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Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism and the Politics

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Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism and the Politics KARL POPPER’S CRITICAL RATIONALISM AND THE POLITICS OF LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIANISM ________________________________________________________ A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy in the University of Canterbury By Oseni Taiwo Afisi Department of Philosophy and Political Science University of Canterbury 2015 _________________________________________________________ 0 Abstract Whether there are prospects for a liberal-communitarian philosophy with aims and objectives that enhance Karl Popper’s project of the open society I here argue in the affirmative. Such a philosophy promotes both self-determination by individuals and community enhancement of individual well-being. My argument for a liberal-communitarian philosophy develops out of Popper’s critical rationalism, exploiting the fact that in Popper’s philosophy, science and politics are intertwined and each is defined by both individual and social elements. In particular, Popper’s politics of liberalism are derived from the ethical and epistemological core of his critical rationalism, the latter originating in his philosophy of science, the former preceding it. Individuals become socially embedded with others as they engage in mutual criticism that is based upon a rational understanding of mutual respect, unity, and tolerance. I defend ontological claims about the social nature of the self and normative claims about the value of community which together make intelligible the idea that the self cannot exist outside of the context of community. This implies that the very consciousness of the self is constituted by interaction, interconnectedness and interrelationship with others. How well a philosophy that upholds individualism marries with the idea of the community, I show that Popper’s critical rationalism fruitfully addresses. Society must protect the individual’s capacity for rational criticism. Rational criticism is mutualistic. Critical rationalism as regards both science and politics is implicitly communitarian. Although Popper’s politics of liberalism are overtly individualistic, they also are implicitly communitarian. Popper’s ideas offer a basis for rational engagement with non-liberal ideologies that emphasise social and community togetherness. iii Abstract ................................................................................................................................... iii Preface ....................................................................................................................................... v Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. ix Chapter One: Discovering Karl Popper: A Biographical Context ................................... 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 Popper, philosopher of science............................................................................................... 3 On the Heroic Age of Science ................................................................................................ 5 Some influences of Kant ...................................................................................................... 11 Interaction with Wittgenstein ............................................................................................... 13 Influence of the Vienna Circle ............................................................................................. 17 On the demarcation of science ............................................................................................. 23 Summary: the context of Popper as philosopher of science................................................. 24 Popper: Personal, Social and Political influences ................................................................ 25 Chapter Two: Popper’s Critical Rationalism: Fallibilism and Inter-Subjective Criticism........................................................................................................................ 31 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 31 On Critical Rationalism ........................................................................................................ 36 Induction, Corroboration, and Severe Testing of Hypotheses ............................................. 39 Wesley Salmon’s Concept of Ampliative Inference ............................................................ 46 Clark Glymour’s Idea of Bootstrap ...................................................................................... 48 David Miller’s Restatement and Defence of Critical Rationalism ....................................... 49 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 52 Chapter Three: Unity of Method combined with Methodological Pluralism .................. 54 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 54 Methodological Pluralism in Science ................................................................................... 57 Epistemic pluralism: The rationality question ..................................................................... 61 Popper’s Pluralistic Methodology ........................................................................................ 68 Value of cross-cultural polylogue: The argument ................................................................ 70 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 70 Chapter Four: Popper on Science of Society — A Refutation of Historicism ................................................................................... 73 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 73 Essential Themes of Popper’s Philosophy of Politics .......................................................... 77 Popper’s Refutation of Historicism ...................................................................................... 81 Popper’s Critique of Holism ................................................................................................ 86 Popper on Piecemeal Social Engineering............................................................................. 88 Popper on Freedom and Negative Utilitarianism ................................................................. 90 “New” Historicism ............................................................................................................... 91 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 91 Chapter Five: Popper on Marx and the Development of Popper’s Liberalism ............... 93 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 93 Marx on Scientific Socialism ............................................................................................... 95 Popper on Scientific Marxism .............................................................................................. 97 iv Should Marxism be defended against Popper’s Critique? ................................................. 100 Development of Popper’s liberalism .................................................................................. 103 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 107 Chapter Six: Popper’s Social Engineering: Piecemeal or ‘Many-Pieces-at-once’? ....... 109 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 109 Understanding Piecemeal Engineering .............................................................................. 111 Is Engineering Science Piecemeal? .................................................................................... 113 Piecemeal Engineering as a Scientific Approach ............................................................... 115 Piecemeal Social Engineering as a Method of Changing Society ..................................... 119 Towards Social Engineering: Piecemeal or ‘Many-Pieces-at-once’? ................................ 122 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 127 Chapter Seven: On Karl Popper’s Concept of Freedom: Individual and Social Aspects ........................................................................................................................ 130 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 130 Popper’s Apparent Individualism ...................................................................................... 134 Popper on Freedom ............................................................................................................ 137 Argument from Tolerance .................................................................................................. 141 The case for social
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