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Russianelection Watch Harvard University (Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Davis Center for Russian & Eurasian Studies) and Indiana University-Bloomington RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH Editor: Henry E. Hale Associate Editor: Danielle Lussier Vol.3, No.2, November 2003 TOP NEWS DATES TO REMEMBER • Russia’s top “oligarch” arrested, assets frozen November 7, 2003: Television campaigning begins • Putin’s chief of staff resigns, defeated by “Chekists” December 7, 2003: Duma elections • Putin taps moderate for new chief of staff March 14, 2004: Presidential election • Court strikes down key media restriction • 23 parties registered for Duma ballot SEE INSIDE • State-owned media blast Communists P.2: Theories on the Khodorkovsky arrest • Yabloko, SPS, Communists defend oligarch P.3: Websites with election information in English • Dollar millionaires on Communist party list P.5: Insider Information: Top Russian analysts from • Putin remains far ahead in presidential race different party camps interpret the campaign TRACKING THE POLLS: How the percentage intending to vote for each party has fluctuated in 2003 35 UR 30% 30 KPRF 23% 25 20 15 SPS 6% 10 LDPR 5% 5 0 Yabloko 4% Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct United Russia KPRF LDPR Yabloko SPS Polling agency VTsIOM-A polls 1600 people in 40 regions nationwide late each month and reports the percentage of adult citizens who, given a list of names, say they would cast their ballot for a party if the election were held now, counting only those who intend to vote. The latest poll was taken October 24-28, just as new of the Khodorkovsky arrest was breaking. A total of 58% said that they were likely to vote, down 5% from September. Margin of error is 3.4%. On the Campaign Trail on October 30, Russia’s Constitutional Court proved not to be as manageable as expected, striking down a key restric- THREE POLITICAL EARTHQUAKES tion on media campaign coverage. With the official start of Just when observers were writing off the elections as fully television campaigning fast approaching on November 7, managed and predictable, Russia struck again. On October each of these political earthquakes have helped to throw the 25, Federal Security Service election’s outcome into question. (FSB) troops stormed the plane of Mikhail Khodork- The Khodorkovsky Arrest ovsky, Russia’s richest man Khodorkovsky, head of the gigantic Yukos-Sibneft oil con- and an open financier of cern, had corporate representatives on the party lists of the opposition parties, during a Communist Party, United Russia, SPS, and Yabloko and refueling stop in Novosibirsk was reportedly the biggest financier of the latter. In spring and hauled him off to jail in Moscow. Presidential Chief of 2003, he was making no secret of his political ambitions, Staff Aleksandr Voloshin, the top manager of President letting slip to reporters that he would give up business in Vladimir Putin’s “managed democracy,” protested by 2007 and perhaps begin a political career. Having gotten his tendering his resignation the same day. To top things off, start using Communist Youth League money in mysterious ways during the Gorbachev era, he had recently sought to foster an image as an “oligarch with a heart of gold,” WHY ARREST THIS MAN? demonstratively funding various good causes and taking There is no shortage of theories pains to make his corporate dealings transparent, a nov- as to why the Kremlin clan elty for Russian business. But now Khodorkovsky stands known as the Siloviki and their accused of fraud and embezzlement during the privatiza- allies in the General Prosecu- tion period when he accrued many of his assets. Prosecu- tor’s Office decided to arrest tors added insult to injury by freezing 44% of his firm’s Khodorkovsky (left). Some are: shares, although they subsequently released a few. On • Punish him for financing opposition parties, candidates November 3, Khodorkovsky resigned as Yukos CEO. • Knock out a major rival for the 2008 presidential election • Prevent the sale of oil giant to foreigners While theories about motive are legion (see • Obtain oil giant for selves to sell to foreigners box at right), few question that the arrest • Grab power, move closer to authoritarianism was arranged by the grouping of FSB- • Shake up a political situation that favors the Family linked St. Petersburgers in the Presidential • Actually clean up Russian business, end corruption Administration known as the Siloviki or Chekists, notably Igor Sechin (left) and strength as an advocate of democracy, with party leader Viktor Ivanov. Putin left little doubt that he, too, had Grigory Yavlinsky warning of “capitalism with a Stalinist approved the move when he forcefully backed his Gen- face” and hoping that the alarmed urban intelligentsia, a eral Prosecutor, who officially ordered the arrest, in front core part of Yabloko’s electorate, would turn out for it in