Harvard University (Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Davis Center for Russian & Eurasian Studies) and Indiana University-Bloomington

RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH Editor: Henry E. Hale Associate Editor: Danielle Lussier Vol.3, No.2, November 2003

TOP NEWS DATES TO REMEMBER • ’s top “oligarch” arrested, assets frozen November 7, 2003: Television campaigning begins • Putin’s chief of staff resigns, defeated by “Chekists” December 7, 2003: elections • Putin taps moderate for new chief of staff March 14, 2004: Presidential election • Court strikes down key media restriction • 23 parties registered for Duma ballot SEE INSIDE • State-owned media blast Communists P.2: Theories on the Khodorkovsky arrest • , SPS, Communists defend oligarch P.3: Websites with election information in English • Dollar millionaires on Communist party list P.5: Insider Information: Top Russian analysts from • Putin remains far ahead in presidential race different party camps interpret the campaign

TRACKING THE POLLS: How the percentage intending to vote for each party has fluctuated in 2003

35 UR 30% 30 KPRF 23% 25

20

15 SPS 6% 10 LDPR 5% 5

0 Yabloko 4% Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct

United Russia KPRF LDPR Yabloko SPS

Polling agency VTsIOM-A polls 1600 people in 40 regions nationwide late each month and reports the percentage of adult citizens who, given a list of names, say they would cast their ballot for a party if the election were held now, counting only those who intend to vote. The latest poll was taken October 24-28, just as new of the Khodorkovsky arrest was breaking. A total of 58% said that they were likely to vote, down 5% from September. Margin of error is 3.4%.

On the Campaign Trail on October 30, Russia’s Constitutional Court proved not to be as manageable as expected, striking down a key restric- THREE POLITICAL EARTHQUAKES tion on media campaign coverage. With the official start of Just when observers were writing off the elections as fully television campaigning fast approaching on November 7, managed and predictable, Russia struck again. On October each of these political earthquakes have helped to throw the 25, election’s outcome into question. (FSB) troops stormed the plane of Mikhail Khodork- The Khodorkovsky Arrest ovsky, Russia’s richest man Khodorkovsky, head of the gigantic -Sibneft oil con- and an open financier of cern, had corporate representatives on the party lists of the opposition parties, during a Communist Party, , SPS, and Yabloko and refueling stop in Novosibirsk was reportedly the biggest financier of the latter. In spring and hauled him off to jail in . Presidential Chief of 2003, he was making no secret of his political ambitions, Staff Aleksandr Voloshin, the top manager of President letting slip to reporters that he would give up business in ’s “managed democracy,” protested by 2007 and perhaps begin a political career. Having gotten his tendering his resignation the same day. To top things off, start using Communist Youth League money in mysterious ways during the Gorbachev era, he had recently sought to foster an image as an “oligarch with a heart of gold,” WHY ARREST THIS MAN? demonstratively funding various good causes and taking There is no shortage of theories pains to make his corporate dealings transparent, a nov- as to why the Kremlin clan elty for Russian business. But now Khodorkovsky stands known as the Siloviki and their accused of fraud and embezzlement during the privatiza- allies in the General Prosecu- tion period when he accrued many of his assets. Prosecu- tor’s Office decided to arrest tors added insult to injury by freezing 44% of his firm’s Khodorkovsky (left). Some are: shares, although they subsequently released a few. On • Punish him for financing opposition parties, candidates November 3, Khodorkovsky resigned as Yukos CEO. • Knock out a major rival for the 2008 presidential election • Prevent the sale of oil giant to foreigners While theories about motive are legion (see • Obtain oil giant for selves to sell to foreigners box at right), few question that the arrest • Grab power, move closer to was arranged by the grouping of FSB- • Shake up a political situation that favors the Family linked St. Petersburgers in the Presidential • Actually clean up Russian business, end corruption Administration known as the Siloviki or Chekists, notably (left) and strength as an advocate of democracy, with party leader Viktor Ivanov. Putin left little doubt that he, too, had warning of “capitalism with a Stalinist approved the move when he forcefully backed his Gen- face” and hoping that the alarmed urban intelligentsia, a eral Prosecutor, who officially ordered the arrest, in front core part of Yabloko’s electorate, would turn out for it in of television cameras the very next day. higher-than-usual numbers (on this possibility, see Nikonov on p.9). Adding to the party’s worries, how- The arrest and asset freeze set off an economic and po- ever, Russian prosecutors searched a po- litical furor. In a rare show of independence and unity, litical consulting firm that had business key big business and even Prime Minister Mikhail with both Yukos and Yabloko and hauled Kasyanov condemned the actions as economically off computers chock full of financial and harmful. Russian stocks plunged. Virtually all parties not strategic documents from Yabloko’s cam- linked to the Kremlin Siloviki found themselves in a paign. When Yabloko legislator and cam- highly awkward position and struggled to respond. Most paign coordinator Sergei Mitrokhin uncomfortable was Putin-endorsed United Russia since showed up to protest, he was detained in its pro-presidential and pro-business stances suddenly the firm’s building until the end of the day wound up at odds. Making the best of a bad situation, (at right, he peers out a company window from “captivity”). party leader decided to try and grab the (On how this impacts Yabloko, see Michaleva on p.7.) reins of the anti-oligarch bandwagon, warning large cor- porations that no one had ever given them the right to While the (SPS) has always been privatize profits on natural resources. The party also unambiguously pro-big-business, its leadership had made a promptly purged a top Yukos shareholder (incumbent conscious decision to stress its support for Putin’s economic Duma deputy Vladimir Dubov) from its party list. policies in its 2003 campaign, a choice symbolized by the inclusion of controversial but Putin-blessed “electricity oli- For the Communist Party garch” in the number-three slot on its (KPRF), the arrest drew party list. By rebuking Putin for sanctioning the arrest, Chu- attention to the presence on bais risked the extensive coverage he had been receiving on its list of former Yukos state-controlled television. Things could still break SPS’s board chairman Sergei Mu- way, however, if a sizeable pro-business vote abandons the ravlenko as well as three newly anti-oligarch United Russia. other “dollar millionaires.” While denying their party The only parties not facing difficulties are those most often was under any obligation to linked to the Siloviki clan in the Kremlin, notably Gennady Yukos, KPRF leaders condemned the arrest as economi- Raikov’s People’s Party and, some would add, Vladimir cally damaging. (above) repeatedly Zhirinovsky’s Liberal of Russia explained that the Communist Party was not just for the (LDPR). Neither of these parties included Yukos people on poor anymore, representing a broad social coalition that its party lists and both have loudly championed the could work with business (on KPRF aspirations and limita- Khodorkovsky arrest. Some experts now predict an LDPR tions, see Peshkov p.10). Its opponents, among them showing in the 10-percent range as it historically performs “news” editors at Russia’s state-controlled television better than polls indicate. The People’s Party, however, still networks, however, eagerly pointed out the irony. (Might shows no sign of creeping closer to the critical 5% threshold the KPRF still come out the winner? See Kolmakov on p.5.) in the party-list competition though it remains highly com- petitive in at least 30 territorial district races. The most pro-Western liberal-market parties were also embarrassed. Yabloko, long critical of “crony capital- ism” and Russian monopolism, was forced to own up to Voloshin’s Resignation its dependence on the biggest oligarch of them all. In In Russia’s “superpresidential” political system, the head of defending him, though, the party stressed its traditional the president’s staff can wield enormous power. Voloshin was one of the most powerful, personally handling eco-

