appropriate officials, designation of one to two people of an appropriately high level to serve as members of the review team, and active participation in the review process.

15. The mission is fully responsible for its independent report which may not necessarily reflect the views of the Government or of FAO. FAO is not entitled to modify the contents of any review report, nor is a review report subject to technical clearance, beside the quality assurance control by the Office of Evaluation.

VI. Team Composition and Responsibilities 16. The review will be conducted by a team composed of three experts: a. An Review Team Leader; b. Representative of the DAFF; and c. Two independent consultants.

31 VII. Date and Schedule of Review

17. The timing and schedule of the mid-term review will be as follows: a. Identification, recruitment and assembly of the Team by April 2010; b. Briefing of Team Leader in HQ by late April 2010 c. Team begins work by late April 2010 d. Submission of draft evaluaion report by late May 2010 e. Comments from FAO and Goverrnment early June 2010 f. Final Report by mid-June 2010.

32 Annex 2: List of people met - itinerary

Date Time Activity Week One 05 May 15h00-16h00 Meets the FAOR: Rosebud Kurwijila

16h00-17h00 Yolanda Ntlakaza: NPO Joseph Kunene: Administrative Clerk Nonhlanhla Mnguni: Project Assistant Week Two 10 May 08h00 – 11h00 Focal Person: Jemina Moeng (Ms): Director Land 11h00 – 13h00 Settlement 14h00 -16h00 Stanford Manthata (Mr.): Thailand Young professional 11 May Mr M Mankazana, Acting Deputy Director-General DAFF 12h00-13h00 Luyanda Sondiyazi (Ms): France study tour (teleconference) 12 May 14h00 Travel To KZN 13 May 08h30-10h00 KZN Department of Agriculture, Environmental and Rural Development Lani Wepener (Ms) : Director Harry Swatson (Dr.): Manager Bhekithemba Mkhize: Judyne Wallace: PA to Lani afterwards KwaZulu Natal site visit Inkululeko Farm: Rodney Khumalo (Mr) : Farm Manager Sonja van Zuydan (Mr.): Admin and Finance Beneficiaries: Malevu (Mr.) : Deputy Chairperson Samson Simamane (Mr.) Patrick Buthelezi (Mr.) 14 May Whole day KwaZulu Natal site visit Siyaphambili Livestock Cooperative: Selebaleng Leotwane: Animal Health Technician Beneficiaries: Shezi (Mr.) Khumalo (Mr.) Magutane (Mr.)

33 Mzinyane (Mr.) Vilakazi (Ms)

Silindokuhle Irrigation Scheme: Nomakhisimusi Mvula: Extension Officer Uthukela Mwelase (Mr.): Soil Scientist Beneficiaries: Mfungelwa Funeka (Mr.) Mbatha (Mr.) Khumalo (Ms) Mchunu (Ms.) Cindi (Ms) Qwabe ((Mr.) Hadebe (Mr.) 15 May Travel to back to Pretoria Week Three 16 May 12h00 Travel to Fort Hare 17 May 09h00- Fort Hare Francois Lategan (Dr.) Ivan Lwanga –Iga (Dr.) Patrick Masika (Dr.) 16h00 Travel to back to Pta 18 May 08h30 – 10h00 Paula Van Dyk (Ms):National Treasury 10h30-13h00 Andries Oosthuizen (Mr.) :Department of International Relations and Coorperation Thapsana Molepo (Mr.): IR DAFF 13h30

Afterwards Travel to Mpumalanga 19 May 09h00 Mpumalanga Department of Agriculture Jabulani Mokoena (Mr.): Manager Umjindi Dudu Ndlovu: Manager (Ms.): Thaba Tshewu Mashudu Mothogo (Ms) : Animal Scientist MJ Khoza(Mr.) : Manager Service Centre Zacharia Mabuza (Mr.): Crop Scientist

Site visit: Calicom/Mosley

34 Nokuthula Shongwe (Ms.): Agric Scientist Nomcebo Buthelezi (Ms): Trainer Sthemiso Mbuyane (Mr.): Agric Advisor Gladys Mhlanga (Ms): Agric Advisor Mandla Ndashe: Intern Beneficiaries: Olga Khoza (Ms) : Managing Director Johannes Ndlazi (Mr.) Zephania Ndlengethwa (Mr.) 20 May 09h00 -13h00 Mpumalanga site visit Coromandel: Brian Phokane (Mr.):General Manager Philemon Mokadi (Mr.): Tourism Manager Elvis Mkhabela (Mr.) Orchads Manager Thomas Mkhabela Johannes Pule: Workshop Manager Sharon Magagula 14h00 Travel back 21 May 09h00 Teleconference: Mulat Demeke 10h00 DETES: Joe Kgobokoe 11h30 Margaret McEwan 13h00 FAOR Week Four 24 May 09h00 Denmark Tour: PN Tamba (Teleconference) 14h00 DAFF Mr. Kgobokoe 25 May 09h30 Ms Titi: Deputy Director General Trade and Economic Development 27 May 10h00 – 12h00 Debriefing Meeting

