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Voter Landscape Analysis for Final Five Summary 1 Voter Landscape Analysis for Final Five Summary 1 Key Insights 1 National Landscape 1 State Picture 2 Most Supportive Voters 2 Least Supportive or Unsure Voters 2 Further Questions to Explore 2 Research References 3 State-by-State Support in Detail 5 Best Positioned States for Ballot Initiatives 6 Opportunities to Expand Support 6 Winning Coalitions 7 Alaska 8 Massachusetts 8 Florida 9 New York City 9 Maine 10 Further Questions to Explore 11 In which States and Precincts is Reform most Likely to be Successful? 11 Do Voters Understand the Problem (and Solution)? 11 Idiosyncrasies of Previous Victories 12 1 Conclusion 12 Summary Over the last 15 months, as part of Citizen’s broader research on democracy reform, we have conducted survey research measuring public support for electoral reforms--both nationally and in key states. Specifically, we measured support for non-partisan primaries, ranked choice voting, a package of reforms proposed (and subsequently adopted) in Alaska similar to the “Final Five” reforms. Our goal has been to identify and understand on a detailed level the base of support for these reforms and to help our partners understand what states have the best pre-conditions for successful campaigns. In this memo, we examine the electorate’s views on democracy reform proponents as well as its broader beliefs and opinions, as one important factor of many in the due diligence process. In addition to survey responses, we conduct a precinct-level electoral analysis to identify possible key constituencies who supported and opposed the measures in states such as Alaska and Florida. Our intent with this memo and subsequent research on these policies is to provide the electoral reform community with a shared understanding of current baseline support for reforms, so that our community of partners can focus energy on making progress rather than debating known facts. Key Insights National Landscape ● At the national level, as recently as January 13-15, 2021, we see that while most respondents favor some kind of electoral reform, they are not yet broadly supportive of reforms with the exception of those that limit the role of money in politics; redistricting reform follows as a close second. ● While non-partisan primaries consistently receive support from a majority of voters, ranked choice voting is less popular, particularly as a standalone policy, and with strong Republican partisans and very conservative voters. ● Opinion may still be unconsolidated for RCV with one-third of voters across multiple surveys saying they’re neutral or need to learn more; however, partners looking to pursue RCV as a standalone or even to use the “RCV” terminology should be aware that very conservative and solid Republican voters are consistently more opposed than supportive. State-Level Picture ● Support is very high for s ome kind of reform to make representatives more accountable to their constituencies. The top ten jurisdictions in which voters have expressed strong interest in reform are Minnesota, DC, Rhode Island, Alaska, Washington, Hawaii, Oregon, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. 2 ● Support for open primaries was highest in Alaska (+38%), followed by Hawaii (+37%), Oregon (+34%), Washington (+32%), and Minnesota (+31%). These states were also among the highest in general support for electoral reform as well. ● Based on aggregate survey data in states that allow ballot initiatives, states that present the best opportunities for reform at present include Washington, Oregon, Utah, Montana, Ohio, and Arizona. Most Supportive Voters ● Generalizing support measures across several surveys, the following types of voters are the friendliest to electoral reforms, and specifically FFV’s reforms as a package: ○ Democrats, and self-described non-partisans; ○ Young voters, particularly those under 34; ○ Hispanic voters; and ○ Individuals at either end of the income spectrum: (those making less than $25,000 or over $150,000 per year). Least Supportive or Unsure Voters ● In general, the demographic groups that are relatively more likely to indicate opposition to electoral reforms include: ○ Older voters, particularly those over the age of 65; ○ Less educated voters, particularly those with only a high school education or less; and ○ Self-identified Republicans. ● Those who are unsure are very evenly spread across demographic categories and generally represent about 30% of respondents, regardless of income, race, education, or age. Further Questions to Explore In the future, we recommend more 1) state specific polling, including message and language testing, to understand how best to position measures for success in states with unique voter bases, 2) r esearch to probe how much voters agree with reformers’ diagnoses of the problems ailing our elections (let alone the proposed solutions), and 3 ) building national or state-specific model(s) based on what we know about the winning voter base for these reforms to understand early which voters warrant the most attention. Understanding the base