2 nomic issues and overseeing the implementation of the threat of prosecution, although only for the final five “managed democracy,” the means by which the state weeks before the election. Since the restrictions favored manipulates election outcomes. As the incumbents whose activities as politicians could be covered head of the “Family” grouping of legally under the law, the court ruling works in favor of the Kremlinites linked to the Yeltsin re- opposition. gime, Voloshin (left) also managed the building of United Russia together With the ruling, Court Chair- with one of his deputies, Vladislav man (left) has Surkov. Just last month Voloshin’s cemented his reputation as one group appeared to have won a decisive victory over the of the fearless free thinkers of Siloviki, as Putin bestowed his endorsement upon United Russia and as a de- Russia and not any of the Siloviki-sponsored pro-Putin fender of the rule of law rather parties. Khodorkovsky’s arrest, however, dealt a major than the “rule by law.” As blow to Voloshin, who worked closely with “oligarchic” head of the Constitutional business and whose authority in this sphere was thus Court in 1993, he first gained undermined. notoriety for his court’s ruling that Yeltsin had acted uncon- Allaying fears that the autocratically inclined Siloviki stitutionally in ordering the would now take full control of his Administration, Putin dissolution of the Russian par- has created a new balance among Kremlin “clans.” As- liament. After being removed and enduring nearly a decade cendant is a previously little-noticed grouping that ob- of political oblivion, Zorkin returned in 2003 to head the servers have dubbed the “St. Petersburg Lawyers” for Court again. Almost immediately upon his return, the Court their professional legal training and roots in Putin’s na- invalidated a key mechanism by which the central govern- tive city. As of October 30, the new chief of staff is ment had sought to constrict regional autonomy, restoring (below), a longtime Putin friend who the authority of provincial basic law. has assiduously kept his distance from the Siloviki. Unlike Voloshin, he is known for uncreatively imple- menting his bosses’ orders and is thus widely expected Internet Resources in English to seek compromises among the Observers can find a good deal of information on the 2003- different groupings. To underscore 04 Russian elections on the Internet, even if one speaks no his independence from the Siloviki, Russian. While most parties have little or no information in Medvedev almost immediately English, Yabloko regularly translates party documents and questioned the legality of the freez- press releases as well as campaign-related news stories it ing of Yukos assets. Moreover, his considers of interest to readers. Party sites with at least new first deputy and close ally, some English material include , is widely seen as a Yabloko: www.eng.yabloko.ru stronger figure and a veteran of SPS: www.sps.ru many battles with the Siloviki. LDPR: www.ldpr.ru While the Family lost the chieftancy, it was compensated United Russia: www.mos-partya.ru by the addition of , another strong figure, Several organizations also publish extensive English- as a deputy head of administration. Since Shuvalov is language campaign information, including candidate lists, rumored to be assigned the economic responsibilities party programs, poll data, and expert analysis. See that Voloshin used to have, and since Surkov remains in Carnegie Moscow Center: www.carnegie.ru place as the coordinator of the Kremlin’s Duma cam- VTsIOM-A / Univ. Strathclyde: www.russiavotes.org paign, United Russia’s financing and coalition of Krem- RFE/RL: www.rferl.org/specials/russianelection lin-dependent governors are not significantly threatened. Jockeying for Position The Unmanageable Court With television advertising forbidden until November 7, The Constitutional Court’s latest ruling declared uncon- political forces sought creative ways to sway voter opinion. stitutional a clause in Russia’s main election law, the Playing a variation on 1999, the two main television net- Law on Voter Rights, that had radically stifled media works, both state-owned, have unleashed a steady wave of coverage of the campaign. The clause defined the print- negative stories on the KPRF. One day, a reporter describes ing or broadcast of almost any information about a can- the economic crisis in Communist-governed Bryansk. An- didate as “campaigning.” This made media vulnerable to other day, the target is the Communist of Kam- prosecution for illegal campaigning if they could not chatka, who was brought in for questioning by legal authori- prove that information reported was paid for from a can- ties. Without equitable media coverage, the KPRF has re- didate’s official election fund, ruling out commentary sorted to a massive door-to-door campaign, hoping to reach and analysis. In finding that this clause violated constitu- every voter in Russia personally. Sergei Glaziev’s left- tional norms of free speech, the court also provided a leaning Motherland bloc, languishing far below the critical more specific definition of campaigning. The result is 5% mark in the polls, may have come up with the most crea- that mass media will now be able to provide election tive way to spend official campaign money: bounty for in- commentary and report on candidate activities without famous Chechen terrorist Shamil Basaev. Meanwhile,