of television cameras the very next day. higher-than-usual numbers (on this possibility, see Nikonov on p.9). Adding to the party’s worries, how- The arrest and asset freeze set off an economic and po- ever, Russian prosecutors searched a po- litical furor. In a rare show of independence and unity, litical consulting firm that had business key big business and even Prime Minister Mikhail with both Yukos and Yabloko and hauled Kasyanov condemned the actions as economically off computers chock full of financial and harmful. Russian stocks plunged. Virtually all parties not strategic documents from Yabloko’s cam- linked to the Kremlin Siloviki found themselves in a paign. When Yabloko legislator and cam- highly awkward position and struggled to respond. Most paign coordinator Sergei Mitrokhin uncomfortable was Putin-endorsed United Russia since showed up to protest, he was detained in its pro-presidential and pro-business stances suddenly the firm’s building until the end of the day wound up at odds. Making the best of a bad situation, (at right, he peers out a company window from “captivity”). party leader Boris Gryzlov decided to try and grab the (On how this impacts Yabloko, see Michaleva on p.7.) reins of the anti-oligarch bandwagon, warning large cor- porations that no one had ever given them the right to While the Union of Right Forces (SPS) has always been privatize profits on natural resources. The party also unambiguously pro-big-business, its leadership had made a promptly purged a top Yukos shareholder (incumbent conscious decision to stress its support for Putin’s economic Duma deputy Vladimir Dubov) from its party list. policies in its 2003 campaign, a choice symbolized by the inclusion of controversial but Putin-blessed “electricity oli- For the Communist Party garch” Anatoly Chubais in the number-three slot on its (KPRF), the arrest drew party list. By rebuking Putin for sanctioning the arrest, Chu- attention to the presence on bais risked the extensive coverage he had been receiving on its list of former Yukos state-controlled television. Things could still break SPS’s board chairman Sergei Mu- way, however, if a sizeable pro-business vote abandons the ravlenko as well as three newly anti-oligarch United Russia. other “dollar millionaires.” While denying their party The only parties not facing difficulties are those most often was under any obligation to linked to the Siloviki clan in the Kremlin, notably Gennady Yukos, KPRF leaders condemned the arrest as economi- Raikov’s People’s Party and, some would add, Vladimir cally damaging. Gennady Zyuganov (above) repeatedly Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia explained that the Communist Party was not just for the (LDPR). Neither of these parties included Yukos people on poor anymore, representing a broad social coalition that its party lists and both have loudly championed the could work with business (on KPRF aspirations and limita- Khodorkovsky arrest. Some experts now predict an LDPR tions, see Peshkov p.10). Its opponents, among them showing in the 10-percent range as it historically performs “news” editors at Russia’s state-controlled television better than polls indicate. The People’s Party, however, still networks, however, eagerly pointed out the irony. (Might shows no sign of creeping closer to the critical 5% threshold the KPRF still come out the winner? See Kolmakov on p.5.) in the party-list competition though it remains highly com- petitive in at least 30 territorial district races. The most pro-Western liberal-market parties were also embarrassed. Yabloko, long critical of “crony capital- ism” and Russian monopolism, was forced to own up to Voloshin’s Resignation its dependence on the biggest oligarch of them all. In In Russia’s “superpresidential” political system, the head of defending him, though, the party stressed its traditional the president’s staff can wield enormous power. Voloshin was one of the most powerful, personally handling eco- 2 nomic issues and overseeing the implementation of the threat of prosecution, although only for the final five “managed democracy,” the means by which the state weeks before the election. Since the restrictions favored manipulates election outcomes. As the incumbents whose activities as politicians could be covered head of the “Family” grouping of legally under the law, the court ruling works in favor of the Kremlinites linked to the Yeltsin re- opposition. gime, Voloshin (left) also managed the building of United Russia together With the ruling, Court Chair- with one of his deputies, Vladislav man Valery Zorkin (left) has Surkov. Just last month Voloshin’s cemented his reputation as one group appeared to have won a decisive victory over the of the fearless free thinkers of Siloviki, as Putin bestowed his endorsement upon United modern Russia and as a de- Russia and not any of the Siloviki-sponsored pro-Putin fender of the rule of law rather parties.
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