35 Annex 3: List of project staff

Yolanda Ntlakaza – NPO (National Project Coordinator) Joseph Kunene – Administrative Assistant Nonhlanhla Mnguni – Project Assistant Maria Molaodi – Driver

36 Annex 4: List of major expenditure items under contracts

Costs of contracts Name of the Company Purpose Costs ( R /USD) Date Design Monitoring and Social Dimension - Ms, Marlene Roefs Evaluation Framework R164, 160.00 25-Oct-07 Review of Experiences of Establishing Emerging Farmers in South Africa R 349,061.00 11-Apr-08 Capacity Needs University of Fort Hare Assesment R175, 435.00 22-Jul-08 Contract 24 October Mr Philip Amis to commit 2008 - 22 honorarium & non December University of Birmingham honorarium 73809 USD 2008

LoA with University ob University of Birmingham Birmingham R 24,890.00 Jun-08 Rethinking public policy NEW INTERSTAMPA SRL in Agriculture 60 USD (R474 ) Jan-10

A review of experience of establishing emerging MILIGRAF SRL - FORMELLO farmers in South Africa 1696 USD (R133,98.40) Feb-10 Project Management KwaZulu Natal Training R 443,265.00 May-08 Project Management KwaZulu Natal Training R 58,478.23 26-May-08 Project Management South Arican Sport Development Agency Training R 75,000 23-Mar-09 Project Management SIDUS Institute of Learning Training R 75,000 23-Mar-09 Project Management ITS Learning and Development Institute Training R 75,000 23-Mar-09 Project Management Boigatsho Consulting and Events development Training R 75,000 23-Mar-09 Project Management JOC developers Training R 75,000 23-Mar-09 Project Management Psedonym Solutions Training R78 116.71 19-May-10 Itumeleng Training Solutions CC Conferencing & Facilities R 78,116.71 19-May-10 Project Management JOC Developers Training R78 116.72 19-May-10 Project Management SASDA Training R 78,117.71 19-May-10 Project Management Boigatsho Consulting and Events development Training R78 116.73 19-May-10 Project Management The Winning Force Marketing (Pty Ltd) Training R 78,118.71 19-May-10 Project Management Sidus Institute of Learning Training R 78,118.71 19-May-10

37 Annex 5: Project fact tables

Table: Study Tour Targets Total, Year 3 Targets, Actual39

Output Total Target Target by Year 3 Actual Comment Senior-level 25/50 15/30 10/10 Study Tours to Managers ST person/weeks person/weeks person/weeks Denmark, France and Thailand Junior-level 30/180 15/90 1/6 1 YPO to Staff/YPP person/months person/months person/months Thailand APOs 2/48 2/36 2 /16 FAOHQ & SFE; person/months person/months person/months started simultaneously Oct 2009 Middle-level 10/30 6/20 Nil Professionals person/months person/months fellowship/ST Middle-level 5/10 3/6 Nil Professionals ST person/months person/months Junior 10/20 6/12 Nil professional ST person/months person/months Relatively senior 5/30 0/0 Nil foreseen for South African person/weeks Years 4&5 managers

Table: Training Courses Supported

Year Date Service Number Cost Provider & Province 2008 9 – 12 May UKZN 25 (KZN, Mp, EC) R501 743.23 2009 23 – 27 March Private 30 (Mp) ? Provider 2009 23 – 27 March Private 20 (KZN) Provider 2009 23 – 27 March Private 20 (EC) Provider 2009 23 – 27 March Private 17 (FS) Provider 2009 23 – 27 March Private 20 ( Limpopo ) Provider 2009 23 – 27 March Private 14 ( Western Cape ) Provider 2009 30 March-02 April Private 19 ( Mpumalanga ) Provider 2010 May Private 6 (Cape Town) Provider

Table: Workshops Organized Review of Experiences – Mini February 2008 To present approach to PSC Workshop Workshop on Review of 22 July 2008 Half-day workshop; Umhlaba Experiences presenters; DoA and provincial staff from KZN and MPL present

39 Targets taken from project document

38 Workshop on Needs 30 October 2008 UoB and UFH presenters; Assessment and Aid DIRCO and DoA present Architecture

Table: Study Tours Organized Study Tour Denmark 18-23 May 2008 Four senior staff from DoA, 2 from farmer organizations Study Tour Thailand 27 Sept – 5 Oct 2008 3 DoA (DETES/Kgobokoe, Food Security, Marketing), 1 WARD (Women in Agric & Rural De Study Tour France 19-25 Oct 2008 One participant from DETES, 2 prov Dept Agric (KZN & North West), 1 WARD

39 Annex 6: List of Equipment

Category Date Description Equipment Description Amount 07/02/2008 General Computer Printer Hewlett Packard 9997.9 Printer Model 4250

Printer Nashua 11346.35 Model C13500n

29/02/2008 Computer, Risk Server Power Edge 20174.6 Processors, 28/08/2008 Servers Dell Pe1950 Rack M

Personal 29/02/2008 Computers Laptop Dell D630 Intel 11756.1 Core 2 Duo T730

31/12/209 Computer Dell Optiplex 6109 755 Towers

31/12/2009 Computer Dell Optiplex 6109 755 Minitower Business