3 Motherland’s number-two leader, , has to be found in violation of some aspect of election law and been whipping up Russian passions in a territorial dis- disqualified from the race. pute with Ukraine over a tiny island called Tuzla. In the 225 territorial districts, over 2,000 candidates were Concluding party registration, the nominated. These contests reflect some of Russia’s most Central Election Commission in the colorful electoral strategies. For example, in two Ryazan end approved 23 organizations for the districts, candidates Sergei Kprf and Svetlana Kprf dedi- party-list contest, three fewer than cated even their names to the Communist Party. But as the appeared on the ballot in 1999. A actual KPRF did not nominate them, their likely aim is to lottery determined the order in which confuse the latter’s voters and thereby win a few ballots. In parties would be listed. The liberal-market parties both fact, in several districts, rivals have sought to sap votes from came out near the top, with SPS at number 2 and a favorite by nominating a political nobody whose only elec- Yabloko at number 4. The KPRF selected the very last toral asset is the exact same first and last names as the likely spot, 23, and the LDPR got the nondescript 18. The winner. The LDPR appears to have come up with the most worst luck befell United Russia, not so much because it innovative strategy. Having only one promising candidate in selected ping-pong ball number 20 (above) but because the Novosibirsk region, incumbent Duma deputy Yevgeny the party that will appear at the top of the ballot has a Loginov, the party not only nominated him in one district strikingly similar name, Unification. One party official but advanced another “Yevgeny Loginov” in a neighboring lamented that the resulting confusion could cost the constituency. party 2% of the vote, Izvestiia reported. Thus it would not be surprising if the Unification Party were suddenly — Henry Hale, Indiana University, Carnegie Moscow Center

Russian Election Watch can be found online at http://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/publications/rew.html

Russian Election Watch is produced with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and is a joint publication of

The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Graham T. Allison, Director The Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University Timothy J. Colton, Director and Lisbeth Tarlow, Associate Director Indiana University - Bloomington

The views expressed in Russian Election Watch are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of any sponsoring organization. The editors welcome feedback of all kinds. Please direct comments to

Henry E. Hale (Editor) Danielle Lussier (Associate Editor) Assistant Professor Research Associate Department of Political Science Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Russian & East European Institute John F. Kennedy School of Government Indiana University Harvard University [email protected] [email protected]

Special thanks to Isabelle Kaplan for translation and layout and to Mara Zepeda for logistical support. The editor is also grateful to the Carnegie Moscow Center for Visiting Scholar status during the campaign season and to various Carnegie colleagues for feedback.

SOURCES FOR IMAGES USED IN RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Vol.3, No.2: All accessed on November 2-3, 2003: airplane (vesti.ru), Sechin (president.kremlin.ru), Zyuganov (gazeta.ru), Khodorkovsky (cnn.com), Mitrokhin (yabloko.ru), Voloshin (cnn.com), Medvedev (president.kremlin.ru), Zorkin (novaiagazeta.ru, no.14, 2003), lottery balls (edinros.ru).

CORRECTION: In Vol.3, No.1, Surkov’s first name should have been printed as Vladislav.

4

INSIDER INFORMATION: CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS BY LEADING RUSSIAN PRACTITIONERS

DUMA & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: MUTUAL IMPACT Sergei Kolmakov Vice-President of the Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarism in Russia ______