motivations and be liefs of undecideds and Neutral voters should be a high priority since those are the groups that will be decisive for campaign victories. In general, knowing which voters or “audiences” will be most important for victory early on 3 should drive campaign strategy including decisions about staffing, surrogates, messaging and budget e.g. which Republicans are persuadable. Research References Linked here please find the survey toplines for the following : ● January 2021 “State of Play” Survey ● November 2020 Alaska After Action Survey ● September 2020 National Vote by Mail Survey: Reform Results Citizen Survey Results On two separate occasions in the last six months, Citizen Data has fielded large nationwide surveys that collected public opinion on the need for non-partisan, open primaries, for ranked choice voting elections, as well as the need for some kind of electoral reform generally. The first survey, fielded between September 3 - 8, 2020, collected 30,000 responses from a representative sample of likely voters from all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The second survey was fielded between January 13 - 15, 2021, and collected 3,000 responses from a nationally representative sample of 2020 voters. In general, the surveys found that while the vast majority of respondents are strongly in favor of some kind of reform, they are less supportive at this stage of the specific reforms proposed in the surveys. Non-partisan primaries received majority support in both surveys, while ranked choice voting was substantially less popular among those who expressed an opinion. However, in the case of both reforms, about a third of respondents were undecided or said they may need to learn more. Support for non-partisan primaries and ranked choice voting broke down similarly across both surveys and between proposed types of reform. In general, Biden supporters and self-identified Democrats were more likely to support these reforms than Republicans and Trump supporters. Levels of support were largely stable across racial and education strata, though the most educated were more likely to support an increase of accountability among their representatives and least likely to support ranked choice voting in particular. One notable trend we observed is that younger voters are more likely to support reforms (including ranked choice voting and open primaries specifically), while older voters are comparatively unlikely to do so. Additionally, Citizen broke down support for each measure by whether the respondents voted in 2018 (a midterm year) or 2016 (a presidential election year). In general, the support among voters who voted in the most recent presidential election for which we have complete data is indistinguishable from those who voted in the most recent midterm 4 year. Though we would need to conduct further research to offer better support for the claim, it appears that a campaign for these measures would probably fare about the same regardless of whether they were offered in 2022 or 2024. The results of those breakdowns are presented in the table below. 2016 2018 2016 2018 2016 2018 Electorate Electorate Electorate Electorate Electorate Electorate Need for Reform* Open Primary Reform* RCV Reform* Support 65% 65% 43% 43% 18% 19% Not Sure 27% 27% 29% 29% 29% 29% Oppose 8% 8% 28% 28% 52% 52% *differences between each category a re statistically indistinguishable As seen in these tables, support does not vary between those voters who participated in the 2016 election compared to those who participated in the 2018 election. The two types of voters both report an indistinguishably high need for reform, a moderate openness to open primary reform and demonstrate an equivalently low baseline support for ranked choice voting. The data summarized in the tables above offer some preliminary evidence that a ballot initiative in a midterm year would have about the same chance of success compared to one in a presidential election year. State-by-State Support in Detail The survey results visualized state by state in the series of tables below demonstrate the support and opposition percentage breakdowns from the national 30,000 response survey from September of 2020. The following analysis is an initial surface-level look into state-by-state support for each of these measures. Bear in mind that the data here was part, but not the main focus of, a longer survey focused on early in-person and vote by mail turnout in the 2020 election. Further, this survey did not test messaging or seek to educate survey respondents on the details of any of the measures. In combination, these three factors indicate that the results presented below should be viewed as preliminary findings that warrant further research and investigation. Further, as we’ll discuss in the section below, there remains a significant portion of the population that remains “unsure” or expresses a desire to learn more about the measures 5 before taking a stance for or against them. Nonetheless, some interesting trends are revealed when looking at baseline support across the top states.
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