SOME KEY POINTS: the stuff of machine politics to me- has become more isolated from the * The Putin card has already been dia campaigns; political process. It has become clear played, but not well that even unequivocal support by the *Putin has become a “symbolic • A larger role for the courts in elec- President for any politician whatso- superleader,” wildly popular but toral campaigns; ever influences the public’s attitude unable to lend popularity to others • Heightened manipulability of na- towards that person only slightly. In *United Russia is vulnerable tional mass media outlets (in par- fact, the President himself has lost *The KPRF may come out the ticular electronic media), which his political agency. He has been winner, although SPS and Yabloko rules out an information war of the transformed once and for all into a are also likely to benefit from the type we saw in 1999; symbolic superleader. Yukos affair • A purging of the political arena, which has eliminated any challenge For United Russia, this means that to the president. the semantic fulcrum of its campaign I. The particulars of electoral cycles — “the party of the President” — by In Russia there is a close connection II. The presidential factor and the itself can in no way guarantee high between parliamentary and presiden- Duma elections results, and there is probably not tial elections. A sort of tradition is The “presidential factor” has al- enough time left to revamp its image. developing in which parliamentary ready been employed but not to Thus, in the pre-election fracas, elections serve as a means of letting maximum effect. With all the doubts United Russia is much more vulner- off steam and gauging society’s about United Russia’s status as the able than expected — and the “presi- moods, while the presidential elec- sole “party of the President,” the im- dential factor,” already used once, will tions are “a choice of fate.” pact on ratings and PR of the unambi- hardly be able to compensate. For example, ’s guous clarification of this status success in the 1990 elections for Rus- should have been more substantial. III. The influence of the parliamen- sia’s parliament paved the way for But the growth of United Russia’s tary elections Yeltsin’s presidential triumph a year rating did not exceed 5%, and no The opposite effect — the parlia- later. Similarly, the Communists’ vic- revolutionary changes came to light. mentary campaign’s impact on the tory in December of 1995 made their So it appears that the modest surge of presidential race — is more compli- leader, Gennady Zyuganov, into a real support United Russia managed to cated. A possible shortfall of votes for contender for the presidency. And pull off has already slackened. United Russia — “the party of the Fatherland’s loss to Unity in the 1999 President” — would somewhat Duma elections did away with the weaken the position of the President presidential aspirations of Yevgeny The President has lost his himself, though this weakening would Primakov and . political agency, having not be serious. But the current electoral cycle is A collapse of the elections them- substantially different from the previ- been transformed once selves — a scandalously low turnout ous ones: it is the first genuine and for all into a “sym- or an extremely high level of “against “Putinite” electoral cycle and it is pro- bolic superleader.” all” votes — could have a more sig- ceeding in the framework of new elec- nificant effect. In such a case, the dis- tion legislation. In his first term Putin crediting and delegitimizing of the implemented political reforms that One can hardly hold United Russia entire political system as a whole are leaving their imprint on the elec- responsible for this situation; rather, could be at stake, and even the Presi- toral campaign. All this means that there have been certain developments dent wouldn’t be able to ignore that the campaign methods themselves in the current political context that threat. Steps to restore to the citi- have changed significantly, producing United Russia is obliged to examine zenry at least a minimal level of • A contraction of public politics, as its campaign proceeds. trust and interest in politics will with political elites now preferring For one, the “presidential resource” become inevitable.

5 We should also note that under Communist lead over United Russia such things as social justice, the redis- Putin the status of the in the party-list voting will be per- tribution of wealth, and a review of has fallen to the level of a technical ceived as a failure for the President, privatization. organ. Under the popular President, particularly if the KPRF levels any All these issues were thrust into the the Duma ceased to be a “forum for criticism at Putin in the course of its public’s attention not by party cam- protest,” an arena for political bar- Duma campaign, which is not out of paigns but by the best armed struc- gaining. the question. tures of the state, most of all the Gen- Accordingly, interest in parliamen- In addition, a tie between United eral Prosecutor and the FSB. tary elections is declining, which can Russia and the KPRF in the party-list have a negative effect on voter turn- race shouldn’t be interpreted as a suc- out. And since low voter turnout is cess for the President; for the “party These forces aim for a advantageous most of all to the Com- of power,” with overwhelming supe- left-patriotic Duma with munists (who have the most disci- riority in financial and administrative the KPRF, United Russia, plined electorate), the pro-presidential resources and the open support of a parties will have to look for ways to popular president, to manage only a the LDPR, and Mother- increase voter turnout, which may put draw in a duel with a backward- land or the People’s Party, them in a contradictory situation. looking opposition isn’t too good… On the one hand, in order to con- The most interesting thing is that with no Yabloko and only tinue the course to stabilization they even a United Russia victory benefits a little SPS. have to try as much as possible to Putin little. No one anticipates a rout- lower the pitch of the pre-election ing of the Communists, and if United These forces clearly aim to produce campaign, but this leads to a lowering Russia comes out on top by a few a left-patriotic Duma comprised of the of turnout. On the other hand, in order percentage points, this won’t be any KPRF, United Russia, LDPR, and to increase turnout it is essential to feather in Putin’s cap. Next to the either Motherland or the People’s present the voters with some sort of President’s sky-high ratings, a party’s Party, with no Yabloko and only a intrigue, which, by definition, under- showing to the tune of 30% will look little SPS representation. mines an image of stability. So far very modest. The fact that out of all In the 2003 elections, the adapted, United Russia has not found a way out the parliamentary parties, Putin will educated, and most active part of Rus- of this trap. be supported in the presidential elec- sian society may decide to support the tions by United Russia and only democratic parties at the expense of United Russia leaves the President United Russia. A scandalously low turn- one-on-one with the voters. The winner of the biggest electoral out or an extremely high prize may be the KPRF, which will IV. Agendas and scenarios “against all” vote could add to its anti-regimist slogans such A radical restructuring of the ideas as the defense of democracy and have a significant effect. general political context, the rise of citizens’ rights and the deliverance of new large-scale intrigues and conflicts the country from the practice of “clan (for example, armed conflict with In its final stage, the electoral cam- shoot-outs” in the corridors of power. Ukraine over the island of Tuzla or a paign for the State Duma of the Rus- An attempt to cast the next Putin sudden resignation of the government) sian Federation is superimposed onto agenda as deliverance from the could bring major changes. the beginning of the presidential cam- “nightmare of Yeltsinism” in all its Putin’s agenda for a second term paign. Virtually all the parties that can forms will be met ambiguously by the is still not set, which introduces anxi- realistically vie for meeting the 5% Russian public. With each passing day ety and uncertainty into the Duma Duma barrier will nominate a candi- until December 7, the rupture of the campaign. In the course of the parlia- date for president. inertia and the intensification of the mentary elections, each political force Should the Duma elections liven up, political situation will steadily erode can try to sway the president towards the presidential election could proceed United Russia’s standing. Unlike an “agenda” that is in its interests, for quite dramatically. The party leaders, Putin, on whose resources it relies instance, the dispossession (dekulaki- warmed up by the Duma campaign, entirely, United Russia has not de- zation) of . could have quite a strong showing in fined its position on the main issues of The General Prosecutor’s decisive the presidential elections, too. In this November’s electoral campaign. actions with the escalation of the way, United Russia bears direct From all sides, United Russia will Yukos affair and the arrest of the oil responsibility for the presidential be the target of concentrated attacks. company’s head, from all appear- election. If it doesn’t manage to main- United will either have to ances, end the inertia of the parlia- tain the current inertia and still solve criticize the “anti-oligarch campaign” mentary elections and significantly the turnout problem, then the presi- or lead it. Keeping in mind the con- complicate things. Now the President dential elections could play out in an glomeratic nature of the party, making will have to define his agenda and entirely different key. this decision could mark the begin- team for his next term not in February In the current scheme of things, it is ning of its end as it loses ground 2004 but at the end of October and the hard to imagine a scenario in which among the prosperous strata of the beginning of November 2003. the Duma elections would help Putin population in big cities, most of all Tensions are rising in Russia over win re-election to a second term. Any Moscow and St. Petersburg. █ potentially tough questions involving

6

OCTOBER: THE PLAYERS AND THE YUKOS AFFAIR Galina Michaleva Head of the Yabloko Party’s Analytical Center ______

SOME KEY POINTS: would be the main players of this Motherland’s presence is manifest * The Yukos affair and Kremlin re- campaign. Yabloko was the first regis- only in the public appearances of its shuffling dominate the campaign tered party. leaders — Glaziev, with the idea to * SPS continues to run an anti- Of the 44 political parties and 20 redistribute so-called “natural re- Yabloko campaign, but Chubais social organizations with the legal source rents,” and Rogozin, on the could follow Khodorkovsky’s path right to run, only 23 have officially conflict between Russia and Ukraine * Yabloko has been hit hardest, with joined the campaign. Of these, 12 are over the island of Tuzla. campaign documents confiscated insignificant players, with neither fi- The election’s main players, the and most of its funding gone nancial nor administrative resources parliamentary parties, have conducted * Medvedev’s rise as Putin’s chief or even a minimally well-known active campaigns in the media and the of staff gives hope to democrats leader. Almost none of these parties is field with different levels of intensity. running a campaign with the excep- Of course, United Russia has made Events in October proceeded in the tion of “Rus,” which has hung bill- use of its preferential media treatment, expected vein of inertia until the third boards. with leaders Boris Gryzlov and Sergei week of the month, which saw the Of the remaining minor players, Shoigu always on the air. arrest of Yukos head Khodorkovsky “New Course — Automotive Russia” and the resignation of Voloshin from and “Great Russia — Eurasian Union” his post as head of the presidential are headed by relatively well-known The subject of Yabloko administration. Thus the significant leaders, Viktor Pokhmelkin and Pavel continues to be one of pressure applied to Yukos and the Borodin, respectively. The Agrarian reshuffling in the Kremlin — not Party has long been on the political SPS’s main themes, with preparation for the election — were scene. But these three players also are an intense anti-Yabloko the focal points of this month. not conducting an active campaign. campaign in the regions. As far as the campaign itself goes, Motherland, the People’s Party, the particularly important was the Consti- Speakers’ Bloc (a coalition of the tutional Court’s ruling that part of the Party of Russian Revival and the Party The party has used endorsements by election law, which broadly inter- of Life), all parties created specifically sports and cultural stars as well as its preted the definition of campaigning, for this election, have well-known leaders’ trips to the regions as a pre- was unconstitutional. Now the mass leaders and varying degrees of finan- text for coverage. As far as outright media can provide commentary on the cial and administrative resources. campaigning goes, two patterns are candidates and describe their activities However, if one is to believe the pub- clearly observable — a negative cam- without running the risk of being lic opinion polls, the parties in this paign against all parties (especially closed down by the court. Of course, group do not have a good chance of the KPRF) and the cultivation of an they can take advantage of their new getting more than 5%. image as “a party that cares about all opportunity for all of a week; Novem- Judging from the reduced activity citizens” in the style of the Commu- ber 7 marks the start of official cam- and absence of visible campaigning as nist Party of the . paigning. well as the lack of information filter- The KPRF, in addition to its tradi- ing into the press, these parties face tional methods, has gotten creative financial drought and brewing internal with hip youth activities and the Inter- Internal warring among conflicts. It seems the Kremlin has net. The basic themes of its campaign Kremlin clans has moved realized that putting financial re- have been criticism of United Russia and advocacy of social justice. On the their election projects to sources into party upstarts has little effect. On the other hand, the internal other hand, an active media campaign the back burner. warring among Kremlin clans has against the Communists was launched moved their election projects to the this month, with a whole range of spots on the main national channels Another significant event is the back burner. One exception is the People’s Party, exposing the KPRF’s ties with big election of Valentina Matvienko as business. governor of St. Petersburg, which which has a resource that is independ- ent of the presidential administration’s In October the LDPR used its main shows the might of the “administra- resource, , to tive resource” in securing election political crises — a large number of incumbents in the district Duma elec- maximum effect as the party’s leader outcomes. continued his systematic tour of the Throughout October, parties and tions. Judging from the quantity of its billboards and its presence on the air- Russian regions. He appeared across blocs collected signatures and regis- the media with statements radical in tered their lists, determining who waves, the People’s Party’s financing has not been significantly cut. both form and content that often con-

7 tradicted each other. A basic theme from the company, found themselves tends that Khodorkovsky financed ran through all of this: the need to turn on the hot seat. parties with an anti-Russian orienta- Russia into a unitary state and to re- Zyuganov expressed extreme con- tion, was also pleased by the devel- move democratic institutions. The cern, emphasizing the political nature opment; he suggested that all the oli- main slogan of the LDPR campaign is of the persecution of Khodorkovsky. garchs go to London. “We’re for the poor, we’re for the SPS and Yabloko released a joint The People’s Party, a project of the Russians” — the quintessence of Zhir- statement about the change in the po- Kremlin Siloviki, seems to have inovsky’s nationalistic declarations. litical situation, which, they contend, gained an advantage from all this. For In SPS, Chubais entered the spot- casts doubt on the stability of the con- United Russia its pro-Kremlin rival’s light, actively appearing in all media stitutional order. gain was a mere unpleasantness, with the idea that Russia should be- which it quickly got over. come some kind of “liberal empire.” For now, Yabloko is in the trickiest Meanwhile, and Irina Almost all major political situation, hit by ricochet in the Yukos Khakamada continued their trips to players had Yukos repre- affair. Computers with a large volume the regions. As far as open campaign- sentatives on their party of campaign documents were seized ing and the leaders’ public appear- in a search of the Agency of Strategic ances go, the party has held forth on lists and found themselves Communication, which had done the subjects of military reform, hous- on the hot seat. campaign and PR work not only for ing utilities, and business. Yabloko but for Yukos as well. Be- However, the subject of Yabloko sides that, the party lost virtually all continued to be one of SPS’s main Yabloko reacted by proposing an its financing. themes, sometimes with various accu- “anti-oligarch package,” which envi- The events of the last day of the sations and at other times with pro- sions laws on lobbying, transparency month suggested that SPS could also posals to merge immediately. In the in the financing of parties, the creation end up in a tight spot, with Chubais regions, the anti-Yabloko media cam- of real public television, and anti- possibly joining the list of “disgraced paign was intense. monopoly policy. Yabloko considers oligarchs.” Authorities searched the In both its media and field cam- the Yukos affair to be the conse- offices of Novosibirskenergo, 14% of paigns, Yabloko moved along two quence of those economic and politi- whose stock belongs to Russia’s elec- lines: image (Yabloko as the only cal reforms that have been conducted tricity monopoly, Unified Energy Sys- democratic party of the people) and in recent years and sees the crisis as tems, run by Chubais. Such a begin- substantive issues. The focus was on systemic in nature. At the same time, ning strongly recalls the first steps proposals from legislation packages all of its statements underscored the taken against Yukos. on poverty, corruption, housing re- excessiveness of the suppressive form, environmental protection, and measure and the opportunity to con- education. On October 21 the party duct an investigation if the accused is Yabloko is in the trickiest celebrated its 10th anniversary. released but restricted from leaving situation; computers with The events surrounding Yukos, the country pending trial. though they started to unfold back in SPS is worried about “serious a large volume of cam- the summer, took an unexpected turn. changes in the political course” and paign documents were This was true for all parties, but par- serious repercussions for business. seized and the party lost ticularly for those sponsored by Chubais quickly proposed a unifica- shareholders of the company. tion with Yabloko in order to mount a virtually all its financing. It seems no one believed the Presi- joint resistance. Nevertheless, SPS dent would take so drastic a step (one continued its “anti-Yabloko” cam- On the whole, it is becoming obvi- so fraught with economic and political paign, with the number of publications ous that, with the high cost of televi- risk) as the arrest of Khodorkovsky. against Yavlinsky and Yabloko re- sion and newspaper advertising, only maining stable. the parties who have administrative United Russia also found itself in an resources can conduct an effective Yabloko moved along two uneasy situation. Gryzlov stated that media campaign. lines: image (Yabloko is the General Prosecutor’s actions in the The situation that is shaping up now Yukos affair are in accordance with the only democratic party is favorable first and foremost to the law. But Vladimir Dubov, a co- United Russia. However, the reshuf- of the people) and sub- owner of the Menatep Group and the fling in the Kremlin is not to the ad- stance (poverty, corrup- best known (and richest) of the Yukos vantage of the Siloviki; the appoint- representatives on the party’s list, was ment of Dmitry Medvedev as head of tion, housing reform, en- forcibly removed from it. the administration and his deputies, vironmental protection, There was unabashed gloating in Igor Shuvalov and Dmitry Kozak, statements by the People’s Party. Rai- and education). give the democratic parties hope that kov said that it is necessary to stand the Kremlin’s plans for the configura- up to defend the interests of the peo- tion of the new Duma leave a place ple, society, and the president from Almost all major political players, for the democrats also. █ who had Yukos representatives on the presumptuous oligarchs. their party lists and received funding The leader of the LDPR, who con-

8

YUKOS AND THE ELECTIONS President, POLITY Foundation

SOME KEY POINTS: allowed the head of his staff to leave, thus far, now recognize that they have * Voloshin’s departure may herald the has preserved the rest of his team if something to lose. end of “managed democracy” only for the time being. Nevertheless, These sentiments are already clearly * The most likely outcome is “man- Voloshin’s departure will inevitably visible at least in Moscow and St. aged non-democracy” change the nature of the Kremlin’s Petersburg, where people regularly * The youth and middle class are relations with other political players. read the newspapers. It should also be likely to rebel against Khodorkovsky’s The Family was associated with a noted that a majority of the print me- arrest in the Duma race, to the benefit certain political course (or political dia is noticeably dramatizing all these of the democrats style), dubbed “managed democracy” events as something like a return to by sharper tongues, which is based on the Stalin era and sympathize more The Duma electoral campaign, administrative and informational with Khodorkovsky than with the barely noticeable to begin with, has domination in the elections and on General Prosecutor. now gotten completely lost in the fu- tough (but outwardly democratic) The very liberal radio station Ekho ror over of the Yukos affair. The ar- methods of marshaling support for the Moskvy posed the following question rest of the company’s head, Mikhail president in the Duma and the regions. to its audience: If the presidential Khodorkovsky, along with the freez- It is not out of the question that Vo- elections were held this Sunday, ing of its shares, has already prompted loshin’s departure will mark the be- whom would you vote for — Putin or a chorus of commentaries about the ginning of the end of “managed de- Khodorkovsky? A record number of possible consequences for Russia. mocracy,” which in theory could be listeners phoned in their answers, and On the economic front, few experts replaced either by real democracy or Khodorkovsky won by a ratio of 75 to doubt that they are very bad: the stock by “managed non-democracy.” I 25. Thus I foresee higher than usual market is already convulsing, a grow- would say the chances of the latter are voter turnout among the prosperous ing amount of capital is flowing out of higher, though I am almost certain middle class that traditionally does not the country, and Russia is becoming that Putin will try to preserve a bal- vote. This will be good news for less attractive to investors. ance of power in the Kremlin and will Yabloko, SPS, and the “against all” There are far fewer voices on the not want to rely on only one group — option on the ballot more than for the political front, where evaluations of the Siloviki — as this would alienate . the consequences boil down to predic- all the other groups and dangerously tions of whether Aleksandr Voloshin limit his power base among the elite. would resign as head of the presiden- Although the electorate’s reaction to A liberal radio station tial administration and debates over recent events hasn’t been precisely asked voters: Whom would popular support for the arrest of the gauged yet, such information will not you vote for, Putin or oligarchs. be very telling — public opinion usu- I will hazard to suggest that the po- ally doesn’t notice even serious shifts Khodorkovsky? litical ripples of all these events will of this sort. Generally speaking, in widen significantly to influence the light of the public’s aversion to big Another difficulty for the govern- upcoming elections. Keep in mind that business, one has to agree that the ment is the timing of the Yukos we are talking about the biggest scan- Yukos affair won’t do the Administra- events, which coincide with the offi- dal of Putin’s first term and possibly tion much harm. But it will still cre- cial start of campaigning in the mass the biggest political crisis of his nearly ate some problems, it would appear. media. On November 7 candidates crisis-free presidency. In the “Putin coalition” — that bloc from the registered parties will begin Voloshin’s resignation represents of voters who are ready to vote for the to appear on television screens daily, the obvious aging of the Kremlin clan President — there is one significant often live, and there may be more referred to as “the old Yeltsinites” or social stratum that does not harbor criticism of the government’s actions “the Family,” which is to the advan- prejudice against private enterprise than many in the Kremlin expected. tage of the Petersburg Siloviki. and does not support suppressive Since Yukos had supporters (and not According to the division of labor measures against it. This is the youth. always disinterested ones) in many within the Administration, elections If Putin wants to win in a single round segments of the , have been traditionally delegated to next March, he cannot allow himself this criticism will come from both the the Family, who have proven to be to lose the support of this group. right and the left. highly effective political managers. It is entirely likely that the noise In conclusion, the Yukos affair’s The resignation of Voloshin on the surrounding the Khodorkovsky affair consequences for the elections aren’t eve of elections for Duma deputies can also rouse a “sleeping dog”— the vast, but they are there, mainly in the and president obviously will not middle class of small business owners form of difficulties for the Kremlin as strengthen the Administration on the who, though not too politically active well as for Putin personally. █ electoral front, and so Putin, having

9

BATTLING FOR THE HOPES OF THE PEOPLE Viktor Peshkov Russian State Duma Deputy, Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee

SOME KEY POINTS: The public’s economic aspirations TABLE 2: * Candidates raise hopes for a better are firmly pinned to the Communist In your opinion, which party, if in life to attract voters Party of the Russian Federation, on power, could best end crime and cor- * Economy, law-and-order, interna- which 27% of the population is laying ruption? tional status are the biggest issues for its stakes (Table 1). OPINION % Russian voters At the same time, 22% of citizens 1. United Russia 14 * Many voters pin hopes to KPRF chose United Russia. A clear minor- 2. SPS 9 * United Russia also scores well ity staked itself on the remaining par- 3. Yabloko 2 * One-third of population sees no ties — 10% of the population on SPS, hope in any party only 5% on Yabloko, 3% on LDPR, 4. LDPR 7 and even less on the others. Another 5. People’s Party 2 In any election, one of the main very important finding is that 29% of 6. KPRF 22 campaign techniques is the creation of citizens have no confidence at all in 7. Others 1 any of the existing parties when it hope for the future, the raising of 8. None 27 popular expectations. Parties then use comes to the economy; they have no this as a politico-psychological spring- expectations of anyone. 9. No opinion 15 board to their own electoral work. As Another key question — Who can a rule, experienced politicians and rectify the material well-being of the Again SPS is in third place with 9% parties begin employing this strategy nation? — yielded roughly the same of popular hopes, followed by the early, well in advance of the start of results (Graph 1). Many people, a LDPR with 7%. In general, United the electoral “marathon.” Quite often, third of the population, expressed Russia, as a party of bureaucrats and such appeals to popular expectations deep disillusionment and a crisis of “new Russian” wheeler-dealers, are made throughout the campaign expectations. clearly crumbles in the arena of elec- and continue into its final moments. toral hopes when it comes to criminal TABLE 1: activity and the country’s descent into While the hopes generated by even In your opinion, which party, if in corruption. And a record 42% do not the most diverse candidates invariably power, could best improve the coun- see anyone who could rectify this have the same intention — to excite try’s economy? situation. the public — at times, the hopes them- OPINION % Finally, the foreign policy issue is selves can differ quite strongly from 1. United Russia 22 closely tied to Russia’s position in the one another. And the higher the 2. SPS 10 world and the loss of her former su- perpower status (Graph 2). Russian hopes, the deeper the divisions. Often 3. Yabloko 5 public opinion has long viewed the in the course of a campaign these 4. LDPR 3 various hopes come into serious con- country’s geopolitical “crash” as no flict. There is a single reason for such 5. People’s Party 2 less important than its economic dis- clashes: whichever political force the 6. KPRF 27 location and rampant poverty. public pins its hopes to — hopes for a 7. Others 2 Here again, the picture is more or better life, for material prosperity, for 8. None 19 less the same. The main concentra- tion of hopes (27% of all responses) solutions to life’s most pressing prob- 9. No opinion 10 lems — will increase its electoral are bound to the Communist Party. At the same time, the ruling United Rus- chances, sometimes heavily influenc- Nevertheless, the remainder say that ing the outcome of the race. At the sia is lagging perceptibly and in no they do have hope on this score. condition to overcome the distrust and end of October, the Duma campaign Twenty-four percent of the population passed into this phase of the race. irritation that the public has built up point to the KPRF and 21% to United over the many years of “reforming” We’ll examine three problems that Russia. SPS does not have a bad have long preoccupied Russians: Russia’s unchecked retreat from all showing with 9% of those polled, nor her geopolitical positions. which of the parties will be able (and does Yabloko with 5%. want) to raise the Russian economy It is symptomatic that the People’s On the issue of crime, the split be- Party is in third place as it has been from ruin and improve the material tween the Communists and the well-being of Russians; which one propagandizing itself very actively for “United Russians” is greater — 22% nearly a year already as a demonstra- will fight crime and corruption; and to 14% of expectations in favor of the which will restore Russia to its former tively patriotic force, borrowing a lot KPRF (Table 2). from the Communists’ arsenal of position of respect in the world and authority as a superpower.* So far the picture looks as follows.

10 Graph 1 Graph 2 In your opinion, which party, if in power, could In your opinion, which party, if in power, could best best raise Russians’ material standard of living to restore Russia’s status as a great and respected an acceptable level? superpower?

25 30 27

25 20 23

20 20 15

% % 15 10 11 10 7 5 5 5 3 2 2 0 0 12 3456 789 123456789

мнения мнения

(1 = United Russia, 2 = SPS, 3 = Yabloko, 4 = LDPR, 5 = People’s Party, 6 = KPRF, 7 = Other, 8 = No one; 9 = Other opinion)

ideas. Support for the electoral cam- major one. In addition, SPS is holding * This article cites data from the Cen- paign’s other participants ranges from steady in third place. And most im- ter for Research into the Political Cul- 2-5%. And once again a third looks portantly, the share of voters who tie ture of Russia (TsIPKR). The panel around without hope, not seeing any- their plans for the future to the KPRF sample is based on quotes and thing reassuring in the political party does not go beyond the bounds of the weights. 1500 respondents in 72 re- landscape. Party’s electoral base. In other words, gions of the Russian Federation were In sum, thus far the Communist it does not give the Communists any polled. The statistical margin of error Party has the advantage in the “battle significant electoral advantage in the is 3.4%).█ for hopes.” However, its lead over its current campaign. chief rival, United Russia, is not a

11